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Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century: Strategic Appraisal 1997

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from civilian control is what Upton insisted the military must always have, and the author believes that Upton's influence has been so lasting that there has been a certain illusory quality to the apparently harmonious civil-military relations of the post-World War II era.

It is indicative of Hoffman's strong historical sense that he links Upton's ideas, which emphasized military administration, with strategy and policy—a connection not often recognized. That same historical sense, combined with strategic insight, warns Hoffman that the supposedly new American way of war is too much like the old way, in its unsubtle vision of the application of force, to be likely to serve much better than the old version did after 1945. We cannot separate military force from civilian policy. We will rarely be able to apply overwhelming force in politically ambiguous scenarios. The invocation of military force almost never comes without risks, including those of prolonged involvement, unanticipated political consequences, and casualties. This cautionary book is indispensable reading for military professionals.

Russell F. Weigley
Temple University

Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and David A. Ochmanek, eds. *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century: Strategic Appraisal 1997*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997. 377pp. \$20

This is the second in what is intended to be an annual series of books published by RAND to provide current insights into broad national security and defense planning issues. It was intentionally produced prior to the final reports of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP), with the hope of informing participants in those efforts.

The volume is a collection of nine essays covering a broad range of defense planning issues, with a primary focus on the development of force planning criteria in the post-Cold War era. The common point of departure for the

collection is that the United States has entered a very challenging period that should call into question existing assumptions about long-term U.S. military sufficiency. At the very least, the declining force structure driven by defense budget reductions is seen to be incompatible with a U.S. national security strategy of forward engagement and global leadership. At worst, the book foresees the possible emergence of new types of threats that will require military capabilities very different from those that are now planned for the coming decades.

Both the QDR and NDP efforts sought to address these challenges, but the fact that their respective final reports came to diametrically opposed conclusions clearly indicates a continuing lack of consensus among senior

defense leaders regarding future military challenges for the United States, and regarding the adequacy of programmed forces to meet those challenges. *Strategic Appraisal 1997* will be valuable to the extent that it assists in choosing between the findings of the QDR and NDP, or makes a convincing case for some alternative course of action.

The editors profess that the book seeks not to provide answers but rather to identify the primary factors behind the critical issues in order to help decision makers make informed choices. For those who are not current on the parameters of the debate, the volume provides a useful overview of some of the most relevant issues. However, whether the essays serve to further the analytical basis for the promotion of major change to the current force structure remains to be seen. In general, this appraisal takes a "top down" approach to future military force structure planning; in other words, it moves from specific requirements to generic capabilities as the best way to position the military optimally for a broad range of potential missions. Despite its apparent logic, the difficulty with this approach is that major changes within military forces have in the past been driven not by top-down requirements for broad capabilities but by a common recognition of very narrowly defined and urgent operational problems—problems so compelling as to overcome the multitude of military, industrial, and congressional interests in maintaining the status quo. The argument in this book notwithstanding, the prospect of severe constraints on defense spending does not appear to be compelling

enough to foster significant force changes; indeed, the inability to articulate a severe military problem seems to be the primary cause of the present defense drawdown. Thus one must be skeptical that the top-down strategy recommended in this collection will have any more impact on the defense planning process than has the similarly argued report of the NDP.

This is not to say that there are no indications of emergent problems serious enough to stimulate major force restructuring. The increasing risk to U.S. forward-presence and power-projection forces posed by the proliferation of precision guided weapons and associated targeting capabilities would seem to be such an issue. This issue of regional "denial" is raised in the book, but it tends to be lost in a vast catalog of challenges ranging across the broad spectrum of warfare—some very difficult, and some relatively trivial. Moreover, proposed responses to some of the most vexing military problems—such as reliance on dubious active missile-defense concepts to counter growing arsenals of theater ballistic missiles—seem remarkably linear for a volume that seeks to promote innovation and change. Indeed a questionable theme throughout the book is that future problems will require expensive new technologies to counter, and thus substantial dollar investments for U.S. force modernization that must be squeezed out of a static defense budget. However, before accepting this conclusion, one would like a convincing argument that new and innovative ways of operating with our existing systems will be unable to reduce

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adequately the growing risks from these emerging threats.

In sum, *Strategic Appraisal 1997* offers a good benchmark of the state of the art of current thinking with regard to long-range defense issues in an era of great change. It is also indicative of how much intellectual work lies ahead if a compelling case is to be made for a radical restructuring of the U.S. military.

JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS
Captain, U.S. Navy

Ricks, Thomas E. *Making the Corps*.
New York: Scribner's, 1997. 320pp.
\$24

"Now! Sit up straight. Get your eyes on me. Now, get off my bus. Let's go. Now. Move. Move! Move!"

Welcome to Marine Corps basic training.

In *Making the Corps*, Thomas E. Ricks follows the members of Platoon 3086 through the most difficult eleven weeks of their lives. Ricks, a Pentagon correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal*, is there when the recruits get off the bus and when, nearly three months later, most of them graduate. He then follows them onto active duty, showing how their personalities and performance in training relate to their ultimate success or failure in the Corps. Looking through the eyes of not only the recruits but also the drill instructors, the reader will watch as the culture of the Marine Corps is developed within its newest members.

Ricks accompanies the recruits through all phases of their training at Parris Island. In doing so he explains

the Marine Corps culture and shows how new Marines are brought into the fold. The reader comes away understanding that unlike that of the other services, the Marine Corps' basic training is primarily designed to indoctrinate new members into the culture rather than to develop military skills; combat readiness comes later. Parris Island (and its counterpart in San Diego) forces new recruits into the Marine mold, through drill, weapons training, physical conditioning, and constant reminders of their heritage and obligations.

The discussion of Marine culture is a timely one. The other services seem to be going through an identity crisis as the world changes around them, and they appear to be looking to Marine culture as a template. The Army has created contingency forces, smaller and lighter than its main formations, ready to deploy rapidly, much as the Marines have always done. The Air Force is developing an Air and Space Basic Course for new officers that seeks to develop a common identity among lieutenants from all the commissioning sources, similar to what The Basic School does for new Marine officers. In *Making the Corps*, leaders from the other services are given the opportunity to see what it takes to create an organization like the Marine Corps; they may decide the cost of doing it right is too high. After all, if their soldiers, sailors, and airmen wanted to be Marines, they likely would have joined the Marine Corps in the first place.

What is it that makes a Marine? Ricks does not pull any punches. He portrays the recruits and their indoctrination honestly, using their words and