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## In Quest of National Security

George Galdorisi

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Boris Savinkov, in 1943. Still, this rather ponderous tome will in future stand as the criterion by which other such labors are measured.

CURTIS C. DAVIS  
Lieutenant Commander  
U.S. Navy (Retired)  
Baltimore, Maryland

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Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *In Quest of National Security*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. 252pp. \$34.95

*In Quest of National Security* is a compact collection containing twenty-five of Brzezinski's speeches and articles that span the Carter and Reagan presidencies. Grouped into seven categories, the essays cover an extremely broad range of issues, yet they remain focused and coherent due to Brzezinski's unique ability to distill complex issues into essays that the layman can understand, but provocative enough to interest the national security professional.

The author's credentials make this a distinctly authoritative work. Dr. Brzezinski's broad experience in the National Security arena as director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976, National Security Advisor to President Carter from 1977-1981, and counselor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies have provided him with a unique perspective on world events during the eventful decade he reports on.

Typical of works of this genre, Dr. Brzezinski moves from the

general (discussions of U.S. strategy and policy formulation) to the specific (policy statements of the Carter administration, arms control negotiations, trilateral relations and regional conflicts, particularly in the Mideast and Central America) to the prescriptive (his views on the future of U.S.-Soviet Relations). Beginning with the premise that the world is now experiencing four interrelated revolutions: political, social, economic and military, he links this concept with his general, specific and prescriptive discussions.

Brzezinski's discussion of U.S. strategy is taken primarily from the ideas presented in his 1986 book *Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest*. He offers a concise charting of a geostrategy for the United States, which includes predictions on trends in U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. He continues with an examination of the organization and operation of the U.S. national security policy-making apparatus and its ability to seize opportunities presented by the aforementioned "Four Revolutions." Brzezinski then deals with specific issues that are extremely broad in scope and offers some accepted and some novel ideas. Writing on defense and arms control, Dr. Brzezinski presents familiar, but strong arguments *against* banning nuclear weapons. In his section on trilateral relations he presents a proposal for a "tank-free zone" in Central Europe. Throughout, Dr. Brzezinski keeps

these seemingly diverse threads tied to his central "revolutions" theme. His treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations, his most prescriptive chapter, begins with what is now recognized as his classic description of the Soviet Union, "A world power of a new type." First presented in 1983, this short but thorough analysis presents the Soviet Union as a one-dimensional military power. If you read only one chapter, read this one! The author offers some very explicit advice to U.S. policymakers.

Perhaps the book's only weakness lies in the three chapters on the "Carter legacy," based on speeches delivered by Dr. Brzezinski in the early years of the Carter administration. They provide an excellent synopsis of that administration's policy goals and objectives, including human rights. These essays would fit well into almost any other book or anthology, but they have less contemporary relevancy in this future-oriented book. Simply stated, the book moves too fast to pause for decade-old pronouncements.

Finally, the book is almost eerily prophetic. Brzezinski's concepts on arms control and trilateral relations are the same that underlie the INF and CAFE negotiations on security in Central Europe. Additionally, his statement that "the central substance of the political revolution is the attraction of democratic ideals" rings particularly true in light of the demonstrations last year in the People's Republic of China. National security leaders who choose not to be

exposed to Dr. Brzezinski's ideas do so at great peril.

GEORGE GALDORISI  
Commander, U.S. Navy  
USS *New Orleans*

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Bok, Sissela. *A Strategy for Peace*. New York: Random House, 1989. 202pp. \$17.95

Admiral Stephen B. Luce, as recorded in *Sailors and Scholars*, founded the Naval War College on the idea that it would be "a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war." *A Strategy for Peace* contributes to Luce's purpose by providing a blueprint for the study of war prevention.

Dr. Bok's major premise is that Clausewitz' position on the impossibility of "absolute war" is now irrelevant with the advent of nuclear weapons. While readers may or may not agree with the points she makes, most will enjoy the thoroughness and clarity with which she makes them.

Strategic study needs to shift its perspective from war *per se* to the threat of war according to Bok. The threat now is caused by excessive partisanship and irrational distrust.

Two questions arise with respect to the legacy of Clausewitz. "Would his realism, in our present crisis, require a strategy better suited to avoiding, rather than conducting war? And would it not then call for rethinking his claim that morality