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## COMMUNISM IN CHINA

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
2 October 1959 by  
*Professor David Nelson Rowe*

The topic for today, "Communism in China," I have chosen to treat not historically but analytically. In other words, rather than attempting to summarize the whole history of the development of Chinese Communism, I will try to bring out only some of the main features of its development, to understand which it is necessary for us to get down to basic fundamentals and often to think in genetic terms.

First, I want to talk about the basic character of Chinese Communism. Here you will understand that I will make use of the material that has been published over the past 25 years, a period during which our understanding and knowledge of Chinese Communism have advanced greatly. I think it is saying a very great deal, even though it sounds as though we were speaking in minimum terms, to say that we have begun really to learn something about Chinese Communism.

Now, to start out on the basic character of Chinese Communism, I will make a flat statement here which I hope you will take in the way that I make it, namely, that it is not something I am going to leave dangling in the air, but that I will try to show the truth of it as we go on. That statement is that Chinese Communism is an orthodox development of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. Here are some relevant quotations from leading Chinese Communists on this subject.

In 1949, in a book entitled *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and formerly Chairman of the so-called Chinese People's Republic, spoke as follows: "The Chinese found the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism which holds good everywhere, and the face of China was changed." To bring this more up to date, and radically

shift the emphasis, in January 1957, then Premier Chou En-lai spoke as follows: "All of us Communists consider it a matter of pride for us to be as true to Marxism-Leninism as was Stalin himself." This takes Stalin's so-called Marxism as the standard.

Now, some people may say that these are matters of lip service. I do not believe this is true. It seems to me that the more we examine the real nature and content of Chinese Communism the more we find that Chinese Communists are sincerely devoted to Marxism as interpreted, and changed, by Lenin and Stalin. There have been some interpretations of these doctrines by Mao Tse-tung, but most of these so-called interpretations are not essentially new; they do not really depart from the main core and the main trend of orthodox Marxism as revised by Russian interpreters, namely, Lenin and Stalin.

Much has been made of the supposed Chinese, and particularly so-called Maoist modifications of orthodox Marxism, but these are at best highly dubious. At worst, those who call attention to the so-called Maoist modifications are making propagandistic efforts to establish the ideological "autonomy" of Chinese Communism in relation to the USSR.

Why should there be a propaganda of ideological autonomy of the Chinese Communists vis-à-vis the Soviet Union?

I believe this is because of the vain hope of many people who wishfully think that it may be possible at some time to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union — between Communist China and Soviet Russia. I do not believe this process of wedge-driving has the slightest chance of success in the future which we can consider from a responsible policy-making point of view.

Actually, the Chinese Communist do not wish to be autonomous in regard to the Soviet Union; and, to bring it down to earth, they cannot possibly afford to be autonomous from the Soviet Union. They cannot trade even any partial dependence upon the West for a reduction in their dependence upon the Soviet Union.

Now, I will develop these matters later in this lecture. We can make up our minds as we go along in this discussion just how

much real autonomy there is in the relations of China to the Soviet Union and how much is likely to be developed in the future.

The important modifications of Marxism did not begin in Communist China. Those modifications of Marxism which were important in the Chinese Communist revolution were initiated by Lenin and Stalin. This is why it is so important to note that Mao Tse-tung and all the chief Communist theorizers in China keep constantly advocating not merely primitive Marxism, but primitive Marxism as amended by Lenin and Stalin.

Here is how some of the features of primitive Marxism were modified by Lenin and Stalin, such modifications having a primary importance to the history of the Chinese Communist revolution.

Lenin, for instance, spoke of the place of the peasantry in the Communist revolution as over against Marx's emphasis upon the proletariat, that is, the urban laboring class. Mao Tse-tung did not originate the notion that the peasantry should form an important component element in the Communist revolution; that was Lenin's contribution, as early as 1905.

Lenin also advocated substituting a conspiratorial revolution carried on by professional revolutionaries, usually middle class intellectuals, in place of the orthodox Marxist revolution conceived as strict class warfare between the working industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie or the property-owning classes.

The conspiratorial elitism of Lenin also has had an important part in the Chinese Communist revolution. This idea was taken over by Mao Tse-tung as part of a normal Communist ideological inheritance.

Marx's idea, for instance, that the emancipation of the working class, that is, the urban proletariat, is to be the task of the working class itself, was long heralded by Lenin, but was effectively abandoned by the Russian revolutionaries of 1917, headed by Lenin. The Russian revolution itself was far from being a mere matter of an urban industrial proletariat revolting against a bourgeoisie of property owners. In fact, the entire Russian socio-economic environment — an environment of agrarian feudalism, for example, some-

thing which has not existed in China for 2,000 years — would have made it impossible to succeed in a revolution on that kind of basis. So here was the modification along that line. This is not by any means an invention of Mao Tse-tung; in Communist China it is nothing but a take-over from Russian Communism. Similarly, Stalin's great emphasis on the force of arms in a successful revolutionary struggle was originated long before the takeover of this idea by the Communist Party in China.

Later in the lecture I will call further attention to how the Chinese Communists made use of these and other ideas of orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. But first I want to discuss the chief *tactics* of the Chinese Communists in gaining power in China, because here we may secure further insights into the nature of Chinese Communism and how it has developed in China.

A primary tactic of the Chinese Communists in gaining power was to establish the leadership of a military and intellectual elite over the proletariat and the Communist Party. This military and intellectual elite was distinctively middle-class in its social origins. It was not a peasant-derived elite. None of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in the early days had ever lived on a farm as adults or cultivated the soil themselves. Neither were any of these leaders people who had worked in factories — the proletariat of the classic Marxist definition. They were primarily middle-class intellectuals. This was in accordance with the Chinese tradition under which for thousands of years the educated small minority of the country was the center of political activity. Accordingly, all those who aimed at power tried to become members of the educated minority.

When we realize that in traditional China not more than ten per cent of the population could be considered literate, not to say highly educated, we can see that Chinese politics has for many, many centuries been in the hands of a very small elite. This elite has never been agrarian in the sense of being professional farmers and who tilled the soil by their own hands. Many of them came from peasant families; but in order to become educated they had to become divorced from the countryside at an early age. This was

because Chinese education, difficult and formidable as it was, began in early childhood when the differentiation between the laborer and the scholar had to take place; it was not a matter of educating adults and securing leadership therefrom.

This concentrated small leadership that the Chinese Communist elite embodies is thus traditional in China; and there has been, indeed in modern times, no governmental system, whether it be Communist, Nationalist, revolutionary, or anything else, which has been based upon anything other than a small minority elite. The Communist elite worked up an alliance with the peasants and that is the second tactical feature.

This revolution was not a peasant revolution in a sense of being led by the peasantry. It was not a matter of violence coming up from the peasantry; it was a matter of a great deal of peasant discontent, which indeed is built into the Chinese countryside, has been built in for many generations, and probably will continue as built into the Chinese countryside even under the Chinese Communists, as I am going to develop a little bit later. So there was an alliance of this elite with the peasants.

Third: This Communist revolution so manned, so commanded, and so operated, was allied with non-Communists. This is the so-called "united front" tactic. This is not at all exclusively a Chinese matter and, in fact, the original pre-1927 united front tactics of the Chinese Communists were adopted at the behest of Stalin. And after 1927 their similar tactics were in strict coordination with a similar and simultaneous policy of the Soviet Union before, and during, World War II.

It was in the course of World War II that the united front policy, that is, of taking into an alliance with the Communists all elements which would cooperate with the Communists in any way, was greatly developed and put into effect in Communist China. This is the third general tactic of the Chinese Communist revolution.

The fourth general tactic is reliance upon armed revolution, with resulting initial emphasis upon highly developed irregular or

guerrilla warfare. This was the consistent means of war of the Chinese Communists until massive armed supply came from the USSR to the Chinese Communists and, combined with training by the Russians, gave the Chinese Communists their first formally organized and supplied field armies of a regular type after 1945.

The fifth general tactic was the division of the revolution into two stages, the first stage being a so-called "democratic" revolution, which would include all the bourgeois parties under the Chinese Communists, it was hoped; and this did develop in the course of time. The second stage was to be the so-called "socialist" (that is, Communist) revolution, which was to be final.

The two-stage revolution was more a propaganda device than a real thing, because the Chinese Communists, in fact, did actually control in both stages, so that the device was largely an effort on their part to bring other elements into camp.

Now, having considered here briefly the tactics and the basic features, I wish to turn again to the Communist elite, about which I have already spoken somewhat.

What is the real nature of the Chinese Communist elite?

Here I wish to repeat and magnify some of the previous remarks. This is a vitally important subject because of the controlling character of this elite, its utter and complete domination not only of the government, but of the whole country. It is important because Chinese Communism has been controlled by this elite. It is not a matter of Chinese Communism or some doctrine controlling this elite so that it would act on behalf of other groups.

First, the Chinese Communist Party was never a peasant party, as I have already indicated. It was a peripatetic group. They had to travel around the countryside. This cut them off from any particular part of the Chinese countryside; and it meant that no native local peasant leader could possibly maintain his leadership over discontented peasants in his area and utilize and exploit this as a basis for gaining control over the country at large.

Why did these people have to travel about so much?

It is because they were chased about. They were driven out of the cities where they first tried to work and were pursued from place to place. In 1936 they finally wound up in northwest China, where by December of that year their supporting armed forces were reduced to the last 20,000 or 30,000 total effectives. At this point the Chinese Communist elite and its remaining armed force were threatened with complete destruction by the armies of the National Government; and if it had not been for the intervention of the Japanese in North China in 1937 they doubtless would have been exterminated, and subsequent Chinese history would have been different.

These members of the Chinese Communist elite — not a peasant group, not a solid group identified with any particular part of the country — did not want at any time to be consistently or solely identified with any particular part of the population. They avoided identification with the proletariat because, certainly in the early stages of the revolution, the proletariat in China was powerless. They did not wish any firm identification, of course, with the landlords. Sometimes they sought it but most of the time not. They refused to be solidly tied to any one of the different elements of the peasantry. Their policy was to be flexible, and to have complete maneuverability from time to time between and among these different elements of the population.

In fact, the real interests of the Chinese peasantry, the single most numerous class of the population, were not the interests of the Chinese Communist elite. Why? Simply because the Chinese peasant was wholly dedicated to very, very un-Communist, un-Marxist ideas.

What was the Chinese peasant interested in? He was interested in owning land for himself.

For 2,000 years the Chinese peasant has had a tradition of private individual property rights in land. And what he has always wanted is more of the same. At times he feels he does not have a fair share, At those times he gets difficult and trouble arises; but he has never departed from his original devotion to the notion

of owning private property in land. This is utterly and completely incompatible with orthodox Marxism, or even with Marxism as modified by Lenin and Stalin, and the Communist elite of China could not, therefore, trust the peasant as a reliable agency for bringing about the Communist or so-called "socialist" revolution.

In 1928 the Chinese Communists were a great deal less experienced than they were to be in later years. In 1928, in South China, where they controlled a limited area, they tried to put into effect some of their orthodox Marxist ideas. They put in a decree for the nationalization of land. Lenin's ideas along this line had previously been rejected by the Russian peasantry. And the Chinese peasants objected so strongly to land nationalization that the Communists had to make a tactical retreat. They shifted then to taking into their hands all land owned by landlords, but this again was not what the peasants wanted.

The peasants would have been glad to help the Communists or any other group in killing the landlords, but, when they had the landlords safely buried underground, they wanted to take the land and own it themselves. So there was no use, as the Communists soon found out, in talking about the Communists taking the landlords' land and "nationalizing" that. No; this they had to retreat from, too.

Finally, in 1937 they shifted to reducing all rents. Well, this was fine from the point of view of the peasants — lowering all rents and taxes.

In 1942, they had gone so far as to announce that they were not attacking "the enlightened gentry (for 'gentry' you can read 'landlords') who supported democratic reforms." What did they mean by democratic reforms? They meant the reduction of rent and the limited redistribution of land. They said they would guarantee rent and interest rates on loans to peasants after they were reduced and brought down to a reasonable level.

In 1947, however, they veered again to the left on their land policy because by this time they were so close to getting power that they did not have to worry about the support of the peasantry.

As soon as they realized they didn't have to worry about peasant support, they embarked upon a policy which they have consistently followed ever since, namely, a policy of *deprivation* of the peasantry.

Now, the Chinese Communists do not practice the systematic deprivation of the peasantry just because they enjoy it. They do not practice it merely for purely doctrinal reasons, although they are Marxists. They practice the deprivation of the peasantry because 80 per cent of the people in China make their living directly from the land. This means that here, in peasant production of agricultural goods, lies the chief productivity of the country.

When we remember how absolutely rudimentary the industrial and technological development of China has been we can see that if the Chinese Communists want to go anywhere in economics they have to go from where they are — that is, they have to start saving from the sources of income that are available.

It is all very well to say that the peasant should be allowed to keep enough so that he can have a minimal standard of living; but this is incompatible with the Communist schedule for savings. The Chinese Communists are devoted to saving so as to bring on industrialization as rapidly as they can. They are going to get the money from where it is, and thus any industry they construct will be built upon the backs of the Chinese peasantry. Therefore, they search most assiduously for ways to extract more from the peasantry, painlessly if possible, but, if impossible, painfully. That is the basic capital accumulation problem in Communist China, and it was the basic capital accumulation problem of Japan in the early days of its modernization. When we study Japanese history after the restoration in the middle of the 19th century we find much the same thing was done there, namely, that modernization in Japan was constructed upon the backs of a long-suffering and highly-disciplined peasantry. But even there peasant deprivation was not pushed by any means as far as it is being pushed in China today.

Thus the Chinese Communists today are trying to discipline very rigidly a great mass of perhaps 500 million peasants who, unaccustomed to such rigid regimentation, are thoroughly opposed

to it, and see clearly where such totalitarianism is going to lead them. This has been the history of peasants in their relation to all strong governments in China over the last two thousand and more years. There is every reason to think that the Chinese peasants are today highly conscious of this basic problem, which every day the Communist government bears in upon them more clearly, more obviously, and more evidently than it has ever been borne in upon them in the past.

The question here for Communism was stated in its most clear-cut form by no one else than Lenin, years ago. In his emphasis upon the elitism of Communism, and the separation of the elite from the masses, Lenin showed his realization of the fact that the peasantry is an utterly undependable component of Communist revolution. Of course, Stalin found that out, too. He found that he had to liquidate eight million kulaks because they would not do what he wanted them to do. But Lenin had pointed out the problem long before. He said that the only question is *which* of the *urban classes* will lead the villages.

Now, for the Chinese Communists the working proletariat could not lead the villages, because the working proletariat to all intents and purposes hardly existed; China did not have much industry. And at the outset this proletariat was so small, weak, and scattered that Chiang-Kai-shek and the Nationalists, in the years after 1927, simply hounded out of existence their Communist organizations in the cities. The Communist organizations of the urban proletariat were far too vulnerable to police control. Therefore, no Communist urban proletariat could lead the villages in the truly Leninist sense; it had to be this disconnected group of Communist intellectuals, this elite, which in China applied the Leninist doctrine about the leading of the villages in the Communist revolution. If you wish to substitute a more realistic word, take out the word "lead" here and put in "dominate," "control," or "rule." That is what it really came down to.

In fact, however, the non-proletarian Chinese Communist elite enjoyed at least one great advantage from the weakness of

the urban proletariat and the fact that they could not survive in the cities. They were driven out into the country; and they were kept there from 1937 to 1947 by the Japanese war and the civil war that followed it.

During this time this elite very skillfully and cleverly exploited the fact of their presence in the countryside, to confuse people into thinking that they were an agrarian group. They were not; they were not agrarian in origin; they were not agrarian in character. But they used the fact that they lived a life of wandering through the country to establish a false image of themselves. This was of immense propaganda value outside China. Inside China it did not mean too much. But in the West this propaganda had an immense value.

People in the United States began to think of the Chinese Communist elite as grass-roots agrarians. Nothing could have been more fantastically untrue. Nevertheless, this doctrine was assiduously cultivated and spread throughout the Free World by all pro-Communist propagandists, both inside and outside the Communist countries.

Now, since the take-over, the Chinese Communists have consistently exploited the peasantry.

Let us now look at some specific aspects of Chinese Communism in China today. We can best do this by examining functional areas in which Chinese Communist policies can speak for themselves. In saying that we are going to look at Chinese Communism inside China I do not wish to confuse the issue. All this may be treated as *internal* to China, But only for analytical purposes. It is not internal to China from the point of view of the Communist world revolution. From that point of view there is no such thing as Communism inside one country. Stalin used this phrase merely to describe a temporary device, a temporary necessity, leading eventually, he hoped, to world Communism.

Communism inside any country is an organic part of a world-wide reality — the Communist attempt at world revolution. We can look at Communism inside China as an internal thing. It is

difficult to do this because we can hardly separate the purely internal features of Chinese Communism from its inextricable ties outside the country. But for the sake of analysis, let's at least try. For convenience we may divide this analysis under two main headings.

### *Political*

Politically, we will start at the top. At the top we have the Cult of the Leader (spelled with a capital "L"), the Leader who is omnipotent. Perhaps with the aid of the secret police, is he also nearly omniscient? In the light of abandonment of age-old religious superstitions, which has been going on apace for generations in China, this Leader takes on some of those rejected aspects of divinity. He is called by the Chinese their "Saving Star," or, if any of you understand Chinese, their *Chiu Hsing* (the Saving Star of China). He is the arbiter.

An ultimate arbiter is necessary in a country where the purge is so vitally important to stability. The purge has to supply from time to time, for theatrical and other reasons, the scapegoats to sacrifice for two purposes: (1) to keep your party and your politics purified, and (2) to see to it that the conduct of government is as accurate and efficient as possible. Somebody has to be alone in responsibility for decisions along this line; somebody has to be irreproachable and unchallengeable. Therefore, the leadership is a mystical thing. The Leader does not always have to be seen; his pronouncements take on tremendous importance. The Chinese Communists are trying to re-establish the age-old Chinese political tradition of absolute despotic power, something that, whereas it was a supposed attribute of the Chinese emperors, was never really held by very many of them.

This Leader is at the top of a party. This is the largest Communist Party in the world. It has approximately twelve million members. These Communists are scattered all over the country. They are not identical with the government but they control it. The reason for this is that it would be very inconvenient for the party to have to bear on its shoulders the burden of all the errors

of governing officials. But the party does control all government because party members hold all the critically important posts.

This party is *controlled*. It is controlled from the inside; it is controlled by many well-known and obvious devices. Among these are mutual spying, control committees, reprimand, expulsion, purges, criticism and self-criticism, and constant schooling of party members in the orthodox doctrines of Communism.

The many, many types of evils which are constantly being discovered by these processes of spying, criticism, and self-criticism include just about everything imaginable. This results in numerous campaigns for what is known as "party rectification."

Now, to go from the party directly to the government, the government is supposedly described by a constitution. This constitution demonstrates the truth which we sometimes lose sight of, which is that it is perfectly possible to have a constitution without having constitutional government. We Americans often tend, I think, to confuse the two.

This constitution, so-called, of Communist China *does not* establish a government which is subject to any kind of popular or legal control. The interests of the individuals in the country are all secondary to and inseparable from the interests of the state. Thus, there is no rule of law in our sense of the word. In fact, the constitution and the laws in Communist China are treated very much as they are in Communist Russia; that is, they can be amended out of existence by actions which are unconstitutional but which are perfectly possible because the elite decrees them.

One has always to stop and ask: "Why then do these Communist countries pay so much attention to laws and constitutions?" Not purely for formal and theatrical purposes, not at all, but because any going concern has to have in it certain elements of stability and continuity. No government can exist solely on a basis of the whims of an absolute ruler who may change his mind overnight about everything. This would lead only to the most intense disorder and chaos.

The Chinese Communists are trying to bring a communist-type order out of chaos, and therefore they cannot dispense with laws and constitutions. The constitutional dilemma of the Communist states is simply that they have to try to reconcile two utterly incompatible elements. One is an absolutist elite, and the other is a legal, statutory, stabilized situation. But I would make it as a general statement that none of us would recognize any state of law in Communist China. Certainly we would not recognize the so-called judicial processes, as they are in China, as resembling anything that we understand the term to mean.

The judicial process in China is at its best nothing but political pageantry, and at its worst is an absolutely and completely arbitrary process. Trials are conducted on a basis that you and I would find utterly incomprehensible. Actually, the trial is nothing but a forum; the judge is nothing but a presider; and the verdicts are always political. Most of the so-called "trials" are mere theatrical demonstrations, often with masses of people yelling and shouting about what is supposed to be happening. It is a commonplace that people are punished for crimes without being convicted of them by any judicial process whatever.

Now, this government is generally described as a government of democratic centralism — the Chinese term it the People's Democratic Dictatorship.

How can you have a democratic dictatorship?

It is called a democratic dictatorship because, first, it is a dictatorship as everybody knows, and, second, because the Communist elite professes to think, and tries to persuade the people to believe, that it is for the ultimate welfare of "the people." This is the sole extent of its being democratic.

In addition, of course, the word "democratic" has many values associated with it outside China. It is used in Communist states largely for its value in external propaganda, so that even the Communists' own internal description of their government is related to external things. This shows how absolutely impossible it is to separate internal from external factors so far as Chinese

Communism is concerned. In Communist China security becomes a central concern of the government. The people, in fact, are all incorporated into security committees. These committees exist in every factory, in every enterprise, in every school, in every street in the towns, and in every village in the country; everyone is a member of one or more of these security committees.

The security committees are characterized by what is known as collective responsibility; that is, the members of the committees are responsible for each other's actions. If any one member breaks the rules, all other members of the group are responsible for what he does, and may be punished for it. Therefore, they certainly have to go about to find who violated the rules, in order to expiate their own crimes, since the crime of any one person in a group is the crime of all.

One of the most grievous features of the security organizations is the organized denunciation of relatives. This is a highly formalized matter and it is usually a case of the young denouncing the old. This is because the young can be influenced more successfully along these lines. The older people cannot quite forget their old practices of family loyalty, which the Chinese Communists are doing their best to uproot.

All this security business and, in fact, the whole political and social order of China under the Communists is upheld by a system of penology that is characterized by concentration camps for the double purpose of punishment, and of organization and supply of masses of labor. All this is based upon and maintained by propaganda, and the propaganda is completely a state monopoly.

The state monopolizes all media and all channels of communication. It does not only monopolize them in a positive way; it also exerts an all-pervading censorship of all communications which by any chance can be exempt from the area of total state control. Propaganda is carried on also by vast organized movements. You have doubtless heard of a number of these.

The combination of police terror and propaganda is uniquely characteristic of totalitarian Communism, and China is no exception.

In general, this points up a chief feature of Communism as a political system. That is, that Communist politics is war, war to the death with the opposition. There should be no confusion here: the total destruction of the opposition (and *we* are that opposition) is the fixed objective of Communism. In this way, inside any Communist country, no opposition can be tolerated. The slightest sign of it brings to bear persuasion, but persuasion backed at every point by the ultimate sanction of physical terrorization. To those who are, or seem, unpersuaded, terror is indiscriminately applied. This is as true in Communist China as it is in the Soviet Union. We should keep this in mind, and never allow ourselves to be deluded by lying efforts to deceive us, no matter how thickly coated with an overlay of diplomatic practice. For example, if Mr. Khrushchev's trip to this country left him in any doubt that we understand that he is out to destroy us, then it did us much more harm than good.

### *Economic*

Now, it is impossible to understand the internal nature of Chinese Communism as a system without some consideration of it in the economic field. I am not going to talk much about economic potentialities, or about developments in purely economic terms. But, it seems to me, I do have to mention some of those things for their political implications.

I have already mentioned the great political meaning — as far as the relations between the Chinese Communist elite and the peasantry are concerned — the great political impacts of China's poverty. I wonder whether you can quite realize or understand that poverty.

Chinese poverty is often talked about but it is hard to understand unless you have been there and have actually seen it. This poverty is a multiple thing. It is a poverty in resources. China is particularly poor in resources per capita. That is, what they do have has to suffice for a huge population. It is also a poor country from the point of view of average personal income. It is probably the poorest large country in the world; it is far behind India, for

example. It is one of the most poverty-stricken countries in the world from the point of view of capital production. It is backward not only in production, but in technology.

Then there is the population, which has to be considered not only in its quantitative features but in its qualitative features as well. And here, for better or for worse, we must conclude that the Chinese population is for the most part qualitatively poor. This is not an adverse reflection upon the character of these people, their industriousness, their hard work, their frugality. These are all well-known Chinese characteristics. But it is true from a biological, physiological point of view.

The life span is short. The people are afflicted constantly with endemic diseases, which not only kill millions of people in epidemics, but also lower the health and productivity of hundreds of millions of people all the time, year by year. These include tuberculosis, malaria, internal parasites, and things of that kind, which almost anyone who ever goes to China finds rife in the countryside and all about him in the cities. These are not quick killers; they are afflictions which cut down the efficiency of the individual in a drastic way, so that many of the 600 million are only half alive most of the time. This is something which is hard for any of us to believe unless, as I say again, we have been there and have seen it with our own eyes.

What we have here is a vicious circle which seems almost unbreakable: mass ignorance and poor health mean low productivity; low productivity means low margins of economic income over the needs for subsistence. As a result, there are inadequate surpluses from which to extract those substantial sums of money which are needed for social improvement. But until you get social improvement you cannot begin to alter the basic environmental factors that hinder social improvement. This is a vicious circle, one of many constantly discovered in China. There is always present this baffling and puzzling problem: "Where do we begin, where do we start?"

The easiest place to start in China, as it was in Japan in the early days of its modernization, is by taking capital out of the

blood of the peasantry. This means mass deprivation, and this means solutions to such problems as agrarian production, which are dictated not on a purely economic basis, but by political and power demands that take the solution clear out of the field of economics. For example, the real meaning of the Commune system in Communist China today is political, not economic. It is aimed at the total breakup of the farm family and the destruction of the individualism and independence that are normal to it.

Now, in the brief space available I cannot even start to give you a general analysis of the economic problems of China, but I do want to try to give you an approach to thinking about these problems. Some economists will tell you it is perfectly possible for the gross income in a country like China to go up a certain per cent per year. But we must ask them how they estimate the net annual increase in the Chinese population. If they are honest they will tell you they cannot be certain about it. Nobody knows the answers. But the gross population problem is clearly visible: very high birth rates, and death rates which are almost equally high. But one of the first things necessary in order to increase production is to improve the health of the workers. This means that fewer people die; the death rate goes down; the population goes up. You are defeating yourself; aren't you? You are creating a fresh problem, namely somewhere between 12 and 18 million new people per year. They all have to eat. Where do the agricultural surpluses go then? What happens to savings?

Under orthodox, primitive Marxist doctrine, labor is the only source of wealth. Now, we are not dealing with orthodox primitive Marxism in any country today — we must remember this — certainly not in Communist Russia or in any satellite country. The Chinese Communists have long recovered from the notion that uninhibited increase of the population will add to the net income through adding more hands to work. You run out of space; you run out of land; you run out of the stuff to do with. At the same time, the Chinese Communists are trying to adhere to Marxist dogmas on population.

These are some of the great challenging dilemmas of China. No administration in China, no matter whether it aims at a complete development of democracy or at a complete totalitarianism — no administration in China in modern times can possibly face these problems and solve them, without introducing elements of total control into the environment. People say: "Well, that means then that the Chinese Communists are no worse, perhaps better, perhaps more rigidly efficient, than any other administration."

At this point we are forced to revert to a real and legitimate interest of our own. Our real interest is not in the character of Chinese government. For my part I would say, for example, that apart from our moral repugnance for it, we really are not very much concerned with the internal character of Russian Communist government. If the Russians want to suffer with it, let them have it. But we do have a legitimate concern with the attitude of specific countries toward us and their declared intentions toward us.

Here the Chinese Communists leave us in absolutely no doubt. Let us repeat again the statement of Chou En-lai: "All of us Communists consider it a matter of pride to be as true to Marxism-Leninism as was Stalin himself." We know that this ideology has as its central aim the takeover of the world by International Communism. This is orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

Stalin is even more strongly and widely approved in China today than in the Soviet Union. This is seen in Chinese Communist anti-Titoism, and its support of the USSR's aggressive foreign policy in every aspect, as in the case of Hungary. This helps us answer the question as to what the aim of the regime in Communist China is toward us. The answer intimately affects, and indeed determines, the internal character and nature of Chinese Communism. It is that Communist China completely supports the Communist world revolution. We cannot understand so-called Chinese Communism unless we know that and understand it fully. This means that Communist China has declared herself to be our mortal enemy.

Now, in view of this, there are only two possible and obviously opposing attitudes which we could take. One is an attitude of opposition, that is, that we do our best to harm Communist China.

The other is that we try to wean it away from its support of Communist world revolution and make it more friendly to us. I submit (and I cannot, of course, enter into that exhaustively here) that the weaning-away tactic will never work in the case of Communist China. Therefore, in view of their openly declared destructive aims toward us, the only strategy we can adopt is to try to harm them as much as we possibly can. In the economic sphere this means, for instance, that we must not attempt in any way to help Chinese Communism by lifting any of its burdens off its back, by trading with it, or by supplying it with capital or loans.

The solution of the tremendous internal problems in Communist China is merely the first and vital concern of the Chinese Communists in their efforts to *promulgate World Communism in general*. Therefore, we must not help them; we must not trade with them; we must not lend them funds. All these things are being discussed nowadays; and it is said that we must recognize them and not keep them in isolation lest they are driven closer into the arms of the Soviet Union. In complete opposition to this idea, I will urge as strongly as I can that we should try to drive these two countries closer and closer into each other's arms. To change the figure of speech, we should do everything possible to put the Chinese Communists and their massive problems firmly upon the back of Russian Communism. This burden will continue to grow in size, to grow in intensity, and to distress the USSR for a long time to come if we have the will, the foresight, and the devotion, the dedication to this policy that I believe we should have.

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

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### *Schools:*

Princeton University, A.B. degree.

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### *Career Highlights:*

1935-37 General Education Board Fellow in Humanities, Harvard University.

1938- Rockefeller Foundation Fellow, College of Chinese Studies, Peking.

1938-43 Lecturer, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, also taught Chinese language and Social and Political Institutions of Eastern Asia.

1941-42 Special Assistant to Director, Branch of Research and Analysis, Office of Strategic Services, and Special Assistant to Ambassador, American Embassy at Chungking.

1943-51 Research Associate, Institute of International Studies, Department of Foreign Area Studies, Yale University.

1943-45 Member, War and Peace Studies Project, Council of foreign Relations.

1945-46 Director, Staff Officers School for Asiatic Studies, Yale University.

1947-48 Director, Undergraduate and Graduate Studies, Yale University.

1949-51 Director of Graduate Studies on East Asia, Yale University.

1954-56 Representative, The Asia Foundation in the Republic of China (Taiwan); Visiting Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University; Vice Chairman of Taiwan Committee at China Institute in America.