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Description

Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq examines how the U.S. Marine Corps was able to learn from and adapt to conditions on the ground in Anbar province from 2006–2008 and develop a three-dimensional strategy that resulted in stability. Dr. Richard Shultz views this success through the lens of organizational theory, arguing that the Marine Corps’ organizational culture underscores learning and embeds lessons from its history into the Corps memory.

Publication Date

11-2012

Keywords

ADAPTATION, *IRAQI WAR, *LESSONS LEARNED, *ORGANIZATION THEORY, CASE STUDIES, COUNTERINSURGENCY, COUNTERTERRORISM, LEARNING, MARINE CORPS, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, MILITARY TRAINING, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

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