

2018

# August 2018 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop Summary Report

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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
*Est. 1884*  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND



# Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop

August 16–17, 2018

## Workshop Summary Report



# August 2018 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop – Summary Report

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On August 16-17, 2018, over one hundred participants – including humanitarian practitioners, academicians, and military leaders – gathered at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island to explore current and future challenges to humanitarian civil-military coordination in crises, including natural disasters, complex emergencies, and routine military security cooperation activities.

This was the third in a planned series of civilian and military humanitarian-focused events, designed to help the international humanitarian community, academia, and international militaries collaboratively develop robust research, professional education, training, and development agendas. Each of these entities plays a vital role in helping to improve humanitarian civil-military coordination and engagement.

As a follow-on to the two previous workshops, this event aimed to improve humanitarian responses by meeting the following four objectives:

1. Enhancing the response capacity of UN OCHA, USAID OFDA, humanitarian NGOs, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international militaries, and other key organizations through supporting a Community of Practice in civilian-military issues and promoting information sharing that can inform policies and processes during humanitarian crises.
2. Expanding and strengthening a network of practitioners, academicians, and leaders who routinely work civilian-military engagement in the humanitarian space.
3. Highlighting key opportunities for professional education, training, and development for key decision makers to identify the best practices associated with overcoming cultural, policy, technical, and legal challenges for coordination and information sharing.
4. Developing a comprehensive research agenda focused on civilian-military coordination considering international approaches to effecting solutions.

Attendees benefitted greatly from presentations and discussions by experts who explored the current and future state of humanitarian civil-military coordination. High profile speakers included: Paul Spiegel, MD – Johns Hopkins University; Paul Wise, MD – Stanford University; Gregory Gottlieb, JD – Tufts University; and Mr. John Spencer, MA – U.S. Military Academy.

Participants had thoughtful and constructive discussions over the course of the two days, with over two-thirds of the workshop time devoted to small group breakout sessions.


Seven working groups examined key areas of civilian-military engagement in the humanitarian sector:

- Civil-Military Coordination in Humanitarian Response
- Urbanization
- Information Communications & Remote Sensing Technologies
- International Humanitarian Law & Attacks on Aid Workers
- Pandemics
- Corruption in Humanitarian Response
- Climate Change & Sea Level Rise

At this year's event, for the first time a series of "Cross-Cutting Thematic Sessions" were held in the areas of Humanitarian Response in Conflict, Mass Migration, the Military's Role in Disaster Preparedness, and Humanitarian Notification Systems for Deconfliction (HNS4D).

Each working group approached their area from a slightly different perspective and developed the following summary papers to continue to encourage thinking, inspire an ongoing exchange of ideas, and ultimately help drive research, education, simulation, and other innovative efforts that can improve humanitarian civil-military coordination and engagement in the future.

We would like to thank everyone who took part in this workshop including key sponsors from UN OCHA, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, and the Naval War College EMC Informationist Chair – for their willingness to explore key issues that are so important to humanity – and for their passion and commitment to help people across the globe who find themselves in harm's way. Our sincere hope is that this event will continue as a vibrant and expanding discussion that can better help to advance trust and confidence with key actors in the humanitarian ecosystem, so we can all work more effectively together to help vulnerable people around the world.



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DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this summary of proceedings are those of the workshop participants and editors, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

# Civil-Military Coordination in Humanitarian Response

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## Summary of Outputs

The Civil-Military Coordination in Humanitarian Response working group (WG) focused on discussing the current issues, challenges, opportunities that exist to help improve coordination between humanitarian NGOs, IGOs, and military actors in natural disasters and complex emergencies. This is the third meeting of this working group since the first workshop in 2016. A highly experienced from a variety humanitarian and military backgrounds enriched the discussion. After an introduction of participants and their experience in humanitarian interventions, the discussion centered primarily on the lack and difficulties of civil-military coordination in conflict zones, influenced by the Mosul case study which was presented to kick off the workshop.

During the first day, the WG concentrated on the following challenges:

- Access and obstacles in conflict zones
- Civil-Military training
- Development of guidelines
- Academic research

During the second day, the WG focused on:

- Pragmatic versus principled NGO approaches
- Determining possible research topics on Civil-Military coordination

## Day One

Initial topics of discussion were:

- How can the multitude of actors in this space be influenced?
- How can we develop sound practices and standards?
- As standards are difficult to implement, perhaps the focus should be on developing operational techniques.
- Civil-Military coordination needs to be studied in both academic and operational settings.
- Current evidence is largely anecdotal and needs to be empirically tested.
- Potential areas of research.

## Discussion highlights:

### **Access and Obstacles in Conflict Zones**

Attempting to understand why coordination in conflict zones is more challenging was a major point of discussion. Several reoccurring themes were present. Most NGOs felt that access was more difficult to gain in conflict zones. In addition, it was noted that any access that was gained can easily be lost, while some actors may expect reciprocity for allowing access. Some NGO participants expressed frustration about how one NGOs access can jeopardize another, or if one NGO “cuts a deal” to gain access, that “deal” would be expected out of all subsequent NGOs. Some participants mentioned that the lack of NGO coordination in gaining access can potentially hinder greater cooperation. Military participants were sympathetic to these concerns – and there was a rich discussion on instances where NGO access can undercut military objectives and introduce additional tensions into an already fragile environment. Many participants expressed a desire for greater information sharing. Participants agreed that recent improvements in sharing of information can further improve humanitarian de-confliction by decreasing military strikes on humanitarian facilities and operations in some conflict zones.

### *Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop*

An openness to more information sharing was agreed upon in the abstract, but both NGOs and military actors were concerned with how their information can potentially be used to undercut their goals.

Participants agreed that appropriate sharing has been done successfully but creating a universal standard that can be replicated is challenging.

The issues of access and information underscored a crucial observation – that both civilian and military leaders felt either of these areas can be exploited to stymie their objectives. Military leaders were concerned that information and access can legitimize the enemy, increase their strength, or lengthen the conflict – thus costing more lives on all sides. Likewise, humanitarian leaders were concerned that information can be exploited to target them, and access could be used as leverage in future negotiations. It was generally agreed upon that civilian and military leaders are continuously discouraged from sharing access and information. Until incentives can be better aligned, this problem can be dealt with only on a case by case basis.

#### **Civil-Military Training, Development of Guidelines, and Academic Research**

The WG agreed that training between civilian and military groups could be increased to help improve coordination in current and future crises. Military members expressed a frustration that there is a small participation of NGOs in humanitarian crisis training, and if so, is typically only in natural disaster exercises. NGO representatives mentioned that such training could strain budgets and resources, and undercut their neutrality and independence. Also, neither group appeared to have a sense of how conflict training should best be conducted. Regardless of the hurdles, all shared a desire to improve in this area.

Both sides agreed that guidelines or standards could be better designed to aid future humanitarian civil-military coordination. However, it was stated that such guidelines already exist and have recently been improved. Nevertheless, they usually are not committed too and sometimes are ineffective. A barrier in developing better guidelines is that many non-western states and non-state actors do not adhere to current international laws, norms, and standards. All participants viewed this as an ongoing issue, but with no clear path for resolution. Training was viewed as a potential avenue to close this perceived western and non-western divide, but that may not provide enough to truly effect change. Education at the mid-level manager level could make a big difference in the NGO world, because in many instances those managers are making the decisions about how to engage. The WG discussed the media's role in embarrassing bad actors and also highlighting good examples, which could entice nontraditional actors into embracing western norms that are better aligned with humanitarian principles. Effective media engagement was viewed as a positive tool. However, participants understood that many organizations lack the capability to create media stories and narratives.

The scarcity of academic research in the humanitarian civil-military coordination field was a major concern. Without greater scientific research, these issues will most likely remain unresolved, and each new situation will be handled on a case by case basis rather than through uniform sets of rules and norms. Academic research arguably presents the greatest hope for understanding how civil-military coordination can be improved. The majority of WG participants highlighted budgetary restrictions that often prevent them from conducting such research, as it is typically not considered a high enough priority to warrant committing resources.

## **Day Two**

During the second day, the discussion was centered on how the humanitarian ecosystem can improve the integration of militaries into civilian-led humanitarian response efforts.

### **Pragmatic versus Principled Approaches**

Civilian and military participants alike understand that some NGOs operate under a pragmatic approach to humanitarian response, while others operate under strict principles. It appears all participants, regardless of the organizations they serve under, view this as the natural state and it isn't inherently problematic. Instead, according to their mandates, pragmatic and principled NGOs all play unique roles in the larger ecosystem. Also, many NGOs are incapable of being highly principled due to budgetary and operation limitations. One area of consternation, however, is that the different approaches to humanitarian work can undercut the work and reputation of different types of NGOs. Therefore, a more thorough consensus and understanding of principles and norms should exist within the humanitarian community, making every effort to have NGOs examine a more principled approach, when able, and at least be willing to explore dialogue within civil-military coordination frameworks while their mandates are not at risk.

### **Research topics and questions**

Understanding that research and training are key elements to improve humanitarian civil-military coordination, the WG identified the following potential research questions and topics as follows:

- What are the barriers to NGOs engaging with militaries? What are barriers to improving civil-military coordination in natural disasters and complex emergencies?
- Identify different contexts where humanitarian civil-military coordination happens or does not happen. There is tremendous value in getting interviews and stories from responders who have been in different contexts and their specific experiences.
- Why may NGOs not want to engage with military? This might be because NGOs have a fear of being perceived to collaborate with any armed actor, whether state or non-state.
- Is there a lack of technical expertise to effectively engage in humanitarian civil-military coordination? Are there problems with language? Underlying assumptions? Cultural differences between NGOs and military? Military personnel can also seem intimidating or hard to interact with. However, putting these groups together in training or workshops often goes a long way to building better understanding and willingness to coordinate.
- Humanitarian civil-military coordination as an entity is not well resourced. Can we work together more effectively to sustain joint workshops and training to keep up with the turnover on both sides? Generally speaking, there is usually discussion on an ad-hoc basis rather than a sustained commitment. Also not just civil-military, it is also civil-military-police, etc.
- Is there any historical evidence that humanitarian civil-military coordination improves a response? What is the "business case" for improving coordination?

### *Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop*

- Compare organizations that have demonstrated a willingness to engage in humanitarian civil-military coordination vs those that do not. Examine events where there has been effective coordination vs. events that have not had effective coordination. Is there a business/effectiveness case to be made for coordination? How does coordination relate to disaster readiness and response (DRR)?
- What policies and/or doctrine do NGOs have for engaging with the military? Some larger and well-established NGOs have published theirs, but there are many other NGOs that might not have a specific policy. Some larger NGOs are often willing to communicate and coordinate (mechanisms like IASC exist to help with this), and some guidance already exists, but people many not be aware of it or there is little understanding of the benefits of utilizing it.
- Can engaging with the Women Peace and Security agenda be an entry point to improve humanitarian civil-military coordination? Both the military (at least some militaries) and the NGO community may be trying to understand the role of gender and the imperative to enact national action plans informed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820.
- What is the best humanitarian civil-military coordination mechanism in very complex situations (but not conflict) settings (i.e. Cox's Bazar?). How does this change in conflicts and protracted emergencies? In most countries, the first responders are the military, so there should be a coordination mechanism with this group. There is a perception that many key leaders in the humanitarian community do not value civil-military coordination. Military to military training can support humanitarian objectives like training on IHL, etc. What resources / standards /guidelines are helpful for people engaging in humanitarian civil-military coordination (if any)? It would be good to drill down on what makes coordination effective when it is positive.
- What are the conversations that NGOs have about engaging or not engaging with militaries and armed actors? What are the decision points? Or do organizations just default to not engaging (and if so, why)?

Those interested in collaborating with the civil-military coordination working group should contact David Polatty ([david.polatty@usnwc.edu](mailto:david.polatty@usnwc.edu)). This group is open to all humanitarian and military practitioners and academics who have an interest in this sector. We very much welcome the opportunity to grow this effort!

# Urbanization

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## Summary of Outputs

The urbanization working group aims to improve the coordination between civilian and military actors in the context of specific challenges and opportunities presented by the urban environment. Urbanization is forcing a change in traditional humanitarian practice towards more locally driven operations with emerging actors playing a larger role and a shift away from in-kind aid to market interventions. Conflicts and natural disasters in urban settings present myriad challenges that necessitate innovative thinking and frameworks to facilitate effective civilian-military coordination that can better save lives and alleviate suffering. This working group will frame its efforts based on these changing dynamics in the humanitarian response space.

During the two-day workshop, our focus areas were as follows:

**Developing joint civil-military education and training for urban humanitarian response.** This was the focus of the 2017 working group with excellent progress made and will provide brief overview with a work plan for completion and tentative next steps.

**Leveraging the working group to produce a research output.** What are potential high-impact focus areas for civilian-military research as it related to urban crises? What joint tools exist through UN OCHA's CMCoord, International Committee of the Red Cross, or other actors to better coordinate between civilian and military actors? What topics deserve more focus in the humanitarian civilian-military coordination space?

Following 2017's successful course development project, our working group focused the majority of this year's meeting on planning research objectives that draw upon the combined networks and subject matter expertise of the working group participants. The intended deliverable will be continued development of an urban civilian-military course and at least one collaborative paper for academic publication based on a series of urban civilian-military case studies to be developed throughout the upcoming year.

**Day One:** The urbanization working group collaboratively developed a template for building case studies for urban civilian-military coordination.

The group began by compiling a list of potential cases for consideration and also identified a number of existing case-study-like materials that can serve as rough templates as we put together our case studies. These templates include the Harvard Business School case study model, the Overseas Development Institute model, and military after-action / "lessons learned" reports.

The structure of the case study template aims to enable a standardized framework and language to assess and judge the quality of humanitarian civilian-military coordination in urban environments. Once the template is finalized, cases will be selected based upon how well they can demonstrate various aspects of urban civilian-military coordination such as urban environmental conditions (i.e., diversity, dynamism, complexity, density) and urban actors (i.e., local governments, migrant populations, religious groups). Beyond the purposes of the working group, the case studies can also be used by students and professionals - whether in the military, academia, or the humanitarian community - to learn from and think critically about various examples of urban emergencies.

The case studies developed for this research output can also be used for further development of this working group's urban civilian-military course as well as other courses that may be developed by any and all participating organizations.

The historical or current events that may be covered in case studies are incredibly diverse, including a broad range of natural disaster events, conflicts, and public health emergencies. Some of the key potential case studies include, but are not limited to:

- 1993 Battle of Mogadishu
- 1998 Hurricane Mitch
- 2004 Southeast Asian Earthquake and Tsunami
- 2005 Pakistan Earthquake
- 2005 Hurricane Katrina
- 2010 Haiti Earthquake
- 2011 Libyan Crisis
- 2013's Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda
- 2015 Nepal Earthquake
- 2015-2016 Battle of Aleppo, Syria
- 2016-2017 Battle of Mosul
- 2017-2018 Conflict in Yemen

Multiple members of the urbanization working group also attended a cross-cutting discussion regarding the possible development of a civilian-military pandemic-urban tabletop simulation to explore the unique coordination requirements and frameworks that may be needed to respond to a public health crisis in a large urban setting. Members were able to offer their unique perspectives on scenario development and objectives, pushing for the inclusion of critical urban elements in the simulation environment and narrative.

**Day Two:** The working group continued development of the case study template and briefly discussed the prospect of beginning a project to identify "hotspot" cities based on the City Fragility Index, jointly developed by Igarapé Institute in Brazil, United Nations University, the World Economic Forum, and 100 Resilient Cities. Using this index, cities around the world can be scored from 1 to 4, ranging from least to most fragile based on 11 indicators in categories of risks: rapid and unregulated urbanization, inequality, poverty, unemployment, policing problems, lack of security, and natural hazard exposure.

The group discussed the utility of presenting the case studies in multiple ways: one case from two perspectives (civilian versus military); two cases in the same place at different points in time (e.g. pre- and post-OCHA's development in 1995); similar cases in rural versus urban settings; cases with different degrees of military involvement; and domestic versus international cases. At this point in time, it is difficult to judge which approach is the most pedagogically valuable, though the group agreed that testing the case study template by writing two or three cases will inform which approach may be the most beneficial to different audiences, as well as which parts of the template need further refinement. Ultimately, the working group may only write 2-3 case studies in-house and then provide the finalized template to the general public and/or research community so that others may continue these important efforts. Three working group members agreed to collaborate on at least one case study to advance the template development and explore the creation of a baseline case study.

Finally, due to limited time and to the group's focus on case studies, the City Fragility and Resilience Framework (CFRF) was presented briefly to group members at the end of the conference, with the implication that interested parties could pursue projects related to the framework individually and/or collaboratively. The CFRF co-developed by a working group member is an approach to systematically map key factors shaping city fragility and resilience and assess the compounding effects of these multiple factors through empirical evidence and big data. This framework allows a comprehensive diagnostic of the fragility and resilience in cities to challenges ranging from violence to climate change and extreme poverty.

At the workshop's close, the working group discussed ways to stay in touch and to organize shared documents and resources throughout the course of the next year. Working group members involved in course development will continue building the curriculum for the joint civilian-military education and training for urban response. Group members responsible for developing the case study template and writing the initial cases will report back to the larger group for feedback after the first case is written.

Going forward, the group will continue to search for interested parties and members that would be valuable additions. The urban working group will also look for areas of collaboration with other working groups such as the pandemics working group on an urban-pandemics table-top exercise to find other outputs that could be achieved.

Those interested in collaborating with the urbanization working group should contact Ronak Patel ([rbpatel@gmail.com](mailto:rbpatel@gmail.com)), David Polatty ([david.polatty@usnwc.edu](mailto:david.polatty@usnwc.edu)) and/or Lily Bui ([lilybui@mit.edu](mailto:lilybui@mit.edu)). This group is open to all humanitarian and military practitioners and academics who have an interest in urbanization. We very much welcome the opportunity to grow this effort!

# Information Communications & Remote Sensing Technologies

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The Information Communication Technology (ICT) Working Group met over 16 and 17 August 2018 to discuss challenges and dilemmas associated with the use of ICTs during humanitarian response. Participants consisted of practitioners and researchers from government, academic and humanitarian communities, many of which were new to the working group this year. Although some participants had previous military experience, conversations over the two days primarily focused on civilian-use of ICTs.

## **Day 1, Session 1: Mapping Challenges and Dilemmas of ICTs**

To facilitate discussion and active participation, working group leads organized an interactive exercise to kick off the two-day meeting. In the first part of the exercise, participants to individually brainstormed challenges and dilemmas of using ICTs in humanitarian response. Shared definitions were presented to ensure common language. A challenge was defined as an issue for which the objective is clear, but there are difficulties in reaching that objective. A dilemma was defined as a difficult choice that one has to make between two problematic options. Upon completion of brainstorming, participants were invited to place their sticky notes on the wall under the appropriate 'Challenge' or 'Dilemma' category. It became clear that participant-identified topics and themes were repeating and cross-cutting in both categories.

In the second part of the exercise, participants worked together to map out the challenges and dilemmas according to whether they are technical, professional, or normative in nature. Technical issues were defined as very specific and really about implementation: the "what" of the issue; professional issues were about procedures and approaches to implementation: the "how" of the issue; and normative issues related to the different principles and norms that the relevant parties value: the "why" of the issue.

This mapping resulted in the following categorizations of challenges and dilemmas:

1. **Technical:** Lack of standardized platforms, slow/limited bandwidth, limited access to technology by first responders, limited to no capacity to manage large volumes of data, time zone challenges to coordination, destroyed/disrupted infrastructure, multiplicity of data, connectivity between headquarters and field offices.
2. **Professional:** Lack of common data security standards and procedures, collecting/sharing data that can affect the security of beneficiaries, translating big data to multi-stakeholder audiences, protocols for data sharing between organizations, knowing what organizations have what data, collecting/sharing data that can affect the security of responders, knowing end user data requirements, how to share data in different formats, lack of interoperability of data management systems.
3. **Normative:** Incentives for data sharing, collection of data without a clear purpose, duplicate data collection by organizations on different timelines and in different formats, gap in technical understanding by leadership, no common operating picture, privacy and security, trust and relationship building, resource competition.

## **Day 1, Session 2: Participant Presentations and Discussion**

### ***Remote Data Collection for Needs Assessments***

The first presentation focused on the current state of humanitarian needs assessments, which are the basis for coordination in a response. Needs assessments have traditionally been done through face-to-face interviews, and therefore are subject to security, financial and logical constraints. There has been a move to collect data electronically, but this has created new challenges and limitations—in addition to pre-existing constraints—based on the equipment required to carry out surveys (chargers, phones, tablets, etc.). Electronic data collection has also not addressed the key methodological problems associated with in-person needs assessments. For example, efforts are often duplicated as organizations are collecting the same information from the same key informants. To address these technological and methodological issues, it is argued that humanitarian needs assessments can be done using survey platforms to conduct remote interviews with the affected populations rather than key informant interviews. Taking this a step further, coordination amongst key organizations could result in a single survey that captures baseline data required by each sector.

It was emphasized that using technology to collection information directly from affected populations means that information may be more comprehensive and inclusive as compared to the use of key informants. However, it must be accounted for that populations do not have equal access to mobile technologies so the views of those who are most vulnerable still may not be captured. Supplemental field visits may help address this issues.

It was acknowledged that the creation of a single coordinated needs assessment would require involvement and buy-in from multiple organizations, along with a focal point lead. Challenges associated with resource competition, which was discussed in the brainstorming session, and lack of leadership in the humanitarian sector were highlighted as obstacles to moving this forward.

### ***Satellite Imagery Analysis and Mapping***

The second presentation explored the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme's (UNOSAT) analysis and dissemination of high resolution satellite imagery. Imagery is typically analyzed for the rapid mapping of phenomena to provide situational awareness and to support humanitarian needs and security analysis. This information helps humanitarians plan operations, create safe corridors, monitor ceasefires, and gain insights into hard to reach areas.

Governments and private companies collect imagery and provide it to UNOSAT, which produces analysis products for organizations. This model may work for their workflow, but it was discussed that many technical challenges and obstacles immediately arise when considering how share this satellite data with other organizations. For example, do the individuals who are acquiring the data know how to use it? Can they download it? Do they know how to analyze it? Relatedly, there are significant limitations in the processing of this data due to the current state of manual analysis. Machine learning and artificial intelligence are major potential sources for technological aids.

The role of governments and private companies as key collectors and disseminators of this data raised technical, ethical and political questions. Participants discussed that governments and companies can restrict what imagery can be shared with the humanitarian community, and when. This presents challenges in how humanitarians can and should engage with entities motivated by political and profit motives, which linked in broader thematic questions of the workshop of civilian-military coordination in humanitarian response.

## **Day 2, Session 1: Cross-Cutting Thematic Discussions**

Discussions on the second day focused on identifying cross-cutting themes, gaps in knowledge and areas for future research. The following areas for further exploration were identified:

- **Data security and protection:** Participants discussed that there is a lack of knowledge in what guidelines and protocols for data security and protection already exist across organizations. High-profile initiatives, such as the ICRC data standards, were cited, but participants agreed that cross-organizational knowledge is lacking. To address this gap and promote knowledge sharing, a two-step process was suggested. First, research should identify what data security guidelines already exist, including both organizational-specific and general guidelines. Second, research should review these guidelines to identify repeating areas, which can be used to inform generalized guidance for humanitarian organizations. Doing so can help identify best practices and minimum standards.
- **Risk:** Participants discussed that there is limited knowledge of the risks that technologies create for beneficiaries and humanitarian actors. To advance this understanding, research should first focus on the understanding the risks of data sharing. This must include how risks change based on what data is shared, who this data is shared (humanitarian-humanitarian, humanitarian-military, humanitarian-private, etc.) and in what context (natural disaster, complex emergency). Once this foundation is established, research can then focus on how different technologies may exacerbate or decrease risk.
- **Humanitarian leadership:** Throughout the two days, the role of humanitarian leadership emerged as a repeating theme. Specifically, participants discussed that in the current humanitarian ecosystem there is no clear leadership on various ICT issues, ranging from the application of new technologies to establishing sector-wide data protection guidelines. Specifically, the conversation focused on what is the role of OCHA, IASC and the cluster leads in these areas. The group agreed that open discussions on who is leading in the space and who should be leading may provide clarity in establishing a broker or focal point for advancing policy development.
- **Informed solutions:** Participant discussions highlighted tensions between those who work in academia or the private sector and seek to develop technologies and those who work in the operational humanitarian space. It was emphasized that problems must inform solutions and that need must drive tool development. However, this is not always the case as those who work on both sides of these issues are not necessarily connected and informing each other. It became clear that a means of connecting these groups must exist. The ICT working group proved to be one type of forum for facilitating this exchange, but there is an opportunity for taking more deliberate focus in future ICT working group meetings of creating a space where humanitarian workers can share operational problems with to those in the tech sector – and vice versa.

Those interested in collaborating with the information communications & remote sensing technologies working group should contact David Polatty ([david.polatty@usnwc.edu](mailto:david.polatty@usnwc.edu)) and/or Brittany Card ([brittany.card@usnwc.edu](mailto:brittany.card@usnwc.edu)). This group is open to all humanitarian and military practitioners and academics who have an interest in this sector. We very much welcome the opportunity to grow this effort!

# International Humanitarian Law & Attacks on Aid Workers

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## **The Ongoing Armed Conflict in Yemen**

Like the 2017 Workshop, the discussion of humanitarian assistance and international humanitarian law quickly turned to the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Specific questions emerging from this discussion included how the repeated aerial bombardment of water supplies contributed to the cholera epidemic in Yemen. A follow-up question of state responsibility for the effects of the epidemic also received consideration, although the group concluded that the barrier for state responsibility under the Draft Articles of State Responsibility likely remained too high for the acts to qualify. Nonetheless, the group recognized the important policy considerations that this issue raised and that states and military planners should consider moving forward.

The maritime blockade imposed on Yemen, and especially the Al Hudaydah Port, by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition also raised significant legal questions, such as whether these efforts could amount to the use of starvation as a method of warfare, an act clearly prohibited by international humanitarian law that may result in a war crime. The maritime blockade also raised worrisome questions regarding secondary effects to the civilian population. Thus, while the refusal to provide civilians with adequate food, water, or medical supplies is an obvious problem, secondary effects from the denial of essential goods such as fuel imports may be just as devastating even though less obvious. Accordingly, military planners and humanitarian experts should recognize secondary effects and work to mitigate them in future operations.

### **Thematic Concerns**

Thematically, the group also noted the plight of humanitarian workers operating in armed conflict and areas of active hostilities. That humanitarian workers often bear the greatest risk in these situations was of particular concern. Moreover, the group, and especially those with situational experience, expressed concern that UN and government officials relied on humanitarian workers for information even though these groups often lacked adequate security for operating within the areas that they did. One group member remarked that the localization of conflict served as a transfer of risk, as the humanitarian workers were often most familiar with local dynamics having worked within that area the longest and thus relied upon when larger agencies and organizations arrived.

Achieving the most appropriate level of medical care was another key thematic concern. Here, group members with direct experience negotiating access with non-state armed groups to provide medical assistance helped contextualize and drive the discussion. One key point was managing the tension between threat assessment and meeting the humanitarian impulse to provide medical care. This point resonated with Paul Wise's comment during the opening panel discussion that the medical standard of care pushes medical personnel forward and closer to armed conflict. One group member suggested that a historical perspective could be useful for assessing this standard. Thus, research that examined the provision of medical care by U.S. armed forces and civilian organizations in past armed conflicts, such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War, could provide insights as to capacity and civilian care in contemporary armed conflicts, noting of course that various differences will limit the ability of direct comparison between these efforts.

In addition to the risks facing humanitarian workers and ensuring appropriate medical care, accountability emerged as an important thematic concern. This issue arose not only for states that have demonstrated their unwillingness to observe even the most rudimentary aspects of international humanitarian law, but also largely compliant and responsible actors such as the United States. For example, the role of the U.S. in providing intelligence, training, and material support to the Saudi coalition in Yemen was seen as extremely problematic, given that these acts likely contributed to excessive and avoidable civilian casualties. One group member noted that the National Defense Authorization Act provides some oversight for this issue through its reporting requirements for collateral damage and civilian casualties. Another issue of concern for accountability was the use of “by with and through” operations, as some group members felt that this tactic could amount to avoiding duties imposed by international humanitarian law.

### ***Interpreting and Applying International Humanitarian Law***

Legal discussion focused on how well-established rule of international humanitarian law apply to contemporary armed conflicts featuring asymmetrical forces engaged in non-international armed conflict. Thus, the group engaged in a spirited discussion on how to strike the balance between military necessity and humanity. For example, those with operational military experience noted the need to isolate the enemy during a siege or blockade, while others argued for prioritizing the protection of the civilian population during military operations.

Another area of legal discussion was what qualified as the arbitrarily withholding of consent for providing humanitarian assistance during armed conflict. This question has proved vexing for international organizations and legal scholars alike. Here, the group cited the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ commission of a report on the legal obligations to provide humanitarian relief during armed conflict. This commission led to the Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict, which provides the best legal guidance on what constitutes an arbitrary withholding of consent. This legal issue is of particular interest because unlike most matters relating to humanitarian assistance during armed conflict, where the law is clear and the challenge lies with observation and enforcement, there remains considerable debate, particularly among states as to what constitutes arbitrariness and thus when a state can bar humanitarian relief operations.

A final issue of legal discussion was that of reverberating effects pertaining to airstrikes within Yemen. Reverberating effects continues to receive considerable policy and scholarly attention as it becomes easier to predict not just the immediate effect of military strikes for the civilian population, but also longer term effects. With respect to international humanitarian law, a key question is how these effects apply to article 54 of Additional Protocol I, which provides for the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Here, a tension arises between military necessity and humanity, as military planners can more accurately predict reverberating effects that may violate article 54. In essence, this legal issue is a classic line-drawing problem, as military lawyers advising planners and commanders will need to provide advice as to when a reverberating effect may violate article 54 and when the effect is too far removed to alter a military operation otherwise judged to be legally compliant.

### ***Concluding Discussion***

On the second day, the group identified how problems with terminology, both within the military and across the civilian-military community, led to a lack of clarity and misunderstanding that could result in negative outcomes during humanitarian relief operations. Frontline operations and risk assessment remained a key concern, as did fulfilling legal obligations. However, as many legal obligations within this area of law are tempered by the phrase “to the extent possible,” the group recognized that the application of the obligation is often so context dependent as to make generalizations or take-away lessons extremely problematic, if not entirely non-useful.

The group returned to the crucial issue of balancing humanity with military necessity, particularly as applied to armed conflict in urban centers. Accordingly, the group identified the need to provide groups flexibility for meeting their international humanitarian law obligations and that the International Committee for the Red Cross Commentaries often employed the phrase “to the extent possible” to recognize the difficulties of applying international humanitarian law during armed conflicts. Thus, good faith and foreseeability emerged as important concepts for evaluating whether groups were complying with international humanitarian law.

### **Opportunities for Simulations**

Like 2017, the group briefly discussed opportunities to design a scenario to evaluate a complex humanitarian response effort during an armed conflict. Such a scenario could be a standalone exercise or incorporated into aspects of various war games, particularly war games that focused on urban warfare or siege-like conditions. Key aspects of these exercises would involve coordination between multiple actors with differing goals, such as various states, UN agencies, and nongovernment organizations, as well as humanitarian aid delivery and logistical challenges, such as ensuring effective humanitarian corridors or humanitarian air drops.

### **Further Research and Ongoing Discussion**

Following the 2017 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop, several group members expressed a desire to collaborate on research projects and to remain engaged in further discussion. Accordingly, the group identified four issues to focus on before the 2018 Workshop: the erosion of fundamental international humanitarian law norms, the need for better enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and punishment for those responsible for violations, the need for better international humanitarian law training, particularly training that translates across cultures, and the specific challenges that modern conflict, especially armed conflict within urban areas, creates. While the 2017 group succeeded in maintaining a dialogue regarding these and other topics, it did not collaborate on a specific research project as planned.

The 2018 group included several members from the 2017 group, as well as new members. The group again expressed a desire to formulate a research project and to begin working on this project before the 2019 workshop. Although the group did not settle upon a final project, it did identify important research questions to consider when formulating its research project:

1. For the purposes of providing humanitarian assistance, what are the obligations of states directly supporting parties engaged in armed conflict?
2. Under the Geneva Conventions, what legal obligations does a state have when supporting a party engaged in armed conflict?
3. What level of support makes a state become a party to an armed conflict?

Those interested in collaborating with the international humanitarian law & attacks on aid workers working group should contact Tony Fox ([francis.fox@usnwc.edu](mailto:francis.fox@usnwc.edu)) and/or David Polatty ([david.polatty@usnwc.edu](mailto:david.polatty@usnwc.edu)). This group is open to all humanitarian and military practitioners and academics who have an interest in this sector. We very much welcome the opportunity to grow this effort!

# Pandemics

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## Overview

This year’s Pandemic Working Group (WG) met over two days in August 2018 with the key objectives to **conceptualize and explore humanitarian civil-military coordination challenges in responding to pandemics, outbreaks, and other global health emergencies**. Participants consisted of leading practitioners and researchers from the military, government, academic and humanitarian communities. The group contributed a diverse cross-functional range of public health and civil-military expertise to the discussion.

Building off momentum from its last two sessions in 2016 at the Naval War College, and 2017 at Brown University, chairs Adam Levine (Brown) and Josiah Kaplan (Oxford) focused on revisiting and narrowing the action plan established over these two session sessions, and in developing a concrete set of actions and research priorities for moving this agenda forward.

Previous WG action plan had identified **key challenges and emerging opportunities** for improving humanitarian civ-mil pandemic coordination. In some cases, it was clear what **key recommended actions** were needed; in other cases, the group had identified the need for **new research and analysis** to fill gaps in current understanding. The objective this year was to **reduce the larger action plan to a shortlist of the most promising concrete collaborative opportunities to take forward to implementation**. The meeting was conducted under Chatham House rules. The following contains a summary of key actions, followed by key minutes from the WG sessions.

## Agreed Actions

WG members endorsed the following shortlist of actions and research priorities, derived from the longer 2017 Action Plan, briefly summarized here. **(See below for more detailed descriptions of each action)**

Priority Actions	Priority Research Topics
1. Expand Civil-Military Public Health Emergency Response Network (CMPRN).	1. Comparative analysis of ‘best-fit’ humanitarian civil-military coordination mechanisms for pandemics and other global health emergencies.
2. Catalogue military and civilian Assets/Capabilities for Pandemic Response.	2. Develop new case studies of humanitarian civil-military coordination for pandemics and other global health emergencies.
3. Map Humanitarian Civil-Military Surveillance Data and Knowledge Exchange Frameworks.	3. Improve understanding of community perceptions of civ-mil in pandemic response.
4. Leverage new and existing joint research fora.	
5. Support pandemic civ-mil simulation and gaming.	
6. Support Intra- and Inter-Organizational Pandemic/Emergency Health Capacity-Building.	

## **Day 1, Session I: Intro and Objective-Setting**

The first meeting in 2016 established conceptual boundaries and key challenges for civilian and military collaboration, then identified broad areas for developing collaborative improvements and research priorities in this space in the form of a rough action plan. The 2017 meeting further developed this action plan, and established the formation of a Civil-Military Public Health Emergency Response Network (CMPRN) to maintain engagement and dialogue between WG members and additional stakeholders in advance of the 2018 Workshop.

The chairs conducted a thorough review of key themes from the preceding 2017 WG discussion, which formed the basis for this year's activity.

These included, first, a **brief discussion of operational and strategic coordination gaps preventing effective humanitarian civ-mil coordination**, including ambiguous definitions for when the military should be involved as a responder of "last resort"; a lack of discrete representation of pandemic preparedness/response in the OCHA framework; a dearth of opportunities for joint civilian-military exercises and fora for sustained dialogue; and a critical lack of preparedness and thinking about pandemics which occur in **non-permissive environments**.

Second, the group recapped some of the **major knowledge gaps limiting our understanding of pandemic civ-mil good practice**, including missing opportunities for generating empirical data and data-sharing.

Emphasis was placed, third, on the **intersectionality of outbreaks other global megatrends**, including urbanization, climate change, and migration/displacement crises, and the important distinctions between responses in both **permissive and non-permissive environments**.

Fourth, the **critical politics of outbreak response was debated**. The absence of voices from the Global South – including perspectives of Southern ministries, militaries, and affected community members themselves – and the contested discourse surrounding global health engagement, were recognized as essential considerations for debate.

Finally, despite these challenges, the group also reaffirmed **pandemics represent a particularly constructive arena for civil-military coordination**. The severity, speed of escalation, and global nature of pandemics offer a powerful foundation of shared incentives between military actors and the international humanitarian community (IHC). Likewise, the natural pre-existing professional affinity for dialogue between uniformed and civilian medical communities suggests a constructive foundation for cross-sectoral communication. Chairs then reviewed the WG's activities over the past year, emphasizing the growing 'global conversation' around pandemic civ-mil issues since the 2017 session. Key milestones included the Oxford-RUSI Pandemic Civ-Mil working in London, October 2017, two remote meetings of the CIM-PRN discussion group, and the NGO-Civil-Military Contact Group (NMCG) conference on the theme of Pandemic Response, co-hosted by the British Red Cross and Chatham House in London, 17 July 2018. The room likewise welcomed the increase in non-US participants to this year's group, but also acknowledged the remaining need for greater geographic diversity in future.

Lastly, the Chairs laid out the 2018 Session's key objective: **to revisit and sharpen 2017's longer Action Plan into a short-list of agreed priorities for collaborative coordination and research between members**.

## **Day 1, Session II: Member Presentations**

Over a working lunch, several members next presented briefs to the WG on key initiatives and research which offer examples of progress on last year's action plan, followed by a brief round of Q&A.

- **Samuel Boland, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine:** The first speaker presented work related to civilian perceptions of military involvement in the Ebola disaster in West Africa. Targeted groups included Ebola Response workers from the UK, members of the UK government, Sierra Leone Parliamentary Chiefs and individuals from Ebola Affected households. His findings indicated that the greatest acceptance of military involvement in outbreak response was among those working closely with military members in the field. This was hypothesized to be due to the military's operational and technological strengths, and their relative prominence in countries comprising the "global south. The greatest resistance to military response was from other international responders. This resistance was hypothesized to be due to a historical divide between civilian and military collaboration, and that this attitude may vary by age group. Sierra Leoneans themselves held a neutral response to their own military's involvement, and similarly were ambivalent toward the British military as well. There were important reports of abuse by some within the SL military, including sexual and physical violence. SL respondents were broadly critical of quarantine efforts.
- **Michael de St. Aubin, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative:** The second presentation of the day looked at a novel modeling technique for outbreak visualization. Applying design principles to agent modelling of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, this model demonstrates how infection may spread within a community based on several variable factors. Progression of the outbreak overtime followed an SEIR model of susceptible, exposed, infectious, and recovered individuals. The initial model focused on Ebola in Orientale province, and there are plans to add additional complexity to the outbreak visualization, based on the current outbreak in North Kivu. This visualization has multiple potential applications for civilian military coordination as a hypothesis generator and visualization tool for outbreak modeling, including use in joint civ-mil games or simulations, or interoperability with existing risk models.
- **Silvia Colona, British Red Cross:** The last presentation was a review of the recent NGO Civil-Military Contact Group (NMCG) meeting, convened by the British Red Cross and Chatham House in London July 2018, on the theme of civ-mil coordination in pandemic response. The objective of this event was to bring together representatives of the British government, the International Red Cross, and NGOs to understand expert opinion on outbreaks and humanitarian conflict. Participants met over 4 main sessions focusing on planning for epidemics, lessons learned from recent outbreaks, preparedness, and improving civilian and military coordination. Several key takeaways were noted from the conference, including: (i) the observation that a rising trend in epidemics was linked to drivers including urbanization, encroachment on natural habitats, large migrations of people, poverty and conflict; (i) debate around the possible ethical implications of quarantine in the West African Ebola outbreak, and the need for greater evidence regarding the utility of future quarantine strategies; and (ii) the opportunity for greater joint simulation, gaming, and training between civilian and military actors around complex pandemic response scenarios.

During the question and answer session following the presentations, several important issues were raised. First, there was discussion of how existing public health institutions may be strengthened to respond to outbreaks, and how that might affect civilian military coordination. Numerous participants supported the idea but emphasized that top level commitment from the government was necessary to accomplish this. To that end, CDC and WHO have explored working together to support these goals. However, it was noted that in the absence of strong government support for controversial measures such as quarantine, the military may be required to enforce compliance.

## **Day 1, Session III: Sharpening Of 2017 Workgroup Action Plan**

The next phase of the WG was dedicated to reviewing the WG's 2017 action plan, with the objective of reducing to a more concentrated short-list to take forward. Five focus areas laid out in the OCHA Draft Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards.

### Preparedness

Important focus areas identified included improving standardization of reporting mechanisms and better mutual understanding of both civilian and military assets that might be brought to bear in an outbreak. It was concluded that there is a strong need for mapping both civilian and military capacities for preparedness, particularly regarding testing and surveillance. Ideally, this would create a more complete data sharing system in anticipation of potential outbreaks and prevent the development of numerous ad-hoc capacity analyses in response to an outbreak. It was agreed that the WG should work on developing a framework for civilian-military data sharing.

### Deployment

The group identified communication strategies as an important focus area for effective deployment during humanitarian emergencies. There was generalized concern regarding a lack of opportunities for informal communication during deployment. However, many members expressed concern regarding the perceived optics of civilian and military communication in situations where certain NGO's may be more welcome than the military. Although the HUMOCC model was presented as a possible communication solution, there was some resistance to its broad application. Emphasis was placed on the unique context in certain outbreaks, the differences between permissive and non-permissive environments, and the need to tailor response to the individual setting. There was consensus that a thorough review of civilian-military field coordination strategies would help inform future coordination efforts.

### Employment

The focus during this discussion was how the military should be interacting with communities during outbreaks. Important questions that were raised included the military's role in quarantine, both in terms of when it might be required and how it might be implemented. This was of particular interest given the lack of quantitative data to demonstrate the efficacy of quarantine. In contrast, it was suggested that community behavior change and risk reduction were in fact the difference makers in outbreak settings. Given that assumption, the question was posed as to how the military might best promote such changes, or instead might at least avoid harming NGO efforts. Furthermore, there was some discussion regarding the military's position as a resource of "last resort", and how in some circumstances they may be the only organization with the capacity to effectively respond. There was shared recognition of a large data gap on community perceptions of humanitarian response, and a commitment to further evaluation.

### Transition

The WG's discussion on transition focused on identifying best practices for effectively transferring response from foreign actors to the local Ministry of Health. The overarching challenge identified was the potential for different standards of care between foreign and local actors. In that setting, important questions were raised regarding duty to engage in capacity building in the affected community, and what kind of management infrastructure would be required to continue the response. There was a group desire for examples of both successful and unsuccessful attempts at transition of care, and the key activities that distinguished a successful transition. In summary, there was a consensus on the need for identifying the markers of a successful transition, and how they might best be accomplished.

### Monitoring and Evaluation

The challenges identified during this discussion primarily focused on facilitating exchange of knowledge, technology and other resources between humanitarian NGO's and military medical teams. Specifically, opportunities for humanitarian involvement in military research included the opening of military funding proposals to the wider humanitarian community.

### New Ideas and Refining Goals

Ideas for coordination through CMPRN included the development of horizontal information sharing, such as webinars, defining articles, and explanations of humanitarian and military acronyms that would promote communication.

## **Day 2, Session V: Action Plan Shortlist Synthesis**

The WG ended with final agreement of short-listed priorities, summarized in Table 1, below. These priorities were broadly divided between actions (including light-touch knowledge mapping exercises) and deeper-dive research questions.

### Actions

#### **1. Expand Civil-Military Public Health Emergency Response Network (CMPRN)**

The moderators set forth a challenge to the participants to help develop a collective schedule of Civ-Mil events, to create unique educational content, and to promote CMPRN as a clearinghouse of humanitarian resources. Additionally, they hoped that CMPRN also may provide an option for bringing local voices into the Civilian-Military discussion and recruiting additional participants to future meetings. It was agreed that developing the CMPRN network would be a major action point for the upcoming year. To this end, the group reaffirmed value-add of CMPRN in maintaining and building on connections established during the conference, and committed to further growing the network through quarterly calls, and extending invites to a wider range of participants. The network's knowledge sharing platform component to be further strengthened by expanding the website functionality (i.e. setting up a shared calendar, populating a resource page); developing clear educational guidance on key issues and concepts related to civ-mil and global health outbreaks; and developing a platform hosting and management plan.

#### **2. Catalogue Military and Civilian Assets/Capabilities for Pandemic Response:**

As noted last year, the group noted a continued lack of 360 degree-awareness, by both military, government, and civilian humanitarian actors, regarding the specific assets and capabilities their respective organizations are able to contribute to global health emergency responses. Members proposed a light-touch knowledge-mapping exercise to answer the following questions. First, what specific assets have organizations brought to bear for past responses? Second, how do these assets and capabilities divided between 'wholesale' and 'retail' contributions? Third, what does the record of past military contributions tell us about the future likelihood of which assets are likely to be committed?

#### **3. Map Humanitarian Civil-Military Surveillance Data and Knowledge Exchange Frameworks:**

Last year's group identified a significant coordination gap in the under-developed **sharing of infectious disease surveillance data** between both communities prior to, during, and after a global health emergency. The group also noted a similar gap in mechanisms for transferring **R&D knowledge relevant for international pandemic response** between defence and civilian humanitarian sectors – including research into the etiology of key infectious diseases, their causative agents and the symptomatology, **clinical research** into safety and efficacy of potential new vaccines and drugs; and military **product innovations** with dual-use civilian applications, such as appropriate PPE, prophylaxis: point-of-care diagnostics, and novel therapeutic agents – between both communities. In order to better address this disconnect, the group recommended a **light-touch review of surveillance data and knowledge exchange frameworks that currently exist, or could be developed, to facilitate better engagement between both communities.**

**4. Leverage New and Existing Joint Research Fora:**

Member strongly reiterated the importance of building joint research agendas between military, NGO, and academia knowledge-producers - either by tapping into existing research symposiums or developing new fora. As a first step, the group agreed to share details on upcoming scientific fora and calls for proposals that would be open to both groups. The hope is that through these kinds of meetings civilian and military scientists will better understand the state of each other's work and promote inter-group collaboration.

**5. Support Pandemic Civ-Mil Simulation and Gaming:**

The Group strongly reiterated its commitment to supporting future outbreak simulations, beginning with the potential scenario discussed during the Urban Pandemic breakout group. Members agreed to continue building on this momentum after the conference through CMPRN.

**6. Support Intra- and Inter-Organizational Pandemic/Emergency Health Capacity-Building:**

Several military members discussed the need for greater prioritization of disaster health expertise in their respective organizations, particularly DoD, as a pre-requisite for improving their ability to effectively engage with the humanitarian sector. The room discussed ways in which the WG and CMPRN network could help advocate and reinforce this message for member's own internal advocacy.

**Research Questions:**

**1. Comparative Analysis of 'Best-fit' Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Mechanisms for Pandemics and other Global Health Emergencies:**

The group agreed that an obvious starting point for research in this space was to conduct a comparative analysis of existing civil-military coordination mechanisms applied to outbreak contexts. This represents a consolidation of several inter-related research questions from last year's action plan. Such a study might comprise three stages: (i) a survey existing coordination mechanisms (i.e. HUMOCC, NERC, ad hoc mechanisms, etc); (ii) comparative case studies of military actor coordination experiences in outbreak settings (i.e. US, UK, and National Actors during the Ebola response); (iii) exploration of how each coordination mechanism might function in a permissive versus non-permissive environment.

**2. New Case Studies of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Pandemics and other Global Health Emergencies:**

The Group emphasized the general lack of empirical data and analysis on experiences of civ-mil coordination during global health emergencies. Specifically, there was a desire to learn more about the Liberian and Guinean military involvements in Ebola response, and how these efforts were received. The Chinese Government was also highly involved in the W. African Ebola response, but little is known about how they were organized or the role of their military in their Ebola treatment Units. At the same time, the group emphasized the danger of over-relying on Ebola as a single source of insight, and the need to diversify the pool of cases. Other scenarios that were also suggested included the Singaporean and other SE Asian military's response to SARS, Nigerian military involvement in polio epidemics, and Angola's response to recent outbreaks of Yellow Fever.

**3. Community Perceptions of Civ-Mil in Pandemic Response:**

There remains a major gap in understanding of **local communities and local health care providers** towards coordination between civilian and military actors during global public health emergency response. How do these perspectives vary from context to context and change with scale of the outbreak?

**Proposed Name Change to ‘Outbreaks Working Group’**

The name ‘**Outbreaks Working Group**’ was accepted as the collaborations new name going forward. It was suggested that the Outbreaks Working Group would serve as the core of a community of practitioners involved in humanitarian response to infectious disease emergencies. The group also agreed to change the full title of CMPRN from ‘Civil Military Pandemic Response Network’ to ‘Civil Military Public Health Emergency Response Network’.

Those interested in collaborating with the outbreaks working group should contact Josiah Kaplan ([josiah.kaplan@gmail.com](mailto:josiah.kaplan@gmail.com)) and/or Adam Levine ([adam\\_levine@brown.edu](mailto:adam_levine@brown.edu)). This group is open to all humanitarian and military practitioners and academics who have an interest in this sector. We very much welcome the opportunity to grow this effort!

## **Corruption in Humanitarian Response**

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### **Working Group Rationale and Focus:**

Although 2018 represents the first year the topic of corruption in humanitarian response was considered as a stand-alone working group, its DNA is found in each of the areas of focus in this year's workshop. Indeed, its un-severable DNA is so prevalent in the humanitarian space that use of Naval War College EMC Informationist Chair funding (which focus on exploring corruption through a wide range of organizational, personal, and technological perspectives) was deemed essential to understanding myriad challenges that exist in civ-mil relationships.

The working group applied five key framing questions to stimulate response holistically. These questions were as follows:

1. Corruption in Humanitarian Response at a Macro Level: What does it mean and why is it important?
2. Governmental/Organizational/Institutional Corruption in Humanitarian Response: What are some of the major historical and contemporary cases worthy of further research?
3. Personal Corruption in Humanitarian Response: What are the most common issues encountered at this micro level?
4. Theory meets practice: What key Sociological/Political/Criminological theories are pertinent to the study of corruption at macro and micro levels? What corruption control/mitigation strategies appear to be working in this arena?
5. Opportunities for Collaboration: How and where might participants in this working group identify opportunities to collaborate with the Naval War College in research and teaching given our working group's discussions and the overarching EMC Informationist Chair vision?

The working group was comprised of fourteen highly-respected academicians, business leaders, non-governmental organization (NGO) practitioners, and U.S. Government officials. Six prestigious universities were represented along with a major corporations and two NGO interests, as well as the primary U.S. Government civilian and military agencies involved in foreign humanitarian assistance.

### **General Summary of Two-Day Discussion**

From the onset of the first session and throughout the two days of robust conversation, it was evident the great challenge which manifests in discussing corruption in the humanitarian space is identifying a viable, operationalized definition of corruption. While there was general consensus that corruption involves misuse of an official position for personal or organizational gain, there was lively debate on the necessity of engaging in activities such as bribery and black market trade to gain access both geographically and politically; especially when the tyranny of both time and distance mean that failure to engage in such practices might be the difference between life and death for internally displaced persons and vulnerable populations.

A related, important element of discussion focused on the role of corruption within the humanitarian response framework. Corruption as a typology was proffered not merely as a case of civilian U.S. government and military entities stating that all corruption is inappropriate, while NGOs assert that they are a necessary evil, and corporations assert that they are a pragmatic cost of doing business. On the contrary, participants explained nuances in how corruption is manifest through complex procurement processes, opaque outsourcing, and biases in direct v. indirect aid delivery. They also shared that many of these subtleties are cross-cutting between U.S. Government agencies, military units, NGOs, and the private sector.

The inter-variable relationship between corruption and resilience (of both nation-states and individuals) was a topic that generated lively discussion. Using the Rohingya case study to foster a common context for conversation, working group participants expressed opinions and insights on what role, if any, humanitarian organizations should play in building resilience. Many workshop participants noted concerns with codifying corrupt practices into already unstable systems after a complex emergency, particularly given the likelihood that minority groups or other disadvantaged persons might be further marginalized post-response. Other workshop participants noted the inextricable connection between corruption and resilience, with one member summarizing it as “two sides of the same coin,” and offering that if you are bogged down in corruption, this can degrade your effort to build resilience; however, if you don’t use corruption to create stability, you may never create a foundation where resilience is viable.”

One of the few areas of consensus among working group participants was the need to enhance the palette of tools available to both academicians and practitioners focused in the area of civ-mil humanitarian response. Despite the challenges posed by quantification-style coding of data that are often grounded in ideas, beliefs, values, behaviors and opinions (i.e., qualitatively-derived), there was near-unanimous agreement among working group members that modeling corrupt practices (e.g., kickbacks, bribes, black marketeering, price-gouging, skimming, and fraud) to better inform decision-makers or support forecasting the impact of these variables upon the efficacy of aid delivery would prove immensely valuable. Beyond analytic tools, working group participants also expressed widespread interest in the development of experientially-focused games and simulations—especially if these could be used to improve awareness of the political realities of corruption for students and entry-level professionals who would be responding to complex emergencies in the humanitarian space.

As a direct outcome of the corruption working group, two proposals were generated from participating academic institutions. The first proposal would examine and characterize effective civ-mil humanitarian response through analysis of key factors. The second project would employ a meta-analytic approach to aggregate the drivers of corruption at a macro-level, which in turn be used to inform U.S. Navy training and response doctrine. Both proposals are currently being evaluated by the EMC Informationist Chair to determine their viability for funding in Calendar Year 2019.

Myriad benefits are borne through events such as the two-day working group on corruption control and mitigation at the Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop held at Brown University from 16-17 August 2018. Beyond the rich dialogue which broadens collective understanding and insights, formulation of follow-on research proposals, and opportunities to identify possible tools and techniques to foster greater utility in humanitarian response, the greatest takeaway from such happenings is the expansion of professional networks which serve as a force multiplier to better assess and combat corruption in civ-mil humanitarian response.

Those interested in exploring issues of corruption control and mitigation in the humanitarian sector, particularly as these may relate to maritime response and sustainment should contact Dr. Hank Brightman ([hank.brightman@usnwc.edu](mailto:hank.brightman@usnwc.edu)), NWC Professor and EMC Informationist Chair.

## Climate Change & Sea Level Rise

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The Climate Change & Sea Level Rise Working Group drew together a range of subject matter experts, including military officers, social scientists, environmental design experts, biologists, and humanitarian practitioners. Attendees discussed current challenges to resilience, particularly in disaster response contexts and also in application to military installations. The group quickly agreed on a fundamental point: climate change will have broad impacts, including on long term planning on military bases, deployment of mitigation resources, escalation of global conflicts, and its complications on military and humanitarian disaster response.

Members who participated in the previous year's discussion (2017) were eager to agree on a concrete set of objectives and craft a mission statement that would inform the group's actions. The 2017 working group produced a meaningful exchange of information that greatly informed the 2018 meeting's discussions and allowed participants to focus on how their combined knowledge could be applied to raise awareness and create a shift in policy-making and budgeting for the future. A concerted effort was made to build off the 2017 working group's discussions and a major focus area for this year's effort was on resilience and preparedness.

The 2018 meeting initially focused around budgetary limitations to preparing for and mitigating climate change impacts. Military participants explained the current shift in U.S. government policy that has directed less attention towards readiness of climate change. Ideas to address this challenge included creating products such as short briefs, information papers, or videos that could be shared with high-level policy makers. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act demonstrates legislative interest in increasing military resilience to the impact of climate change, as the act included language allocating funding for a study of military vulnerabilities. The working group discussed congressional interest and potential action for this addition as a vehicle to advance research funding and as a voice on Capitol Hill.

After the initial discussion, the working group agreed on the following mission statement to help guide future conversations and efforts:

*The mission of the Civilian Military Humanitarian Climate Change Working Group (CMHCGW) is to generate new knowledge for informing stakeholder policy makers and facilitate proactive long-term resilience planning and policy towards disaster risk reduction and humanitarian response.*

The working group also created a website to facilitate research and collaboration between group meetings: <https://sites.google.com/uri.edu/civ-mil-climate-resilience/home>

### Highlights of key discussions surrounding internal executive/Department of Defense (DoD)

- **Difficulties accomplishing anything** regarding climate change because of current U.S. government policies.
- **Public support for military is at risk** if climate response is ignored. To date, the DoD response is scattered with no coordinating office. Environmental concerns including fuel usage and landscape destruction are not taken into account. Climate change is not currently factored into military budgets.
- **Funding is needed** to further expand research of climate change impacts on global conflicts and migration.
- Highlights of key discussions surrounding external approaches to advancing climate change research and action.

- **Facilitate teaching/student exchanges** through war colleges and USG/DoD institutions and other institutions, educating students to produce work that influences policymakers. Research questions include:
  - What divisions or positions at relevant institutions oversee resilience/climate change?
  - Who specifically is pushing climate change in NDAA on Capitol Hill?
  - What case studies should be pursued?
  - How do different governments and militaries engage in long term preparation?
  - How does the military engage in development projects as part of resilience?
  - What role do endemic diseases and migration play?
  - How do other countries approach planning for climate change impacts on conflict and HR?
- In order to advance discussions, people/groups must make the case as it applies to national security outside of DOD to **create groundswell of concern and funding**.
- There is a need to **create white papers** and other publications that are short and designed for high level usage.
- Meeting participants identified several groups to include in future projects:
  - DoD representative from pentagon
  - USAID Office of Climate Change
  - Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency
  - Office of Naval Research
  - Center for Climate & Security
  - Harvard Climate Policy Group
  - Rhode Island Congressional representation

**The working group identified these specific activities to pursue during the upcoming year:**

- 1) Develop a framework that identifies mandate/responsibility for “long range planning” amongst agencies and organizations engaged with Civ-Mil Humanitarian Response.
- 2) Which agencies/organizations are engaged?
- 3) How do they address long-range planning, either formally or informally?
- 4) Are there specific divisions/positions that consider climate change to be within their mandate?
- 5) Develop a consensus paper that identifies key areas of concern for Civ-Mil Humanitarian Response with respect to climate change. This consensus paper could be developed for an academic audience (journal paper note), a government audience (white paper or policy brief), and others. Authors would be drawn from the working group, but include others with an interest.

Those interested in collaborating with the CMHCGW should contact Austin Becker ([abecker@uri.edu](mailto:abecker@uri.edu)) or Dave Polatty ([david.polatty@usnwc.edu](mailto:david.polatty@usnwc.edu)). This group is open to all humanitarian and military practitioners and academics who have an interest in climate change. We very much welcome the opportunity to grow this effort!



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