1-1-2018

Yemen

Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups

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Table of Contents

Conflict/Security Situation Overview ........................................................................................................ 3
Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups ............................................................................................ 4

Houthi Movement (Ansar Allah) ............................................................................................................... 4

Houthis Background ............................................................................................................................... 4
Houthi Leadership ................................................................................................................................. 5

Escalation of Conflict 2014 ..................................................................................................................... 5

Houthi Takeover – 2015 .......................................................................................................................... 6

Houthi Controlled Territory 2017 .......................................................................................................... 7

Houthi Maritime Threat .......................................................................................................................... 7

Houthis Oust Government ....................................................................................................................... 8

Flight of Hadi - March, 2015 .................................................................................................................... 8
Return of Hadi - September, 2015 ........................................................................................................... 8

Saudi-Led Coalition Declares Takeover “Coup” .................................................................................... 8

President Saleh’s Support of Houthis ..................................................................................................... 8

Houthis Kill Saleh .................................................................................................................................... 9

Coalition Against Houthi Forces ............................................................................................................. 9

Counterattacks/Battles ............................................................................................................................ 9

Sanaa ....................................................................................................................................................... 9
Taiz ............................................................................................................................................................ 10
Aden ......................................................................................................................................................... 10

Protests Against Houthis ....................................................................................................................... 10

Iranian Support of Houthis ...................................................................................................................... 11

Supplying Arms ....................................................................................................................................... 11

Iran Supplying Drones ............................................................................................................................. 12

Supplying Military Training and Leadership ......................................................................................... 12

U.S. Concerns .......................................................................................................................................... 12

U.S. Position ............................................................................................................................................ 12

Civilian Deaths ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Conflict/Security Situation Overview


This paper from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explores the economic, demographic and domestic security challenges threatening stability in Yemen. Included in the paper is a timeline of attacks as well as policy recommendations focused local law enforcement, the need for U.S. aid and alterations to Yemen’s membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The author concludes that it is necessary to address and resolve Yemen’s problems or else they could impact neighboring states.


The Critical Threats Project (CTP) is a program by the American Enterprise Institute. (AEI) The AEI states that its goal is to track and analyze national security threats to the U.S. The map featured in this article presents the locations of three particular security threats in Yemen; al Qaeda, the al Houthi rebels and the southern secessionists.


This article states that the Arab Spring-inspired unrest has increased the destabilization of the region and allowed for increased outside influences, mainly Iranian and al-Qaeda. The author states that Iran seeks to show that the conflict cannot be resolved without increasing Iranian presence and al-Qaeda has utilized the instability to further their foothold in Yemen.


The Saudi led coalition is engaged in a war with a resilient Houthi enemy that is a master practitioner in guerrilla tactics, and has the versatility to fight by conventional means. In the last two years, Saudi Arabia has made little progress in removing the Houthis from strategic territory or crippling their resolve. The author, believes that the Saudis have engaged in an unwinnable war, where public support due to airstrikes on urban areas and against Yemen’s infrastructure has only garnered public support for the Houthis and other factions like them such as AQAP. The only way that there will be progress in Yemen is through negotiations.
http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/2013/08/07/yemen-a-hotbed-for-al-qaeda-terrorism/

This 22-minute radio segment discusses AQAP and the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen. The guest speakers on the segment are American journalist in Yemen, Adam Baron, the Yemeni founding member of Democratic Awakening Movement, Abdul Ghani Al-Eryani and former U.S. ambassador to Yemen from 1997-2001, Barbara Bodine.

https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/yemen

A comprehensive view of the security situation in Yemen with a focus on developments from 2014-2017 concerning the war between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the coalition of Arab states backing the Yemeni government. During the continuation of the conflict, the instability has allowed for AQAP and ISIS to expand their presence in Yemen. This report receives regular updates and provides a timeline that at the time of this update covers attacks in the country from December 1992 to December 2017. In addition to this, a description of regional and international counter-extremism operations in Yemen are provided.

**Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups**

**HOUTHI MOVEMENT (ANSAR ALLAH)**

**HOUTHIS BACKGROUND**


This 412-page analysis of Yemen’s Huthi movement examines its origins and combat tactics, the government’s response (including COIN operations), as well as the security implications for the region. The report states that it evaluates the conflict by looking at the sociocultural, political and military aspects. This report is from a few years before the recent takeover.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/yemens-forever-war-the-houthi-rebellion

This report provides the analyst’s comments on the Houthi conflict. Salmoni argues that while the conflict seems to have a ready solution, it will continue unless the government includes Houthi affiliates in the reconciliation process. The importance of including Yemeni tribal identity as part of this process is emphasized.
“Yemen Crisis: Who is fighting whom?” BBC, March 26, 2015. 

This BBC primer is an excellent reading on the chaotic 2015 fighting in Yemen. It describes who the various armed groups are fighting and targeting. It has a focus on the Houthi movement.


This article provides basic information on the Houthi movement. It was written after the Houthi takeover of Yemen and provides a look at the activities and groups operating out of the different regions of Yemen.

HOUThI LEADERSHIP

http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/yemens-abd-almalik-alhouthi

This BBC article is about Abdul Malik Al Houthi, who is said to be the spiritual and military leader of the Houthi movement. He is believed to be a relatively young man, around 30 years old. It points out that he prefers to be reclusive and does not make regular mainstream media appearances.


This article from April cites the Houthi leader, Abdul Malik al Houthi, saying that he will never surrender. These comments came nearly one month after coalition air strikes.

“Houthis: Key Leaders” Counter Extremism Project, December 2017. 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/houthis#keyleaders

A brief description and image if available of the central leadership of the Houthis including the primary and deputy leadership, spokesmen and appointed governors.

Escalation of Conflict 2014

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42996&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=7c8ccca8c9f2ab5b689051688151ce9b#.VG9-rvnF98F.

This brief, from before the massive takeover in 2015, provides a background of the Houthi movement and their goals. It also describes their fight against AQAP, due to the Salafist AQAP
viewing the Shi’a Houthis as heretics. The author then describes the significance of the attack and how it will assist with monetary support and supplies for the Houthi movement.


This article points out that the Zayidi Shias that make up the Houthi insurgents were seen as ragtag rebels for many years. It points out that the Zayidi Shia tribesmen, are a large minority in Yemen (40%). It points out that the Houthis consolidated their military and political power starting in 2011, when the country was in an uprising followed by political deadlock. It also states that the Houthis have been demanding lower fuel prices and following their takeover of Sanaa there were some agreements with Hadi to involve Houthis along with Southern separatists in the decision making process, although these agreements have fallen through. The article contains other good background information on the Houthis.

Brandon, James., and Waliullah Rahmani. “Houthis Continue to Consolidate Control in Yemen.”  
*Terrorism Monitor* 12, no. 21 (2014). Jamestown Foundation.  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43058&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=a7ba1d886822f5cd3064ca595c0c5b6c#.VH4iFzHF98E

This brief examines the Houthi’s consolidation of territory in Sana’a as well as Yemen’s central and western regions. It then reviews the fighting between the Houthi’s and AQAP and Sunni militant groups contesting the same areas, in specific, Islah (Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) and al- Bawaba. This power consolidation occurred before their takeover of the country in 2015.

**HOUTHI TAKEOVER – 2015**


This article from Feb, 2015 points out that the Houthis had taken over Yemen’s capital Sanaa. They also dissolved parliament and appointed a 5 member council that would act as “President.” The analysis in this article points out that some Yemenis may see the Houthi takeover as offering better stability and possibly having a better future under Houthi rule. The article points out that Saudi Arabia is very concerned as the Houthis are backed by Iran.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/22/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0MI08B20150322

This article discusses the Houthi takeover of Taiz, the third largest city in Yemen. The Houthis took over Taiz after capturing Sanaa. The article also states that this takeover can trigger the intervention of Saudi Arabia and therefore, Iran.

This link contains graphics on the fighting in Yemen. The maps are updated as of June, 2015.

**Houthi Controlled Territory 2017**


A comprehensive overview of the current front lines of the conflict between the different groups in Yemen. The maps include the Houthi expansion from 2012 to 2015 and the current areas under Houthi control in 2017. It also provides a description and representation of the location of coalition forces.

[https://yemen.liveuamap.com/](https://yemen.liveuamap.com/)

This interactive map provides real time updates on breaking events occurring in Yemen, with overlays that provide information on where things are unfolding in the country. The map also provides a clear picture of which organizations hold key territories, cities, and landmarks.

**Houthi Maritime Threat**


As Saudi Arabia pushes towards the Houthi controlled port of Hodeidah, the Houthis have cautioned that further action against the port would result in a blockage of the international Red Sea shipping lane. Eighty percent of the states imports go through Hodeidah, and with widespread famine throughout Yemen, the port remains an important asset for the Houthis to sustain their control over their territory.


A Houthi suicide strike against a Saudi warship in the Red Sea is the latest attack demonstrating the complexity of dealing with the Houthis maritime tactics. The success of the Houthi attack is attributed to limited seaborne defense capability and what appeared to be a failure to determine the intent of the vessel as it approached the Saudi frigate. Reports indicate that while
the ship was primarily outfitted for anti-air and anti-submarine defenses, the ship did have the capability to deter against the attack.

**HOUTHIS OUST GOVERNMENT**

**FLIGHT OF HADI - MARCH, 2015**


This article points out that President Hadi fled the country in March, 2015, about 2 months after the Houthi invasion of his Presidential Palace. It points out that the Yemeni government effectively collapsed after Hadi left. The article also states that military units loyal to former President Saleh have supported the southern advance of the Houthis. Although Hadi fled, pro-Hadi military units, AQAP, and Sunni tribes still resisted the Houthis.

**RETURN OF HADI - SEPTEMBER, 2015**


After nearly six months, President Hadi returned to Yemen. The President returned to Aden after coalition airstrikes and ground forces drove the Houthis and Saleh’s forces from Aden. The Yemeni government has set up base in Aden.


This article points out that the Yemeni Prime Minister and government officially “returned” to the country in mid-September 2015. The government is using Aden as its base of operations. The government’s priority would be to restore governance and incorporate the former southern rebels into the Yemeni army and retake Sanaa.

**SAUDI-LED COALITION DECLARES TAKEOVER “COUP”**


This article shows the immediate reaction of the Gulf States after the Houthi takeover. The GCC states protested the takeover and said that it unraveled Yemen’s delicate government.

**PRESIDENT SALEH’S SUPPORT OF HOUTHIS**

This article provides analysis and profiling on former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. It provides a background of Saleh’s rule in Yemen and describes him as playing a key role in the current internal strife. The article states that Saleh maintains lot of influence over the military and various tribes. Military units loyal to Saleh have become vital in supporting the Houthis.


This article, just months before the takeover, reports that former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is working with the Houthi’s in order to return to power. Saleh assisted with the coordination of several groups whose goals are to gain popular support for the Houthi movement and feed misinformation to Saudi Arabia. According to the article, these tactics can allow the Houthi’s to garner public support during their removal of Sunni tribal leaders, who are resisting the Houthi’s advance, by associating the tribal leaders with al-Qaeda.

Houthis Kill Saleh


Recently allied with Houthi forces until he decided to switch sides and seek peace terms with the Saudis, Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by Houthis as he fled the capital. Saleh’s forces and the Houthis jointly held the capital of Sana’a until Saleh announced publicly that he was seeking terms with the Saudis. After this announcement, fighting broke out and after five days the Houthis followed his convoy out of the city and killed Saleh en route to his home.

Coalition against Houthi Forces


This link contains a CNN map that shows the various countries that were initially involved in the coalition created to combat the Houthis.

Counterattacks/Battles

Sanaa

This article points out that the coalition’s battle to take back Sanaa will be much tougher than its successes in Aden. The article points out that much of the military success in the southern part of the country was due to the presence of a large Sunni population. However, as the coalition counterattacks further north, it will be fighting for territory inhabited by Sunni and Zayidi Shia Yemenis.

**TAIZ**


This article describes coalition fighting against Houthis in Taiz and Mocha. It provides detailed accounts on the fighting.

**ADEN**


This article describes how Saudi backed pro-Hadi fighters managed to take back control of Aden. The article also has a host of other detailed information on the fighting, including on how Saleh’s forces directly supported the takeover of Taiz.


This article points out that coalition planes dropped off a shipment of weapons to pro-government fighters. The Saudi led coalition also carried out fresh airstrikes in Taiz in order to help weaken the Houthi grasp over the city.

**PROTESTS AGAINST HOUTHIS**


This article points out that thousands of citizens in Taiz, a city south of Sanna, were protesting the Houthis takeover. The Houthis faced very little resistance when invading Taiz. The article also has other analyses on the fighting that occurred around March.
**Iranian Support of Houthis**


This article points out that Iranian support is critical for the Houthis, who were a ragtag band of rebels. The article points out that Iranian officials admitted to supporting the Houthis. It is common for Iran to use Shia proxies to challenge the dominance of Saudi Arabia in a growing regional struggle. The article also states that Saudi Arabia cut off aid to Yemen after the Houthis took over Sanaa in September, 2014.

**Supplying Arms**


This brief article is citing a UN report that claims Iran has been arming the Houthis since 2009. This indicates that Iran has been involved with the Houthi insurgents since their official formation around 2009.


U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin M. Donegan stated that Iran continues to supply the Houthis in Yemen with sea mines, anti-ship missiles, explosive boats and small arms and other weapons. The scope and scale of these weapons did not exist in Yemen until the conflict started. Iran has a smuggling network where weapons are sent to Somalia and Yemen in local ships known as “dhows” that are commonly used for fishing or trade. From September 2015 through March 2016 over 5,000 small arms, 300 RPG’s and 80 guided missiles were taken from Iranian dhows interdicted by coalition vessels.


Houthi rebels in Yemen fired a second ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia in as many months. The missile was directed at a palace of the Saudi Monarch, King Salman, but the Saudi Arabian government claimed to have intercepted the missile before it reached its target. The U.S. claimed to the UN that the missiles were provided by Iran, yet there has been insufficient evidence to validate those claims.
**IRAN SUPPLYING DRONES**


https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/next-gen-drones-making-war-easier-dictators-terrorists

The rapidly advancing technological level of drones and their availability make their use more feasible for use by non-state actors, aggressive states and rogue nations. Several subject matter experts, including former Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, Deborah Lee James, evaluate the threat of commercially available small drones and more sophisticated models for sale by state actors. This ready availability of drones poses a concern, considering that Iran has supplied drones to Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi forces and China has become the vendor of choice for weaponized drones without restrictions on sales or delivery.

**SUPPLYING MILITARY TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP**


https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/irans-growing-casualty-count-in-yemen/

IRGC coordination and leadership of Houthi forces in Yemen has led to greater casualties among Iranian and Iranian affiliated Hezbollah forces. Iranian and Hezbollah losses have doubled in a year as they play a greater role in the conflict. While the increasing flow of small arms from Iran is a concern, the equipping and training of the Houthis with drones and unmanned “suicide boats” poses a whole new challenge. *War on the Rocks*, June 1.

**U.S. CONCERNS**


http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/22/barack-obama-warns-iran-against-weapons-shipments-to-yemen-rebels

This article points out that POTUS gave a stern warning to Iran over its support of the Houthi rebels. The U.S. stance is to avoid a proxy war in Yemen where Iran and Saudi Arabia support opposing factions. A U.S. Navy carrier has also been dispatched to the Gulf in order to intimidate Iranian vessels shipping weapons to the Houthis.

**U.S. POSITION**


Based off of information that former president Saleh was coordinating with Houthi rebels, the U.S. Treasury “blacklisted” Saleh and two Houthi separatists for engaging in activity that threatens the security of Yemen.
**CIVILIAN DEATHS**

Fisher, Nigel. “93% of deaths and injuries in Yemen are civilian - this must change.” *The Guardian*, October 27, 2015.  

This article points out that a vast majority of the deaths in the Yemeni civil war between the Houthis and the government have been civilians. Many of the victims have been killed in explosive ordnance attacks.

**AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)**

**BACKGROUND**


This is an updated CFR backgrounder on AQAP. It provides all of the basic history and background information of the group as well as latest news regarding the branch. It points out how the sectarian conflict is helping AQAP to regroup and reorganize.


This is a BBC report providing various background information on AQAP. It points out that AQAP was formed when the Saudi and Yemeni branches of AQ combined to form AQAP. It provides various information on high profile AQAP attacks throughout 2009, including the failed “underwear bomb” attacks. It also states that the chaos created by the Houthi rebels is allowing AQAP to expand into the southern part of the country.


This article describes the adaptability and resilience of AQ’s Middle Eastern and North African organizations. It includes information on AQAP, including analyses of its ambitions and its place in Yemen’s tribal landscape.

**AQAP RESURGENCE**

**CIVIL WAR ALLOWS FOR EXPANSION**

The fighting in Yemen caused by the Houthi takeover is allowing for AQAP to quietly expand the territory it controls. As of April, AQAP seized Al Mukalla, a large airport, and a major oil field. It points out that AQAP also freed many prisoners, including some senior leaders when it took over Mukalla. AQAP is also building strategic tribal alliances with tribes that share their enmity with the Houthis.


This article discusses how the war in Yemen continues to develop as territory exchanges hands, and Yemen’s political landscape remains ever changing. The multipolar strife has caused the combatants to evolve and adapt, with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) becoming more effective and disruptive to its opposition forces than ever before. AQAP has monopolized support from Yemen’s rural community and is now more readily able to sustain itself. As the organization continues moves forward, it will continue to seek opportunities to exploit weaknesses and capitalize on its ability to freely recruit and engage with Yemen’s southern communities.

**GROWTH IN 2015**

Perkins, Brian M. “AQAP Surges in Yemen as War Rages.”*Terrorism Monitor.* 13, no. 9. (May 1, 2015).  
Jamestown Foundation.  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43859&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=787&no_cache=1

This analytical piece by the Jamestown Foundation observes AQAP’s role in Yemen’s civil conflict. The report points out various steps AQAP took throughout 2014 in order to successfully take advantage of the current power vacuum. It points out how the group reached out to local tribes to create better relationships. The report details AQAP’s presence in various provinces of the country.


This article discusses the quiet expansion of AQAP and JuN. The article also points out that AQAP has seized military bases and other important infrastructure during its latest expansion. The article draws parallels between the two AQ groups and points out that they are expanding quietly in the shadows of more powerful groups.
NEW LEADERSHIP


This article is discussing the appointment of AQAP’s current leader, Qassim Al Rimi. Al Rimi is a veteran AQ operative. Al Rimi is believed to play a key role in AQAP’s resurgence in the region. The article also points out that Al Rimi dislikes the Houthis and vowed to fight them for control of Yemen.


This is a profile of Qasim Raymi that provides more information on the new AQAP chief. It describes Raymi as one of the founding four of AQAP. It also provides a list of high profile terror attacks he was directly tied to that include the failed underwear bomb attack of 2009. The article also states it is unclear if Raymi will take on Wuhayshi’s post of General Manager of AQ Central.

RE-PLEDGE TO ZAWAHIRI


This article points out that the new AQAP chief rekindled the bayat to Ayman Al Zawahiri. He also reiterated that AQAP must gather itself to fight against the U.S.

GROWTH IN 2017


Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has reached its power apex as Yemen continues to descend deeper into its civil war. The state is more fractionalized than ever, and AQAP, like the Houthis, have effectively filled the power vacuum left behind by a crumbling Yemeni Government. With Saudi Arabia and its allies focused primarily on the Houthis along their borders, AQAP has been able to operate largely unimpeded against a weakened Yemeni government. Their ability to capture and govern territory effectively has earned AQAP the
support of the locals and has greatly increased their recruiting base, ensuring that the organization will continue to grow.

**REGIONAL STRIFE**


Following a defeat at the hands of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in which the capital of the Hadramaut governorate was occupied by insurgent forces, the Yemeni government created a new forces known as the Hadrami Elite. The Hadrami Elite forces, trained by UAE and funded by Saudi and U.S. Forces, are the anti-terrorism unit of the Yemeni armed forces. Uprooting AQAP has proven to be challenging even for the Hadrami Elite Forces backed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. AQAP has roots within the local community in the Hadramaut region, and many are from influential families and communities with the power to destabilize governmental control. Until the regional government can take back control and influence from AQAP, the Hadrami Elite Forces will continue to fight an uphill battle.

**ANSAR AL SHARIA**


This BBC article provides a brief profile of the AQAP offshoot, Ansar al Sharia (AAS). AAS was formed to counteract the pro-democracy movement in Yemen. It is seen as an AQ affiliate in Yemen but is not a formal branch like AQAP. The group has seized parts of the southern province of Abyan and claims that its goal is to establish Sharia rule in the areas they control.

**U.S. TARGETING OF ANSAR AL SHARIA**


This article points out that the U.S. is targeting Ansar Al Sharia. It recently eliminated Ma’moun Abdulhamid Hatem. It also discusses other strikes on AQAP/Ansar targets.

A suicide attack on Yemeni soldiers in Sana’a’s al-Sabin Square in 2012 is described as a turning point for AQAP and Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS). This attack was in response to Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s pledge to purge terrorists from every part of the country. The author examines the methods and tactics used by the AAS to garner support in Yemen.

http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1145/20130124_ct14final.pdf

In March 2011, Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), an AQAP wing, took control of the southern town of Ja’ar in Abyan. After capturing the town AAS built up its infrastructure and provided basic utilities and managed sanitation. In response to these programs, tribal elders would provide fighters to the groups in return for food, wells, and irrigation systems. The author states that while water and electricity was provided by the AAS in some areas, their media campaign greatly exaggerates their levels of assistance. AAS is described in the article as AQAP’s attempt to rebrand itself to assist with gathering new support and fighters.

**LATEST ATTACKS**

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0L51VN20150202#r7ugd5ddITCo0xRI.97

This article points out that Ansar Al Sharia, an AQ affiliate in Yemen separate from AQAP, carried out a string of attacks against the Houthis. One of the attacks was the killing of a high ranking Houthi commander. The article discusses other aspects of the current fighting Ansar is engaging in during the civil war.

**AQAP FIGHTING HOUTHI S**

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/yemen-sunni-militias-seek-aqap-help-oust-shiite-houthi-rebels-1511250

Saudi backed Sunni militias are believed to be seeking AQAP’s assistance in fighting the Houthis. It is believed that these militias are turning to AQAP out of desperation.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/aqap_houthis_clash_i.php

This article from late 2014 points out that the Houthi advance into central Yemen saw little resistance from the Yemeni government. However, AQAP continued to clash with the Shia group that it sees as apostates.


This article covers the territorial gains of the Houthi movement and the threat it poses to AQAP. AQAP blames the Yemeni government for what it says is the support of the Shi'a Houthis and urges Sunnis to combat this conspiracy. Statements have been made by AQAP against the Houthis and there have been some sporadic attacks as well. The author concludes that further engagements between AQAP and the Houthis are a possibility.

**AQAP Threat to U.S.**


This article points out that a letter attributed to AQAP bomb maker, Al Asiri, is calling for attacks against the U.S. The unconfirmed letter apparently states that the U.S. is still the primary target of AQAP. Another video message released by a high ranking AQAP leader also reiterates the message in the letter, reminding everyone that AQAP is the primary terror threat to the U.S.


This is an older U.S. primary document detailing the threat posed by AQAP to the U.S. Members of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and the Committee on Homeland Security along with presenters from George Washington University, The American Enterprise Institute and the Center for American Progress discussed and evaluated the threat of AQAP.


This is an older article that provides a brief outline of the organization’s origins and size. The English-language magazine, Inspire, created by AQAP is also discussed in the article. Inspire is designed to recruit European and American Muslims and instruct them on perpetrating attacks in their locations. The article concludes by giving brief profiles on AQAP’s leader and main bomb-maker.
Impact on U.S. Counter Terrorism in Yemen

HOUTHIS IMPACT ON U.S. COUNTER TERRORISM EFFORTS


This article is a transcribed interview that discusses the impact of the Houthi takeover on American CT efforts in Yemen. It aims to answer how much harder the current turmoil has made the CT program combined with the loss of pro-U.S. President Hadi.


This article points out that the discontinued training of Yemeni partners, due to the troop pullout, seriously affects the U.S. CT in Yemen. The article includes other information on the security situation in the country.

U.S. DRONES/CT AGAINST AQ TARGETS


This article is news coverage on the death of Nasir al Wuhayshi. He was killed in a drone strike in June 2016. Wuhayshi was believed to be in line to lead the global AQ network. The article provides detailed information on the terror chief as well as analysis of his death.


This brief article provides a series of charts evaluating different aspects of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen. The charts provide the number of airstrikes from 2002-2017, whether the strikes were targeting AQAP or ISIS, and the number of strikes per province.

PRE-CIVIL WAR CT AGAINST AQ

This detailed report evaluates the level of stability in Yemen, the various threats posed to U.S. interests and presents an overview of U.S. and Yemeni cooperative security operations.


This article provides an overview of the trial and background of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to take down a U.S. airliner with an AQAP-built device.


This article argues that current counterterrorism efforts in Yemen need to be conducted utilizing low-cost and low-visibility methods in order to assist the Yemeni government with its counterterrorism operations.


This legal analysis of the Awlaki drone strike argues that self-defense did not justify the targeting of Anwar Al-Aulaqi and other individuals. However, he could be considered a likely target due to his direct participation in the armed conflict between AQAP and Yemen.

IBRAHIM AL ASIRI


This profile of AQAP bomb-maker Ibrahim Al-Asiri describes his bomb making ability as well as his role in the organization. Al-Asiri is believed to be behind the failed 2009 assassination attempt on a Saudi minister and at least two plane-related plots. The article states that his actions and bomb making abilities are responsible for several of the enhanced security measures at U.S. airports.

ANWAR AL-AWLAKI


This article provides some basic information on the terrorist-imam, Anwar Al Awlaki. It provides a brief bio of Awlaki’s life and his terror activities with AQAP.

This NYT report was written by Scott Shane, an NYT writer who travelled to Yemen in order to document the life of Anwar Al Awlaki. In this detailed report he lays out various lessons learned from Al Awlaki.

**LOCAL MILITIA & TRIBAL RESPONSE**


This article examines the formation and use of various state-backed local militias, also referred to as Popular Committees, that have emerged in Abyan. These forces have been utilized as the frontline security force against al-Qa`ida affiliates in the area for over a year.


This paper explores the intricacies of Yemen’s tribal communities and tribal governance structures, particularly as they relate to state institutions and the country’s weak security environment. The author believes that the methods of conflict resolution utilized in the tribal communities need to be recognized and incorporated into the government system. In the paper’s conclusion, the importance of including the tribal systems are reiterated along with a warning to be critical of applying lessons learned from other countries.

**SOUTHERN MOVEMENT/SECESSIONISTS**


This article points out that the Houthi occupation of Aden has given a major boost to the Southern Secessionist cause. The destruction brought upon Aden by the northern Houthis and army forces loyal to Saleh is making it harder for unity as more southerners blame the north for the violence. The article also provides a brief backdrop of north-south issues in Yemen.


This is a paper from 2010 that analyzes the origin and evolution of the country’s Southern Movement. The author argues that heavy-handed government behavior has radicalized the
movement, pushing it toward open talk of secession and that it is not too late for authorities to change this dynamic. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.

**REFUGEES/FOOD CRISIS**


This testimony addresses Yemen’s environmental pressures and domestic security threats in detail. The topics covered include Yemen’s shrinking oil reserves, dwindling water supplies, and a growing undereducated and underemployed population.


This article describes how the north ward counterattack has left a trail of chaos in its wake. It points out that as the Houthis were pushed north there is no law and order institution in charge of the areas that were liberated from them. The government that was reestablished is not able to assert itself effectively.


This research paper evaluates the role of food prices in sparking Yemen’s current wave of instability. The paper states that before 2008, violence could be attributed to conflicts between different religious and tribal groups. Starting in 2008, increasing global food prices resulted in the violence spreading to the impoverished southern region

**REFUGEES**


This article describes how many Yemenis are choosing to leave Yemen for various HOA countries. It describes this as a massive migration where people would rather go to failed states instead of staying in Yemen. The article provides various details regarding the Yemeni refugees.

**WATER/FOOD/NATURAL RESOURCES**

“WFP Warns Of Food Crisis In Yemen Amid Challenges In Reaching People And Shortage Of Funding.” *World Food Program*, August 19, 2015.
This WFP article discusses the food crisis in Yemen as the civil war rages. It points out that continued lack of access to people in need of food may lead to a famine. It points out that food shortage is affecting up to 13 million people and up to 6 million are facing severe food shortage issues. The commercial food sector is also disrupted due to the civil war, exacerbating the problem.


This article is citing a UNICEF report that describes the situation in Yemen as catastrophic. The medical situation and the food crisis are acute.


This article discusses the food shortage issue as the civil war continues.


This report explores the regional impact of Yemen’s economic, demographic, and environmental challenges. The impact of dwindling supplies of oil and water are evaluated along with the impact of the Houthi conflict in the north and the presence of AQAP. An additional concern is the use of Yemen as a transit point for guns, drugs, and other illegal/criminal activities. The report considers the impact of the exodus of 23.5 million people to neighboring countries once all of the resources disappear.


This brief examines the social dynamics of Yemen’s land and water resource issues. The limited space and water supply are the sources of fighting between different local tribes on frequent basis. The Yemeni government reported that fighting over these resources results in 4,000 deaths a year. The rapid population growth and established precedent of complex land claims only serve to exacerbate the conflict surrounding this issue.