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EIGHTEENTH  
INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

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Report of the Proceedings



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# EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

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Report of the Proceedings  
17–19 October 2007

*Edited by*

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Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History  
Naval War College  
with  
John W. Kennedy



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

2009



## Editor's Note

The editor has made every attempt to establish a clear and accurate record of the symposium proceedings, one that faithfully records the opinions and views of the participants. In establishing the printed text from speaking notes, transcripts, seminar notes, and tape recordings of speakers or of the official English-language simultaneous translators, the editor has silently corrected slips of grammar, spelling, and wording. He has inserted full names and ranks when omitted by the speaker, and occasionally a word or phrase in square brackets to clarify the text.

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Newport  
July 2009

J.B.H.



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# Welcoming Remarks

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy

*President, Naval War College*

Good morning. Welcome to the Naval War College and to the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium. Last night, we got a chance to meet most of you and we will have the opportunities during the course of the week to get to know everybody a little bit better. It was terrific seeing a lot of old friends and to begin to make some new friends. It was a terrific kick-off and thank you all for making what for some of you was a very long and arduous trip to join us here to be together in Newport. I can tell you last night, though, as I spoke to almost everyone, I did not detect any weariness in anyone's eyes or their sense. It was clear then that everyone appreciated what a propitious evening that was to kick off this historical event. Everyone, despite their weariness, clearly buoyed by the sense of promise that coming together like this has created. I am sure you can sense that as well this morning.

For centuries, Newport—this historic seaport town—where, even before the United States was a nation, John Paul Jones on the sloop *Providence* used to ply these very same historical waters of Narragansett Bay. For centuries, Newport, as well as your great seaport cities, has welcomed mariners from around the world. But I can tell you, and I confirmed this with Dr. John Hattendorf, who is one of the premier naval historians, that no group of maritime leaders has ever come together in the number and with the distinction that this group represents here in this room today.<sup>1</sup> There are sixty chiefs of navies among us this morning, seventeen commandants of coast guards, twenty war college presidents, many other senior representatives from the United States and from our most trusted friends and partners. Admiral, I am sure you sensed last night in the receiving line that there are a good number—well more than a quarter of you here today—who are alumni of this war college. We are very, very proud of that. To all of you: welcome back to Newport; welcome back to the Naval War College. We are looking forward to having everyone back together this evening over at the officers' club.

Although we have differences in uniform, in language, in culture, there is a very special brotherhood of the sea that we all share, as well as a set of common bonds, mutual respect, and a commitment to work together for peace. That is what is at the heart of this symposium. For over three decades, the leaders of world's seafaring nations have routinely gathered on the shores of historic Narragansett Bay to share ideas, to strengthen friendships, and to plan effectively for the future.

That is certainly what happened at International Seapower Symposium XVII, two years ago in September of 2005. Many of you were there and you will remember it. Those two days produced comprehensive lists of key concerns from all

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1. 195 delegates attended from 100 different countries, including the United States.

nations—from every region of the world—the similarity of which was remarkable when we put them all together at the out brief. As that symposium drew to a close, a consensus emerged and was articulated: that maritime security is fundamental to address those concerns, that the scope of the security challenge reached well beyond the shores of individual nations, and, most importantly, that the responsibilities in the maritime domain, the great commons of the world—this was the metaphor that predominated at the last ISS—that these responsibilities in the maritime domain were shared. Moreover, the need was expressed for regional and global mechanisms that allowed maritime nations to more routinely and effectively bring their particular capabilities together into concert to ensure a free and secure maritime domain.

Over these past two years, this institution has had the privilege of finding itself in a position to support the leadership of our maritime forces and those of our global partners in thinking through implications of this new set of global security challenges and opportunities. It has been a very productive period since the College—against [the background] of that fundamental notion from the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium—was tasked to work and help coordinate the work of a new strategy, a new maritime strategy, one *of* and *for* its time. Critical to this effort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive series of scenario analyses, war-gaming efforts, a series of high-level conferences as well as symposia and other professional exchanges with our maritime partners here in Newport, in venues certainly around the United States, and around the world—many of which you have participated in. This collaborative effort has been very successful in producing great and profound insights and has brought into focus a broad range of diverse perspectives. The next few days give us a chance to take a fix on just how far we have come together since the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium, as we better understand the key role that maritime forces must play in this evolving international system. If history tells us anything about the International Seapower Symposia, it is going to be a stimulating and impactful three days ahead of us.

It is now my great pleasure to introduce your official host for the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, Admiral Gary Roughead. Just appointed last month as the twenty-ninth Chief of Naval Operations in the United States, Admiral Roughead graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1973. He has commanded at all levels, to be sure: six operational commands and he was the first officer to command both classes of Aegis ships—the guided-missile destroyer, *Barry* (DDG 52), and the cruiser, *Port Royal* (CG 73). As a flag officer, he has commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two, the *George Washington* Battle Group, U.S. Second Fleet, and NATO Striking Fleet, Atlantic. Ashore, he has been the Commandant of the United States Naval Academy, the Navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs, and is one of only two officers who have commanded fleets in both the Pacific and the Atlantic: U.S. Pacific Fleet and Joint Task Force 519 and the United States Fleet Forces Command. Now, those of us, and I am one of them, who have been privileged to have worked closely with him for these many years know him not only as an accomplished naval officer, but also as a very sincere and generous man and a friend and a mentor.

Ladies and gentlemen, join me in welcoming Admiral Gary Roughead, the chief of *my* Navy.

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# Introduction to the New Maritime Strategy

Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy  
*Chief of Naval Operations*

General James Conway, U.S. Marine Corps  
*Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps*

Admiral Thad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard  
*Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard*

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

Good morning, and, Jake, thank you for that very kind introduction, and welcome to all of you who have traveled many, many miles to come to Newport. I am pleased that we have been able to order up some decent weather and, if last night was any indication, I think we are off to a wonderful start for this symposium. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my colleagues, General Jim Conway and Admiral Thad Allen—Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Coast Guard. Together, we are going to talk about our new maritime strategy, a cooperative strategy for sea power for the twenty-first century.

It is also fitting, I believe, that we unveil the strategy here at the International Seapower Symposium and, as Jake mentioned, there has never been as large an audience at any gathering of maritime leaders as we have here today. It's fitting for that reason. But it is also fitting because our strategy process and our strategy development began here two years ago. It began with the discussions that came from our gathering at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium. And we heard what was being said. We heard of the increasing interest in the maritime domain and the need for cooperative efforts among all maritime forces around the world in many, many regions. We began to go down a road to develop the strategy.

That strategy also included something that was very unique in efforts that we had undertaken in our country before, because we went forth in that period of time and had what we called “conversations with our country” within the United States. And we went about and we talked in several large cities, Atlanta, Phoenix, Miami, Seattle, San Francisco, and we brought together in these gatherings leaders in our academic world, leaders in our civic world, and business leaders. They listened to us, as a navy, as a marine corps and a coast guard, and we listened to them. And what did they see in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—in our maritime

forces? What did they expect of our forces? Some things came through in every location. One was that the American people expect—demand—that we, as a navy, a marine corps and a coast guard, remain strong. That is their expectation. They also expect our services to defend our territory and to be able to protect our citizens. But, they also said that there was an expectation that our activities should be cooperative with other maritime forces around the world. In fact, what came through was that our security and our prosperity are completely linked to the security and prosperity of other nations around the world. There is a system at work every day around the world. In our strategy, you will see that we refer to it as a global system. Much of that system depends on what happens in the maritime environment, but all of us here know that that system is undergoing constant change every day. The linkages among people, among nations, among economies, law, and knowledge are always undergoing change and change is a good thing because change gives us opportunities to make adjustments, to pursue new initiatives, and that is what this strategy is about.

We, as naval leaders, have many responsibilities. As we developed our strategy, it was also clear that we must always be prepared to win wars and to prevent wars and that these are equally important to us. As leaders of our navies, our marine corps, and our coast guards, we must make decisions, all of us, every day, about the activities that we pursue, the operations that we conduct, the investments that we make, the type of people that we seek to serve in our services. Those are decisions that we must make every day. They are not easy; they continue to be pressurized by the fiscal and the budgetary restraints that we all feel. Those are the decisions that we must make. They will never go away—as much as we may wish and hope; those are with us all the time. The strategy that we have developed is designed to frame and to organize those types of decisions that we must make.

As we developed our strategy, we identified certain tasks or strategic imperatives that we believe must be realized in order for our strategy to be successful. For us in the United States—for the Navy, the Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—we believe that we must be a global force—a global position force—that has credible combat power, that can limit regional issues, that can deter conflict, and that can fight and win when called upon to do so. Fight and win in cooperation with others, but fight and win alone, if we must. That is what we believe. Our forces will remain globally distributed, but as you will see in our strategy, we call out for those forces to be concentrated in two general areas. One is in the Western Pacific; the other is in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region.

The other strategic imperative is that those forces must be able to be moved, to be brought together, to be shaped, to be structured, so that we can conduct operations around the world—operations with friends and partners, with long-standing allies. You have been able to see those intentions at work within the last couple of years. Our concentration of combat power we have been able to do at levels that we have not seen in decades, because we have been able to create the flexibility and the ability to bring forces together, distribute them, and move them away. We have conducted operations with our friends and partners in NATO, in OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, in maritime security operations in the Pacific and more activity around South America and in Africa. In fact, next month, Harry Ulrich [Admiral Henry G. Ulrich III, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe] is leading

an operation with one of our amphibious ships on the west coast of Africa that is very cooperative. He spent some time in Washington just a couple of days ago talking about that. The ability to bring these forces together, concentrate them, distribute them, and conduct operations that we believe add to this cooperative nature that we have regionally around the world. Those activities, in which we have participated, have fostered increased cooperation and have led to activities with other countries as we have addressed maritime security considerations.

Those are the two strategic imperatives. In order for us to be able to conduct activities that support those imperatives, we have identified what we call our core capabilities. They are core capabilities that are enduring for navies and they have existed for centuries and they have been a part of our Navy, our Marine Corps, and our Coast Guard since our beginning. I have already touched on one and that is to be forward, with a forward presence—a global forward presence. And from those forces adding to our sea-based strategic deterrent and our space-based capabilities, those forces are a deterrent force that can be applied. We also must be able to conduct sea control operations. To be able to control local areas of the ocean in order to facilitate operations of mutual benefit or need, we must be able to project power. When access is denied, we must have the capability to be able to project power and to maintain those capabilities as our core capabilities and as enduring capabilities as they have been for centuries.

But the strategy also calls out for more and we refer to those as expanded core capabilities. One is maritime security and the others are disaster response and humanitarian assistance. On maritime security, all of us understand that the global system and network and commerce could not happen, could not function, without the free flow on the world's oceans, on the sea-lanes of communication. Even those countries that are landlocked are dependent upon that flow of commerce and that flow of activity. We all know—and we have seen it in regions around the world—the disruptions that can occur, whether it is piracy, smuggling of people, of drugs, of weapons, terrorism—all of that disrupts maritime security.

So, what are the activities, what are the initiatives that we must undertake to enhance maritime security? Key to maritime security and to all that which is the foundation for maritime security is the awareness of that which is moving above, on, and under the ocean, or maritime domain awareness. What must we do to enhance that and what are the initiatives and programs that we must pursue collectively, cooperatively, collaboratively to enhance the maritime security of the world? That is an expanded core capability.

Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance: there are things that happen in our lifetimes that affect us. I will tell you, for me, one such event happened a couple of years ago. Many of us in this room were part of the relief effort in the aftermath of the tsunami that swept through Southeast Asia and South Asia in late 2004. The relief effort continued on for months into 2005. It demonstrated that in circumstances like that, the ability of maritime forces to come together—of navies, and marine corps, and coast guards to come together and provide relief—was something that we had a unique capability to do. But it also showed that, without warning, there has to be a basis for those forces to come together. And that is why the area of humanitarian assistance is specified as an expanded capability in the strategy. Not just because there is a compelling need to help and assist others, but



also because in those activities that we undertake in proactive humanitarian assistance, we develop the relationships, we develop the procedures, we develop the methods that allow us to be more effective should something like that happen and it is not simply an international issue. There is no other officer in our military today who understands that better than Admiral Thad Allen, who led the relief effort after our country was struck by Hurricane Katrina.

So those are the two expanded core capabilities and I believe that these are not just words, because if you look at what our Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have been doing over the last couple of years, we have begun to move into that area. You have seen us concentrate the power—the conventional power—that gives us the forward presence, that provides the sea control, and that provides the power of projection. And we have continued to do that in ways that we have not in the past. But you have also seen the response that we have been able to produce in disaster relief and a movement toward proactive humanitarian assistance and the deployment of our hospital ships to South America, to Southeast Asia, the operation that [Admiral] Harry [Ulrich] has coming up in Africa, and so we are beginning to move down that path already.

Key to all of this is trust. And we believe that trust cannot be surged. Trust is not something that has a switch that you turn on and off. Trust is something that must be built over time and trust is built through discussions, activities, and through exercises, through initiatives that each of us may undertake and bring others into. It is built on seeking opportunities to work more closely together. The key element of trust is people. It is wonderful that we are all here today and to see friends from over the years, but many of us meet for the first time when we come to a symposium like this. I believe one of the commitments that we should have as we leave the Eighteenth Seapower Symposium is to look for those types of activities that support our interest, but that allow the engagement and the interaction of our young people—our young officers and our young noncommissioned officers—so that many years from now, when the chief of your navy and the chief of my navy are sitting down next to one another, they have known one another for decades and there are friendships that span the years. I believe that is one of the things we must particularly focus on. The ships that we have, the airplanes that we have, submarines, are very valuable, but they are nothing without people and that is why I believe this is one of the key elements that we must all take on and seek ways to advance.

So that is a quick sketch of our strategy. As I said, it began here two years ago. It has continued with ongoing discussions. It is unique in the engagement that we had within our country in identifying the desires of the American people for our Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to remain strong, to protect our territory, and to seek cooperative efforts with others. I believe that the discussions that we have here in the next couple of days will be a continuation of that process and that, as many of you are in the process of developing strategies today and have plans to work on strategies in the future, this dialogue is as helpful to you as it has been for us. And also that our discussions here allow us to leave with some specific objectives and ambitions and some identified opportunities and initiatives and actions that will allow us to go forward as maritime leaders to work in a cooperative way and to use our forces in ways that build a better tomorrow. That is my hope; I look forward to the next couple of days of discussion, the panels, the sidebars, the breakouts we will

have. My hope is that when we leave the Eighteenth Seapower Symposium we leave with a commitment to do just that. I look forward to it all, I welcome you all to Newport, to this symposium, and it is a great honor to be with all of you today and in the coming week. Thank you very much.

[Applause]

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

Thank you, thank you. Now, it gives me great pleasure to introduce my closest colleague because, as you all know, the Navy and Marine Corps have been inseparable for centuries, that we draw strength from one another and we give strength to one another and there is no finer leader of the Marine Corps or anyone that I would rather stand at the side of than General Jim Conway. He has led in peace and war. He is sincere. He is direct. He cares deeply and passionately about our country and the young men and women who choose to serve our nation in uniform and especially in the United States Marine Corps. General Jim Conway.

[Applause]

***General James Conway:***

Thanks. Good morning, folks, and thank you very much. Admiral Shuford, thank you very much for hosting this most significant event; gentlemen and ladies, thank you for your attendance. The fact that we have one hundred nations represented at this symposium—the most ever for any of these—is significant and tells me something about how you feel about the value of nations coming together, to go out onto the global commons, and provide for a better way of life for our countries. I would also like to congratulate and say welcome to Admiral Roughead as our new Chief of Naval Operations. I did not know him much before, but my initial impressions are that the Secretary of Defense and our President have chosen very well for our Chief of Naval Operations.

Now, I must tell you folks: I was welcomed by an admiral. I was flanked by admirals as I sat down. I see a lot of admirals in the audience. As I went about looking at some of your bio[graphie]s, I came across what I thought was kind of an interesting reading. It is a quote by the noted British author and poet and playwright, George Bernard Shaw. He said:

Men go into the Navy . . . thinking they will enjoy it. They do enjoy it for about a year, at least the stupid ones do, riding back and forth dully on ships. The bright ones find that they don't like it in half a year, but there's always the thought of that pension if only they stay in. . . . Gradually, they become crazy. Crazier and crazier. Only the Navy has no way of distinguishing between the sane and the insane. Only about five percent of the Royal Navy have the sea in their veins. They are the ones who become captains. Thereafter, they are segregated on their bridges. If they are not mad before this, they go mad then. And the maddest of them become admirals.<sup>1</sup>

So, I . . .

[Laughter; applause]

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1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 3.

*General James Conway:*

... I would offer, in spite of that relatively bleak assessment, I still have a great deal of optimism for the success of this conference and, certainly, I wish you all well. I was asked by the organizers to spend about ten minutes, if I could, to explain to you how my service, the United States Marine Corps, plugs into this concept of a national, maritime strategy and I'll be happy to attempt to do that.

First of all, I have to express that what we do is couched in where we are now, and I think everyone in this audience knows that we're in the middle of what we consider to be a long war. The first battles of that war [are] taking place now in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we are joined with multiple coalition nations in order to defeat extremism and empower the moderates of the Muslim religion to once again take control of the religion and bring a greater level of peace to our world. Now, we have about 26,000 Marines engaged today, principally in Iraq, and, although we're seeing some significant margin of success these days in our province out west, the Al Anbar province, I think that will continue to be the case probably for some time to come. We are probably closer to the United States Army than we have been for a long, long time. We have been operating alongside them—intertwined with them, really—over the last four or arguably five years and that's a good thing, but in some regards, it also has its negatives because we have grown heavier than ever before.

We are an expeditionary force by our nature. We go down to the sea in ships, but right now we are very much taking on a profile of a second land army and we have to go through what I would call an expeditionary filter when we come out of there to get back to a lighter, faster, more hard-hitting kind of a capability that is deployable on board our nation's ships. So, that is a necessary filter I think that we will have to endure. As I say, we have been close to the Army, but I am the very first to recognize—and it is clearly in my guidance—that our ties are with the United States Navy. We are, indeed, a naval force and there will come a day, not far, I hope, where we are back with the Navy in ways that we simply cannot manage now because of this significant commitment in this global war on terrorism.

I have asked some of my staff to take a look at what the future of the world is going to be: what will the environment be out there in about 2020 through probably 2025? We think that is sort of a sweet spot to examine, because if you look further than 2025, I think you're truly just crystal-balling it. If you look shorter than that period of time, at least in our country, you are not able to influence those weapons programs that will carry on for some time. So, we think that is about right for us. Now there is jeopardy even there. One of our great national philosophers, who also happened to be a catcher for the New York Yankees, a guy named Yogi Berra, had [this] to say, and he had a way with words. He said, "You know, when it comes to predictions it's hard to say anything about the future."

Nevertheless, we have tried and what we have assessed is that there are six or seven sorts of characteristics of that environment out there that I think will probably have an impact on us all. What our vision people are saying is that, first of all, the demographics are going to change fairly dramatically in our nations. What they see as a trend that will be exacerbated in that period is that developed nations will gradually grow older. Underdeveloped nations will have their population demographic actually be younger and many of those young men will not have jobs and that—folks, I don't need to tell you—is sort of a dangerous climate. They also say

that by the year 2025, 75 percent to 80 percent of the world's population will be located in what they call sort of an urban sprawl adjacent [to] a sea coast—75 to 80 percent. They also indicate that, although there is effort out there right now to find other means of power and energy, that oil, as a resource, even by that time, will still be a principal driver in all of our nations and, again, particularly those developed nations.

They also highlight, and I thought this was extremely interesting, that at that time—again, 2020 through 2025—water will be as important as oil. Fresh water supply and the ability of nations to provide simply clean drinking water to their citizens will increasingly become a challenge and, by that time, they predict that there will be as many deaths [due] to a lack of fresh drinking water as there will be to AIDS, just as a means of comparison.

They tell us that as opposed to state-on-state warfare, which we see occasionally, the much more likely type of—probably regional—conflict will be what they call hybrid war or complex irregular conflict: somewhat like you see going on right now potentially in Iraq and Afghanistan, where you'll have combinations of maybe hot skirmishes between conventional forces, but, more likely, guerrilla activity in some of these larger areas of urban sprawl.

And lastly, they point out to us that although by 2025, the United States of America, my nation, will still be influential in terms of its diplomacy, its business, its military, we will be much less so, because the world will increasingly become multipolar in terms of its influence and the impact that other nations have on all of us as a global society.

What is recommended then for us, in terms of the future of our service, is that we simply be balanced, that we be what I would call a two-fisted fighter, able to perhaps effect a forcible entry across a nation's shore—if we had to do that—but also very capable of operating in this complex irregular warfare that our vision folks see as the wave of the future. We are attempting to stay balanced with regard to our training, our recruitment, our programs, and those manners of things.

That said, I want to emphatically state to you folks here today that we fully embrace the maritime strategy that hopefully now you have had a chance to take a look at. We see, as we look at the arc of instability, the Old Caliphate more contemporarily called the Middle East. There is a great deal of blue on that map. We think that there is tremendous value for a Navy–Marine–Coast Guard team to operate and be effective in those waters. My service has its ties traditionally to the Pacific. We are not there now nearly in the numbers that we used to be, but we see the day coming when we have the opportunity to go back and so we of course have interests that remain there.

Increasingly, I would highlight that we see use for small numbers of Marines in the back of an Osprey [MV-22B] of utility in Africa. I think you know that we are creating a new Africa Command. It is still in its fledgling status at this point, but we have engaged, early on and directly, with regard to putting personnel on the staff. We have the operations officer assigned to the command and we look forward to working with our interagency partners to be able to work with African nations, with whatever types of requirements they might see, in order to create a better quality of life and make extremism not attractive to the citizens of the African nations.

Not mentioned in the strategy document—but I would highlight it for you anyway as something that we are keenly interested in—is this concept of sea basing. We are now developing a concept that will allow ships to literally mate at sea and use a series of interconnector vessels that will be able to serve essentially as a port and an airfield—using the sea as maneuver space, when nations do not desire U.S. forces ashore and where we choose to minimize our footprint ashore for any combination of reasons, simply for the over-the-horizon kind of capacity that it gives the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team. We see that as very exciting. We continue to develop and experiment and, I would offer, the day is not far away where that kind of capability will exist for use not only by U.S. forces, but potentially by other nations' forces as well.

Let me close my comments by saying, essentially, right now, the United States Marine Corps will not be as able to engage with some of the things that Admiral Roughead spoke about as I, or as he, might like. There are simply other callings that cause us to be engaged, doing other things in this global war on terrorism, but the day will come—and I would hope that it is months, not years, away—when you will see more Marines out there. They will be the people with the short haircuts, a kind of a glint in their eye, and the feeling that everything is fine because the Marines have landed. But they also will be the people with their sleeves rolled up, ready to go to work with our Navy and Coast Guard counterparts, ready to go to work with you to do what is best for all of our nations to ensure a better quality of life for our children and our grandchildren. Thank you all very much and thank you for attending.

[Applause]

***General James Conway:***

It is my pleasure to introduce next a gentleman that I have known now for probably about twelve years or so. We were classmates, once upon a time, in one of our advanced courses. He is a personal hero; he is a national hero to us for reasons that the CNO referenced with regard to his actions and those of his service in the wake of the terrible storm Katrina that ripped our Southeast. I have a very real appreciation for our United States Coast Guard. When you are on the coast and a storm is approaching, everybody else is coming in; they are going out and that is just an amazing brand of courage and capability that we all have regard for and have found tremendous pleasure now in mating to with this global and maritime strategy. Gentlemen, ladies, let me introduce the other commandant in and around Washington, D.C.: Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen.

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

Thank you, Jim, for that kind introduction. It is a little daunting to share the stage this morning with two people like Gary Roughead and Jim Conway. Gary, your breadth and scope around the world and your expertise in battle space is daunting. I remember the pride I felt looking at the picture of Jim standing on top of that tank leading them off into Baghdad. You are heroes; you moved from the battle space to leadership, and I am just really proud to be here with you today.

This is a fairly momentous occasion, not only for the reasons that Jake Shuford mentioned—based on how many of you are in the audience, where you come from,

and the diversity that is represented here today—but the fact that all the sea services are represented here today with a consensus and a way forward on maritime strategy for this nation. It is not an accident. This is a convergence of ideas; this is a convergence of leadership; this is a platform from which to talk about how to move this nation forward in a very uncertain future, in an era of persistent conflict, irregular conflict. What the next challenger lays before us is something that may not have happened before and may not be measured. To do that, you need flexibility, agility, adaptability. Those are all hallmarks and characteristics which are embedded in the strategy that was outlined by Admiral Roughead. The Coast Guard subscribes completely to the strategy. It reinforces the time-honored missions that we have carried out in this country since 1790. It reinforces the Coast Guard maritime strategy of “safety, security, and stewardship” and it reflects not only the global reach of our maritime services, but the need to integrate, synchronize, and act with our coalition international partners to not only win wars, but, as Admiral Roughead said, to prevent wars.

Now, your United States Coast Guard is not a large organization, but we are broad in reach. As we meet here this morning, we have Coast Guard patrol boats working with our Navy, Marine and coalition partners in the Northern Arabian Gulf, maintaining the security of the oil platforms off Um Qasr. We are working together in the Eastern Pacific: aerial surveillance, surface units, drug interdiction teams, Navy—foreign partner, coalition partner—platforms extending the reach, removing drugs from the transit zone before they reach our country, and before they reach other parts of the world, including an increasing threat vector of cocaine from South America to Europe. The Coast Guard Cutter *Healy* [WAGB 20], one of our three icebreakers, just returned from a science mission off the north slope of Alaska related to trying to determine the extent of the United States’ continental shelf—[a] very topical deployment, given the change of the environment in the Arctic and the challenges that are presented there. There is a new challenge for the Coast Guard; it is consistent with our missions set to be able to extend our reach, our competencies, our capabilities, and our capacities into the high-latitude areas, but it is also impactful in that it is aligned with this strategy. Working together with our U.S. coalition international partners against new challenges, there is possibly a new choke point being created in this world and it is called the Bering Strait. We have challenges ahead of us and, I might add, because it is very topical in the United States right now, the Coast Guard supports the other leadership in this country and the administration in our push to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. We need to do this.

In the conduct of our operations around the globe, the Coast Guard focuses around three things that we think build on our capabilities and our capacities in support of the maritime strategy. One [is] our global frameworks and governance regimes that help us all work better together. The Coast Guard has a leadership position in working with the International Maritime Organization to establish international standards and regimes, [which] allow us to provide governance to what is arguably the last global commons. I will be leading the U.S. delegation to London next month. High on our agenda are long-range tracking initiatives that expand on automated identification systems, which are expanding around the world, to make maritime commerce transparent, allow us a higher degree of

certainty, because we are dealing with known routes, known shipping. We can focus on anomalies and put our efforts where they need to be to disrupt threats as far as we can from our shore. I have to compliment [Admiral] Harry Ulrich, [U.S. Navy] and all of his efforts in the Mediterranean to share information among the navies and the coast guards in that area—a true leader in the globe and we thank you for that, Harry.

The next thing, which has already been mentioned by Admiral Roughead and alluded to by Jim Conway, is maritime domain awareness: our ability to understand what is out there. Things like long-range tracking built on international regimes allow us to do that, but beyond that is the ability to share that information in an open environment with low barriers to entry for those who need that information and have the capability to act on that information. And finally, we need to build the operational capabilities that Admiral Roughead alluded to that allow us to be able to be effective and achieve mission effect across a broad spectrum of threats, including the enhanced capabilities, humanitarian assistance, disaster recovery, and maritime security.

As we move forward, we need to converge our requirements. We need to become interoperable and here, I would submit to you, if the Coast Guard has a unique role to play, it is in this area. We have always considered ourselves a unique instrument of national security. The reason we believe that is that we are maritime, military, [and] multi-mission, but the thing that separates the United States Coast Guard from other agencies and most coast guards in the world is that we are simultaneously an armed force of the United States and we are a Federal law enforcement agency. We have a dual character that allows us to operate in many venues, both in our capacity as a military service and in our capacity as a law enforcement agency. For that reason, when we deal with your countries on a global scale, we necessarily move beyond the traditional relationships, the military-to-military relationships with the defense ministries.

And a good example of that is where the coast guards of many countries are located. Many work for the defense ministries, but many are under the ministry of the interior, some under public safety, and some under transport. Our ability to interact with those various ministries and departments and countries allows us to perform an integration and a synchronization function as we expand the concepts that are contained in maritime strategy being discussed here today across the broad spectrum of elements of national power that need to be brought to bear to deal with the challenges we face in the world today.

Military operations—kinetic operations—achieve effect, achieve an end. There is no better collection of military leaders representing capability and capacity in the entire world than is sitting in this room today, but we know [that] to prevent wars—to ensure peace—we have to move beyond military operations to create and sustain the elements of a civil society. That moves beyond the portfolio of most military organizations and herein lies what we can bring not only to the fight and the peace: it is the integration and the synchronization capability to deal with domestic departments and ministries regarding search and rescue, oil and HAZMAT [hazardous materials] spill response, illegal migration, counterdrug operations, polar operations.



So, as we move forward, the Coast Guard will continue to be the strong partner to the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. We will stand shoulder to shoulder with our shipmates, but, hopefully, what we will bring to the effort is the ability to move beyond traditional relationships and take the notion of “the thousand-ship navy” and create “the thousand-ship navy and coast-guard maritime services” and extend that reach, that integration, that global partnership, in defense of a global system that we all need for the prosperity and livelihoods of our country to make a much safer world.

So my promise to you, as I stand here today, my promise to Admiral Roughead, my promise to General Conway—in addition to the fact that we are all very good friends—is that we will work tirelessly in the implementation and the execution of this strategy, not only because it is the best thing for the Coast Guard, it is the best thing for the sea services of the United States, it is the best thing for the maritime security of our nation, and the best thing that we can do for the maritime security of this world.

I thank you very much for being with us this morning; I think we would be glad to take questions at this point. Thank you.

[Applause]

***Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:***

Ladies and gentlemen, while the admirals and General Conway are getting their headsets, I just want to remind everyone that there will be assistants with microphones in the aisles, so if you have a question, please raise your hand and we will deliver a microphone to you. Please state your name and country and ask your question.

***Captain Athanassios Makris, Greece:***

Good morning. Concerning your introduction, Admiral Roughead, you mentioned as a key word: trust. I could add also reliability as a core element. In this context, to expand and to have a competitive maritime strategy, it is apparent that we shall face diversity in our national interests, so we have this parameter as our national interests may not coincide. By experience, we have seen the categorization of the good and bad or the black and white. What is your opinion about the case that we have diversity, but we have a strong will to participate and to contribute to our common endeavor to face these contemporary threats in the maritime domain? Thank you very much.

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

Thank you. I think, as we talked about, the trust and the black and white and if I understand your question: how do we participate in areas where the national interest may be different? I believe that every country must take into account its interests and engage in those activities that are beneficial to national interest, but also, where those interests overlap, look for opportunities to participate. I also believe that, as we pursue the activity, we must all do that mindful of the sovereignty of the nations with whom we are working. For those of you who have worked with me in the Pacific that has been something that has always been a consideration as we go forward and work in that regard. I believe as we work in areas of maritime



security—maritime domain awareness—that is an area where the greatest trust and understanding must be applied. There are concerns that countries have about sharing specific information that may be in their national security interest, but how can we best work through those problems? How can we characterize that exchange of information so that there is comfort among the participating nations? Those are things that I believe in practice, in dialogue, and in discussion that we can achieve if we put our mind to it. So, there are national interests; but I believe that there are many areas where those national interests converge and that is what we are looking for.

***General James Conway:***

Could I also offer a comment there. One of the most effective things that I have discovered is, when you have coalition forces coming together—whether they are ground forces or sea forces, I don't think it matters much—there is tremendous value in commanders going to a private space, be it a captain's cabin or a tent, to discuss what is it you can do and what is it that you cannot do, and, then, how do we best blend our capabilities to accomplish the mission, because a commander does not want to find out in the middle of an operation that suddenly there is a caveat or there is a red flag that he was not aware of earlier. So early, frank discussion about nations' vital interests—and/or just the capability of given forces—is tremendously valuable for the execution of whatever you intend to accomplish later on.

***Major General Dari R. Alzaben, Jordan:***

Thank you very much. My question is to Admiral Roughead, please. What about the private sector? Are they helping? Are they cooperating with the shipping, whether it is in or out of the countries, because especially containers and things like that? We have a problem with the shipowners or ship agents, things like that, for the delay. Most of the time, they are not willing to cooperate in checking mainly the containers and we cannot check every container. Yes, we use X-ray machines, but not all the time they are available. Is the private sector cooperating in this field? Thank you.

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

Okay, I am going to pass this to Admiral Allen. But, before I do, many organizations participated in our discussions and where we sat down with the senior leadership of commercial maritime interests as we developed the strategy, they were key to this. They were very informative. Clearly, they understand the importance of being a participant in the initiatives that we are talking about. I believe that Admiral Allen can offer significant insight into that. So, Thad, over to you.

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

You ask a very excellent question. One of the things we need to understand is that nobody owns all of the elements to achieve security in this world. It is a shared responsibility and most of the maritime infrastructure—the maritime transportation system, the logistics and supply chains that are the lifelines of this world—are owned by the private sector. When I mentioned earlier the need to create international framework and regimes, these are frameworks that must be created openly

through bodies like the International Maritime Organization, which, as you know, replicates what the International Civil Aviation Organization does for air transport. Agreements that are openly arrived at by the participants in the International Maritime Organization and signatories to the Safety of Life at Sea Conventions constitute a global consensus, on not only what is necessary, but what is also the art of the possible in terms of technical standards. We are many years away from having radiation portal monitors that can screen 100 percent of the containers, notwithstanding what our Congress may say. It is a challenge. However, I would tell you—moving forward—there is a paradigm shift in international trade. It used to be that you wanted anonymity for proprietary reasons for your business. We need to understand now that the assurance of your supply chain is related to transparency and the sharing of information so that we can detect anomalies and act on them first.

***Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France:***

Thank you for your excellent addresses. My question is global. You speak about global forces, but one of our major difficulties is to convince our politicians that we share global interests and that we need to increase global security in order to develop the prosperity of each nation. We have a difficult message to pass to our politicians. Also, to increase security, we need what we call maritime domain awareness. One difficulty we have is in the legal aspects, because we all have different interpretations of international rules. We need a normalization of all the legal aspects in order to be more efficient when we act together, because we have rules of engagement that are quite different. For instance, we have TF150; it is quite difficult.

And third, you spoke about expeditionary forces. Is that to say that we think that it is more and more difficult to maintain a long enduring footprint ashore?

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

I would just like to say with regard to the political dimension of our maritime activities and maritime security, we believe that the process that we used to develop this maritime strategy—by going out and getting a better sense of the beliefs and the interests of those in our country—gives us a good sense of the political issues and then how we may be able, in working with civic leaders, with those in academia, and those in the business community, to move some of that along not just on the legal side, but also internal to our own bureaucracies. I think we can all talk about the solutions to problems that are harder from a policy perspective than they are from a technical perspective. So, there are legal issues, but I would submit that there are many issues that we face, to include in my Navy, getting through some of the bureaucratic issues and on the legal side. Any comments that you would like to add?

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

Actually, I'd like to link the first statement about trust to the statement about politics. You would not think they would go together. I was at one of our outreach meetings over the last year, when we have had the "conversation with our country." You would be surprised how much consensus can be reached where you think there would not be. We talk about trying to understand where shipping is at right now and make things more visible and more transparent. The example that was used, in the meeting I was at, was weather. We have almost forgotten about weather

information in this world and how well it is exchanged. Countries that don't like each other exchange weather information, because the system that has been built to exchange it is open, transparent, and everybody on the globe can trust it. So, I think where everything needs to come together, we need a political recognition that building trust, building transparent mechanisms, and governing regimes with low barriers to entry is exactly what the admiral was talking about in building that thousand-ship navy. It is open information, transparency, and trust and the politics will follow.

**General James Conway:**

Will you repeat your question on the expeditionary forces and footprint, please?

**Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France:**

My question was: In your speech, you spoke about your own agreement to turn from an expeditionary force to a resident force, for instance. Is it to say that you think it is more and more difficult to maintain long footprint ashore and your new strategy is to have a short action and to go back?

**General James Conway:**

Well, that's the beauty, as we see it, of a naval force with an expeditionary flavor—that you can operate from the sea. Now oftentimes it is the desire of a nation we may be working with to have us ashore for some of the things that we bring. Where we work with the Navy, we often bring in a medical capability, a dental capability, a vertical-build capability that can assist developing nations, even as we work with their military, but, if the preference is that you not have an enduring or even a temporary presence of U.S. forces ashore, we also have the flexibility to move from the ships and stay aboard the ships. That capability will only be increased again with the development of our sea-basing capability that will give us even more potential operating out of the sea base. Hopefully, that answers your question, sir.

**Admiral Gary Roughead:**

Okay, if I could just add to that. In, for example, the tsunami relief operation, it was rare during the operations that we were conducting in Indonesia with the maritime forces that we had there that we ever exceeded having any more than about twenty-four people on the ground at night from our maritime force. They would come back; we also used our aircraft carrier as a staging base for NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] to do their coordination, again, with very little footprint coming from the sea.

**Vice Admiral Wasantha Kumar Jayadewa, Sri Lanka:**

First of all, we were also beneficiaries of tsunami assistance provided by the United States and many other countries—like India, United Kingdom—and we are very grateful and very thankful to these countries to come to our assistance in the hour of need.

My question, sir, you mentioned, one of the most important aspects of this symposium is to plan the strategy against maritime terrorism or have a maritime strategy to prevent maritime terrorism. We are one country, maybe the only

country in the world, that is facing maritime terrorism. We are fighting a terrorist outfit called LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and they may be second only to al-Qa'eda or maybe equal to al-Qa'eda. They use small boats and they use merchant vessels as floating warehouses in high seas. We destroyed one vessel [on the] seventh of this month [October 2007], three vessels on the 10th–11th of last month [September 2007], one vessel 18th of March [2007], another vessel on 20th of February, another one September 17th last year [2006]. So this destruction we can see the total weight of these vessels—the cargo—could be around 8,000–10,000 tons. Now, we are a small navy and fighting this maritime terrorism even in high seas, about 1,400 nautical miles away from Sri Lanka, using very limited resources that we have. We do appreciate that, when you say that sharing of information and intelligence, but I feel that a developed country like the U.S. and other countries should do a little more than that, if we are to eradicate terrorism and maritime terrorism, because if we allow these floating warehouses to build up—and in other areas also—that will pose a great threat to global security as a whole and particularly small countries like ours. Will there be a plan to assist other than in sharing of intelligence and information, maybe physically? Why I say this; all the U.S. and others thinking of imposing sanctions in Sri Lanka and few other countries, if that happens we buy certain military hardware from Sri Lanka, so we are fighting terrorism. We are playing a major role at sea in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Mahan said Indian Ocean is the ocean of twenty-first century. If that is allowed to be, if terrorists are allowed to continue the activities in these oceans, it will be a big threat to the global security. So I request whether there will be a plan—or there could be a plan—to assist, not only in sharing information and intelligence, but also providing military assistance of some sort of more effective way of assisting the smaller countries? Thank you.

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

Thank you very much; as someone who has watched your operations and the competence and the courage of your navy, I have great respect for the work that you are doing and the fight that you are fighting. The exchange of information, I believe, comes from many different participants as we talk about the type of activity that can feed that sort of terrorist activity. It is not only that which is moving on the oceans and the ability to discern where that activity is taking place on the ocean, but I would submit that it even goes beyond just the pure maritime and that which is taking place on the water, but similar to piracy—pirates and smugglers do not live at sea their entire lives. They come from the land and they bring their weapons from the land and their people from the land. So I see this as a network of arrangements and opportunities for the sharing of information that allows us to come at problems like that, so I think it is indicative of the complexity of what we are dealing with. As Admiral Allen mentioned, it is not only a military operation in many instances, but it transcends into other areas of activity that, at some point, begin on shore. Thad, you wanted . . .

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

If I could just add a comment as far as exchanging information. I want to thank you for what you just said, but I want to thank you for what you have been doing over the

last couple of years. We are your students. Nobody in the world is doing this better than you are right now.

***Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, Brazil:***

Thank you. I am from Brazil Navy and will speak in Portuguese if possible.

[Simultaneous English translation follows] The Brazilian Navy agrees 100 percent with the original cooperation, with interoperability with the importance of maritime operations. We have a very long coast in the Atlantic; we are a country of many resources, and we think international cooperation will only help. My question is: is it not that we are going to be able to do a strategy on the world level—on the international level—without the participation of international organizations like the IMO or the United Nations? Like you said, this participation, in my view, facilitates the strategy to have weight for the rest of the countries of the world. Thank you.

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

I believe that there can be much done in the regional associations that all of us are participating in. I have seen increased levels of activity, coordination, cooperation, and I believe that our ability as military leaders to work those regional activities is a very, very good place to start, because, in a way, we have the control over our activities, our engagement, and the resources that we can apply to that. Thad, do you want to take the international organization?

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

Yes, I agree completely with Admiral Roughead. I think we need to look at international bodies—the International Maritime Organization. As I said, the time has come to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. We need to get in the international framework with the rest of the world and we are very desirous of doing that. We have found in the Coast Guard that regionally based constructs, whether they are military, interior-based or public-safety-based, add tremendous amounts of value in marine safety. We are currently involved in two Coast Guard Forums. One is the North Pacific—that is the United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and China—and, next week, we will have the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, hosted in Stockholm, Sweden, with most of the northern Atlantic coast guards. And again, this gets back to my comment about being an integrator and a synchronizer. We reached into the other ministries and other parts of organizations and we can bring that back to build onto the strategy that has been started jointly by the three of us here.

***Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Denmark:***

I'm head of the Danish Navy and still without luggage.

[Laughter]

I would like to go back a little bit on the processes that have led to this strategy. You mentioned that you have talked with your citizens in various cities. I remember during the symposium two years ago, we spoke about the difficulty we all face of making our work visible for the public and for decision makers, because the navy's work goes unseen. So what were your experiences with these talks with the citizens?

Was there something that actually surprised you about their knowledge about maritime matters? Thank you.

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

I think the ones that I participated in [it] was the fact that many of the citizens take for granted what our maritime services do. As you talk to groups on the coast, there was increased awareness. As you came into the center of the country, not that much awareness, and as we look at polls of our citizens and how they see the various military services, you can see that that understanding is not there. I liken it to perhaps that navies and coast guards are like air. We take it for granted until it goes away and then it is a great crisis. I believe, as we found, that that discussion showed us that [for] many people, and particularly in the world that we live in today—where so much of our prosperity, our livelihood, the quality of our life comes from that which flows on the sea—it is taken for granted. When someone pulls something off a shelf or puts the gas hose in their car that is just the way that life is and they don't realize that that is the case. One of the things that we will be doing after this symposium is to continue those conversations with our country. In fact, we are going to be going out again to have these—and I believe they must become more routine. They must be discussions that we have, because the seas—and that which flows on them—are tying us all closer together and the citizens of the world are becoming more dependent on what flows there. So, we have already laid out a schedule. It is a rather aggressive schedule that we will continue to have the conversations, because we want them to be two ways as well. We want to talk about what our maritime forces are doing, but we also want to have a better understanding of what the American people believe their maritime forces are doing for them and appreciate the value of what our young men and women do every day around the world.

***General James Conway:***

If I may, because I asked the same question of my people who were participating, just to get a feel for it myself, but also to ascertain the value of what we were doing. Our country may or may not be like yours, but we are somewhat unique in the regard that we have now over 300 million people, but less than one percent wears any uniform in our nation's military—very small percentage of our countrymen. That is not the way it used to be; it used to be, I think, a much greater understanding of military affairs because so many people had served during World War II. We just don't see that today. So, there is a level of ignorance—and I use the word in its strict definition—on the part of our people with regard to what our military does do. We are still fairly well respected, if you see the polls of respect for military service. We rank pretty high amongst the other institutions in the country; that is a good thing, but there is increasing question as to whether or not we really need as much money on an annual basis as a percentage of GNP [gross national product] as is being spent in the nation's defense. So it's a give and take. I think it's an absolutely necessary one, so that people do have a higher appreciation for who we are, what we do, and the costs associated with that.

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

I'd just like to add, I was the host of the conversation with the country we had in Omaha, Nebraska, which is right in the middle of the country. I was talking about international ship and port security codes and these are things that were negotiated with the International Maritime Organization. The chief executive officer in the room that was most knowledgeable of this was the CEO of Union Pacific, a large railroad in the United States, because the only way he could operate his business was to understand container security.

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Thank you very much; I am Vice Admiral Mudimu, Chief of the South African Navy. Admiral, my question is very simple indeed, but first I think I'm very proud to hear that you are touching communication as one of, you know, the yardsticks to measure the success of the four areas that you have highlighted. But my question is this: what are the inhibiting factors that you see towards the realization of your strategy?

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

The inhibiting factors, I believe, in addressing the expanded capabilities, are the issues of trust and resources, the ability to have confidence in sharing data and information—not intelligence—but just the ability to come together to do that. I believe some of the policy structures that we talked about. Because technically, I think, it is not that difficult to do that in the areas of maritime security, so I think that those are the issues that we will have to deal with the most that will require the greatest amount of cooperation and dialogue and understanding—understanding of the resources, but also understanding of the various national interests that are at play and then building a trust from that. So, I think that is the area that will be the most challenging to move forward. I mentioned in my comments the fact that all of us face budget issues—those are going to be with us for a long time—but I believe that the strategy path that we have laid out is a good framework, but in order to get to the expanded capabilities, I do believe that it is in the trust that will be required to share this type of information that allows us to be most effective.

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

I think it is a capacity and a resource issue. But just an example from my experience with Hurricane Katrina down in the Gulf Coast: It was an extraordinary sight in Gulfport, Mississippi, when I went there with the President [George W. Bush]. There were U.S. Navy Seabees' construction people working to rebuild a schoolhouse and with them were Mexican construction people from their navy working together: assistance in the United States from our partners, working together, based on trust.

***General James Conway:***

That's a good question. I'll branch from your question just a little bit. The criticism inside our country that I have heard of the strategy to date is a question saying, "Are we, as the naval services, abrogating our responsibilities to defend vital national interest—or associating them with coalitions and expecting a coalition of nations now



to do that?" I think the answer is absolutely not. I mean, there's an old Russian proverb, "may all your enemies be coalitions." We are understanding both the strengths and advantages of coalitions and yet, as I think both my esteemed counterparts said, our nation likes coalitions. We don't necessarily like to be going it alone at the point of a spear. That said, we will, certainly, in the case of a vital national interest. So, our critics are understood, but they're also explained to the fact that we have vital national interests that we will defend, whether a coalition is involved or not.

***Captain, Dominican Republic:***

Good morning, sir, and thank you for your wonderful presentation. I want to make a question in Spanish.

[Simultaneous English translation follows] I am the director of the naval war college in my country. I had the opportunity to share [thoughts], many times, actually, regarding my hemisphere. You talked about cooperation in the private sector and maritime security, but I believe that, in our countries, economic power has a very large impact on the politicians. For example, the economic situation right now in the hemisphere is not the best and many countries have shrinking budgets for the armed forces, especially for the navies. Most of us have navies that are smaller than our armies and the culture of the institutions are completely different as well. I was here once and Admiral Mullen talked about that the military-to-military relationship in the hemisphere is very good; however, the decisions have to be done through the politicians. President Bush also talked about the economic problems faced by Latin America; he talked about Haiti; he defined Haiti as a failed country. These could be a source for terrorism. But we had a lot of journalists that talked about the social condition in our countries, where maybe people are living in like medieval ages and we are facing a lot of poverty. Right now, the armed forces in Latin America are committed to the security of their countries and it is very difficult for us, the officers from the navy, to make people understand our culture—the culture of the navy—to be able to attain security and maritime power. So, my question is: have you any strategy, or have you talked to the politicians in your country, so that they might help you in making the people understand how important cooperation is?

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

Let me summarize this question for the benefit of others in the audience and please correct me if I don't get it exactly right, the question being: given some of the economic drivers and the economic situations that exist, particularly in the Western Hemisphere and in South and Central America, that there is not a very good understanding of what navies do, that the navies are much smaller than the other armed forces, and do we have a way of being able to talk to our politicians about that so that they may be more helpful?

I believe that's exactly the approach that we have taken with the maritime strategy. The fact that we have gone out and we have tried to connect with other parts of our leadership within the country—business, academics, and civic leaders—to be able to share our observations, to be able to take the strategy that we have developed, and to use that as the dialogue that we have with our politicians—with our



Congress, in particular—because, as is the case, they are the ones that provide the money for us to build the capability that we then use as a navy, marine corps, and coast guard. So, we believe the process, the effort, and the interaction that we have with our political leaders is helpful to do that very thing.

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

You ask a very good question and I'd like to give you just one other answer. I spoke earlier about being able to combine not only military-to-military cooperation with other elements of a civil society. I think you have, in the Dominican Republic, several good examples of how we can do this internationally together. Our recent counterdrug operations, where we have used U.S. military for detection and monitoring of threats approaching Hispaniola and then the coordinated teams inside the Dominican Republic with the Drug Enforcement Administration, working with the United States Coast Guard in and around Mona Pass [Mona Passage] and off Cabo Engaño, south of the Dominican Republic, are excellent examples of how we take what we've got together, put it together, and achieve more than we could independently.

***Lieutenant General Robert Zuiderwijk, The Netherlands:***

Thank you. I have a question, I think for General Conway. You were talking about the Navy–Marine Corps team and one of your core capabilities is power projection. Now, you are also talking that it is necessary that your forces have become heavier and it is necessary to make them lighter, more flexible, and push them—you mentioned the maritime expeditionary filter. That may lead to lighter forces, but also more vulnerability, and, therefore, the higher risk of loss of life. Aren't you afraid that, for that reason, your politicians will be more hesitant to use the Navy–Marine Corps team for power projection and, if so, what do you think we could do about that?

***General James Conway:***

Well, great question and great insights into this dilemma that we face. The reason, going back to the last couple of years that we have gotten heavier, is for purposes of force protection of the force that's invested, but there has to be a balancing act there—almost a trade-off, if you will—between the ability to get into a situation quickly, try to quell it before it grows to a larger capacity, and the ability to do the force-protection thing as soon as you get in. You're right; I mean, our losses today are unfortunate, but they're not nearly the losses that we have sustained in previous conflicts. I make the point only because it's a comment on national tolerance for casualties in virtually any scenario. So, it is a balancing act; it is a matter of risk associated with lightening the force, and stepping away from some of these force-protection measures, but we think that, if we're going to be that fast-moving, agile, ready-to-move-out-quickly kind of force, we cannot be as heavy as we have been. So, the things you reference are very much in our conscious in terms of how we go about this discussion and make these determinations. That is the best answer I can give you, sir.

***Admiral Guillermo Enrique Barrera Hurtado, Colombia:***

It is probably to—as you answered the last question—Admiral Allen. I was thinking in the possibility that narco-traffic could be a part of developing a togetherness strategy and getting more trust and results for combined operations and multiple operations. How do you see that it can be fit within our common strategy for countries in sea power and also fighting at the same time narco-traffic?

***Admiral Thad Allen:***

I thank my friend for the question. There has not been, in my view, an adequate discussion at the political level regarding the nexus between narcotics trafficking and terrorism. One is a financing, cash-generation mechanism that can empower the other. In some cases, they have not come together, but when they do, it produces very, very bad results for the rest of the world. Admiral [James] Stavridis [U.S. Navy], who is the combatant commander for U.S. Southern Command, fears the day when these two things come together and create a negative synergistic effect. As Admiral Barrera knows, we have found recently in the narcotics-smuggling routes coming from South America the use of self-propelled, semisubmersible vehicles to carry multiton loads of cocaine, not only to the United States, but potentially to Europe. And any self-propelled semisubmersible that is capable of carrying multiton quantities of cocaine can carry other things, including a weapon of mass destruction. They are inseparable in my mind, sir.

***Admiral Gary Roughead:***

If I could just follow onto that—as I look at the maritime security environment and, oftentimes in dealing with friends and partners around the world as we would have a discussion about terrorism, there would be a comment that does not affect me, but I do have problems with piracy or smuggling or whatever. The way that I view this—and I think it gets to the heart of what Thad was talking about—is when I look at that activity, I put it in a category of transnational criminal activity, because those who are engaged, whether it's a terrorist or whether it's someone that's smuggling drugs or weapons or people, the one thing that is in common is that there is no moral foundation for their activity, nor do they value human life. And when that condition exists, I believe it is a recipe for those activities to blend together, to use the strengths of each of their networks and methods and put it into an even more powerful and destructive mix. So, I view all of that—and particularly in the maritime area, because if you look at how those flows occur, they are based on patterns of maritime activity that may be centuries old—indeed, thousands of years old. But, when they come together with a lack of a moral foundation and a lack of respect for human life and value for human life, I think it's a very unhelpful and destructive mix. That is why I believe cooperative efforts and maritime security are so very important, because they may go after one problem, but those problems can become even more lethal if left untended.

***Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, United Kingdom:***

Late of the NATO machine. Thank you very much, indeed, for a marvelous morning in terms of insight into the strategy. It does seem that one of the key elements of change, or alteration of course, to your strategy is the addition or the formalization

of the extended core capabilities: the humanitarian piece and the maritime security piece. Can I ask why you would see any key headline changes to the standard sort of lines of development of your Navy: the training piece, the equipment piece, and the operation and deployment piece and, indeed, of the Coast Guard? How this change of course in your strategy might affect those areas of development?

**Admiral Gary Roughead:**

Clearly, and as Jim mentioned, as you look at our core capabilities, those are very much areas that we will continue to resource and ensure that we can deliver on those that fulfill and meet our vital interests, but we are already beginning to see how we are doing some things differently. As we get into the maritime security area, for example, not just in how we are driving toward more collaborative systems and combined systems, but we have already gone forward and made changes in our organizational structure within our Navy in order to get a better handle on our information systems. We've created a command that is now about four years old, our Network Command [Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM)], but recently, we have created the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command [NECC] that consolidates those forces that exist within the Navy that are more applicable to expeditionary operations—ground and water operations, creation of the riverine force—so I think you are seeing that in play. How we manage those forces and how we resource those forces is already under way, so I think that that is a piece of it. The training that we do now is aligned to that. The proactive humanitarian operations are a different way of going about how we operate the forces, so we are beginning to see change there, but we are always looking at our training process to ensure that we are relevant, that we are meeting the requirements that the forward commanders need, and that we can continue to maintain the flexibility in our forces that allows us to break them and to form the types of units and force packages that are particular to a given situation.

And then we will take one more [question] and then we'll go off stage.

**Captain, Turkey:**

As you know, there are some national and regional initiatives, operations, and cooperation mechanisms to fight against terrorism and other illicit activities at seas. What is the importance of those activities and initiatives at your new, new maritime strategy? Thank you.

**Admiral Gary Roughead:**

Well, I think the importance of those initiatives gets to the expanded capability of maritime security and the lessons that we can learn, the opportunities that we have to work together to come at this problem in a collective way. I think that is exactly why the expanded core capability of maritime security has been better defined within the strategy and then from the strategy will be the direction with respect to budgeting and training and organization that will allow us to fulfill the objectives of the strategy.

And on behalf of my colleagues, I thank you for your participation, for your interest, and for the wonderful questions that we have received. We look forward to

continuing this discussion over the next couple of days on the issues that we have introduced and that are so important to all of us. Thank you very much.

[Applause]



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# Review of the Chiefs of European Navies Conference

Vice Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev

*Commander in Chief, Bulgarian Naval Forces*

Captain Karsten Schneider

*Branch Chief Plans & Policy, International Cooperation, German Navy*

***Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:***

Ladies and gentlemen: welcome back to Spruance Auditorium, distinguished delegates. Just a word about the rest of the schedule. We will begin with two short presentations between 1300 and 1400, and at 1400 Admiral Roughead will introduce Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Honorable Nicholas Burns, who will be speaking to us via video teleconference. At this time, we are pleased to present a report on the activities of the European navies. As you know, they have formed an organization that meets regularly, and today we have the honor to welcome to the Spruance Auditorium stage the current chairman of the chiefs of the European navies, Vice Admiral Kavaldzhiev, the chief of the Bulgarian Navy. Admiral, please come forward. Following the admiral will be Captain Schneider from the German Navy.

[Applause]

***Vice Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev, Bulgaria:***

Admiral Roughead, Admiral Shuford, admirals, generals, ladies and gentlemen. Before continuing with the address on behalf of the CHENS [Chiefs of European Navies] committee, I would like to express my deep belief that everyone is in good shape, and also spirits after the delicious lunch, and also that everyone is charged with a strong will to listen.

Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honor for me to address this distinguished audience on behalf of the chiefs of the European navies, the CHENS. Let me in a few words introduce this group of leading naval officers. It is an informal, independent, and nonpolitical forum, whose twenty-four members include the chiefs of navies of each European maritime nation that is a member of NATO or European Union, and [that] has naval armed forces. The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe is the permanent observer for the United States Navy. CHENS represents a wide variety of navies, ranging from forces with nuclear, carrier, and amphibious capabilities to very small ones with mainly coastal craft. Some are

operating globally, while others are fulfilling their important security tasks directly off their own coasts.

Some navies have been integrated into the NATO alliance for a long time, others have been part of the Warsaw Pact in the past, and in a third group there is a history of strict nonalignment. Now, all the nations that are represented are, as already mentioned, members of NATO or the European Union.

Founded in 1990, CHENS seeks to promote mutual understanding, to examine issues of common interest, and to increase awareness of the maritime domain in the member countries. It was recognized that the maritime domain and navies often are “over the horizon” and out of sight of the general public and that naval and maritime methods tend to be marginalized as a consequence. The promotion of naval points of view within strategic fora and the wider maritime community has, therefore, become an important function of CHENS. Since 2002, they have published a number of documents on maritime, strategic, and security methods. This spring [2007] the group accepted the U.S. Navy’s offer to external partners to participate in the discussion of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy. At their Stockholm meeting in May [2007], [CHENS] tasked a working group to take up a strategic dialogue with the U.S. Navy in three major steps. The first step was to extract relevant maritime strategic elements from the agreed CHENS documents and to provide a synopsis to the U.S. Navy for their conceptual discussions. This was completed in June [2007].

The second step was to collect and consolidate information on CHENS naval activities for presentation, preferably to be given at this International Seapower Symposium. Also, in the name of my European colleagues, I would like to express my deep appreciation for this opportunity to speak to you directly after the presentation of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy. We, together, regard this as an important part of common dialogue on maritime strategies. As we have learned this morning directly from the three senior officers of the U.S. maritime services, the new U.S. Maritime Strategy will have a strong focus on international cooperation as a tool to promote maritime security in a comprehensive approach. This following presentation will show you the extent to which we, the European navies, are engaged in this field. It will give the audience an idea on how we are pursuing this common goal.

In our third step, we would like to continue this fruitful U.S.-European dialogue and to compare the U.S. Maritime Strategy with CHENS’s ideas. Our aim is to draft our commentary in time for our 2008 meeting in Bulgaria.

Now, I would like to introduce to you the chairman of the working group on “CHENS-U.S. Navy Dialogue on Maritime Strategies,” Captain Karsten Schneider, German Navy. During the next minutes, he will give you a consolidated overview of the various activities of European navies all over the oceans.

Thank you very much for your attention. Karsten, you have the floor.

[Applause]

***Captain Karsten Schneider, Germany:***

Thank you, Admiral Kavaldzhiev, for your introduction. Admiral Roughead, admirals, generals, ladies and gentlemen: it is a high honor for me to brief you on the CHENS navies’ activities and to give you an impression of the variety of cooperation and operations of our navies.

We have conducted a survey with our members to collect the information that I will present to you in the next few minutes. Given the limited time frame, our working group has produced a comprehensive overview of the kind of cooperation with other navies we are involved in to promote maritime security and how and where we are operating. Deliberately, no single member navy will be mentioned in my brief.

Let me begin with this picture, showing you the countries CHENS are representing and their territories inside and outside of Europe. There are a number of strategic routes and choke points in the vicinity of these territories.

**FIGURE 1. CHENS COMMUNITY**



The navies are regularly present in these areas. The navies are patrolling 25 million square kilometers of their exclusive economic zones [EEZs], equaling 20 percent of the world EEZ area. In addition, there are other regions with a permanent or semipermanent European maritime presence.

You can see [below] the areas with permanent presence and areas where European navies are operating regularly but not permanently. In fact, about 1,300 warships of different types are in the inventories of European navies to maintain, amongst other tasks, presence in these waters. Even the smaller ones of these ships are well suited to contribute to maritime security when conducting patrol and surveillance missions.

A variety of cooperative programs is part of the routine activities of our navies. This slide [Figure 3] shows you those seventy-five countries and nations where at least one of our member navies, and very often more, have indicated [that they] maintain regular cooperative relations. These may include regular naval staff or



**FIGURE 2. CHENS PRESENCE**

expert talks, the exchange of personnel, training programs, or even operational arrangements. For the latter, I would like to give you one special example.

In the Black Sea, three of our CHENS navies and three other navies are conducting operations in support of maritime security. For this purpose, they have set up the Black Sea Force, a permanently available group of ships ready to counter different threats to regional security and to conduct operations such as search and rescue, mine countermeasures, humanitarian assistance, maritime interdiction, or environmental protection.

This slide [Figure 4] shows you, as dots, the 210 external ports (that means outside the CHENS territories) that our ships have visited or intend to visit this year in 2007. Such activities as cadet training cruises and other long-range deployments are an important contribution to defense diplomacy. Here you can see some of the travel routes that illustrate the wide range of European navies' contacts. They foster mutual trust and understanding with navies and people in other regions of the world. Likewise, the contacts of high-ranking naval staff and also of young sailors allow for better understanding even between distant partners. And even more, operational and training arrangements can help to build maritime capabilities.


In addition to these cooperational and more diplomatic tasks, CHENS navies are also involved in a number of operations of a different nature, including multinational peace supporting or counterterrorism missions. In fact, some of the CHENS documents that Admiral Kavaldzhiev mentioned earlier deal with the future role of European maritime forces, the naval utility in countering asymmetric


**FIGURE 3. CHENS COOPERATION PARTNERS**



threats, or the maritime support for joint operations, including a generic maritime concept. Let me show you some examples of our operations.

**FIGURE 4. CHENS PORT VISITS AND TRAVEL ROUTES**



**FIGURE 5. CHENS OPERATING AREAS**

In the marked area encompassing the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and parts of the Indian Ocean, a number of navies are participating in the U.S.-led counterterrorism missions, such as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In the Mediterranean Sea, the NATO Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR serves a similar purpose. At the same time, a number of navies are supporting national law enforcement operations, mainly against illegal migration in this region. This also applies to operations off the West African coast and in the Caribbean with an emphasis on counterdrug operations in the latter region. Besides multinational cooperation, these activities also have a strong interagency aspect. To cover this aspect, CHENS have published their ideas for “a European interagency strategy for maritime security operations” earlier this year, at the already-mentioned Stockholm meeting.

And finally I would like to mention UNIFIL, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Since summer 2006, this already-long-existing mission is being supported by a maritime task force (MTF). This is in many respects conducting a most remarkable maritime operation: It is of significant strategic importance, as it was set up to defuse a highly dangerous crisis directly in the Middle East powder keg. It is the only maritime operation directly under control of the United Nations. It is probably the largest multinational maritime operation without U.S. participation, involving five destroyer-size ships and ten smaller units, plus the required support elements. So far, all contributors to this force are from the CHENS group.

This operation illustrates in many respects the importance and benefits of close cooperation within this group—e.g., for two of the participating navies, it was the first deployment of a vessel to a multinational operation of this quality. The close

connection with larger, more experienced partners helped them to make their forces available for this peace-supporting mission. Common training and the application of NATO standards and procedures ensure the required interoperability.

To sum up, European navies are providing global maritime presence. With 1,300 ships in their inventories, one can regularly expect two hundred of them, plus a number of naval aircraft, to be on or over the seas at any given day. About fifty of them will normally be deployed away from European waters. European navies participate in numerous cooperative activities worldwide. They maintain good relations with seventy-five other countries through a variety of common programs. Cooperation, trust, and mutual understanding also have proven to be key elements in capability building. And finally, European navies conduct a wide spectrum of different operations, together with other partners or on their own. Thank you for your attention.

***Vice Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev, Bulgaria:***

Thank you, Karsten! Admirals, ladies and gentlemen, I hope that you have got an impression of how we Europeans are approaching the strategic challenges of the seas. From my point of view, there are a lot of commonalities between the new U.S. strategy and our ideas. The security challenges of the seas require a multilateral and worldwide exchange of thoughts with many partners. As a part of this global maritime security network we are looking forward to an intensified transatlantic dialogue on how to make the world's oceans and the adjacent regions a safer place. Thank you very much for your interest!

As was offered, if there are some questions we are ready to answer them, but also I would ask our colleagues to give their point of view, if they agree [to do so] of course, if there are some questions which connect to other countries and ships of European areas. Please.

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## DISCUSSION

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***Rear Admiral Tarek Faouzi El Arbi, Tunisia:***

Are you thinking about inviting other observers from your neighboring navies in the future?

***Vice Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev, Bulgaria:***

Of course, the CHENS committee has this tradition to invite the different states for their activities. For example, for next year the CHENS committee decided to invite, as observers, four countries which are not members of the European Union and also are not members of NATO. I think this will continue in the future also. Thank you. Other questions? Please.

***Vice Admiral Patrico Cancuta Yotamo, Mozambique:***

[Simultaneous translation follows] I am from Mozambique and I am going to speak in Portuguese. My question has to do with what you talked about concerning control areas. I understand that one of the control areas is where Mozambique is located, especially the Mozambique Channel. I would like then to say that in the area, we do not have very clearly defined sea borders. When the CHENS committee

carries out control activities in the Channel, is there coordination with local countries? As far as I know, the control activity has not been well informed to us. We don't know where they are; we don't know where they're located; we don't know what they're doing. There is no exchange of information with us. So what is it that European navies are considering to do to exchange information regarding economic zones and frontiers? What is the plan that you have? How would you define these boundaries with the countries in this area?

The second part of my question is different interests in the zone. We see the presence of the U.S. Navy, of European navies, and other countries are involved in the same zone. So, everybody is involved in the same zone. So what kind of coordination is there between these different groups in order to be working in tandem with the coastal countries in this area? What is the plan that the European countries have to benefit the coastal countries? We do not know what is happening at sea, because we do not have the resources to control these zones. Thank you very much.

***Captain Karsten Schneider, Germany:***

Shall I take the first part? Thank you for the question. I think what you meant is not an operation in your area, but that was the green stuff [the area marked on the map shown in the PowerPoint presentation], which is "presence." There are some of our member nations that obviously have some territories in this area, and they are conducting their national presence inside their area and also on the high seas. One has to say that this was a global chart that we showed to you. It always has respected the high seas, the territorial waters, and so on, so no one will be interfering with your territorial waters. It was a report of one navy that said we are down there, and I think you know pretty well who it is. And all those navies also have indicated their national relationships with other countries, so we expect that if a nation is active in some area, it will have national or bilateral communications with the countries in the region. So the CHENS is not a group; it is not an organization; it is a meeting of navy chiefs. One navy or two has said that we are in this area and so you have to expect contacts, not from the CHENS—they do not exist as a body acting to the outside—but from the European nation that is in this area. I guess that this nation will probably have contacts not only with your country but also with the other countries, visiting them and conducting exchanges. And on the high seas—of course, that is also what we discussed this morning—there are a lot of nations and navies acting, that is just part of the character of the high seas, there are many of us, and everyone has his interests. I think such a gathering like here helps a lot to coordinate those interests in the future. Is that an answer to your question?

***Vice Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev, Bulgaria:***

I would like to get to some words in the synthesis set by Captain Karsten. All activities of CHENS's European ships are in accordance with international law; this is the main point of their activities. Also, all activities which are in territorial waters—if there are any—are always agreed upon with adjacent countries. But, if I [can] answer that part of your question, what is the benefit for a [specific] country, I think [that] increasing the maritime security measures on the open seas is [to] the benefit of everyone. This is a general strength for European navies, and also I think for the U.S. Navy, and for other countries which are not members of this committee.

***Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France:***

Please, may I say something as a CHENS member and maybe a little involved in what has been a provocation to our Mozambican colleague? [On] all the actions of what has been presented as a CHENS navy: CHENS is a nonpolitical organization. It is only a coordination of action between European navies, and all what we are trying to do is to try to have a regional approach in order to coordinate, in order to save assets, in order to save money, in order to do the best job without asking for more money for our budgets. If you have some trouble about the regional activity, we are ready to discuss it with you, and I think this meeting is a very good opportunity to see what is wrong. I am ready after the official meeting to have direct and frank discussions with you, in order to solve all the issues you can have with what you heard, and which is very important. We are ready to make it easy for you, like for us, like CHENS navies, as you can see. We have some difficulties in other areas. We had discussions and we had always solved the problem, so I think there is obviously a solution to the concerns you mentioned.

***Admiral Jorge Omar Godoy, Argentina:***

[Simultaneous translation from Spanish follows] Yes, thank you very much for your presentation. I am Admiral Godoy, the CNO of the Argentine Navy, and I am here not only representing the Argentine Navy, but my government as well. I believe that our navies are a very useful tool for the political processes among our countries. This is the reason why I would like to mention in a very respectful way something that you showed this morning regarding the permanent presence in different areas where some border issues are being debated. I think it is something that we should highlight now, because we must, as it was said this morning, we must work in a coordinated manner, cooperating not only among navies but among countries as well. When you talk about this permanent presence in areas that are being disputed between two countries and the countries in their own constitutions say that they have to resolve these issues diplomatically, I think it is timely to say that these problems are present and the countries have the intention to solve them among themselves. I just wanted to make this point very clear. Thank you very much.

***Vice Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev, Bulgaria:***

Thank you very much for your statement. We totally agree with you. Thank you. [Applause] One more [question], please?

***Vice Admiral Ganiyu Tunde Adegboyega Adekeye, Nigeria:***

Thank you very much, Admiral. When you mentioned permanent presence and I saw that Nigeria is printed in deep green [on the map in the PowerPoint presentation], I already have some problems. I know that right now, the Gulf of Guinea is becoming a veritable focus point of insecurity in the maritime area, but I must make bold to say that we are gladly taking control of security in that environment. To answer another question, I was being informed that when you establish a presence there, you recognize a state's territorial waters and their rights, but I am constrained to say that I don't physically agree with that, because we have been finding ships from your group literally in our waters, eight nautical [miles] from the shore. How do you explain that? And secondly, is it only an agreement with the

government or connections with the navies? Because I do not know anything about such arrangements. [Inaudible] . . . ships. Could you please explain that to help me? Thank you.

***Captain Karsten Schneider, Germany:***

Well, if I got it right, I think it is very much the same as with the question from the admiral from Mozambique. We are, of course, always honoring the international law of the seas. And again, the national navies are sending their ships and they are responsible, in their national channels, to establish contact with the local forces and regional arrangements in a way they do that on the national channels. So there is not a coordination, as such. We might talk about it, but there is not a coordinated European approach to certain coast areas presently. There might be something at the very high political level, but there is not a European naval agency that coordinates them. So it is the responsibility of the single navies, if they go to some region, to coordinate themselves with the local authorities, with coastal nations, and so on and so on. I hope that answers your question.

[Applause]

***Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:***

I know we probably can continue the questions longer, but it is my unfortunate duty to try to adhere to the schedule so I would urge you to continue these discussions during the breaks and this evening and throughout the symposium.

[Professor Robert Rubel's briefing on the professional program followed.]

[Applause]



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## An Address

Ambassador Nicholas Burns

*U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs*

*Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:*

Welcome. As we spoke this morning about our maritime strategy and the coordination among our three maritime services—the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and the Navy—what we do around the world today would not be possible for the U.S. maritime forces without the interagency cooperation that we enjoy. Clearly, the most important partner that we have is the U.S. State Department and so I am very pleased to be able to introduce—and also grateful for the participation of—Ambassador Nicholas Burns, who is our under secretary of state for political affairs. He has held a number of posts in our State Department in Washington and overseas for the past twenty-five years. He has a distinguished career of early postings in Africa and the Middle East. He has a keen understanding of Russian and Balkan and Eurasian and NATO issues and so he brings a very broad and extensive experience that he will share with us today. He is a former ambassador to Greece and a former ambassador to NATO. And while he is very much aware and sensitive to the concerns of individual nations, he fully understands the role that strong alliances and partnerships play in understanding international security and defense. At NATO, he became deeply familiar with military-political issues and how those relationships can effect positive change and promote stability. In his current post as the under secretary of state for political affairs, he is responsible for a wide, wide range of issues. He is an active participant in many of the high profile administration issues, working with a permanent “5 plus 1” in addressing the challenge of the Iranian nuclear program, the U.S.-India relationship, and managing the many issues of Kosovo. His portfolio is indeed broad, but he is a professional who is highly respected and has a great deal of experience. I also believe that he is also connecting into us here in Newport and New England because he is an avid baseball fan and his team is not doing that well right now—and that team comes from Boston—so perhaps he is hopeful that we will make a trip there collectively to get his team out of the difficulty that they find themselves in today. It is with a great deal of pleasure and pride that I introduce Ambassador Nicholas Burns, our under secretary of state for political affairs.

*Admiral Roughead:*

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for joining us today and for taking time out of your very busy day to join with ninety-eight countries and the leaders of the maritime services from those countries from around the world and we look forward to hearing from you and perhaps taking some questions at the end.



***Ambassador Burns:***

Admiral, thank you very much, and I hope in the course of my remarks my visage is going to pop up on a big screen so you will be able to see the State Department, but it is a pleasure to be with you and I wanted to thank you, Admiral, for your leadership and for the invitation to be with you today. Admiral [Michael] Mullen [Chief of Naval Operations until 29 September 2007] had called me a couple of months ago to ask that I be with you in Newport. I accepted that invitation, but unfortunately, the press of business has kept me here. I can assure you, I would much rather be in Newport, Rhode Island, than in Washington, D.C., particularly, because—and many of your guests from around the world might not know this—but they are right now in the heart of Red Sox Nation. The Red Sox are our baseball team in the six states of New England. We are currently in the American League Championship. We are not doing very well and we need the wishes of the U.S. Navy and others for success tomorrow evening.

Admiral, I do not want to monopolize this session by speaking too long. I thought it might be much more interesting for us to have a conversation and for me to respond to any questions from the military leaders assembled with you, but I did want to say a few things. I first of all wanted to thank the allied representatives, who are with you in Newport—the members of the naval forces of the NATO allies; I had the great pleasure and honor of being ambassador to NATO for four years—and also our allies from the Asia-Pacific region. I wanted to thank them because the ability of the United States to be a global power and a naval power, of course, is, in large part, a function of our ability to work with allies in like-minded ways. We see that every day as we plan to prepare for our military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and for our peacekeeping responsibilities around the world. We have certainly seen it when we have had to respond to natural disasters. I will never forget December 26, 2004, when the great tsunami hit South Asia and Southeast Asia. It was the navies—the naval forces and the air forces of India and of Japan and Australia and the United States—that in the immediate aftermath of that disaster rushed assistance to the afflicted populations, so we are very grateful for the allied naval forces. I also wanted to thank those military officers, naval officers, who are there from partner countries. One of the great developments, I think, of the past fifteen to twenty years since the end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, has been the emergence of good, solid military relations between the United States and our partner countries—countries that are not members of our treaty alliances, our defense alliances, but countries with which we cooperate. I have seen that with countries in the Caspian Sea Basin, in the Black Sea region, in the Mediterranean, and in North Africa, and we are very heartened by this support and the cooperative military relationships that we have been able to establish. I also would like to say, just as a civilian, as a career diplomat, how much respect we have for our armed forces, the U.S. armed forces. We in the State Department believe that our national strategy, our foreign policy, cannot be effective unless it is joined, commingled with that of the U.S. military, and particularly of the U.S. Navy.

Since the founding of our country 231 years ago, there has been, if you will, the tightest possible connection between our Navy and our diplomacy. That was true in the earliest years, from the crisis that we had with the Barbary pirates, the first great crisis that we had in the 1790s and early 1800s, when American diplomats were

being taken hostage by the Bey of Tunis. It was the American Navy that came to the rescue of those hostages and, through President Jefferson's effort, was able to resolve that problem. Since then, we, in the State Department, in diplomacy, have relied upon the Navy, as well as the other branches of our armed forces, for the kind of support we need to try to create the conditions in the world that are important to us, stability and peace, but also to defend our country when that is necessary.

I should also say to this particular group, that the United States is cognizant of the fact that we are just one of 192 nations in the world in the United Nations General Assembly and so we understand that we have an obligation, a responsibility as well as a self interest, to be a good citizen of the world, and that is why we are hoping so much that our Senate might ratify, at long last, the Law of the Sea Convention, which we believe is in our national interest, but also in the interest of the world. Now, I know many of the countries represented in the room today have already implemented that treaty and are following that treaty and have been for many years. We have signed that treaty, but we have not had it ratified by our Senate, which is a necessary constitutional step in our system and President Bush has asked our Senate over the last few months now to ratify that treaty and I hope very much that [happens]. [not recorded for 27 seconds] . . . our national security interests by focusing on Europe, because Europe, of course, was the epicenter of American foreign policy for much of the last century. In fact, I would suggest that between 1917—when Woodrow Wilson, President Wilson, decided that the United States would enter the First World War on the side of Britain and France and Belgium and that we would put one million American soldiers into Europe—between that time in 1917 through the rise of the fascist powers, through our successful prosecution of the Second World War in two regional theaters, through the long decades of the Cold War, and onto the [19]90s, when we intervened twice with Europe in Bosnia and Kosovo to sustain the peace, during those seven decades, the United States was focused primarily on Europe. I think now given the great changes in Europe and, happily, given the fact that Europe is the single greatest, peaceful, prosperous place in the world now where the Cold War is clearly over, I think we can say that there are no more vital threats to our country that emanate from Europe. There's unfinished business in the Balkans, where we hope that Kosovo might become an independent state at the end of this year. Our hope that the countries of the Balkans—Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo itself—in the future might become members of NATO in the [European Union] EU, that's unfinished business. And certainly, our relationship with Russia, which is quite uneven and inconsistent and in some ways troubled, that is unfinished business.

But still, we're very proud of the American effort over many decades to help Europe become what it wishes to be, a whole, free, and peaceful continent, but I think that also means that we now see our national security interest and the vital threats that we face primarily emanating from three regions: from the Middle East, from South Asia, and from East Asia. Those are now the focal points of our national security attention here in Washington, D.C., and certainly worldwide. I suppose that all of you will understand why that's the case. In the Middle East, we have 168,000 American military personnel and the largest American embassy in the world in Iraq. We wish to be successful in Iraq and we wish to complete the task that our national authorities have laid out for us. In Iran, we face a country that is seeking, in

our judgment, to become a nuclear-weapons power, a country that is now arming and financing all of the Middle East terrorist groups that are disturbing the peace, from Hamas in Gaza to Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Shia militants in Iraq and to the Taliban, unfortunately, in Afghanistan. And so dealing with those two challenges, Iraq and Iran, I think those are the two greatest challenges that the United States faces in the world today and I'm quite sure the secretary of state, Secretary Rice, would agree with that judgment. We also wish to work for a stable Lebanon and a democratic Lebanon and not to see Syria and Iran and Hezbollah destabilize Lebanon, and Secretary Rice is working at the behest of President Bush to try to jump-start, kick-start, rejuvenate the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In fact, today, she's been in Bethlehem and in Jerusalem working with the Palestinian leadership as well as with the Israeli leadership to prepare for this international conference that the United States will be hosting in just over a month's time not far from here in Annapolis, Maryland, where the U.S. Naval Academy is located, and to see if the United States and our friends around the world can stimulate progress so that Israel can be assured that it has a secure future and that a Palestinian state can be created to live side by side with Israel in peace. So these are major objectives of our country and I would say that those four are our seminal, our most important objectives in the Middle East. In South Asia, well, I don't think you would have heard an American diplomat say ten years ago today that South Asia was a region of vital importance to the United States, but it certainly is now given our military engagement in Afghanistan: 27,000 American troops, an extraordinarily ambitious diplomatic apparatus, and the help of many countries around the world, from Japan, South Korea, and Australia in the Far East to nearly all of our European allies stationing military forces there—naval, air, and ground—to stabilize the Karzai government and to prevent the Taliban and al-Qa'eda from achieving a military victory that they seek in Afghanistan. To see the importance that we attach to our relations with Pakistan, which is, without any question, the most important partner that the United States has in the battle against al-Qa'eda, both in South Asia and globally, and to remember that we have a positive opportunity with India, which we view as a strategic ally of the United States, a partner of the United States on a global basis. I think the rapid rise of the U.S.-India relationship is going to be positive for stability in South Asia and in East Asia. In the Far East, Admiral, I just wanted to say how much we value our alliances with Japan and South Korea and Australia and our alliance partners in the Philippines and in Thailand and our friends and partners in Singapore and in Malaysia and Indonesia and in all of the other countries of that great region. We have been, in fact the American Navy has been, a guarantor of peace and stability. That's how we see our role in Asia since September 1945, since General MacArthur signed the peace agreement ending the war, I should say, with the Japanese government. We're proud of the role that the Navy has played as well as the Air Force, the Marines, and the Army. The United States wishes to maintain a position of military strength in the Asia-Pacific region, not because we seek to dominate that region, but because we seek to preserve peace and stability and democracy and economic growth and, in that sense, we're very focused on the rise of China. We believe that we can have a constructive relationship with China. We do not believe that the right policy would be to contain China, as we tried to contain Soviet power between 1946 and 1991, but we believe in engaging

China. Working with China as a partner is the best policy for our country; and so we effectively said to the Chinese leadership, in addition to the economic and trade disputes that we have, in addition to the differences that we have on religious rights and on human rights, (in fact, I just came from watching the ceremony in the [Capitol Rotunda] where President Bush and Speaker Nancy Pelosi were honoring with a congressional gold medal the Dalai Lama)—we have differences with China, but we also have connections with China. We believe that China wants peace and stability in Asia. That's what we want. We believe that China, as a rising power, as India's a rising power, that all of us have a responsibility to help resolve conflicts. So China has played a central role in the recent Six-Party agreement that will lead, we hope, to the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear apparatus. China's been critical in that. China has now helped the United States and other countries to convince the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping force to Darfur. We wish China would do more, frankly, in Asia to promote a return to freedom and democracy in Burma, where the Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi continues to be under house arrest and where the military government just forcibly put down peaceful demonstrations by Buddhist monks. And we very much hope that China will stop arming Iran and stop the increase of its economic trade and investment with Iran and help us to contain Iranian power by discouraging and preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapons power. So this relationship with China is going to be very important for peace and security in the future; we hope it will be a productive relationship. And finally, Admiral, I'd say that we're not just focused on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, we're also focused on Africa and on Latin America, as we should be. As I mentioned, I'm a career diplomat and I've been in the foreign service for twenty-five years and I don't remember a time when our government has been so focused on Africa. We consider we have national security interest and that has led to the development of some partnerships between the United States and Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal. It's led us to support the United Nation's peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, in Congo, in Côte d'Ivoire, in Sierra Leone, and in Liberia. We hope to support the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, a country that's desperately in need of it. In Africa, we've tried to use power, our economic power and our scientific power, to produce efforts that can help the African people cope with HIV/AIDS. We have a \$30 billion ten-year program to help the people of primarily the southern African countries to cope with the scourge of HIV/AIDS, with an antimalaria initiative and we believe that the future of our relations with Africa is very positive and very bright. Finally, let me say that I know that some of your colleagues gathered today with you are from our hemisphere, from the Americas, and there I would say that we desire very much to have an excellent hemispheric cooperation through naval exercises, through military cooperation, and through the type of work that we have to do together in Haiti. In Haiti, there's the United Nations peacekeeping force, and the countries making the greatest difference there, the leading contributors, are Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and many other countries in between, including Canada and including the United States. All of us have an interest in our own hemisphere in assisting those countries that need help in preserving their internal stability, in overcoming conflict, in overcoming poverty. Haiti is the prime example of that. But we also see in the future of our hemispheric relations the possibility of free trade. Of course, we have this historic,

extraordinary free trade space called NAFTA among Canada, the United States, and Mexico, which is a huge success for all three of us. We have a free trade agreement with Chile and we hope the U.S. Senate will ratify free trade agreements with Panama, Peru, and Colombia this year. We have a very strong partnership with Brazil and I don't know if you have Brazilian naval officers with you, but we desire a close military partnership with Brazil. We consider Brazil to be our most important partner in the hemisphere, in South America. With Mexico, with Colombia, with Panama, I think the future of our relations is built on support for democracy and support for free trade, support for those countries that have narcotics production and trafficking problems. All of us live in this hemisphere and we have to work in it together.

Finally, Admiral, I'm going to finish on one point and I look forward to a conversation with you and your colleagues. I think it's important these days for American government officials to acknowledge the fact that while we are a country with extraordinary power—military, political, and economic—we realize that we do not and cannot live in the world alone. We don't wish to. To conquer any of the great future challenges ahead of us we're going to need international cooperation through our alliances and through our friendships. We don't seek to live in the world unilaterally or work unilaterally; we seek to live cooperatively. If you think about the greatest problems we face—global climate change; trafficking of women and children in the world; international drug cartels; international crime cartels; piracy at sea; the scourge of terrorism and its juxtaposition with chemical, biological, and nuclear technology and [weapons of mass destruction]—if you think of those as at least the core of the great global challenges that we, all of us on this planet, will face for the next generation, none of those problems can be resolved by any one of us alone. Certainly not by the United States alone. So we know that our alliances are vital to us in NATO and with the Asian allies. We know that the regional organizations that promote stability, like the Organization of American States in our hemisphere, like the African Union or the European Union or ASEAN, are very important institutions with which we must work. We also know that, militarily, if we can expand the number of cooperative military relations that we have, so that we discuss and share our views of doctrine and our views of threats, and if we exercise and train together and if we can work together militarily then the world can be safer. We Americans truly believe that. So that's why I'm very happy to be with you today, at least remotely with you, to say thank you for the cooperation that all the countries in the room are giving to the U.S. Navy and we hope to continue that in the years ahead. I think I've probably said enough, Admiral, and now I'd be very happy to have a discussion with all of you.

***Admiral Roughead:***

Ambassador, thank you very much for that wonderful overview and perspective that you bring to the group here. What I'd like to do now is turn it over for questions from my colleagues.

***Ambassador Burns:***

And Admiral, as I can't see everyone, if I could just ask you to identify yourself and country, I'd appreciate that.

***Captain Makris, Greece:***

Mr. Ambassador, I was a little bit surprised when I heard from you that you support the Red Sox team in red and white and, in Athens, you supported Panathinaikos in green and white. To come into my question, we hear your very interesting strategic, political approach. Could you elaborate a little more concerning the relationship between and the approach to Russia and China, because we have seen or we know that there is a military, not exactly cooperation, but military common exercises or approaches in the energy field. Can you elaborate a little bit on that relationship? Thank you very much.

***Ambassador Burns:***

[Welcome in Greek] Captain Madres, thank you very much. You know that I had the great pleasure of living and working in your country and I can assure you I'm still a fan of Panathinaikos in basketball. The Red Sox are baseball, so I hope you'll support my team. Captain, I want to thank you for the great naval traditions that we have between Greece and the United States, for the hospitality you provide to us in Souda Bay in Crete—to our Navy, as well as our Air Force, as we deployed into Bosnia and Kosovo and Afghanistan over the last decade. We thank you for that. And thank you for your question. Let me say a word about Russia to stimulate some conversation. I don't know if there are any Russian officers present today—I'd be happy to hear from them or Chinese officers. But in terms of Russia, I think that we need to maintain a balanced view of our relationship. On the one hand, you think about our two most important global objectives: countering terrorism and limiting the number of nuclear powers in the world that [are capable of] nuclear proliferation. Russia's a partner on both of them. Russia's been a victim of terrorism and has been a very good partner of the United States and I think of your country, too, in this worldwide campaign to try to defeat the terrorist group. On proliferation, Russia's been a partner in the Six-Party Talks in North Korea and a very good one. In Iran, we have some tactical differences with Russia for the short term, but I think in the long term President Putin has made it clear that he does not wish Iran to be a nuclear-weapons power. So we trust that Russia will be with us at the end as we seek to resolve that issue peacefully and diplomatically. On the other hand, and I don't mean to be disrespectful if there are Russians present, but I would say we have a very big disagreement with Russia, [regarding] what Russia calls its "near abroad." The fact [is] that we believe that there are countries now sitting near Russia that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. They are now independent countries; they're sovereign and they should be treated as such. So Georgia, for instance, is a country, I think, towards which Russia should act in a friendlier manner and a less aggressive manner. Moldova is a country that deserves to have Russian forces leave its territory. Estonia is a NATO ally of the United States and yet was subjected to a cyber attack last spring. So I think it's important that the Russians understand that we Americans and many Europeans are going to stand up for these countries and if [these countries] wish to choose an association with NATO and the EU, well, that's their right; but they certainly do not deserve to be treated in the manner in which they've been treated. I would also say that we have a disagreement [over] the centralization of power in the Kremlin. Secretary Rice said that the other day publicly. To see the declining fortunes of democracy



and the press freedoms in Russia is very sad for us, and we've been very critical of it. So I think we have to have a balanced view of Russia. We seek cooperation. We certainly do not seek confrontation, nor do we expect it. But the Russians have to understand that they have to be good, cooperative citizens in the world. Sometimes we believe they are and sometimes we disagree with their actions.

I think China's a very different case and I said a few words about the relationships. I won't try to repeat myself except to say that China needs to think of itself as a stakeholder in the world. I don't know if that translates well, but [it means to] act as a country that has a responsibility to lead globally and to participate in our global efforts to try to stabilize the world and make it peaceful. I think on some issues, China has demonstrated that—on North Korea. On other issues, such as Iran, they have not and so we would hope that China would emerge as a responsible global leader and as one that would contribute to global solutions. Sometimes we see each other doing that, but often we do not. So I think that's what I'd say about both of those great countries.

***Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Denmark:***

I am head of the Danish Navy. I would like to exploit your experience as a NATO ambassador. Could you please elaborate a little bit on your view of the future of NATO and the American focus that is going to the Far East and the Middle East. Could that mean that NATO is decreasing in importance? Some have the opinion that the operations in Afghanistan are the ultimate test if NATO is a relevant military tool. Could you please give us your insight and your viewpoints on this?

***Ambassador Burns:***

Thank you very much and thanks for the great cooperation that we've had for decades with Denmark. Denmark's a great ally of our country. I'd just say very briefly I think that I'm personally totally convinced, but more important President Bush, Secretary Rice, and Secretary Gates are convinced, that NATO is vital for the United States. As I said before, there aren't many people in our country, and certainly not in our leadership, who believe that the United States can go it alone in the world. We need allies and we need friends. NATO is our greatest alliance and has been since April 4th of 1949. I spent four years at NATO as the American ambassador. I'm convinced that it's in our clear national interest to strengthen NATO and to bring members into it. You asked about the future of NATO—I would [state] perhaps four or five goals. Number one, NATO has always been an organization that wishes to take in new members. We've taken in ten countries from Central Europe in the last decade and those countries are now among our strongest-willed and most active members and we thank the Central European countries, the Baltic countries who are now members. We now have a chance to bring in Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia in 2008. Now, those countries have to achieve the membership. They have to meet the criteria and I think we haven't made that decision yet as an alliance, but we need to consider it. We need to consider bringing in the Balkan countries as members of the Partnership for Peace, as partners. While we do not believe that the Asian allies are future members of NATO, we do believe it's important for NATO to continue this program of global partners so that Australia, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan can continue to

participate with us in military exercises, in training. In Afghanistan and in the Balkans, we see that nearly all these countries are present, as many of them are in Iraq with the multinational coalition there. So we value these global partners and we don't see them as future members, but NATO has to think of itself as a transatlantic organization in terms of membership but with global partnerships. I think we can expand those global partnerships to North Africa, to the Levant, to Israel, as well as to the countries of Africa and Latin America in terms of partnerships. We have been trying to do that for many years now. I will agree with you that the operation in Afghanistan is our crucial test. It's extraordinary, but NATO's almost sixty years old and we had never fought a ground mission—we've never had a ground mission until Afghanistan. We fought an air war in Bosnia in 1995, an air war in Kosovo in 1999. We never had a ground effort until Afghanistan. We must succeed there. NATO must not allow the Taliban and al-Qa'eda to emerge victorious and I do think it's nearly an existential challenge for the alliance because the stakes are very high, we are fully invested, and we're going to have to think of this as a long-term mission. We have been in the Balkans for more than a decade. We should expect to be in Afghanistan for as long a period of time. We've done well, the NATO forces have done well. The enemy is shifting to asymmetric tactics, borrowing some of the tactics of the Iraqi militants, suicide bombs and that kind of thing. We have adjusted to that. We have excellent military commanders on the ground. We just need to see that all the NATO allies are willing to take the responsibilities of the toughest fighting on their shoulders. Right now, the great burden of the fight is being carried by Canada, the Netherlands, Britain, the United States, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and some of the Baltic allies. I know I've missed a few and I apologize. We do not see some of the West European allies assuming those responsibilities in the southern part of the country in Orazgan, in Helmand, and Kandahar provinces, and along the border with Pakistan. That's where the great majority of the fighting is. We very much value what the West European allies—Italy, Spain, Germany, France—are doing in the north and west, but we need them to come south and east over the next few years to spell the Canadians and the Dutch. The Canadians, in particular, have shouldered an extraordinary burden and have lost the greatest number of Canadian military personnel since the Korean War. So I do think this is a test for our lives and I think we have to meet that test. So we're very bullish on NATO and we believe in NATO and we're looking forward to strengthening the alliance in the years ahead.

***Major General Dari R. Alzaben, Jordan:***

Your Excellency, going back to the Middle East and the influence of Iran in our area, I think they are using their religion as a cover-up to support either the Shi-ite[s] in Iraq or Hezbollah or Hamas or anybody else. But I think the truth behind it is the Persian era or Persian[s] against Arabs. It's unfortunate, maybe it's a hidden agenda for them that's the situation. We think it is because they are trying to put their hand to everybody's throat in that part. And my second remark is they are talking to the masses, the ordinary people, and with the Palestinian/Israeli issue. So I just want to see your thought, your Excellency, on that, please. Thank you.



***Ambassador Burns:***

General, thank you so much and may I first thank His Majesty King Abdullah and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for your great friendship to our country and for the role that your country is playing in the Middle East, which is a vital one for peace and stability. I mean that quite sincerely. We have great respect for His Majesty and your government. May I also say that I think you've asked the two pertinent questions about the future of the Middle East. On the one hand, can we contain Iran and resolve the Iranian threat peacefully and, on the other, can we help to build a Palestinian state, independent Palestinian state that will live with Israel freely and securely? Those are two great ambitions of the United States. On the first question, we do think Iran is the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East. It's trying to achieve a nuclear-weapons capability. That, if it does achieve that capability, is going to change the balance of power in the Middle East for the worse—against the interest of the moderate Palestinians, of Israel, of your country, and of all the Arab states, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council States that live along the Arabian Gulf, Persian Gulf, and have to live near Iran. What we are hearing from the Arab countries is real concern about the rise of Iranian power and the aggressiveness of Iran politically and militarily. We are, right now, trying to convince our Congress that the United States, and I think we'll be successful in this, should continue our half-century tradition of military cooperation and assistance to the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. I do believe that we will be successful in increasing our level of conventional and naval and air defense assistance of those countries. We're also trying to convince the Iranian government that the way to resolve this problem is for Iran to suspend its nuclear research and to join us in negotiations. They have turned down the United States, Europe, Russia, and China on our joint offer to negotiate with them. But we also have deployed, as the American admirals know very well, carrier battle groups to the Gulf over the past ten months. We've done that not to be provocative, not to be aggressive, but to simply demonstrate what we have demonstrated since the arrival of the American Navy in the Gulf on a permanent basis in 1949, that the Gulf is an international waterway, and that many countries depend on it for commerce and for energy. No country, including Iran, has the right to threaten the maritime security and the security of shipping in the Gulf. We made that point twenty years ago when we had to display considerable naval force to keep the Gulf open in 1987 and 1988 and we are doing so again. It is the great wish of our country, of our government, and of our leadership that we would resolve the Iran problem peacefully and through diplomacy. One of the responsibilities that I have here in the State Department is I am the point person for these Iran talks. Now, I spent a lot of my time with Russia and China and the European countries, as well as the Arab countries, thinking through how we can convince Iran to turn away from the nuclear-weapons future and turn back towards negotiations. I hope that Iran will meet us halfway in those talks. And second, General, you asked about the Palestinian issue. We are very, very focused on that. I think I mentioned that Secretary Rice has spent the week in the Middle East. She was in Egypt yesterday. She's had meetings with Abu Mazen in Ramallah. She met with Palestinian leaders in Bethlehem today and visited the Church of the Nativity. She has been meeting with Prime Minister Olmert in Jerusalem. President Bush is the very first American

president who declared, unequivocally, that it is the policy of the United States to support the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Now, we wish to work with Fatah and with Abu Mazen—Mahmoud Abbas—to seek that objective. We do not work with Hamas because Hamas, of course, practices terrorism, refuses to accept the existence of Israel, and refuses to accept the whole body of negotiations going back to 1948 that we call the Middle East Peace Process. And so we will work with Fatah and Abu Mazen, but not work with Hamas in that objective, but we hope that all of us around the world might be successful in helping to produce an Israeli/Palestinian peace. Thank you very much.


***Admiral Roughead:***

Thank you very much for such a great overview and for your candor and forthrightness in the questions that my colleagues presented. We realize that you are very busy, so I think we may have given you a little bit of white space back, but again, thank you so much and we'll put our collective efforts into seeing what we can do about the Red Sox. Thank you and have a great day.

***Ambassador Burns:***

Admiral, thank you very much. Thanks to all of your colleagues and I wish all of you well and I thank you for your friendship to our country. Thank you very much.





## Panel Discussion One: Information Sharing in Pursuit of International Maritime Security

Moderated by Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa

Panel Members:

Rear Admiral Mohammed Berrada-Gouzi, Morocco

Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich, U.S. Coast Guard

Vice Admiral Rogelio I. Calunsag, Philippines

Rear Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand

Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy

*Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:*

Panel members are invited to take their places on stage at this time. If I could ask you to take your seats, we will begin panel discussion number one. As Vice Admiral Mudimu makes his way to the stage, I would just like to say that there has been a lot of talk about baseball and basketball so far today by Under Secretary Burns and by the Greek delegation, but no one yet has mentioned the beautiful game. So I will. Since this is the most famous game throughout the world, I just want you to know that that we Americans are learning something from soccer and it is directly connected to my job here as the moderator and MC. As I said, it is my unfortunate duty to keep the proceedings moving along; so I will tell Panel One, and as a forewarning to Panels Two and Three, that each panelist has fifteen minutes at maximum to speak. I will be sitting down here in the front and when you have five minutes remaining, you will see this yellow card and when you have two minutes remaining you will see this yellow card again. Everyone knows what happens after the second yellow card: the red card. So I am hopeful that I will not need to use these this year, but we do need to keep the presentations to a maximum of fifteen minutes.

Beginning the proceedings with panel number one, titled “Information Sharing in Pursuit of International Maritime Security,” I would just like to welcome the panelists and introduce Vice Admiral Mudimu, Chief of the South African Navy, who will be the panel moderator for this discussion. He will, in turn, introduce the panelists when it is their turn to speak.

The purpose of our panel, or the objective, is to try to capitalize on lessons learned from efforts that have successfully begun building a common picture of support for increasing maritime security. I will now turn the proceedings over to Vice Admiral Mudimu and we will begin the panel.

*Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:*

Thanks very much, ladies and gentlemen. Thanks also to the master of ceremonies [who] has assisted in terms of [defining] the protocol that you are going to observe in terms of the time frames of the panelists. But firstly allow me to thank Admiral Roughead for organizing this seminar and wish him all the best in his endeavor. I think, together, Admiral, we shall author the new destiny for the navies of the world. Admiral, allow me also to thank the participants of the seminar, and, of course, my panel will be focusing on information sharing in pursuit of international maritime security.

Ladies and gentlemen, allow me just one minute—I think I have three minutes to play around with to share with you some of my thoughts about this particular topic. As a short introduction, I would like to share some of my thoughts. In the troubled relations in which we live today, no country can survive as an island, be it in the economic, social, political, or technological environment. We need to stand as one, as a team to face maritime challenges together. Therefore, mutual cooperation is vital and must be nurtured at every opportunity at the national, regional, continental, and international level.

Our common purpose is to acknowledge that we have a collective responsibility inspired by principles of openness and a balance of maritime power, where both the mighty and the small contribute and benefit on equal footing. It is imperative that the navies learn to trust and respect each other in order to eliminate all forms of suspicion between fellow navies. No navy, no matter how small, should be excluded from the brotherhood and sisterhood of the sea. Enablers that will allow interoperability and the sharing of information to develop trust and eliminate suspicion within the operational framework must underpin these principles. To succeed in this information age, we collectively require developing a common, global data link, a link between all navies. Common operating procedures must be available and be readily available and accessible to all nations. Hand in hand with this cooperation, there is the need for information sharing, particularly in areas of common interest. As navies of the world, our common interest is the maritime environment and the security thereof. Across the globe, our mariners on the high seas, coastal, and inland waters are being faced with increasing asymmetric threats. These are evident in the form of piracy, human trafficking, drug and arms smuggling, and terrorism. This asymmetric warfare is linked to asynchronous warfare and whether our forces can lie in wait at a particular time and place of their choice and to their advantage, to strike or evade the conventional forces of the adversary. To counter such a threat on our participants in the modern world, we must be more reliant on high-speed information and communication systems and we need uninterrupted levels on the high seas and availability. We also have to evolve all of the industrial age to the information age that is transforming ways and means of warfare from the platform-centric to a net-centric paradigm. The information age paradigm focus is on being able to gain and maintain network-centric warfare where forces accomplish objectives faster with few forces and equipment to maneuver in better space. Success lies with timely and accurate intelligence, surveillance, and air reconnaissance allowing for decision making to locate optimal force and configuration to counter specific threats. As mentioned, the key to success is the flow of [and] sharing of information between all the interested parties so that they

are aware of the nature, movements, and possible intentions of all vessels at sea, both in and outside their areas of responsibility, that can pose a threat to maritime security. To achieve this, we need to have structures and systems in place that will keep us continuously up to date with the maritime situation and awareness so that you are always ready and prepared for every eventuality and scenario. Ladies and gentlemen, to navigate with us through this complex topic, I wish to introduce Rear Admiral Berrada-Gouzi from Morocco to speak on the topic of visual reality maritime traffic control. Admiral, over to you. Thanks, ladies and gentlemen.

***Rear Admiral Mohammed Berrada-Gouzi, Morocco:***

With your permission, I will speak French. [Translation follows] Admiral, Chiefs of Naval Staff, delegates, I am Rear Admiral Mohammed Berrada-Gouzi, Inspector of the Royal Navy of Morocco. It's with pleasure that I take the floor today to talk with you about the extent of information for maritime security and to illustrate the measures taken by our navy in order to increase coordination of maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean. My talk will deal with the recent experience of the Royal Navy in matters relating to V-RMTC (Virtual Regional Maritime [Traffic] Centre); but, before, I will talk about the maritime nature of the Kingdom of Morocco, the interest we have for the security problems, and the action of the Royal Navy of our country in this framework.

The Kingdom of Morocco is, without any doubt, a maritime country with an exceptional geostrategic position. Situated between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, we overlook the Straits of Gibraltar from the south. With a coast of 3,500 kilometers on both sides, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, we have under our jurisdiction a very large, exclusive economic zone. The sea is, for us, a strategic space. Nearly all trade exchanges of Morocco are done by means of sea transport. The fishing sector represents a priority of the socioeconomic plan of the country and it contributes in an important way to the GNP [gross national product]. The exploration of the continental shelf has acquired a new dynamic. The promising areas are covered by offshore research permits and cover a great part of the continental shelf. Nevertheless, our country is exposed to the risks and incidents threatening maritime security because of this very preponderant position—all the more [so] when the density of traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar [is] added to the transit of hundreds of vessels en route to Europe by the Cape of Good Hope. [All] present risks that come from the sea. In that respect, the high number of sea incidents along our coast is revealing. These risks would tend to become greater with greater traffic and the appearance of new forms of maritime criminality. It is noteworthy, therefore, that because of geographic position, Morocco has had opportunities to take advantage of, but also has had to assume a maritime dimension. This dimension, [which] for centuries has linked the kingdom to friendly countries more than it has separated it from them, goes back to a maritime history that the Royal Navy has inherited. Thanks to the maritime orientation of the kingdom, its human resources, and a quarter of a century of excellent naval cooperation with the great navies of the United States, France, Spain, Italy, and NATO, the Kingdom of Morocco has acquired the know-how and knowledge necessary for carrying out the missions of a modern navy. The role that is incumbent upon the Royal Navy demands a constant mobilization and stronger vigilance that requires an active and

very visible presence on the sea. In order to confirm this permanent and ubiquitous presence of naval means in the maritime spaces under our jurisdiction, the result of the action has always been to fulfill the expectations of the command. Each year our navy has carried out in a satisfactory way [its] tasks of boarding vessels, permitting us to seize numerous offenders, tens of thousands of clandestine migrants that are intercepted and detained, and tens of tons of drugs that are seized and the criminals brought to justice at the international level. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, numerous project initiatives have been carried out under the auspices of the [International Maritime Organization] IMO and with the encouragement of the United States, to respond to the challenges of security and the safety of maritime spaces. On its side, the Moroccan state, in order to strengthen maritime security in the waters under its authority fulfills its international commitment in accordance with the [International Ship and Port Facility Security] ISPS Code that came into effect in 2004 and defines the package of rules of security that apply to the states, the relations between states and operators of maritime trade, shipowners, vessels, harbors, etc. The equipment of the merchant marine modification systems was originally to assist in the security of navigation in territorial waters and execution of action plans in the fight against the threats to security. Improving the coordination between civilian and military entities, the establishment of new structures strengthens the immediate delegation of operational control and permits a better understanding of the problems of maritime safety, the scope, and integration of the signaling that works along the coast, ensuring the coverage of greatest part of the coastline. Increasing the presence at sea, increasing the surveillance activities and the competence of sea control, the investment in the new generation technologies and telecommunication to increase command and control communication of the operations center necessitates the development of cooperation with the neighboring coastal states in the framework of maritime security. It is clear, in summary, that by means of pragmatic actions, the Kingdom of Morocco has confirmed its decision to safeguard the security of territorial waters under its jurisdiction and to keep its coast free of these threats.

Having underlined the actions of Morocco to secure its coastline, allow me to sketch here the geopolitical and strategic context that we will have to face. The fall of the Berlin Wall has created a new geopolitical situation and the shocks of the terrorist attacks undertaken in many countries have shown the world the type of potential threats that can be expected. We have to take into account the fact that terrorism and organized crime will be the predominant threats for the beginning of the twenty-first century, for the sea environment. The hypothesis of seeing this space used for mafia-like ends is a reality since the terrorist doctrine advocates for suicide attacks and encourages economic targets with the greatest psychological impact. In general, numerous maritime spaces see greater tensions and confrontations from contradictory viewpoints, strategic challenges, and especially perceptions and convictions stemming from sociocultural and religious identities that are antagonistic toward each other. The Mediterranean basin is not free of this logic. The scope of the issues have continued to exacerbate certain dangerous foci, making our countries vulnerable to maritime threats that are born sometimes from beyond our immediate areas. Faced with these risks, we have to prepare an approach that is coordinated and concerted to intervene as far as possible on the high

seas against illicit activities. Freedom on the high seas, [which] was very broad originally, has to be limited in order to coincide with the need for safety that we now face. The obligation to conform with the ISPS and AIS code are examples that show the emergence of new rights and that call for a review of the Montego Bay Convention, [which] the Kingdom of Morocco has ratified, and which continues to be the basis of the legal condition of the oceans. Nevertheless, the fact [is] that the Montego Bay Convention should be modified to better take into account the evolution of the legal panorama of the sea and an awareness of the seriousness of maritime threats. The sea, to the difference of land and air space, is distinguished by a legal mosaic of maritime zones where the national laws are different from each other and where there are great areas that are not covered by law and that encourage a multiplicity of illicit activity when the state is weak. Therefore, the moment has come to favor the opportunities for a voluntary sharing of information by means of global cooperation that takes best advantage of the experience acquired in similar areas. The example of V-RMTC, established by the Italian Navy, is very good in this respect. This maritime tool was initiated during the Fifth [Regional Seapower] Symposium, [which] was held in Venice from 12 to 15 October 2004. In order to enable you to share our recent experience with this system, we can examine together the management of the V-RMTC, which is a resolution of the 5 + 5 Defense Initiative that gathers the ten countries of the western Mediterranean. The Royal Navy, in order to adhere to this system, has obtained the necessary approval from the navy, the merchant marine, and the national harbor agency for its implementation. The evident interest of the system together with the mechanisms that have already been established has enabled us to improve the performance and the framework of the surveillance of the approaches to our kingdom. We are going to institute in due time an international hub and a very major initiative that we have to protect the legal framework that defines the implementation. Its functioning has been the subject of an operational arrangement signed in a meeting of the Chiefs of Naval Staff of the navies of the 5 + 5 Initiative, on 25 May 2007, in Naples, Italy. On a technical level, the exchange has been limited to the flow of vessels of over 300 gross tons. Up to now, twenty-seven navies have joined this initiative in different degrees. These will present a group of alliances and regional cultures that are different but share the same concerns. As far as the Royal Moroccan Navy is concerned, the system has been completely operational since September 2007. Up until now, in addition to the countries participating, international organizations such as NATO, IMO, and [the International Hydrographic Organization] have adhered to it. Its characteristics are flexibility, transparency, [ease of] implementation and its cost-efficiency ratio makes it into a tool that is readily adaptable to regional cooperation. To carry out all the steps necessary for full operability by the Fifth Regional Symposium of the naval powers in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in October 2007, we secured agreements for participation in Naples, 2005. In June 2005, we started the initial phase through the exchange of information by means of Internet and fax. This process has adapted to the 5 + 5 format and was operationally agreed to by the signatories in March 2007. The start-up of the connection of the Royal Moroccan Navy's operations center was started on 7 September 2007. This started thanks to the very valuable support of the Italian Navy. This system had its test of fire during the multinational exercise CANALE 07



with the participation of the 5 + 5 navies. The exchange of information is done by a specialized network. The input is uploaded [in] real time. The availability of the surface situation is guaranteed and the link between the military navies and the civilian departments was evidenced. The system only targets merchant marine vessels over 300 tons for now. It is conceived to be able to evolve and integrate into a global system. From a technical standpoint, the implementation parameters are defined. As for its evolutionary capacity, its possibilities for expansion are important and provide for greater use for humanitarian activities thanks to its flexibility, its transparency, its very good cost-efficiency ratio, and its appeal for eventual participants. Nevertheless, evaluation of this mechanism in light of the recently acquired experience enables us to carry out the following analysis. Based on the principle that our final objective is to neutralize a threat, the knowledge of maritime traffic is not sufficient, in and of itself. You have to be able to actively identify the vessels with suspect behavior and/or carrying out illicit activities to take the appropriate measures against them. For the system to have greater relevance we will have to establish an exchange of information that has characteristics, certification, cargo, ports of call, et cetera. This will only be able to have coastal surveillance capacity. The necessary expansion will be subordinate to the increase of the coverage of the land station, subordinate to the acquisition of sophisticated material which only belongs to some of the collaborating nations, and in addition to the complex training of men. This threat [requires] a thorough knowledge of all maritime activities in order to be able to have a well-targeted intervention. It is obvious that it is not sufficient enough now to take decisions on targeted interventions. The intention of this double capacity—surveillance and intervention—demands we know the use of very advanced means of coordinated detection, transmission, and processing of the information. This requires more enthusiasm on behalf of the emerging navies and more concession on the part of the developed navies and this standpoint will be completed by the talk of Admiral La Rosa of the Italian Navy. As a conclusion, I would like to insist once more on the enormous asset in the maritime domain that we have to protect in a pragmatic and global cooperation. Nevertheless, Admiral and delegates, the objectives of this panel are a group of challenges that this eighteenth symposium is going to emphasize. I'm convinced that the cordial discussion will give a new enthusiasm, a new impetus to the cooperation for a safer sea. So let us shove off towards the maritime world where the knowledge of information will be such that the threats to the maritime security will be eliminated. Thank you.

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Thanks, Admiral Berrada-Gouzi, the Inspector of the Moroccan Royal Navy. Our second panelist, honorable delegates, is Rear Admiral Joseph Nimmich, the U.S. Coast Guard's Director, Joint [Interagency] Task Force South on the topic *Joint Intelligence Task Force South Operations*. Admiral, over to you.

***Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich, United States Coast Guard:***


Thank you, sir. Admiral Roughead, chiefs of navies, commandants of coast guards, delegates, thank you very much for the invitation to be here and to speak to you a little bit about what JIATF South does.




JIATF South is the Joint Interagency Task Force South, an 18-year journey against illicit maritime threats—the primary maritime threat being the one behind you, which is drug trafficking. Drug trafficking in the region is an enemy without borders. [Traffickers] look at any opportunity and any mechanism with which to



transport their drugs. Hiding within legitimate traffic, use of legitimate trade routes and trade vehicles, they have no requirements, no limitations on their mechanisms and how they go about doing their business. It makes it very difficult for anyone to be able to understand and have a complete picture. My requirements as the director of JIATF South are to provide detection and monitoring, to find and monitor the flow of narcotics, and to pass that off to legitimate entities to apprehend and intervene. Those legitimate entities often are U.S. law enforcement and often militaries from partner nations. I'm also to promote security and cooperation in regional initiatives, but primarily by information sharing and that's the focus of what I hope to talk to you today about. Joint Interagency Task Force South is a unique opportunity because we have both all of the U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as some of our allied partner agencies, and multiple foreign liaison officers that begin the process of building relationships to share information based upon trust. As Admiral Roughead talked about this morning, the closer and the more we understand each other, the better we are able to share information and information, much like territory, has national sovereign[ty] requirements to it. Every nation has information that they can share and every nation has information that they can't share. How we go about providing the maximum amount of information in a very rapid, highly tactical environment is what JIATF South is about. Much of my information has a very short life span and I need to be able to provide that in as rapid and as capable a means as possible. Many of these liaison officers that you see here work with multiple countries. They aren't just required or restricted to their own countries. They have relationships with other countries within the area where we operate that provide that ability to share information; but person-to-person information often is the slowest way and we look for opportunities to be able to find systems that allow us to share information. Let me talk a little bit about how we go about developing the information itself.




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Much of what I do in JIATF South starts with human intelligence. It starts with a cueing from an individual who has spoken to U.S. law enforcement downrange: DEA (the Drug Enforcement Agency), our Federal Bureau of Investigation, one of the agencies that participates in JIATF South. They will get a piece of information that will be a cue for us. Then I need to use all of the opportunities that are available to me (e.g., my allies, my partner nations, tactical information) to be able to fuse together a picture, identify, sort, and monitor that particular threat vector, and then I need to be able to share that to the maximum extent possible. The sharing becomes a real challenge when you talk in terms of the various agencies and their requirements, the partner nations and their requirements, and our ability to sort through that and ensure that we don't break that bond of trust with those entities that provide the information. At JIATF South, we bring all that together, we create a fused picture. We then go ahead and sanitize it, eliminate sources, eliminate the possibility that confidential informants will be compromised, and then we provide that in a unique manner to each country. How we go about it is a process that was developed over the last 18 years. I apologize, there's a set of slides that should be in here to talk about CNIES. CNIES is the Cooperating Nations Information and Exchange System. It's a system run by SOUTHCOM, but used primarily by JIATF South. It's one where we can provide information from op center to op center. It has the ability to provide a common operating picture, bilaterally, meaning that each nation allows certain information to be shared with another nation, so that if it is proprietary for one nation they do not have to share with a second nation. We can require

that or put that into the system so that we don't compromise a nation's information; but we share the critical information in order to allow partner nations to be able to enforce their laws with the information that we have. Currently, JIATF South is the primary user of CNIES. We are the ones that have deployed the system in many of our countries. Many of you here in the room are users of the CNIES system. CNIES is a hardware system. It's got computers and encryption capability, but it also has the software for a common operating picture, as well as translating capability, e-mail, and probably most importantly, a chat capability—a chat capability where we can define, send information downrange, and receive information back. CNIES is not just for JIATF South. Partner nations share information with each other through the CNIES system because it goes operations center to operations center, but there is a backbone that allows us to ensure that the sovereignty of that information is always protected. So the next slide that is up is what we do:



JIATF South, based on the cueing that I indicated, will detect and monitor. We provide that information to the level possible to partner nations. We sort through that information to be able to find that illegitimate entity operating through legitimate means: that fishing vessel that appears to be fishing, but is carrying a load of narcotics; that container on a containership that's on an illegitimate traffic; that aircraft that has declared a legitimate route and then an in-flight emergency and landed in an illicit airstrip to off-load the narcotics before finishing its trip. We sort through all that, provide and monitor it, and then transfer that information through CNIES, through the relationships we have built with our LNOs [liaison

officers], back to host countries that do much of the interdiction, or to U.S. law enforcement assets. Depending upon where the interception is done, we may bring the individuals back to the United States, prosecute them in the United States, use that prosecution as a means to gather more human intelligence in starting the cueing cycle or we work with our partner nations as they prosecute and gather additional information for us to be able to move back into the cycle. Information is the heart and soul and backbone of what we do at JIATF South. Without the information, we can't provide the picture to all of those countries because, as it says in the national strategy that you were discussing this morning, we realize day in and day out that we can't combat this illicit trafficking by ourselves. We need to have each and every one of you in the room as part of our partners in our ability to be able to interdict and apprehend those that are using legitimate means, using the oceans, using the global commons as a mechanism for illicit activities. Thank you.

[Applause]

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Thank you Admiral Nimmich. Our third presenter is Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, on global and terror information sharing. Admiral, over to you.


***Vice Admiral Rogelio I. Calunsag, Philippines:***

Admiral Roughead, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. It is my distinct honor to present to you the Philippine Coast Watch South System as our contribution to the attainment of situational awareness and the effective governance of the maritime domain. The scope of my presentation is as shown.


The Philippines lies between the Malacca Strait and the North Pacific Ocean. While more than half of the world's cargo and about half of the Middle East oil passes through Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits in Malaysia and Indonesia,







some of this maritime traffic invariably passes either north or south of the Philippines. Many vessels even cross the Philippine archipelago to reach the powerhouse economies of China, Korea, Japan, the United States, and Australia, among other ports of call.



To give you a clearer view of the maritime traffic in the Philippine maritime areas, shown are the shipping routes passing close to or through our archipelagic nation and maritime state. To maintain the economic and social equilibrium in our largely maritime world, goods must flow and people ought to pass freely through its sea lines of communication.



But the movement of people and goods across the maritime domain has not always been safe, secure or without damage to the maritime environment and the ecology. Piracy and armed robbery against ships is still a cause of concern for us. Incidents of bombings of passenger ferries have been launched by different armed groups; the intrusion of foreign vessels in the Philippines remains rampant. Intrusions occur for various reasons, such as illegal immigration and illegal fishing activities. Human trafficking and smuggling of goods are frequent threats that we have to confront. Furthermore, activities that threaten our marine resources, such as poaching and illegal fishing, are concerns that our government is addressing. Our country is losing vast amounts of resources due to these illegal activities. Studies have shown that the Philippines is losing annually some Php 50 billion [50 billion Philippine pesos] due to illegal fishing, Php 5 billion due to smuggling, and some Php 15 billion due to water pollution.

To protect our national interest and, at the same time, perform our obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Coast Watch System has been conceived. Due to resource constraints, the Coast Watch System in




southern Philippines, the most vulnerable to threat and challenges, was given top priority; hence the initiative Coast Watch South. Eventually, Coast Watch South shall be replicated in other parts of the Philippines to cover the waters of the whole archipelago—especially our Exclusive Economic Zone.


Coast Watch South shall have three major components, namely surveillance, command and control, and response or interdiction. Surveillance shall be provided through an integrated land, air, and seaborne monitoring capability. Interdiction will be provided by small- to medium-sized seaborne assets and maritime aircraft. And in order to coordinate maritime surveillance and response operations, the development of command and control centers and centralized information-sharing architecture will be pursued together with the acquisition of the necessary communications equipment.

Coast Watch South Headquarters aims to integrate national capabilities for a comprehensive coverage of the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas. The Coast Watch South headquarters will be the facility for obtaining a common operating picture of our waters for use of both client agencies and force providers.

Moreover, Coast Watch South is envisioned to link with Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Agency and Indonesia's Bakorkamla as the single point of contact for coordinating cross-border maritime security operations. It is also scalable to have room for trilateral operation or even evolve into a multilateral maritime security initiative.

The development of national capabilities in the case of the Philippines can be a showcase of how international cooperation can be maximized to enhance maritime security. For our next year's budget, the Philippine Navy has allocation for the acquisition of interdiction assets and for upgrading our existing maritime aircraft. Our partners in the region, such as the United States, Australia, Japan, and Korea,





have extended support for the establishment of Coast Watch South. Mention must also be made on the ongoing discussions on maritime security among four countries, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, under the East ASEAN Growth Area framework.

In conclusion, Coast Watch South will enable the Philippines to protect its national interest and contribute its modest share in the effective governance of the maritime domain in order to keep its waters as a highway for legitimate travel and trade and as a barrier to lawless elements and undesirable goods. It ensures the protection of international trade and the safe voyage of people across national boundaries which are essential in achieving our common vision of a community of developed nations. It also enables our governments to better manage our resources for future generations to enjoy. Finally, Coast Watch South enhances our ability to cooperate with our neighbors in the protection of our common borders. This ends my presentation, thank you and good afternoon.

[Applause]

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

We will now call upon Rear Admiral David Ledson, Chief of the Royal Navy of New Zealand, to give us his experiences on Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Admiral Ledson.

***Rear Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:***

Thank you, sir. Admiral Roughead, chiefs of navy, ladies and gentlemen. It's been my personal experience that when you wish to make a contribution, particularly

one that gently leads towards some action, the word you most often hear is no. But it has also been my experience that when you want to do that, the yeses you do hear make the noes worthwhile. This afternoon, New Zealand is making a presentation on behalf of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and it is a presentation that includes a proposal to gently lead us towards taking some action. Whether or not we take action depends on whether or not the chiefs of navy in the room say yes or whether they say no. As the Western Pacific Naval Symposium's contribution to maritime security, it's our contribution to demonstrate that navies can achieve a global effect, and they can achieve a global effect as forces for good. As you listen to the presentation, I ask you to please think less about the challenges that it raises, which are quite small, and more about the opportunities it presents, which are immense. And I want you to think about it too in the context not of the bonds of trust, but of the freedoms that trust gives us. So now I'd now like to introduce Captain Roger MacDonald, who will make the presentation on the Western Pacific Naval Symposium proposal. I would add that it sits alongside the presentation I know that Admiral La Rosa will make about the system used by Italy.

***Captain Roger MacDonald, New Zealand:***

Admiral Roughead, distinguished admirals of the panel, chiefs of navies, fellow colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, it's my pleasure to present to you this demonstration from the WPNS nations. The agenda for today is in front of you and part of the demonstration today will be a live demonstration at the end of it. So it's not just a brief on what technology can do, but it's actually a demonstration of what can be done in a mobile environment like we are in today. The purpose of the brief is to brief the Western Pacific Navy Symposium proposal to achieve the exchange of information in the context of a global maritime information exchange integration to be demonstrated in the next three years. That's the purpose of this brief.

In today's information exchange environment, there are just simply a multitude of networks, sponsors, standards, technologies, et cetera, et cetera; and every time we come across a new situation, we resolve it by building another network to interoperate with and so it's quite a multitude out there that does need addressing. There are also a multitude of venues and capabilities, but the key is which ones, which combinations, how much of each network, when, and at what cost do we incur to achieve interoperability as and when required and in a dynamic situation. It's quite a challenge for navies to actually achieve. We need to change perspectives in the way we look at interoperability. The way we actually carry out interoperability at the moment is in a very layered approach. We have security levels, a first specific layer. It's largely nondynamic and we really work on a basis of excluding individuals and nations and partners rather than including them. Security ranges from basic security to quite complex security and it really depends on which particular layer we're dealing with and the security solutions are specific to each layer. Whether it's the governing agency layers and numerous numbers of coalition layers, allied layers, and national layers at a high assurance level, they all have complexities with security that pertain to those particular layers. Where we need to go tomorrow is to move towards a single depth of security system that is responsive dynamically to need. That really works on the basis of inclusion rather than excluding individuals, nations, and participants in those layers. It needs to be completely

independent of the transmission mediums. It doesn't matter what platform, in a navy context, that we use to connect to our network. We really want to be independent of that transition medium. We want to use everything that is possibly available in a theater at the time we need it. It needs to be simple and it needs to have a low cost of access, so it's not prohibitively expensive to actually build the infrastructures or connect to that particular layer you want access to. The interoperability spectrum really needs to be looked at from a matter of low classified, rank classified information that we may want to have in the public domain from a navy perspective, to highly classified information at the top of the spectrum. It's more how we actually connect the communities of interest into that. It doesn't really matter what the community of interest is, whether it's an allied, national or public, or civil agency, we really want to scale them into the environment, the information environment that we have in a structured sense. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium discussed this in October last year in Hawaii, discussed it in more detail in Auckland in New Zealand in June this year, and took a proposal forward to use the Internet, with an adaptive security gateway, that has been designed and is running live, that meets all these requirements of what we really need today and in the future for interoperability. It doesn't matter what the community of interest is or who [the members of] the community of interest are. If they want access to information at a particular time, dynamically, they're going to need access to the information independent of where the information is currently parked in terms of the security layout. The solution that the Western Pacific Naval Symposium came up with and the solution that has been demonstrated today shows that if there is an unclassified component, then we can easily access that through the Web, through the World Wide Web, which is global, and an unclassified level that is a level of connectivity. If we want to protect information at a more sensitive level, then we need a single adaptive system that actually allows us to do that so that the community of interest requiring access to that particular layer gains the access they require. And if we want to show a lot more granularity of information and classification level then we want the same solution to the community of interest who need access to that information and scale them up into our classified sense without having to change systems, without having to log on to some other network, without having to buy other infrastructure to actually achieve that. So in one seamless interchange, move up into a higher classification level. The WPNS solution is highly responsive to need. It does provide dynamic access information. It is completely independent of the transmission system. It is technically simple. It actually can operate at low to no cost. If you already have access to the Internet, you already have access to a Web browser, then there is no additional cost to interface into and scale into any level of information you require. It is easy and it's immediately available. The WPNS solution is an immediately available global solution. It's able to use any communications system in the world. It uses existing equipment with no additional investment. It's able to communicate with any existing information system independent of security classification. And it is able to use any connecting device at any time. In today's demonstration, there will be a number of devices running on wireless or cellular mechanisms to actually access through the Internet the gateway and gain information [at] various classified levels that can be demonstrated live. A World Wide Web site for WPNS has been established through which access to these

levels of classification, anywhere in the world, at any time, on any communications system, can actually reach the information required. The live demonstration today will be at secure and nonsecure access levels. It'll use commercial cellular devices. It'll use the Internet and wireless. The demonstration will utilize the Internet. It will show access to unclassified World Wide Web. It'll show access to secure collaboration, e-mail capabilities. And it'll show access to a WPNS cop for a tsunami that actually occurred today for this particular presentation. And various units from WPNS are actually en route to that particular spot at the moment. These tracks are, when we show them in this demonstration, live and it's operating access through the actual Web itself. The capabilities shown today are just representative capabilities. The WPNS solution is not another network in its own right. It acts as a gateway to any other network in the world, so whatever capabilities are on that network and those networks it has access to, then it will actually allow access to those. So it's not inventing new capabilities, *per se*. The next steps forward are that there is an opportunity for the International Seapower Symposium delegates, for users to note that there is an opportunity to rapidly leverage off WPNS and other navy initiatives that already exist to provide global maritime interoperability for low-level contingencies. That there is a potential, for the demonstrated capability that will be shown today, to be able to be used to enable maritime information sharing when used in conjunction with an existing nation's networking capabilities. There is a recommendation to seek your agreement that International Seapower Symposium should set as an objective the arrangement for a humanitarian assistance operation based on WPNS initiatives within the next three years and agree to an approach made by WPNS to other navy fora to establish a framework for planning and executing such an activity. There is an agreement sought from you as an international seapower symposium to the commencement of dialogue during the symposium to capitalize on the available synergies that are present to move this interoperability piece forward and agree that WPNS will report back to this forum in 2009 on the movement forward and the achievement of this goal.

That was the end of the brief. I will try and bring out one slide further, which is just the next slide. That's just the representation of live track data that is running on the Web or accessed through the Web and it's showing WPNS nation navies' platforms en route to a tsunami in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. As I said, it is a live track database running. There are a number of devices that are available for your staff officers to look at, and yourselves too, during this forum. Any other technical detail, then, I am happy to answer in any detail during this forum while you're present. Thanks very much.

**Rear Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:**

Thanks, Roger.

[Applause]

**Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:**

Thanks very much. The last presentation of the day is *Information Sharing in Pursuit of Maritime Security: The Italian View*, by Admiral Paolo La Rosa, the Chief of the Italian Navy General Staff. Thanks very much.

**Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy:**

Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. First of all, I would like to thank Admiral Roughead for inviting me as Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy to participate in and to talk to this remarkable event. Then I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Admiral Shuford and to all the U.S. Navy people. They have so perfectly organized this important symposium.

I wish to start addressing the Italian Navy's vision on the improvement of information sharing in pursuit of maritime security, showing the need of a proactive approach to this fundamental issue and thereby closing with a proposal to the entire maritime community for the enhancement of cooperation and security. In an ideal vision, in an ideal world, the vision of maritime awareness and security would probably look as follows:

- Free and secure transport. Ships depart ports heading towards the clear destinations through the most convenient route;
- Port authorities have systematic knowledge about loading and unloading operations;
- Containers, shipping terminals and the whole maritime supply chain are secured;
- Information flows without barriers through the global maritime community.

Well, in such a world, let me argue that we might joke by saying that navies should look for something better to do, maybe even more amusing. Unfortunately, in the

**Italian Navy**

## WHY ARE WE HERE TODAY?

TO FORGE COOP. SOLUTIONS FOR INT. MARITIME SECURITY

<p style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; margin: 0;">THREAT TYPES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PIRACY</li> <li>• TERRORISM</li> <li>• ILLEGAL MIGRATION</li> <li>• DRUGS' TRAFFICKING</li> <li>• ARMS' SMUGGLING</li> <li>• TRANSPORT OF WMD</li> <li>• ENVIROMENTAL POLLUTION</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; margin: 0;">THREAT DISTINCTIVENESS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ASYMMETRY</li> <li>• SURPRISE FACTOR</li> <li>• GUERRILLA TACTICS</li> <li>• OFF THE SHELF TECHNOLOGIES</li> <li>• SUICIDE ATTACKS</li> </ul>
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HOW CAN INFO SHARING CONTRIBUTE TO MARITIME SECURITY?

<http://www.marina.difesa.it>



real world, things are not that easy and the so-called ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] model, whereby every movement is known and controlled, neither applies to the maritime context today, nor will it probably in the medium term. As a consequence, no authority can currently avail itself of a systematically updated and comprehensive maritime picture. The achievement of an ideal situation is hampered by several factors, such as information asymmetry, which is related to the need to gain advantages in the shipping industry and is affected by international regulations less strict than in the air traffic world. It is, therefore, important to carefully dig into the information-sharing issue, to investigate how it can contribute, to forge cooperative solutions for international maritime security.

And that is why we are here today, striving to find solutions for keeping order at sea through the development of cooperative strategies for our navies. By all means, the threat is out there posed to strike. Yet we do not know where, when and how. So what can we do?

Let's see what we have done in the Italian Navy.



In early 2006, starting my [Chief of Naval Operations] tour, I developed the vision based on two strategic functions; one focused on the contribution to homeland and regional security, the other concern[ed] the exploitation of [a] navy's typical expeditionary capabilities. These functions have respectively generated the concepts of integrated maritime surveillance and capabilities projection—something more or different from force or power projection. Capability projection at sea and

from the sea [are] both supported by the important catalyst role played by dialogue and cooperation.

Concerning integrated maritime surveillance, last year we rolled out an operational framework foreseeing the exploitation of naval and air patrols on [a] 24/7 basis, radar and AIS inputs from our coastal radar network, information from the Italian Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service, and other sources. We are now getting this framework operational into what has been christened as the System for Inter-agency Integrated Maritime Surveillance, nicknamed with the acronym of S-I-I-M-S, or easily, SIIMS. SIIMS is by all means the Italian response to the quest for maritime situational awareness, in line with the similar initiatives started within the context of NATO, the European Union, and other forums, such as CHENS [Chiefs of European Navies].<sup>1</sup>



The implementation of SIIMS emphasizes once more the importance of dialogue and cooperation, the key binomial that enhances effective confidence building, also being the catalyst of our vision. Indeed, no navy can effectively deal with maritime security alone, thereby implying the need to foster cooperation and synergies with other institutions involved in the maritime constabulary activities.

1. The CHENS in its Maritime Security Operations document mentions four lines of development (LODs), one of which is devoted to information. The others are diplomatic, commercial, and operations.



Italian Navy

# THE COAST GUARD CONTRIBUTION

## INTERAGENCY INVOLVEMENT

The diagram illustrates the interagency involvement between EMSA and the Italian Coast Guard (C.G. OPS CENTRE) through the SAFESEANET system. EMSA is represented by the European Union flag logo, and the C.G. OPS CENTRE is shown with a computer monitor displaying a map. A double-headed arrow labeled 'SAFESEANET' connects them. A large arrow points from the C.G. OPS CENTRE towards the V.T.M.I.S. section. The V.T.M.I.S. section lists several systems: Regional AIS, VTS vessel traffic service, ARES for radio control of national merchant traffic over 300 tons, HAZMAT for control of hazardous cargo, VMS for satellite control of national trawlers (Blue Box), NAVTEX for the transmission of danger signals to sailors, and MAREM for marine pollution fighting. The URL <http://www.marina.difesa.it/> is provided at the bottom right.

**V.T.M.I.S.**

**VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM**

- Regional AIS
- VTS vessel traffic service
- ARES for radio control of national merchant traffic over 300 tons
- HAZMAT for control of hazardous cargo
- VMS for satellite control of national trawlers (Blue Box)
- NAVTEX for the transmission of danger signals to sailors
- MAREM for marine pollution fighting

<http://www.marina.difesa.it/>

And I have to say that this is in line with the U.S. Navy maritime strategy illustrated this morning and the coordination among the three maritime services. At a national level, for instance, SIIMS is the Italian Navy's hub that gathers, integrates, and disseminates information in connection with pertinent agencies also ensuring connectivity with analogous international hubs.

In this interagency effort, particular contribution is provided by a specific and key corps of the Italian Navy, the Coast Guard, hereby represented by its commandant, Admiral [Raimondo] Pollastrini. The Italian Coast Guard, besides running several information systems specifically aimed at its institutional tasks, is posed to act as regional AIS integrating agency in the ambit of SAFESEANET, the European Union maritime safety net. However, by moving towards a wider view of maritime security, we find that procedures commonality and systems compatibility bear inherent limitations.

Indeed, the need and the will to share information become crucial, thereby overcoming any other interoperability issue. This requires it to continuously develop a reciprocal knowledge and mutual trust, both to be nurtured through appropriate and long-lasting confidence-building initiatives. The seeds of this process have already been sown, as testified by Admiral [Michael] Mullen, [U.S. Navy,] at the 2006 Venice Symposium when he stressed the need to develop global maritime partnerships.

This issue has been confirmed by the Singapore Navy, which had declared intent to adopt Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMix), a system exploiting a model similar to the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center (V-RMTC) in the



# INFORMATION SHARING

## KEY CONCEPTS

- RECIPROCAL KNOWLEDGE
- MUTUAL TRUST
- CONFIDENCE BUILDING
- PROCEDURES COMMONALITY
- SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY
- WILL TO SHARE



GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP

<http://www.marina.difesa.it/>



# VIRTUAL REGIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC CENTRE

REGIONAL SEAPOWER  
SYMPOSIUM  
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AND  
BLACK SEA NAVIES  
6<sup>th</sup> Edition

17 COUNTRIES OPERATIONAL  
ARRANGEMENT SIGNATURE



VENICE, 12 OCTOBER 2006

## OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENT

BETWEEN:  
THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CANADA  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
AND  
THE NAVY OF DENMARK  
AND  
THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE BAHAMAS  
AND  
THE ROYAL NAVY OF THE BAHAMAS  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC  
AND  
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA  
AND  
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE PORTUGAL REPUBLIC  
AND  
THE NAVY OF ROMANIA  
AND  
THE NAVY OF SLOVAKIA  
AND  
THE NAVY OF DENMARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA  
AND  
THE NAVY OF DENMARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF SPAIN  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SWEDEN  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM  
AND  
THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
VIRTUAL REGIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC CENTRE  
(V-RMTC)  
FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA



<http://www.marina.difesa.it/>

Mediterranean. And something similar we have seen in the presentation of our New Zealand colleagues.

This brings me to briefly touch on the V-RMTC, regionally conceived as a pilot project at the 2004 edition of the Venice Symposium, and it quickly turned into a program thanks to the prompt and solid support received from several countries. Seventeen navies signed the V-RMTC operational arrangement last year [2006] in Venice and the community is growing through a transparent process that requires unanimous approval from the incumbents. Germany has just joined the community. Bulgaria is in the process to get approval and other Mediterranean and Black Sea countries are showing a concrete interest in the system.


This fosters a process that is also spurring massive information exchange, as confirmed by the average 20 percent growth rate experienced in the last few months and by our year-to-date statistics showing a consistent increase in the number of daily reported tracks.

As a matter of fact, through its Internet portal, the V-RMTC connects operations centers from eighteen navies operating in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, thereby building up an international community characterized by strong diversity and plurality. This community generates a varied environment that allows the seamless sharing of information based on mutual trust, handled as unclassified among different countries. In truth, besides its operational nature, with an effectiveness that can and must be improved, the V-RMTC has, so far, proved to be an effective confidence-building measure. Furthermore, having been conceived as an open system for an open community, the V-RMTC fosters its effectiveness for being

## Italian Navy


# V-RMTC GETS OPERATIONAL

### AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATISTICS



applicable to different contexts. With this respect, I wish to recall its exploitation in the development of the maritime dimension of the 5 + 5 related by Admiral Berrada-Gouzi. Here, I wanted to underline that despite a commonality of concepts, the V-RMTC 5 + 5 net enjoys total separation from the V-RMTC wider community, whereby even separate rooms are employed to host the different hardware of the two systems. This stems from a concept that although overcoming physical and bureaucratic boundaries, yet has to ensure the restriction standards still required by information sharing in the maritime domain.


Another example lies in the adoption of the V-RMTC model as a two-way operational tool for maritime information sharing between Italian ships and Lebanese authorities during the 2006 crisis in Lebanon. Indeed, within the scope of the purely maritime early-entry operation, besides projecting ashore a joint landing force mainly composed of navy and marines, we also promptly undertook with other navies, namely the French and Greek navies, maritime surveillance in advance of the designated UN force. The task required the immediate setup of [a] dedicated information-sharing system for maritime surveillance. The availability of a flexible and easy-to-use system for building up a recognized maritime merchant picture (from this the name RMMP-Lebanon [RMMP-L]) was fundamental on that occasion, based on a bilateral agreement between Lebanon and Italy [Technical Agreement between the Italian Navy and Lebanese Navy on Maritime Cooperation in the Areas Facing the Lebanese Coast, signed at Venice on 12 October 2006].



- Free software developed and distributed by Italy
- Software developed with technologies allowing automatic update
- Internet as underlying asset for connectivity
- Shareholding framework: equal share – no leading positions

The RMMP-Lebanon therefore becomes another concrete example of the inherent flexibility of the V-RMTC model, which is also cost effective due to the free distribution of its software, to the adoption of Internet connectivity, and to a host of savings that can be achieved in terms of reduced patrol activities.

To summarize, let me just say that the only real cost to bear with the V-RMTC is the genuine will to cooperate in line with the theme of this symposium. Indeed, V-RMTC and its variants represent different solutions to the quest of international maritime security forged through cooperation among individual players. If I were to define the V-RMTC in terms of corporate governance, I would describe it as a shareholding framework where community members are entitled to manage equal shares of business and nobody can take a leading position.




As I said at the beginning, the ICAO model is currently inapplicable to the maritime context. I am, however, convinced that we must keep a proactive approach, which means designing a future of global partnership with total information sharing whereby each actor strives and operates at its level to widen and strengthen the network for as much as he can. Each area of the world might have regional initiatives paving the way for a global trusted information network.

We might, therefore, imagine a world where[*in*] navies interact at a regional level sharing unclassified information on shipping with the aim of achieving a common and comprehensive maritime awareness and thereby improving regional security. This would generate a family of regional initiatives to initially share the same model and then to evolve into a global network enabling many-to-many



information sharing, always in the spirit of the three main features of flexibility, transparency, and cost-effectiveness. It goes without saying that members with global reach can participate in several systems. In the Italian Navy, we are open to share the V-RMTC model with the whole maritime community, in line with a global maritime partnership concept. On this ground, I have already started an extensive interagency involvement in my own country raising the interest of superior authorities at [the] interministerial level up to the head of government.



As a matter of fact, the regionalization of local information networks through the adoption of open and compatible systems based on V-RMTC or similar models should be viewed as an optimal solution that guarantees wider information sharing whilst globally exploiting maritime surveillance capabilities developed and tailored at the regional level. In conclusion, on our way towards the achievement of a global trusted information network, I think that the maritime community is going through an interim period during which we need to take into account specific aggregation constraints among countries while, at the same time, increasing trust. I, therefore, believe in the idea of a flexible network model, fit to provide the framework for the global trusted network, as well as suited to satisfy specific community needs. I am confident that the concept of a family of networks independent from alliances and geographical constraints will meet the favor of the entire maritime community, being an open system with no owner and in which each country gives a little, its data, to get a lot, all data coming from other participants. The development of this concept will significantly build confidence, thus accelerating the process towards a global network.

I therefore call on the navies represented in this symposium and on the IMO to support an idea that goes beyond any specific political and commercial interest and only for the sake of forging a global situation awareness as a cooperative and effective contribution to international maritime security. All in all, I must say that the saying “Act locally, think globally” continues to keep its validity. In thanking you all for your attention, I take this opportunity to announce that I am starting the organization of the next edition of the Regional Seapower Symposium for the Mediterranean and Black Sea navies in Venice, as usual, between the 14th and the 17th of October, 2008. Thank you very much.

[Applause]

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Members, we have 20 minutes to ourselves, meaning twenty members will be able to ask questions but each member will have one minute and you have to identify yourself in terms of your name, rank, and the question. Whether you make a question or a comment, you must state that. But members, I think the question that ranges in our mind is: Can we really afford not to share? Are we a team of naval leaders of the world who can alter the course of events? Is there a willing determination amongst ourselves to create an environment where we can share information and protect each other? I think this is the question that will range and I think the questions will be directed in that direction. I think of the number of suggestions in terms of concrete steps that need to be taken. I think we're on the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium here in Newport. What is it that we're taking back to our countries? What is it that you want to see happen? Can we afford to continue to live in a world of suspicion? Members of the house, I invite questions. Thanks very much.

[Long pause]

The lunch was excellent, members, I know the lunch was very excellent and I hope my able panelists here managed to keep you awake with this very interesting topic and there were no yellow flags or red flags. I think they lived within the expectation. Tim, thanks very much, I think you are a very excellent panelist. I enjoyed working with you. Now I want to enjoy working with the house in terms of the future, the destiny, we want to create for ourselves and for our countries and what agenda that we are going to push to our leaderships. Thanks very much.

***Captain Abderraouf Atallah, Tunisian Navy:***

I didn't catch the difference between the proposal of [the] New Zealand Navy and the proposal of Admiral La Rosa. Could you clarify if there is a difference between the two.

***Rear Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:***

I'm not a technical person, so my answer to your question is that one of the proposals was given in Italian and the other was given in English.

[Laughter]

However, since we are inclined to be a serious bunch of people, I'll ask Roger. Can you give a quick response to that? Grab a mike.

***Captain Roger MacDonald, New Zealand:***

Okay, the proposal as put forward to you was based on the fact that we don't really want to know who wants to connect to the network. We don't want to know what their operating systems are; we don't want to know anything about them. What we want to know is that if they have to connect to a maritime network of any form, then at the time they want to connect, then we'll interrogate them to find out what their security posture is and bring them into the network. So it's totally independent of what software they're running and what operating system they're running. All they need to do is access the Web portal and we take care of everything from there. So it's basically a front-door access to any other system. So it's not a system in competition with the V-RMTC or NC or Centrex or any other network. It's just the front gateway to bring anyone in the world independent of our civil agents, civil aid agency, [nongovernmental organization], or any agency at all into the network domain. So it's a front door to all the other networks, which they can't do at the moment.

***Captain Christophe Pipolo, France:***

I do not have a precise question but I would have some remarks on your level and all I'd ask of you is just to be sure to understand what you have said. Sir, I perfectly understand the need for all our navies to be connected to any original system via the Internet. So if I'm traveling from France with a ship going to New Zealand, for example, I could be connected to your system, sir, so that I could have information. If you are coming to Europe and you are going through the Mediterranean, you could be connected to the V-RMTC, where all the signatory navies would be pleased to welcome you on board and to provide nonclassified information that could help you to progress in your mission; and, wherever in the world we are going to, we could do so. So this is the first objective I understood that we are trying to build together and it seems to me, as a technician of these types of things, that is achievable. On the other hand, there are some other realities we have to take into account. I mean, we as navies have the need to be connected to these types of systems because these are not depending on any political stance or official alliance or organization to which we could have some difficulties to get in and to exchange information. But, on the other hand, we have to know that all these organizations, European Union in Europe or NATO or some other much more formal organization, are developing, let's say much more rigorous networks into which we as sailors would need to be plugged in. So, I think that here we have two realities. The network realities you are describing, sir, and I totally subscribe to your point of view, and one day, all this will have to be seen as global. On the other hand, we will need to be connected one way or another to the much more official networks into which our politicians are leading us. I just want to be sure that this understanding is one of the things that you mention, sir, during your presentation. Thank you.

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Thanks very much. I said we have 20 minutes, so give each other that minute to say something please.



***Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France:***

There we had very good presentations about maritime surveillance and what is going on is going well. But, after surveillance, we need an action and I was very interested by the joint intelligence and task force presentations. Sometimes we have some operations under our control, but our difficulties [are] a lack of legal tools and possibly in the future we will have to convince our diplomats and our politicians that we have to improve the legal aspect of that because it's very difficult. We had a common operation with friends and thanks to our mutual knowledge, we succeeded in finding a solution. But it's more and more difficult.

***Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich, United States Coast Guard:***

I agree completely that we're finding more and more the reality of information sharing is often policies. What we find in JIATF South is the policies are linked to law enforcement entities. That nexus between what law enforcement can do and the policies of law enforcement is really where most of the work comes from and then how we share it is dependent upon what those law enforcement entities allow us to share. So it really is something we need to go back to. I believe it was discussed at the last symposium, as an entity of the naval forces, driving the civil portion to indicate how do they expect you to perform and what authorities can they provide you, because ultimately, most of what I do is a law enforcement function. Some of the partners I have, their militaries have that authority. Many of them don't. We carry on our own U.S. vessels Coast Guard law enforcement teams in order to do that interaction at the end of the day. So you really are talking about a very unique aspect of not just sharing general data of tracking, or what is on there, but how can you react to that and who can you share it with from a law enforcement perspective.

***Admiral Harry G. Ulrich, United States:***

The tension that we're seeing in this discussion and the fundamental difference between what you proposed and what Admiral La Rosa proposed is about trust and partnership and data exchange and classified information. Therein lies the tension. Admiral Allen said this morning that everybody shares weather observations, and that's true. Admiral La Rosa talked about the airline industry, and everybody shares [information about] that. There are civil organizations, military organizations, and commercial organizations so that we know where all planes are at all times within 50 feet, where they've been, where they're going, what route they're on, what frequency they're on, and what they're carrying. If we can do that in the air with very little, tiny airplanes flying very, very fast in three dimensions, the question is why can't we have that same information with really, really fat ships that are going really, really slow and normally only in two dimensions. So that is the issue that we have here and that's the discussion and we, because we're naval officers and military officers, have grown up in not sharing information and classifying it with secret stamps. This is a whole new mental model for us, which we're somewhat uncomfortable with, and we're going to have to work through that and shed our discomfort if we're going to get to the pictures that you all describe. That's the fundamental issue. The stock exchanges in all our countries have to share that information. Everybody shares the information on the stock exchange. Nobody asks what network it's on, nobody cares; but everybody has the same amount of information. If we didn't

have that and we didn't have that trust, then the financial system would collapse around our ears. So keep that in mind when you take your ATM card and put it into an ATM tonight to get money out. You're counting on that and there's a whole lot of trust there between whatever bank and whatever country you have your ATM card issued and the Bank of Newport here which is going to give you cold, hard cash. Again, trust, partnerships, and protocols are what it's all about and that's a mental model that we're going to have to get over.

***Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich, United States Coast Guard:***

Can I just add to that for a moment? Admiral, you're absolutely correct and we've had this discussion before. We are at the cliff's edge of a culture change. It is a culture change [from what] we grew up [in] for centuries, in which secrecy was your security. Your security now lies in transparency. The aviation community grew up in an era of transparency due to safety that easily moved into a community where that transparency also provides security. You're absolutely correct.

***Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy:***

Yes, I would like to underline that, in my opinion, we must look forward. Only a few years ago, 2004, we had many doubts. We had many problems. In only two years we succeeded in the system. Now we have the V-RMTC, eighteen countries in the wider community, nine countries in the 5 + 5 community, and two countries in the RMMP-Lebanon. Well, this is a reality and so we must look forward and we must be very confident. Thank you.

***Rear Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:***

I'd just like to make a comment, if I may, and sort of ask a question of all you powerful men sitting in the audience. Have we just sort of sat here, to use an American analogy, and grabbed a basketball and flicked it into the audience? Or do we want, as an organization, the ability for someone up here to say there are three hoops along the wall and we'll go for that one there? And I'll pass the ball to you, and you pass it to him, and you pass it to him, and you put it through the hoop. So there have been some proposals from the panel and it's as though all we have done is thrown a basketball and there are a whole lot of people not knowing whether or not to grab it and even less clear about what they're then going to do with it. As Admiral Mudimu said, I was in Singapore a while ago and a Singaporean officer said to me, "The difference between you Europeans and we Asians is that we decide a meeting is successful if we agree to meet again. You decide a meeting is successful because you agreed this action and this action and this action." And that's true to a point, but you can only do so much talking. As Admiral Mudimu said, by and large, we've been talking for eighteen symposiums and I thought that there was a feeling that we needed to do something about sorting out information exchange between us. And all some of us are asking is let's just take a few short steps together and see where it goes. That's it, I mean.

***Rear Admiral Mohammed Berrada-Gouzi, Morocco:***

If you allow me, Admiral, I would like to give you the standpoint of somebody who is responsible for a modest navy that has no pretensions abroad and only has its

own waters to monitor. Of course, we have recent experience, as I told you in my presentation. It is so recent that, Admiral La Rosa, we haven't been able to even put your flag among the adhering participating countries yet. That being said, for a small country or medium-sized country, the Kingdom of Morocco has an Exclusive Economic Zone that is larger than its land surface. It has the entrance of one [of] the three most navigated passages in the world, with a navy that has only a very small percentage of the armed forces. Even though we saw a minute ago the regions of the world where the European vessels have a permanent or occasional presence, Morocco is not concerned, which shows that our country does its work. I think that we will have to change our culture for this sharing of information. At any rate, it is inevitable taking into account the volume of vessels that pass through the waters that are under our jurisdiction. This is absolutely necessary and very useful. We have entered into the system for about a month and we have realized how interesting the information is. It is very numerous. There is perhaps an idea that too much information can kill information, but it can be used. If the information is adequately used, it could lead to the use of [our resources] in a rational way. Thank you.

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Thanks very much. I think I'm remaining only with one minute. I think what Admiral Ledson is saying is that when we leave here, what will we say has changed? How have we changed and altered the course of events with the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, audience? I think from his point of view, he made a proposal to say we need to put a team together which will be able to report back to us in 2009, to try and see what it is that can be achieved. I don't think it's nice to come back to Newport again . . . I think it would be nice, of course to come; but we need to say how we have added value in the course of history. This is our responsibility, nobody else's. We are the chiefs of navies in our countries and we have the responsibility to advise our principals how to take care of this particular aspect. In the arena of information exchange and sharing I think it is one of the fundamentals, because if you don't have information, you don't know what's pending. Now you are, in fact, weak, diminished. So we are calling for a course of action and we hope, Admiral, that tomorrow after the workshops, when we come back to the plenary, we will come with concrete propositions in terms of the way forward. What is it that needs to be done? How are we going to alter the events in our countries, in our regions, in our continent, to make it better where it's safe for all of us, for our mariners, in terms of the sea lines of communications so that we are able to focus on the issues of growth and development? Ladies and gentlemen, thanks for listening to this panel and we hope tomorrow we'll come recharged and coming back from the panel, we'll have a better idea about what needs to be done. That's what we need to answer. Admiral, thanks very much.

[Applause]

***Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:***

We talked of a couple of things today and I'd just like to bring up one area where we talked about the cooperation and some of the impediments that [Admiral] Harry Ulrich [Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe] mentioned. There are several

countries in the room that participate in an information-sharing system that is extraordinary in its speed and its scope, and it deals with things that are very sensitive for us who operate them. It deals with submarines. That organization is called ISMERLO. It's an International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office and our submarines, for those who operate them, are some of our most classified operations and sensitive operations that we do. Yet, when one of those submarines gets into difficulty—as has happened with the Russian submarine [*Priz*] AS-28 a couple of years ago [7 August 2005], and then, through a series of events, in my Navy a few months ago, the same thing happened—that information-sharing network that the submarine-operating nations participate in comes to life with a speed that is blinding. There is very little hesitation of the information that moves on there and it is shared freely and quite openly. So I think that there is a model for how information can move very quickly even when there are some sensitivities at play. We also, in my discussion this morning, talked of concrete actions and the admiral alluded to that as well. I think the proposals that have been laid out and the ideas that have been put forth have been very interesting. What I would like to challenge the panels or the breakout groups with, and a point the panel on information sharing spoke of, [is] legal, policy, and technical aspects. What I would like to challenge those individuals who will be in those breakout groups, because I do believe they represent every region in which we are dealing, is that perhaps they come forth, not necessarily with a plan that will be briefed in 2009, but rather some opportunities where there can be linkages between the regional activities, and for them to lay that out for us. To say here are opportunities, very specific steps not only with regard to perhaps a humanitarian exercise that's coming up, but the regions that may wish to connect and the means with which they can connect. Perhaps, in that way, we can frame the decision in a more focused way and one that is just less broad and open. So I would like to change that charter for those groups that will meet to see if they can come up with that, with options on how to pass this information back and forth. So I think it's now time to do some wrap-up.

***Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:***

Thank you, Admiral. We thank, I know on behalf of every delegate in here, Admiral Mudimu and the distinguished panel for their comments today.



## Keynote Address

The Honorable Donald C. Winter

*U.S. Secretary of the Navy*

*Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:*

Well, good morning and I hope everyone had a good evening last night. It was a true pleasure to be with some of your successors, the young officers that are currently undergoing the course at our Naval War College. It was a very exciting group and as you look at them, you can see that our navies and our maritime world will be in good hands as we move into the future. It gives me a great deal of pleasure this morning to introduce our next speaker. He is our Secretary of the Navy. He is a true patriot, a great leader, and someone who cares deeply about our Navy and Marine Corps, [which] he leads. A little bit of background: He has a doctorate in physics from the University of Michigan. He has extensive corporate experience, having worked at Northrop Grumman as the corporate vice president of missions systems, leading over 18,000 employees. At TRW Systems, he was the president and chief executive officer, the vice president and deputy general manager for group development of space and electronics business, and the vice president and general manager for defense systems divisions. He also has worked with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA. Those are the elements of the CV. But in my time as fleet commander and most recently as the Chief of Naval Operations, as we all know, there's much more to that. It is about leadership. It is about character and integrity, and Secretary Winter embodies those traits; but, most importantly, he displays them daily. With the leadership of the Navy and the Marine Corps, with his keen sense of business, with his abiding commitment to the stewardship of our nation's treasure, to his directness and his forthrightness in making hard decisions after assembling complex facts, it is truly a pleasure to work for him and to learn from him as he goes about making the tough decisions for our Navy and Marine Corps. He has made the Navy and Marine Corps much more capable because of his leadership, because of the thinking that he has put into our current activities and, most importantly, where we are going in the future. But there's another dimension that I would like to mention and that is his keen interest in, his loyalty to, and his devotion to the young men and women who put on the uniform of the United States; and even though his leadership is of the Navy and Marine Corps, every young man and woman that wears the uniform, he cares deeply about and invests personally in their well-being and the well-being of their families. So, it gives me great pleasure to introduce our seventy-fourth Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Don Winter.

[Applause]

***Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter:***

Admiral Roughead, I really have to thank you for that very kind and generous introduction. It really is a great pleasure to have you as our Chief of Naval Operations and I'm truly looking forward to working with you over the next year to further the interests that are being discussed at this conference.

I am also very pleased to be here today and pleased to see such strong turnout of naval leadership on the part of those representing nearly all the nations of the world with maritime interests.

This conference is a unique forum for maritime nations to discuss the many issues that impact the security and prosperity of every nation.

I have had an opportunity over the past two years to visit many of your countries and engage with the maritime forces of nations in virtually every region of the world. I understand the value of engagement and I am fully supportive of pursuing cooperative partnerships as we go forward.

Today's challenges call for a reassessment of our maritime strategy.

Many obvious changes in the strategic picture have occurred since the end of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. And yet, many of the strategic imperatives of the United States—particularly with respect to the maritime component of the strategic equation—remain unchanged.

The Navy's bedrock obligation to the American people—to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic—requires that we maintain a navy with certain indispensable attributes.

Worldwide presence, credible deterrence and dissuasion capability, an ability to project power from naval platforms anywhere on the globe, and the ability to prevail at sea are the nonnegotiable elements of the U.S. Navy's strategic posture.

The realities of America's interest and position in the world remain fixed. The United States is a maritime power bounded by the sea to the east and the west. The health of our economy depends on safe transit through the seas—and the trend in international commerce is ever upward. The strength of a nation's navy remains an essential measure of a great power's status and role in the world.

All these realities suggest that maritime dominance, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. military strategy since World War II, is still indispensable to America's security interest.

Therefore, our maritime strategy reflects enduring strategic imperatives and interests.

This strategy builds upon changes that have already been under way for some time and formally endorses operations that we are already carrying out.

The shift in focus from blue- to green- and brown-water threats began in the 1990s. This shift has resulted in a Navy and Marine Corps that are focused on the full spectrum of possible threats.

We must manage a portfolio of capabilities to defend against a range of threats from criminals and terrorists at sea to rogue nations, to potential competitors.

This array of threats complicates our task considerably. Organizing, training, and equipping naval forces in order to execute our core missions now require an ability to meet the challenges posed by threats of unpredictable nature and geographic location. And yet our core missions in the joint fight are unaffected by this development.

Providing combat airpower, carrying out land attack missions, providing amphibious assault capability, providing military logistics, and executing strike missions at sea continue to be *raisons d'être*.

Faced with these requirements, we are diversifying the fleet. We are developing new littoral capabilities: the first riverine force since Vietnam has already been deployed to the Euphrates River. We are conducting maritime security operations in the littorals of the north Arabian Gulf. These operations are aimed at both protecting oil platforms and protecting shipping in and out of this vital body of water.

In shipbuilding, we are embarked on a program to build fifty-five littoral combat ships [LCS] with two competing configurations scheduled for sea trials in the coming year. Our 30-year shipbuilding program, which already reflects our plans for LCS, is unchanged; our aircraft procurement schedule remains on track; and our end strength targets will not change as a result of our new strategy. There is no deviation from our plan to reach at least 313 ships and maintain 11 nuclear-powered carriers, 48 SSNs, and 14 SSBNs.

Meanwhile, to better meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, our new maritime strategy also embraces new core capabilities in the areas of maritime security and humanitarian assistance. Public discussion of our new maritime strategy has tended to focus on these particular elements of soft naval power. However, there should not be an overemphasis on any one aspect of our strategy.

Let there be no mistake, we are not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those elements of hard power that win wars or deter them from ever breaking out in the first place.

We do view cooperative engagement as essential to our maritime strategy. But our increased emphasis on maritime partnerships and the "1,000-ship Navy concept" is not a repudiation of the Mahanian insistence on U.S. Navy maritime dominance.

Yes, the size of the U.S. fleet today is less than half the fleet size of only twenty years ago, but it would be a mistake to interpret that development as a lack of capability or intent to pursue our long-standing policy of maritime dominance.

The issue of assessing our Navy as a function of the number of ships versus the capability of those ships is often debated.

Yes, presence matters; it matters a lot.

But an almost exclusive focus on the number of ships in the fleet can be very misleading, even dishonest.

Capabilities also matter.

In fact, given a choice between a nearly six-hundred-ship navy of twenty years ago and today's fleet, I doubt there is anyone who would have the slightest hesitation in choosing our current fleet.

We have a surge capability today that did not exist before, thanks to a deliberate policy of increased investment in maintenance and sustainment, both of which are critical to readiness. After all, having a fleet ready is better than having a larger fleet incapable of surging.

We have platforms with weapons systems capabilities which are superior to those on ships in earlier fleets. We have a lethality and flexibility in our surface, submarine, naval aviation, and expeditionary forces that have never been seen before.



The reality is that today's combatants are second to none, particularly when compared to combatants of yesteryear.

We cannot afford to lessen our commitment to the Navy, because we cannot escape the need for global presence, strategic deterrence, and an enhanced missile-defense capability. Moreover, I see no trends that call for any diminution in these strategic requirements.

Thus, Mahan's principles still apply and still guide our thinking. However, there was no way that one could have anticipated the range of concerns that energize naval leaders today—weapons proliferation and the trafficking of arms, people, and narcotics.

There is also an aspect of protecting the maritime domain globally today that is different—the vulnerabilities to disruptions, to the world economy, are far greater than what anyone could have imagined.

Take the example of the suicide-bomber attacks on ABOT [Al-Basra Oil Terminal], Iraq's most important oil terminal, in April of '04. Even though the attack failed, it had repercussions on world markets. The price of oil immediately spiked and insurance rates skyrocketed, costing the world's economy billions of dollars. Even those who had no ties to that oil, who were neither producers nor consumers of oil coming from those platforms, were significantly affected.

We worry about what happens in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Gulf of Guinea, in the Caribbean, on the great expanses of the Pacific Ocean, and everywhere in between. The issue is not simply a matter of energy resources, but legal and illegal trafficking, weapons smuggling, and economic lifelines to every nation.

Mahan looked at choke points such as Panama, Suez, and Gibraltar.

Today, however, the number of vulnerable points in the global economy is enormous and the potential impact is huge.

Getting to the level of security we desire would require not a six-hundred-ship navy or even a one-thousand-ship navy. We would need thousands of ships to police all the world's sea lanes—an impossible task for any one nation.

With 315,000 miles of coastline, enough to circle the globe twelve times, we must find a way to keep the sea lanes open against threats from terrorists, pirates, and nations not committed to upholding the international order.

We must recognize that we have fundamental dependencies, all of us. The fact is, we are dependent on a secure maritime environment. We have seen that massive dislocations can be caused by interrupting a very small fraction of the oil market, but other key commodities can be similarly affected.

World markets are very efficient today. We have very little excess capacity and capital gets reallocated quickly to its most efficient use. Such efficiency raises productivity and standards of living, but leaves us very vulnerable to minor perturbations in the world market.

Thus, we are living not just in an age of asymmetric warfare, but of an unprecedented global interdependence.

We must guard against the clandestine expansion of nuclear networks, terrorist attacks at sea, hostage taking at sea, and maritime banditry.

Since we cannot control every choke point or platform target or intercept every ship that is in violation of international law, we can only have maritime security if all nations come together to enforce a peaceful environment in their own regions.

This partnering with other nations is an opportunity to learn from each other, share unique knowledge and experience, improve our interoperability, increase transparency, and build trust between our Navy and the maritime forces of every nation.

I saw these results during my visits to Ghana, Djibouti, Guatemala, and many other countries over the past two years, all of which have reinforced in my mind the importance of our cooperative efforts. Our partnerships with other nations enhance our security when our interests are in common, and, therefore, we will continue to pursue them wherever possible.

Now, in closing, I would like to share an anecdote about my office, which is highly relevant to this discussion of our maritime strategy.

It is common for U.S. secretaries to have a portrait in their office of a former secretary whom they hold in high regard. I have a portrait of Theodore Roosevelt in my office. I consider him an inspiration.

Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and later, of course, the twenty-sixth president of the United States, was a passionate believer in the virtue of naval power. Roosevelt understood that no fine-sounding words, no treaty, no gathering of diplomats expressing their peaceful intentions can forge diplomatic solutions without hard power to back them up. Words not supported by the implicit understanding of what would follow, should words fail, are empty. He lived by the credo and so should we. Successful diplomacy is made possible by the capability evidenced by naval power. Our strategy reflects that message.

Thus, as we soon approach the one hundredth anniversary of the sailing of Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet, which I look forward to celebrating with many of you over the coming year, it is most appropriate to reflect upon his vision. Combining both hard and soft aspects of naval power, we are building a fleet of the future, while also seeking to strengthen cooperative partnerships with traditional allies and develop new partnerships with other maritime nations.

The future of the United States as a great nation depends on our continued maritime superiority, and long-term perspective, and a cooperative approach towards all nations who share the maritime domain.

Thank all of you very much for participating today and giving me the opportunity to address you.

[Applause]

If there are any questions, I'd be most pleased to take them here this morning. Well, if not, I thank all of you very much for your kind attention.

[Applause]

***Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:***

Ladies and gentlemen, at this time, we are a little bit ahead of schedule so what we'll do is set up for panel discussion at this time. So we'll take about a 15-minute break. Please be back in the auditorium at 0915 and we'll begin with the next panel discussion, panel number two. Thank you.



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# Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations

Admiral Thad Allen

*Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard*

*Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:*

At this time, as you can see by your agenda, we come to the discussion of humanitarian operations, which will be combined, first of all, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard introducing this topic, and then by a panel discussion. So, at this time, I'd like to bring back to the stage the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen.

[Applause]

*Admiral Thad Allen:*

Good morning. Since the topic is humanitarian assistance, I hope you all survived last night. It's always good to get together and talk with shipmates and renew acquaintances and I can think of no better place to do that than the International Seapower Symposium and the Naval War College. You heard Admiral Roughead talk about the core capabilities required to execute a maritime strategy and those traditional capabilities and competencies that have been embodied in our maritime forces for centuries. The twist and the new nuance to this strategy has to do with maritime security disaster response and humanitarian assistance. The next panel will talk about humanitarian assistance. I do not want to supplant this distinguished panel on what they are going to talk about. I would like to make a few observations about humanitarian assistance in the world that we live in today and some of the challenges that are presented. But I think moreover [about] the tremendous opportunities that we have to do a better job for the people that live in this world when things happen to them that they have no control over. I'd like to compare and contrast, if I could, by way of introduction the evolution of search and rescue in the maritime environment and the aviation environment. We are all seafarers; we all go to sea. Men and women who go to sea are brothers and sisters. There is an enduring legacy of rendering aid to seamen in the maritime environment but that duty has been largely unstructured over the years. If you are in the area, if you hear a distress call, and we all know those words—Mayday, SOS—it is an international language. If you are in the area and you can respond, you have a duty. But, I would tell you with the advent of the aviation and transportation system in the twenty-first century, the requirement increased from a duty to respond to having a system that could ensure response. And the modern search and rescue network we have in the world today is an artifact of air transportation and the early

international agreements on transoceanic flight following World War II. The International Civil Aviation Organization basically created the search and rescue structure that covers the globe today by which we execute search and rescue operations on air, land, and sea. And in the United States, by doctrine, the United States Air Force and the Coast Guard jointly issued search and rescue doctrine—the Air Force for inland and the search and rescue side in maritime for the Coast Guard; and we jointly man the search and rescue school for the United States. When we have large, catastrophic events, whether it be Hurricane Katrina, a tsunami, an earthquake in Pakistan, an earthquake in Iran, tropical cyclones in the Indian Ocean or the Western Pacific, we are starting to encounter incidents of such a large scale and complexity that are starting to exceed the capacity of existing systems to be able to respond. This is exacerbated by the fact that most of the population of the world, as was stated yesterday, is moving from rural areas to urban areas and many of those urban areas are near coastlines. If you add the implications of climate change, you have the prescription for more frequent and larger-scale natural disasters and, with the transnational threat of terrorism, man-made disasters. I think there are a couple of key things we need to keep in mind as we talk about disaster response and humanitarian response. The first one is nobody can go it alone. These events are larger than a single service, a single agency, a single department, or even a country—even countries like the United States—and we found that out during Katrina. The answer moving ahead is cooperation, outreach, and integration of doctrine and a way to bring our capacities and capabilities together to produce the mission effect that relieves suffering for our people. That sounds noble. That is a worthy cause. That is very, very hard. And it is very hard because it moves beyond the realm of military services, any one particular agency, and requires us to take all of the elements of national power and not direct them at an enemy, unless you consider nature the enemy. We learned in Hurricane Katrina, in the United States, that advanced planning can be overwhelmed by a complex event. We learned that massive population displacement creates demands that we had not foreseen. The population displacement by Hurricane Katrina, which was between 1.5 and 2 million people, was larger than the historic displacement of individuals in the United States during the Depression in what we would call our dust bowl, which was only four hundred thousand people. It was the largest displacement of population in the history of the United States. We were not prepared. Where we succeeded was where we broke down barriers between agencies and military organizations and this is what brings me to a very, very critical point. When we look forward and look at disaster assistance and humanitarian assistance, disaster recovery and humanitarian assistance as core capabilities, we need to move beyond the ability to respond with our own forces. We need to move beyond joint. We need to move beyond coalition. The challenge we face in the United States, I'm sure, is the challenge that you face in your own countries. I've talked to many of you in the last 24 to 48 hours about all operations. It is the emerging paradigm for conducting operations with other civil authorities in your country that have a different mission, set different statutory requirements, and [for] integrating their capabilities with your military capabilities to achieve mission execution, or the effect you want, to relieve suffering. Let me give you some examples of how we are trying to attack this problem in the United States

and within the Coast Guard that may serve as a touchstone for the conversation that will follow.

Mutual aid agreements and local agreements that focus on operations below the political level are extremely useful. The United States Coast Guard has a long-standing search and rescue agreement with the United Kingdom, Canada, and with the United States. We use that as a basis to conduct and coordinate operations that become seamless on a border, which becomes very important when you're looking at something like a tsunami response. I will give you a good example.

During Hurricane Katrina, we took every Coast Guard helicopter that was not needed for search and rescue standby in the United States and we sent it to New Orleans. But we actually did more than that. Not far from here is our northeast helicopter station, with H-60 helicopters on Cape Cod. We took all of the H-60s from Cape Cod and we sent them to New Orleans. Our Canadian friends to the north brought down two Cormorant helicopters from Halifax and stood the search and rescue watch for the United States, in our country, while our helicopters were in New Orleans. To the extent that we create regional mutual assistance networks that focus on operations that don't require a lot of structure, political agreements, treaties that focus on what we do on a day-to-day basis working together to create that equivalent of the thousand-ship navy for disaster response and humanitarian assistance is the way forward. But to do that, you need internationally recognized doctrine so that everybody speaks the same operational language. We have many of those details for military operations worked out; they've evolved over a number of years. I would submit to you that the existing international search and rescue doctrine can be embodied in standard operating procedures at very little overhead, very little barrier to entry, that will allow us all to work better together. I mentioned to you yesterday the extraordinary sight of United States Navy Seabees, our construction battalion, working side by side with the Mexican navy to rebuild a schoolhouse in Gulfport, Mississippi, in the United States. One of the ways you can move towards creating greater capacity and competency and mutual assistance is to work regionally. We have been very successful with the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which involves the United States, Canada, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China to create multilateral exercises and multilateral operations for search and rescue response and oil and [hazardous material] HAZMAT response. Next week, we will have the initial meeting of the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum hosted in Stockholm, to begin the same process in the North Atlantic. I would commend to you to the extent that you have a common purpose in a region and you have a common threat—whether it is an earthquake, fault line, the threat of tropical cyclones, hurricanes, or tsunamis—the best way to prepare and respond is to meet, talk, plan, and exercise in advance. There's an old saying: you train like you fight and you fight like you train in military operations. That is no different for emergency response and humanitarian assistance. The more that we can identify common operating procedures and capabilities and capacities and shortfalls that exist that would have to be augmented from outside the region, the better prepared we are. The first time that you meet somebody that you have to depend on is not at two o'clock in the morning after the event has occurred. And it gets back to Admiral Roughead's statement yesterday that the central theme of all of this is trust. Two types of trust. Trust that we can build mutual assistance packages, common

operating procedures built on the historical search and rescue structure, in my view, that has been started with the aviation industry in this world in the middle of the twentieth century, and then having that build into a larger trust in our citizenry. That when an event like this happens, governments can competently respond, and, if somebody is constrained by capacity, competency, or resources, they have a network regionally that is in place that allows them to do that. This is not easy, because we have internal barriers in our own countries on how our agencies work together. In the United States, our enduring question is what to do with what we call the interagency. It's everybody else we have to deal with that does not wear a uniform. It's to find a common language to create a way to manage crises. The fact that it is difficult does not mean it shouldn't be done. The challenge we have in the United States, the challenge we have together, is collectively—and we have learned this after Katrina—to build an interagency process that allows us to bring all the elements of national power to bear when the country needs us the most. If we could continue to do that together and then create regional coordinating systems that can do that, we will build a trust between ourselves, but moreover, we will gain the trust of the citizens we serve. Thank you for allowing me to kick off the panel this morning and now we'll have the introduction of the panel speakers. Thank you very much.



## Panel Discussion Two: Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations

Moderated by  
Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan

Panel Members:

Vice Admiral Nirmal Verma, India

Captain Ousmane Ibrahmima Sall, Senegal

Admiral Jorge Omar Godoy, Argentina

Vice Admiral Sergio Enrique Henaro Galán, Mexico

*Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:*

Could I ask the panel moderator and the panel members for panel number two to please be seated on the stage at this time. We're especially grateful to Admiral Allen for providing those insightful comments on humanitarian operations and disaster relief, illustrating the obligations that we all have to protect our citizens and to rescue them in time of need and the great challenges that are inherent in conducting humanitarian assistance in disaster relief operations. Admiral Allen also outlined the necessity for a good preparation, planning, and cooperation among domestic and international agencies. Now, to explore these challenges and obligations, I would like to introduce the moderator for panel number two, Admiral Tahir, Chief of Naval Staff of the Pakistan Navy. He will make opening remarks and introduce his panel members in turn. Thank you, sir.

[Applause]

*Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:*

Admiral Roughead—although he's momentarily gone out, I think—navy leaders, coast guard leaders, presidents of naval war colleges, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, a very good morning to you. I'm privileged to be the moderator of this panel and I'm thankful to Admiral Roughead for inviting me to do the honors. Before I give the opening remarks, I would just like to refresh the rules. Each of the speakers will get fifteen minutes, five minutes short, first yellow card, two minutes short, second yellow card and, at the end of the time, fifteen minutes, it will be the red card, but I'm sure that we all will abide by the time, I'm sure. That will be followed by a question-and-answer session and, depending upon the time, we will take in as many questions as is possible.

Ladies and gentlemen, humanitarian assistance is one of the most important benign operations that navies and, indeed, the armed forces can be called upon to perform. Natural disasters, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, storms, and, indeed, outbreak of diseases are phenomena whose destructive ability has been augmented

ironically by population growth, infrastructure development, and contemporary lifestyle—because any disaster has the potential of causing more death and destruction and damage today compared to, let's say, 100 years ago. This fact has precipitated a situation where in most cases the affected country finds itself incapable of dealing with the aftermath on its own. Hence the requirement for regional and, in most cases, international efforts to deal with the situation. Two very recent examples of this are the Asian tsunami of 2004 and Pakistan earthquake of 2005. There is, therefore, a dire need to first of all understand and then to streamline the modalities of such undertakings that may involve a host of actors, governmental and nongovernmental.

Speakers of this panel will do exactly the same; and, without any further ado, may I start the proceedings and call upon, first of all, Vice Admiral Verma, who is Vice Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy and his topic is humanitarian operations and NGO [nongovernmental organization] coordination. Vice Admiral Verma.

***Vice Admiral Nirmal Verma, India:***

Thanks. Admiral Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, chiefs of navies and coast guards, ladies and gentlemen, I'm honored to have been asked to contribute to this discussion on lessons learned from humanitarian operations. Over the next fifteen minutes or so, I will present an overview of recent humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. I may refer to it as HADR for short during the course of my presentation, which are those operations that have been undertaken by the Indian Navy, within the Indian Ocean and its environments, focusing a little upon aspects relevant to support issues and in respect to the deployment of U.S. Naval Ship *Mercy*.

India is acutely conscious of the fact that no nation is an island to itself. I'm certain that I speak for all of you in saying that today we find ourselves in the midst of an unprecedented globalization of trade, technology, media, and a host of other areas of human activity. We are acutely aware that this interdependence is, in fact, the defining characteristics of the modern world. In the wake of this interdependence has come the realization that there is a pressing need to ensure security in all its myriad forms: economic security, security of international trade and commerce, and security of life against the vicissitudes of man and nature alike. It is clear to us that our geostrategic environment is sharply impacted upon and perhaps even molded by the interplay of the geostrategic moves of other players, both state and nonstate, with those of India. Consequently, the Indian Navy fully subscribes to the spirit underlying the insightful statement made by Admiral Mullen at the U.S. Naval War College in June 2006, which continues to hold relevance: that "the economic growth of all nations rises—not when the seas are controlled by one—but rather when they are made safe and free for all."

Many in this audience would be aware that the immediate geostrategic environment of India is shaped enormously by the geographic and oceanographic contours of the Indian Ocean. I know that all of you are familiar with this body of water, whose cartographic limits are laid down in IHO's [International Hydrographic Organization] Special Publication 23. So I won't dally here, except to point out that India lies at the natural junction of the busy, international shipping

lanes that crisscross the ocean. Indeed, in terms of shipping density, the sea area around India is one of the busiest waterways of the world. Well over one hundred thousand ships transit the international shipping lanes of this region every year, with the Strait of Malacca alone accounting for some sixty thousand ships annually. We see the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard as stabilizing forces in this great movement of maritime commerce along the international shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, not just for ourselves, but for the world at large.

Within the Indian Ocean region, the threat of intrastate, as well as interstate, conflict remains a grim reality. The region is also subject to a variety of security threats that are short of state-on-state conflict, yet present an equal if not greater threat to peace and stability.

The region is marked by extreme economic diversities, where some of the fastest growing economies live cheek by jowl with some of the poorest countries of the world. The region is also the locus of almost 70 percent of the world's natural disasters. And yet, if the problems of holistic security are enormous, so are the opportunities.

In addressing the question of how these opportunities may be maximized, the Indian Navy considers constructive engagement to be its mechanism of choice against the individual and collective challenges that I have mentioned. We believe that constructive engagement of regional and extraregional navies enables the gaining and sharing of operational and doctrinal expertise, as also transformational experiences, the examining and imbibing of best practices, the generation of interoperability, and the enhancement of maritime domain awareness through a variety of information-sharing mechanisms.

It is my belief that it is the patient and step-by-step process of building capacity and enhancing capability, especially amongst the smaller littoral states of the region, that will transform some of the security-related fragility of the Indian Ocean littoral into robustness born of self-confidence and self-sufficiency. Cooperative mechanisms for the speedy, effective, and humane obligation of maritime power, for regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, form an obvious and important aspect of this constructive engagement. Yet it took the tsunami of 2004 to drive this home with telling effect. With the more recent example of the Yogyakarta earthquake in Indonesia, the criticality of working towards interoperability, right from the planning and induction process of new platforms, bears no repetition to an informed audience such as this one.

The widespread publicity that was undertaken to the regionally inclusive evacuation in July of 2006 by the Indian Navy, [which] moved as many as 2,280 nationals of India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Lebanon, and even Greece to safety from war-ravaged Lebanon, makes it unnecessary for me to expound unduly upon the advantages of having succor and extrication options available to noncombatants and civilians, even in distant lands.

I'm very pleased to be able to inform you that in order to encourage and focus the process of constructive engagement amongst the littoral states of the Indian Ocean region, the Indian Navy has this year, itself, taken the initiative of setting up an inclusive and consultative regional forum to be known as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, where the chiefs of the navy of all littoral states of the Indian Ocean region can periodically and regularly meet to discuss issues that bear upon regional

maritime security issues. The acronym for the proposed forum is IONS, which seems politically fitting since the etymology of the English word “ion,” is drawn from the Greek word *ἔϊνα* meaning to go, and implying movement. The fundamental concept of IONS, too, is one of moving, moving together as a region.

To formally launch the IONS initiative, ratify its objectives, and establish its charter, the Indian Navy in conjunction with the National Maritime Foundation of India has invited the chiefs of navy of the nation-states of the Indian Ocean littoral to an inaugural IONS seminar 2008 being hosted by the Indian Navy at New Delhi from fourteenth to the eighteenth of February next year. The subject will be constructive engagement in the maritime domain. The formal theme of the seminar is Contemporary Transnational Challenges: International Maritime Connectivities, the sort of thing that HADR would call for when we operate as a region. The object of IONS is to establish and promote a variety of transnational maritime consultative and cooperative mechanisms designed to promote the provision of speedy, responsive, and effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief throughout the Indian Ocean region, as also to address and mitigate other maritime security concerns of the Indian Ocean region, and to develop interoperability in terms of doctrines, strategies, organization, logistics, and operational procedures and processes.

In this regard, we continue to be encouraged by the realization that we are not alone in these efforts at constructive engagement. The efforts of USNS *Mercy*, as also those of USS *Peleliu* for instance, offered a vivid example of the enormous goodwill that can be generated and the succor that can be provided through multinational efforts and constructive engagement. However, before dilating upon the recent HADR missions undertaken by *Mercy* and *Peleliu*, I would like to reiterate that the term “Asia-Pacific” includes both Asia and Pacific and neither word can be unduly emphasized at the cost of the other. Within this pan-oceanic region, we are quite clear that all efforts at constructive engagement need to be supported in every manner possible. Thus, India responded to a 2006 request from the U.S. Navy for Indian medical augmentation and support, by the way of participation on board the hospital ship *Mercy* during her humanitarian mission to East Asia, with an Indian Navy medical team consisting of five specialists from the fields of general medicine, surgery, pediatrics, radiology, and pathology and two general-duty medical officers, including a lady officer. This, perhaps, would be a record of sorts, because we don’t carry lady officers on board Indian Navy ships. So, this was a first. We had three paramedics comprising operating room technicians, male nurses, along with another team jointly drawn from the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. They undertook a four-month embarkation from 23 May ’06 to 1 September ’06, rendering medical succor and humanitarian relief to stricken people in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and East Timor. Services provided by the team included the conduct of medical and dental camps, immunization, surgery, public health services such as examination of water and food, the entomology of the local area, training in basic and advanced life support techniques, and counseling. In similar fashion, ten medical veterinary and medical engineering specialists from the Indian armed forces embarked in USS *Peleliu* on the ship’s Pacific Partnership. This mission was from June to September ’07, covering the Philippines, Marshall Islands, Vietnam, and Papua, New Guinea.

Why did these developments and embarkations provide the ample evidence of the relevance and support that HADR operations enjoy across the Asia-Pacific? That is, there is much that could and should be done to synergize the very considerable naval and maritime resources of the region. Logistic support from the region's littoral states already includes port facilitation and sharing of human expertise.

The involvement of nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, is clearly an option that holds much promise, but there are definitional as well as procedural aspects that need to be wrestled with. The term "NGO" conjures up different visions in different segments of different countries. The United Nations and the International Red Cross are, of course, transnational in the true sense and are universally welcome, but are more properly recognized as intergovernmental organizations. However, the incorporation of private NGOs into naval structures poses special challenges on a number of levels. NGOs such as Aloha Medical Mission, Project Hope, and the University of California, San Diego, Pre-Dental Society are models that resonate well with the societal structure of the United States, but I'm not really clear whether these models can be transplanted either easily or effectively onto other societal and governmental setups. In our case, the government and state agencies themselves play a really major role in carrying out these activities. That having been said, the possibilities are certainly tantalizing. Consequently, I would strongly allocate the promotion of cultural sensitization and intensive as well as extensive exchange of organization structures amongst the different littoral states of the region. These will be the building blocks for common understanding which would then form the foundation of what will be, we hope, an enduring and responsive organizational edifice. Many navies of the region are growing quite rapidly: Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and India, too. And these are some examples only in this regard. The construction and acquisition and induction of large amphibious-, helicopter-, and hovercraft-capable platforms are becoming increasingly common because of the obvious application in HADR missions. This is one of the many lessons that the tsunami of December 2004 has taught us. This boom in regional naval growth thus offers a unique window of opportunity to all of us within the Asia-Pacific region. Concurrently, there is also a need for structures such as the IONS initiative to be supported, which I talked about earlier, and I do so seek and receive the support of the members of the Indian Ocean region in this regard. Interoperability through constructive engagement, I believe, ladies and gentlemen, is the key to unlocking the potential of the Asia-Pacific and with that and, in trying my best to avoid the red card, I am finished and thank you for your kind attention.

[Applause]

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***


Thank you very much, Admiral Verma. You managed to avoid it [the red card] by half a minute.

[Laughter]

But thank you very much for the very elaborate presentation. I would now request Captain Sall, Chief of Staff of Senegal Navy, to talk about illegal immigrants, Frontex/C2 issues. Captain Sall, please.

**Captain Ousmane Ibrahmima Sall, Senegal:**

Merci. I'll speak in French. [Simultaneous translation follows] Admiral Roughead, honorable delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor that I will talk about a topic of great current interest dealing with humanitarian operations led by Senegal in the framework of combating illegal emigration. But before presenting this topic, I would like first to give you another view of this illegal emigration phenomenon with its subregional dimension. Then I will give you a summary of the activities in Senegal and then I will conclude with the lessons learned from these humanitarian operations. In 2006, to talk about the subregional dimension of the scourge after the events of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, Senegal, like many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, witnessed a very significant phenomenon—the illegal emigration to the Canary Islands by sea.

**MULTIPLE POINTS OF DEPARTURE**


In a short time, this transnational scourge took on significant proportions such that no nation in the subregion could contain it by itself with its own assets. There was indeed a thirty-five thousand peak, if you will, of clandestine emigrants who went to the Canaries in a few months so the complexity of this stemmed mainly from several factors that made operations very difficult—*inter alia*, multiple points of departure on the coast and from the continent, dugout canoe crews that adapted quickly to a maritime environment, the absolute determination of aspiring illegal

immigrants, and then the inclusion of fishing boats, foreign ships, and immigrants from Asia.

To broach the first topic, multiple points of departure, here, you see the extent of the phenomenon and the rush to the coast, going from Morocco and Guinea-Conakry. Guinea-Conakry, it seems right now, is the economic limit or border for smugglers because beyond that, you would have to have dugout canoes with more food, more fuel, rather than men. So the cost per person would go from eight hundred to one thousand dollars, which really would not be possible for smugglers if they were to go beyond this price.

So to go back to Senegal.


## SENEGAL



Senegal, as you see here has, fishing villages, about one hundred on this map, 13,000 dugout canoes, three rivers that go into the land, and 531 kilometers of coastline and the specificity of Senegal is the river, the Gambian River Divide, the waters of which divide the country into two parts. As to the adaptation of dugout canoe crews to maritime environment, the techniques that are used by the smugglers and the crews are numerous and let me give you a list. You have large dugout canoes that are being built with modern navigation and modern communication means, for instance, with GPS and satellite telephones that are used to exchange data between smugglers, data with the crews, but also for changes in circuits and routes.



## ROUTES



So the routes that are taken by the dugout canoes, as you see in the next slide—these are, of course, dugout canoes, but they are really for the high seas. In order to avoid any naval assets, the dugout canoes will take several routes and they can have 100 people aboard and we also have had up to 170 people on board so this is a very daring societal behavior that illustrates the determination of the aspiring illegal emigrants.

This determination—let me talk about that. As you see it here, again, [in the following slide], it needs no comments, obviously. You see here a dugout canoe, but what you don't see are the two engines that are brand-new. All the people who are on the beach are candidates for emigration. So you can imagine on this, from this picture, how many people would be in this dugout canoe. Of course, I'm talking about the smugglers, they cannot control the environment and all these passengers are innocent people and they will brave the high seas in very difficult conditions.

Another topic that is very important is the fact that there are foreign fishing boats, foreign ships, and immigrants from Asia. This illustrates it. It is a new phenomenon that was unexpected, that complicates even more the operations at sea because, of course, there is no control.

Obviously, the rapid progress of all these factors will have an impact in the management of this scourge. There are four factors: The first point is the massive influx of people into the archipelago of the Canaries. I said so earlier, thirty-five thousand clandestine emigrants, of which many were lost at sea. And it's not only one hundred people, but really thousands of people who have died and, up until now, I

## CANDIDATES FOR EMIGRATION


### DÉTERMINATION DES CANDIDATS À L'ÉMIGRATION



should say, we do not have statistics on this that will tell us how many, but, somewhere, families are going to funerals.

In Senegal, we should talk also about the loss of fishing activity. Thirteen thousand dugout canoes, so that equates to one hundred villages, fishing villages, have had lost activities because the young fishermen who know the high seas become the crews. Most of them, indeed, have succeeded in reaching Spain, but many of them came back also. But also we've seen a new network of smugglers, locally, and this has grown into an international network now. And they are there only for money and they are not into diplomacy. So faced with this unpredictable situation, the Spanish government has sought the collaboration of the affected African countries and those in Europe. This collaboration translated into the development of the Frontex Agency, a European agency; the development of diplomatic agreements and MOUs [memoranda of understanding] on illegal emigration are; the strengthening of national capacities with European assets, and I would like to thank here the dynamic cooperation and efficient role and determination of Italy, Portugal, France, and, of course, the one that is more affected, Spain, because, on one hand, we don't see migration in only one dimension. There are sons, African sons, who die and this means economic difficulties, because these are young men from our country. So this collaboration has translated into the HERA program, the development of diplomatic agreements, the strengthening of national capacities, the establishment of coordinating bodies, the exchange of information, and the repatriation of illegal emigrants.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM



To combat this phenomenon, an operational unit was created in Senegal as you see it here. It is a joint staff with an operational center in Las Palmas, with representatives from law enforcement. It is based on operational centers supported by personnel of the navy, air force, police, and gendarmerie to coordinate ground, air, and sea operations. I would like to tell you here that Senegal authorities have given high priority to the coordination of actions for security, and safety in the maritime environment.

After talking about this emigration and its subregional dimension, let me talk about this second point, which is the update on humanitarian operations, Frontex, in Senegal, from the beginning of the events up until fifteenth of September, 2007, as follows: The patrols completed up to the point I wrote this document are 871 vessel sorties, i.e., 1,008 days at sea; 363 air sorties, or 1,045 flight hours. The results attained by Senegal: we seized nineteen dugout canoes and two ships; 2,148 people, of whom 300 were Asians, were arrested at sea; and 922 individuals, including 69 smugglers, were arrested on land; and several batches of cargoes of important equipment were seized. But I have to say that in spite of the efforts made, we have to report that the flood of emigration hasn't stopped, due to the length of the coast and the lack of sufficient assets. Obviously, even though it went down from 35,000 people to 13,000 in September, still many efforts should still be made.

After two years of operations, there are several operational and political lessons to be learned and this is the third item on my agenda. Operationally, it should be noted that we should solve, first and foremost, the implementation of a national regulating authority. You can't work if, nationally, among all the people who work

in these operations, there is no unity. This issue, as I said earlier, we solved about two years ago and this really made our task easier. Then we saw that there is a link between sea and land and that is crucial. You can't work on land and say, "it's not my problem, it's at sea"; so land and sea are linked. We understood that quickly and that the fight, the combat that results, is not at sea, but rather on land. But when the land cannot contain this human flood of emigrants, that's where we take action with the assets we have. We also saw that one nation couldn't fight alone. There should be cooperation amongst states and here I would like to give you the example of Spain and Senegal. Obviously, we constructed a convention and we have implemented numerous agreements, but you have to understand that this should be a bilateral action and, later, we'll talk about the political aspect in order to explain the collaboration in detail.

Capacity building is also a major factor, because we have some resources which we talk about sometimes, but sometimes we need very quick response times in order to carry out these projects. Originally, we need to have harmonized modus operandi. This is extremely important because this is where the flaws are in our setup. We know that this is a long-term program, but it has its cost and we believe that we need flexibility in our funding mechanisms. The funding mechanism in the European Union is quite complex and for our operations we need to move fast and it is for this reason that I wanted to talk about it. This can be a hurdle in our operations, this slowness, and also to the relevance of intelligence [which] is, if you will, the backbone of the system. Without intelligence we might not reach our goals and there has been an effort that has been carried out and we are using all our resources at the national and international level in order to get intelligence, in order to work efficiently. Lastly, air support is very important. These are dugouts that are made of wood and that cannot be easily detected by the ships, especially if the seas are rough. We know that a dugout can leave Senegal today, and get to a beach in Tenerife without being detected; so, you know that it is important to have adequate resources to monitor this.

Politically speaking, we think that we need to craft agreements at the subregional level. The agreements between Spain and various governments are bilateral accords, of course, but we need agreements to strengthen our operations among African states. This is a political issue and without this particular approach, we cannot work efficiently. Here I join Admiral Allen, who was talking about the legal framework, which is extremely important. Without this framework, you cannot carry out operations efficiently.

We also need a communications policy. We have to build it in a proactive way. We have carried out a few actions, both at the level of the immigration organization and the political level. The solution is a political solution and that's why I would like to conclude by talking about the lessons that we have learned.

We have had some lessons learned, but there are some collateral effects of emigration. And what are these collateral effects? We're talking about human trafficking, drug trafficking, weapons, pirating and so on and so forth, and terrorism, etc. And they have a particular name and that's why together we should join efforts so that sea security should be better protected, but we have to react in time to carry this out. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

[Applause]

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

There are two reasons that I didn't stop Captain Sall. One is that, of course, the topic under discussion was very interesting, but that can be said about all the topics. The real reason is that I have not been provided with the two cards.

[Laughter]

So thank you very much, Captain Sall, for a very informative discourse. I would now request Admiral Godoy, Chief of Staff Argentine Navy, to talk about Haiti operations.


***Admiral Jorge Omar Godoy, Argentina:***

Thank you very much. First of all, I would like to thank the U.S. Navy and especially Admiral Mike Mullen for the kind invitation to participate in this symposium. I would also like to thank the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, for his warm welcome and the hospitality that we've received.

I am especially satisfied to address such a knowledgeable audience on the role that the Argentine Navy has performed for a long time, namely participation in humanitarian operations under the United Nations mandate. This task, which is certainly not the main mission of the Argentine armed forces, brings with it, however, the huge responsibility of committing our efforts, our specific efforts, to building peace by integrating our contingents with others who are driven by the same goal.

The nature of armed conflicts after the Second World War has dramatically changed from a clear confrontation between states to complex forms of inter- and

### ARGENTINE NAVY IN PEACE OPERATIONS



intrastate crises with political actors and people who are in power, not necessarily legitimately, but whose power is of great influence. Therefore, prevailing concepts of postindustrial warfare are based on low intensity conflicts and asymmetric warfare which requires adaptation of military power to be adjusted to peacemaking efforts.

### CURRENT DEPLOYMENT OF ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES IN PEACE MISSIONS



After the end of the Cold War, the United States has often combined peacekeeping with peace building in the context of complex operations conducted in intrastate conflict. Currently, the concept of peace missions includes joint and combined operations integrated into police actions, and civilian forces for pacification and later development of people who have been affected by the scourges of violence, various forms of slavery, extreme poverty, and interracial extermination, among other factors.

Therefore, the greatest challenge to countries that are part of international organizations, such as the United Nations, is to be able to deploy forces that should be able to achieve peace, in some cases, by the imposition of military power on different belligerent groups who are acting within the civilian population. This is how we contribute to government and nongovernmental organizations, both national and foreign. It may sometimes satisfy the multiple and urgent needs of people and allow the reconstruction of deteriorated or emerging political systems so that they can develop in the medium and long term. The Argentine Republic, which is a permanent member of the United Nations and has been since 1947, fully subscribes to the goals proposed by the General Assembly for the third millennium in the sense of building a better, safer, more equitable, more peaceful, and more prosperous

**ARGENTINE NAVY IN PEACE OPERATIONS**

world, united by the common values of freedom, fairness, solidarity, tolerance, respect for the environment, and responsible commitment to promote the dignity of human beings.

In this context, the army has contributed to principles of international law, together with the resolutions that have been passed by the UN Security Council and the OAS [Organization of American States] as part of the systems of collective security in the region and internationally by projecting its capacities and deploying troops, both jointly and in combined ways. The evolution of the conflicts mentioned earlier has required the adaptation and the application of naval means effectively in order to reach the levels of high standards that circumstances may require.

The participation of the Argentine Navy in UN missions has been going on in basically four categories: first, verification of cease-fire and supervising pacification and demobilization; second, humanitarian mine sweeping; third, peacekeeping operations; and finally, peace enforcement operations.


Faced with the new challenges, our new armed forces are taking advantage of a great experience gained since 1958, and our ministry of defense has created, in 1995, the Argentine Center for Joint Training in Peace Operations (CAECOPAZ), which very quickly became the best tool, and a most prestigious tool, for training both national and foreign contingents. In this sense, I think it's worth mentioning that the adequate training of personnel in their different fields of expertise is a vital part of ensuring mission success.

Today, and since we signed the UN standby agreement in 1997 between the Argentine Ministry of Defense and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at



the United Nations, the Argentine Navy has been committed to maintain certain means, ready capabilities, on a permanent basis in order to be able to deploy them on short notice for any mission that they are directed to do so. I would like to now refer briefly to the peacekeeping mission in Haiti, which has, for us, been the most demanding and is the most demanding at this point. Shortly after beginning this mission in 2004, we were able to appreciate the complexity of a country that was seriously degraded in its infrastructure. Since then, the contingent made up of personnel from the three armed forces of Argentina has been in a complex environment where, initially, it was necessary to employ operational means to ensure a stable environment and, later, to give humanitarian assistance until the international organizations were able to reach the place.

### HURRICANE "JEANNE"



A month after the deployment by the Argentine Navy and Marines the population of Gonaives and our own forces in Gonaives were seriously affected by the devastation of Hurricane Jeanne, which left hundreds of dead and many thousands injured. The initial logistic infrastructure ashore was destroyed and we had to maintain security among the civilian population while reconstructing the operational base so that we could carry out the mission in the middle of that crisis.

Under those circumstances, the presence of an Argentine surface vessel providing logistic support became absolutely indispensable to permitting the development of operations while ground forces were lacking absolutely every kind of support.

From all of the operations that we carried out in different scenarios, I would like to highlight the most important lessons that we have learned.

This task force does not only reflect the excellent relationship between our armed forces, but also shows the determination to be ready to deploy it, deploy to any place, and accomplish UN missions. This goal shall be met by July 2008.

## LESSONS LEARNED

- **PEACE OPERATIONS ALLOW TO ACHIEVE OR ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION**
- **EACH MISSION REQUIRES A DEEP ANALYSIS ABOUT THE NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF CONFLICT TO FACE.**

### **CORE ISSUES:**

- *DEPLOYMENT & LOGISTIC CAPABILITY*
- *TRAINING IN MOST MODERN TECHNIQUES IN URBAN AND LOCAL COMBAT (Roe's , Human Rights Law, etc.)*

- **COMMUNICATION AND GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ARMED FORCES AND GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO DEFINE CONDITIONS, REQUIREMENTS AND STRENGTH OF FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED.**

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## LESSONS LEARNED

- **READINESS OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT UNITS, ABLE TO OPERATE IN JOINT AND COMBINED ENVIRONMENT**
- **INTERACTIVITY AMONG MILITARY, POLICE FORCES, GO's and NGO's AS MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATIONS**

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Given the severity of current crises, it's necessary for us to take a deep look at the nature and complexity of each conflict that we have to deal with and the capabilities required to provide a timely, sustained, and effective response to peacekeeping operations. We have to look at two fundamental aspects here.

The training in modern techniques to forestall the escalation of conflict in rural areas and the political will and understanding among different agencies at the international level are key in order to have participation in such an operation, and to define the parameters and the magnitude of the forces to coordinate the necessary logistics, and to decide whether it's necessary to change the rules of engagement once the operation is under way. So, it's very important for there to be quickly deployed forces that are capable of interacting with each other jointly. The interaction of the military, and police, and civilian forces is necessary.

Recent peace operations have proven the special capabilities of naval forces to carry out this type of activity.

### LESSONS LEARNED

#### RECENT PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT NAVAL FORCES ARE SPECIALLY FIT FOR:

- *DEPLOY PERSONNEL & TRANSPORT MATERIAL TO FAR AWAY AREAS*
- *ARRIVE TO THE OPERATION ZONE FROM INTERNATIONAL WATERS*
- *BRING LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM THE SEA UNTIL  
SELF-SUSTAINMENT OF LANDING FORCES HAS BEEN ACHIEVED*
- *SUPPORT LANDING FORCES IN NATURAL DISASTERS*
- *CONTRIBUTE TO MAKE SURE C4 I<sup>2</sup> S / R*
- *EXECUTE SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OVER COASTAL AREAS*

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Along those lines, this makes it possible for personnel and the material to be deployed at great distances, allows for the arrival of operations from international waters, sea-based logistics, providing support until forces can ensure self-sustainment on shore and general support of ground forces, and, in the event of natural disasters, the severe logistics problems require ensuring command and control requirements and carrying out surveillance and control of the coastal area.

If you give me just one more minute, I'm going to conclude. By way of summing up for the gentleman who has just flashed the card, I would just like to say that taking part in humanitarian operations always entails demands in the sense of

operational risks and training. From our outlook, these activities have been positive for us. They have enabled us to strengthen our joint military operations, to enhance our interoperability and to strengthen our joint operational capability, and, once more, to enable us to interact with forces from other countries. So the intrinsic nature of our naval forces, as far as mobility, self-sustainability, and flexibility, we have seen that our navy is capable of carrying out this type of activity or operation. Lastly, I should say that even though this activity entails diverting assets from their traditional purposes, [at] the moment that we face right now that is helping to create regional stability by warding off the appearance of new conflicts. The benefits derived from this should all come together to constitute an incentive when it comes down to deciding whether or not a country should take part in humanitarian operations. Thank you very much.

[Applause]

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much, Admiral Godoy. It is a hard job telling a service chief that his time is up. I am sorry for that, Admiral. Now we come to the last speaker of this panel. May I introduce Vice Admiral Galán, Chief of Staff of Mexican Navy, who will talk about tsunami relief operations. Admiral Galán, please.

***Vice Admiral Sergio Enrique Henaro Galán, Mexico:***

Thank you very much. Representatives of the navy here today, I appreciate the opportunity to be an active participant in a panel on lessons learned from humanitarian operations with the objective of listening to and knowing my colleagues' perspectives.

It is unquestionable that in the international maritime scenario, all the states must seek greater closeness in terms of cooperation and collaboration, not only the roles and missions, which the navies are engaging [but] in the execution of sovereignty and functions of their state. More than ever, they are included in the participation in humanitarian assistance due to natural or man-made disaster. Allow me this opportunity to brief you on our participation and the experiences we have learned.

***Participation in naval operation for humanitarian assistance:*** The humanitarian assistance that Mexico has provided has made us a group of national and international labor coordinated actions with the objective of mitigating the population's suffering of the affected country, guaranteeing their subsistence, and protecting their dignity and fundamental human rights.

Historically, the Mexican Navy has a tradition of participating in the state's policy aimed at providing assistance to countries in a disaster situation derived from a natural phenomenon. The assistance that Mexico, by means of the navy, has provided to affected countries has given us the opportunity to increase our operational experience with an international framework. It's standing out because of the type, magnitude, as well as the distance from one another, during the operation carried out to support Indonesia after it was impacted by a tsunami in December 2004.

The process followed by the Mexican government was a result of the planning and execution of our naval operation with the mission of providing international humanitarian assistance; generally speaking, it is as follows.

**PARTICIPATION IN NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**



SECRETARÍA DE MARINA


**THE MEXICAN NAVY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS**



## PARTICIPATION IN NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE




**IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPS**



SECRETARÍA DE MARINA

**THE MEXICAN NAVY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS**




## IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPS.

### PROCESS FOR THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION

**FOREIGN RELATIONS SECRETARIAT:**

- ✓ COORDINATES TYPE AND QUANTITY OF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.
- ✓ THE NECESSARY INTERAGENCY COORDINATIONS FOR THE EFFICIENT AND EXPEDITIOUS SHIPMENT.



REQUEST

OCEAN

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Affected countries' request for assistance or, as the case may be, the support over and on behalf of Mexico is received by or transmitted to the Foreign Relations Secretariat, which is the first step. We will coordinate with the authorities of the affected country about the type and quantity of the assistance required with the purpose of carrying out the necessary interagency coordination for an efficient and expeditious treatment of personnel, material, and equipment. Once the president of the republic is aware of the requirements, he issues instruction to several agencies that compose the National Civil Protection System and, in the role of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he instructs the Minister of the Navy, the high command of the Mexican Navy, to organize the treatment of humanitarian assistance.

The high command, supported by the general staff of the navy, issues a directive in a letter of instruction to the Pacific or Gulf naval force commander establishing the concept of the operation and the mission to be accomplished. The naval force commander, with the assistance of his staff, elaborates the naval planning and organizes the surface, air, and ground assets assigned by the high command to integrate the naval task group for the treatment of the humanitarian assistance, as well as for the fulfillment of the activities coordinated in advance or to be present in the affected areas.

The letter of instruction issues the required planning guidance to the naval force commander and it includes general instructions in order to specifically define the actions to be executed by the task group during its stay in the operation area in the affected country. (For example, coordination mechanisms with civilian and military authorities in order to establish the priority for humanitarian assistance activities and the exchange of information of value for the efficient accomplishment of the operation.) By the same token, it establishes a specific action to be developed by the naval members that compose the task group, as well as several aspects related to the on-loading of personnel and cargo, logistics, and communication issues. Parallel to all this action described, Mexico's government, as soon as possible, sends by way of air travel a delegation of specialists on diverse areas composed from several federal agencies, including from the Minister of the Navy, to the affected country with the goal of attaining a firsthand evaluation of the damages and to coordinate with the federal and local authorities the requirement of personnel and the most urgent needs, as well as to obtain as much information as possible about the situation for naval planning purposes. However, according to our experience, we base our planning for all humanitarian assistance operations on the assumption that a task group will only have on hand the supplies they carry on board. Besides this, the plan also considers detailed tasks, security and safety measures, and logistic issues to be executed by the element of the task group and, not least important, the communications plan to be followed during the stage of preparedness environment in journey to the operations area, disembarkation, humanitarian activities in the affected areas, conclusion of activities, and return to base.

***Operation, operational challenges, and experiences during humanitarian assistance operations:*** The actions that the navy carries out for the execution of operations in support of the population affected by nature are mainly drawn from the lessons learned in our country, which have been adopted for the purpose of international humanitarian assistance operations. Under normal circumstances, naval operations in foreign countries took place for training or cargo shipment of



our property. These allow us to foresee and solve in advance whatever logistic and operational requirement arises. It has been a constant task that our chiefs attain and maintain a high level of readiness in order to embark personnel and cargo for departure as soon as possible, no matter the duration of the journey. Likewise, it is important to realize that a prompt response depends on the ship's capabilities. It may be the case that because of the urgency of the time required by this operation, a huge amount of assistance is received at the point of the embarkation. Therefore, if a state for coordination does not exist, the access to the area or port facilities could be restricted—especially if the cargo needs to be classified and inventoried for proper control before it is stored on board. Consequently, affecting the schedule for off-loading, all cargo must be loaded in a way that it will be balanced, and positioned to make possible its quick disembarkation on arrival. Having in mind that the air element is a valuable component of the task group for the purpose of airlifting humanitarian assistance toward the affected area, we have learned to solve the problems related to the tie-down, preservation, organization level maintenance, and operation of non-navalized helicopters, such as the Russian-built MI-17s, from the decks of our ships. Despite our preplanning, it is common that during the voyage, technical problems will arise. This has required close coordination for a solution and support from the general staff and with the logistic functional elements back home, in order to provide the ships with the required mechanisms that will allow them to be supplied, whether by direct acquisition to government or commercial vendors in foreign ports of call along the journey or, if such is the case, ship and deliver materiel from Mexico.

Another issue is security. Due to the high concentration of military forces in the affected area, sometimes it is agreed the condition established by the local government could be precarious. The military and civilian assistance from several countries inside requires time to be fully coordinated; therefore, security measures have been strengthened as necessary. The required connections with local authorities, in order to attain close coordination, are of great importance, especially when the ships arrive at the port of the affected country. Even with close coordination there have been occasions where assumptions on the availability of dock space at the designated port have proven erroneous, as local authorities have been dealing with very different, more pressing problems than the ones perceived at higher levels of decision making, both political and militarily. This situation could result in the necessity to anchor the ship nearby or the impossibility to quickly disembark the humanitarian assistance, such as vehicles or heavy equipment. It could require the need to contract for additional services to solve a series of extra administrative and financial problems.

With regard to the disembarkation of personnel that will be engaged in several activities in the affected areas, it is essential to have in mind the exact obedience to the various and diverse international and local laws and regulation in order for them to swiftly and legally blend into the scheme of labor implemented by local authorities. Without disregarding that for an effective interaction with them and the population, it is crucial to have people that handle the language of the affected country. Now and then, a specialized civilian from other agencies of our federal government participates in our operation for humanitarian assistance; however, such personnel are not familiar with the sea environment, in addition to the life on



a ship. It is important to consider that such personnel must have the appropriate mental and physical conditioning; otherwise, they have shown in a short period of time to develop adaptation problems. As in all operations, the task group must maintain a high degree of readiness and the general staff must continue establishing the required connection and coordination needed to guarantee their return to base or to navigate to any part of the world where help is needed.

In conclusion, there is no effort in vain to create the mechanisms for international maritime cooperation for the efficient and effective mitigation of the population suffering from natural disasters. Consequently, allow me to mention some of the lessons learned during the planning and execution of these types of operations:

- All coordination made with participating agencies that are responsible for determining the type and quantity of personnel and cargo for the humanitarian assistance required must be clear and adequate with the purpose of attaining an orderly and constant flow of goods that allows efficient and expeditious embarkation, shipment, and disembarkation.
- It is essential to have all available preliminary information from the disaster area. Our operational plans and procedures for humanitarian assistance must be adjusted from the ones used by the international naval community.
- Besides the knowledge of international laws and regulation, it is necessary to be familiar with laws of the affected country with the purpose of facilitating the solution to logistics and legal issues that the task group may encounter.
- There must be a close connection with our diplomatic representative in the affected country, as well as with civilian and military authorities with the aim of reaching the level of coordination that paves the way to precise and rapid actions under an umbrella of security for the personnel and unions units that compose the task group.
- It is necessary to consider that it is possible that the only logistics available are the ones which the task group holds.
- Present times are marked by an accelerated process of social, economic, and technological changes. These represent a challenge for the armed forces who invariably will meet in humanitarian assistance operations under circumstances of confusion and uncertainty that are attached to the destructive impact of natural phenomenon.
- The key is that the armed forces of the world, participating in humanitarian assistance operations, must work together in a constructive way under an environment of collaboration and understanding.

Thank you very much.

[Applause]

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much, Admiral. Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that you will agree with me that we have just heard four very interesting, very well prepared, and very well delivered talks on the subject which is so important to all of us. I would request you to join me in a collective applause for the four distinguished officers who took our time to deliver these messages.

[Applause]

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## DISCUSSION

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***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much and now it's time for questions and answers. The procedure is the same: that a hand will be raised and a microphone will be passed on by the staff in the back. I would request that the questions be short, so that more and more of us can participate in this interactive session. I think we are all right for time. I suppose I have until about 11:10 according to my reckoning; but anyway, I will be showing the red card when there is time. So, may we have the first question?

The admiral in front; can you please pass on the mic?

***Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza Soto, Spain:***

It's not really a question; it's just a comment for Captain Ibrahim Sall from Senegal. If you don't mind, I will speak Spanish. [Simultaneous translation follows]

I would like to thank you for your impressive presentation. I'd also like to say that in Spain, we appreciate the effort that Senegal is making in the fight against illegal immigration. You have given your perspective as a country from which immigrants come. I'm going to give you my perspective; for the outgoing country and the incoming country the problems are very different, as you have said. This is a problem both for the country from which the immigrants are coming, as well as for the country that receives immigrants, since the problem starts at sea. So the problems are different and solutions necessarily are going to be different; and so, this one solution would be perhaps trying to keep them from exiting those countries. But our problem isn't just keeping them from coming in because that gives rise to a humanitarian situation. We cannot deny an immigrant entry into our country when they arrive at our coast exhausted. Our solution is to pass them on to the state security forces and to start the repatriation process, a process that is not easy at all, given the need to identify them. We don't necessarily know what country they come from. Since the summer of 2006, we have a national plan that has set up a mechanism that is called NOBLE SENTINEL in which the air forces and the rescue forces and the civil guard all take part. As far as Europe goes, we have sought to involve Europe in our coasts through Frontex, because this is viewed as a common problem that affects all of our countries. What I can assure you is that without agreements like that which we have with your country, the problem of illegal immigration will not ever be solved. I would also like to tell you that we are just starting to deal with the problem and that is likely to last for many years to come, so I would just like to express, once again, my great thanks for your stance.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much, Admiral; that was very kind of you and it is, indeed, an addition to our knowledge and the knowledge of the audience here. Thank you very much for your comments.

***Captain Aurelio De Carolis, Italy:***

Thank you, Chairman. I am from the Italian Navy and in charge of international affairs of the Italian Coast Guard. First of all, I would like to also thank Captain Sall for having mentioned the support of Italy in the operation in front of his coast, in

particular, the cooperation of the two Italian cutters from the Italian Coast Guard. My question is very simple. I would like to ask his opinion about the reliability of the international convention, mainly for the search and rescue activity and, in particular, in the case of boarding a merchant vessel—unless she's on the high seas—transporting illegal immigrants. Thank you very much.

***Captain Ousmane Ibrahmima Sall, Senegal:***

This is an aspect of search and rescue and I think that your question deals with a very important subject. Senegal had a ferry that sank in 2002, where we had over 1,900 dead; so from that standpoint, we have restructured. This is why I have spoken about political measures that were taken and that are being put into effect now so this is a high authority that is in charge of the coordination of sabotage actions at sea.

Of course, this aspect, as you see, has to be taken in its dimension, the size. Senegal is a small country that has ratified the convention on SOLAS [International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea] and since then is trying hard to manage the search and rescue questions and the cooperation with a different MRCC [Maritime Rescue Coordination Center], especially Madrid and that of France. We also work with Norfolk. We have to say, especially, that it is by means of exchange of information. If I had to give you statistics, we have about 54 interventions in 54 weeks. We have to consider that we have approximately one sea intervention per week. We have managed until now, for better or worse, to be able to save many human lives. What we manage is not only the national coast. We have 8,000 square kilometers from the latitude of Mauritania to the latitude of Angola and the depth that we have in that zone is contiguous to that of Brazil. So you can see that it is a very important area; but, in this framework, we also count upon the support of France, because we have a convention that links us to France in the case of the use of the TL2 plane, a maritime plane, and here we have a very appreciable help when we have situations such as catastrophes or disasters at sea. This plan helps us a great deal. You can imagine that this is very normal as your question takes into account clandestine emigration. We have to fight against this clandestine issue. We have to—we have sabotage, but I am dealing with our daily activities, even though I understand your question. We have not had great difficulties working in collaboration with other states and respecting international rules.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Yes, please, in the middle here.

***Lieutenant Colonel Fernando C. Pereira, Cape Verde:***

Thank you. I don't have a question, but I want to make a contribution. Clandestine emigration today is a concern of Europe and it's also an African concern and together we should find solutions for this issue that affects all of us. Obviously, we have talked about Senegal as departure country, Spain as an entry country, and I would like to mention Cape Verde as a transit country. As you know, Cape Verde is 500 kilometers from the African continent. Because of this maritime barrier created by Frontex, these little boats try to go around the vigilance that exists. Many times they come involuntarily to Cape Verde and it creates a problem for us. We are not indifferent, as we suffer directly. We're Africans. We suffer the consequences of

this issue that affects our African region and we also suffer the consequences of this illegal emigration. I would also like to express our satisfaction here for the cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain and who, together with the Cape Verde, both signed a protocol, a memorandum of understanding, actually. By that document, the Coast Guard of Cape Verde—by the way, I'd like to say that I'm Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Pereira, Commander of the Coast Guard of Cape Verde. Well, in that document, the Coast Guard of Cape Verde, the air force, the Spanish Air Force, and the Civilian Guard of Spain are working together in order to create a barrier around Cape Verde in order to support and provide assistance to those very small boats that sometimes appear in Cape Verde. It's our contribution and we want to thank Spain for their support in this joint action detecting and protecting those that eventually come to our country. Thank you very much.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Okay, sir. Yes, please.

***Captain Ousmane Ibrahmima Sall, Senegal:***

Indeed, I didn't talk about all the states that cooperate in the subregional effort, Mauritania, Morocco, Gambia, Guinea, and Cape Verde. I didn't want to go too far, but when I talked about the countries that are affected by this scourge, there is a synergy. The chiefs of staff are conversing; it is very important and we're exchanging information. We saw that we couldn't combat the scourge without an exchange of information. So, the subregional cooperation is mandatory. We couldn't do anything else. Again, Cape Verde, I would like to salute you and all the countries of the subregion that are helping to fight this scourge.

***Admiral Guillermo Enrique Barrera Hurtado, Colombia:***

Good morning. Thank you very much, it was a fantastic opportunity to listen to all of you and especially the opportunity that I have to have two friends from my course in 1993 of the Naval Command College together at the same table, Vice Admiral Verma and Vice Admiral Sergio Enrique Galán. It's a great opportunity to see you two there together. I have a question for each one of you, a short one. Listening to Admiral Ali, he said that probably the best way to work in humanitarian relief operations is to do it together. What would you think would be the key element for having a successful combined operation in humanitarian relief operations?

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Okay, I would request Admiral Verma to respond first.

***Vice Admiral Nirmal Verma, India:***

I thought that as ex-classmates there was an unwritten rule that you never put a question to them.

[Laughter]

Well, notwithstanding, you see, what has dawned, I think, especially in my area—talking about the Indian Ocean region—the tsunami of 2004 was a wakeup call. I mean, the immense nature of the problem wasn't understood until then; and that is the reason we've been thinking about it from that time onwards. It is

something for which we need to prepare and that can only happen once we, the countries in the region, get together and discuss the issues which are involved and work out procedures, processes, structures that need to be put into place. And this was one of the things which got us thinking in this direction. I've taken some time to speak about the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the new initiative which is there. The primary purpose is that we talk about common problems, especially HADR issues where there can be no second opinion on how we should get together and solve our problems. So, the short answer would be this: that we have to evolve new procedures, which are presently, I would say, not really existent. We have responded well when the issue did come up, I think, within the short span of time. Everybody reacted, all those who could muster the forces. I can only say as far as the Indian Navy's concerned, the operational commanders, the moment they learned that the tsunami was on, the ships were loaded. Since we have already been involved in certain disaster relief operations on our own coast, there was this experience in fine-tuning the sort of items that are carried on board—because when you have an issue of humanitarian relief, in such cases, what is important is the first glass of water that a refugee can get and it is the first meal. I mean there's no idea of dropping bag loads of rations. There's no place to cook. We realized in the past the importance of tackling waterborne diseases. You know the number of immunizations that are carried is phenomenal. So, I think the tsunami for us was a satisfaction in the type of processes that we put into place to tackle the issue. But that was us singly, you know. Imagine if all the resources of all the nations in this region are put together—I think [then] we can handle the most difficult of disaster relief ops. So we need to get together. Yesterday there were some interesting discussions on what the CHENS does and something on similar lines needs to be done also in my area. Thank you.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Admiral Galán, please.

***Vice Admiral Sergio Enrique Henaro Galán, Mexico:***

Yes, thank you, Guillermo, but I think I'm going to answer your question after the symposium. This afternoon, we're going to solve some problems about joint operations, but right now, in Mexico, we don't have any joint operations. But for this purpose of humanitarian assistance, we are going to require some changes in regulations before having the opportunity of participating in these types of operations. I'm going to give my superiors some advices about this after this panel and symposium when I return to Mexico. Thank you very much.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

All right, I think we'll have a question from the back.

***Captain Athanassios Makris, Greece:***

I'm from the Hellenic Navy. It's rather a comment than a question, just to contribute to the last question. Yesterday, Admiral Roughead quoted a model—I take the opportunity to advertise the submarine community—that we developed after the *Kursk* tragedy. I had the privilege to be the drafter of the concept under [Vice] Admiral [Charles L.] Munns, [U.S. Navy], COMSUBGRU 8 [Commander, Submarine

Group 8], at that time, and it has been materializing for some years. As it was mentioned yesterday also, it is a model for the information-sharing process. So, we have something that can work. It means that it can have an application for humanitarian operations. My next comment is on the new initiative in the area of the Indian Ocean. Just using a Greek word for your initiative just makes me feel proud, but the main point is that ancient civilizations are always made contemporary when people use classical languages. In this case, it happens to be a Greek word, but it means that we have a heritage that we can rely on. The other thing is that we have to accept that the commons cannot be commanded and it means that we have all to contribute positively in order to come into the best result for our common benefit. Also, this kind of humanitarian operations, in my opinion, is a very good way in order to overcome some disputes that potentially exist between countries. I don't want to speak for particular countries, but in 1999 when we had the severe earthquakes in Greece and Turkey, it resulted in earthquake diplomacy. It means that, as Admiral La Rosa has today stated very successfully, information sharing is somehow a confidence-building measure [CBM]. We can say that these kind of operations are true examples of CBMs, although I don't think that it was in the mind of the drafters of the confidence-building measures theory—it is an example right now and it is a reality. So, we should take advantage of that and use that because we must be focused on things that unite us and do not put us separate as enemies. Thank you very much for the opportunity.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much, Captain, for that comment. Any more questions? Yes, please, in the middle, please.

***Brigadier Carmel Vassallo, Malta:***

First of all, I would like to join my counterparts from Spain and Cape Verde and praise what Senegal has been doing over these last two years in an attempt to control illegal migration towards Europe. I wondered how many of us here are aware that the cooperation that has been going on between Senegal and Mauritania and Spain and other countries has had, however, an adverse effect on illegal migration in the central Mediterranean region. And I say this not as a criticism; rather, it underlines the importance for countries in the Mediterranean—like Malta, which is carrying a huge burden, Italy, Spain, and Greece and others—to reach agreements similar to the one reached with Senegal. I also plead for an international organization like the European Union to make efforts to try to bring about similar agreements, because that is the only way how we can start controlling this problem of illegal migration. Having said that, I have a very small question for Captain Ibrahim Sall: You have mentioned you are focused on immigrants from Asia, from the Asian region. May I ask how they arrive in Senegal, by which means and by what way? Thank you.

***Captain Ousmane Ibrahim Sall, Senegal:***

They land in the subregion, not meaning Senegal. That's not what I said, but they could come through Mali, though Guinea, and by road because we have the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), so this permits the free

circulation of people, but our borders are porous, [so] it is very difficult to control. When they come, they are considered as regular people. But when they come through via different flights, and that's what we have seen in Senegal, they take several flights and then they come to concentrate in certain places. So they transit here, they choose a neighborhood, they choose specific citizens who are their accomplices and they come to a neighborhood, to different houses. Following some intelligence that we received, we found the different houses where they were and that was where we arrested them, the 300,150 Asians that we arrested first, and then the others came by sea. They came through different countries and they came to our territory. But since they were on fishing boats, it was not easy to find them, so we had to have intelligence so that we could come locate the fishing boats. What was difficult is that they were like boat people, I should say, because some states didn't want to take them in. And Senegal, as a matter of fact, didn't, but we had to play on consider the humanitarian side in cooperation with Spain. It's not always easy, but they come through regular ways and then they gather and they choose a smuggler. There is always a smuggler there. So this is how they do it. Thank you.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much, Captain Sall. We have time for one more question. Yes, please.

***Rear Admiral Mohammed Berrada-Gouzi, Morocco:***

In Morocco, geographically, you know, we are between Spain and Senegal, and I should confirm that there are many Asians that we find at sea that are amongst the people that leave from Africa. I should confirm also that they are very numerous and I would like to record this, it is a daily drama that we have. When our Senegalese friends had seized two thousand people, in Morocco we had three thousand individuals in the south of the Kingdom of Morocco. It is a constant struggle. We also have to say that there is a legal framework that arises, because these people are not asking for our help. They do not want to come to Morocco. They don't want to be repatriated, either. Several planes each week go to Senegal, to Mali. So, this is just my statement and I would like to add to the work that has been done by Senegal. Thank you very much, again.

***Admiral Muhammed Afzal Tahir, Pakistan:***

Thank you very much for a very active participation in the question-and-answer session. I think it is indeed a measure of how important the topic of this panel was. Also, it is indicative of the justice that the speakers did to the topic that actually brought out so many comments, questions, and a lively discussion. I would just like to say a few words at the end and that is that we have all learned today that no nation alone has the capacity or capability to tackle the aftermath of the tragedies that happen around the world. It has to be a collective effort by all the nations, combining the capabilities of navies, air forces, armies, the medical staff, and so on and so forth, with equipment, with earth-moving equipment, construction material, construction equipment, and so on and so forth. These have to come forward, first of all, to provide the immediate needs, as Admiral Verma said, to a person stricken, to a community stricken. The most important thing could be a bottle of water and a



cooked meal and not tons of other materials that the aircraft might drop. Also, in the interim period, is the prevention of diseases. Taking care of the sick, taking care of the children and the elderly, and also, of course, in the long-term period, as we are tackling the situation in Pakistan, is the reconstruction phase that has to come about. Again, I would say that many countries around the world are not able to cope with the requirement of finances that such tragedies leave behind them. The international community has to come forward with this. I would thank you very much for active participation, as I said, and patient listening. However, I will be failing in my duty if I don't at the end individually thank, on behalf of all of us, Admiral Verma, Captain Sall, Admiral Godoy, and Admiral Galán for the excellent presentations that they gave. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

[Applause]



## Panel Discussion Three

### Economic Maritime Security and Solutions

Moderated by

Vice Admiral Ganiyu Tunde Adegboyega Adekeye, Nigeria

Panel Members:

Rear Admiral Tayfun Uraz, Turkey

Commodore Geoffrey Biekro, Ghana

Admiral Rodolfo Codina Díaz, Chile

Mr. Chris Trelawny, International Maritime Organization

*Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:*

We now proceed to panel discussion number three, a subject near and dear to everyone's heart: the economic aspects of maritime security. Probably one of the more important aspects of what we all do. We have four distinguished panelists from among your colleagues, and our distinguished moderator is Vice Admiral Adekeye, the Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Navy. And at this time, I turn the proceedings over to you, Admiral.

*Vice Admiral Ganiyu Tunde Adegboyega Adekeye, Nigeria:*

Admiral Roughead, heads of navies here present, distinguished participants, good afternoon. Please let me start this by expressing my sincere appreciation to the CNO for the honor and opportunity to moderate this panel and, by extension, to thank him also for all the panelists who have been allowed to express their opinion and to contribute to the subjects of ISS 18 at the U.S. Naval War College.

Economic maritime security and solutions—that is the subject before us. And with the challenges of economic maritime security, simply put, they are the activities inimical to the successful exploitation of a maritime environment for economic purposes. And this may be global or regional in nature. This includes terrorism, piracy, human and drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and crude oil stealing, also known as illegal bunkering. All these events, even if some cases are localized in some subregions, have a tendency to have a global impact. Distinguished participants, following the first two panels' exhaustive work in their topics, we have unwittingly had a superb preparation for this panel, and I wish to thank the seasoned, preceding panelists for their help. Most especially I would like to stress here that the most critical need of the security economic maritime environment is in information, both globally and regionally. The type of economic maritime trades that we do experience often does not need very heavy weapons, and it's with few exceptions, maybe just presence; this company can be enhanced by good surveillance and good information sharing.

This afternoon, our seasoned panel will examine this topic and offer solutions from the regional prospectus on specific topics. They are, starting from my immediate

left, Rear Admiral M. Tayfun Uraz, Commandant, Turkey's National War College. He'll be speaking on Turkey's contribution to maritime security in her surrounding seas. Commandant Geoffrey Biekro, Chief Staff Officer, Naval Headquarters, Ghana Navy, will also be speaking on Gulf of Guinea operations. Then Admiral Rodolfo Codina Díaz, Commander in Chief, Chilean Navy, will be speaking on maritime awareness. While Mr. Chris Trelawny, Head, Maritime Security Section, International Maritime Organization, will speak on IMO initiatives in West and Central Africa.

Gentlemen, good afternoon. I'd like to remind you that you are all required to speak for not more than fifteen minutes each, and I will humbly remind you as we go along at five minutes to the end, two minutes to the end, and at full time. May I also remind you that the organizers have graciously adopted the soccer method of reminding you with two yellow cards followed by the red card at the appropriate time. So I wish you all the best. Thank you.

***Rear Admiral Tayfun Uraz, Turkey:***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admirals, ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure and honor for me to be here in the Naval War College after fifteen years and address such a distinguished audience. This presentation should have done by my Chief of the Navy, Admiral [Metin] Ataç. And as all of you may know, he couldn't attend this symposium. He sent his best regards to all of you.

In following minutes, I would like to touch on the implication of new global security environment over Turkey's surrounding seas. The new global security environment has brought forward the Turkish Navy to a versatile and dynamic defense and security provider and transformed some of its conventional tasks into nonconventional tasks including stability ones.

Maritime transportation carries 90 percent of Turkish export and import. Last year, a quarter of a billion tons of goods were handled in Turkish ports. That figure has doubled since 1997. The Istanbul and Canakkale Straits do not only provide a vital link between Turkey's maritime flanks but also constitute a major artery for the global economy. Turkey, straddling the Caspian Basin, Middle East, and Europe, forms a natural energy bridge between the source-rich countries and the energy-hungry work markets. Due to its geographical location as well as existing and prospective oil and gas pipeline networks, Turkey casts itself as an energy hub in its region. From this perspective, Turkey has become a part of a contemporary sea road which binds Central Asia to Europe.

As you can see in the slide [on the next page], Caspian Basin oil and natural gases are almost 3 percent of world oil and natural gas reserves. On the other hand, from the production side, Caspian Basin oil production is almost 2.5 percent of the world oil production. Natural gas production of the region is approximately 4.5 percent of the world natural gas production. In itself, the Caspian share of global oil and gas reserves and production is not considerable.

However, in view of the uncertainty of the other part of the world's energy resources and possibility of the use of energy delivery as a power tool, the transport of Caspian and Central Asian energy supplies to the West with the share of 32 percent has gained vital importance.

## SEA TRANSPORTATION

**TURKISH NAVAL FORCES**

# Sea Transportation



**A Major Artery  
for the Global Economy**

**90% of  
Turkish Export & Import**

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## CASPIAN BASIN ENERGY RESERVES

**TURKISH NAVAL FORCES**

# Caspian Basin Energy Reserves

<u>World oil reserves</u>		<u>World natural gas reserves</u>	
1200 billion barrels (b/b)		180 trillion cubic meters (tcbm)	
<u>Caspian oil reserves</u>		<u>Caspian natural gas reserves</u>	
Azerbaijan	7.000 b/b		1,37 tcbm
Kazakhstan	39.500 b/b		3 tcbm
Turkmenistan	500 b/b		2,90 tcbm
<b>Total</b>	<b>47.000 b/b (4%)</b>	<b>7,3 tcbm (4%)</b>	

**Caspian Basin Oil 4% Natural Gas 4% of the world resources**

Iran	137.500 b/b (11,5%)	27 tcbm (15%)
Russian Fed	74.500 b/b (6,2%)	48 tcbm (26%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>212.000 b/b (17,7%)</b>	<b>75 tcbm (41%)</b>

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## CASPIAN BASIN ENERGY PRODUCTION



The growing importance of the sea-based energy corridor crossing the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean seas, through the Turkish Straits along with the Blue Stream gas pipeline in the Black Sea, as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Kirkuk-Yumurtalik, and the future Samsun-Ceyhan pipelines, will make Turkish maritime jurisdiction areas more vital and important than before [see figure, p. 127].

The Black Sea is gaining importance particularly within the context of Euro-Atlantic security as Black Sea-origin politics are becoming increasingly relevant in the international politics. The main reasons for this lie on two important words: energy and security. During the last decade as the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia hydrocarbon resources opened up to global markets, the Black Sea has become one of the most important energy corridors of the world. In this context, the Turkish approach to Black Sea maritime security is based on two pillars: First, full cooperation and coordination among all Black Sea littoral states should be attained. Second, the maritime security of the region should be complementary to the Euro-Atlantic security system [see figure, p. 127].

The amount of the Black Sea Basin-originated oil transportation through the Turkish Straits has reached approximately 145 million tons a year. In other words, 3 million barrels of oil by 25–30 tankers are being transported to the global markets on a daily basis. Forty percent of this amount is consumed by Europe, and is supposed to reach 70 percent by the year 2020. As an average, 300 ships move in the Black Sea on a daily basis. One hundred and fifty of this figure cross the Turkish Straits; the rest operate mainly in Turkey's west access in the Black Sea. Last year



### TURKEY'S MARITIME JURISDICTION AREAS



## TURKISH NAVAL FORCES

# Turkey's Maritime Jurisdiction Areas



**Blue Stream**  
**Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan**  
**Samsun-Ceyhan**  
**Kirkuk-Yumurtalik**

**More Vital and Important Than Before**

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### THE BLACK SEA



## TURKISH NAVAL FORCES

# The Black Sea



**Energy**      **Security**

**The Black Sea has become one of the most important energy corridors of the world.**

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55,000 merchant ships belonging to 102 states navigated through the Turkish Straits either to or from the Black Sea. They carried almost half a billion tons of goods, a quarter of which were petroleum products.

Possessing the Turkish straits and the longest coastline in the Black Sea, Turkey has always promoted peace and stability in this important area. In this respect, the major role that the Montreux regime has played in the last seventy-one years cannot be denied. We know that there are no threats but risks in the Black Sea maritime domain. However, these risks have potential to transform themselves into threats if not checked and deterred. In order to increase maritime security in the Black Sea area, Turkey has pioneered a series of initiatives in the last decade. She led the BLACKSEAFOR [Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group] initiative in 2001; participated in Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field [CSBM] in 2002, which is a Ukrainian initiative; launched Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY in 2004; and initiated the Black Sea Coast and Border Guards Cooperation Forum in 2006. In 2001, in order to revitalize regional cooperation activities, improve relationship between the Black Sea countries, and increase peace and stability in the region, a multinational naval on-call task group was established and named the BLACKSEAFOR. Turkey regards BLACKSEAFOR as a unique and exemplary regional initiative promoting peace and stability in the maritime domain as well as an instrument increasing interoperability. At the operational level, BLACKSEAFOR has already achieved the interoperability of different units belonging to different security systems. This is a unique success further encouraging the idea to consider BLACKSEAFOR as a regional security tool with a large mission and roles. In this regard, the representatives of the littoral countries reaffirmed their common understanding that security in the Black Sea constitutes utmost importance for littoral states and that, therefore, they should take primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability in the area through the engagement of their common assets and capabilities. They further underline the fact that the BLACKSEAFOR is an already available instrument which can be used for the achievement of this objective. Currently, BLACKSEAFOR is undergoing a new process to prepare itself for more demanding tasks of the future in this vein.

On the other end, the Turkish Navy in close cooperation with the Turkish Coast Guard launched a maritime security operation named Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY in March 2004. Since 2004 there has been no single incident in the maritime domain of the Black Sea. The aim of this operation, in compliance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions [UNSCR 1373, 1540, 1566], is to make a contribution to the overall efforts for deterring, disrupting, and preventing the risks and potential threats of terrorism and illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in the maritime domain. The mission of Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY is to achieve and maintain maritime situational awareness in the designated patrol areas enabling prompt identification of, and reaction to, suspect vessels, as well as to conduct active presence operations in our vital sea lines of communications in Turkish surrounding seas. With these aspects, Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY is a typical maritime security operation composed of maritime situational awareness (MSA) and maritime interdiction operations (MIOs) pillars. This operation is affiliated with the NATO-led Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR in the Mediterranean regarding information and intelligence sharing, as well as suspect-vessels shadowing and

interdiction. Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY consists of regular patrols with frigates and patrol boats in predefined surveillance areas in the Black Sea. Helicopters, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and coast-guard vessels assist in this activity. According to statistics gathered over three years, Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY has detected approximately 475,000 ships and identified 98 percent of them. Search and in-port visits were conducted by the Turkish Coast Guard in cooperation with other state agencies. Until now, 364 suspected vessels have been detected and more than 10,000 of them were hailed.

### INTEGRATED COASTAL SURVEILLANCE RADAR STATIONS



An integrated network of coastal surveillance radar stations equipped with Automated Identification System (AIS) has been activated in the Black Sea. So, maritime situational awareness over the Black Sea has been dramatically improved. The system is also integrated with Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Service, VTS.

The data gathered from this station is currently disseminated to NATO. Not only in the Black Sea but also in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, maritime situational awareness has been developed through AIS and VTS to gather and used under the Turkish Maritime Surveillance System. This overall architecture is expected to be finalized by 2008. All suspect vessels and those vessels carrying hazardous material are being shadowed during their transit through the Turkish Straits as well as the Black Sea. Providing security through maritime interdiction operations and maritime situational awareness, Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY has become the core for closer cooperation and interface with the NATO and

## INFORMATION SHARING WITH NATO

**TURKISH NAVAL FORCES**

### Information sharing with NATO

**Mar 06 (Not Automatic Interface + Limited Sites)**

**Jun 06 (Automatic Interface - Trial)**

**The data is currently disseminated to NATO.**

**Starting from Feb 07**

- Automatic Interface
- Enhanced coverage

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littoral states of the Black Sea. This operation is open to all Black Sea countries, and Turkey has extended an invitation to all Black Sea countries to participate in the operation. The Russian Federation officially concluded the participation process in Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY on 27 December 2006. A Russian liaison officer has already taken the post at the Permanent Coordination Center located at the base in Kdz.[Karadeniz] Ereğli. Additionally, a Turkish liaison officer is already at the Constant Coordination Center in Divnomorskoye-Novorossiysk. The Ukraine is officially a participant in Black Sea Harmony from 25 April 2007. We suppose that the Ukrainian liaison officer at the permanent coordination center in Kdz. Ereğli and the Turkish liaison officer at the Contact Point Cell–Sevastopol in the Ukraine will begin their duty in the near future.

Following Romania's political decision to join BLACK SEA HARMONY in May 2006, Romania and Turkey have conducted the first technical meeting in order to conclude a memorandum of understanding for the participation of Romania in Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY. With the aim of promoting the stability and safety and security in the Black Sea area through improvement of cooperation and coordination of maritime law enforcement activities, littoral states signed an agreement at the seventh annual meeting of leaders, held in Istanbul from 7 to 9 November 2006, to establish the Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Cooperation Forum [BSCF]. The Turkish Navy makes cooperative efforts to increase our Black Sea allies' interoperability at sea. Under this context, the Turkish Navy

## PIPELINES



shares its own experiences with at-sea training with the Romanian and Bulgarian navies.

Now when we turn to the south, the Bay of Iskenderun as the terminal area for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Kirkük-Yumurtalık pipelines presents itself as a special location. When full capacities are reached in both pipelines, this area will pump 140 million tons of oil to global markets. Thus, the Bay of Iskenderun-originated sea lines of communication will become new lifelines of the world energy network. When the Samsun-Ceyhan bypass pipeline project is realized this amount will increase up to 190 million tons of oil per year.

In order to deter, disrupt, and prevent terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other illicit activities at sea, the Turkish Navy in April 2006 launched a maritime security operation under the name of Operation MEDITERRANEAN SHIELD in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Maritime traffic information obtained through this operation has been shared with relevant NATO headquarters, Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, United Nations Interim Force Assets in Lebanon [UNIFIL], and other regional and national initiatives already existing in the Mediterranean such as Virtual Regional Traffic Center of the Italian Navy.

Since its beginning in October 2001, the Turkish Navy has supported Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. Statistically Turkey has provided a maximum number of assets for this important maritime security operation of NATO. Operation MEDITERRANEAN SHIELD and Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR are complementary and provide uninterrupted presence in the eastern Mediterranean with mutual

coordination and cooperation. Furthermore, UNIFIL maritime operations which are conducted to patrol Lebanese maritime areas under UN auspices also provide security in the region through active presence. From its very beginning, the Turkish Navy has provided frigates, corvettes, and oilers to this operation.

In conclusion, maritime security in a Euro-Atlantic sphere is directly linked to the security and stability of its surrounding seas. Turkey as a member of NATO and a candidate to the EU has become a security provider in the surrounding seas, contributing to the regional as well as global peace and stability. I would like to stress that, in the current situation, security, and stability have already been achieved in the Black Sea by the littoral countries. Our aim is to maintain stability in the Black Sea. Even as a constructive manner, any external intervention can disrupt this delicate balance in the region. We believe that under the leadership of the navies the rapprochement amongst littoral states can be enhanced and the spillover effect of this approach creates more secure and safer seas around us. What is important is to create synergy amongst littoral states for information exchange and coordination interdiction operations when and where necessary.

Last but not the least, what the Turkish Navy is doing in our surrounding seas is burden sharing. As an ally, Turkey believes that NATO has a lot of issues to deal with. So we have to deal with our regional problems in order to contribute to NATO's global endeavor. For us, littoral countries' efforts and active participation in regional initiative are the key elements for the economic maritime security. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

***Vice Admiral Adekeye, Nigeria:***

Thank you very much, Admiral. I was [entranced] by the speech while it was going. I was forced to give you one and half minutes more, where I hope I won't have to do that again. Commodore Biekro, Ghana.


***Commodore Geoffrey Biekro, Ghana:***

Admiral Roughead, service chiefs, most distinguished invited guests, commanders and senior officers, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great delight and honor for me to have this opportunity to speak to such a distinguished audience on the issue of economic maritime security and solutions and share my thoughts with you on how support in the form of a Gobar Fleet Station from the Gulf of Guinea sea base enables lookout operations.

The Gulf of Guinea is that part of the Atlantic Ocean that washes the coast of West to southwestern Africa [see figure p. 133]. The region witnessed one of the worst fratricide conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The only intrastate conflict yet to be resolved is in Ivory Coast. Otherwise, the area is relatively calm, with several of the countries making significant strides in the democratization of their political systems. With the absence of any major conflict within the region, it has been suggested in several quarters that the potential human and material resources inherent in the military be applied to directly support economic development. In recent years, the Gulf of Guinea has become significant in global affairs for both good and bad reasons. Growing maritime threats and vulnerabilities pose significant economic, environmental, social, and security challenges across the African continent. In the Gulf of Guinea, in particular, maritime safety and security has



## GULF OF GUINEA



become a multidimensional problem that impinges on sustainable development and economic prosperity of countries in the region. Our concern in the region is not just about prevention of the threats in the region. It is about defining and tightening security from an integrated perspective, from the perspective of global partnership. It is in the light of this that we find a workshop adjusted in the right direction, and the theme forging cooperative solutions for international maritime security very apt.

Before I get into the subject, permit me, distinguished personalities, to convey the warm regards and gratitude of my Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Nuno, to Admiral Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Navy, in general, for offering the Ghanian Navy this unique opportunity to participate in such a laudable forum. On behalf of the leader of the Ghanian delegation, Commodore Franky Daley, I wish to thank most sincerely Admiral Shuford, our host, for his outstanding hospitality and reception.

My purpose is to contribute to discourse on the concept of a Global Fleet Station in relation to economic maritime security as solutions in the Gulf of Guinea. And to do this, I shall highlight economic maritime interests and security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and proceed to look at the capacity or the capabilities of the regional navies and their impact on the region. I shall then look at the effort of the U.S. in the Gulf of Guinea, and, before I conclude, I'll make a case for the Global Fleet Station, or Africa Partnership Station, in the Gulf of Guinea.

Now let's look at maritime interest and security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. All the states in the Gulf of Guinea have ratified the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, UNCLOS for short, to take advantage of its provisions. With a right to exploit the living and nonliving resources comes the responsibility to preserve those resources in their environment. The common maritime interests within the region are shipping, hydrocarbon, and fishery, amongst others. To us in the Gulf of Guinea, pursuing these maritime economic activities peacefully has become a daunting task for the following reasons:


1. *Commercial Shipping.* The states that border on the Gulf of Guinea depend on the sea for about 90 percent of their external trade, which constitutes their very livelihood. The World Shipping Council reported that in the year 2001 the global shipping sector alone produced a freight bill of \$285 billion. This case is supposed to translate into economic development and enhancement of human security globally. In reality, however, many parts of Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea, have benefited marginally. Commercial vessels, especially those inside ports and harbors, are often the targets of armed robbery by organized gangs. These attacks have been the subject of frequent complaints by the World Shipping Council. Many of these gangs have international connections within the region. Therefore, an individual country's effort in combating this crime has little chance of success.
2. *Hydrocarbon Reserves.* The Gulf of Guinea region retains a significant degree of importance in the production of hydrocarbons. Apart from Nigeria and Angola, who are major world exporters in Africa, Ghana, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and many others either produce crude oil or are prospecting for oil offshore. It is estimated that the region has a total crude oil reserve of over 60 billion barrels. Indeed, the region is described as one of the hottest maritime areas in the world of hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. As compared to the other oil-producing regions, such as the Middle East, the Gulf of Guinea is relatively calm and a most stable source of crude oil to the USA and Europe. According to the International Policy report, oil production in the region is estimated to increase by 40 percent in the next ten years. Presently, two countries in the region, Angola and Nigeria, alone, supply more of American's crude oil requirement than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates combined. However, according to the International Maritime Bureau, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most unsafe and insecure areas in the world. At the 2005 Energy and Security Seminar in Nigeria, it came to light that the region loses over \$1.5 billion annually through illegal bunkering and other illegal oil-related activities. It is feared that insecurity in the Niger Delta, for example, could be replicated in other parts of the region.
3. *Pollution.* The threat of an oil spill is a major constant in the region. It is, however, doubtful whether any country in the region has the capability to contain and clean up any spill before it becomes an international issue. Since the damaging impact of an oil spill would not be limited to the point of incidence, there is a requirement for collaborative response in such an eventuality.
4. *Seabed Resources* Apart from oil and natural gas, the continental shelf is believed to contain minerals such as gold, diamond, and manganese nodules.



Until the requisite technology and capital are acquired to explore them, there remains a need to protect these offshore resources.

5. *Fisheries*. The waters of the Gulf of Guinea support one of the richest concentrations of marine life in the world. Fish export is an important source of foreign exchange. Fishing is also a traditional industry and employs over 80 percent of the people living along the coast. Data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, UNFAO, indicates that over 60 percent of the animal protein intake of the people in the region comes from fishery resources. It might interest this august audience to know that Atlantic tuna spawns in the Gulf of Guinea before migrating to the other parts of the world. Unfortunately, however, the rich fishery resources of the Gulf of Guinea have attracted illegal, ultramodern, foreign fishing fleets. According to the Center for Contemporary Conflict, poaching accounts for over \$370 million of the unlawful fish catch in the region.

### DRUG SMUGGLING



6. *Drug Smuggling*. The Gulf of Guinea has now attained notoriety for being a transit point for Latin American cartels. The drug trade obviously has a damaging effect on the international image of the region. Equally damaging is the impact on the socioeconomic development of the region. If the drug trade is entrenched, the fragile economic and political systems would suffer.
7. *Capacity and Capability of Regional Navies*. Despite these vulnerabilities, distinguished personalities, security in the Gulf of Guinea has traditionally been

focused on shore concerns; besides no nation in the subregion can boast of any credible navy to effectively secure its maritime environment. It therefore goes without saying that a lack of maritime security is having a negative impact on stability, human security, and economic development. It is also noteworthy that this is part of its global importance and strategic significance. The Gulf of Guinea has seen comparatively few resources devoted to maritime security. I wish to emphasize here that maritime security is a shared concern and consequently requires a collective approach. Like fish in the sea, threat in the maritime domains knows no boundaries. The solution is to take a collective approach. A collective approach maximizes individual potential and capacities resulting in effective and efficient regional and global regime.

8. *United States' efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.* The U.S. has already been active in enhancing the capacity of Gulf of Guinea navies through U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR). At this juncture, I wish to acknowledge with a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation the personal commitment and enthusiasm of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, Admiral Harry Ulrich, in helping the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, especially my country, Ghana, deal with very significant problems of capacity building. With establishment of the new Africa Command, AFRICOM, it is my hope that General [William E.] Ward will continue with even more zeal and dedication the good work which has been started. NAVEUR is supporting my country, Ghana, in developing an international maritime security strategy involving all stakeholders in the maritime industry. This is an interministerial committee that I chair. It is hoped that the national maritime security that we are formulating will provide the mechanism for information sharing amongst stakeholders in order to ensure a unified approach to dealing with maritime security challenges. Our immediate concern is to acquire the capability to know who is out there at sea and what they are doing. Once we can tell who is out there and what they are doing, we will be in a position to fish out the bad guys and respond accordingly. In this direction, NAVEUR has also provided the Ghanaian Navy with three AIS systems, training, and technical systems to improve our capacity to monitor the coastlines. The U.S. has also donated five new Defender-class patrol boats to the Ghanaian Navy in this regard. We are very grateful, sir. It is also noteworthy that the U.S. military, especially naval, visits to Ghana have increased consistently over the past few years, and this is yielding good results. My committee also envisages the development of partnering and international seminars in the Gulf of Guinea area, which would enable countries to approach the maritime challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.
9. *Global Fleet Station in the Gulf of Guinea.* Mr. Chairman, in spite of all these efforts, our dream of harnessing the economic benefits of the ocean has still not been realized. There is the need to complement these efforts with more innovative and proactive ways of ensuring security at sea and I believe this is what the Global Fleet Station, now known as the Africa Partnership Station, has come to achieve. I see the Global Fleet Station as a practical demonstration of the thousand-ship navy concept, a means of contributing naval assets to original area of interest in order to sustain presence and ensure economic maritime security. Although some may argue that a Global Fleet Station in

the Gulf of Guinea may offer anti-American extremists an increasingly rich target environment for both criminal and terrorist networks, I believe the time has come for us to look at maritime security as a team effort, a team effort in which every nation has a stake in maritime security. In this respect, distinguished personalities, I see the Global Fleet Station in the Gulf of Guinea leading an international effort to improve monetary and enforcement abilities through enhanced cooperation. In this regard, there will be the need for a standard operating procedure for all parties involved. To make this dream come true will require the political will of governments in the region to provide the resources to strengthen their navies, which will then play their part effectively in complementing the efforts of the Global Fleet Station.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that no single navy, no single country, will be successful on its own in combating the myriad of threats in the Gulf of Guinea. The solution is a collaborative effort by an international fleet of like-minded nations participating in security operations in the Gulf of Guinea. As a very senior officer in my navy, charged with ensuring the safety and security of Ghanaian waters, I see a great partnership in the Global Fleet Station, a partnership to make our oceans safer and enhance the economic development of Ghana, the Gulf of Guinea, and the world at large. Distinguished personalities, thank you once more for the honor given me, and thank you for your rapt attention.

*Vice Admiral Adekeye, Nigeria:*

Thank you very much for such a very fast and a good delivery of that.

*Admiral Rodolfo Codina Díaz, Chile:*

Admiral Roughead, Admiral Shuford, chiefs of navies, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank Admiral Roughead for inviting me to take part in this important event and have the opportunity to discuss this current subject with all of you. I will explain how the Chilean Navy is facing the challenge of acquiring and keeping a timely and thorough knowledge of all the events related to our maritime domain and the efforts aimed at sharing and increasing the maritime information available.

For this presentation, I will follow the outline shown on the screen [see figure, p. 138]. After a brief introduction, I will review the way we're working maritime awareness from our national perspective. And last, I will present some conclusions in order to highlight what we foresee is the path to follow.

Chile is known because of its distinctive geography: a long and narrow strip of land in the southern part of the American continent, which also extends far into the Pacific with our Juan Fernández and Easter islands [see figure p. 138]. However, this simple definition has a different meaning for the Chile Navy. For us, it means a very long coastline with a significant number of ports, even greater number of fjords, a huge responsibility in the Antarctic territory, and hundreds of island and navigation aids, especially in the southern part of our country [see maps p. 139].

The growing aquaculture industry and significant fishing activity create an enormous area of responsibility for safety of human life at sea, and a growing trend of international exchange of goods and services by sea.

## OUTLINE



**MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS: THE CHILEAN PERSPECTIVE**


### CONTENTS

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
- I.- **INTRODUCTION.**
- II.- **MDA : THE CHILEAN PERSPECTIVE.**
  - **Conceptual Analysis of MDA.**
  - **Our Maritime Scenario.**
  - **MDA in Action.**
- III.- **CONCLUSIONS.**

2

## MAP



### I.- INTRODUCTION



The map displays the Pacific Ocean region, highlighting the Chilean coastline. Two islands are specifically labeled: Easter Island to the west and Juan Fernández Island to the east of the main coast. A white arrow points to the location of Juan Fernández Island.

4

## SOUTHERN CHILE: STRAITS OF MAGELLAN AND CAPE HORN



### I.- INTRODUCTION



## THE CHILEAN AREA OF MARITIME RESPONSIBILITY




### I.- INTRODUCTION



In short, we can define Chile essentially as a maritime country. This fact explains why we have been concerned about all the issues that take place in our ocean for such a long time. In this endeavor we have transited from American safety towards a more comprehensive maritime security perspective. In looking at our perspective toward Maritime Domain Awareness, let us start with a short conceptual analysis [see figure, below]. Maritime Domain Awareness is defined by the U.S. Coast Guard as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States.” In this globalized world, it is clear that this concept is completely applicable to many countries that are dependent on maritime activities. Furthermore, considering that the concept requires the process and an enabling structure, we also see that the steps and elements considered are completely applicable to many of the navies here present.

## CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF MDA




Although the infrastructure may vary greatly from navy to navy, the most important difference lies mainly in the extension and quality of the information being addressed. But it is in this last area where we have a great opportunity for the sharing of relevant information which will significantly enhance the capabilities of our own national system. Today, threats have clearly become global in nature; therefore, the need to interact on the international level, thus generating a global MDA, is becoming a must.


Let us now review the Chile-American scenario [see figure p. 141].



## MARITIME SCENARIO



## MARITIME SCENARIO II





This scenario has demonstrated the constant increase in maritime activity—as a matter of fact, more than 5 percent a year. This can be supported by some of the figures shown on [the slide on p. 141]. The significant expansion in many areas related to the maritime activity is demanding from our Maritime Authority greater awareness and response capability so as to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to us by the Chilean state.


Lastly, I will address how we are implementing the MDA concept in Chile. By that I mean MDA in action. To start, I have to explain that Chile has a particular organization for the Maritime Authority: it is part of the larger navy organization. There is no separate service. This allows us to use all navy logistic support and training facilities, command and control systems, and other aspects of management without the need to replicate this in another organization. Moreover, this gives us the flexibility to adapt the resources needed, providing the necessary capabilities to cover a greater range of maritime control and response activities using, when required, the blue-water naval assets.

### THE MODEL



From the MDA point of view, the most relevant of these capabilities is to be able to build and maintain an accurate picture of what is happening in our maritime scenario. For this we have to integrate all available means and sources of information into a robust command and control system enabling rapid response [see figure, above].

## OUR ORGANIZATION




A broad overview of how our MDA organization considers the following command and control capabilities.

First of all, a centralized command is exercised in the different naval regions with the technical support of the Maritime Directorates [see figure above]. The immediate decision-making is located at the port authority level. Control is centralized in the Maritime Directorate and its technical offices. All relevant activities are automatically recorded and transmitted to the higher authorities using available computer infrastructure. In terms of communication, we have a multiservice network that connects eighty-four points along the country, including the Chilean islands and the Antarctic region. There are over eighteen hundred workstations connected to the network, allowing for timely access to the required information. The intelligence and information obtained from the external sources is further introduced into a system complemented by surveillance and reconnaissance assets, which include radars and cameras for coastal surveillance, AIS stations ashore and afloat, and naval and maritime surface and air units. Together these assets are operated in an integral and coordinated way.

On the action side of things, increasing maritime security problems have oriented the Chilean Navy towards the upgrading of human, material, and technological assets so that the information provided by the MDA system can be acted upon. Material-wise we are presently involved in the renovation of our naval, surface, and air assets and the upgrading of the maritime units. We strive for a continuum, from the coastal border through the exclusive economic zone [EEZ] into

## CHILEAN ASSETS FOR MDA



the high seas, for in these maritime areas our presence would be increasingly required [see figure above]. But going back to the essence of the MDA system—and that is the building of relevant information—this definitely requires information exchange on many different levels. At the national level we presently have a suitable and fluent exchange of information among the agencies that are involved in the maritime domain. Internationally speaking, these exchanges are less fluent. The exchange of information related to drug control has the lead, with a lower level of fluency in issues related to terrorism. However, we are just starting the change of information with reference to arms traffic control. Commercial satellite information is definitely unsatisfactory, for the data is not received in a timely manner or with the quality needed. The Long Range Identification and Tracking [LRIT] System, which will become available by 2009, will constitute a significant achievement of relevant information, allowing control of ships outside our immediate zone of responsibility.

Many countries have implemented a variety of systems to provide decision makers with a comprehensive picture of what is going on at sea. This is particularly applicable to the shipping business: the United States promotes the Command and Control PC (C2PC); Australia, the REMBRANDT (Remote Briefing and Tracking); Chile, the GRAFIMAR; United Kingdom, the NAMESIS (Naval Merchant Shipping Information System); and not long ago, Brazil introduced its own software. But not everything marches on a smooth path. As stated before, at the international level, technological problems and commonality of standards are inhibiting the

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

**II.- MDA: THE CHILEAN PERSPECTIVE**  
*MDA in Action*

**International Cooperation**

- **The Chilean Maritime Authority participates in many international organizations and agreements . . .**
  - ➔ **OMI**
  - ➔ **ROCRAM (Red Operativa de Cooperación Regional de Autoridades Marítimas de Sudamérica, México, Panamá y Cuba).**
  - ➔ **IALA (International Association of Navigation Aids and Lighthouse Authorities).**
  - ➔ **STAR (Secure Trade APEC Region).**
- **Proper scenario to agree upon norms, technical standards, responsibilities to achieve a common MDA.**
- **Aim is to generate an "integrated network" to achieve a "Global Maritime Domain Awareness".**

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real-time information exchange, although greater volumes of it have become available. As a matter of fact, regionally we have a permanent exchange of information with Peru and Argentina but this is only possible by using manual systems.

The Chile Maritime Authority participates in many agreements and international maritime organizations [see figure above]. Of these agreements, it is important to highlight the Operational Network for Regional Cooperation of Maritime Authorities in South America [ROCRAM] together with Mexico, Panama, and Cuba; the International Association of Navigation Aids and Lighthouse Authorities [IALA]; and the Secure Trade in the APEC Region [STAR]. For many years these organizations and agreements have provided us an effective way for cooperation among maritime countries and, through them, we can also advance in the establishment of norms, technical standards, responsibilities for local maritime authorities, and all of the issues that relate with the MDA process at a more global scale. The aim is to generate an "integrated network" to achieve a "Global Maritime Domain Awareness." These future agreements do not necessarily mean the discarding of local systems, but, rather, adding missing capabilities those other systems have to offer.

Closing this presentation, and based on the information provided, I would like to end with some conclusions.

1. The United States' Maritime Domain Awareness concept is applicable to all countries that depend on maritime activity and it is an appropriate way to

develop an international coordinated action to face current and future challenges.

2. Since threats have clearly become global in nature, we need to interact at the international level, generating an “intergrated network” to achieve a “Global Maritime Domain Awareness” for an adequate response capability.
3. So far, Chile has been able to meet the challenges derived from the evident increase in maritime activity thanks to a constant development of the material, technical, and human resource areas. However, we realize that the growing traffic of cruise ships and hazardous cargo vessels will increase the threats and risks.
4. Command and control systems developed by different countries for their own MDA requirements are currently not linked among themselves so our main challenge is to find a solution for the exchange of a huge volume of information with other countries and agencies.
5. International maritime organizations and agreements seem the correct scenario to work on the legal framework and technical standards to achieve a common MDA.
6. In our experience, to have the Maritime Authority being part of the Chilean Navy has proven to be a strength factor to deal with the new and more demanding scenario of global maritime security.

And lastly, the Chilean Navy is willing to keep an active participation in the international maritime scenario and we are ready to assume our responsibility in the Global Maritime Domain Awareness effort. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

***Vice Admiral Adekeye, Nigeria:***

Thank you very much for your precise timing. Mr. Trelawny, IMO.

***Mr. Chris Trelawny, International Maritime Organization:***

Thank you very much. Admiral Roughead, chiefs of navies, chiefs of coast guards, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Secretary General of IMO, Admiral Metropolis, I would like to thank Admiral Mullen very much for his kind invitation for the organization to participate in this event. Admiral Metropolis very much regrets that due to the work program of the organization he is unable to be here. My own personal thanks very much for the hospitality and welcome I’ve received on his behalf.

You may be wondering why a civilian is standing in front of you talking in your sleep. I’d just like to introduce the International Maritime Organization. We are a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with safety, security, and efficiency of global maritime trade and the protection of the marine environment. In the context of security, we focus on what the civil maritime industry can do to protect itself and to assist governments to protect global maritime trade. And as there are a lot of people here in uniform, please allow me to indulge my sense of humor. There is a marked difference between a warship and a merchant ship. The small one at the back is the warship. The main difference is this lot, the crew. On a warship, you will have a crew of a large number of people who have all been trained to common standards in common training centers. They all speak the same language

as their commanding officers and they're probably all from the same country. On a merchant ship, you generally do not have that luxury. Any tie-in between the flag on the stern and the ownership and the nationality of the crew is probably coincidental. This slide shows *Emma Maersk*, an 11,000 TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit] containership with a crew of probably about twelve. So our ability to protect merchant ships is very different from the ability of navies to protect their own ships. Warships don't do cargo. Merchant ships do. And when people start talking about screening containers and imagining it's like airport security, please believe me, it isn't. If you've got five thousand containers onboard your ship, the master will not have a clue what's in any of them. The other side of it, of course, is that merchant ships don't shoot back. So we do rely on the navies to protect us. I'd certainly agree with Admiral La Rosa that the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] model of security does not apply to merchant shipping and probably will not do, largely because of the multinational aspect of the industry I've already alluded to.

Moving on, we've heard about UNCLOS. In the maritime domain, as elsewhere, states have a number of rights and obligations conferred upon them through their ratification of international conventions and agreements, and, in particular, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. But in a security environment context, we also have the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); the subordinate International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code; we've already heard talk about the Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR); we've also got the convention Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and its associated protocols of 1988 and 2005 which relate to counterterrorism; as well as wider obligations under things like United Nations Security Council resolutions for the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and the 1988 Vienna Convention on Drugs.

Now, in order to meet these and other obligations, states are expected to conduct a number of constabulary tasks, or what I'll refer to as coast-guard functions with a small "c." These are primarily civilian rather than military in nature and are concerned with the enforcement of international and national law at sea. Such activities include fishery protection, which we've heard quite a lot already; prevention of trafficking people—already addressed by Captain Sall—drugs, weapons, other prohibited and restricted items; the prevention of attacks on ships and offshore installations; the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships and energy security, of which we've heard;

**Estimated theft of 70,000–300,000 barrels of oil daily  
70,000 barrels @ \$60=\$1.5 billion annually**


prevention of theft; protection of the maritime environment; safety of navigation, including conducting hydrographical surveys; and search and rescue. Now these coast-guard functions, which are additional to the defense and diplomatic task traditionally carried out to sea by navies, ultimately require the presence of patrol craft at sea in order to deter and detect wrongdoing and take appropriate action when offenses have been committed.



A country unable to actually arrest and prosecute offenders will not deter crime at sea, no matter how strong the country's legal framework. States also have a number of primarily land-based tasks with respect to maritime security. SOLAS and the ISPS Code oblige states to implement preventive security regimes in port facilities serving international maritime traffic. They also require states to conduct threat assessments, promulgate threat information to ships operating in their territorial waters, and to ensure that ships arriving from foreign ports comply with the international maritime security regime. These activities require legislative basis, enforcement powers, and skill sets. For example, those directly involved in fishery protection need to be trained in areas such as legislation, quotas, fishing methods, and boarding operations. Those involved in countertrafficking operations also need to be skilled in legislation, boarding search techniques, drug or weapons recognition, safe handling of contraband, gathering and preservation of evidence, and all of the other skills necessary to bring about successful prosecutions. However, the key to lowering enforcement activities at sea must be an awareness of what is happening off one's own coastline. That is, maritime situational awareness. And for small states with limited resources and a large exclusive economic zone to protect, the challenges can, at first sight, seem insurmountable.

In West and Central Africa not many states have coast guards, but many do have a navy, albeit one that acts largely in a coast-guard role. However, few of these navies are large enough to be capable of conducting traditional naval military and diplomatic functions independently, let alone the full range of constabulary tasks. Few of

### MAP OF WEST AFRICA WITH GRAPH





these states have the capability to maintain a credible maritime law enforcement presence in their own territorial waters, let alone any exclusive economic zones. In many African states, as well, I understand, as in the Dominican Republic, the perceived threat has traditionally been land-based and thus the navy's often seen as a poor relation when it comes to budgets. As a consequence, navies themselves are underresourced by comparison to the land and air forces and have to compete for scarce resources. This tends to make navies even more protective of their maritime roles, and, consequently, more likely to oppose the creation of civilian coast guards as separate bodies. As many of the governments in the region are, indeed, military in nature and as several of these states have recently emerged from bloody civil wars, there's also a corresponding reluctance amongst donors to support military forces, even for peaceful purposes. This is a major challenge to the development of an effective constabulary regime and sustainable fisheries for the region.

The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), comprises twenty coastal states and five landlocked states stretching from Mauritania around to Angola. All coastal MOWCA states claim EEZs or territorial seas of 200 nautical miles. In October of 2006, IMO and MOWCA convened a forum in Dakar, Senegal, to discuss the establishment of a system whereby the various national entities responsible for carrying out coast-guard functions could cooperate both domestically and on a regional basis for the benefit of West and Central Africa as a whole. This proposed system became known as the Integrated Sub-regional Coast Guard Function Network, which sounds pretty awful in English, let alone when translated. So we'll refer to it from now on as the Integrated Coast Guard Project, and I stress "coast guard" with a small "c." The forum was attended by twenty-two of the twenty-five member-states of MOWCA and other interested parties. Subject matter experts from the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Office of UNHCR, Food and Agricultural Organization [UNFAO], ICAO, INTERPOL, and the navies of France, UK, and U.S., as well as IMO, participated actively.

The forum addressed issues including

- Maritime security,
- Implementing national legislation on countering terrorism,
- National legislation on security and piracy,
- Combating organized crime,
- Interagency cooperation at the national level,
- Search and rescue,
- UNCLOS and EEZ,
- Establishing a coast guard,
- The development of EEZ and sustainable fisheries,
- Monitoring, control, and surveillance of fisheries,
- Policing the EEZ,
- Fisheries management,
- Humanitarian issues, and
- Naval issues.

This led to the adoption of a resolution listing twenty-two action points, which will form the basis for action plans to be developed for establishing an integrated coast-guard function network for MOWCA states, the project to facilitate the coordination and capacity building later. Since the forum, the concept has been adopted [in February 2007] by the African Union, Conference of Maritime Transport Ministers, and [in September 2007] by the MOWCA general assembly of ministers, who are expected to conclude a memorandum of understanding next year [in March 2008].

The importance of fisheries in the area, we've just heard about. The financial loss of illegal and unreported and unregulated fishing is a serious global problem. And the losses to Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia from illegal fishing alone are estimated at 140 million per year [see figure below]. Where do navies come in? Although the IMO-MOWCA initiative is civilian in nature, it has distinct synergies with other naval-focused initiatives conducted in region—for example, the Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea [Ministerial Conference] Initiative [held in Cotonou, Benin, 13–15 November 2006] and, also, the French-led African Navies' Seminar on maritime safety and security missions held in Lomé, Togo, [6–7] June of this year [2007].

So where do navies come into all this? Basically, we would ask that navies and other stakeholders should identify all of the core functions and derive tasks which need to be done in order to progress the Integrated Coast Guard Concept. The use of an estimate process coupled with detailed gap analysis should be used to reveal

### LOSSES FROM UNREGULATED FISHING



any legislative, organizational, material, technical, or manpower requirements, as well as to highlight areas where efficiency could be improved. On a single-service level, naval personnel may require additional training in a number of disciplines: for example, general seamanship, navigation, boat handling, conduct of boarding operations at sea, joint operations with civil agencies, and support services such as equipment maintenance. Navies should therefore review their current capabilities to provide platforms and to perform or assist in operational coast-guard functions and determine their training, material, and organizational needs so as to ensure the sustainable effectiveness of performing such roles. At the national level, the effectiveness of infrastructure and equipment should be enhanced: for example, the collocation of search and rescue, coastal radar, fishery surveillance, Automatic Identification System, Long-Range Identification and Tracking, and other sensors in single centers networked to relevant departments and services, the use of law enforcement detachments from relevant agencies transported by warships. It's a potential win-win situation which deserves strong consideration. On a regional level, governments should consider sharing assets and responsibilities. Sharing of assets could be through joint patrolling, cooperation, training exercises with neighboring or visiting navies: for example, Admiral Ulrich's forthcoming initiative in the region, about which you've heard from Commodore Biekro; exchange officer programs; use of regional training centers; and sharing of security-rated information. Sharing responsibilities could include legal agreements on hot pursuit, prosecution, and extradition, and interregional agreements on joint policing on the outer reaches of the EEZ.

## CONCLUSIONS

### Conclusions

- **Sustainable development of African EEZs is worth the investment**
- **Investment, not aid**
- **African States must take the lead**
- **Multi-agency approach: Co-ordination, Co-operation, Communication**
- **Major role for navies as a force for good**

Please let me conclude by saying that I'm convinced that there is a considerable interest within the international community to invest in sustainable development in West and Central Africa. Whether or not this stems from self-interest—for example, a security of energy supplies, prevention of terrorism, combating trafficking with a reduction of illegal migration to Europe—remains of less importance than the potential benefits to the people of West and Central Africa accruing from a secure and well-managed EEZ regime throughout the region. However, this investment is more likely to be forthcoming if the states in the region develop their action plans and give clear signals of their willingness to coordinate the activities of the various government agencies concerned. International and nongovernmental organizations such as IMO, UNODC, Food and Agricultural Organization, INTERPOL, financial institutions, and national governments, and I'm sure the navies represented here, have capacity- and capability-building programs and appear keen to coordinate their activities to promote sustainable development in Africa. However, it is up to the governments of the member states of MOWCA to signal their desire to take action and to drive the process forward. Thank you very much.

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## DISCUSSION

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*Vice Admiral Adekeye, Nigeria:*

I'd like to request all of us give a good round of applause to the very good presentations the panelists have done. Please, thank you.

[Applause]

Thank you very much. I will just put in one or two words, and then we can open the floor for questions. The rules are one minute for questions, and please identify yourself, which navy you belong to, and ask the questions or indicate if it is question or a comment or supporting statement you want to make. From the presentations we have seen illustrations where individual navies, like the Turkish Navy, are confessing that they've had to convert some of their conventional tasks into non-conventional tasks. For instance, I said that sometimes it's just information we need because we don't need too much of an effort. And if you go back to the Gulf of Guinea, most of the problems they have there are not sophisticated. They are from petty criminals and others like that which you can easily handle if, and only if, it is good information, timely information, and very good coordination of information being presented. It is gratifying to acknowledge also the effort of the United States Navy to the European Command, not only to establish an interstate Maritime Awareness Network and, going from that, the donation of Defender-[class] boats to the navies in the region. We hope this can be sustained. We can do with much more. And then finally, the IMO has already too little [inaudible] for us and challenges, which I believe is—even though it laid emphasis on the West African subregion, I believe it is applicable globally, at least in terms of support. Additionally, I wish to thank you very much. We should take some few questions and I would like to start in any order. Thank you. Questions, please? Comments, please?

***Captain Athanassios Makris, Greece:***

Just a comment to supplement your last comment. Besides the air forces of NATO concerning the Maritime Domain Awareness, there is also the European Union with the respective initiative named Maritime Situational Awareness and through various agents they have developed a number of initiatives, like the European Union Surveillance System and the European Union Patrol System. And in order to come eastwards—and just to give some more information in addition to Admiral Uraz concerning the Black Sea initiatives by Turkey—in order to proceed in the Dardanelles Strait, the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, you have to cross the Aegean. So Greece and the Hellenic Navy in cooperation with the Hellenic Coast Guard have an extensive network of patrols supported by the land-based surveillance system, supported by the Vessel Traffic System and Vessel Traffic Monitoring Information System. So there is a complete coverage with an extensive network of AIS. So in that way we ensure the security of shipping in the Aegean. In the approaches of the Aegean, there is the European Union with the initiatives of the borders, MEDSEA, with a network of patrols through the coast guards of Southern European and Mediterranean countries. Thank you very much.

***Vice Admiral Adekeye, Nigeria:***

Any more questions? Supporting statements? Divergent comments? I thank you very much.

***Associate Dean Mocini:***

Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, we'll proceed directly to the seminars now after a break. So at 1445 please be in your seminar rooms. Thank you.



# Seminar Working Group Reports

Moderated by Dr. John Maurer

*Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department, Naval War College*

*Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:*

Good morning again, to the final day of the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium. This will be my last opportunity to address you, because I'll be followed by the seminar debriefs and then closing remarks by the President of the Naval War College and the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]. I would just like to take this time to render a few rounds of thanks to some of the folks that worked so hard to put this symposium together.

- First of all, in general, the entire Naval War College staff, team, and the Chief of Naval Operations team, who have worked together for the last few months to make this symposium possible.
- I'd like to particularly point out Debbie Maddix, from our Special Events Department, and Steve Rebello and the audiovisual folks here who have coordinated everything in Spruance Auditorium during this symposium, the interpreters and the audiovisual presentations. Debbie coordinated virtually everything that had to do with your hotels, transportation, and logistics.
- The Naval War College escort officers and our naval attachés, both the foreign and the ones from your own countries and the American ones who have accompanied you here.
- The Naval War College graphics team, who did a lot of great work to provide the graphic support for this symposium, was headed up by Gigi Davis.
- I mentioned before, but I'd like to mention one more time, our great interpreters from the Department of State who have made it possible for all of us to understand each other.
- And I must include also the Navy Band Northeast, from Newport, and the staff from the Officers' Club who provided the first day's lunch, the Naval Command College and Naval Staff College cocktail party, and yesterday's lunch in the Naval Staff College wardroom.
- Naval reservists, you may or may not know, made up the entire staff of the command center. All the drivers and transportation people have been naval reservists who have come on active duty to support the International Seapower Symposium, about fifty of them. And they've worked very hard to try to make sure that this was a great symposium for you all. And, finally,
- To you, delegates and spouses, for having traveled all this way to be with the CNO and to participate in this symposium.

At this time, we're going to proceed with the seminar debriefs. To moderate the debriefs, we have with us the Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department of



the Naval War College, Dr. John Maurer. If I could ask the first debriefers to please take their places on the stage.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Good morning to everyone. What I want to do is get down to this morning's work of having the debriefs from the various seminars and working groups. They have put in a great deal of effort—you all have put a great deal of effort—into making some presentations which we're going to give this morning. What I propose that we do is have the group A, B, and C presentations go together because they deal with economic maritime security. And then we will follow up those debriefs with questions or comments from the audience at large. The seminars' working groups have provided us with some valuable information and insights, and sharing this information and these insights is the first goal of this morning's sessions. The working groups will give short presentations. We've asked that these presentations be kept to about five minutes so that there is time to go beyond the presentations to have comments and questions from the larger group. What I'd like to do first is go to group A's presentation, which will be given to us by Admiral Palacios from El Salvador. If we could have the first briefing, please.

***Rear Admiral Marco Antonio Palacios Luna, El Salvador:***

Admiral Roughead, generals, ladies and gentlemen, I've been asked to summarize group A's discussion on economic maritime security and solutions. But I wanted to say first that I feel so privileged to have the opportunity to share ideas with such a brilliant group of leaders and friends. We had a very open and rich discussion. So five minutes are not enough but I will do my best.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you.

***Rear Admiral Marco Antonio Palacios Luna, El Salvador:***

Our discussion was so intense and rich that I missed the bus yesterday in the afternoon, so I had to walk back to my room. But I'm still privileged. I will read the questions. You will be able to see the slides and I will just kind of comment on the main topics we discussed.

On the first question, we all agreed that smuggling, trafficking of persons, and illegal immigration are still important issues today. Furthermore, we believe that smuggling, especially drugs, is a huge phenomenon and we have not come close to addressing it properly. Also, even though they might be important, they are not new issues. There are new issues to be considered carefully as they can bring you elements for discussion in the near future, such as international seabed claims. As we know, Russia dropped a flag on the Arctic seabed. The UK is thinking of claiming the seabed's area. So is China in the Antarctic.

Another element for discussion is the uncertain maritime boundaries among many countries. There is still a sovereignty and security issue that disrupts the element of trust in some instances.

Question number two: Again, we feel that sharing all the information and relevant intelligence up to a certain convenient degree needs to be done. But the thing



## **“Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”**

**Group A: Smuggling (drugs, weapons, including Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.), Trafficking in persons and Illegal immigration.**

**1. Are these still important issues today? Are there other maritime security issues which are now more important? (Please identify them)**

- Yes - still seen as important
- Smuggling is a huge phenomenon
- International Seabed Claims
- Uncertain Maritime boundaries




## **“Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”**

**2. What cooperative measures make the most sense in dealing with these issues? Are they achievable in the near term?**

- Information/intelligence sharing
- Standard Procedures
- Exercising
- Presence

is that we keep talking about it but we are not doing it properly. We have to reconsider, maybe, the traditional paradigms which our naval doctrine has been based upon, such as deception and secrecy. Also, developing standard procedures as part of a multinational routine would improve our interoperability and effectiveness. Exercising them within a basic common doctrine and within common interests would increase our effectiveness while fighting our common threats. We also discussed presence. To make it more effective, we discussed the possibility of helping patrol other countries' EEZs [exclusive economic zones] when asked according to the national law.



## “Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”

### 3. Are there identifiable “best practices” which should be highlighted and considered? How could they be implemented?

- Interagency Meetings
- Build at subregion/bilateral level
- Choose specific operations

Question number three: Since these issues are multidimensional in nature, no agency can go alone. Within a country, agencies have to develop a plan to help each other, so regular interagency meetings are advised. We also need to build capabilities at the regional and bilateral levels and choose a specific operation where cooperation can be easily achieved. We discussed a Central American example. We, in Central America, have a naval conference. After two years of discussions, four Central American countries designed a regional search and rescue plan. We agreed on command and control issues, operational limits, standard procedures, and logistics. And we believe that we can expand those agreements to other kinds of combined operations, if necessary. By the way, we are planning a combined exercise to implement this plan in June 2008.

Question number four: We believe that the biggest challenge in this matter will be trust. We have learned not to trust each other for so long that it will take some



## “Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”

### 4. What are the challenges to implement “best practices” and cooperative solutions?

- Trust
- Definition of international boundaries
- Inability to define responsibilities within military and civilian agencies
- Inability of some nations to conduct surveillance and interdiction on the high seas

time to achieve legitimate trust. But we also believe that it can, and it must, be done as soon as possible. We also discussed how the definition of international boundaries will improve the trust between countries and it will ease the political pressure on some navies. Another challenge is the inability to define responsibilities within military and civilian agencies. This inability will turn bureaucracy into another powerful enemy. Another challenge would be the inability of some nations to conduct surveillance and interdiction on high seas, creating blind spots which will be used by smugglers, pirates, and terrorists. We discussed the Central America region. It's a very important region. And, by the way, we haven't even mentioned it in this symposium and Central America has the Panama Canal. They are modernizing the port system and expecting more maritime activity. However, we're not, I think, really paying much attention to this area. Central American navies have well educated officers, well trained sailors, but not enough as assets. We also discussed the social needs being so great in those countries that governments have problems finding resources for defense. This example would apply to other areas in the world.

Question number five: Information sharing is critical to solving these problems. Yes, but again, we could do it better. One way to share would be a measured approach to partnership building starting at this initial level, and, like we said, find topics of common interest. Formal and informal meetings and conferences should be encouraged. This is already being done in some cases, but it needs to be implemented in other regions also.

Question number six, and I'll be finished with this. One way to do that is building or improving the capability of national navies. Some of them are willing. We,



## **“Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”**

**5. How intertwined is the issue of information sharing in effecting solutions to these problems? How can it be achieved?**

- Information sharing is critical to solving these problems.
- Measured approach to partner building starting at the subregion.
- Frequent formal and informal meetings and conferences.



## **“Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”**

**6. Given the new U.S. Maritime Strategy and the deployment of ships on “global fleet stations”, are there other ways these or other U.S. initiatives can reinforce individual nation/regional efforts at controlling smuggling, trafficking in persons, and illegal immigration?**

- Capacity building of national navies
- Training and education
- Regional information and intelligence fusion and distribution centers (afloat or CSL)

Central America, are willing to help but need more resources. We have to focus also on developing the leaders' mind-sets through training and education. Another way to reinforce individual efforts would be to create regional intelligence and information fusion and distribution centers that could be afloat or to become formal organizations. That's all I have. Thank you very much for your attention, gentlemen.

[Applause]

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you very much. Admiral Stanhope from the United Kingdom is going to give the report from group B.

***Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, United Kingdom:***

I'll do it from here so I can talk to my slides rather than having constantly to lean back. Admiral Roughead, colleagues, it was our remit to look under the economic maritime security and solutions piece, partnerships as a whole, and aspects therein.

Obviously, this question spurs a long list of partnerships which I don't intend to go into. But I would like to focus on one area that we did highlight and that's that many of these maritime security partnerships are focused on naval forces alone. Whilst in national agreements, the workhorse is the dark blue machinery of that nation. Wider engagement, we felt, was critical in this particular piece and I'll come onto it again on the different questions. You can see the three bullets here that we extracted in terms of whether they can be improved. Partnerships do exist, of



**“Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”**

**Group B: Partnership**

**1. What partnerships have been established to meet the challenges of maritime security? Can they be improved?**

- Partnerships can exist in many forms; what is important is that they be tailored to the member nations' needs
- Harmony and Unity of Effort are critical; however, no one nation should dominate the forum
- Perception of common interest/common benefit is critical to political will



course, in many forums and some of the original *raison d'être* for setting up some of these partnerships do change, morph, and develop over time. I take NATO as an example. It started off as a core, defensive organization and is now moving slowly towards a recognition that it's not simply about defense but about the security challenges of the future as well. Obviously, each partnership is tailored to each member state's needs, and I'll come back to this later; but, I think in some respects, in some of these partnerships we try and focus too broadly on what they can achieve without narrowing down to specifics. Obviously, harmony and unity of effort are critical in any partnership but we did discuss in our group the importance of collective ownership of what the partnership is all about. We are, in each and every partnership, a group of equals and that has to be recognized within the mechanisms of the partnership itself. Burden sharing within each partnership is critical to ensure that everybody collectively engages in the areas that they can. And the final bullet, a statement of the obvious, really, in terms of the common interests, the need for political will, and the fundamental requirement to achieve this. But, of course, the word "perception" is interesting in that everybody within every partnership will have a slightly different perception about what it is that can be delivered or should be delivered by that particular partnership. We talked about trust under this particular question as well, and that's already been highlighted, and the sense of start small and work up to establish the baselines of that trust to ensure that it's delivered, because without it nothing can happen. Equally under this particular question, the label that we define the partnership with is critical to ensuring that that partnership can deliver what it is set out to achieve.



## **"Economic Maritime Security and Solutions"**

### **2. Are there identifiable "best practices" which should be highlighted and considered?**


- **Countries being able to meet on an equal basis**
- **Working together to build confidence and develop competencies**
- **Security and development go hand in hand – developing neighboring countries enhances one's own welfare and national interest**
- **Important to work within the guidelines of international law**
- **Involvement of NGOs and various agencies in partnership is essential, but challenging**



Second question, please. Best practices across. A long list here, but if I could just expand on some of these bullets:

- Countries being able to meet on an equal basis: back to that point I made under bullet two of my last slide, common goals are fundamental to ensuring that the partnership is a success.
- Working to build confidence and develop competencies: Under this bullet, we're talking about something that we're all very good at in the maritime sense of working together in exercises, practicing together, exchanging what information we can together. Also, a very significant point, I think, came out in our discussion there about actually focusing our partnerships, not on necessarily what we're doing today and who is doing it today, but actually focusing it on the youth of our countries to make sure that we are developing a sense of ownership for this partnership that's enduring.
- Security and development: We would, all in this room, I know, see security and development going hand in hand. But the importance of this, of valuing your neighbors in any sense of a partnership, came out strongly in our discussions.
- Importance of working within the guidelines of international law: We worked on this bullet quite hard in terms of what we meant by the constraints that international law has on any partnership. It is a sensitive issue. But it is the rules that are out there, in terms of the international law, which are fundamental to, I think, developing that trust piece that is so much part of strong partnerships.
- Involvement of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and IO [intergovernmental organizations]: This was something that we discussed at great length. Many here might sense that this comes down to what we call the comprehensive approach in some of our national doctrines nowadays, involvement of all agencies and NGOs to deliver the requirements. I thought about the depth and the breadth of partnerships that we're all involved in, all the various different partnerships that we're involved in. The breadth of these partnerships is very much how many nations are involved and the size of the partnership is defined by that. But I sense the depth of a partnership is, particularly in the challenging area of maritime security, driven as much by who else is involved other than the dark blue in our respective nations that make up the partnership, as well as, of course, internationally across the piece. Of course, the IMO [International Maritime Organization] featured significantly in our discussions when we were looking at this particular question.

Third question, please. A long question but principally focusing on what it is that a partnership can actually achieve. We decided the clarity of purpose of any partnership was absolutely crucial. If you make it too wide, then you dilute maybe the ability for it to deliver what it really set out to do. Now the breadth of maritime security is this big. If we can narrow it down slightly to know exactly what areas of maritime security this partnership has been developed for, then maybe we'll get a quicker engagement in terms of trust and, therefore, with that trust, better exchange of information, something that's come out time and time again in this conference. We highlighted JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] as an example here of one particular partnership of nations delivering one particular product in a geographical area of the world, the Caribbean, where nations have signed up to collectively engage in fighting drug trafficking across the Caribbean. Because of



## “Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”

**3. With regional experience as background, are there things that could be done to effect cooperative partnerships where they don't exist or are less than effective? What are problems and what can be practically done to effect cooperative partnerships? Identify in priority order the most important factors.**

**Clarity of Purpose is crucial**

- **Option A - “Coalition of the Willing”**
- **Option B – Geographic association (start bilaterally and work out)**
- **Option C – Unity of Effort among partnerships**

the narrow nature of that partnership [there is] a much swifter ability to exchange quite sensitive information within it to achieve the aim of that particular partnership and, therefore, narrowing down these partnerships seems to be quite crucial. So the three options here sort of utilize our thinking in terms of the types of partnership:

- **Option A:** The “coalition of the willing”—wide area involvement in a specific issue or a specific area, which indeed doesn't have to be an enduring partnership, maybe set up to deliver a product for a purpose for a limited period of time.
- **Option B:** Geographical association of partnerships is common to us all, of course. Each region will have special, different needs and focuses, be they economic or be they other security focuses. All have a slightly different style to how they deliver.
- **Option C:** Unity of effort amongst partnerships: This last bullet came out of a discussion we had [regarding the fact that], while each partnership has a very clear purpose and intent, we seem to be in an era of proliferation of partnerships. There's always an idea to set up a bilateral, trilateral, or even broader partnership. While that of course can be a good thing, there is a lot of duplication of effort. We are all limited in resources, both in people and financial terms, and, therefore, we will have to limit where and how we engage ourselves and have to prioritize across some of these partnerships. There's also a sense of confusion about what partnership delivers what. So, there was a discussion, very broadly, on maybe a need to rationalize or indeed create some sort of



## “Economic Maritime Security and Solutions”

### 4. Against the background of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy and the deployment of ships on “global fleet stations”, are there ways these U.S. initiatives can reinforce individual nation/regional efforts at achieving maritime security?

- Strategic Communications convey US purposes/principles
- Presence equals deterrence
- Interagency - Tailor capabilities to local needs
- Ensure actions address causes rather than “symptoms” to avoid dependencies
- Synchronization of Effort among contributing countries

regional and international structure of coordination for some of this proliferation of partnerships that are currently existing.

And the final question, four. This question actually, we felt, got slightly to the crux of some of the business we’ve been doing here in terms of the United States’ new maritime strategy. The width of the definition and an understanding of what global fleet stations are, I have to tell you, Admiral Roughead, were not clear to our group and what they are likely to achieve. We felt that the strategic communications was key to the success of such an initiative, both locally in the area that it was going to engage as well as internationally, so there’s a very clear understanding of what it is that the global fleet station was set to do. Obviously, the presence of such an initiative in any area of the world, the deterrent presence, was significant. But what was it actually there to do in the first place? The interagency tailoring of this group to the local needs was felt to be absolutely significant; but the expanse of what it can do—everything from support and infrastructure and health, as an example, right through to providing a real security assistance piece—the breadth of that is broad, and the different interagency connections would be very different. It was felt that we had to be careful about the building of dependencies upon such a fleet station, if I could put it that way. Give a man a fish and he can eat for a day. Give a man a fishing rod and he can eat for a long time. We have to be careful, I think, in terms of creating such dependencies with such an initiative. And finally, back to the point I’ve made earlier, the synchronization of effort amongst the contributing countries within the fleet station itself, but also, of course, those that are the recipients of it must be part of the

participation within it. So, against those very broad questions, those were the surveys of discussion we had. Thanks so much indeed.

[Applause]

**Dr. John Maurer:**

Thank you, Admiral. Group C's report will be presented by General Mwathethe from Kenya.

**Major General Samson Jefwa Mwathethe, Kenya:**

Admiral Roughead, senior officers, ladies and gentlemen, I'm here to report on seminar C, the panel of discussion that we held yesterday, and I'm reporting on behalf of the seminar under the wise leadership of Professor [John F.] Garofano. After the discussions that we held yesterday, it was agreed, after a very long discussion, that a major general does a presentation. This was a bit difficult to comprehend because they wanted an admiral to do this. But nonetheless, I think I captured most of the issues that we discussed and I hope I will be able to pass them across.

The first question that we had was the issues of security that we consider to be still important and relevant. Some of the issues that we as a team looked at and thought to be still very important and relevant, in that order:

- The issue of smuggling. We still feel that this is an issue [and] that we cannot just hope that it goes away.
- The issues of small arms proliferation, piracy, and illegal immigration are issues we think are still extremely important and that we need to look at them more closely and deal with throughout.



## "Economic Maritime Security and Solutions"

**Question #1. What are the most important issues?**

- Smuggling
- Small arms proliferation
- Piracy
- Illegal immigration
- Failed States – Somalia as major regional problem
  - No functioning Government or Military
  - No mechanisms to:
    - Return citizens who emigrated illegally
    - Control illegal activities originating internally to the failed state or along its coasts or borders

- We also looked at the issue of failed states such as Somalia. In the region that I come from, we have a failed state with no functioning government or military. As a result, there are no mechanisms that you can deal with in that part of the world. When you deal with the issue of the illegal immigrants, from Somalia for example, there's no system that you can return these people to. You cannot return Somalis from Yemen or from Kenya back into Somalia. They will just walk away and come back again. So that is a big challenge that we really need to look at. The control of illegal activities originating internally from those failed states is a major challenge.

On the second and third questions, to describe effective cooperative measures and associated "best practices":

- We feel that information exchange needs to be improved. Information exchange is vital and it needs to be improved.
- The issue of regional networks still remains very important.
  - The IMO provides a framework for building regional cooperation.
  - Exchange systems must not be limited to military users but must include other government agencies.
  - The measures implemented by military forces must be integrated into government and interagency practices and they must be exercised and practiced.
  - Regional navies and their governments must establish working relations in order for information-sharing systems to work. This has been shown in this symposium. There are navies which work together, but we also know that there are many navies which do not work closely together. So, it is a challenge for those navies which don't work closely together to take this on board and establish ways and means of working together.
- The long-term solutions to most of these problems rely on the economic development and the political stability of the regions and the countries. We talked about questions two and three at the same time.

I'll now turn to question four, which looked at the challenges to implementing the best practices and cooperative solutions.

- We looked at the barriers, the challenges, that we have to open exchange. We looked at
  - The issue of lack of compatible technologies between the partners—this is still a major challenge;
  - Lack of common, international standards for design;
  - The seminar looked at the issue of mistrust between information-sharing partners as a major barrier in exchange of information and, therefore, adaptation of best practices—the mistrust must go away if we are to achieve and see movement in this area;
  - The cost of acquiring some of this equipment is prohibitive; and
  - The simplicity or ease of use. The cost of acquiring and running was shown by the representatives from New Zealand and the ease of use of such systems, I think, is important.
- The issue of legislation and lack of common national laws for prosecuting piracy and illegal activities needs to be looked at from the regional level when countries don't have enough or sufficient legislation to deal with issues such as piracy. Although we know that piracy is an international crime there exists a

lack of international standards and practices for tracking small craft. This issue, again, is a challenge because some of the craft that are used at sea for smuggling are smaller in size than those required to be reported in AIS.

- The issue of budgets and political authority also remains a challenge in major countries. In many countries government agencies (e.g., Transportation) do not have the budgets or political authority required to create solutions.

The fifth question was “how intertwined is the issue of information sharing with effecting solutions to these problems?” My seminar looked at the critical issues in resolving this problem. One of the issues that [we] identified is coordination problems required to address the issues of piracy, ship tracking, smuggling, etc. Vital also is the building of consensus on how to prioritize challenges and the allocation of resources. It is also critical for solving the near-term problems and developing current operations. The seminar also looked at the issues and agreed that sufficient information exists. The problem is devising platforms and processes for effective sharing.

Question six: The new U.S. Maritime Strategy, “global fleet stations,” and individual nation/regional efforts need to

- Address areas requiring specific focus, like the Gulf of Aden, and then the application of required resources.
- Efforts must also include providing regional navies with training, improved maintenance practices, platforms [from] which nations can conduct law enforcement activities, etc.
- Each country must be able to conduct its own enforcement activities rather than relying on the United States to act as a global enforcement authority.
- Regional governments must enact laws and policies that permit incorporation of assistance by the United States.
- The global fleet stations are an important concept but the United States must recognize the diversity of cultures, laws, and societal norms of each nation when implementing this concept.

Thank you very much.

[Applause]

[In its prepared report on Economic Maritime Security and Solutions, Committee C also submitted the following, “Other Important Questions to Be Addressed”:

- (Yemen) Population migration occurring along Africa’s Northeast and Northwest coasts. Illegal immigrants are taken:
  - in ships that are unseaworthy and unsanitary,
  - by means that result in major human rights violations,
  - via persons who are often involved with drug smuggling.
- Yemen becomes a transit point for these activities, destination the Arabian Sea region. Yemen has established three centers to:
  - address these issues, and
  - address weapons smuggling.
- Countries in the region need to assist in addressing this issue.
- Illegal immigration stems from individuals seeking a better life outside the shores of their own country:
  - Regional and international solutions must be found in order to reduce the desire for illegal emigration from one’s homeland.



- Root causes for population migration need to be identified and addressed. A network of exchange (regional then international) needs to be created to share lessons learned that address root causes of migration.
- Population migration is frequently the result of economic inequality:
  - Citizens seeking to improve their lives;
  - Economic inequalities amongst nations;
  - Law enforcement agencies lacking sufficient resources to stop the flow of migrants;
  - The Safety of Life at Sea conventions do not currently apply to small vessels (dhows, fishing, etc.), leaving regulation and tracking of such crafts to state law;
  - The primary use of AIS is safety of navigation, not the tracking of legal and illegal activities on the high seas.

Are nation-states in the vicinity of the acts of piracy capable of prosecuting the act of piracy?]

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you, General. Thank you to the presenters of groups A, B, and C. There are a number of common threads through the presentations that highlight just how important that interaction is between good order at sea and also stability, political development, and economic development on land, how closely intertwined the sea and land are. What I'd like to do now, while the reports of groups A, B, and C are still fresh in our minds, is take any questions or comments about these issues of economic development and maritime security from the audience. Right here in front, please.

***Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:***

Thank you, moderator. Admiral Stanhope, you have a statement in your presentation that talks about the coalition of the willing. I think from my point of reference, you see, when you talk about the new U.S. cooperative strategy for the twenty-first century, that presupposes a paradigm shift of where one force is suppose to accede to the problems of the world. I think General Mwathethe also repeats that where we are saying the regional governments need to enact policies that allow the United States to handle these issues. I don't think it's a correct approach. What we're proposing, as the ISS, is that there should be a global cooperation among the navies of the world so that the problem of security and stability of the world is solely not the responsibility of one nation. Those are the issues that bring mistrust. Those are the issues that bring suspicion. What we need to do is to say, "In order to build trust, what are the quick ways that we can achieve at the regional level, utilizing cooperation of all navies that are ready and are concerned about the issues of illegal trafficking, the issues of human trafficking, and all the issues of piracy that we're speaking about?" But we need to refrain from a position where we are going to push the United States as the policeman of the world. That is not a new strategy. It's an old strategy that you want to perpetrate. So we need to guard against the terminology that you are using with a view that this terminology must be inclusive rather than exclusive. Thank you.



***Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, United Kingdom:***

Let me start and follow. I mean I don't dispute anything you've just said. An understanding of the strategy is important so that the world at large knows what it is that the United States wants to do with regard to these global stations, which is the question we're answering, which was the hook in the end of all of our questions about the work we've been doing over the last two years, or rather the United States has been doing over the last two years. It seems to me that, as I mentioned, the first bullet was about actually articulating what it was that the real purpose of these global fleet stations was for. And I think there's a spectrum, or it appears to me and our group that there's a spectrum, of activity that they can become involved in and they have to be very clear to, first of all, the area that they want to insert the global station into, the local region, and explain the purpose of it. But equally, they must explain internationally why it is that they're involving themselves in this particular area, at this particular time, producing this particular package of support, or whatever. So I totally agree with you. It's not a question of the old strategy. It's a question of the new strategy being clearly defined to the region and the wider global community as to what it is they're doing.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

There's another question or comment right here. Excuse me, General Mwathethe wants to comment as well.

***Major General Samson Jefwa Mwathethe, Kenya:***

Sir, I agree with you as well. The issue that maybe we'll bring out is that inasmuch as we want to refrain from talking about a global policeman when we look at some of the regions that we talked about or presented here, I think what we had in mind as a seminar discussing this issue was, in the event that aid or help is required in those areas, do you have a way of receiving or is there a way of accepting that or not. I think that is the way that we looked at it, more than looking deep from the point of view of somebody doing the actual policing. Thank you, sir.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Again, I believe there was a question right here.

***Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Denmark:***

Yes. I am wondering—when we're talking about economics and security and if you take out the word maritime and just discuss it in a more general perspective, I don't think you could discuss these things without mentioning the UN. But the UN is not appearing on any of our slides and our discussions at a seminar like this. Before I came up here, I went to visit the UN headquarters in New York [and] the Danish delegation there. It astonished me, the lack of maritime insight they have in that headquarters. And that is, of course, because traditionally the UN has had land operations and missions ashore. But I think that we as a global society miss immense opportunity if we don't give the UN a maritime dimension because a lot of the things that we are discussing here would actually be able to be pushed into a framework like this and maybe it could bring a lot more ships to the table than if you don't utilize this. It is just food for thought and something that puzzles me because

I just had this relation of being at the UN headquarters and then going to the seminar here. So, it's not really a question, it's more a comment.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you very much for that comment; a very useful one.

***Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, United Kingdom:***

Can I just interject? Yes, I absolutely support that and imbedded in the point I was making about breadth and depth of this or any partnership must be the players that are within it, outside of the national players—the UN or UN agency or, let's look at the best we've got on the streets at the moment, the IMO or something that forms an equal position in this partnership alongside the nation that says that they are the facilitators of some of this broader requirement. I absolutely agree.

***Dr. John Maurer:***


We need to now move on to the other three working groups. I'm looking at the clock and time is a tyrant and forces us to move on. What I want to do now is look at the three groups that looked at humanitarian operations: groups G, H, and I, and I ask Admiral Darcourt from Peru to give the presentation from the work of seminar G.

***Admiral Eduardo Darcourt Adrianzén, Peru:***

Pardon me, but I'm going to make my presentation in Spanish. [Simultaneous translation follows]

Admiral Roughead, officers, ladies and gentlemen, and my friends. The issue that group G touched on is related to everything that has to do with humanitarian operations. I would like to first thank the group which designated me to represent them. It's an honor for me to represent this group that I worked and talked with about all these issues. Basically, after exchanging a series of opinions about everything having to do with humanitarian operations, we worked primarily on the issues of natural disasters, which was the most important issue that we talked about. After exchanging views, we talked a lot about what happened in Peru, given that we have had a 7.9 earthquake in southern Peru, with the epicenter at sea, about 250 kilometers from Lima. This was on 15 August [2007]. We were able to collect experiences which we shared with our colleagues in this conversation that we had. After this small preamble, I will go on to the first question.

The first question asks, "What are the maritime services capability sets that can contribute to humanitarian operations?" and "What are those that are unique to maritime services?" So, we looked at the support that we get from maritime services and the armed forces in this type of natural disaster. We had a very positive experience with the participation of our navy in this activity. Basically, it all depends on the size of the natural disaster. In our case [following the Pisco City Earthquake Disaster, August 15, 2007], we had to take into account that the access roads were destroyed and we also had to bear in mind that almost 90 percent of the housing collapsed. There was no capacity to react on the government's side, especially at the regional level. We heard the news at 6:50 in the afternoon and one of the other important points here, which is our experience that I'd like to share, was the lack of



## “Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”

### Group G: Interagency Coordination and Working with NGO's

**1. What are the maritime services capability sets that can contribute to humanitarian operations? Which are unique to maritime services?**

- Sea Basing capability
- Initial response
- HADR in poor security situations
- Amphibious capability
- Mobility/Flexibility/Endurance
- Command, Control, Communication systems
- Self sufficient

communication, because the entire communications system also collapsed. There was no way to communicate with the emergency zones.

The only way we could do it was with the support of the armed forces, and specifically of the navy, knowing what the magnitude of the disaster was. Once communication was established, we didn't even wait for them to tell us what they needed. We just charged in and four units which were disembarked were the most important ones to solve our problems. They took with them various types of equipment, basic water systems, a water transportation system, we took boats, and, for transportation of personnel, we had trucks and buses, we had tractors. All of this was very useful and disembarked in order to reach the area as quickly as possible.

We, the following day, traveled in a helicopter in the morning and were able to talk to the population. They needed three basic things. We needed to satisfy those needs. First of all, they needed water, they needed food, and they needed shelter. Those are the three main things that we needed to solve as the immediate problem, and that is the main thing. What is the immediate problem? We add to that medical attention. But basically, it is water, food, and shelter. So, our units were transporting everything that we have just mentioned and we did that without any coordination with the central government. It was just based on what we could see and observe with our own eyes.

I also want to tell you that we also prepared, after the first unit, a second unit as a hospital ship. They had a lot of stretchers, a lot of beds, and we equipped it as a hospital ship to be able to take care of emergency cases, in addition to establishing an air bridge to transport more than four hundred injured to Lima hospitals, given

that no hospital in the area could respond to the need for attending to the injured in this catastrophe. We should also say that we immediately moved a great number of marines to take care of security needs in the area, to prevent looting, and to prevent any kind of instability. So security was also important.

It's also worth mentioning why this went beyond the police's means. It's because regional police were also affected. They were part of the victims. That is to say, many of them had died or they had wives, sisters, or children who had died. They were part of the crisis. They could not tend to security needs in the area. That's why it was important to immediately move in security personnel; in this case we're talking about marines. The army also did the same [provided security] once the roads were opened and could be used again.

It's also important to talk about the armed forces. Our army was able to transport its machinery, tractors, and pile drivers, in order to be able to open the roads, especially the bridges, and to do some maneuvering on the sides of the bridges to be able to create some kind of traffic flow so that they could take supplies in a normal fashion after a few days. I also wanted to mention that, regarding rescue operations, the marine personnel were extremely important. Some of them took care of security and the other ones, instead of having their weapons with them, had tools to be able to rescue people that were buried under the rubble. There were three hundred people in one church in Pisco. One hundred of them perished. So we were able to find one hundred bodies under the rubble just in this church.



## **“Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”**

### **2. How should Naval responses to humanitarian operations be coordinated? Are there good models? How much prior coordination is necessary or useful?**

- Subregional advance coordination/cooperation
  - Readiness/reaction force
- Experienced Initial Assessment Teams
  - Spearhead/facilitate coordination
- Coordination linked to information sharing
  - Mobilizing right assistance at right time

The second question refers to how the naval responses to humanitarian operations should be coordinated, and asks if there are good models, and what sort of prior coordination is needed. Regarding the models, I'm sure that each country has its own plans, its own organizations, to face these kinds of natural disasters. I'm going to talk about our experience and it would not have worked had the armed forces not been there, especially the navy. In our organization, we have the civilian institute that covers everything at the national level, but the people that are in charge of these organizations are what we call the regional chairmen. Then we have the mayors. All of them are part of this civil organization. What we have seen is that this has to adjust according to the needs, because everybody in that area had been affected. They can respond if the disaster is not of the magnitude of what we faced in August. This is similar to the example that I talked to you about with the police, because the mayor of Pisco came to the area about three days later because half of his family had perished and there was nobody to take over his post in his absence. So the armed forces had to respond very quickly. If they had not done so, we would not have been able to save as many people as we did.

So, what is clear from our experience is that the armed forces have the good discipline and structure that allow them to respond to these disasters. A long time ago, the armed forces worked in another way. They have changed their operations and so these new civil organizations were created. But in light of what happened, I think that we have to reconsider these civilian organizations.

Regarding the third question, I'm going to summarize. Actually, I'm going to merge the third and the fourth, which are the issues that should be addressed in order to improve interagency coordination and NGO efforts. We had a lot of NGOs that participated in these operations, especially the Red Cross; however, there are several NGOs, whether small or large, that participated in these efforts. But I think that what should be highlighted is that communication must be there. There has to be communication between the government and the NGOs to see what is needed, what is required, and sometimes this communication is lacking. And so, the efforts that we might implement in one place might not be the ones required *vis-à-vis* another situation. So, I think that we must have communication. Sometimes it's difficult because the NGOs usually have their own plans, their own agendas, their own way of working, and sometimes the communication is a little bit difficult. I think that the government has to have very clear policies regarding safety and defense and this is something that has to be communicated to the NGOs.

If you have communication and a good relationship with NGOs, I think that you could have a very good understanding and you would be able to work together and they could do some things and we can do other things and everything will be in the benefit of the whole country. The issue is rather lengthy. They had given me only five minutes. I tried to summarize it as much as I could. Thank you very much for your time.

[Applause]

**Dr. John Maurer:**

Thank you very much, Admiral. Group H will have the report given by Admiral Contractor from India.



## “Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”

### 3. What issues should be addressed in order to improve interagency coordination and NGO efforts?

- Communications – Critical piece
- Missions/Goals
  - NGOs vary in size and goals
  - Government and NGO mission not antithetical



## “Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”

### 4. What are “best practices” related to interagency coordination and working with NGOs?

- Suggested set of Principles
  - Proximity
  - Equality
  - Responsibility
- Patterns and Habits of cooperation
  - Practice and Operate together on regular basis




***Vice Admiral Rustom Faramroze Contractor, India:***

Good morning, gentlemen. Admiral Roughead, chiefs of the navies and the coast guards, ladies, and gentlemen. Yesterday afternoon, I was in a very nice situation where I was sitting on the back bench in the seminar room and I was quite happy that my other senior colleague was at the table and he would take on this responsibility. Then I got moved to the table after some time and then I find myself catapulted over here today. I consider myself singularly honored and privileged to be speaking on behalf of my group H, which comprises Argentina, Cyprus, Denmark, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Lithuania, Montenegro, USA, and, of course, India.

My group focused on the subject of humanitarian operations, command, and control, and discussed these issues under four headings. And those were:

1. How should command and control [C2] be accomplished?
2. Should efforts be made to collect information on humanitarian requirements of resources and requirements in order to make best use of resources? Who should do this?
3. What are the best practices related to humanitarian operations C2? What has worked? What hasn't worked so well? And finally,
4. Should C2 be exercised? Gamed? If so, what are appropriate venues?

I should first delve upon the first issue: how should command and control be accomplished? The common consensus amongst the seminar group was that the affected country should be in charge and also identify a lead agency at the national level that will coordinate all activities related to the disaster. As a preparatory



**“Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”**

**Group H: Humanitarian Operations  
Command and Control (C2)**


- 1. How should command and control be accomplished?**
  - Affected country should be in charge and identify lead agency
  - Dialog with immediate and near neighbors in region before disaster strikes
  - Create Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
  - Do not make rules that cannot be applied
  - Solid knowledge of environment
  - First on-scene takes action; approach as Search & Rescue



measure, it would be of interest for the host nation to have a dialogue and general agreement with neighboring countries in the region and contributing nations before the disaster strikes, which could include formulation of SOPs [standard operating procedures] having sound knowledge of the environment, ensuring that you establish procedures which are pragmatic and applicable. Nonetheless, as in search and rescue operations, the first on scene must make his intentions known to the host nation to provide this assistance.

Having said that, I'll move on to the next point: should efforts be made to collect information on humanitarian requirements and available resources and requirements in order to make best use of resources and who should be doing this? Having said in the earlier part that the affected country should be in charge, their on-scene commander would analyze and make the first assessment of the situation. You will agree that, in many cases, the military has the mobility and the advantage of its command, control, and communication structure to analyze and respond which can assist in this assessment. However, it would be in the interest of the entire operation that organizations other than military are also brought into the overall assessment of the situation. All inputs should be pooled for the host nation to determine these requirements. Since time is of the essence in any disaster situation, thought should also be given to prepositioning assets or preparing forces to respond even before a complete assessment is made.

Coming to the third point: What are the best practices related to humanitarian operations C2? What has worked? What hasn't worked so well? Identification of a lead agency to coordinate activities is crucial to the successful conduct of a crisis



## "Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations"

**2. Should efforts be made to collect information on humanitarian requirements and available resources and requirements in order to make best use of resources? Who should do this?**

- On-scene commander makes first assessment
- Organizations other than military might be better suited to further assess the situation
- Host nation gathers expertise & info from various pools of organizations
- Mobility and speed to react are critical
- Preposition resources or start moving forces
- Information data base that facilitates future assessment



## “Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”

### 3. What are “best practices” related to humanitarian operations C2? What has worked? What hasn’t worked so well?

- Identify lead agency to conduct crisis response
- Rapid and correct assessment about requirements
- **Communications and sharing of information/collaborating efforts**
- Control of resources/equipment/help received (C2 for execution)
- Restoration of civil order
- Reestablish basic infrastructure
- Contingency planning/SOPs/regional response
- Know regional capabilities/resources (available & willing)
- Plans should be flexible, pragmatic, and adaptive
- Advance warning of impending disaster threat & identify targeted areas
- Coordinate types of support available
- Establish high level coordination & Status of Forces Agreements

response. As we all know, coordination is tricky from the point of view that everyone wants to be the coordinator but nobody wants to be coordinated. Communication and sharing of information to achieve unity of effort are key to identifying and prioritizing requirements in order to provide emergent care, restore civil order, and reestablish basic infrastructure. What has worked in some areas is a regional response with developed contingency plans, identifying predetermined regional capabilities and resources, and standard operating procedures such as the Caribbean Disaster Response Unit. I believe they have eighteen countries in this grouping and they have a central coordinator in Barbados. I’m told it’s working very well in this regional environment they operate in. What has not worked well? Without stating which contingency plans or a particular incident, success follows the effective use of time and anticipating the impending dangers.

That brings me to the last issue: Should C2 be exercised? Gamed? If so, what are appropriate venues? Exercise and training maximize efficiency and effectiveness where time is critical, such as in disaster relief situations. Games should include multiple scenarios, other countries, agencies, including the UN and Red Cross, and, of course, the NGOs. When contingency plans and procedures are gamed and exercised on either Web-based [systems] or tabletop regularly, basic frameworks of command and control architecture would get refined automatically. Therefore, gaming and exercise have the potential to update information databases through research. Now, this research is a very important component of any information database you want to create nationally and internationally. These information databases could facilitate future assessment and increase interoperability.



## “Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Operations”

### 4. Should C2 be exercised? Gamed? If so, what are appropriate venues?

- Annual gaming (regionally)
- Gaming facilitates other nation integration if basic practices established
- Game multiple scenarios
- Web-based games with crisis management
  - Government agencies
  - Other military orgs (including other nations)
  - NGOs
- Practice plans (including C2 arrangements)
- Information database that facilitates future assessment

Finally, I would like to thank my group and, on behalf of my group, I would also like to thank Captain [Mark] Seaman and Professor [Robin M.] Babb for their excellent support and thoughtful input yesterday.

Thank you for your attention.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you, Admiral. Moving to the last group for this session this morning, group I, Admiral Henaro from Mexico.

***Vice Admiral Sergio Enrique Henaro Galán, Mexico:***

Thank you, sir. Admiral Roughead, Admiral Shuford, our group focuses on the issue of preparation for humanitarian operation, addressing the specific questions:

1. What preparations are necessary or beneficial in humanitarian operations and what are the costs both direct and indirect?
2. How does the new U.S. maritime strategy relate to humanitarian relief operations?
3. Concerning standard humanitarian operation guidelines, what should be included in a lessons-learned database?

The countries included in our seminar are listed [Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Indonesia, Mexico, Mozambique, Portugal, Sweden, Ukraine, United States]. As you can see, we had a wide range of experience in these operations.

The first question focuses on preparations. First the group further defined the question to focus on disaster relief at the strategic and operational level. At this level, we saw four main objectives. These are

- relationship building,
- sharing information,
- mustering political will, and
- preplanned response.

Participants believe that planning should begin at the national level and should include the following steps:

- If possible, establish relations between military and local authorities prior to a disaster.
- Ensure coordination among national agencies.
- Identify the needs through the local authorities. This come from lessons learned [from the tsunami relief operation] in Indonesia.
- Approach to aid, must consider cultural needs of the population.
- Needs must be identified before deployment.
- Must ensure the area of need has been surveyed to update charts.
- Poor communication infrastructure demands helicopters and other mobile vessels to reach remote areas.
- Ensure the local population is trained to deal with disaster and how to find assistance.

Preplanned responses should consider whether to use a national or multinational effort and whether forward basing is available. Multinational efforts should be focused on a regional basis. In planning, it is crucial to identify channels through which international assistance flows as well as defining the level and type of information to share. System integration is a primary consideration. The group recognized that we must address the cost in any operation of this type.

How does the new U.S. maritime strategy relate to humanitarian relief operations? The group felt the new U.S. maritime strategy dovetailed well with the disaster relief missions. Noted was that one strength of the document is that it is not prescriptive. It also recognizes the unique attributes that our maritime forces bring. The strategy confirms and codifies the approach the United States and other nations have been taking.

What should be included in standard humanitarian operation guidelines? In the area of guidelines, the group felt that a common template or guideline will build a common language across nations and help build relationships. An example of existing guidelines is the NATO Experimental Tactic 1011 [NATO EXTAC 1011, *Naval Humanitarian Assistance Missions Originator*] and participants propose it be given wider dissemination. The question was raised whether other guidance exists, possibly within the United Nations. Participants recommended a database be established and maintained.

And the last one: lessons-learned database. Participants felt strongly that disaster relief is a good place to start information sharing. It was noted that NATO maintains a disaster relief database which could possibly be shared universally. It was also recommended that the United Nations maintain such a database. Thank you very much.

[Applause]

**Dr. John Maurer:**

Thank you very much, Admiral. We have time for one comment, question, or observation about this issue of the problems of humanitarian relief before we go on break. The groups put together a remarkable set of slide presentations here that highlight how important it is to build capacity. Do I see a hand? If that's the case then, I'm going to call an adjournment right now. We take a break and then come back in half an hour to have the other groups give their briefings. Thank you. Thank you to the presenters this morning.

[Applause]

*[Pause for coffee break]*

**Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:**

Ladies and gentlemen, there will be a compact disc with all the proceedings from the eighteen International Seapower Symposium available for distribution as you leave the auditorium. If you have to leave prior to the conclusion and you don't get it, we will mail it to you. It's being burned off right now as we speak and it should have everything that's been said and presented at the symposium, including the photos. I'll turn the proceedings back over to Dr. Maurer.

**Dr. John Maurer:**

Thank you, Vince. This session is going to look at the reports that were put together by groups D, E, and F that deal with information sharing in pursuit of international maritime security. Group D's work will be presented today by Admiral Higgs from South Africa.

**Rear Admiral R. W. Higgs, South Africa:**

Admiral Roughead, sir, Professor Maurer, colleagues, it is indeed an honor and a privilege for me to stand here today to talk from our collective, the collective of a number of nations. But in fact, my initial experience with a collective happened [here at the Naval War College] with the class of '95, the NCC class of '95. And from the spirit of the class of '95, I think that the cooperative approach to shaping a new world future is apt and is the only way to go. With regard to specifically whose ideas I'm speaking to today, I'm speaking to the collective of the Cameroon, Colombia, Finland, Iceland, Jamaica, Madagascar, the United States, of course, Morocco, Romania, Seychelles, and South Africa. Much discussion was held with regard to the concept of cooperation and collaboration being the way to go: that by sharing and working out together in a collaborative, inclusive, not exclusive, way, we'd be able to ensure that by exchanging information, by developing trust between peoples, between all navies, great and small navies, by ensuring that everybody associated with a broader maritime brother- and, hopefully into the future, sisterhood has a part in determining the future. This is the way to go and will ultimately ensure that good prevails.

The issue which we have been specifically asked to address is what opportunities can be used to establish linkages for information exchange between regional activities. The very, very first point which we decided was necessary to look at was to develop statements of very clear intent to increase trust and transparency. Things must be very, very clear, right away up front, so that people know where they stand

and know what the strategic intent of the collective is. The concept of integrating local cooperative efforts is fundamental to the success of this. All efforts should be made to make sure that local initiatives are in fact taken through to success and supported with everybody, as best possible. The concept of “your success is my success,” and that attitude, must prevail into the future. We cannot sit with a zero-sum game as we move into the future. With regard to the operational level, GWOT [Global War on Terrorism] is an opportunity and a number of people in the group believe that it is a greater opportunity to form political cooperation. But at the same time, one cautions about it being exclusive in nature. It is very important that, as we move into the future, exclusivity must be played on to the favor of inclusivity.

The next point related to identifying common threats and interests beginning specifically with the tangible resources in the EEZ. The next point related to improving internal information sharing, looking specifically at means and at will, looking at capability and the intent to make things work, and looking at how to get from the broader regional activities specifically focused into the national. A concept which was raised by a number of people yesterday during the seminar and then later on was the issue of the war against poverty. The war against poverty is perceived to be the dominant theme of the next century and the century beyond that. And if one bears that in the back of one’s mind, when you go into the future, it will set one up for success at the strategic level right the way through. The war against poverty has got to be a function of inclusivity, of getting everybody together so that everybody and every responsible citizen of the world is able to win and every responsible citizen’s children and grandchildren have a better future in the world, a future in a stable world, a future in a world where there is development for everybody. The issue with regard to sovereign governments and the development of those capabilities is fundamental.

What opportunities can be used to establish linkages for information exchange between regional activities? The issue of where the ISS fits into it was raised. The idea is that one should build on the ISS at regional events for the common collaborative focus, allowing these regional events to feed back to the ISS. There should be a continuous OODA [observe, orient, decide, and act] loop moving between regional activities and the ISS. [Events] potentially coming up in the next eighteen months were then focused on and a number of symposia were listed: the Indian Ocean Navy Symposium, the Sea Power for Africa Symposium, the Australian Sea Power Symposium, the Colombia-Caribbean Conference, the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, etc. These are very important initiatives. They are initiatives, they are processes, and those processes can breed greater collaboration and cooperation and greater success. The appeal from the group is that all nations, as far as possible, should support each other’s activities in this to ensure that they can work and then also to support these initiatives to share the lessons learned from the various fora and symposia. The next point, which was proposed by Italy, was building on the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center [V-RMTC] to the Five Plus Five (5+5) nations in the Mediterranean as a way to communicate regionally.

The second major point which we looked at is the concept of steps required to achieve these linkages from a legal perspective. After much discussion, it was decided that perhaps the legal expertise, the great legal expertise, to allow us to take



this through to its logical conclusion was not in the technical way. We looked at it from a strategic perspective and the bullet points which we came up with were

- To build partnerships on a basis of equality. All navies should be considered to be part of the game. The basis of equality is fundamental to a collaborative co-operative approach.
- Building domestic legal standards and policy guidance for information development was highlighted.
- Discussions of law of the sea interpretation, in particular at regional symposia, should be strongly encouraged, with prepared experts able to articulate the various issues which need to be debated. And then of course,
- To concentrate on regional information sharing to build trust at the regional level before moving [to the] global.

The third question was “What are the legal impediments to effective information sharing?” The first point related to political barriers and domestic laws which one must [be] cognizant of. Democracy is the only way to go. We’ve got to get used to it and make things work in that environment. To execute coordinated operations where and when there are barriers to direct operations is something which we’ve got to manage and get on top of. The issue of national interest should be looked at in the cold calculated way as is often taught at the war college and also at the same time [we should] strive to identify common interests where nations may together look after each other’s interests to pursue a common good. The issue of privacy was raised—protecting individuals and business information. The ethos of a naval culture—[in which] one sits together with a corporate naval environment, [in which] everybody wants everybody else to succeed in the cooperative environment—does not necessarily work outside in the area of commerce and we must just take note of that. The lack of domestic implementation of international agreements is something also [that we] must be [aware] of and, with regional workings, one must make sure that it does not damage or deflect the collective cause.

The issue “can, and how do, international regimes assist in effecting solutions?” was one we discussed at length and decided that possibly the better question might be “what can we do to foster and assist the development of international regimes?” This is something which we did not have time to go into in great depth but it is something which we believe needs to be pursued in greater depth in the future. So without further ado, I’d like to thank Mr. Peter Dutton, for facilitating what we did, and then also Commander Dave [David J.] Sampson, for the role which he played in putting the collective presentation together, which I was privileged to [present to] you. Thank you.

[Applause]

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you, Admiral. The presentation coming from group E is being given to us today by Admiral de Monval from France.

***Rear Admiral Michel de Freese de Monval, France:***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our group had to focus on policy challenges for information sharing. The discussion we had raised more questions than answers related



to the political, legal, and technical issues we have to face. The discussion we had was so rich that we could easily fill up [more than] one slide.

First [is] what the question was: what information to share before discussing policy and why? Any piece of information is characterized by the property, private property, agency, or departmental property. Information sharing is a need but situational awareness is of no use if you do not compare it to interagency intelligence to determine what is illegal activity so you can launch an action at sea, which is, at the very end, a responsibility and thus it's a major point on the legal aspect.

What information is to be exchanged? Maritime security is a comprehensive concept which covers different and security issues. Each nation, each region, or subregion, given its geography, its common interest in the area, can focus only on part of the spectrum of maritime security, with the consequences of the nature of the information collected and shared. What should be the approach toward information sharing? The first point is information sharing is purely a national approach, the same way we focus on the comprehensive concept. We need to have national policies of information sharing inside our countries between agencies and departments, that is to say, a national interministerial organization.

We agree that we could not have global policy at once but we have to maintain and develop global dialogue to facilitate regional best practices and establish principles of corporative information sharing. So the business of any progress in this field relies on the regional or subregional approach. These approaches are at different stages all around the world. We have some areas in the world that are not yet covered by such a regional approach but we're looking forward to having all the



## **“Information Sharing in Pursuit of International Maritime Security”**

### **Group E**

#### **1. What opportunities can be used to establish linkages for information exchange between regional activities?**

- Identify Regional organizations
- Regional symposia working groups focus on:
  - Principles of information sharing
  - Definition of information to be shared
  - Enhance regional centers capabilities
  - Evaluate the other Regional Centers approaches to information sharing

world covered by this regional approach. The first point is to create the trust we need to be more efficient and effective. It is easier to make it in a small group sharing common geography and interests. Information-sharing principles are currently based on the distributed system connecting national centers. We have to enhance the system. Then we have to raise the question of sharing information belonging to agencies other than navies and coast guards. This is a real difficulty. Having worked on the PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] issue, I can tell you the legal aspect is the worst one and the fundamental one.

To conclude, I would like to thank you, all the members of the group, and our mentor, Mr. [Derek S.] Reveron, for the wonderful discussion we had yesterday. Thank you.

[Applause]

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you, Admiral, for that presentation. Group F will be represented by Admiral La Rosa, Chief of the Italian Navy.

***Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy:***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Roughead, admirals, gentlemen. It's my privilege to introduce the outcomes of the activity of group F on the technical challenges to information sharing—a very interesting subject, a very interesting discussion, and some forward-looking proposals. I wanted to thank all the representatives from the countries: Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Mauritius, New Zealand, São Tomé and Príncipe, the United States,



## Information Sharing in Pursuit of International Maritime Security

- **Group F: technical challenges to information sharing**
- **Assigned countries:** Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Sao Tome & Principe, United States
- **Moderator:** Prof. Hoyt

and the moderator, Professor [Timothy D.] Hoyt. Well, I will pass the floor to Captain De Carolis, my assistant, who very spontaneously asked to brief all of you on our works. Please, Captain De Carolis.

***Captain Aurelio De Carolis, Italy:***

Thank you, Admiral. Good morning, Admiral Roughead, admirals, gentlemen. It is a privilege for me to be in this position. I will start by highlighting that, of course, we started by agreeing on the concrete need to exchange information for maritime security. At that point we had to address the four questions that were assigned to our group. We found out that as soon as we were answering one question then we were also addressing the other three. Therefore, we tried to look at what was the main aim of the four questions. The four questions were looking at proposing something for the future, coming up with something concrete. So, we did this comprehensive approach to the four questions and we started by realizing that an approach was needed to the problem. Now, very often, there is a very well known methodology, bottom-up. Another one is top-down to the problem. We found out there is a similarity between the problem that we are facing and this methodology.

We are dealing with information. The information, as was clearly pointed out in several presentations, in particular I remember the New Zealand presentation, starts with unclassified then goes up through all the levels of classifications. So, we decided to choose a system-based approach, a system-based approach that must be interoperable and affordable. Interoperability and affordability, we believed, are the main outcomes of the discussion yesterday, two important attributes of the solutions that we have to find to our problems. In particular, when we talk about affordability, there are lots of issues out there. One of them is costs—because to have interoperable systems, very often depending on the level of information that we want to deal with, the cost may significantly go up. And cost can be a limit in some situations when a system [needs] to be delivered to many different players to achieve an objective. Therefore, affordability [is] in terms of cost but also time, and time is money. So we go back there. It takes time to develop systems. It takes time to develop procedures. It takes time to develop trust. We have realized how much this is important when we have been working in the Mediterranean region in the development of the V-RMTC initially and then in the application of the same order to another community. When I talk about time, I'm talking about years. Not just one, but it can be two, three years. But the important thing is to have a clear objective to hold to. So the group members highlighted this existence of the panoply of independent systems around the world. Some of them operate at [the] regional level, in some cases subregional level, but in some cases we already have systems that look at the global view of the world. There is one particularly interesting one that is going to be brought forth. It's already operational. We use it, the Italian Navy, and other navies use it. NATO is not looking only at the Mediterranean, it's going global. It's fantastic. There are, however, some problems in the sense of cost, in the sense of dissemination. So, we have to deal with it. There is the panoply of systems.

Now, there is also a need, and this was an important point that came out, to link those systems. Why do we have to link those systems? Well, of course, the light that we see at the end of the [tunnel] is the so-called system of systems. How to get there? Well, we have to link the systems for doing our operations but also to build and



## Main Findings (1)

- Concrete need to exchange info for maritime security
  - Info sharing requires a system-based approach that must be
    - interoperable
    - affordable
  - Group members highlighted existence of:
    - multitude of independent systems
    - need to link those systems for
      - operations
      - building and keeping MSA
  - Linking systems requires:
    - building trust among info sharing partners
    - achieving compatibility (data formats, exch. protocols, models, etc.)
    - overcoming legal differences
    - dealing with information classification as appropriate
    - dealing with encryption if/when needed
- } Maritime security

maintain the maritime situational awareness. We wanted to keep this separate because maritime situational awareness is something that is there and is available all the time and is not related all the time to specific ongoing operations. In other cases, we have operations, the level of which can go from humanitarian assistance—and we have been talking a lot during this symposium about humanitarian operations—but it goes through the whole spectrum of these support operations including disaster relief and other sorts of operations. At the same time, there is this compelling need to have a situational awareness. Everything heads to maritime security.

Now, we said we would need to link systems. How do we do it? Well, as it has been mentioned before, it is important to build trust among the information partners, no matter whether it is at the regional, subregional, or global level. We were dealing with technical aspects, though, so it was not part of our mission, but we found out that to go into the technical details, trust is still an important element. The other thing is achieving compatibility. And when we talk about compatibility, of course, there's a host of elements there such as data format, exchange protocols. These are very technical things—different models that can be applied.

What other elements? Databases. Since the information can be found somewhere and can be used, it can also be stored and it can be retrieved, and the level and the value of unclassified information can grow. It is important to take this into account. The[re is a] possibility of all the partners being able to access this stack of information and to retrieve and to find what are the anomalies, for instance, in the behavior of the different tracks, such as surface tracks, reported in the database.

Now, there are also legal differences that need to be overcome. The legal aspects were not the topic of our working group. However, if we take a legal framework for an existing system, we realize how much technical information is inside it, because we start dealing—and now I go to the next bullet—with information classification; there can be legal aspects that are connected to it. So, it is still necessary to look at it in a comprehensive way. There can be the particular necessity to deal with encryption, which goes even further, and can increase the costs that we were talking about before in terms of affordability.

In terms of findings, we realized that this was very well presented, so we are just reporting it again on this slide—the existence of a very important tool that was presented yesterday at <http://www.wpns.org>.

This is a hub. This is something that can work when it comes to link systems that are operating in different parts of the world, because it's a portal, so somebody can hook to this portal and can find the availability to go into some specific systems. Now, the question may be “But can I also look into the database of those systems?” Well, it depends on the technical arrangements that have been made. This can be easily achieved, though, at the technical level. But before that, it depends on the legal framework that is behind the agreements between the players to have the possibility to hook up to this wpns.org portal and to go into the system that makes itself available to the rest of the world community through a portal. Using a portal can be a way to link up systems. Of course, it is not the only one. Another way can be to have the same model as the V-RMTC that was given yesterday, that is applied by a group of countries in another part of the world. In this case we have similar



## Main Findings (2)

- Existence of tool presented by New Zealand Navy
  - [www.wpns.org](http://www.wpns.org)
  - capable of linking different systems
- Italian Navy offer to make available the “V-RMTC model”
- Dealing with information sharing also requires
  - addressing sensitivities of information obtained from commercial operations
  - developing Interagency information sharing
    - within single government
    - amongst governments
  - addressing Internet vulnerabilities

models and it can be easier to link them together. There are different ways of achieving the results that we are looking for, which is to share information and to overcome all the hurdles in terms of technicalities with the final aim to achieve and to increase maritime security.

Dealing with information sharing also requires addressing particular sensitivities. I've been talking about information classifications. There are other sorts of sensitivities when we deal with information, in particular, in the shipping industry. The shipping industry is very broad. We go from line ships, containerships that we know when they go from port A into port B and how much it costs to ship a specific cargo. That is one issue. There are also other sectors, such as the oil transport, in which the margins are at the moment based on information asymmetry. Maybe one day this will change for sure and we will be capable of heading towards that sort of ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] model that has been mentioned on several occasions and that is for sure what each of us is looking forward to. We have to take into account these sensitivities today because unclassified information can increase its value but, more than that, can create problems when it comes.

Now I'm going to the second bullet point—developing interagency information sharing. Because the information that we deal with comes from a host of agencies, it is important that we identify at the national level who is dealing with all the information that is related with maritime security; and then, this same action gets done at all the other levels, at the regional levels, organizationally (e.g., the European Union), but also at global level (the IMO can have an important role in this). We have to take into account the importance of the interagency factor. In Italy, we are trying hard to convince, for example, politicians and everybody there that the navy has a central role in this interagency approach. I think most of us in this room would agree on that. Navies have a central role. The other thing is we have to be very careful addressing Internet vulnerabilities. I gave some examples [of systems] but these examples use the Internet as the underlying platform. So we have to take into account these vulnerabilities.

In terms of the way ahead, the first point goes back to the first slide. We have to come up with something concrete. So, within the group, what we said is let's begin with unclassified information, which, still considering all the sensitivities that are out there, can be a good start. For sure it is a bit more than sharing weather forecasts. Also, it was mentioned by some of the group members that all these issues would be brought forward within the forum of the chiefs and heads of European navies. This is part of the way ahead. Furthermore, we will see what are to be the follow-on outcomes of the offer to use the V-RMTC in other regions of the world. The model is out there, it's free, and it responds to the criteria of affordability with a very good cost ratio. Another thing in the way ahead that we are foreseeing is the possibility to link systems at regional to global levels through a common gateway. We put some systems as an example on the slide, and we put also a possible gateway. Also, we thought about future events that might be used as a demonstration that this can happen. Of course, there are some agreements that have to be made well in advance because there can be a community that is currently using a particular information-sharing system [of which] not all members [may be] happy to use their information and give access through the portal to somebody else from another region, or from wherever in the world, even it is for an exercise.





## Way Ahead

- Concrete need to exchange info for maritime security
- Start with UNCLAS
- Conduct further discussions during CHENS
- Follow on outcomes of the Italian Navy offer of the "V-RMTC model"
- Link systems (regional – global) through a common gateway
  - Possible Systems: NEMESIS (UK), CENTRIXS, CNIES (Cooperation National Information Exchange System), V-RMTC, etc.
  - Possible Gateway: WPNS, most promising due to low cost and common technology
- Utilise upcoming events for testing: e.g. Transamerica 2008, COAMAS 2008 (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay).
- Exploit future events to report findings:
  - 2008, Venice 7<sup>th</sup> Regional Seapower Symposium
  - 2009, Newport XIX International Seapower Symposium
- Experts Meeting in the near term is necessary at various levels

What we also need is to have events to report these findings. It was previously mentioned that the forthcoming symposia are important events to build on what we have been doing today. We reported some events on this slide based on the countries that were represented in that particular group; but, of course, the other symposia that were mentioned in the presentation by Rear Admiral Higgs [seminar D's out brief, above] add to those.

To make things happen, for sure, it will be necessary to have some experts meeting in the near term. So we call on someone, probably the U.S. Navy, to take care of this, to put together the people at the right level that can agree how to make things happen and to come up with this sort of concrete solutions. This ends up my presentation. I thank you very much for the attention.

[Applause]

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you very much for that presentation. There are many issues here to discuss, questions about trust, building capabilities, trying to work together to face common problems. Are there any questions, comments, observations on the part of participants in response to the reports of the working groups? Right here in front.

***Captain Christophe Pipolo, France:***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just offer a comment from CHENS [Chiefs of European Navies] maritime security operation and [a] member. I have some of my



colleagues all over the place here who are sustaining and working for their chiefs of naval staff. From all these presentations this morning, I take two elements. First, the need for regional forums in which head of navies are discussing issues. Second, as Captain De Carolis mentioned, the need to connect values in regional systems to a global approach. For the first part of the problem, there is a clear need to have this regional symposium developed, just to take the example of the CHENS. The chairmen are meeting once a year and it has been done for some coast guards. You have [a] working group level below that where experts are addressing policy issues as you did during some working groups, addressing legal issues, addressing information exchange issues, addressing economic corporation issues. We are reporting to CHENS and they are making decisions once a year. The objective is not to compete with international organizations, but just to explain and show how our navies can deal with all the obstacles they have to address properly the maritime security problem. On the other hand, the information exchange obviously is a subregional approach, is the basic one, and the one we need because we have so [many] immediate common interest issues. It's dependent on the regions. These developments are not mature enough and need to be secured. As is the case in Europe, V-RMTC is covering the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, but you have initiatives also in the Baltic area, in the eastern Atlantic, and some other regions. So you have to stabilize all these approaches and keep a firm grip on the fact that all these initiatives can be connected, one to the other, and this is where there is a clear need to be in contact with the other forum which is close to yours. So this is just a pragmatic approach and just a comment on what is going on in the European part of the maritime security puzzle.

***Dr. John Maurer:***

Thank you very much for that comment. Are there any other comments or observations? Well, then I want to thank again the presenters for the superb job that they did in reporting what was worked in the seminars and the working groups yesterday afternoon. It is an incredible amount of thought and effort that went into those slides. The presentations that were given [are] important because they have a lot that can be taken away from this symposium. Again, I want to thank everyone for their presentations.

[Applause]



## Closing Remarks

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford and  
Admiral Gary Roughead

*Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, United States:*

Well, it's up to me here to set things up for a final farewell from Admiral Roughead and it gives me an opportunity to do what I haven't done yet but needs to be done. Professor Mocini was up here earlier today and went through a list of a number of folks and organizations that you don't see. You just see the work they do. It's like a huge portion of an iceberg that lies just beneath the surface and Vince gave his appreciation to those folks. But he couldn't thank himself. So, I need to point out to everyone here that much, not just the moderating but much of the foundation work for this and a lot of the planning and execution, rested on Vince's shoulders. And to my old shipmate, thank you very much. Well done.

[Applause]

I should also emphasize the critical role that the Ops and Plans and Information staff—the N3/5 staff that works for the Chief of Naval Operations under the brilliant guidance of my old friend, Admiral John Morgan—has played in conceptualizing this effort, in arranging the seminar precepts, which were different this time, and clearly very, very effective. All of that and all of that genius and energy was brought together and I don't think there is a more effective partnership within the Navy than that that we have been developing here over these last couple of years with the N3/5 staff. It is a great joy for me, and I speak for the rest of the folks here at the War College, to work with Admiral John Morgan's folks down there at N3/5 in Washington. They're routine visitors up here. We are routine visitors down there. Captain Lee Tabanken, particularly for this International Seapower Symposium, is due a debt of thanks and recognition along with Admiral Kid Donnegan who works down there with Admiral Morgan. And finally, as we all begin to bid farewells among ourselves to each other, I simply have to say thank you to everyone here. This whole college has been so very privileged to have on its decks and passageways these last several days folks of such magnificent quality as are assembled here today. It is a very high honor for this institution indeed. It's a very high honor you give us. For almost 125 years, the Naval War College has welcomed our international partners from around the world. That's a long time for folks to have come here to be a part of the things we do. We're very, very proud of this. I talk about it all the time. We believe it is strong evidence of the international trust and confidence that we seek to build here and I think it's also a tribute to the integrity of this institution. The point of all this, and this is my further hope, is that this college is seen not just as an asset for the United States, the United States Navy, but is recognized as something that is owned by all of the maritime nations around the world. Over these last few days, we've had a chance to see old friends and make new friends. I certainly have. I appreciate that profoundly. I hope that as we leave this conference and go back to our nations and as time passes the strength of the

discussions, the warmth of these last few days, doesn't cool down and the commitment to seek opportunities to work more closely together is strengthened in the days ahead. Thank you all again very much for coming, for sharing your valuable time, for enduring so many of the hardships of travel. Thank you for your perspective, your genius, and your passion. This is my second International Seapower Symposium, and, like many of you, we go to symposia often, but I don't think I have ever attended one—don't think there has been one that has the same level of authority as this has, and I have never left one where I felt a more profound sense of encouragement at the work that's been done and optimism about the work that we will continue to do together. Thanks once again. Admiral Roughead, a final thanks to you, sir, for allowing the College to be a part of this. Over to you, sir.

***Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:***

Well, I too would like to offer my appreciation to the War College and all of those behind the scenes that made this event possible—not just the substance of what we were able to talk about, but the comradery and the enjoyment that all of us have been able to experience these last couple of days. But to bring us back to reality, I would like to extend my condolences to the country of Pakistan for the tragic events that occurred there and the loss of life. On behalf of my Navy, and I'll be so bold as to say the collective audience, we extend our condolences. Also an earlier report that we have received [told] of an explosion in Manila, with some loss of life. What the cause may be there is still unsure. But it reinforces the world that we live in, the challenges that we face. That is why we all came together to talk about these things, to seek solutions, and to be part of those solutions. It has given me a great deal of pleasure and pride to be here with you on [what is] also my second Seapower Symposium, last time as a panelist and a member and now to be able to host it. It is my hope that I will be able to do two more Seapower Symposia the Chief of Naval Operations and, because I may have some control over that timing and when the scheduling of that is, I think I'll be able to get two more in. That will span eight years of being part of this wonderful collection and group as we have come together to move our collective interests forward. This is really a historic event. It has been mentioned on several occasions [that] never before in the history of navies have this many leaders of navies and coast guards ever been assembled in one place to talk about things that are important to our individual nations and to the collective security, stability, and prosperity of the world. It was our pleasure to be able to use this venue, this event, to be able to unveil our maritime strategy, to share that with you, and to begin the dialogue with you that will continue into the future about our strategy and what we believe and our commitment to a cooperative approach as we go forward with our Navy fulfilling the responsibilities that our country expects of us, but also to do it in a cooperative way. I think as we do go forward, to use a phrase from Admiral Mudimu, the fact that we have a collective responsibility to work together in the briefings—and that you have seen here—is indicative of some of the opportunities that we have before us. I endorse those and I would also [say]—Jake is probably wondering what I'm going to say next because I rely on this War College a lot—that should there be the opportunity to bring technical experts together to deliver on some of these ambitions, we will stand ready and available to do that. The other aspect of the conference that has been so helpful to me is to hear the

perspectives from around the world, to see and listen and to understand in a first-hand way the challenges that countries face, that regions face, the solutions that you have proposed to bring those challenges under control and collectively and cooperatively solve them. There is no question in my mind that the dialogue that we have here as part of the ISS and that continues into the regional symposia is the key to the future and the key to going forward. To be able to take [elsewhere] what we have done here, whether it's a conference that will take place in Venice or the conference that Admiral Verma has talked about: these are the vehicles by which we will be able to advance our thinking, to look at ways to link our collective efforts together, and I encourage the continued exchange dialogue that allows us to move down that path. There are many vehicles that we can use. One of the recommendations of the panel was to be able to do some gaming and I think that that is a very good way to test these ideas and concepts. I fully endorse that and commit my Navy to whatever efforts may be possible in the various regions that are around. The opportunities to advance our information sharing, which is very important to me, mindful of the many factors that have been identified by the panelists, we stand ready to do that, as I have said. I commit to the technical experts meeting, if that is the case, but also to encourage other things that are going on. The work that is being done in the concepts such as Global Fleet Station—you have seen that that is part of our strategy for the future; but I will also commit to you that as other countries and organizations perhaps put together a global fleet station, I will tell you that the United States Navy is willing to participate in those initiatives that other countries will put on the table, and also those by other regional organizations.

So I think it's the commitment, again one of mutual cooperation and participation, the opportunity to come together here happens every two years. But I will also tell you that the relationships that we have among all of us—the ability to see things through a very common lens because of our backgrounds, because of the fact that we all live and operate on the sea—afford us opportunities throughout the year to communicate with one another. I look forward to those opportunities as well, to be able to exchange ideas, to make recommendations, to seek assistance from one another. I assure each and every one of you that is here today that you will have a listening ear and a willing partner on the other end of the phone, or e-mail, whenever you choose to communicate.

I think probably the greatest mark of the success of this conference has been that the ladies are happy. And if the ladies are happy, everybody is happy. I think that the comradery that has been experienced there, the relationships and the enjoyment that we have derived from one another, makes me very eager to go into the future, makes me very optimistic about the future, because I believe that, regardless of what the problems may be that we face, if there is one group of people that can solve those problems they are those of us in the room right here. Because of the commitment that you have, the strength of the people that work for you, and their desire to see the same thing that every other person on the planet wishes for—safety, security, and prosperity—I look forward to going forward with each and every one of you individually, and collectively, into the future. I look forward to the next International Seapower Symposium, in 2009, and we will take it up another notch. Thank you very much. Have safe travels. Again, I'm always at the other end of the phone and I always look forward to maintaining the relationships. So thank you very much.



# APPENDIX

## List of Delegates

### *Albania*

CAPT Kristaq Gerweni  
Commander  
Albanian Navy

### *Antigua & Barbuda*

LCDR Auden Nicholas  
Commander, Antigua Coast Guard

### *Argentina*

ADM Jorge Omar Godoy  
Chief of Staff  
Argentine Navy

CAPT Alvaro J. Martinez  
Naval War College Director  
Argentine Navy

VADM Ruben Oscar Tubio  
General Director, Development & Plans, Prefectura Naval Argentina  
Argentine Navy

### *Australia*

RADM James V. Goldrick  
Commander, Border Protection  
Royal Australian Navy

VADM Russell Shalders  
Chief of Navy  
Royal Australian Navy

CDRE Vince DiPietro  
Australian Attaché in Washington, D.C.  
Royal Australian Navy

### *Azerbaijan*

CAPT Yunis Mammadov  
Chief of the Navy, Azerbaijan

### *Bahamas*

CDR Clifford W. Scavella  
Commander, Royal Bahamas Defence Force



***Bahrain***

COL Ala Abdulla Seyad  
Commander, Bahrain Coast Guard

***Bangladesh***

VADM Sarwar Jahan Nizam  
Chief of the Naval Staff, Bangladesh Navy

***Barbados***

LCDR Errington Ricardo Shurland  
Commanding Officer, Barbados Coast Guard

***Belgium***

RDML Jean-Paul Robyns  
Commander of the Maritime Command  
Belgium Navy

VADM Michel Hellemans  
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence and Security  
Belgium Navy

***Belize***

BGEN Cedric Borland  
Commandant, Belize National Coast Guard Service

***Benin***

CAPT Fernand Maxime Ahoyo  
Benin Navy

***Bolivia***

CAPT Hugo Contreras-Llanos  
Director General, Naval Education Institute  
Bolivian Navy

VADM José Alba Arnez  
Commander General  
Bolivian Navy

***Brazil***

RADM Carlos Autran De Oliviera Amaral  
Director, Brazilian Naval War College  
Brazilian Navy

ADM Julio Soares de Moura Neto  
Commandant of the Brazilian Navy

***Brunei***

COL Syed Abdillah bin Dato Syed Hussein  
Deputy Commander of the Royal Brunei Navy  
Royal Brunei Navy

MAJ Spry Bin Haji Serudi  
Commanding Officer Training  
Royal Brunei Navy

***Bulgaria***

VADM Minko Kavaldzhiev  
Commander in Chief  
Bulgarian Naval Forces

CAPT George Fidanov  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Training  
Bulgarian Navy

***Cameroon***

CAPT Djourwe Koskreo  
Surface Fleet Commander  
Cameroon Navy

RADM Guillaume N’Gouah-N’Gally  
Chief of Staff of the Navy  
Cameroon Navy

***Canada***

VADM Drew W. Robertson  
Chief of the Maritime Staff  
Canadian Forces

RADM Dean McFadden  
Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT)  
Commander, Joint Task Force Atlantic  
Canadian Forces

***Cape Verde***

LTCOL Fernando C. Pereira  
Commander of the Coast Guard  
Cape Verdean Coast Guard

***Chile***

VADM Francisco Martinez Villaroel  
General Director, Maritime Territory & Merchant Marine  
Chilean Coast Guard

CAPT Piero Fagandini González  
Director, Chilean Naval War College  
Chilean Navy

ADM Rodolfo Codina Díaz  
Commander in Chief of the Navy  
Chilean Navy

***Colombia***

ADM Guillermo Enrique Barrera Hurtado  
Commander of the Colombian Navy  
VADM Edgar Augusto Cely Nuñez  
Director of Naval Operations  
Colombian Navy

***Costa Rica***

LTC Martin Arias Araya  
Director General, Costa Rica Coast Guard  
Costa Rica Maritime Service

***Croatia***

CDR Boris Katicin  
Croatia N5  
Croatian Navy  
COMO Ante Urlic  
Commander of the Croatian Navy

***Cyprus***

CAPT Andreas Ioannides  
Deputy Commander, Cyprus Navy

***Denmark***

CAPT Jens Walther  
Commander, First Squadron  
Royal Danish Navy  
RADM Nils Wang  
Admiral Danish Fleet  
Royal Danish Navy

***Djibouti***

COL Abdourahman Aden Cher  
Commander, Navy, Armed Forces of Djibouti  
Armed Forces of Djibouti

***Ecuador***

CAPT Arturo Romero Velasquez  
Director of Education, Ecuadoran Navy  
Ecuadoran Navy

VADM Jorge Homero Arellano Lascano  
Commander General of the Navy  
Ecuadoran Navy

***Egypt***

RADM Ali Ali Abd El Hamid Arafa  
Egyptian Navy

***El Salvador***

RADM Marco Antonio Palacios Luna  
Chief of Staff, El Salvadoran Navy  
El Salvadoran Navy

***Finland***

CAPT Kimmo Kotilainen  
Commandant, Naval Academy  
Finnish Navy

VADM Hans Holmström  
Commander in Chief, Finnish Navy  
Finnish Navy

***France***

CAPT Christophe Pipolo  
Office of International Affairs, Paris  
French Navy

ADM Alain Oudot de Dainville  
Chief of French Naval Staff  
French Navy

RADM Michel de Freese de Monval  
President, Naval War College  
French Navy

***Gabon***

GEN Jean Ntori Longho  
Gabonese Navy

CDR Paul Biviqou Nziengui  
Gabonese Navy

***Gambia***

LCDR Sillah Kujabi  
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations  
Gambian Navy

***Georgia***

MG David Galua  
Deputy Head, Border Police; Director, Coast Guard  
Georgian Navy

COL Koba Gurtskaia  
Acting Chief, Georgian Navy  
Georgian Navy

***Germany***

VADM Wolfgang Nolting  
Chief of German Naval Service  
German Navy

CAPT Karsten Schneider  
Branch Chief, Plans & Policy, International  
German Navy

***Ghana***

CDRE Franky Daley  
Commander, Western Naval Command  
Ghana Navy

COMO Geoffrey Biekro  
Chief Staff Officer  
Ghana Navy

***Greece***

VADM Elias Sionidis  
Commandant, Hellenic Coast Guard  
Hellenic Navy

CAPT Athanassios Makris  
Hellenic Navy

RADM Kyriakos Kyriakidis  
Chief of Hellenic Navy  
Hellenic Navy

***Guatemala***

CAPT Luis Alfredo Monterrosa de la Mora  
Guatemalan Navy

***Guinea***

RADM Aly Daffe  
Chief of Staff, Navy  
Guinean Navy

LCDR Samba Traore  
Executive Officer to Chief of Naval Operations  
Guinean Navy

***Honduras***

CAPT Jose Eduardo Espinal Paz  
Captain of the Navy  
Honduran Navy

***Iceland***

CDR Asgrimur Larus Asgrimsson  
Commanding Officer, Maritime Traffic Service  
Iceland Defence Force

ADM Georg Kristinn Larusson  
Director General of the Icelandic Coast Guard  
Icelandic Coast Guard

***India***

VADM Rustom Faramroze Contractor  
Director General, Indian Coast Guard  
Indian Coast Guard

CDRE Ravi  
Indian Navy

VADM Nirmal Verma  
Vice Chief of Naval Staff  
Indian Navy

***Indonesia***

RADM Moeklas Sidik  
Assistant for Operations  
Indonesian Navy

ADM Slamet Soebijanto  
Chief of Staff, Navy  
Indonesian Navy

***International Maritime Organization***

Mr. Chris Trelawny  
Head, Maritime Security Section  
International Maritime Organization, London

***Iraq***

RADM Muhammad Jawad Kadham  
Iraqi Head of Navy  
Iraqi Navy

CDRE Marij Ahmed Jasim  
Iraqi Navy

***Ireland***

CDRE Frank Lynch  
General Officer in Command, Irish Navy  
Irish Navy

CDR Mark Mellett  
Commandant, Naval College/Associate Head,  
National Maritime College of Ireland  
Irish Navy

***Israel***

VADM Eli Marum  
Commander in Chief, Israel Navy  
Israel Navy

***Italy***

CAPT Aurelio De Carolis  
Italian General Staff, Operations Department  
Italian Navy

VADM Raimondo Pollastrini  
Commandant of the Italian Coast Guard  
Italian Navy

ADM Paolo La Rosa  
Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy  
Italian Navy

***Jamaica***

CDR Sydney Innis  
Commanding Officer  
Jamaica Defense Force Coast Guard

***Japan***

CAPT Hiroshi Yamamura  
Director, Plans & Programs Division  
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

ADM Eiji Yoshikawa  
Chief of Staff, Maritime Self-Defense Force  
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

***Jordan***

MG Dari R. Alzaben  
Royal Jordanian Naval Forces  
CAPT Ghareth Anan Saleem Oweis  
Royal Jordanian Naval Forces



***Kenya***

COL George Khakhubi Shiundu  
Kenya Navy Fleet Commander  
Kenya Navy

MG Samson Jefwa Mwathethe  
Kenya Navy Commander  
Kenya Navy

***Korea***

VADM Yang Won Sur  
Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
Republic of Korea Navy

CGEN Dong-Ok Kwon  
Commissioner General  
Republic of Korea Coast Guard

***Kuwait***

BG Jasim Ali Failakawi  
Director, Coast Guard  
Kuwait Coast Guard

***Latvia***

CDR Juris Roze  
Commander, Latvian Naval Forces  
Latvian Naval Forces

***Lithuania***

RADM Kestutis Macijauskas  
Commander, Lithuanian Naval Force  
Lithuanian Navy

***Madagascar***

RADM Abel Radavidson  
Chief of Naval Forces  
Madagascar

***Malaysia***

ADM Datuk Ramlan Mohamed Ali  
Chief of the Navy  
Royal Malaysian Navy

***Malta***

LTC Martin Cauchi-Inglott  
Commander, Maritime Squadron  
Malta Navy

BGEN Carmel Vassallo  
Commander, Armed Forces of Malta  
Armed Forces of Malta

***Mauritius***

LTC Mahadeo Malloo  
Mauritius Navy

***Mexico***

VADM Sergio Enrique Henaro Galán  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Mexican Navy

VADM Moises Gomez Cabrera  
Director, Naval War College  
Mexican Navy

***Montenegro***

CAPT Rajko Pesic  
Deputy Military Cooperation Section J-5 General  
Republic of Montenegro

CAPT Rajko Bulatovic  
Commanding Officer of the Navy  
Republic of Montenegro

***Morocco***

CAPT El Hourri Lahoussaine El Horri  
Royal Moroccan Navy

RADM Mohammed Berrada-Gouzi  
Inspector of the Royal Moroccan Navy  
Royal Moroccan Navy

***Mozambique***

VADM Patrico Cancuta Yotamo  
Chief of Mozambique Navy  
Mozambique Navy

CAPT João Simao Dzonzi  
Chief of Navigation and Hydrography Department  
Mozambique Navy

***Netherlands***

LTG Robert Leonardus Zuiderwijk  
Deputy Commander, Royal Netherlands Navy  
Royal Netherlands Navy

***New Zealand***

RADM David Ledson  
 Chief of Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy  
 Royal New Zealand Navy

CDRE Pat Williams  
 New Zealand Naval Attaché  
 Royal New Zealand Navy

***Nigeria***

VADM Ganiyu Tunde Adegboyega Adekeye  
 Chief of Naval Staff  
 Nigerian Navy

***Norway***

CDRE Bernt Grimstvedt  
 Commander, Norwegian Navy Training & Education  
 Royal Norwegian Navy

RADM Jan Eirik Finseth  
 Chief of Staff, Royal Norwegian Navy  
 Royal Norwegian Navy

***Oman***

CAPT Al Yahyai  
 Royal Navy of Oman

CDR Ahmad bin Feery bin Suleiman al  
 Commander of the Royal Oman Police Coast Guard  
 Royal Navy of Oman

***Pakistan***

ADM Muhammed Afzal Tahir  
 Chief of the Naval Staff  
 Pakistan Navy

CDRE Tahseen Ullah Khan  
 Commandant, Pakistan Navy War College  
 Pakistan Navy

***Papua New Guinea***

CAPT Max Aleale  
 Chief of Operations  
 Papua New Guinea Defence Force

***Paraguay***

CAPT German Gimenez  
 Paraguayan Navy Representative  
 Paraguayan Navy

RADM Vidal Villalba Vega  
Commander of the Paraguayan Navy  
Paraguayan Navy

***Peru***

ADM Eduardo Darcourt Adrianzén  
Commanding General of the Peruvian Navy  
Peruvian Navy

RADM Oleg Kriljenko Arnillas  
Director, Peruvian Naval War College  
Peruvian Navy

***Philippines***

VADM Rogelio I. Calunsag  
Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command  
Philippine Navy

RADM Wilfredo Tomayo  
Vice Commandant for Administration (VCA)  
Philippine Coast Guard

***Poland***

FLTADM Roman Krzyzelewski  
Commander of the Polish Navy  
Polish Navy

***Portugal***

VADM Victor Manuel Bento Lopo  
President, Strategic Research & Studies Group  
Portuguese Navy

***Qatar***

BG Al Mohannadi  
Qatar Amiri Navy

***Romania***

RADM Dorin Danila  
Chief of Romanian Naval Forces Staff  
Romanian Naval Forces

***Saint Kitts and Nevis***

LTCOL Pat Wallace  
Commander, Saint Kitts and Nevis Defense Force  
Saint Kitts and Nevis Defense Force

***Saint Lucia***

CDR Winston Mitille  
 Commissioner, Marine Police Unit  
 Royal Saint Lucia Police Force

***São Tomé and Príncipe***

LTCOL Justino dos Santos Lima  
 Commandant of the Coast Guard  
 São Tomé and Príncipe Coast Guard

LTCOL Idalecio Custodio Pachire  
 Commander of Army  
 São Tomé and Príncipe Naval Forces

***Saudi Arabia***

CAPT Adnan Al-Shamrani  
 Director of Training Exercises  
 Royal Saudi Naval Forces

RADM Dakheel Allah Al-Wagdani  
 Deputy Commander, Royal Saudi Naval Forces  
 Royal Saudi Naval Forces

***Senegal***

CAPT Ousmane Ibrahimima Sall  
 Chief of Naval Staff  
 Senegalese Navy

LCDR Papa Lamine Ndiaye  
 Staff Officer  
 Senegalese Navy

***Seychelles***

COL Donald Gertrude  
 Seychelles Navy

***Sierra Leone***

CDR Daniel Mansaray  
 Commander, Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Maritime  
 Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces

***Singapore***

COL Harris Chan  
 Deputy Coastal Command Commander  
 Republic of Singapore Navy

LTC Hong Wee Tan  
 Chief of Navy  
 Republic of Singapore Navy

***Slovenia***

CDR Andrej Androjna  
Commander, 430th Maritime Detachment  
Slovene Navy

***South Africa***

RADM R. W. Higgs  
Director of Fleet Staff  
South African Navy

VADM J. Mudimu  
Chief of the South African Navy  
South African Navy

***Spain***

ADM Sebastian Zaragoza Soto  
Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy  
Spanish Navy

***Sri Lanka***

VADM Wasantha Kumar Jayadewa  
Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy  
Sri Lanka Navy

***Sweden***

COL Lars-Olof Corneliusson  
Naval Attaché in Washington, D.C.  
Royal Swedish Navy

RADM Anders Grenstad  
Chief of Staff of the Royal Swedish Navy  
Royal Swedish Navy

***Togo***

CMDT Soukoume Alleda  
Chief of Logistics at the Office of the Navy Staff  
Togolese Armed Forces

***Tunisia***

CAPT Abderraouf Atallah  
Commanding Officer, Fast Patrol Boat Squadron  
Tunisian Navy

RADM Tarek Faouzi El Arbi  
Chief of Staff of the Navy  
Tunisian Navy

***Turkey***

RADM Tayfun Uraz  
 Commandant, Turkish Naval War College  
 Turkish Naval Forces

Pvt Ezgu  
 Turkish Naval Forces

***Ukraine***

VADM Ihor Yiosypivych Tenyukh  
 Commander in Chief  
 Ukrainian Naval Forces

CAPT Voledymyr Sergejevich Bilousov  
 Director, Operations Department  
 Ukrainian Naval Forces

***United Kingdom***

ADM Sir Mark Stanhope  
 Commander in Chief Fleet (Designate)  
 Royal Navy

CDRE Paul Henry Robinson  
 Assistant Commandant (Maritime)  
 UK Joint Services Command and Staff College  
 Royal Navy

Dr. Geoffrey Till  
 UK Joint Services Command and Staff College

***United States***

ADM Thad W. Allen  
 Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard  
 U.S. Coast Guard

Mr. Thomas A. Betro  
 Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service

Mr. Duncan Brown  
 Lab Director, Johns Hopkins University

VADM Evan M. Chanik  
 Commander, Second Fleet  
 U.S. Navy

GEN James T. Conway  
 Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps  
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VADM Kevin Cosgriff  
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RDML Tony L. Cothron  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
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VADM Mark P. Fitzgerald  
Director, Navy Staff  
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VADM Jeffrey L. Fowler  
Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy  
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ADM Jonathan Greenert  
Commander, Fleet Forces Command  
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VADM John C. Harvey  
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RADM Carlton B. Jewett  
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VADM Samuel J. Locklear  
Commander, Third Fleet  
U.S. Navy

BGEN William Mayville  
DJ5 U.S. European Command  
U.S. Army

RADM Bernard J. McCullough  
N8  
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RDML David J. Mercer  
Director, Deep Blue  
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RDML John W. Miller  
J5 U.S. Central Command  
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RADM David P. Pecoske  
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Commander, Atlantic Area  
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Mr. Rino Pivrotto  
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ADM Gary Roughead  
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RADM Brian M. Salerno  
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ADM Henry G. Ulrich  
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ADM Robert F. Willard  
Commander, Pacific Fleet  
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HON Donald C. Winter  
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Department of the Navy

***Uruguay***

VADM Juan Heber Fernandez  
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Uruguayan Navy

CAPT Daniel Marcelo Martinez Santalucci  
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Uruguayan Navy

***Yemen***

COL Mohammed Mohammed Mohammed  
Director, Legal Affairs  
Yemen Coast Guard

BG Ali Ahmed Yahya Rasa'a  
Chairman, Yemen Coast Guard Authority  
Yemen Coast Guard Authority