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CENTER ON IRREGULAR WARFARE AND ARMED GROUPS READING LIST

Al-Shabaab in Somalia & HOA

Last updated January 2017

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
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Map of Somalia and Horn of Africa



Somalia. Bing Maps. Microsoft. July 13, 2015. Retrieved from <https://www.bing.com/maps/#Y3A9LTAuNDgwNjg3fjU3LjQxOTQzMjZsdmw9NSZzdHk9YiZxPVNvbWFSaWE=>

HOA consists of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia,

Greater HOA consists of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Sudan

Part I: Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Somalia Conflict/ Security Situation Overview

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Clarke, Walter S. "Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-93." SSI Special Report AD-A259 777. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. (approved for public release) <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a259777.pdf>

This report provides an in-depth history of Somalia starting with its independence and providing information on clan history and organization, domestic politics, historical figures and then concludes with a thorough list of significant dates in Somali history along a chronology of Operation Restore Hope (pre-Mogadishu intervention)

MAPS REPORTS AND DATASETS

"Country Report: Somalia." Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset. April 2013. http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ACLED-Country-Report_Somalia_April-2013.pdf

This report reviews the impact of al-Shabaab and its areas of operation and the level of conflict in different regions. It also presents the issues of communal conflict. The challenges of the local government are examined with concern to the establishment of local administration.

Zimmerman, Katherine. "Somalia Conflict Maps: Islamist and Political." AEI: Critical Threats. May 31, 2010. <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalia-conflict-maps-islamist-and-political>.

The maps from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) featured in this article present the locations of three particular Islamist groups in Somalia; al Shabaab, Hizb al Islam and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama'a and the different self-declared regions.

U.S. Department of State. (N.D) "U.S. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheets." U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/index.htm>

The U.S. State Department fact sheets provide information on U.S. relations with the particular country and any aid provided and U.S. representation in the country.

POLITICAL HISTORY AND U.S. POLICIES

Bruton, Bronwyn E. "Somalia: A New Approach." *Council Special Report*. Council on Foreign Relations. March 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

This report outlines the political history involving the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and al-Shabaab. It evaluates the U.S. policies regarding the country and the effectiveness of its support of the TFG. The author describes a series of strategies to combat terrorism in the region and to stabilize and develop the country.

CULTURE AND CLAN IDENTITY

Center for Security, Armed Forces and Society. "Somalia." *CEADS Papers*, 2 (2012). http://www.csfas.net/downloads/ceads_volume_2_-_ansa_in_somalia.pdf

This collection consists of five different papers on Somali culture, clan structure, and religion, especially as they relate to non-state violence. Titles include, "Clan Identity and Islamic Identity in Somalia: An Examination of Non-State Armed Groups in Regional and Sub-Regional Context" and "Legitimacy Among the Somali: The Importance of Clan and Islamic Identities in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Any Eventual Solution."

GROWTH/ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL ISLAM

"Somalia's Islamists." *Africa Report* 100 (December 2005) International Crisis Group. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Somalias%20Islamists.pdf>

This report from 2005 details the rise and expansion of political Islamism and the growth of several groups, some more radical than others and the Sharia Court systems, that would pave the way for al-Shabaab. The rise and collapse of al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI) resulted in a few members establishing a new jihadi network with ties to al-Qaeda. It also discusses how the Islamist groups were able to coordinate several different clans who had been at odds with each other for a long time.

CONFLICT REPORTS

Fergusson, James. *The World's Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia*. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2013.

An in-depth recounting by James Ferguson, an imbedded journalist in Somalia, of his time in Somalia observing the AMISOM military forces fight against Al-Shabaab. He covers a wide variety of topics and provides a “front-line” look at the conflict. The book provides a history into the conflict, interviews with many AMISOM soldiers, civilians, and local journalists,

Historical Context

RUSSIA AND SOMALIA

Painter, David S. *Cold War: An International History*, Routledge, 1999.

This article discusses the aid provided to Somalia by the Soviets beginning in the 1960s. The main objective of the aid was to strengthen the Soviets' presence in the Indian Ocean by using the port of Berbera. Somali forces invaded Ogaden in July 1977 after the U.S. pledged to supply defensive weapons in the quest for a 'Greater Somalia'. In November 1977, Soviets sent military equipment, advisors, and Cuban troops into Ethiopia. Ogaden, the desert region in Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis, remained a center of the separatist insurgency.

Khapoya, Vincent B. and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, *The Cold War and Regional Politics in East Africa*, 1985. <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/14668/15737>

Soviet-Somali relations emerged from Siad Barre's 1969 coup. By 1972, Soviet aid grew to \$50 million, a significant increase from \$35 million in 1963. The Soviets shifted their support to Ethiopia in 1974 when the emperor was overthrown. Somalia used the Ethiopian emperor's death as a chance to seize Ogaden, the southeastern province of Ethiopia. The U.S. was permitted access to the Soviet-built air and naval stations in Berbera by mid-1980.

SIAD BARRE

Castro, Alfonso Peter. “Cousins and gunmen.” *World and I* 9, no. 3 (March 1994): 268. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9407062371&site=ehost-live>

This article provides a look at the crisis in Somalia with particular focus on the dictatorship of Siad Barre and his experiments with socialism, “modernization” removal of the tribal/clan system and harsh repression of any opponents while simultaneously ensuring that his clan and its allies were in a position of power. It concludes with information on programs to rebuild the economy and agriculture as well as a need to disarm the various militias and tribal groups.

CIVIL WAR AND SECESSIONS

Bakonya, Jutta. “Moral Economies of Mass Violence: Somalia 1988-1991.” *Civil War* 11, no 4. (December 2009): 434-454. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240903403790>

This article covers that start and growth of the Somali war between 1988 and 1992. It then examines the expansion of the war to different regions and the mass-upheaval in Mogadishu 1990/91. The role of clan-affiliation and its impact on the spread of violence and their role in insurgent groups.

Balthasar, Dominik. “The Wars in the North and the Creation of Somaliland.” World Peace Foundation. October 28, 2013. <http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/28/the-wars-in-the-north-and-the-creation-of-somaliland/>

This report covers the Somali Civil War and the continuous conflicts throughout the 1980’s and into the 90’s culminating with the creation of Somaliland.

TNG AND TFG

Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 247-272. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876279>

This article examines the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TNG emerged from the May-Aug 2000 Somali National Peace Conference in Arta. Delegates adopted a provisional constitution and a Transitional National Assembly of 225 people. The TFG was declared in 2004 and Abdullahi Yusuf was elected as president in October 2004. His pro-Ethiopian and anti-Islamist stances sparked hardline Islamists to organize a support base. Al-Shabaab engaged in political assassinations targeting TFG collaborators and hostilities against the Western-backed government in Mogadishu began to rise. Due to the inability of both the TNG and TFG to extend its authority

throughout Somalia, warlords continued to control portions of territory throughout the country.

U.S. AND SOMALIA AND U.S. INTERVENTION

OVERVIEW AND POLICIES

Schraeder, Peter J. "U.S. intervention in the Horn of Africa amidst the end of the Cold War." *Africa Today* 40, no 2. (2nd Quarter 1993):7.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=9311080970&site=ehost-live>

This in-depth article provides a look at U.S. policies regarding Somalia during the Cold War and how they shifted from a hands-off, limited involvement into direct military intervention following a UN humanitarian initiative. The article moves on to further evaluate the decisions and results regarding U.S. intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the impact they might make on future U.S. involvement in the region.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

"Humanitarian mission to Somalia." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 3, no. 49: 855.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9301250310&site=ehost-live>

Address by President George Bush describing the need for an intervention in Somalia, the goals of the coalition forces and the limited mission duration.

Cooling, Norman L. "Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia: A Tactical Action Turned Strategic Defeat." *Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no. 9 (09, 2001): 92-106,

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/221430576?accountid=322>

This source begins by providing an overview of the critical events that led Somalia to the point where foreign intervention was needed. It then gives a thorough description of the events of the U.S. role in Mogadishu, the tactical plan, intelligence, the execution of the raid, command and control and lessons learned.

Dworken, Jonathan T. "Rules of engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope." *Military Review* 74, no. 9 (September 1994): 26.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9411220389&site=ehost-live>

This article examines concerns and issues regarding the Rules of Engagement utilized by U.S. forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope and the lessons learned from them. It also provides a brief overview of the situation that warranted the operation and the threats faced.

UNION OF ISLAMIC COURTS

OVERVIEW/PROFILE

“Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts.” *BBC News*, June 6, 2006.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm>

This brief profile gives an introduction into the 11 Islamic courts making up the Union of Islamic Courts/Islamic Courts Union. As of June 2006, relatively soon after the courts had come to power, the article describes the courts’ perception in Somalia, their role, and possible radical links.

Barnes, Cedric and Harun Hassan. “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.” *Journal of eastern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (July 2007): 151-160.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050701452382>

The history and the origins of the Islamic courts are provided in this article, tracing them from their origins in 1990 until their destruction in 2007. While the courts provided some form of law and order in Mogadishu, their harsh tactics and extremist leanings led to their downfall at the hands of an Ethiopian invasion.

UIC/ICU AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo. “The Union of Islamic Courts and Security Governance in Somalia.” *African Security Review* 19, no. 1 (March 2010): 88-84.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=53466404&site=ehost-live>

This article discusses the role that the Union of Islamic Courts played in provided public services and local security versus that of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG was designed to serve as a coalition government consisting of members from four of the largest Somali clans and a combination of representatives from a collection of smaller clans. The UIC originated in clan courts and was run by Islamic clerics. The Supreme Council which oversaw the courts persuaded different groups to assign members to form a combined militia force. This militia force was integral in defeated the rival warlords and led to the

growth of the courts and sharia law along with the growth and radicalization of the militia. While the courts sought to purvey some sense of order, their aggressive morality policing and harsh punishments caused the general populace to feel that their fundamental rights and freedoms were being violated and led to the UIC's undoing.

LOCAL SUPPORT OF THE COURTS

Samatar, Abdi Ismail. Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, US Warlordism, and AU Shame, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 34, No. 111, Debates on the left in Southern Africa (March 2007), pp. 155-165. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20406369>

This article examines the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)'s reaction to the UN Security Council's authorization of a peacekeeping force in Somalia. That author argues against the invasion and claims that the UIC provided a more stable and less corrupt system of government, and that Somalia did not need foreign intervention. The UIC's lightly armed militia and the chaotic internal organization in Somalia allowed for U.S.- and British-backed Ethiopian forces to overtake territories from insurgents in Mogadishu.

WARLORDS VS. UIC/ICU

Hirsch, Michael., and Jeffrey Bartholet. "Fighting in the Shadows." *Newsweek* 147, no. 23 (June 5, 2006): 36-38.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=20968787&site=ehost-live>

This article covers the fight for control of Mogadishu that took place between the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union, aka Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the secular Warlords who supposedly received U.S. support.

GOVERNANCE/FAILED STATE

LACK OF FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT

Menkhaus, Ken. "Governance without Government in Somalia." *International Security* 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 74-106.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=23814988&site=ehost-live>

This in-depth report examines the lack of a fully functioning government in Somalia since 1991 and the events influencing this including a war with Ethiopia, an already crumbling infrastructure, the reduction and removal of Cold-War era foreign aid and a multi-year civil war. Menkhaus covers the attempts to formulate a transitional federal government (TFG) and the role of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)/sharia courts and the Supreme Council of

Islamic Courts (SCIC) in undermining the TFG and seeking to insert their own brand of governance. The original sharia courts were controlled by a coalition of local interests and operated within Somali customs as opposed to superseding them.

Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups

AL-SHABAAB

GENERAL INFORMATION/OVERVIEW/BACKGROUNDER

“Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia. “ S/2013/413, United Nations Security Council. July 12, 2013.
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413

This report from the UNSC provides a very in-depth look at al-Shabaab, its tactics, goals, finances, leadership (as of 2013) and structure.

Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-shabaab>

This website provided a wide variety of information on al-Shabaab, including its tactics, lists of its attacks and leaders and lots of multimedia. The multimedia provides footage of propaganda, interviews, training camps, attacks, and news reports on their attacks. A timeline of al-Shabaab’s attacks is also provided.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

This book goes in-depth into the history of al-Shabaab, starting with its growth in the ICU and separation in 2007. This look at the group shows it as a hybrid organization that not only is an Islamic group but also a Somali nationalistic group by utilizing firsthand field research and interviews with al-Shabaab members.

Masters, Jonathan. “Backgrounder: Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 9, 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650>

This background report provides an initial overview of Al-Shabab including its origins and an interactive timeline regarding the group's development. Also included are sections on Al-Shabab's leadership, tactics, motivation, and relationship with core Al Qaeda.

Also see the timeline of al-Shabaab's growth and development, starting with the founding of the ICU and including CT programs against it and ending with the Westgate attack.

<http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468>

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Harnisch, Christopher. "The Terror Threat From Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab."

Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute. February 12, 2010.

http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf

This report from the American Enterprise Institute provides an in-depth look into the origins and aspects of al-Shabaab up to 2010. Topics covered include the group's origins, how it gained control, connections to al-Qaeda, international recruiting, threat level, and a timeline of attacks and assassinations conducted by or claimed by Al-Shabaab. Early on in the document a list of ranking individuals associated with al-Shabaab and its affiliates is presented followed by a series of maps.

OPERATIONS/TACTICS

The National Counterterrorism Center. "Al-Shabaab." National Counterterrorism Center 2014

Calendar. (n.d.). http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html

This page provides a concise overview of al Shabaab's history, area of operations and associated attacks. The site also provides a map of Al-Shabaab's locations and links to U.S. State Department Fact Sheets.

Also see CNN and the BBC's Q&As on the group:

<http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-explainer/index.html>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689>

Crawford, Alex. "'White Widow' Lethwaite 'Key' in Al Shabaab." *Sky News*, October 11, 2013.

<http://news.sky.com/story/1152971/white-widow-lewthwaite-key-in-al-shabaab>

This article summarizes the contents of a 35-page Kenyan intelligence report on Al Shabaab. It describes the report as giving a detailed description of how Al Shabaab operates throughout Africa along with how it recruits and utilizes cells in different countries across the continent. The article also notes Kenyan intelligence's identification of the British "white widow" Samantha Lethwaite and her involvement with an Al-Shabaab terror cell. This cell is co-ordinated by Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir.

Bergen, Peter. "How Al-Shabaab Picks Its Targets." *CNN*, September 23, 2013.
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/opinion/al-shabaab-aims/index.html>

Frames Shabaab's September 2013 attack of an upscale mall in Nairobi as consistent with the group's anti-Western agenda, hostility toward Kenya, and desire to remain relevant. For more on the significance of the Nairobi attack, see this NYT article, which underscores Shabaab's fractured organizational structure and weakened operational capabilities inside Somalia:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/world/africa/kenya-mall-carnage-shows-shabab-resilience.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>

ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT

Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo. "State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia." *Politics, Religion, & Ideology* 13, no. 4 (December 2012): 513-527.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=83933546&site=ehost-live>

This article explores the relationship between the collapse of local government, and the following void allowing for the growth and entrenchment of Al-Shabaab. During this period Al-Shabaab has sought to delegitimize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and legitimize their organization. Al-Shabaab utilized Somali nationalism, Islamism as politics, propaganda, and social services in order to make themselves appear as a viable alternative to the TFG. There is a thorough analysis of "Salafi" Islamism and how it is utilized by groups to legitimize their actions. The development and role of Al-Shabaab's precursors such as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Al-Ittihaad Al-Islamiah (AIAI) are examined and discussed as well, especially Al-Shabaab's role as a militaristic youth group in the UIC.

LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS

KAMPALA

Pippard, Tim. "Al-Shabab's Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks." *CTC Sentinel*. July 3, 2010. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-shabab%E2%80%99s-agenda-in-the-wake-of-the-kampala-suicide-attacks>

Al-Shabaab conducted a multi-pronged attack in the Ugandan capital of Kampala in an effort to prove its worth to al-Qaeda and expands its presence to the greater Horn of Africa, outside of its normal operating areas. These outside attacks are seen as a movement of the group to advance itself from a local, nationalistic group to a global force focused on jihad.

ATTACKS ON UN COMPOUND IN JUNE 2013 IN MOGADISHU

Yusuf, Mohammed. "Al-Shabab Gunmen Attack UN Compound in Mogadishu." *VOA*, June 19, 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/content/alshabab-gunmen-attack-un-compound-in-mogadishu/1684664.html>

An attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu that killed at least 15 people was led off by a suicide attack and then followed by a direct assault by al-Shabaab. Following the attack, fire was exchanged for several hours between al-Shabaab and U.N. security forces. A few months prior, al-Shabaab had killed 30 people in an attack on the Supreme Court complex in Mogadishu.

WESTGATE MALL

Howden, Daniel. "Terror in Westgate Mall: The Full Story of the Attacks That Devastated Kenya," *The Guardian*. October 4, 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-terror>

This article presents a succinct overview of the 80-hour siege by al-Shabaab militants at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Interviews with survivors, their relatives, and members of the Kenyan security forces detail infighting and incompetence among the authorities. A clash of egos among Kenyan authorities impaired a swift response to neutralize the insurgents, highlighting the need for security sector reform and improving the mobilization of assets within the Kenyan security forces.

FEBRUARY 2014 ATTACK ON PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

Nor, Omar and Laura Smith-Spark. "Al-Shabaab militants attack Somali presidential palace in Mogadishu." *CNN*, February 21, 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/africa/somalia-attack/>

Following similar tactics, al-Shabaab used an explosion to breach the gate and exchanged fire with security forces. Somalia's security minister, Adbikarin Hussein Guled stated that at least 12 people were killed in the attack but out of this number, seven were al-Shabaab members.

MAY 14 ATTACK ON A RESTAURANT IN DJIBOUTI

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Henry Appel. "Al-Shabaab Strikes in Djibouti." *War on the Rocks*. June 3, 2014.

On May 24, 2014 a man and a woman detonated explosives they had hidden under their clothes at a restaurant in Djibouti popular with NATO members and other peacekeeping forces. One person was killed and 11 were wounded. This was the first suicide bombing in the history of Djibouti. The article describes when Djibouti is significant militarily in the fight against al-Shabaab and shows the growth in al-Shabaab attacks outside of Somalia in 2014.

JUNE 2014 ATTACK AND SIEGE IN MPEKETONI KENYA

"Kenya attack: Mpeketoni near Lamu hit by al-Shabab raid." *BBC*, June 16, 2014.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27862510>

Members of al-Shabaab attacked Mpeketoni in force. At least 48 people were killed during the attacks in which al-Shabaab throw bombs into buildings and restaurants and systematically executed Christians and Kenyans. Many people were out in town watching the world cup games.

GARISSA UNIVERSITY

Hatcher, Jessica and Kevin Sieff. "Al-Shabab attacks Kenyan university, killing at least 147."

Washington Post, April 2, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/70-killed-hundreds-rescued-after-kenya-university-attack-by-al-shabab-militants/2015/04/02/0c554516-d951-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html

The attack on Garissa University in Kenya conducted by al-Shabaab in April of 2015 resulted in the deaths of over 140 students. Reports indicate that at least 79 students were injured during the attack. Gunmen, four in total, stormed the dormitories in the early morning and all four were killed after a 15 hour long siege by security forces. There had been initial threats made in the past by al-Shabaab that they were going to attack the university and students had been evacuated in the past due to the potential threat.

Sheikh, Abdi., and Feisal Omar. "Al Shabaab militants attack Somali army base, say dozens dead." *Reuters*, January 15, 2016.

<http://in.reuters.com/article/somalia-attacks-idINKCN0UT0EY>

Al-Shabaab attacked a Somali army base, housing African Union (AMISOM) peacekeeping forces, in the town of Ceel Cadde near the border with Kenya. The base was overrun and AMISOM forces are counterattacking while in turn, Al-Shabaab claims to have killed 60 AMISOM soldiers. With the loss of the base, also came the loss of almost 30 trucks and armored vehicles.

SOCIAL MEDIA/ONLINE PRESENCE / PROPAGANDA

“Al-Shabab showed gruesome social media savvy during attack.” *CBS/AP*, September 24, 2013.
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-shabab-showed-gruesome-social-media-savvy-during-attack/>

This article describes the group’s use of Twitter during its attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. It reports that Shabaab militants sent out numerous tweets taunting the Kenyan military, praising the attack and threatening more violence. It notes that the group repeatedly started a new feed each time the social media company shut down its account and tailored its messages to specific audiences. Tweets were sent out in both Somali and English. These actions are seen to be consistent with the group’s “aggressively public” posture.

Also see this *Long War Journal* article outlining the differences between authentic and inauthentic Shabaab tweets http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/09/are_you_looking_at_an_official.php

INTERNAL DIVISIONS/SETBACKS

Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. and Hussain Solomon. “Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab’s Losses in Somalia.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. September 26, 2012.
<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/factors-responsible-for-al-shababs-losses-in-somalia>

This article examines what the author sees as the three primary factors behind al-Shabab’s setbacks. These factors are the successful model provided by AMISOM, clan rivalries within al-Shabab and al-Shabab’s mishandling of the regional drought in 2011. It also identifies the challenges facing the Somali government as it begins to strengthen its position against al-Shabab.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. "An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab's Internal Divisions." *CTC Sentinel*. February 24, 2014. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/an-in-depth-look-at-al-shababs-internal-divisions>

This article evaluates the results and implications of the infighting among Al-Shabab members. It also reviews the role Al-Shabaab plays in the local economy and its impact on and utilization of Tribal politics and rivalries.

Rosen, Armin. "How Africa's Most Threatening Terrorist Group Lost Control of Somalia." *The Atlantic*, September 21, 2012. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/how-africas-most-threatening-terrorist-group-lost-control-of-somalia/262655/>

Brief piece outlining factors behind Shabaab's 2011-2012 decline, including "famine, unprecedented African military cooperation, and [the group's] own medieval rule."

"Somalia's al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out." The George Washington University: Homeland Security Policy Institute, HSPI Issue Brief 22, August 27, 2013. http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrief217_222_AfricaSecuritySeries.cfm

Argues that internal divisions, alienation of the local population, and sustained CT efforts by domestic and international forces have significantly weakened the group, but that it remains a significant threat to Somali security. Provides information on the group's rise and its relationship with various Somali clans, as well as its governance structures (including the organization's internal power struggles), messaging strategies, and links with outside groups. (check to see if duplicated)

LEADERS/HIGH PROFILE MEMBERS

AHMED GODANE (MUKHTAR ABU ZUBAIR) (KILLED 2014)

Anzalone, Christopher. "The Life and Death of Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane." *CTC Sentinel*. September 29, 2014. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-life-and-death-of-al-shabab-leader-ahmed-godane>.

This article provides a background on Ahmed Godane, Al-Shabab's leader until his death in September of 2014. Godane studied in Sudan and Pakistan and was believed to have been turned to militant Islam during his time in Pakistan. Godane's involvement in the Islamic

Courts Union and rise to leadership saw the expansion of al-Shabab's territorial control. In conclusion, the article speculates whether al-Shabab will dissolve due to the lack of Godane's leadership

AHMED UMAR (ABU UBAlDAH)

West, Sunguta. "Al-Shabaab to Face Different Direction after Appointment of New Leader."

Terrorism Monitor. 12, no. 21 (2014): The Jamestown Foundation.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43060&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=52620b3e9602e94d93816058fb04a416#.VH4b9DHF98E

This article describes al-Shabaab's new leader, Shaykh Ahmad Umar (a.k.a Abu Ubaidah) and speculates what his impact on the group will be. The policies of the previous leader, Godane, are reviewed and the attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab are included. The article concludes by stating that Umar has not indicated a new direction for al-Shabaab yet, but he will have to manage the clan politics within the group in order to continue operations.

MOHAMED ABDIKADIR MOHAMED (IKRIMA)

Cruickshank, Paul and Tim Lister. "U.S. target in Somalia: An inside story on an Al-Shabaab commander." *CNN*, October 7, 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-commander/>

This article provides a background on Mohamed Abdikadir Mohamed (Ikrima) and his alleged involvement in different operations including recruiting in Kenya and allegedly in Europe.

ADDITIONAL PROFILES

Al Shabaab leadership Profiles. Critical Threats. American Enterprise Institute.

<http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/al-shabaab-leadership>

A collection of profiles on several key figures in al-Shabaab leadership.

West, Sunguta. "Al-Shabaab Leader's Fires Audio Message Suggests Morale is Low Among Somali Militants." *Terrorism Monitor* 14, no. 16 (August 5, 2016). Jamestown Foundation.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45713&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=229f889655d8b23785f1bef0b5620cc3

Al-Shabaab leader, Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, had re-emerged after almost two years of silence to a message of inspiration to his forces which have been facing defeats at the hands of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A unique aspect of this message was the specific labeling of Turkey as an enemy of al-Shabaab and Somalia. While claiming Turkey has invaded Somalia, it has been involved in reconstruction work and aiding displaced persons. In response to its setbacks, al-Shabaab has shifted its tactics to include VBIED attacks which has allowed for some successful attacks against AMISOM bases.

PUSHBACK AND RESURGENCE

Meservey, Joshua. "Al Shabab's Resurgence: Why its Campaign of Terror will Likely Accelerate." *Foreign Affairs*. January 3, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2017-01-03/al-shabab-s-resurgence>

Al-Shabaab has mainly relegated itself to the southern regions of Somalia and launching strikes into Kenya as well. After coordinated CVE efforts against them and a minor schism over AQAP vs. ISIS allegiance, the group had undergone a temporary setback. In the summer of 2016 Al-Shabaab launched a new series of attacks targeting military and government officials. The goals of these attacks were to disrupt the elections for parliamentary positions and the president and to find a new haven in the north. A disrupted election process keeps the country in chaos and allows Al-Shabaab to claim the legal government if illegitimate. The push into the north serves the dual-purpose of providing an escape route for Al-Shabaab as they face more defeats in the south and establishing a stronghold to launch attacks against the schism Al-Shabaab group that pledged to ISIS. Another concerning factor of the push north is the renewed attempts at making a stronger connection with AQAP in Yemen. A direct line to AQAP could give Al-Shabaab the resources it needs to re-solidify its presence in the south.

Al-Shabaab in Neighboring Countries

KENYA

AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT FACTORS

Botha, Anneli. "Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization Among Individuals who Joined al-Shabaab in Kenya. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 11 (2014): 895-919. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.952511>

The increasing presence of al-Shabaab in Kenya has led to enhanced CT efforts and growing local concern. Following two separate attacks in 2014 Kenyan authorities rounded up several thousand "Somali looking" individuals in an attempt to identify any members of or persons

sympathetic to al-Shabaab. This article evaluates the impact of that particular tactic and several other factors and the roles they could play in increased radicalization. The role of peers/friends is seen to have played a significant role in the growth of al-Shabaab in Kenya based on a survey conducted there. The results show that 71% joined with their friends and 54% of existing members worked to recruit their friends with only 6% joining with their family and 23% joined of their own accord. In addition, the results show that introduction to al-Shabaab was mainly through friends, 38% however, 34% stated that they were introduced to the group by a religious figure. The factor of the local economy or the lack thereof is a frequent area of CT research, however, according to the figures in Anneli's report, 87% of Kenyans who joined al-Shabaab cited religion as their reason for joining while only 4% cited economic reasons.

West, Sunguta. "Al-Shabaab Recruitment from Kenyan Universities Alarms Officials." *Terrorism Monitor* 14, no. 1 (January 7, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44951&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=dacdb46fa2777f715aae13d3e578a0b3

Al-Shabaab's recruiting tactics have changed as its position has changed due to increased success of the AMISOM mission against them. Al-Shabaab initially focused on poor areas and recruited youth with few options by offering them money and a form of employment. The same concept is being applied but to a different group who are also in need of those two incentives, students. College students and recent graduates (mainly in Kenya) have served as susceptible targets for recruitment since they are offered a salary and upkeep costs for their family. Al-Shabaab has expressed interest in developing chemical weapons and this may be an aspect of their luring in students with engineering and chemistry backgrounds.

CVE/POLICE TACTICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON RECRUITMENT

Iaccino, Ludovica. "Al-Shabaab's Ranks Swelling Thanks to Kenyan Police Brutality Towards Somali Migrants." *International Business Times*, June 5, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/al-shabaads-ranks-swelling-thanks-kenyan-police-brutality-towards-somali-migrants-1504064>

There is concern that harsh measures utilized by Kenyan police as part of counterterrorism tactics are resulting in more Somali youth becoming radicalized and joining al-Shabaab. Somali immigrants in Kenya report having been targeted by Kenyan forces and claim regular human rights abuses. Officials in Garissa spoke out against photos taken of police officers beating Somalis and stated that those involved will face disciplinary action upon confirmation of the incident.

“Kenyan Forces Accused of Smuggling Racket in Somalia.” VOA, November 12, 2015.
<http://www.voanews.com/content/kenya-forces-deny-smuggling-racket-somalia/3054543.html>

Kenyan Defense Forces are claimed by regional group, Journalists for Justice, to be involved in a smuggling operation involving the illicit sale and transportation of charcoal and sugar. A similar operation was carried out by al-Shabaab and all imports of both sugar and charcoal were banned from Somalia in an attempt to stem this and crack down on smuggling. Kenyan Defense Forces have a base in the port of Kismayu and reportedly have been using this base as a staging area for smuggling potentially making up to \$50 million a year and the untracked funds could go to financing the very group they are fighting.

TANZANIA

Bariyo, Nicholas. “Tanzania Raid Nets 11 With Al-Shabaab Links.” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 2013.
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304500404579125542093731738>

Describes an Oct. 2013 counter-terrorism raid in Tanzania’s southern Mtwara region. Reports that local security forces arrested 11 men, suspected Uamsho militants carrying Shabaab training manuals and assault rifles, who Tanzanian authorities say were planning an attack on Chinese construction workers in the area. Notes that some Tanzanians doubt their government’s attempt to link Uamsho (a separatist movement comprised of Tanzanian Muslims) and Shabaab, and argue instead that local security forces are on edge and quick to make arrests because of popular opposition to the Chinese-funded natural gas pipeline under construction in the country

Foreign Fighters

OVERVIEW/COMMON ORIGINS OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Vidino, Lorenzo, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann. “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” *African Security* 3, no. 4 (October 2010): 216-238.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=55474511&site=ehost-live>

This report looks at how al-Shabaab used the conflict in Somalia to present their ideals and goals as a form of religious obligation or sacred activity in order to garner additional support and financing. The history leading up to and the forming of al-Shabaab is briefly covered along with its ideology and then a section on the origins of foreign fighters. The United States, Canada, Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden are all mentioned with regards to the numbers and actions of recent immigrants and citizens who joined or tried to join al-Shabaab. The report concludes with examining whether the motives of foreign fighters were religious or nationalistic.

“Briton Thomas Evans Among al-Shabab Fighters Killed in Kenya.” *BBC*, June 15, 2015.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-33133896>

British born Thomas Evans, converted to Islam and changed his name to Abdul Hakim. He initially tried to travel to Kenya and was turned back by airport police but he then traveled to Egypt and was able to make his way to Somalia and joined al-Shabaab. Evans was killed in an attack on a Kenyan military base. There are believed to be at least 50 British citizens fighting for al-Shabaab.

Dickey, Christopher. “Nairobi Mall Attack: Al Shabaab’s Scandinavian Connection.” *Newsweek*, October 19, 2013. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/19/nairobi-mall-attack-al-shabaab-s-scandinavian-connection.html>

Reports that a Norwegian citizen, 23-year-old Hassan Abdi Dhuhulow, may have been among the militants responsible for the Sept. 2013 Westgate attack. Mentions other Islamist militants with ties to Scandinavia. Frames Dhuhulow as “typical of what counter-terrorism analysts call ‘generation 1.5’ immigrants—born abroad, but raised from early childhood in their new countries. As teenagers, many are unsure of their identities, their allegiances and their futures, and thus become easy prey for recruiters from Al-Shabaab or other radical organizations who claim to give them a purpose in life, even if that is only an early death as a suicide bomber.” Also see this brief report on the BBC’s list of 47 Britons with links to Shabaab and similar organizations: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24639648>

PURGE OF FOREIGN RECRUITS

Pantucci, Raffaello, and A.R. Sayyid. “Foreign Fighters in Somalia and al-Shabaab’s Internal Purge.” *Terrorism Monitor*, December 03, 2014.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=94400048&site=ehost-live>

(update this description) The article reports on the released of a video entitle "It's an eye for an eye: The Woolwich attacks." The video features 10 British jihadis who had died fighting alongside al-Shabaab organization and one Somali-Norwegian carrying out the massacre at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. It confirms the role of foreign firefighters inside the East African terrorist network.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. "Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11." Santa, Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf

(give a brief description) See pages 12-14 for discussion of al-Shabab's recruitment of Somali-Americans. Also see these pieces on the 2013 killing of Omar Hammami – "the Alabama-born 'jihadist rapper'" – by his fellow Shabaab members:
<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/omar-hammami-terrorist-suspect-killed-in-somalia> and
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/shabaab_kills_america.php

AL-HIJRA

Nzes, Fredrick. "Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab's Affiliate in Kenya." *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 5 (2014): 24.
<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-hijra-al-shababs-affiliate-in-kenya>

This article describes the formation of Al-Hijra in Kenya. This group started as counseling and community center in the form of the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) and over time formatted ties with Al-Shabab. According to the article, Al-Hijra has served as a fund raising and recruiting center for Al-Shabab, targeting Kenyan youths. The organization officially changed its name from the MYC to Al-Hijra in 2012.

Finances/Smuggling/Criminal Activity

SUGAR

Boniface, Bosire. "Sugar Imports from Somalia Fund al-Shabaab, Kenyan Officials Say." *Sabahi*, April 24, 2013.
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/24/feature-01

This report discusses how al-Shabaab militants have compensated for their September 2012 loss of Kismayo by posing as traders and selling Somali-produced sugar to Kenyan merchants. It is noted that much of the \$1.2 billion/year trade is not declared to Kenyan customs officials and is used by Shabaab to smuggle weapons as well as raise revenue.

CHARCOAL

Anderson, Jessica L. "Forget Ivory, Africa's al-Shabaab Terrorists Are Getting Rich on Coal in Somalia." Defense One. June 8, 2015. <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/06/forget-ivory-africas-al-shabaab-terrorists-are-getting-rich-coal-somalia/114673/?oref=d-river>

The threat of poaching and smuggling is a serious concern in East Africa and there are reported ties to ivory smuggling and al-Shabaab financing. These reports have been brought into question due to a lack of concrete evidence, however, charcoal have served as a significant source of al-Shabaab financing for years. Sales of charcoal to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and other areas have resulted in \$38-\$56 million in revenue annually. Additional funds come from smuggling sugar and extorting taxes and fees from businesses.

"The Charcoal Conundrum: Ending the Somali Illegal Charcoal Trade." The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. <http://www.globalinitiative.net/somalia-charcoal/>

Based on reports from the UN Security Council (UNSC), more than 40% of al-Shabaab's funding comes from illegal charcoal sales. The charcoal is shipped from Somali ports through vessels that are registered to other States leading to the belief that this is a larger transnational issue. There is also an environmental concern due to the resulting deforestation and desertification which hurts Somalia's main export of livestock. The UNSC placed sanctions on the importation of illegal Somali charcoal however these sanctions are regularly avoided. The article ends by offering advice on how to stop the illegal charcoal trade.

Manson, Katrina. "UN Pushes Gulf to Cut Off al-Shabaab Economic Lifeline in Somalia." *Financial Times*, September 13, 2013. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09fd06f4-1c61-11e3-a8a3-00144feab7de.html#axzz2fiQ7wbM4>

The article describes UN efforts to pressure Gulf importers of Somali charcoal to stop doing business with Shabaab, reported to have earned more than \$25 million from the charcoal trade in 2011 alone. (Subscription required)

DIASPORA FUNDING AND INTERNAL INCOME SOURCES

Vilkko, Valter. "Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extrication." Research Paper. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. March 2011.
http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/57537_MFS_paper_Vilkko.pdf

This report utilizes information taken from interview conducted with members of the Somali diaspora who are residing in Nairobi, Kenya. Nairobi has become a major hub of Somali trade and economic activity. The three areas of financial support that al-Shabaab receives from external factors are diaspora remittances, donations from international jihadist groups and monetary support from the state of Eritrea. The report's main focus is on funding through diaspora support. Financial support comes from Somalis living in the U.S., Europe, other parts of Africa and the Middle East. As of 2008, outside donations seem to be down due to the end of the Ethiopian occupation. The most common way of providing financial support is through hawala money transfer companies. Cash carriers are still used but to a lesser extent. Some businesses are believed to serve as direct funding sources for al-Shabaab. The Eastleigh district of Nairobi is seen as a "little-Somalia" in Kenya and statements from those interviewed for the report claim that it is known to the locals which businesses provide funds to al-Shabaab, they just do not have fully concrete evidence and it would be dangerous to look for it. A group of representatives from the Eastleigh district strongly denounce these claims and al-Shabaab. Internal sources of financing for al-Shabaab come from taxation of homes and businesses and forcing businesses and aid groups to pay protection money, along with the Islamic charity tax called, *zakat*. The trade port of Kismayo serves as a major source of income for al-Shabaab due to their shipping of illegal charcoal and sugar. Piracy also serves as a source of income, not directly being conducted by al-Shabaab but by forcing pirates to provide them with a cut of their profits.

Mezzofiore, Gianluca. "Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees to Fund Somalia's al-Shabaab Islamist Fighters." *International Business Times*, July 29, 2013.
<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/495268/20130729/eritrea-shabaab-somalia-diaspora-tax-horn-islam.htm>

This article reports that Eritrean citizens and refugees living in the UK are being forced to pay what is being called a diaspora tax by the Eritrean government. The money being taken from this 2% income tax is reportedly being used to fund militant groups including al-Shabaab. Many Eritreans in the UK do what they can to avoid paying this tax however tactics such as voiding travel documents or threatening relatives still in Eritrea are used by the Eritrean government to ensure payment.

IMPACT AND ROLE OF DRUGS IN FUNDING AND RECRUITMENT FOR AL-SHABAAB

Kan, Paul Rexton. *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare*. Dullas, VA: Potomac Books, Inc. 2009.

This book covers the production, sale, use and impact of various drugs on different conflicts around the world. Many irregular conflicts often tend to be fueled by both the drug trade and drug use. Revenues from drug sales are used to pay for continuing the conflict and the drugs themselves are often taken before fighting or given afterwards as rewards. In addition, they are used as a recruiting tool, either by offering criminals and addicts access to them or by drugging civilians and children and impressing them into service. The role of the drug trade and the use of drugs in Somalia is discussed and examined in this book along with several other countries.

POACHING/WILDLIFE SMUGGLING

Stewart, Catrina. "Illegal Ivory Trade Funds al-Shabaab's Terrorist Attacks." *The Independent*, October 6, 2013. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/illegal-ivory-trade-funds-alshabaabs-terrorist-attacks-8861315.html>

This journal article describes the group's involvement in ivory smuggling in east Africa. It identifies common smuggling routes and ports. The broader link between poaching and terror networks, as well as the challenges counterterrorism and law enforcement official's face when confronting the issue, including corruption and lack of manpower are described.\

Piracy

FUNDS FROM PIRACY/REPORTS ON RANSOMS

World Bank. "Pirate Trails" Tracks Dirty Money Resulting From Piracy Off the Horn of Africa": World Bank.. November 1, 2013. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/11/01/pirate-trails-tracks-dirty-money-resulting-from-piracy-off-the-horn-of-africa>

This press release states that between \$339 million and \$413 million was taken in ransom from the hijacking of ships off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa between 2005 and 2012,

according to [a report released by the World Bank](#). This study was carried out by the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and INTERPOL and reveals that much of the ransom money was used to fuel a wide range of criminal activities on a global scale.

Karimi, Faith. “African pirates us millions of dollars in ransom on drugs, real estate, prostitutes.” *CNN World*, November 2, 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/02/world/africa/horn-of-africa-piracy-loot/>

This article by CNN shows the amount of money typically earned by different levels of pirate organizations based off of ransom money taken and their spending habits. The lower level members earn between \$30,000 and \$70,000 per vessel. The article states that the “kingpins” earn the most money and often utilize it to finance future piracy operations, human trafficking and militias.

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS

“Last Hijack Trailer.” YouTube Video, 1:30. Posted by “Submarine Trailer” February 6, 2014. <https://youtu.be/TaeC2NfUM7w>

A documentary movie made with a combination of interviews, animation and story telling that recounts the life of a Somali pirate. This movie also covers aspects of the history of Somalia including the different tribal wars between the various clans and basic survival. The main character, Mohamed recounts how he became involved in piracy and the aspects of that life along with the increasing difficulties he faces due to enhance security and anti-piracy efforts.

See also, this additional clip from the movie. <https://youtu.be/Va5hfin3Bvw>

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF PIRACY

“Somalia’s Incredible Pirate Free-for-All.” YouTube Video, 19:07. Posted by “Journeyman Pictures” July, 2011. <https://youtu.be/oWRZfixUJik>

This brief documentary provides a look at some of the root causes of piracy in Somalia, the views of the pirates themselves, and the evaluation of current counter-piracy methods by outside countries. The reporter interviews pirates, security officials, and local fishermen. One of the highlighted problems is that the illegal overfishing of the area by various other countries had led to a lack of resources and some desperate fishermen turned to piracy as a result. The security forces interview state that the piracy problem needs to be dealt with from the coast and not from

the sea and that they require aid in order to operate their own program as opposed to relying on foreign navies to interdict pirates. The pirates that were interviewed describe the methods used to capture ships and the extent of the ransoms they have received.

Murphy, Martin N. *Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

This book details the start of more overt and aggressive piracy off of Somalia when the targets shifted from local and foreign fishing vessels to larger commercial vessels, both local and international.

Refugees

Fleming, Melissa and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Yemen Arrivals Increase as Horn of Africa Mixed Migration Hits All-Time Highs." August 28, 2014. *UNHCR*.

<http://www.unhcr.org/503ca18c9.html>

This summary of UNHCR spokesperson, Melissa Fleming, remarks on the increased flow of refugees from the HOA to Yemen. Residents of Somalia who flee to other countries are being automatically classified as refugees due to the conflict in the area. During the first seven months of 2012 there was a 30% increase in refugees from HOA to Yemen and in 2011 over 100,000 people made the crossing. These trips can be dangerous due to the reliance on illegal boat crossings and smugglers.

In regards to recent dangers faced and the treatment of the refugees during the crossings see the UNHCR article:

UNHCR. "2014 becomes the deadliest year at sea off Yemen." UNHCR. October 17, 2014. <http://www.unhcr.org/544103b06.html>

Part II: Regional and Western Efforts to Counter al-Shabaab

HOA Counterterrorism/Law Enforcement

HOA GOVERNMENT POLICIES/PROGRAM

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). <http://amisom-au.org/>

The official website of the coalition of African nations engaged in peacekeeping and CI/CT in Somalia. Their website provides information about the mission, press releases and other documents.

Horn of Africa. Civil Military Fusion Center.

https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Horn_of_Africa.aspx

CIMIC's archives of materials on Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Works cover development, security, and governance issues.

International Crisis Group. "The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia." International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 184. February 15, 2012.

<http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia>

This report analyzes Kenya's October 2011 troop deployment in Somalia. It identifies reasons for the intervention, including enhancing its border security, stopping the influence of Al-Shabaab and to ease the flow of refugees. There are some concerns that the deployment could result in the revisiting of old arguments and create new issues and possibly lead to radicalization of Kenyan Somalis.

Also see the related ICG report, *Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization*:

<http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation>

EVALUATION OF CT EFFORTS

Roble, Muhyadin Ahmed. “Al-Shabaab: On the Back Foot but Still Dangerous.” *Terrorism Monitor* 13, no. 2 (2015): The Jamestown Foundation

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43441&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=56e57cc675de12b04908ef7a07a35e7f#.VMpwLv54rYg

This article examines the impact of the Somali government and its allies capturing four major towns from Al-Shabaab. Kenyan forces and a coalition of troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, and Ethiopia also re-captured several towns and villages. A second offensive targeted the financial aspects of Al-Shabaab by retaking several coastal towns, including the port of Barawe, that were being utilized in the group’s multi-million dollar charcoal trade. Despite facing setbacks in conventional fighting and in their finances, Al-Shabaab continued to launch targeted attacks at government buildings and at civilians and infrastructure. The article concludes that Al-Shabaab shows signs of adapting to its more limited presence but shifting its tactics and finding new ways to raise funds.

Reuters. “Coastal killings in Kenya pose insurgency risk for Kenyatta.” *Defence Web*, July 11, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35448&catid=74&Itemid=30

The article reviews the security threats in Kenya and evaluates the government’s response to these issues. Security concerns include the threat of militant groups including attacks by al-Shabab and the discontent of coastal citizens in regards to their treatment and land rights. There is concern that a separatist movement may develop in the coastal area.

West, Sunguta. “Kenya Unveils New Strategy for Tackling Terror.” *Terrorism Monitor* 14, no. 19. (September 30, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/kenya-unveils-new-strategy-tackling-terror/>

Kenya’s recently announced National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NCVE) was designed with the goal of utilizing a collective of government, private sector, civil society and other areas to fully support CVE initiatives. A focus on counter radicalization will be featured by the NCVE as opposed to former tactics that were often seen as controversial. The

augmentation of the military response to al-Shabaab and other threats with counter radicalization/anti-recruitment efforts are aimed to prevent target sections of the population from joining these groups.

ANTI-PIRACY

OVERVIEW OF THREAT AND RESPONSE

Alessi, Christopher and Stephanie Hanson. "Combating Maritime Piracy." Council on Foreign Relations. March 23, 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376>

This article evaluates the threat of modern piracy and contains a section regarding the impact of Somali piracy and the measures the international community has taken in order to counter the problem.

UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION

United Nations. "Solving Somali piracy required effective state governance-UN." *Defence Web*. October 31, 2014.

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36818:solving-somali-piracy-requires-effective-state-governance--un&catid=108:maritime-security&Itemid=233

This news article on the decline of incidents regarding Somali piracy states that a recent decline in attacks is due to cooperation amongst the UN Member States and the maritime industry. It is reminded that this is not a permanent solution and the attacks could return if the current policies and programs, with a focus on the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy, are not attended to constantly. Ultimately, it is concluded that if more countries and states act against piracy and more local growth and development is encouraged in areas impacted by piracy, continued progress can be seen.

"European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) Somalia: Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia." EU NAVFOR. <http://eunavfor.eu/>

This is the website of the European Union Naval Force Somalia. The site provides information about the mission, facts and figures and latest news regarding the programs and operations of the EU NAVFOR Somalia.

U.S. RESPONSE TO GROWTH OF PIRACY

Shapiro, Andrew J. "Piracy Off the Horn of Africa" Remarks to the Center for American Progress, Washington DC, March 27, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/186987.htm>

Andrew J. Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, spoke at the Center for American Progress in 2012 regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa. He spoke on the evolution of piracy into an organized operation, and U.S. response to Somali piracy covering both diplomatic engagement and expanding security. Mr. Shapiro also explains the added security measures that the private sector and shipping companies can take to help deter piracy.

RESPONSE AND ANALYSIS

Reno, William. "Rethinking Counterinsurgency in Somalia." *CTC Sentinel*, April 29, 2013. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/rethinking-counterinsurgency-in-somalia>,

This article covers the difficulties faced in organizing an effective counterinsurgency program between government and local militia forces. The author discusses shifting policies of the local government and how it can at times have connections to the militant groups it is fighting. Local militias also face cohesion difficulties due to politics and individual clan loyalties. Recommendations are made for managing different forces in a counterinsurgency program.

Strategic Aspects and U.S. Policy

IRREGULAR SECURITY THREATS/OVERVIEW

Le Sage, Andre. "Africa's irregular security threats: Challenges for US engagement." *INSS CSR Strategic Forum*, no. 255 (2010): 1-25. Institute for National Strategic Studies. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=116242>

This paper provides an overview of Africa's irregular threats along with an analysis of their strategic impact on regional stability. Issues include, arms smuggling, terrorist and militant groups, drug trafficking, piracy, poaching, kidnapping and human trafficking, and several

environmental threats. The national security interests of the U.S. in the continent are discussed along with recommendations for enabling local government to address these security challenges.

U.S. POLICIES AND REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) www.hoa.africom.mil

The website of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa provides information about their mission, programs and work with local HOA partner-nations' military forces.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) www.africom.mil/newsroom/documents

The website of the United States Africa Command provides information on their mission, partnership programs, operations and security cooperation. It also provides fact sheets and case studies along with transcripts of press briefings.

Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 4 (2013): 32-43, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>

This article argues that drone strikes are still a necessary part of counterterrorism operations. It also makes the case that, as unmanned capabilities proliferate among global actors, the U.S. government needs to identify a set policy in regards to drone usage on terrorist and terrorist targets and adhere to it.

COUNTERTERRORISM/COUNTERINSURGENCY

OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES

Turbville, Graham, Josh Meserve and James Forest. "Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for U.S. Special Operations Forces." JSOU Report 14-1, Joint Special Operations University. February 2014.
http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/al_Shabaab_Feb_2014%20PDF.pdf

This report provides brief overview of the history of Somalia and the formation of al-Shabaab and then proceeds to describe the funding and recruitment methods followed by the diminishment and evolution of al-Shabaab. The majority of the report covers the different

challenges facing counterinsurgency in Somalia, the impact of current CI/CT efforts, and lessons based off of this research for U.S. Special Forces that could be utilized in that area. The ample selection of endnotes provides additional research areas.

Healy, Sally and Ginny Hill. "Yemen and Somalia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks, and the Limitations of State-building." Chatham House, October 2010.

<http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109494>

This paper compares the counterterrorism challenges presented by non-state actors in Yemen and Somalia. Both of these countries are marked by economic hardship, locally perceived ineffective governments, and the presence of illicit trade networks. U.S. intervention and actions can be deemed as attacks and threats by citizens of both countries and can lead them to siding with militant and radical groups. This factor can outweigh the impact of the aid and nation building missions. The authors also advise awareness in regards to residents of both countries who have immigrated elsewhere. They still have the possibility of becoming radicalized. There is also the concern regarding shadow business networks supporting these group

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM/INSURGENCY POLICY

Sheehan, Michael A, and Geoff Porter. "The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations In Africa." *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 2 (2014): 1-3 <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-future-role-of-u-s-counterterrorism-operations-in-africa>

This article begins by evaluating Operation Serval in 2012, an operation conducted by France and Chad with U.S. logistical support, and the lessons learned from it. In the wake of Operation Serval, concerns regarding the growth of new threats are directed at the poverty level and mismanaged and sometimes absent local governments. This combination of desperation and lack of government assistance/support could lead to the growth of militant groups. In addition, the various tensions between different religious and ethnic groups in these areas can be a factor as well. In conclusion, the author points out that coordination between different terror and militant groups across the continent should be monitored.

Schmitt, Nicholas, Kulish, Eric, and Mark Mazzetti. "Target in U.S. Raid on Somalia Is Called Top Shabab Planner of Attacks Abroad." *New York Times*, Oct. 6, 2013.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/target-in-us-raid-on-somalia-is-called-top-shabab-planner-of-attacks-abroad.html?_r=0

This article describes an unsuccessful October 2013 Navy SEALs raid in Somalia designed to capture Ikrimah, a top Shabaab militant. The importance of ensuring that the risks of the operations justify the results is discussed along with the message that the raid sent regarding the U.S.'s willingness to intervene.

Schmitt, Eric and Mark Mazzetti. "Pentagon Says Shabab Bomb Specialist Is Killed in Missile Strike in Somalia." *New York Times*, October 28, 2013.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/africa/pentagon-says-shabab-bomb-specialist-is-killed-in-missile-strike-in-somalia.html>

This article evaluates the October 2013 missile strike against Shabaab explosives specialist Ibrahim Ali as possibly indicative of a shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The authors express that there is some concern that these actions could serve to turn al-Shabab's attentions to America.

Lake, Eli. "Obama's Not-So-Secret Terror War." *The Daily Beast*, July 24, 2012.

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/24/obama-s-not-so-secret-terror-war.html>

This article summarizes a 2012 UN report outlining suspected covert U.S. counterterrorism activities in Somalia, including the provision of intelligence, training, equipment and the deployment of American forces.