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The Newport Papers

BEYOND MAHAN

A
Proposal for a
U.S. Naval Strategy
in the
Twenty-first Century

Gary Anderson
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

BEYOND MAHAN

**Naval War College
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Beyond Mahan

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Preface

The momentous events of 1989-1991 marked the end of the Soviet Union and, as a result, its threat to the interests of the free world. One of those free-world interests was—and is—the ability to use the planet's seas and oceans on all lawful occasions. Another is not to be threatened by hostile seaborne forces.

Though most ships of the old Soviet fleet still exist, the political will to use them as the old rulers used them has vanished. Now an impoverished and geographically, demographically, and industrially reduced Russia has difficulty even in maintaining the visible shells of its former naval might.

With its only rival at sea self-humbled, the United States now has unchallenged maritime superiority and, as part of that, presumptive blue-water sea control. Other nations may subject us to harassment at sea in a regional contingency, but any country's ability to build a serious blue-water challenge would take years and enormous expense.

Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that control of the seas was a worthy goal, and he devoted most of his writing on how to achieve that end. Now that we hold unchallenged presumptive sea control, we must reach beyond Mahan's mark and develop new and appropriate ways to protect our country's interests. Most of those ways will be to affect people and events above the high-water mark.

Late in 1991, the National Command Authority published a new national security strategy that stressed a regional rather than a global approach.¹ Shortly thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a new national military strategy which also stresses a regional approach.² The new military strategy has as its basis four fundamental legs: forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and reconstitution. This study examines the naval strategic contribution to each of those legs.

Now more than half a decade old, the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened both the unified Commanders in Chief (CinCs) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its influence is becoming ever more apparent and is bringing about profound change in the way the U.S. naval services do business. Service chiefs are now providers of forces to the warfighting regional commanders. The underlying reality here is that Service strategic policy formulation, doctrine,

and force structure are both more joint and more customer-oriented than before. The reality that they must continue on that course is explored in this study.

Late in 1991, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to convene a naval force capabilities planning effort (NFCPE) to determine a new strategic direction for the naval services. The document that resulted is titled “. . . From the Sea.” It includes several bold new steps in designing a suitable naval strategy and its corresponding doctrine; however, it is merely a first step. Much more needs to be done if we are to succeed in creating a naval capability truly in step with the times. This study uses “. . . From the Sea” as a departure point to make the recommendations that this author believes are necessary to flesh out that document and make the concepts found in it work.³

I

Forward Presence

What Is Forward Presence and Why Do We Need It? Forward presence operations were once a “lesser included case” within the concept of a global containment policy. This policy was largely implemented through a strategy of forward defense against the threat of aggression from the Communist bloc. An extensive network of bases supported the forward deployments. Together they were regarded as our first line of defense against Soviet expansionism. While the regional stability that resulted from such endeavors was necessary to support the strategy, it remained a secondary consideration of that strategy.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent absence of a true global superpower threat ended the need for a worldwide containment strategy but led to the need for both regional national security and military strategies. The nature of this new environment is also characterized by a significant decrease in the availability of forward bases worldwide.⁴ However, U.S. planners realize that a strong forward presence is required in order to nurture stability on a region-by-region basis; hence, forward presence has become one of the four foundations of the new U.S. National Military Strategy.⁵ There are three major areas of endeavor in which forward presence will be vital to regional stability:

Prevention. The old adage, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” is highly applicable here. Prevention is a function of deterrence plus early reaction. Should deterrence fail, early reaction can prevent a minor crisis from growing into a major one. Perhaps the most striking example of forward presence as a deterrent is the long-standing U.S. presence in Western Europe, which symbolizes resolve and the inevitability of immediate escalation should an act of aggression bring the perpetrator into direct conflict with the United States. During the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. presence in Europe was used as a “trip wire” that threatened the Soviet Union with a massive nuclear response should it invade Western Europe.⁶ Later, more emphasis was placed on conventional forces and the concept of global forward defense.⁷ With

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many in the United States saw the potential to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe; interestingly enough, we are now finding that a U.S. presence in Europe as well as in other regions is still considered to be a stabilizing factor by regional leaders there.

This is true also in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim, where continued U.S. presence encourages regional stability, perhaps because the United States often serves as an “honest broker” among the leaders of nations who are, by heritage, extremely suspicious of one another.

How effective is deterrence? While it is always difficult to prove the negative case, we know that in areas such as Korea and Western Europe, where the United States has shown clear and unambiguous resolve, that resolve has never been tested. In 1950, when we led others to believe South Korea was outside our defensive perimeter and thus of little concern to us, the result was a costly war. In the summer of 1990, the United States sent ambiguous signals about what it might do if Kuwait were invaded by Iraq. And so, even though we had naval presence in the area, our resolve was tested quickly by Saddam Hussein, who mistakenly perceived a lack of resolve; and, just as in Korea in 1950, war resulted—a conflict that might otherwise have been avoided. The deterrent effect of forward presence is a function of the credibility of that presence and the perception of resolve emanating from Washington. If either is perceived to be lacking, the deterrent effect is diminished.

If a crisis cannot be deterred, there are situations in which the judicious and prompt use of forces forward will contain a crisis and prevent escalation. Some critics of the U.S. conduct of the 1975 *Mayaguez* crisis believe that the prompt use of U.S. force probably averted a long-term hostage crisis similar to those the nation endured following the capture of the USS *Pueblo* in 1968 and of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in 1979. The use of non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) has almost certainly saved the lives of many American citizens over the years. In the last two decades, NEOs have been conducted by forward deployed naval forces in diverse places such as Vietnam, Cyprus, Yemen, Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia. The general trend toward localized instability and problems of governance throughout the world indicates that NEOs will be conducted more frequently in the future.

Although not generally associated with vital U.S. interests, the ability to use forward presence forces to conduct humanitarian operations has been a fortunate by-product of forward presence operations. Recent humanitarian operations in Somalia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kurdistan have been successful in demonstrating an American commitment to, and rapid responsiveness in, helping friends in need.

The early use of our forward presence forces in Somalia and Iraq in late 1992 and 1993 to react quickly to a developing crisis are good examples here. The traditional forward presence mix of carrier battle group, ARG/MEU, and MPS were the initial naval components of the U.S. response.

In addition, the active participation of U.S. military forces in the war on drugs has become a prominent element of forward presence in several regions. The United States is now gaining enough experience in these operations to develop a sense for the kind of skills and force structure needed in each region. These operations appear to work well in areas where we have chosen to apply them (and they are exhibiting benefits that outweigh the costs).

Access to Resources and Markets. Another argument for conducting forward presence operations to preserve stability is that it protects continued U.S. access to resources and ensures stable markets for U.S. trade. It is unfair to say that the United States went to war in 1991 solely to ensure access to Middle East oil. Nevertheless, if the oil supply were under the control of a hostile power, the U.S. strategic-economic position would be severely undermined. There is no way to prove that the Gulf war could have been prevented by a more aggressive and visible forward presence in that region, but there is a growing body of evidence to substantiate that the prevention of a crisis is critical to preserving the economic well-being of a nation. Professor Richard N. Cooper, a Harvard economist and pioneer of this premise, reasons that there was a direct correlation between the 1991-1992 recession and the crisis in the Gulf.⁸ The point to be made here is that avoiding a crisis saves money by avoiding the kind of recessionary impact which Professor Cooper discusses.

By concluding that a crisis led to recession in the Gulf case, Professor Cooper indirectly begs a comparison with the absence of recession in 1987-1988 when the United States forcefully and decisively reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and adequately protected them with an enhanced U.S. forward naval presence. Despite several shooting incidents, no real crisis evolved, and no recession creating oil price hikes resulted as it did in 1973 and 1979 when real or imagined oil supply crises occurred. It would appear that the perception of stability can be as important as its actual existence.

In the Far East, stability is considered a vital regional issue. Public pronouncements of leaders such as Lee Quan Yew of Singapore stress that fact.⁹ The point is made even more forcefully by people from abroad who visit the United States or live here for business purposes. The Japanese are particularly concerned with sustaining an ongoing U.S. presence to preserve regional stability.¹⁰ Nations in that part of the world that are mutually suspicious maintain bilateral security agreements with the United States. This tends to ameliorate local animosities and suspicions. These bilateral agreements and the

presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and other U.S. military units tend to temper regional antagonisms.

But what good does this stability provide the U.S. taxpayer? The answer is, regional stability encourages regional prosperity. *The Economist* recently observed—as have many other news media—that the Far East is the fastest growing economic market in the world.¹¹ This is crucial to American workers who desperately seek overseas markets for their products; the markets exist, and it behooves us to invest in their growth. In 1991, U.S. exports to the region grew by 20 percent.¹² That figure is expected to continue increasing as U.S. manufacturers seize opportunities to cater to the newly affluent Far East consumers. Stable foreign markets mean jobs at home.

In the Third World, coalition-building is perceived as a slow, long-term process. The bilateral alliances that the United States has built in both the Mid-East and the Far East are considered by some as the seeds of future standing regional coalitions. However, the potting soil for those seeds is U.S. forward presence. Without that presence, with its web of bilateral arrangements, regional security mechanisms will probably not sprout. This long-term investment in regional security will eventually enable us to greatly reduce the naval forces committed to these regions as our presence is replaced largely by coalition partners. Unlike the immediate and precipitous flight from forward presence advocated by some, this long-term plan will avoid our having to “reinvent the wheel” as we have done again and again in the Middle East and Europe. The current evolution of Nato into a coalition in which U.S. troops will not be the primary military force did not occur quickly. Coalition-building is a long-term investment.

This concept for regional security requires patience in addition to the long-term approach to coalition building. It also requires a short-term investment in continued forward presence, which will ultimately pay off handsomely if handled properly. The use of forward-deployed U.S. forces to encourage long-term multinational confidence-building measures is a low investment for a future with high return potential. In both Korea and Europe, U.S. forces have provided both the nucleus around which successful security structures have been built and the glue to hold them together. Our current ability to draw down U.S. forces is a measure of success, not retrenchment.

The key to this long-term process of using our web of bilateral agreements to build future coalitions is the participation of forward presence forces in bilateral exercises. Many of these exercises are naval in character. USCentCom, in particular, is being extremely innovative in its use of the Marine expeditionary unit, special operations capable (MEU(SOC)), with its associated amphibious ready group (ARG), as a non-intrusive tool for conducting an

aggressive bilateral exercise program in its area of concern, while simultaneously encouraging multilateral exercises as a step toward regional collective security. In this manner, the advantage of coalition building becomes a welcome by-product of an already needed forward presence mission.

Is Forward Presence Really Vital? How important is forward presence compared to crisis response? We may liken presence to the cop on the beat deterring crime on the scene, and crisis response to a police policy that, from a centralized location, reacts to a crime in progress. It is much less expensive to prevent a crisis than it is to react to one. Of course, if a crisis erupts anyway, one must act swiftly and forcibly. The events in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 illustrate this. Neither forward presence nor crisis response is more important than the other, and neither is complete without the other.

The Naval Aspects of Forward Presence. The announced policy of the U.S. military for the next decade is to reduce overseas basing while simultaneously maintaining an active forward presence in those regions where it is vital to U.S. national security.¹³ The most obvious candidate for carrying out most such missions will be our naval forces; by naval, we speak of both Navy and Marine Corps forces. A look at the proposed composition of forces articulated in the new National Military Strategy confirms this, as outlined in figure 1.

Speaking to the staff of III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Okinawa in 1989, shortly after he assumed command, Lieutenant General (then Major General) H. C. Stackpole III stated the need for forward presence forces to be credible, sustainable, and flexible.¹⁴ That statement remains relevant today, although given today's technology, this does not necessarily mean a large ground force. The new National Military Strategy does not necessarily call for our forces to defend forward, but it definitely rejects the notion that such forces be a mere "trip wire."¹⁵ General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, foresees that these naval elements will provide the capability for U.S. joint reaction forces to respond in a timely fashion should deterrence or containment of a crisis fail or should a disaster require rapid, self-sustained relief forces.¹⁶ This enabling function provides impetus to the concepts of credibility, sustainability, and flexibility articulated by Lieutenant General Stackpole. For example, in 1990, Marine Corps maritime prepositioning forces (MPF) provided the first credible and sustainable U.S. ground forces in Saudi Arabia. Within twenty days of the beginning of the deployment, over 33,000 Marines, complete with armor and aircraft, were deployed in Saudi Arabia with thirty days of supplies and equipment. Some of these supplies sustained Army and Air Force units until their supplies arrived in September. The basic

Force Composition

		FY 91	BASE FORCE	
Strategic	Bombers	B-52 + B-1	B-52H + B-1 + B-2	
	Missiles	1000	550	
	SSBNs	34	18	
Army	Active	16 Divisions	12 Divisions	
	Reserve	10 Divisions	6 Divisions	
	Cadre		2 Divisions	
Navy	Ships	530 (15 CVBGs)	450 (12 CVBGs)	Supports Forward Deployed Forces.
	Active	13 Air Wings	11 Air Wings	
	Reserve	2 Air Wings	2 Air Wings	
USMC	Active	3 MEFs	3 MEFs	One MEF Forward Deployed; others in support
	Reserve	1 Division/Wing	1 Division/Wing	
Air Force	Active	22 FWE	15 FWE	
	Reserve	12 FWE	11 FWE	

CVBG: Carrier Battle Group MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent
 Source : Adapted from draft document of the National Military Strategy, September 1991.

Figure 1

capabilities required to introduce these key concepts into each of the three regions are listed below.

Credibility. Because of the general need to gain and maintain air superiority, and given our desire to reduce overseas basing, it is necessary to keep an aircraft carrier (or its equivalent) in each of the three vital regions. But, as a result of the demise of the former Soviet Union and the resulting reduced threat to our carriers, in most cases the number of escorts that each carrier needs may be reduced.

The presence of a carrier battle group or a similar capability is as much a political signal of U.S. interest in the region as it is a military instrument. This visible manifestation of U.S. power and resolve reassures allies and keeps potential adversaries warned of the consequences of their actions. For the near term, an aircraft carrier group, or a like capability, along with an ARG/MEU (SOC), and an MPS appear to be the bottom line of forward presence in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf region, and WestPac.

Flexibility. The flexibility necessary to implement the National Military Strategy from a forward presence perspective resides largely in the capability of the ARG/MEU(SOC). The eighteen mission profiles of the MEU(SOC) are listed in figure 2. These mission profiles allow the MEU(SOC) to contribute substantially in responding quickly to a minor crisis before it becomes

MAGTF Mission Profiles and Strategic Niches

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)]. The MEU(SOC) is the Marine Corps' primary instrument for forward presence operations. Aside from being forward deployed to demonstrate U.S. interest and resolve in a region, it has the capability to carry out the following mission profiles in order to protect U.S. interests by quickly dealing with, or containing, a lesser regional contingency:

- Amphibious raids
- Limited objective attacks
- Reinforcement operations
- Deception operations
- Fire support control operations
- Counterintelligence operations
- *In extremis* hostage rescue
- Non-combatant evacuations (NEOs)
- Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP)
- Military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)
- Security operations
- Show of force
- Civil Affairs operations
- Clandestine recovery operations
- Specialized demolitions
- Shipboarding operations
- Electronic warfare operations
- Gas/oil platform seizure

(Although not a SOC capability, MEUs can assist in the conduct of humanitarian assistance operations.)

Source: Data from advertised Marine Capabilities in Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps publications.

Figure 2

uncontrollable. The capability to conduct opposed NEOs is particularly attractive in an era of increasing governance problems.

Although not currently listed as among the missions to be performed by an ARG/MEU(SOC), such a force can conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations as shown by the Bangladesh episode in 1991 and that in Somalia in 1992–1993. This sea-based capability gives U.S. policymakers greater flexibility than alternative options do.

In addition, the ARG/MEU(SOC) can use the flexibility offered by sea-basing to begin building multilateral military cooperation from the existing web of bilateral agreements in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. The non-intrusiveness offered by sea-basing allows the ARG/MEU(SOC) the versatility to exercise at sea and in the air with one partner, while conducting an amphibious exercise with another in an overall coalition-like manner, without forcing the potentially contentious issues that would emerge in conventional multilateral ground exercises.


Sustainability. The final leg of this forward presence triad is the capacity to sustain forces up front during the initial stages of a crisis. In this respect, sustainability becomes the first manifestation of the enabling bridge between

forward presence and crisis response. It is not limited to the expertise of naval forces to sustain themselves; it also facilitates the capability to support other forces flowing into theater in the early stages of a crisis, such as in 1990 when Marine and Navy forces logistically supported Army and Air Force units extensively during the first week of Operation Desert Shield.¹⁷

Having sustainable forward deployed forces in regions where we have vital interests will provide special challenges in an era of dwindling forward basing. In a speech in Indonesia on 30 April 1991, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney reaffirmed that the United States would look for means other than basing to support forward presence operations.¹⁸ Commander Barry Coombs of the Naval War College has investigated this area and maintains that “while current basing is adequate for peacetime forward presence operations, surge or extended operations may be difficult to support from the logistics standpoint. Innovative solutions for logistics support to combat forces are required in view of basing losses. These solutions may rest in expanded prepositioning, increased Navy use of strategic sealift and contract commercial assets, stronger host nation support (HNS) agreements, or in enhancing the scope of the Combat Logistics Force.”¹⁹

The maritime prepositioning force (MPF) program provides one of the key elements in General Mundy’s enabling bridge concept. Although the entire MPF operation can best be viewed as a crisis action mechanism, the fact that the ships of the maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS), which actually carry the heavy equipment for the MPF, are forward deployed in the region, makes MPS a de facto forward presence asset. Figure 3 is a description of the MPF concept for readers not familiar with the program. To fully demonstrate its capability, the MPF should be exercised frequently as part of the overall U.S. program to support alliances and bilateral agreements.

In forums and war games conducted since the end of the Gulf War, there has been a general consensus among strategic thinkers that had the maritime prepositioning squadron (MPS) from Diego Garcia been moved early in the crisis before the invasion of Kuwait, the signal of U.S. resolve, with adequate attendant publicity, might have altered the Iraqi course of action. It is true that there is some question whether the Iraqis were capable of accurately assessing MPF capability in order to properly read the signal. Both of these arguments point toward more aggressive use of the MPF as a forward presence tool in non-crises. An extensive program of exercise offloads would demonstrate the program’s capability in defensively reinforcing threatened friends as well as its ability to enhance our offensive amphibious capability. Both U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command (USCinCPac) and U.S. Commander in Chief Central-Command (USCinCCent) have embarked on such programs.²⁰



J.R. Nunes, Jr.

Source: Redrawn from U.S. Marine Corps Operations Handbook 1-5.

Figure 3

What Is New in the Regional Approach? Thus far in this discussion, naval forces in the new world order probably look much like naval forces in the Cold War. On the surface, this is true; the day-to-day capabilities that are needed in a region to cover the range of stability requirements that have been discussed do appear familiar, but surface appearances can indeed be deceiving. During the Cold War, it was necessary for our forces to be reasonably concentrated in order to be prepared for battle, which theoretically could have erupted at any time. Carriers generally needed constant escort, and they maintained a high level of combat readiness at all times. Day-to-day, region-by-region, the situation has changed. A much higher degree of independent steaming is allowable, and carriers will not require all the combat capabilities of a CBVG all of the time.

A higher degree of independent steaming will allow naval forces to “show the flag” in more ports and in more peacetime exercises than was previously possible, while continuing to maintain the preparedness of naval force packages that are necessary to concentrate quickly to deal with brewing crises. Some


planners liken this capability to a soccer game where well-drilled team members spread out to play their positions until a friendly scoring opportunity or opposition threat requires a combination of players to deal with the situation. Once the situation has passed, the players resume their original positions. Figure 4 illustrates this concept.

The playing field in figure 4 is superimposed on a map that transcends two CinCs' boundaries in order to show the need to make boundaries between fleet CinCs much more permeable than they have been.²¹ This is a fundamental change occurring since the Goldwater-Nichols military reform legislation passed in the mid-eighties. The regional warfighting CinCs are the employers of forces, while the Services act as providers. The Services would be ill-advised to put themselves in a position of telling the warfighting CinC that he cannot have a certain force package in a timely manner due to geographic internal Service constraints; thus, the requirement for increasing permeability of boundaries.

Finally, regionalization may well mean that forward presence force packages can be closely tailored to suit regional peculiarities. For example, an MEU(SOC) in the Middle East may be built around mobile assets, such as the light armored vehicle, to allow for substantial distances which may have to be traveled over the ground. In addition, the absence of a high-intensity Soviet air and submarine threat may, in most regions, allow for a greater number of attack aircraft aboard carriers (at the expense of ASW aircraft) in order to counter the criticism in some quarters that the Navy did not bring enough "air-to-mud" capability to the theater during Operation Desert Storm. Some regional situations may actually allow us to combine functions of the ARG and CBVG or the ARG and MPS should the need arise.

The Role of Naval Forward Presence in Alliance Maintenance and Coalition-Building. Naval forces play an extensive role in maintaining our alliances and bilateral agreements worldwide. The majority of this effort is in the form of comprehensive exercise programs, the size and scope of which vary from region to region. Given the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower threat, Nato exercises in Europe can be expected to decrease. The number of bilateral exercises in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, has expanded exponentially as a result of the 1991 war. In the Pacific, we can expect the number of exercises to remain steady or even increase in the event we begin doing bilateral work with the Russians. We have not designed regional force structure around exercise programs, but in the future we need to ensure that we have sufficient assets to participate fully in exercises that support alliances and bilateral agreements. This is particularly important in the Middle East and

Boundaries Between Fleet CinCs



J.R. Nunes, Jr

Source: Redrawn from Secretary of the Navy draft Force Capabilities Planning Effort, dated February 1992. Concept introduced by Colonel Mike Strickland, USMC.


Figure 4

Pacific Rim where we are attempting to build our web of bilateral agreements into lasting, standing multinational mechanisms.

Recommendations. The naval services must develop, for each of the unified CinCs, forward presence force packages sufficient both to maintain stability in their region and to assure the CinCs that they can count on the naval share of these forces that would be needed to handle crises should such arise. The mix of capabilities will be distinctive to each region. The variables will include forces for drug interdiction and for exercises in support of alliances and bilateral agreements. However, in the three regions deemed to be of vital interest to the United States, several core capabilities are essential. These are: a CBVG-like capability on station constantly or nearly so; an ARG/MEU(SOC)-like capability; and an MPS and suitable afloat forward sea-based sustainability. The last of these is necessary to support the transition to crisis response.

Each region should have a standing expeditionary naval headquarters in order to furnish the necessary local expertise for command and control of naval expeditionary forces (NEFs). Such headquarters, which would replace the current numbered fleets, would consist of balanced operational Navy-Marine Corps staffs as outlined in figure 5. Command would alternate between Navy

Balanced Operational Navy-Marine Corps Staffs



Source: Redrawn from February 1991 draft Force Capabilities Planning Effort (unpublished White Paper). This draft eventually resulted in "... From the Sea, published by the Secretary of the Navy late in 1992.

Figure 5

and Marine Corps officers. The staff would have a heavier regional political-military orientation than today's numbered fleets.

As illustrated on the left of figure 5, the naval expeditionary force, with its three primary elements, would be organized administratively and for combat in a major regional contingency. For day-to-day forward presence operations it would use deployed naval expeditionary task forces as shown on the right of the diagram. Each could be a miniature representation of the NEF, although some might look like the conventional ARGs, MPS, and carrier battle groups that we deploy today. In all cases, they would employ a "blue-green" staff mix.

Finally, boundaries between fleet CinCs should become much more permeable, and standardized doctrine should be developed at a joint naval (Navy-Marine Corps) doctrine center.

II

Crisis Response

Desert Storm Is Not Necessarily the Future. In 1967 the Israeli armed forces easily defeated the combined forces of their Arab opponents in a six-day campaign. For six years thereafter, Israel was generally considered to be the premier military power in the Middle East; most observers felt that the Arabs lacked the technological sophistication and military skill to challenge the Israelis seriously. The Egyptians and Syrians did not accept this evaluation. They carefully gathered lessons learned from the 1967 war and used the advantages of emerging technologies to overcome the qualitative Israeli superiority in tank and air crews. The Israelis had become complacent, and they paid the price for their overconfidence.

In a surprise attack in 1973, the Egyptians and the Syrians struck. Using anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and well-drilled assault troops, the Arabs crossed into territory occupied by the Israelis and established bridgeheads that, for a time, they succeeded in defending.²² Although the Israelis rallied from their initial surprise and achieved a tactical and operational victory, the strategic results led to peace talks that constitute what the Arabs have always considered to be a moral victory.²³

Just as in 1967, the U.S.-led coalition victory over Iraq in 1991 is viewed by some in the United States and abroad as a seminal event in military history and the beginning of an era of unchallenged U.S. military superiority. To accept this viewpoint without reservation may well be as dangerous as was the postwar Israeli overconfidence in 1967-1973.

We must assume that potential future adversaries, the Iraqis included, will refuse to accept the verdict of Desert Storm as conclusive proof of unchallenged U.S. military superiority. We must assume further that these potential future adversaries are studying the 1991 results as carefully as the Egyptians and Syrians studied those of 1967.

How would an opponent such as Iraq attempt to deal with us by learning from Desert Shield and Desert Storm? His first moves would probably be political acts to deny us basing and overflight rights from neighbors of his intended victim. This would foreclose our ability to repeat our long force buildup in Saudi Arabia prior to Operation Desert Storm. Next, an aggressor would be well advised to accumulate sufficient “state-of-the art” technology to deny us sea control near his littoral waters to ensure that we cannot get close enough to conduct power projection, particularly in the form of amphibious operations. If a future opponent could replicate a modern technological equivalent of the kind of point defense that the fortifications of Charleston, South Carolina, provided during the Civil War—and Charleston was the Union’s greatest naval frustration of that war—he might well put U.S. leaders in a situation where the price to be paid exceeds the value to be gained through military action.²⁴ He would also mine nearby choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz, which we would need to get U.S. forces to the theater. He would probably try to preemptively attack the ports and airfields through which we would attempt a DesertShield-type buildup. This might be done through the use of special operations, chemical weapons, or even nuclear weapons. Jamming or otherwise denying us the satellite communications links so vital in Desert Shield and Desert Storm would be a logical step as well. Once the United States is denied a base of operations in the area, the aggressor could pick off his victim and attempt to consolidate his gains quickly, before we could react. He could hope to render a U.S. response too expensive to contemplate. We must consider how we would have reacted in Saudi Arabia had access to Dhahran and Jubail been denied us. In the case of an Iraqi or Iranian action, it might well be that a diplomatic settlement extorted from the Gulf Cooperation Council states would effectively freeze us out of the Middle East.

The Naval Dimension. With the possible exception of the first step, the worst-case adversary strategy described above would be aimed at denying us both the naval bridge to, and the door into, the theater of operations. In all probability, most potential adversaries realize that they probably cannot stand up to the array of power that faced Iraq after six months of U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia. Considering that, they probably will not even try to do so; thus, the strategy of denying us the buildup in the first place. Given the choice between negotiations on unfavorable terms or having to fight their way back into the theater, some players simulating the U.S. national leadership in seminar war games on this subject have chosen to negotiate at unfavorable terms to U.S. and allied interests, with all of the negative implications of so doing. Stated simply, we surrendered.²⁵

Given current amphibious ship decommissioning projections, it is conceivable that if the U.S. forces on the ground were overrun early, we would not have enough amphibious assault or follow-on shipping to re-enter the Arabian peninsula between the years 1997 and 2000.

In either case, the protection of our enabling bridge into the theater, or the need to “kick down the door” should that bridge be disrupted, is primarily a naval function. The capabilities needed will be endangered if we shape the post-Cold War Navy as we shaped it to meet a blue-water threat. The results of Desert Storm indicate that our naval littoral capability needs considerable work if it is truly to become the naval focus of effort in the coming years. Our capability to clear mines in a timely manner was shown to be woefully inadequate.²⁶ Similarly, our ability to conduct strike operations from aircraft carriers in support of ground troops was far below that required. Further, our shallow water antisubmarine warfare capability is currently poor-to-nonexistent. Finally, as we have seen, our ability to enter forcibly anywhere will be uncertain if present amphibious force projections are not improved.²⁷

At all costs we should ensure that our naval forces can provide our national leaders with viable and acceptable options with which to overcome the kind of strategic challenge posed by the hypothetical enemy described above.

The Desert Storm That Did Not Happen. In Washington today, it is fashionable, particularly among Congressional thinkers, to express future force structure in Desert Storm equivalents. This is a convenient budgetary tool; in strategic terms, however, these equivalents mean little if our naval enabling bridge is disrupted before we enter into a Desert Storm-type position. The ability to prevent that from happening is not only a function of numbers of ships, it is also a function of the kinds of ships we have. We must ensure that among them will be enough with the capabilities for intelligence and command and control infrastructure. That depends on decisions in the fields of strategy, doctrine, and force structure.

The Civil War Analogy. The U.S. Navy’s great sea control conflict was World War II. In the Pacific, the Navy battled a Japanese fleet that in the early stages of the war came very close to victory and that remained a formidable threat until the last year of the conflict. In the Atlantic and European theaters, the Germans opposed the Allies with a naval force designed more to deny us free use of the sea than to use it themselves. Much the same was true in World War I. In the Spanish-American War, although the Spanish fleet was second-rate, the United States Navy was forced to deal with it before undertaking other military operations. When sea control is not presumptive, all other requirements,

including power projection, will be hazardous until the issue of sea control has been resolved.

When sea control is presumptive, it is a different matter entirely. Sea control can be presumed when the foe either has no ability to contest control or does not wish to risk its forces in such a contest. We fought our war with Mexico, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the war with Iraq with at least presumptive sea control. The difficulty has been in translating sea power into action capable of directly influencing events ashore. The United States has normally addressed this issue through a combination of blockade and power projection.

The United States enjoyed presumptive sea control during the Civil War, although in a different way from some of the cases discussed above because, for the most part, the United States had to acquire its advanced bases by taking them from the enemy. Once that was done, Union naval forces could begin to influence events ashore. In Vietnam, Korea, and in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States had unopposed access to bases ashore very close to the fighting fronts. In the future, the United States may find itself in a situation more resembling that of the Civil War than those of more recent times.

In the Civil War, the purpose of the naval expeditionary campaigns was to influence directly events ashore; this meant that the targets for naval campaigning were primarily on land. Realizing this, Confederate strategists hardened the most obvious landing locations with field fortifications, built ironclads, and depended on mobile reserves to deal with Federal attempts at deep amphibious operations such as the Peninsula Campaign.

From the perspective of the U.S. strategists, the two primary tools of the Federal Navy during the Civil War were the blockade and the amphibious thrust to seize key points and to tie down Confederate troops. Though relying on advanced bases usually seized from the foe, blockading was mainly an outgrowth of sea control, whereas Federal power projection efforts were primarily naval expeditionary efforts, using the Army as the ground part of the effort.

There were three primary methods of reducing the Confederate point defenses. The first was to pound them into submission, which worked at Port Royal and Fort Henry but failed at Charleston and Fort Donelson. Next was to run by them and—if necessary—attack them from the rear, as was done at Mobile Bay and New Orleans. The third method was to land troops where the Confederates were weak and envelop the target from another direction. This was accomplished at Vicksburg but failed in the Peninsula Campaign.

The parallel with the present situation is three-fold. First, the Union's leaders in the Civil War faced a situation in which they obtained presumptive sea control with a force structure largely designed for a different mission. The

orientation of the Union Navy at the start of the Civil War was predicated upon harassing operations at sea against a superior foe, presumably Great Britain.²⁸ It was incumbent upon the Union naval commanders of the Civil War to grow a new force. Similarly, as we enter the post-industrial era, we also have a force that is not entirely appropriate for the strategic situation we face. While we are in a position to downsize, we are challenged to deal with presumptive sea control using a force structured to do something else.

The second parallel to the Civil War concerns our need to project power over vast distances into areas where we do not have bases.

A third parallel concerns major technological change. The Confederates attempted to challenge the presumptive Union sea control with torpedoes (mines), ironclads, and improved shore-to-ship gunnery. The Union responded with technological innovations of its own. By war's end, the United States had a naval force well suited for littoral warfare on a grand scale, a navy which, once the Confederacy had been destroyed, it quickly scrapped in favor of one more suited to traditional U.S. naval missions.²⁹

The main difference between our situation and that faced by the Union is that the Union was confronted by a coherent threat to its survival. Although any threat to us is incoherent in the extreme, the two situations have an overarching parallel in that each, in its own way, represents a key turning point in the way U.S. naval forces do business.

The Union's leaders responded to the challenges of the Civil War with innovations in strategy, tactics, and interservice cooperation, many of which were born of desperation. Cooperation with the Army was probably better in that conflict than it was prior to the war, and it was not nearly as good again until World War II. The navy accepted two key missions. The first was purely strategic, in the form of a naval blockade that eventually played a key supporting role in breaking the South's will to fight. The second was power projection.

The blockade became increasingly effective and was a major factor in the South's eventual collapse. It was made possible by presumptive Union sea control, a presumption that was never seriously challenged during the course of the war. To be sure, Southern raiders such as the CSS *Alabama* were an expensive annoyance, but Navy Secretary Gideon Welles wisely kept the focus of effort on the blockade despite strong pressure by Northern commercial interests to do otherwise. This presumptive sea control would have been overturned by British entry into the war; fortunately (since it might well have been decisive in the favor of the Confederacy), that did not come to pass.

The Confederacy made several attempts to challenge the blockade with ironclad technology; the most notable of these was highlighted by the *Monitor-Merrimac* confrontation. Such clashes made headlines when they occurred, but the U.S.

public and Congress generally presumed Northern sea superiority. Similar conditions prevailed in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the recent Gulf war. In those instances, sea control would never have been truly appreciated unless it had been lost.

Most of the Civil War naval battles took place when the Union attempted to project power against the shore. In this regard, that war was perhaps more like World War II in the Pacific than it was to Korea, Vietnam, or the recent war in the Gulf. Sea power had to be applied against the shore in areas far removed from the bases the United States had. The primary difference between the Pacific War, the Civil War, and our situation today is that in the Pacific War there was a powerful opposing fleet. Necessarily, all other naval force structure was secondary to that needed to win sea control. For the most part, this force structuring formula was applied during the Cold War due to the sea denial threat posed by the Soviet Navy. The limited wars previously mentioned, which were fought under the Cold War umbrella (Desert Storm included), were lesser included cases that were fought using the active sea control force structure.

The primary strategic thrust of Union planning was to develop a two-phased approach to power projection campaigns. The first phase was to seize an advanced base deep in Confederate territory. In some cases, such as at New Orleans, Union forces “kicked down the door” in order to create their advanced bases. On the Peninsula, the Union Navy landed General George B. McClellan’s army where the enemy was not, and it built up a logistics base from scratch in a manner similar to the current Navy-Marine Corps “over-the-horizon” concept.

Unfortunately for McClellan, he found that getting ashore is only half of the equation; once ashore, the ultimate objective must still be obtained. Former Secretary of the Navy James Webb pointed this out forcefully to naval planners during his tenure, and the observation remains valid today. The key point here is that Union naval supremacy made it possible for the Union army to begin operations far from its own bases.

One of the most striking aspects of the rapidly evolving Union strategy during the Civil War was the way in which it forced jointness upon often unwilling participants. Some combinations of commanders did it better than others. General Ulysses S. Grant and Admiral David D. Porter eventually found the proper joint mix, but it was not done without a number of false starts.³⁰ In the absence of a developed amphibious doctrine, and lacking the robust Marine Corps amphibious capability developed in the twentieth century, Army and Navy planners improvised as best they could. The end result was not pretty, but it generally got the job done.


The Littoral Battle Space Control Area (LBCA). During an era of single-superpower naval superiority, as in the Civil War, the door through which we choose to project sea power ashore and transform it into effective actions on land is the point at which most naval battles will occur. This area includes the point at which we choose to place forces ashore, and the area needed to build these forces into a true joint warfighting capability, as well as the sea, air, and space areas adjacent to this landward requirement. If this description sounds similar to that of the traditional amphibious objective area (AOA), the similarity is deliberate; it is the essence of the shift from a blue-water to a littoral naval strategic focus.

One term that might be applied to this expanded area is the “battle space.” In order to stress the sea-air-shore aspect of the problem, it is preferable to refer to it as the littoral battle space control area (LBCA). This area can be envisioned as being far larger than the traditional AOA, for it must accommodate all the operations of a naval expeditionary force, including its aircraft carriers.

The LBCA is envisioned as the naval component commander’s zone of action within the overall battle space controlled by the CinC, sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander. If naval forces are first on the scene, the LBCA might well include the CinC’s entire battle space. As other forces enter the theater through the bridge and door provided by naval forces, the LBCA would shrink to a size adequate to accommodate the seaward (predominately Navy) and landward (predominately Marine Corps) operations of the naval forces.

The Naval Expeditionary Force. The commander of the regionally oriented naval expeditionary force command element, which was designed to manage forward presence in chapter 1, would become the naval operational commander in a major regional contingency. The NEF, as originally envisioned by the NFCPE, is outlined in figure 6. As a joint Navy–Marine Corps staff, this element would coordinate the overall naval warfighting effort in the theater. The NEF commander would be an officer of either the Marine Corps or Navy, as appropriate, and he would command and control all the aspects of the landward and seaward sectors of the LBCA. This would avoid the confusing and potentially disastrous command relationships of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as shown in figure 7. It would replace them with a cleaner configuration, as shown in figure 8, with the NEF commander in charge of all operational warfighting naval forces. CATF/CLF planning relationships remain, using new names, but this new relationship is more easily translated into joint terms. The littoral battlespace control area is the naval component commander’s AOR. This relationship is much more easily understood than the AOA. It also eliminates the argument over service versus functional componentcy. In either situation, the Naval Component Commander (NCC) owns all naval forces.

Naval Expeditionary Force




Source: Redrawn from *NFCPE Report* (Quantico: Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center, 1992).

Figure 6

Figure 7 is a rough approximation of the naval command relationships in the CentCom area of responsibility during the Gulf war. The landward area of what could be called the littoral zone belonged to the commanding general of I MEF, the warfighting operational Marine commander, who was also dual-hatted as the Marine component commander. Commander, Seventh Fleet, was the Navy component commander as well as the Navy warfighting commander. He had two Marine expeditionary brigades and one MEU under his command afloat. There was no one in charge of the overall littoral effort. The final decision not to conduct an amphibious landing was made at a conference involving ComMarCent, ComNavCent, and CinCCentCom (General Norman Schwartzkopf).

The command relationship in figure 8 has the NEF commander in charge of all naval forces in the LBCA. His Marine Corps subordinate (land maneuver element commander) commands forces ashore, while his Navy subordinate (sea maneuver element commander) commands those afloat. A supporting element renders logistical (less combat service) support to both. A naval component commander would remain with the CinC to assist in political-military and strategic planning. He would be the senior naval officer in theater; as such he would be responsible for joint strategic naval planning as well as strategic logistics. The command relationship is shown in figure 9.

CentCom Naval Command during the Gulf War




J.R. Nunes, Jr.

Source: Redrawn from DoD Title V Report to Congress on the Gulf War, April 1992.

Figure 7

The Naval Component Commander. One of the primary criticisms of the naval conduct of Operation Desert Storm was of the lack of a strategic naval representative in the CinC's headquarters at Riyadh.³¹ The warfighting tactical/operational commanders of both the Navy and Marine components were dual-hatted as component commanders. This arrangement was both difficult and confusing. At the same time, the commanders of the Navy's Pacific Fleet and the Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Corps Pacific were relegated to the status of providers of forces and monitors of the situation; this was a far cry from their active operational/strategic roles in World War II. This situation repeated itself in Operations Sea Angel and Fiery Vigil, the humanitarian relief operations in Bangladesh and the Philippines respectively. The Marine Corps has reacted to this situation by designating the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force

NEF Command of All Naval Forces in LBCA



Source: Redrawn from DoD Title V Report to Congress on the Gulf War, April 1992.

Figure 8

Pacific as the Marine component commander for the Pacific Command (PaCom) and Central Command (CentCom) contingencies.³² The Navy has designated a separate Navy component commander for CentCom. CinCPac-Fleet remains the Navy component commander for PaCom. A single designated naval component headquarters is needed to handle naval competency issues. Separate component and operational commanders are not needed in all cases. Lesser regional contingencies such as NEOs and humanitarian operations may not require such arrangements. The naval component commander would free the NEF commander from the burden of regional strategic planning and allow him to concentrate on operational matters.

It would be best if the Navy and Marine Corps were to combine the staff of the two fleet CinCs with those of the two Fleet Marine Force headquarters into two super-CinCs (CinC Naval Forces Atlantic and CinC Naval Forces Pacific) in order to create a joint naval headquarters. This headquarters would provide forces to the unified CinCs on a day-to-day basis as well as develop a series of

Overall Command Relationship




Figure 9

deployable Navy-Marine Corps naval component command battle staffs to handle the forward supporting plans as well as naval component issues in a theater during contingencies. Navy and Marine Corps flag officers would rotate in command; the notion that one has to be a qualified ship's commanding officer or a regimental commander to do strategic or operational planning at the joint level in our new littoral naval environment is no longer supportable. As the NEF commander assumes the function of the naval operational commander, the naval component commander becomes the chief naval strategist in the theater. An NEF commander fights at the operational level of war. The ability to plan and operate in a joint and combined environment will take precedence over ship-handling or MEF tactical skills.

Naval Aviation Integration. The integration of naval (Navy and Marine Corps) fixed-wing aviation arose late in 1991 as a result of the desire on the part of the OpNav staff to ensure that enough aircraft were available to provide a full air wing to each of the carriers envisioned in the base force.³³ This was to be accomplished by assigning some Marine Corps squadrons aboard carriers. This has been done before and some Marines see it as a way to ensure that Marine aviation support to troops ashore comes early in a littoral amphibious campaign. There are serious issues, however, that need to be resolved before integration is implemented.

The first issue involves the command philosophy of the carrier air wing and

its staffing. Many Marines, and not a few sailors, point out that there must be a *quid pro quo*; in a littoral environment they feel that assigning Marine squadrons to carrier air wings (CVWs) commanded exclusively by Navy officers is both unfair and unwise. If the emphasis is littoral, Marines are going to need to learn to do carrier operations better, and Navy pilots must get better at air-to-mud work. A truly integrated command and staff arrangement is appropriate. These Marines argue that the composition of the CVW staff should be Navy-Marine and that command should rotate on a “blue-green” basis. This author agrees.

If we are to develop a truly better naval support of ground forces and a more joint orientation in general, Marine Corps command and staff expertise is essential to the CVW’s ability to plan and execute this improved support. Marine aviators are trained to understand ground tactics and combined arms warfare; the more senior officers will have attended other service schools as well. In addition, many Marine aviators have served exchange tours with ground units. They will be excellent facilitators for “purpling” the CVW. In this manner, the true “naval air wing” can be formed for effective carrier air support of littoral operations. By the same reasoning, Navy aviators should be given some of the same cross-training opportunities as Marines.

A second major issue that must be addressed before real naval aviation integration can be realized is the need for naval aviation to go ashore in an expeditionary environment; as the littoral battle moves inland, this will be an ongoing requirement. If the CVW needs to be backfilled to replace aviation units that have gone ashore, procedures must be devised to accommodate that. We need also to address the matter of “yellow gear,” the equipment at air bases and in carriers needed to support an aviation unit ashore. Marine ground support equipment is expeditionary, while comparable Navy equipment generally is not. If that fact were to be allowed to govern action, it would lead to the carrier’s Marine Corps squadrons being dispatched when aviation is to be based ashore, while the Navy squadrons stayed afloat. But aviation ground support equipment aboard the MPF ships and T-AK aviation support ships can support the Navy’s squadrons ashore. Navy squadrons from carriers not deployed to the crisis area would then backfill the carrier. In Desert Storm, six carriers were deployed. This means that if the base force figure of twelve carriers holds true for forward presence rotation, and six remains an adequate figure for crisis response, there will be six carriers capable of backfilling the Marine aircraft sent ashore. Such an arrangement is acceptable for short regional contingencies. A large threat would require reconstitution as outlined in chapter IV.

Naval Deep Strike Capability. In this era of littoral warfare, how much deep strike capability does the United States Navy need? This is an area in which we have not yet reached a consensus. Many people believe that the maximum limit is 500 nautical miles; others hold that 180 is sufficient. The strike radius from carrier-based aircraft should extend to the farthest landward boundary of the LBCA. If the LBCA is to be extended beyond an agreed-upon range limit for carrier-based aircraft, landward bases must then be procured inside the LBCA to do so. TLAMs or Air Force aircraft should be used for special strikes beyond naval aircraft range. The concept here is that the range should fit the battle space of the force. This requires study by a joint air-ground group in order to determine how deep “deep enough” really is.

The other key question for fixed-wing aviation is “How much technology is enough?” Do we need stealth now that the Soviets are no longer around to upgrade air defense technology significantly? Perhaps we would be better off to skip production generations of technology if there is no threat on the horizon to challenge significantly what we have now. The current proposal to use F-14 airframes to replace the aging A-6 appears to be a reasonable fix until we see a threat on the horizon that will warrant development of a follow-on. This issue is dependent on our being able to give the F-14 an all-weather attack capability.

Perhaps now is the time to propose interest-bearing “seed bank” accounts to Congress, allowing the services to store money saved by skipping generations of new aircraft and then permitting them to buy a truly revolutionary system in sufficient numbers when it is really needed.

Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC). The JFACC was one of the most difficult issues to emerge from Operation Desert Storm after-action review. The Defense Department after-action report on the war in the Gulf called for more interoperability between the Navy and other U.S. armed service components and for attempts to centralize coordination of aviation efforts between them.³⁴ The degree to which centralization is needed varies from contingency to contingency; Operation Sea Angel, the humanitarian assistance operation in Bangladesh, did not need nearly the degree of centralization required of Operation Desert Storm. However, when complicated centralization is needed, the requirement is immensely difficult; Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole III pointed out recently that the Navy does not have the capability to run a Desert Storm-type JFACC at sea without taking a major Navy platform (i.e., CV or LCC) out of combatant status.³⁵ This is a grave deficiency for our naval forces if we are to use them as command posts for joint operations.

Emerging Naval Littoral Warfare Doctrine. How would a naval littoral campaign work as an enabling bridge for a joint operation? What follows is a view of how naval doctrine for such operations should emerge.


Phase I. Achieving Superiority in the Littoral Battle Space Control Area. The LBCA can be defined as the land, sea, air, and space area requiring our control in order to ensure that an enemy cannot foil any proposed naval operation of ours. The square (or cubic) mileage will vary depending chiefly on the size, technological sophistication, and military capability of our opponent.

If we contemplate only an MPF offload to reinforce a threatened ally, the job will be easy initially; it would probably entail bringing in sufficient naval forces to protect the offload. If the enemy chooses not to interfere, the operation might well end at Phase I. If Operation Desert Shield had caused Saddam Hussein to abandon Kuwait in the fall of 1990, the situation would have been roughly analogous to the successful Phase I stand-alone effort. However, the joint enabling role played by naval forces in the events leading up to the great offensive of Desert Storm is probably a more predictive model for a Phase I operation in a major regional contingency. Naval forces provided the early air power, credible land power, and joint sustainment for the early phases of the crisis. During the buildup phase, sealift provided the vast majority of sustainment.

If entry into the theater needs to be forcible, Phase I becomes the precursor to a standard amphibious operation. Control of the LBCA may well require a substantial air-sea-space battle. The use of the word space here is not used in an attempt to appear overly visionary. We need control of space to ensure that such seemingly simple factors as unhindered use of our satcom links remain presumptive; we would not assume that a future opponent will be as accommodating as Saddam Hussein in that regard. (National assets can provide space control, but such control must be a valid assumption in establishing LBCA control.) If an amphibious operation is needed, the LBCA will need to include a number of enemy port and airfield complexes within its boundaries as potential objectives to keep the opposition uncertain of the actual objective. If we are to utilize truly the spirit of maneuver warfare, we will also keep the actual objective flexible as well. Figure 10 outlines the concept.

The most fundamental change in naval warfare occurs in phase I. Control of the LBCA will not be a lesser included naval requirement in the future; it will be the primary rationale for naval force structure. Sailors and Marines who cannot accept that development will not be competitive in a rapidly changing joint warfighting environment.

Flexible Objective Concept




J.R. Nunes, Jr.

Source: Redrawn from *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p.40.

Figure 10

Phase II. Probing for the Seams. If presumptive blue-water sea control is the major strategic change of the new world order, the LCAC-LAV-helicopter (LLH) team may well be the great operational breakthrough. As used here, the term "helicopter" includes the medium lift requirement (such as the V-22) as well as existing helicopters. In the past, not only were our choices of places to land restricted, but once our forces had been deposited ashore, they were committed to their beachhead both physically and psychologically. We could try to land where the enemy was not, but we were committed even if we guessed wrong. The LLH team has changed all of that. Now, we can launch multiple probes toward a series of widely separated objectives. We can then choose from among them the landing sites we want. If a landing site proves to be unproductive,

Alternative Focus of Effort Sites



J.R. Nunes, Jr.

Source: Redrawn from *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 40.


Figure 11

we can disengage much more readily than we were able to do in the past. Figure 11 illustrates this concept.

Moderately productive sites can be used for deception, for supporting attacks, and as candidates to shift the focus of effort to as the situation dictates. This allows us to keep the enemy off balance, unsure of our actual objective, and reacting to our previous move as we begin the next. The LLH team becomes the moral equivalent of the swift German reconnaissance forces that made the blitzkrieg concept so successful by finding and exploiting seams in enemy defenses in order to allow other forces to flow through in what Liddel Hart called a "raging torrent."

Phase III. Seizing the Lodgement. Once a final airport/seaport lodgement has been selected and a focus of effort determined, it can be seized from a direction that will most disrupt our opponent, as outlined in figure 12. This

Seizing the Airport/Seaport Lodgement



J.R. Nunes, Jr.

Source: Redrawn from *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 41.


Figure 12

fast-moving, hard-hitting attack will be facilitated by air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs), Tomahawk-type missiles (TLAMs), and deep strikes by Air Force stealth aircraft against targets which, though outside the LBCA, might interfere with our operation by means of long-range capabilities or fast-moving reserve forces. Better maps than we now have are necessary to accomplish all of this.

Phase IV. The Joint Raging Torrent. Once we are established ashore, we can introduce war-winning joint forces into theater. This means that naval forces will allow the introduction of Army and Air Force packages capable of providing the hammer to end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies, as was done in Operation Desert Storm where the MPF capability was a major joint enabler in the early Desert Shield phase. Early response is a naval forte, as is continued seaborne sustainment.

We must make this transition more seamlessly connected than it was in Desert Storm. This sequencing of joint forces into the theater should be done in a manner that does not allow the opponent opportunity to organize his forces or plans. He must be kept "sightless" and continually reacting to our previous move as we proceed with our next. Figure 13 illustrates this concept. We fully expect that naval forces will contribute to the war-winning hammer, but we expect this phase to be one where Air/Land Doctrine takes the lead.

Sequencing of Joint Forces into Theater



J.R. Nunes, Jr

Source: Redrawn from *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 41.

Figure 13

Phase V. Turning Out the Lights and Closing the Door. As in the Gulf war, we can expect naval forces to be the first to go in and the last to leave. The integrity of the LBCA must be maintained until it is no longer required. When everyone else has gone home, the Navy-Marine Corps team must continue to

provide the forward presence that will reinforce the lessons of the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis and minimize the chance of a recurrence.³⁶

So What Is Really New? For the most part, things will not really change that much for Marines. The Marine Corps was well on its way toward an over-the-horizon doctrine in coordination with our amphibious brethren in the Navy long before the momentous events of 1989–1991. The real change will be in naval force structure and doctrine. By switching our focus from blue water to the littorals, Navy officers will need to commit themselves to new challenges such as mine countermeasures, shallow-water anti-submarine operations, and the integration of joint air operations in the maritime environment. Our next Nimitzes and Halseys may well look more like Farraguts and Porters. We may truly find the future in the past.

Recommendations. There will be those in the Navy and Marine Corps who view the following recommendations as heretical. Some of the recommendations result from issues proposed by the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort that resulted in “. . . From the Sea”; others are those proposed but considered to be too radical for inclusion in that document’s recommendations; and others are the author’s own.

Doctrine. The naval services should develop a joint Navy/Marine Corps doctrine center with rotating command to build littoral doctrine.³⁷ The Marine Corps currently has a doctrine center, and the Navy is developing one under the cognizance of CinCLantFleet in Norfolk. However, that is merely a beginning. Separate, independent, Navy-Marine entities will not do the job. We must “bite the bullet” and become naval in the Navy-Marine sense of the word if we are ever to become truly joint. Moves in this direction are occurring as this is being written.

Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) Capability. The NEF should become the primary naval operational warfighter in major regional contingencies.

Develop a True Naval Component for the Unified CinCs. Combine the existing Navy and Marine component staffs in the Atlantic and Pacific into Naval Forces Lant and Pac. Structure the staffs as joint Navy-Marine organizations and rotate command between Navy and Marine flag officers.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM). First, the Navy must develop a truly mobile and capable MCM capability. That means being able to get the assets to where they are needed in a timely manner. This is an area where capabilities may be centrally pooled for dispatch to a crisis area as needed. Although the LLH team affords a better capability than traditional landing craft for avoiding mined areas in amphibious operations, we cannot rationalize away the requirement

to clear mines effectively from key areas such as ports and choke points when the occasion demands it. We will need to use the ports eventually. It may well be necessary to explore better ways of integrating Coast Guard capabilities into this effort under overall naval cognizance.

Shallow-Water Antisubmarine Warfare. Sometimes it will be essential to be able to destroy enemy submarines in shallow water. Perhaps it will be possible to use emerging technologies to conduct these operations. Like the minesweeping capability, these assets need not be forward deployed on a constant basis; however, they do need to be rapidly deployable. This area ranks with MCM as a high priority challenge.

Improved Defense against Anti-Ship Missiles. The point defense aspects of littoral warfare demand constant improvement in this area.

Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) at Sea. Naval forces must be able to do this without taking a platform out of combatant status. We currently do not have CVs or LCCs to spare. It may be that this capability can be pooled for dispatch to the crisis area as needed.

Protection of Satcom Capabilities. This may not be entirely a naval responsibility, but our naval forces should participate fully in the mechanisms being developed to ensure the integrity of our entire command and control infrastructure in any theater.

Improved Sea-Based Logistics Capability. Strong emphasis should be placed on sea-based logistics and strong host nation support agreements that are well insulated from political-military disruption by potential theater adversaries. However, the long-term goal of naval contingencies should be to carry and store all logistics afloat, transferring items and materiel to other ships and commands ashore as needed.

Nuclear Deterrence and Recovery

What Has Not Changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and much that followed, a thermonuclear exchange between the United States and Russia is more unlikely than ever. Still, the Russian Federation remains the only nation on earth capable of destroying the United States. Consequently, the United States retains a “strategic” nuclear deterrent of which the ballistic missile submarines of the United States Navy are the most survivable portion. They can expect to remain so until developments render them unnecessary. The last such development may be a long time in coming.

What Has Changed. As the threat of a superpower nuclear exchange has sunk, the threat of regional nuclear proliferation and use has risen. Because the United States does not yet have a firmly stated policy on these issues, it is difficult to predict the Navy’s future role in this field. Indeed, the line between “strategic” nuclear deterrence and regional conventional deterrence is fuzzy. Some U.S. experts argue strongly for an across-the-board policy of no proliferation and massive retaliation for any first use anywhere, even if this means unilateral action by the United States in situations where vital U.S. interests are not threatened. This is intended to send a strong message against nuclear proliferation. Not everyone shares this view.

It is clear that there has been proliferation on the part of lesser powers. Four of the former Soviet republics have nuclear weapons. Despite promises and strong international pressures to move those weapons to Russia, as of this writing, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine have not done so. There have even been press reports that Kazakhstan has sold a nuclear weapon to Iran. In addition, Pakistan appears to have a nuclear capability to rival that of India. These alarming developments make urgent the rapid development of anti-proliferation regimes, but there is no consensus as to the form that those regimes should take.

Weapons Security and Accountability. This is a major problem in the former Soviet republics. Although there is reasonable assurance that “strategic” weapons are accounted for, there is no similar assurance of an accurate count of “tactical” nuclear weapons. U.S. naval forces may well be called upon to provide expertise in this area, to participate in international teams of inspection, or to contribute consultants in support of future arms control agreements. Some believe that the likelihood of a nuclear accident in both the former Soviet Union and the Third World is increasing. Should one occur, U.S. naval forces, particularly the ARG/MEU(SOC)s and the MPF capability in some form may be called upon to conduct humanitarian assistance, disaster, relief, or radiologist decontamination operations. This has implications for both logistics and training. Similar accidents with chemical weapons may also lead to a call for help.³⁸ Furthermore, there is a very real possibility of nuclear use or accident in our future.

Proliferation Easier to Deal with Than Post-Proliferation. Proliferation is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state or other actor previously without them. Post-proliferation problems that treat the threatened use of nuclear weapons or decisions about what to do with them are even more difficult than managing the proliferation stage itself. Once a weapon is produced, it is difficult to find and deal with, whereas production means and suppliers are easier to cope with when proliferation is occurring; this does not mean that this is an easy process, as demonstrated by U.S. and UN experience in Iraq and Korea. The Israeli air strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 exemplifies a successful action during the proliferation stage. The discussion concerning the difficulty of confirming the existence of a Kazakhstan-supplied Iranian bomb, as well as the debate about what to do about it, outlines the problems of post-proliferation. One thing seems certain, naval forces are likely to be the military response of first consideration in a proliferation or post-proliferation crisis. An MEU(SOC) raid, TLAM strike, or naval air strike are the most likely on-scene options for immediate use. Other naval options range from support of human intelligence and reconnaissance to the use of aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious forces as a show of force or strike force, if required.³⁹

The Problems of Preemption. It is difficult to determine how best to preempt the firing of a nuclear weapon by a Third World power, even if a ready-to-shoot weapon were found. Moreover, not many people, either before or after the event, are likely to be enthusiastic about conducting a preemptive nuclear attack to dissuade the firing of such a weapon by a Third World actor. The naval instruments of preemption would be the same as those we use today for dealing with crises and providing forward presence and strategic deterrence.

Naturally, one turns to the thought of mounting an overwhelming conventional assault on such an actor, but one must question whether such an assault would prevent or would encourage the weapon's possessor to fire it. It is clear that our human intelligence in such situations must get much better. So must our knowledge of how naval forces can support human intelligence activities.

Retaliation. The threat of retaliation to punish the perpetrator of a nuclear attack and to deter further conduct of this nature is also a matter for concern. But again, it is unclear whether retaliation should be nuclear, conventional, or should be contemplated at all. Normal naval forces would have a key role in supporting either conventional or nuclear retaliation. The primary challenge in an era of reduced U.S. force structure would be to ensure that the forces retain the capability to conduct such operations.

The United Nations and other Collective Regimes. After a long period of indifference, this subject has regained life. The need for some degree of long-range seaborne logistical support, particularly from Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels, seems to characterize most of the new thought on this subject. None, however, require forces or techniques not already in the inventory.

Observations. The evolving nature of nuclear deterrence may make the very idea of "strategic deterrence" obsolete, replacing it with a concept that runs the gamut from deterring Russian nuclear use to supporting international arms control regimes. To do any such thing at all, will, of course, require policy decisions; however, naval leaders will be required to monitor developments closely, because the forces they command will be required to play a significant role in virtually every policy enforcement action that can reasonably be contemplated.

Recommendations. The area of standard nuclear strategic deterrence is one where the new world order may actually be less complicated than the old. Naval forces will simply be doing the same thing in the future that they have in the past, but they will be doing less of it. However, an entirely new set of policy and strategy imperatives may arise in response to Third World nuclear proliferation. Most of these will not require radically new naval capabilities. However, the following recommendations are in order.

Support for Human Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance. In this area, forward deployed naval forces must strive constantly for improvement. Target information will be the absolute first priority in both proliferation and post-proliferation operations. We must improve naval capabilities in both joint

operations and operations in conjunction with national intelligence assets. This includes naval support of special operations forces.

Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Expertise. We must work on our ability to do radiological decontamination on short notice to ensure that it does not atrophy. This includes our ability to do so in both combat and humanitarian situations. As part of our preemption capability, as well as to contribute to nuclear safety operations, we must be able to rapidly deploy teams capable of disarming or disabling nuclear devices. These teams need not necessarily be made up of naval personnel, but they will have to fit in with MEU(SOC) or SEAL methods of entry and withdrawal. In this regard, we should explore the possibilities of virtual reality technology as a way of providing technical expertise to remote locations without the physical presence of the technician.⁴⁰

Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The shipboard compatibility of anti-ballistic missile systems should also continue to be a priority subject of study. We cannot count on land-based Patriot systems in all situations.

Humanitarian Capabilities in Nuclear Disasters. The ability of U.S. naval forces to react to a nuclear disaster in a timely and effective manner should be reviewed. This is particularly true in the case of reconfiguring the modules being developed for MPF ships for low-intensity conflict or humanitarian assistance operations. Although not truly a deterrent, this capability may well be the military option most likely to be used, given the notoriously low safety standards for nuclear facilities in places such as the former Soviet Union.

IV

Reconstitution

This Is Not the End of History. The events of 1989–1991, which signalled the end of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and a superpower naval threat to the United States and its allies, should not be viewed as an end to history. At some point—perhaps in the distant future, perhaps not—the United States may again face another superpower competitor with aspirations and agendas which the United States will view as hostile to its own.⁴¹ We cannot tell whether such a threat will resemble that of the former Soviet Union or stem from a combination of power and an ideology or economic philosophy so alien to our own that we will consider our vital interests to be threatened.

When the original draft of the current National Military Strategy appeared in the summer of 1991, the section on reconstitution postulated a renewed hostility on the part of an intact Soviet Union.⁴² Estimates at the time on the Soviet ability to reconstitute into a credible threat ranged from eighteen to thirty-six months. That draft was prepared before the breakup of the Union into fifteen fractious and independent republics. That breakup slowed the former Soviet Union's ability to reconstitute so much that a decade might be needed to reach the old threat level. It was agreed that this time frame would hold true generally for other "potential" superpowers developing a military capability to challenge the United States on a global basis. This means that for a decade indications and warning of trouble on the horizon likely will be highly visible.

In any case, the Soviet Union no longer exists. As a result, some observers ask whether reconstitution should remain a critical leg of the National Military Strategy. It remains the strategy's most difficult and potentially the most contentious aspect. Because so little written work has been done on this forgotten leg of the National Military Strategy, many of the proposals are the author's own, derived from his participation in war games, seminars, and discussions on the subject with DoD and service officials.

Part of the problem lies in grasping the meaning of the concept. The National Military Strategy defines reconstitution as follows: "As we reduce the size of our military forces in response to the demise of the global threat, we must preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. This 'reconstitution' is intended to deter such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves fielding, forming, and training *new* fighting units [emphasis added]. This includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid up military assets, particularly shipping; mobilizing previously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large scale so as to equip these new forces. Reconstitution also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and the innovation necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition."⁴³

The definition listed above has several potential, if inadvertent, red herrings. First, in the context of reconstitution, "mobilization" is not generally meant to be a call-up of forces but a call-up of assets that have been released to non-military purposes in the wake of the Cold War. Second, reconstitution is not meant as a threat to economic development on the part of present (potential superpower) friends and allies; it is contemplated as a deterrent to the development of a superpower military capability by a potential foe.⁴⁴

The Naval Dimension. The deterrent factor inherent in reconstitution is particularly relevant here. One of the key causes of the economic collapse of the Soviet Union was its attempt to keep up with the United States as an economic *and* a military superpower. The enormous capital investment in Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's "blue water" navy may well have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back for the Soviets. That cost will be an enormous consideration for a potential foe considering its transformation into a military superpower; therein lies the deterrent value for the United States of possessing a reconstitution capability. However, that reconstitution capability must be credible; to be credible, it must be affordable. A potential foe must know that we can beat a potential superpower threat without doing to ourselves what the Soviets did to themselves.

The cost of reconstitution is a major problem, especially for the Navy, which needs expensive ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons. Not only must we accustom ourselves to making do longer with old models, but also we must make do with fewer than before. Because of our declining domestic industrial base, we must avoid scrapping old ships and replacing them with new ones. To fail in this regard could price us out of reconstitution altogether. In itself,

reconstitution is a fragile concept because it entails the kind of long-range strategic thinking that is not often practiced in the United States. Congress and the public are probably willing to spend pennies for an ounce of prevention, but they are unlikely to invest in thinly disguised subsidies for the ailing U.S. shipbuilding industry.

What is needed then is a reconstitution philosophy that reflects the fact that this leg of the National Military Strategy is a hedge against a future arms race. As the largesse of the Reagan defense buildup fades ever further into the past, the manner in which we reduce our power will entail making very soon some profound decisions about reconstitution which, if they prove mistaken, will not be reversible.

Assumptions. There are several key assumptions implicit in this discussion.

First, any threat or combination of threats that arise will do so with approximately a decade's worth of indications and warning.

Second, over the next few decades the basic ship propulsion units and hull types presently in use will remain operable and no radical technology will render them obsolete.⁴⁵ We must assume further that any radical development in these technologies by a potentially hostile power would initiate a corresponding development by the United States, and that accordingly, in the absence of such a threat, the United States would *not* invest in such development.

Third, most new weapons technologies can be modularized in such a way as to be attached to existing hulls rather than requiring "keel-up" development. This is not always a popular assumption, but it is technically feasible.⁴⁶

Fourth and finally, nuclear submarines can indeed be mothballed for later use should the need arise.⁴⁷ The notion that we cannot do so is being discredited rapidly. A senior naval officer admonished his peers to this effect at a recent war game.

Crafting a Naval Reconstitution Strategy. A naval reconstitution strategy should have four legs: science and technology, production planning, personnel planning, and strategic and doctrinal thought. Each leg should be designed carefully and incorporated into the build-down before we make decisions from which we cannot recover.

Science and Technology. We must be careful not to squander our technological superiority. It is perishable. There are ways both to protect our advanced technology and to share much of it with our allies. If, however, we should be tempted to spread the financial burden of advancing new technologies by giving some of our ideas to our allies for development, we could mourn that decision for a long time. Despite current goodwill, today's allies may well be

tomorrow's adversaries or neutrals. We would regret it deeply if by our own hand we had frozen ourselves out of our own technologies.

This is not to advocate producing advanced systems simply because we have the means to do so. We do need to demonstrate, however, that we can build advanced systems in such numbers that a potential foe would know he could not win a new arms race.

Production. The key to the effective use of the production leg of reconstitution to deter a potential competitor from building a threatening military capability is to show that we can make an arms race prohibitively expensive. To take a naval example, we must carefully preserve and maintain the ships we are now taking out of active service. If these ships remain competitive in coming decades, we will have a commanding lead before we cross the starting line.


A potential competitor will then have to build sufficient ships and weapon systems to challenge us on a global scale. If we build our naval reconstitution capability on the premise that 2010 or 2030 we will be able to pull good ships out of mothballs and place "state-of-the-art" weapons modules on them, we will have tripled the difficulty for the would-be challenger. To compete with us, the challenger must first build a naval capability comparable to our un-reconstituted peacetime naval establishment. This would be a daunting and expensive proposition. It could not be kept secret.

His second challenge would be to overcome our lead in ship construction. With our ability to bring out old ships with new weapons modules at approximately half the cost of building a completely new ship (this obviously depends on the absolute cost of technology in the "out years"), the competitor would have to pay a "buy-in" cost of at least three times our own simply to join the superpower naval club. In contrast, if we adopt an all-new reconstitution capability, our opponent will need to invest only enough to match our peacetime naval capability before he can run with us ship-for-ship in a naval arms race. This is particularly true for submarines. Truly, in reconstitution, better is the enemy of good enough. The curve in figure 14 demonstrates that if reconstitution is properly conceived, the United States can confront, at an affordable cost to itself, a potential opponent with a crushing economic challenge.

If a technological development comparable to the Civil War ironclad technology-leap arises, rendering current ships obsolete, the arguments above would become moot, and we would be compelled to invest in new technology. But that does not render the policy of creative mothballing ineffective as a prudent hedge against a future naval arms race.

The money saved in buying ships can be used for capitalizing on new weapon systems, EW suites, and information warfare capabilities. Even in the "worst case" situation where we would need to build entirely new hulls and propulsion

Reconstitution



J.R. Nunes, Jr

Figure 14

systems to counter a radically new emerging technology, the skills needed may be so new that old shipyards would be rendered cost-ineffective anyway.⁴⁸ Some new construction will be needed to maintain required defense skills, but this author believes we would be prudent to limit this to what is essential.

The only area where the argument cited above may not apply entirely is in the construction of nuclear submarines; this industry has some very perishable skills. If some form of subsidy is needed to keep those skills current and present in the shipyard, we should find a way that is more economical than building unneeded and unwanted attack submarines. Perhaps a solution would be to keep one of the submarine yards "warm" by mothballing submarines as they are decommissioned.

We must also keep open production lines for scarce, slowly produced munitions to replace those munitions expended in regional contingencies and also for expansion in case of reconstitution. The answer here may well be to encourage "skunk works" contractors who will respond to small orders while keeping key-skills personnel employed as an educational base for expansion.

People Programs. How do we best sustain the skills needed to conduct blue-water sea control without bankrupting the personnel accounts of the naval services? The reserves are an obvious answer. Today we have two essential types of reservists in the Navy: those who support the active duty establishment such as the TAR program, and those who support expansion in mobilization—mine warfare is a current capability here. A recent seminar on reserve capabilities suggested a third category that would embody a reconstitution pool.

A first step in such a program would be to shift the Navy's mine warfare capability from the reserves into regular service and replace it with much of what is now in the active anti-submarine community. If properly managed, the reserve surge mobilization capability can be used as a reconstitution cadre.

It is important to remember here the dissimilarity between reconstitution and mobilization. We mobilize what is currently in the reserves. We reconstitute to give us a greater mobilization capability. If a P-3 squadron is in reserve status, it can be mobilized to help in a regional contingency where there is a moderate submarine threat. With a reasonable investment, that squadron can also be prepared to act as cadre for reconstitution expansion. By educating the squadron members to accept positions of responsibility two levels above those that they are holding, we pave the way for the expanded schools and training squadrons that would put real teeth into the naval reconstitution capability. This philosophy was adopted by General Hans von Seeckt when he prepared the German 100,000-man army to expand in the years between the world wars, although our problem is not as severe as that which the Germans faced. The successes of the German Army between 1939 and 1942 attest to the efficacy of a "two-up" educational philosophy.⁴⁹

The same could be provided to reserves maintaining laid-up ships. Training units could concentrate on maintaining the cadre for schools, stressing blue-water sea control skills not needed on a day-to-day active service basis but vital for reconstitution to deal with an emerging blue-water threat. This would require frequent exercises with the active forces to keep these skills reasonably fresh.

The Marine Corps presently maintains a balanced reserve component for mobilization and would not need to reorganize as thoroughly as the Navy to transition from a blue-water to a littoral strategy. However, the Marine Corps Reserve would be an excellent place to create the cadres for expansion during a time of reconstitution.

The education of mid-level officers in operational and strategic thought would be an absolute imperative for regulars and reserves alike. Consideration should be given to a second year "art of naval warfare" course at the Naval War College, similar to the courses at Leavenworth, Maxwell, and Quantico.

Doctrine. Blue-water sea control doctrine should not be abandoned but put on the shelf and refined as new technologies become available. It should also be exercised and war-gamed, although not nearly as frequently as littoral operations. The reconstitution cadres should be carefully integrated into such exercises, and the essentials of blue-water sea control should be taught in service schools. The naval doctrine center should refine this subject and keep it current with state-of-the-art technology. However, it should be recognized as a future case rather than a prerequisite to littoral warfare. Some degree of risk must be accepted in a time of scarce resources. We will have to accept the fact that we will not have a top-of-the-line blue-water navy in the absence of a high seas threat. Our alternative is to become irrelevant to real defense needs.

React Incrementally to I&W if Necessary. The need to reconstitute totally might not become immediately apparent, and the naval services might need to react incrementally as bits and pieces of the puzzle become clear. This will be particularly true if we become aware that another power is pursuing breakthrough developments in the key elements of naval technologies listed earlier in this chapter. The naval services may find themselves in the position of playing “Paul Revere,” calling for the implementation of reconstitution.

A Final Observation. In reconstitution, we find one of the purest examples of the naval forces’ capability to act as a political-economic instrument of U.S. policy. Our obvious readiness to reconstitute could well become our best insurance of never having to do it.

Conclusions

The United States has entered an era in which this nation is the world's only true superpower, in every sense of the word. Although the threat of global war and that of a nuclear holocaust has lessened, we are still far short of world peace. There are few nations that have enjoyed our situation, and certainly there are no exact parallels. The new National Security and Military strategies are an attempt to deal with the emerging world order in a manner that will prevent wars, if possible, or win decisively should prevention fail. The new strategies stress working with and through multinational instruments such as the United Nations to achieve security and order. The naval policy, strategy, and doctrinal developments advocated in this study define the naval contribution to the national strategy. They would provide a Navy and Marine Corps better unified in purpose and function than before. They also would be in synchronization with the joint approach to military operations that has been evolving in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

The proposed strategy presented herein is an alternative to that proposed by Admiral Paul David Miller, who at the time of this writing is CinCLant. Admiral Miller's concept of adaptive joint force packaging foresees using a naval force structure that has grown smaller than that which existed in 1989, but one that has grown smaller in the same Cold War proportions of carriers, submarines, ASW assets, escorts, MCM, and amphibious shipping. Admiral Miller's proposal gives the CinCs less than optimal packages.

The naval force structure advocated in this paper would also have fewer ships, but it would give the CinCs adequate carriers, ARG/MEU packages, and MPS to accomplish the forward presence missions they deem vital.

The force structure advocated here foresees a navy of about 350-375 ships, achieved by making do with fewer escorts, submarines, and ASW assets. It is a navy driven by warfighters' dreams and not by the aspirations of parochial service desires. That is the wave of the future.

The Newport Papers

The development of naval strategy beyond Mahan will be a dynamic process. Having achieved naval supremacy, our goal now must be to use that power in search of a true Pax Universalis.

Notes

1. *The National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992).
2. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991).
3. . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Navy).
4. *The National Military Strategy*, p.7.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 395.
7. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, *Men in Arms* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979), p. 364.
8. Richard N. Cooper, "Oil, the Middle East, and the World Economy," revised unpublished manuscript dated October 1991, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., p.1.
9. Robert Elegant, *Pacific Destiny: Inside Asia Today* (New York: Crown Publishing Inc.), p. 178.
10. This was the view expressed by Japanese military, civil, and business visitors to the Naval War College and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard during the 1991-1992 school year. The author and other members of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies staff at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., had the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues with these people during their visits to Newport and Cambridge.
11. "Asia's Emerging Economies," *The Economist*, 16 November 1991, p. 16.
12. Noburu Yamaguchi, unpublished research done while a National Security Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Harvard Center for Strategic Studies, 1991-1992.
13. *The National Military Strategy*, p. 7.
14. Excerpted from author's notes taken as a briefing attendee at Marine Corps Fellows brief, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1991.
15. *The National Military Strategy*, p. 10.
16. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Naval Forces and Power Projection, the *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1992, p. 17.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Richard B. Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Cheney Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to Security in Asia, Pacific," *Indonesia Times*, 30 April 1992, p. 1.
19. Barry Coombs, Commander, USN, analyst with the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., unclassified excerpt from an unpublished War College study on Pacific basing.
20. Information provided by USCinCPac and USCinCCent staffs, 1992.
21. *Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort Phase II Seminar Quick Look Report*, (hereafter *NFCPE Report*) (Quantico: Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center, 1992), p. ii.
22. Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 210.
23. Burdi Magdouk Zohdy, *The Ramadan War* (Dunn Loring, Va.: Dupuy Associates, 1973), p. 193.
24. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 171-72.
25. Information provided by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Staff, 1992.
26. Richard B. Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: A Final Report to Congress (Title X Report)* (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1992), p. 299.
27. *Marine Corps Concepts and Issues* (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1992), p. 32.
28. Preston and Wise, p. 215.
29. Weigley, p. 167.
30. Some Union generals, such as Ben Butler, had to be sacked because they could not work effectively with the Navy. Navy Secretary Gideon Welles fired Rear Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont when he failed to take Charleston by frontal assault after the Army had squandered an opportunity to take the Charleston forts by coming in the "back door" in a joint amphibious operation through Stono Inlet. See Weigley, p. 101.
31. Cheney, *Title X Report*, p. K-15.

The Newport Papers

32. Information provided by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Staff, April 1992.
33. This later resulted in a directive from the Secretary of the Navy to the CNO and CMC to explore strategies for naval aviation integration.
34. Cheney, *Title X Report*, pp. 246–47.
35. *NFCPE Report*, p. 15.
36. An early version of this section appeared as an article entitled, “Beyond Mahan: Naval Doctrine in the Post–Cold War World” in *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1992. Use in this form is by permission of the Marine Corps Association.
37. *NFCPE Report*, p. 17.
38. *Implications of Recent Nuclear Proliferation and Post-Proliferation Games for the Marine Corps* (Newport, R.I.: Strategy and Campaign Department Report 3–92, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, 1992), p. 4.
39. Most of the foregoing observations stem from the author’s notes while he was serving as an analyst on games concerned with these issues in 1991.
40. This idea has been advanced by Robert Steele of Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.
41. It is difficult to conceive of a world where “the young and the restless” will not aspire to superpower status. True, it took nearly a century after the death of Napoleon for the British Empire to be faced with a naval superpower challenger, and the Byzantine Empire had several hundred years of unchallenged naval supremacy. However, the best way to avoid such a challenge is to make it forever too hard to do.
42. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the Congress of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992), p. 9.
43. *The National Military Strategy*, p. 7.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
45. Mr. Bud Hay, director of the Advanced Concepts Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., made this point in an interview for this study. Mr. Hay has served as the director and organizer of several war games and seminars examining the reconstitution issue.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Comments from a senior naval officer at a recent war game.
48. Hay Interview.
49. Trevor Dupuy, *A Genius for War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice–Hall Inc., 1977), p. 221.

Glossary

ABN Corps	Airborne Corps
AFLD	Airfield
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARG/MEU	Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
CATF/CLF	Commander Amphibious Task Force/ Commander Landing Force
CentCom	Central Command
CinC	Commander in Chief
CinCCentCom	Commander in Chief Central Command
CinCPacFleet	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
ComMarCent	Commander Marine Component, Central Command
ComNavCent	Commander Naval Component, Central Command
CV	Aircraft Carrier
CVBG	Aircraft Carrier Battle Group
CVW	Carrier Air Wing
EW	Electronic Warfare
FEBA	Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FIE	Fly-in-Echelon
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FWE	Fighter Wing Equivalent
GPALS	Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
HNS	Host Nation Support
I&W	Indications and Warning
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Command
JFC-E	Joint Forces Command-East
JFC-N	Joint Forces Command-North
LAV	Light Armored Vehicles
LCAC	Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCC	Amphibious Command Ship

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LLH	LCAC-LHV Helicopter
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARCENT	Marines Central Command
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MED	Mediterranean
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU(SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MPF	Maritime Prepositioning Forces
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Squadron
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
Nato	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	Naval Component Commander
NEF	Naval Expeditionary Force
NETF	Naval Expeditionary Task Force
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
NFCPE	Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort
OBJ	Objective
PaCom	Pacific Command
PGM	Precision-Guided Munitions
Satcom	Satellite Communications
SEAL	Sea, Air, Land (Team)
SOC	Special Operations Capable
SSN	Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
T-AK	Aviation Logistics Ships
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TAR	Training and Administration of Reserves
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and personnel
USCentCom	U.S. Central Command
USCinCCent	U.S. Commander in Chief Central Command
USCinCPac	U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command
WestPac	Western Pacific

The Author

Colonel Gary Anderson is a Marine Corps infantry officer who served as the Marine Corps representative to the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College during the 1991-92 academic year. He is an honor graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the National Defense University's Security Program. He recently graduated from the Marine Corps War College. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College Continuing Education Management program and holds a master's degree in public administration from Pepperdine University.

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