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The Newport Papers

MISSION IN THE EAST

The Building of an Army in a Democracy
in the New German States

Mark E. Victorson
Colonel, U.S. Army



**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND**

MISSION IN THE EAST

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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Mission in the East

The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States

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Introduction

AT MIDNIGHT ON 2 OCTOBER 1990 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) ceased to exist. The following day the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr, took control of the personnel, equipment, and installations of what had been the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee or NVA). By any reckoning this was a massive undertaking and one of great historical significance. It was massive because of the sheer amount of equipment, ammunition, and acreage for which the Bundeswehr found itself responsible in the new federal states, and it was historic because soldiers who had faced each other across a deep ideological divide for over thirty years would now be serving together.

The six active divisions of the NVA, along with State Security and border forces, had been stationed in some 3,300 installations, and the GDR's military matériel legacy included 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800 armored vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces, 100,000 wheeled vehicles, and 300,000 tons of ammunition.¹ Securing, inventorying, and disposing of this matériel was to be a major mission for the Bundeswehr throughout its first years in the new states. Complicating this mission was the almost immediate need to support the liberation of Kuwait through matériel shipments and support of departing U.S. units, the additional responsibility to assist the Western Group of Soviet Forces in an orderly withdrawal from German territory; and the longer-term requirement to reduce the Bundeswehr's size by almost 30 percent.

Of more lasting significance, however, will be the human impact of the union of the two Germanys. It is difficult to predict how this will play itself out, as these two societies seek to become one. The people of the new states have gone through a roller coaster of emotions since refugees from the GDR first began seeking asylum in West German embassies in East Berlin, Budapest, and Prague in July of 1989, beginning the process that would lead to the "Turning Point" (*die Wende*) in German history. Since then the East Germans have experienced the fear and exultation of those October and November days when they chanted "We are the people" in Leipzig, Berlin, and elsewhere, as well as the euphoria of unification, and they continue to experience the uncertainty of

their economic future and a sense of second-class citizenship. If the changes for West Germans have not been as dramatic, the effects have certainly been felt intensely.

In the midst of the changes wrought by unification, the Bundeswehr took on missions for which its origin and history had uniquely qualified it. First, there was the self-imposed requirement to select former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers who requested active duty in the Bundeswehr and then train them to assume the functions of leaders in the armed forces of a democratic society. Second, the Bundeswehr would have to build legitimacy for the armed forces among an East German population that had learned to distrust the military. The concepts of *Innere Fuehrung*, or "Inner Leadership," which had stood the Bundeswehr in good stead in similar endeavors at its beginning and throughout its short history, were used again to meet these new challenges.

This paper describes some of the ways these concepts aided in facilitating the dual processes of the integration of former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers into the Bundeswehr and the acceptance of the military in the new German states. It begins with a brief analysis of the concepts and their perceived strengths and weaknesses. It describes the essential differences between the Bundeswehr and the NVA leadership philosophy, political education, and outlook and also the impact the revolutionary political changes of the Turning Point and the consequent reunification had on both of these armies. After a brief discussion of the legacy of the NVA, this study describes how the concepts of *Innere Fuehrung* were applied to combat that legacy, the challenges faced in this endeavor, and prospects for the future.

The thesis of this paper is that, despite their flaws and shortcomings, the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* played a key role in the early development of the Bundeswehr as an army in a democracy and in its acceptance by the civilian populace of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that these principles have promoted the same processes in the new German states. Although the NVA was not the army the Bundeswehr thought it was facing during the years of the Cold War, its true legacy is being surmounted by leaders well-versed in *Innere Fuehrung*. Grave problems remain, however. A sensitive application of the concepts of *Innere Fuehrung* can help solve some of these problems, and, in fact, some of them mirror issues from the Bundeswehr's own history, while others, such as the economic conditions in the new states that adversely affect soldiers and civilians alike, are not amenable to correction by the military alone and therefore have the potential to undo the successes of the early pioneers to the East. The Bundeswehr can certainly lay claim to one of the few success stories of the unification, but the entire story has yet to be told.

Innere Fuehrung

LIKE OTHER GERMAN WORDS that describe a whole complex of philosophical ideas, *Innere Fuehrung* has no adequate, concise English translation. Donald Abenheim, in what has become the standard work on the history of the development of the concept in both German and English, describes it as “. . . military leadership appropriate to the modern world, which enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen . . . [It is the] attempt to reconcile the citizen with the soldier, and to overcome the traditional antagonism between democracy and the military in German history.”²

The need for such a concept became evident when, following the demilitarization of West German society after World War II, the leadership of the fledgling Federal Republic of Germany came under pressure to provide armed forces for the common defense of western Europe. The Allies had decided at Potsdam in August of 1945 that “the German educational system must be supervised so that Nazi and militaristic precepts are eliminated completely. . . .”³ The aims of the occupation forces matched the natural inclination of the German population so well that in 1954 Paul Sethe could write in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*:

The military tradition of the Germans was broken off in 1945. In the nine years since, memories and sentiments have become overwhelming among young people that make it difficult to link up with this heritage. Two lost wars [caused] their terrible casualties; great parts of our cities will remain in rubble for long to come; the appeal to idealism and a sense of sacrifice have been brutally abused and arouse today only bitterness among many; the long struggle of the occupiers against German soldierly pride has not been without effect; the division of Germany paralyzes many.⁴

The challenges that faced the founders of the federal armed forces were to overcome this distrust of all things military, which was a legacy of the military's misuse by the National Socialist regime, and to provide a *raison d'etre* for military forces in a democracy that would confer legitimacy on them in a modern pluralistic society. At the same time, they recognized that new concepts

of professionalism and leadership were needed within the military in order to protect the state and the individual soldier from the excesses of a reactionary military elite. In short, they were faced with the problem of the proper ordering of the military within their democratic society.

This was not and is not today a peripheral question. As Samuel Huntington has noted: "The ordering of its civil-military relations . . . is basic to a nation's military security policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values."⁵ In other Western democracies the development of these relations, the growth of a military tradition supporting democratic social values, and the evolution of an officer corps that embodies ideals necessary to sustain these values in a military environment have generally taken place over an extended and unbroken national history. Even when controversy arises, it does so within the context of a general understanding of the utility of the armed forces and their proper place in society.

In the 1950s the founders of the Bundeswehr faced the problems of defining these relations without benefit of history; of discovering a tradition that would encourage their proper development; and of providing leaders, most of whom would come at first from a military with anti-democratic roots, with the tools and the will to support the social values necessary for the proper functioning of a military within a democracy. They would have to do all of this in the glare of publicity and through dialogue with a public which, for the most part, had no desire to face the questions it was being asked.

As early as 1948, upon drawing the necessary conclusions from the Berlin blockade, the United States began to consider with seriousness the need for German rearmament. Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized the need for a common Western defense and understood as well that armed forces were part of a nation's claim to sovereignty. The chancellor originally thought that any new German troops would be part of a pan-European defense force, the European Defense Community. This idea died in 1954, but well before then Chancellor Adenauer and his advisors had recognized that German forces, whether part of a European force or independent, would need to be accepted by the German public as well as by the Western Allies.⁶

The concepts of *Innere Fuehrung* were developed along with the organizational and operational plans for the armed forces during the 1950s and early 1960s in a series of meetings, seminars, and position papers. While a number of people, who included former Wehrmacht officers, academics, and politicians, worked on the conceptualization of these ideas over the years, *Innere Fuehrung* became most closely associated in the public's mind with

Wolf Graf von Baudissin. Baudissin, who was a former Wehrmacht officer, provided some of the earliest input for the concepts that would become *Innere Fuehrung*, and he became its chief advocate, especially among civilians.⁷

While the Federal Republic's constitution or "Basic Law" had to be amended to address the requirements of the armed forces, and separate legislation was enacted to clarify the legal position of the soldier, the basis for the concept of *Innere Fuehrung* was stated in the first article of the Basic Law as it was written in 1949: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority."⁸ This personal dignity is not lost when one becomes a soldier. The soldier retains the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as necessary to carry out his military duties. The soldier is a "citizen in uniform" (*Staatsbuenger in Uniform*). Although not a revolutionary concept for an American soldier, the idea of treating a soldier as a citizen was a key agent for change in a military tradition which, while it had developed superb fighting men, had also subjected them to the harsh, often meaningless discipline of the drill square.⁹ As Theodor Blank, first Minister of Defense of the German Federal Republic, said: "Whoever is unable, as an officer, NCO, or reserve officer to impart his military skills and knowledge to recruits without treating them as free citizens will have no place with us."¹⁰

The soldier also "has the duty to serve the Federal Republic of Germany loyally and to defend courageously the rights and freedom of the German people."¹¹ He must acknowledge and accept the principles of democracy as expressed in the Basic Law and dedicate himself to their preservation.¹² These principles include civilian control of the military (*Primat der Politik*). Furthermore, the soldier is not to follow orders which assault human dignity or would otherwise be illegal.¹³ This places the responsibility on the soldier to keep himself informed, so as to be in the position to think critically about the orders he receives and act accordingly. The soldier is to be treated as a thinking individual, worthy of respect, and capable of understanding the purpose behind an order. Indeed, he must understand its purpose if he is to carry out his duties as a soldier in a democratic society. This understanding goes beyond knowing how to complete a military mission and showing initiative in carrying it out, attributes which German soldiers displayed in pre-Bundeswehr armies. It includes the soldier's understanding of the moral and social consequences of his actions. Theodor Blank again expressed it best: "Democracy can be defended only by democrats, and freedom only by those who experience it themselves."¹⁴

Baudissin wished to embed the soldier firmly in the democratic society and to leave as little as possible in the purely military sphere. The plan was to keep uniforms simple, with little in the way of medals and ribbons, and to keep

ceremonies and parades to a minimum. Military tradition was a thorny matter, because although as Samuel Huntington has noted, “. . . civil-military relations [in Germany] between 1871 and 1914 reflected an extraordinary degree of objective civilian control and military professionalism founded upon a high level and restricted scope of military authority . . . ;”¹⁵ the armed forces’ political manipulations during and after the First World War and their culpability in the National Socialist regime hardly furnished material for the tradition of an army in a democratic society.

Traditions worthy of study and emulation were eventually found. These included the heroes of the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon and the General Staff officers who conspired to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. However, these latter were not uncontroversial, and the whole question of what constitutes a valid tradition for the German armed forces still remains open today.¹⁶ It should be noted that the leadership’s decision that the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht had no traditions worthy of being honored by the Bundeswehr did not cause their memory to wither away, and this problem must be kept in mind when addressing the legacy of the NVA.

Although problems with tradition are only one of its shortcomings, *Innere Fuehrung* did in fact, especially during the first years of the Bundeswehr, provide a framework within which the armed forces could grow. It gave them a mission—the defense of the democratic society within the framework of NATO, which was acceptable to the German public, if not highly popular. Indeed, this acceptance seemed to grow over time until, by the early 1980s, 80 percent of the population favored German membership in NATO.¹⁷ *Innere Fuehrung* also defined the rights and responsibilities of leaders and soldiers to each other and to the society as a whole. It provided a humane and highly effective leadership philosophy. And finally, it helped assure West Germans that the armed services were under civilian control and were an instrument of a democratic society.

In order to achieve acceptance, however, the armed services, through *Innere Fuehrung*, have tied themselves so closely to civil society that they are sometimes indistinguishable from it. This has opened them to conservative criticism that argues that armed forces who have accepted the values of a society that emphasizes personal, material prosperity, and who seek to avoid hard choices in international affairs, no longer have the necessary military ethos.¹⁸ That this is not a peculiarly German concern is evident from the headline of an article by Harry Summers in which he expresses the worry that “Humanitarian Missions Could Signal Collapse of ‘Fighting Spirit’ ” for the U.S. armed forces. In the article he quotes T. R. Fehrenback favorably that “by the very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the

world. Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand ready, if need be, to die."¹⁹ Whether a society is described as being materialist or humane, it is necessary to recognize a tension between a society and its military, which the teachings of *Innere Fuehrung* may have glossed over.

This blurring of the distinctions between civil and military cultures may lead to soldiers' viewing their service as more a job than a profession. In terms of Charles Moskos' institutional-occupational continuum of how militaries view themselves, the Bundeswehr is well over to the occupational side of the spectrum.²⁰ This attitude is nurtured among the officers by a military university system that does not teach military science and does not require students to wear uniforms,²¹ and by a conscription system that does not require them to serve far from home. Many conscripted soldiers sleep at home and come and go from duty "just like civilian employees."²² While most officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the Bundeswehr have developed a professional view of themselves and their duties, most of the junior noncommissioned officers and soldiers retain a "nine-to-five" attitude that does not mesh well with the requirements placed on modern military establishments.

Effective training is needed if *Innere Fuehrung* is to be functional and, in actuality, the training available is largely inadequate. The courses in social science and education, which are provided by the military universities in Hamburg and Munich, are supposed to provide officers with the wherewithal to lead and train "citizens in uniform" effectively but are often considered make-work courses that get in the way of the officer-student's work in his major area of study.²³ Political education is a command responsibility in the troop units, and soldiers are to receive twelve hours per quarter of instruction covering such topics as "Parliamentary Democracy," "The Bundeswehr in State and Society," "the Bundeswehr within the Alliance," and "Other Social Systems," but a 1979 study found that training was often canceled, not adequately prepared, and not always conducted by the company commander.²⁴ Under normal conditions it is difficult for commanders to fit such training into schedules already crowded with normal duty and combat training requirements, and in the experience of at least one senior officer who served as deputy commander of a new home defense brigade in Brandenburg, in the early months after unification it was almost impossible to meet the formal requirements for political awareness training among the troops in the East, although informally a great deal of this was happening.²⁵

Possibly the harshest criticism of *Innere Fuehrung* from the Left, and the least deserved, has been that it was essentially a hate campaign that used a distorted picture of the enemy as all things evil (*Feindbild*) to motivate the soldier. Such criticism sometimes more betrayed the critic's wishful thinking

about benign developments in the German Democratic Republic than demonstrated the plausibility of any conscious attempt on the part of the Bundeswehr leadership to distort the thinking of impressionable soldiers. Thus, in 1970, Siegfried Grimm took the armed forces to task for teaching soldiers that the GDR was a creature of the Soviet Union's political and strategic needs; that its leaders had no personal legitimacy; and that these unscrupulous leaders ruled through force and terror. He felt such oversimplifications disregarded the large part of the population which, while not supporting communist domination entirely, did support the structural changes to society that had occurred in the GDR since 1945. If people did want change, they did not want capitalism but merely a reform of the system. In any case the leadership had gained legitimacy, as it allowed citizens to take greater part in the decision-making process, and moreover, ". . . the economic growth in recent years has greatly changed the picture of the GDR."²⁶

Information presented to the troops in Bundeswehr literature and in training may have been simplistic—though it does seem to have described with greater accuracy conditions across the inter-German border than did its critics—but such information was not used to train soldiers to hate their opponents. In fact, the very absence of a view of the enemy as an evil entity may have been the single most effective element of *Innere Fuehrung* in facilitating the Bundeswehr soldiers' acceptance of former NVA personnel into their ranks.²⁷

The Bundeswehr and the NVA

DESPITE ITS PERCEIVED and some very real shortcomings, *Innere Fuehrung* provided a foundation for the military in German society for almost forty years, and it played an essential role in making the Bundeswehr a very different sort of military than the National People's Army. Born of the West's need to have an ally against the Soviet Union and of Germany's to regain sovereignty, the Bundeswehr was unique in comparison to other militaries as well. As amended, the Basic Law provided armed forces for defense; established a Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag, or parliamentary ombudsman (*Wehrbeauftragter*), to protect civil rights in the armed forces and to assist the parliament in exercising civilian control of the military; established a civilian Administration of the Federal Armed Forces, which manages administrative and personnel matters often handled by uniformed personnel in other militaries; and severely limited the powers of military courts. It also laid out detailed instructions that authorized civilian leaders to determine when the country faced a threat that called for a military defense, at which time command of the military would be transferred from the defense minister to the chancellor.²⁸

From the beginning, the country's political leadership recognized that these armed forces would act only in concert with their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and it also came to be accepted that this military's real mission was deterrence. It would be successful if it never actually had to fight the war for which it was constantly preparing. Thanks in large measure to its very success in this endeavor, as well as to the antimilitarist sentiments of the generations following the war, the Bundeswehr has faced recurring problems of public acceptance, beginning with the "without me" (*Ohne mich*) attitude of young men in the 1950s and extending through the attacks of the radicals in the sixties and the rearmament debate of the late seventies and early eighties. Throughout all the public debate has run the fear that the military has not learned its lesson and still threatens to become a state within a state. Aside from some foolish actions on the part of individual military men and equally foolish reactions in the press,²⁹ there is little indication that this is a real threat. Across

the inter-German border, however, another German army was a key element of a party organization that was in fact a state within a state.

The single most important thing to understand about the National People's Army is that, despite its name, it did not owe its loyalty so much to its people or its nation as to the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED). The NVA had its beginnings in the German People's Police, which in the summer of 1948, at the behest of the Soviet Union, began building so-called "garrisoned police" units. The leadership for the garrisoned police came from the officer corps of the defeated Wehrmacht, as did the original leadership for the Bundeswehr and by the end of 1950 there were over 70,000 personnel in these police units. They were trained and equipped as military units so that when in January 1956 the Chamber of People's Deputies of the GDR passed the "Law concerning the Creation of the National People's Army and the Ministry for National Defense," armed forces were already on hand.³⁰

When the Turning Point came in the fall of 1989, the NVA had an active force of 170,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Like the Bundeswehr, it depended on conscription, and young men were required to serve eighteen months. Unlike the Bundeswehr, the NVA was part of a society which itself had become regimented and militarized along the model of its Soviet big brother in arms. Beginning in kindergarten, extending through "pioneer organizations" for children between the ages of six and fourteen, and culminating in membership in the Free German Youth and the Society for Sport and Technology, young people were exposed to ideological indoctrination and training in basic military skills.³¹ In 1976 the chairman of the latter organization, a lieutenant general, could say, ". . . nearly 95 per cent of all young men between 16 and 18 each year take part in the Society's pre-military courses."³² How effective the training and indoctrination were is open to question, but it did bring service in the NVA into the seamless whole of a world view shared by all the official leaders and organizations of the society.

East Germany's world view of itself was that of a state at the forefront of the socialist revolution, in alliance with the Soviet Union and its other allies of the Warsaw Pact, and envied and under attack by the reactionary forces of the West, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, which the East considered to be the successor state to Hitler's Third Reich. Because of the early collaboration of German communist party members, such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, with the Soviet Union, and their subsequent coming to power in the GDR, the leadership of the country could downplay the history of national socialism and stress the GDR's connection to all the progressive aspects of Germany's history. Through this interpretation of history, the GDR and its social system

became the ultimate goals of German history, and anything that did not support this view became a non-event.

This “world view” had the advantage of not forcing the citizens of the GDR to confront the uncomfortable recent events in German history, and it allowed the NVA to make use of traditions the Bundeswehr would have found embarrassing. Thus, while the Bundeswehr consciously sought to break with the past in its selection of a modern, simple uniform, the NVA’s uniform was strongly reminiscent of the Wehrmacht’s. While Baudissin sought to find republican traditions among the Prussian reformers of the Wars of Liberation, the NVA brought the Prussian generals into its pantheon en masse on their reputations as military men who were part of the “progressive” tradition of the NVA.³³ In July 1990 Lieutenant General Klaus Juergen Baarss, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense and Disarmament for Military Reform, still defended what he considered to be Prussian virtues, such as duty and honor, and Prussian features in uniforms and ceremonies.³⁴

Such an understanding of history had the disadvantage that an unexamined past allowed old attitudes and activities to live on in the new armed forces. The introduction of Soviet military concepts of discipline and organization reinforced these attitudes. The soldier’s welfare was not his commander’s primary concern, and that famous first impression Bundeswehr officers had on their visits to NVA installations, that the tanks were kept in heated bays while the soldiers lived in run-down barracks without showers or any other amenities,³⁵ had as much to do with the NVA’s failure to overcome its past as it had to do with the general poverty of the society. The abusive harassment of the old drill square reemerged in the image of the “EK” system (“EK” is *Entlassungskandidat* or “candidate for discharge”), an approach similar to the Soviet Army’s in which the more senior conscript soldiers forced newer conscripts to work for them and to do demeaning make-work jobs.³⁶ This was allowed in the name of discipline.

The acceptance of a world view of socialism under constant danger of attack also lent itself to the sort of hate campaign the Bundeswehr was accused of running. The NVA soldier swore not only to serve the GDR, but “. . . to defend socialism against all enemies and to stake my life for the achievement of victory.”³⁷ Thus, the enemy was not merely whoever infringed on the legitimate security interests of the state—the enemy and the interests being subject to change—but was a specific, unchanging social and economic class and its lackeys.

In published materials and political education classes, NVA personnel were told that in NATO they faced the strongest imperialist coalition in the world and that the Federal Republic with its Bundeswehr was its spearpoint. The

Bundeswehr was portrayed as a direct descendant of German militarism: it secured the power of the monopoly capitalist class within the Federal Republic and planned to undo the results of the Second World War through a war of aggression when the time was ripe. NVA soldiers were informed that West German children were raised on a diet of nationalism, revanchism, and anticommunism to prepare them for service as unthinking mercenaries in the Bundeswehr, and that *Innere Fuehrung*, along with pastoral care of soldiers, prepared them psychologically and ideologically for the war against socialism.³⁸

Such NVA indoctrination went so far that in some units and branch schools political officers set up rooms for “the political and psychological preparation of soldiers for war.” Along with flashing lights, taped sounds of combat, and gruesomely realistic battle scenes, soldiers saw photo displays of the inequities and violence of the capitalist system (e.g., starving children, unemployed workers, strikes, riots) and of war scenes (e.g., Vietnam and Hiroshima). Sometimes these rooms were separated, one having to do with the stress of war (*Stresskabinett*) and the other dealing with only images of the enemy (*Feindbildkabinett*).³⁹

There is some question as to how effective this form of indoctrination was. The picture may have been painted so black that no one could accept it as reality.⁴⁰ NVA soldiers, as do soldiers in all armies, may have ignored subjects that had little to do with their actual duties. It is difficult to believe, however, that the constant reiteration of these themes did not have some effect. Former NVA Rear Admiral Guenther Poerschel feels that the pictures and reports of United States’ military action in Korea, Vietnam, and the Near East played the major role in validating one’s choice of the military profession and that heavily edited reports from the Western media, which emphasized NATO’s strength and were harshly critical of the socialist states, had a profound effect on those who were constantly exposed to such indoctrination.⁴¹ If nothing else, the NVA’s mission to protect and advance the cause of socialism legitimized the armed services’ close association with the Socialist Unity Party.

In the eyes of the East German populace, the officers’ association with the Communist Party and their prior positions of leadership in “a privileged institution of the SED ruled state”⁴² are what make the rehabilitation of even the small number of officers the Bundeswehr took over from the NVA so difficult. Practically all NVA officers (98 percent) were party members, as were many of the noncommissioned officers (56 percent of the career noncommissioned officers).⁴³ They carried out political as well as military duties, and failure to carry out a military duty could be considered a political transgression; a political failing in turn could lead to loss of party membership and consequent

career failure. Less than total support for the SED and its policies could lead to dire consequences. For criticizing military intervention in Poland to put down the Solidarity movement, Lieutenant Colonel Klaus Wiegand, a history instructor at the Wilhelm Pieck Institute with twenty-five years of service, was summarily degraded to the lowest enlisted rank and thrown out of the party.⁴⁴ For an officer, a career without membership in and support of the SED was virtually unthinkable.⁴⁵

On the Soviet model, the party had parallel structures for the various levels of the military hierarchy. The SED and the Free German Youth had organizations down to the battalion level, and since soldiers came into the service out of the youth movement, the majority of them remained members of it while in uniform.⁴⁶ As noted above, officers were expected to be members of the SED and to take part in its activities. This career requirement has led to the present rationalization among many former NVA officers that since everyone belonged, membership is basically meaningless in determining an officer's true beliefs. One made the decision to be a professional soldier and officer out of the desire to be in the military; party membership was merely a necessary condition of this service.⁴⁷

This may be so, or it may be one of a number of examples of these officers' attempts to rationalize their behavior in the light of what happened and what they now know about the regime they served. In any case, some of the more discerning of these officers note that, although membership was practically automatic and at first essentially a passive acceptance of the state of affairs, officers, especially the successful ones, tended to become functionaries in the party organizations at their levels of command, thus becoming ever more closely identified with the party and its aims as their careers progressed. By grooming the best officers, especially those in the command track, for party leadership, the SED achieved two objectives simultaneously: it identified the best officers with the party and its goals in the minds of their contemporaries and subordinates, and it provided an effective means for the party to control those in leadership functions.⁴⁸ Thus, whether a former NVA officer wishes to admit it or not, membership in the SED takes on a significance beyond simply careerism.

The SED and youth organizations were organized in parallel to the military apparatus. Within the military itself, party influence was represented by the political officers, who were to be found at every level in the company. To view these officers, of whom there were about 6,000 in the NVA, as being of the same mold as the Red Army commissars of the Russian Revolution and its attendant civil wars would be inaccurate. They were of course, highly dedicated and did work to indoctrinate the troops politically. Although these officers were

subordinate to their commanding officers, they carried a great deal of leverage in that they could always approach a political officer at a higher level of command than their own commanding officer and request intervention that a decision with which they disagreed be overturned. For that reason, and because a political officer was always in a position to report a commander's mistake as a party failing, commanders dealt very carefully with their political officers. The commanders also, however, depended a great deal upon their political officers.

Far more important than his political activities, as far as the commander and the troops were concerned, the political officer in the NVA, as in other Warsaw Pact countries, provided for the morale and welfare of the soldiers in his unit. The political officer worked out the leave schedule. If a soldier was having difficulties at home or had a financial problem, he went to the political officer, and not to his commander, who was generally considered unapproachable. Matters that in Western armies are considered command responsibilities and in which U.S. Army commanders at all levels are directly involved were relegated to individual political officers at company level, and to political staffs at battalion level and above.⁴⁹

Commanders were so dependent upon their political officers for the care of their troops that, as communist regimes died in the Warsaw Pact, the political officers underwent a slight metamorphosis and were kept on. They became responsible for "civics" instead of political indoctrination; the names of the schools where they were trained were changed (the Lenin Academy in Moscow to the "Humanitarian Academy" and the Wilhelm Pieck Military and Political Institute in Berlin to the "Institute for Civic Education"); and courses in Marxism-Leninism disappeared in favor of the social sciences. But officers with the duties of political officers, if not in name, have nonetheless remained in the armies of all former Warsaw Pact countries, except the former GDR. Russian Navy ships' captains have even been reported to refuse to leave home port without their political officers.⁵⁰

Opinions differ as to whether these officers were political creatures who otherwise would have been failures in the military or were the cream of the crop, chosen precisely because of their intelligence and communications skills. There is evidence that they were among the first to understand the impact of the Turning Point on the NVA and to attempt to do something to bring the NVA into step with its changing society.⁵¹ Whether these officers were good or bad, it remains that the system insidiously integrated the SED, in the person of the political officer, into the most important relationship of trust—that between the commander and the soldier—consequently turning the soldier's loyalty toward the party and away from his chain of command. The consequence for the leader,

who had primarily to concern himself with the tactical mission and less with the well-being of his troops, was alienation from his soldiers.

The NVA's leadership philosophy was patterned on the Soviet style of leadership. Mission-type orders, in which the soldier is given a mission and expected to use his own initiative to complete it, were not given; directives left little to the commander's initiative, much less the noncommissioned officer's or private soldier's. Part of this was due to a compartmentalized organizational structure in which staff officers had direct access and command authority within their competencies over their counterparts in subordinate staffs. There were eighteen technical areas in which this "pipeline" leading past the commander to his own subordinates existed,⁵² and the system led to a lack of flexibility and initiative and to a swelling in the number of staff officers far beyond that of Western armies in comparable organizations. These officers had very circumscribed jurisdictions and often carried out duties performed by a noncommissioned officer in the West, such as running a dining facility or a supply room. Since rank was essentially only pay grade and was not associated with specific duties or responsibilities, an officer could rise to senior rank and never change his job. Whether one was a commander or a staff officer, the opportunities to use one's own judgment and take independent action were few.

Whatever personal frustration individual officers may have felt within such a system, the officer corps was a privileged class within the society. It received priority for housing, a separate economy saw to its needs, and a system of monetary rewards and bonuses boosted officers' salaries above those of their contemporaries in the civilian economy.⁵³ Other advantages, such as early retirement with a good pension, the opportunity upon retirement to cross over to comparable employment in the civilian sector, and more frequent access to state-run vacation resorts, all indicated the special status of the officer corps.⁵⁴

This privileged status was paid for, however, by near-total isolation from the civilian community and from any source of information other than that provided or approved by the state, and also by long duty hours, extreme readiness requirements, and the knowledge that one's personal as well as one's professional life was subject to intrusive observation. Military families usually lived in separate housing projects and were forbidden to watch West German television or to have contacts with West Germans. Although the rest of the population was not supposed to watch or listen to Western broadcasts either, this ban was normally broken by the civilian population, while many former NVA officers insist they felt duty-bound not to watch. In any case, for an officer, being caught conversing with information available only from the West, or being reported by one of the many State Security (Stasi) informers for having

watched or listened to Western broadcasts would mean the end of one's career.⁵⁵

Bundeswehr leaders have been surprised at the number of Stasi informers within the officer corps alone. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of those selected for career or long-term service in the Bundeswehr will be forced to resign, as separate investigations by the Gauck commission, charged with examining all State Security files, uncover their connection with the Stasi.⁵⁶ The Stasi's Administration 2000, the organization responsible for monitoring the NVA, had a formal presence down to the regimental level and informants throughout the companies and platoons. Even a soldier who was not an informant would feel the pressure to report infractions if someone else knew he was aware of them, fearing that the other person might be an informer who would lodge an accusation that the soldier did not report the incident. Electronic eavesdropping was also widespread and was facilitated by the concentration of officers in housing areas. Western observers were astonished at the complacency with which such eavesdropping was accepted.⁵⁷

The housing areas also facilitated the NVA's high degree of readiness. Eighty-five percent of the personnel of each unit in the NVA stood ready in the barracks at all times. Officers not on duty on the installation could be alerted by sirens in the housing areas and had to be in the unit within twenty minutes of the alarms' sounding. All vehicles were kept topped off with fuel and under full combat load of ammunition at all times, because the unit had to be able to depart the installation within one or two hours; most units could quit their barracks in less than the allotted time. Traffic signals were installed at the exits from the motor pools to allow split-second traffic coordination. There is no doubt that the NVA's ability to quit its installations on alert and reach its assembly areas rapidly and in good order would have been difficult for the Bundeswehr to duplicate, especially on a weekend or holiday, but this ability exacted a heavy price.

The high degree of around-the-clock readiness meant little free time for soldiers, noncommissioned officers, or officers. Leaves were carefully planned and subject to last-minute cancellation should sickness or other absences reduce the unit's personnel strength below 85 percent. It was difficult to keep the soldiers gainfully employed with training and maintenance for such long periods of time, and the boredom and close quarters probably encouraged the harassment of young soldiers through the "EK" system. Moreover, since NATO's attack would come at the least expected moment, special emphasis was placed on readiness on such holidays as Christmas, separating families while soldiers waited for the attack that never came.⁵⁸

Since NVA intelligence and thus the political and military leadership of the GDR knew that NATO, and particularly the Bundeswehr, were neither planning to nor were positioned to attack, there must have been other reasons for the insistence on constant readiness. The obvious reason, besides the fact that the Soviet forces insisted upon it, was that it was an integral part of the ideology. Socialism was under threat of attack from the forces of capitalism, and no sacrifice to protect it was too great. A more subtle reason is advanced by Frithjof Knabe, who feels that it was equally important to occupy officers and men totally with the day-to-day problems of maintaining readiness, so as to keep them from questioning the system that demanded these sacrifices.⁵⁹ It is certainly true that this emphasis on readiness perforce isolated the soldiers from the populace, as did the parallel insistence on extreme secrecy, which kept the installations closed to civilians and off the maps. Also, it facilitated the state's control of the information the soldiers received. Once on the installation, the troops were severed from all sources of information other than those sanctioned by the state.

Two very different armed forces faced each other across the inter-German border. One had made a conscious effort to deal, however incompletely, with its past, and sought to be a part of the society that it defended. The other did not come to terms with its past or with its position of privilege within its society. The rapidity of events leading up to and following the fall of the Wall in November 1989, which led to unification, caught both armies unprepared but had their greatest impact on the army that had been cut off from reality for so many years.

The Turning Point

AS THE EIGHTIES WORE ON and Premier Gorbachev's reforms took hold in the Soviet Union, events there and in other Warsaw Pact countries, especially Poland, began to raise questions in the minds of some NVA officers about the future of the GDR and its armed forces. For some of them the moment of truth seems to have arrived while attending the General Staff Academy in Moscow; for those who had attended courses there in the seventies, the decay of the system upon their return in the eighties was evident. In 1988 an NVA officer's wife wrote home from Moscow that the GDR had no more than one year left to exist. For others, the light of reality came with the NVA's role in putting down the riots in Dresden in September 1989, which took place as the trains with the East German refugees from the West German embassy in Prague passed through on their way to the Federal Republic.⁶⁰ As the demonstrations grew in scope and took on the character of a revolution that could bring down the state, the NVA was placed in readiness for a so-called "Beijing solution." It became a point of pride among NVA officers that it did not come to such a solution, but there is a continuing debate about whether the NVA would have fired upon German civilians if so ordered.⁶¹

On 7 November 1989 the government of Egon Krenz, Erich Honecker's successor of three weeks, resigned, and on 9 November the Berlin Wall was opened. The professional soldiers of the NVA, officers and noncommissioned officers, went through severe psychological shock as the regime to which they had dedicated their lives, for which they had made substantial sacrifices of time and effort, and not unimportantly, from which they had derived many privileges and benefits, fell without a struggle. They experienced further shock when they discovered that the Bundeswehr, against whose attack they had so long prepared and because of which they had made these sacrifices, had never planned to attack and that the regime they had served loyally had consistently lied to them.

Compounding this severe blow to its morale and its understanding of itself, the leadership of the NVA was faced with the need to reform the armed services immediately in order to bring them in line with a state governed by democratic principles. Now the attempt had to be made to build a new relationship, without

socialist, internationalist content, between leader and led, to find a tradition that supported “values like peace, freedom, and democracy,”⁶² terms also now devoid of socialist, internationalist content, and make the military palatable to a newly empowered, anti-militarist citizenry. The logical source for information on such matters was the Bundeswehr, but the armies dealt warily with each other. Official guidance concerning contact between the armed forces of the two states did not go into effect until 1 June 1990.⁶³ Personal, unofficial contact, however, took place before that.

In May 1990, while on leave and dressed in jeans and leather jacket, Colonel Hans-Peter von Kirchbach appeared at an NVA installation in Dresden, showed his Bundeswehr identification, and requested entrance. Although this first encounter was met with hesitancy, the visit resulted in an exchange of correspondence, a plan to exchange visits of officers, and a request for a briefing on *Innere Fuehrung* from the staff officers of the 7th NVA Armored Division in Dresden.⁶⁴ Much earlier, in January 1990, and at greater risk to himself, the NVA political officer, Major Frithjof Knabe, had taken the overnight train from Leipzig to Koblenz, placing his career and livelihood in the balance to search for the outside assistance he felt the NVA needed if it were to learn how to be an army in a democracy.

Since he was part of a fifty-man division of political officers on the staff of a corps-sized military district, Knabe took it for granted that a Bundeswehr corps would have an equivalent staff in its headquarters. In Koblenz he reported to the headquarters of the III Corps of the Bundeswehr and was taken to the G2 (intelligence officer), who in turn sent him to the Center for *Innere Fuehrung*. As he had always been taught that *Innere Fuehrung* was the training that made soldiers amenable to manipulation by capitalists in their wars of aggression, he was more than a little concerned about being trapped in the center responsible for the dissemination of this doctrine. Knabe was surprised by the openness and helpfulness with which he was greeted, and he returned by train to Leipzig that night with a wealth of material and promises of assistance once he had digested the information.

Upon reporting his contact with the Bundeswehr to his superiors, Knabe was relieved of duties and threatened with expulsion from the military. He fought this action by building a “citizens’ initiative” and by threatening the NVA with adverse publicity. Members of this citizens’ initiative and one of Knabe’s superiors met with a small group of officers from the Center for *Innere Fuehrung* in March at Knabe’s apartment. This was one of a number of spontaneous attempts on the part of NVA officers to learn how to reform their armed forces. Reforms were doomed to failure, however, because the leadership of the NVA did not change; it was precisely this leadership that had the

greatest interest in protecting the status quo for as long as possible.⁶⁵ When the generals and senior officers were not released from service following the GDR's first free elections on 18 March 1990, and the new Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, took no effective action, hopes for meaningful change in the armed forces ebbed.⁶⁶

From its inception, the new free German Democratic Republic was seen as a transition state to German unity. On 28 November 1989 Chancellor Helmut Kohl provided the Bundestag a ten-point program for German and European unity. However, even optimists thought in terms of years of slow, deliberate integration of the two states and that during this period a down-sized NVA would provide a bridge to the Warsaw Pact armies. In April 1990, Rupert Scholz suggested a "step-by-step" integration process in the "mid-term" through which the NVA first would leave the Warsaw Pact, then combine with non-NATO Bundeswehr units, and possibly become part of a European multi-national force.⁶⁷ At an NVA commanders' conference in Strausberg on 2 May 1990, Disarmament and Defense Minister Eppelmann said that as long as there were two military blocs, the NVA must continue to exist in order to avoid a "military vacuum" on the territory of the GDR.⁶⁸

Even as it became clear that unity was going to come more rapidly than originally expected, the hope remained alive within the NVA that it would somehow continue to exist as a separate entity, at least for a short time. As late as August 1990 Minister Eppelmann was still talking about a separate army in the new states, even after unification.⁶⁹ There is precedent in German history for armies becoming contingents of other armies rather than disbanding. It happened extensively during the wars of unification after 1866 and 1871, and noble officers in the armies of the German states prior to unification often moved from army to army without giving up rank or privilege. This, however, was before the age of ideology, and thoughts of retaining the NVA or units of the NVA did not take into account that it had thoroughly discredited itself with both the political leadership in Bonn and the East German civilian population.

The NVA had also become increasingly uncontrollable. Conscript service was cut from eighteen to twelve months, civilian substitute service was introduced, readiness requirements were cut from 85 percent to 50 percent, and soldiers took part in demonstrations and refused to carry out orders with which they disagreed.⁷⁰ Without the authority of the state and party, officers and noncommissioned officers were hard put to discipline their soldiers. Citizens' initiatives were organized to challenge military authority, as the concept of an "army in a democracy" was understood to mean a *democratic* army. Once it became obvious that the Germans would be unified in October 1990, and rumors that questioned the future of the NVA began to circulate, discipline

became even more difficult to impose. By the time of unification, in the words of one former NVA officer, the NVA was little more than “a band of robbers.”⁷¹ There were officers who prided themselves on having maintained some form of discipline and in handing over their units in good order to the new Bundeswehr commanders, although even they were ashamed at the indiscipline of many of their soldiers.⁷²

The leaders of the Bundeswehr were also caught unawares by the Turning Point. According to Lieutenant General von Scheven, they were “. . . making preparations for something completely different, namely improving their conventional defense capabilities, maintaining their peacetime strength and increasing their basic term of service from 15 to 18 months.”⁷³ Although in mid-June Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, had called for “one state-one army,” the leadership was still thinking of German unity in the long term and in any case had to refrain from formal planning for unity due to its diplomatic sensitivity. Then on 16 July 1990 Chancellor Kohl and Premier Gorbachev agreed on a formula which allowed a united Germany to remain in NATO, reduced the Bundeswehr to 370,000 troops, and cleared the way for almost immediate German unity and sovereignty.⁷⁴ In a curious parallel to the speed with which the Bundeswehr had had to develop in the 1950s, cutting almost in half the six years that the buildup was supposed to take, the Bundeswehr in 1990 was faced with the challenge of planning and beginning to execute its unprecedented mission in the East within less than three months.⁷⁵

Following discussion with his chiefs of staff and other military advisors, Minister Stoltenberg laid down the guidelines for what was to happen after 2 October 1990. The NVA was to cease to exist, and its soldiers would become for the time being soldiers of the Bundeswehr, subject to the regulations and federal laws under which it operated. The units of the NVA would stand down to be replaced by Bundeswehr units made up of a mix of old Bundeswehr and former NVA personnel. Approximately 20,000 career and long-term soldiers (i.e., officers and noncommissioned officers) of the NVA could be accepted to serve for two years in the Bundeswehr with the possibility of further service to be determined at a later time. Draftees who had been called into the NVA on 1 September would be trained according to Bundeswehr standards. A provisional joint command, the Bundeswehr Command, East would initially have command and control of all armed forces in the new states and work directly for the Minister of Defense, thereby keeping these forces outside the NATO command structure, a prerequisite for troops serving in the new states until the departure of all Soviet forces by 1994. The commander of Bundeswehr Command, East would be Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm.⁷⁶

A small liaison group from the Bundeswehr took up its duties with the GDR's Ministry for Disarmament and Defense on 20 September, to be followed after reunification by 693 Bundeswehr officers, who essentially took over command of NVA units down through division level. At least 30 percent of the commands at battalion level were to be in Western hands, including at least one company in each battalion. Although by this time the NVA had shrunk to approximately 103,000 soldiers (including 32,000 officers and 20,000 noncommissioned officers), when one includes the key staff positions that had to be taken over by Bundeswehr officers from the West, there were comparatively few Bundeswehr officers for the number of positions to be filled. In some cases there was only one West German officer in a unit.⁷⁷ Although additional help, especially noncommissioned officers, would later come from the West, the initial complement was kept small to avoid the impression of a conquering occupation force dispossessing the vanquished foe.⁷⁸

Although they were volunteers, some of these officers had second thoughts about working with former NVA officers, and in some cases first impressions seemed to justify their misgivings.⁷⁹ Their thoughts mirrored the internal debate within the armed forces, which had been going on throughout the summer, about the NVA and the nature of its soldiers.⁸⁰ If the officers of the Bundeswehr thought they were going to meet automatons who had supported a communist system out of deep conviction and would now need to be de-programmed, they were mistaken. They soon found that the legacy of the NVA was something else entirely.

The Legacy of the NVA

BY 3 OCTOBER the generals and admirals had already been dismissed from the NVA, as had been the political officers. Officers over fifty-five years of age had been allowed to retire. Then, too, many officers and noncommissioned officers who had truly been convinced of the rightness of their cause and had no desire even to try to work with the Bundeswehr had already left as well. What the first cadre of Bundeswehr personnel found among the personnel and installations of the NVA and among the civilian population of the new German states was the true legacy of the National People's Army.

The run-down barracks with twenty-man bays, furnished with cots, narrow lockers, and stools instead of chairs; the hoses and water buckets instead of showers; the unhygienic latrines and kitchens, often co-located—all were physical evidence of a system that treated the soldier as a cypher. The officers' practice of addressing soldiers up through senior noncommissioned ranks with the informal "*du*" was considered highly impolite in West German professional circles, and the hang-dog, sullen attitude of the conscripted soldiers who had begun their training under NVA standards testified as well to the system's lack of concern for personal dignity and worth.⁸¹

The officers often lacked the basic elements of leadership expected of a Bundeswehr officer. In a controversial article in *Truppenpraxis*, the commander of one of the new home defense brigades described his subordinates from the NVA as ". . . soldiers, whose behavior was characterized by an unknown mixture of trust in authority [and a] paralyzing lack of drive, . . . who widely lacked initiative, elan and creative individuality. . . . They were indoctrinated with the deterministic Marxist philosophy and told it was science. This resulted in alarming educational deficits . . . of former East German Army officers."⁸² One may argue whether Colonel Millotat should have made these remarks in so public a forum, but his observations coincided with the experience and perception of others.⁸³

Nor is it difficult to understand that having served in a system that did not reward, indeed would punish, the sort of traits Western armies look for in their leaders, coupled with the psychological shock of having served a failed society

and the need to adjust to a totally new set of rules of conduct would inhibit one's initiative and willingness to experiment. It must also be remembered that in the first months after unification, officers were waiting to see who would be accepted for two years of service with the Bundeswehr, and therefore, until the fall of 1992, officers faced the much tougher selection for career or long-term status. The pressure not to make mistakes in both of these periods was enormous.

Other legacies of the NVA among the soldiers were the "not my job" mind-set, caused by the severe compartmentalization of duties and specialties, a curious combination of lack of trust in the leadership, and the tendency to believe rumors and whatever appeared in the newspaper—arising, to some extent, from the absence of useful information from the chain of command during the waning months of the regime and previous access to only certain channels of information. There was also a tendency to train to "stopwatch" standards: whatever could be timed was drilled, checked, and rewarded. This attitude toward training and training standards probably arose from a zero-defects philosophy in an army where error could be punished by the party, as well as by the military, and it led to outstanding performance in individual soldier skill training and in the ability to react to alerts already described; however, since the capacity to understand a commander's intent or to use originality in handling a mission could not be timed or checked easily and could lead to mistakes, these qualities were not inculcated in soldiers or leaders. Consequently, there is some question as to whether the NVA accomplished worthwhile training above the company level.⁸⁴

The legacy of NVA among the civilian population was equally unfortunate and boded ill for the Bundeswehr's chances of securing support for the military among the citizens of the new states. Having closed themselves in their installations and housing areas away from the populace; having enjoyed visible privileges such as easier access to automobiles, televisions, and other consumer products; and having been perceived correctly as supporters of the SED and the socialist state, professional military men had built a wall of antipathy and resentment between the armed forces and the civilian populace, which the Bundeswehr would have to break down.⁸⁵ The decision to allow some officers and noncommissioned officers from the NVA to remain in the Bundeswehr did not help this process.⁸⁶

The Challenges for *Innere Fuehrung*

IN DISCUSSING THE ROLE of *Innere Fuehrung* in the Bundeswehr's mission in the new states, one must keep in mind that it addressed a number of audiences. It had to address those in uniform on 3 October 1990, especially those in leadership roles; it had to deal with the attitudes and needs of the young men in the new states who would be conscripted or recruited into the Bundeswehr and those who would become its officers and noncommissioned officers; and it had to come to terms with the civilian population. *Innere Fuehrung* was realized in two ways: first, through formal training at the Center for *Innere Fuehrung*, in the troop or branch schools, and in the field; and second, through the personal example provided by soldiers of the old Bundeswehr, who had lived with the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* throughout their professional lives, who honestly believed in them and their effectiveness in providing a compass for the military in a democratic society and had internalized them to such a degree that these principles informed their actions and attitudes.

Formal classes on *Innere Fuehrung* began in both the East and the West prior to unification. Officers from the Center for *Innere Fuehrung*, in civilian clothes, went east, and officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the NVA, in uniform, went west, as the attempt was made to teach at least the essentials of *Innere Fuehrung* in forty-hour courses held at all of the branch schools.⁸⁷ These were carried on after 3 October 1990 with emphasis upon personnel in leadership positions. This was a rather chaotic time, because NVA officers were being given the opportunity and being encouraged to leave the service with a small severance payment or, if over fifty years of age, with a pension, in order to reduce the number who would have to be involuntarily cut at a later date. About 60 percent of the 32,000 officers on hand on 3 October elected this option.

Thanks to the uncertainties caused by the resignations, the schools would plan courses only to find that there were not enough officers left to support the class, or bus-loads of officers would appear for classes that had not been scheduled.⁸⁸ The effort was made, however, because it was essential that the former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers who remained on active duty have some idea of the Bundeswehr structure, procedures, and discipline.

The emphasis was on their understanding that a military in a democracy did not mean a democratic military and that, although leadership styles were different, leaders still had authority.⁸⁹

By the early spring of 1991, about 6,000 of the approximately 11,000 former NVA officers who had requested to serve a two-year probation period in the Bundeswehr were informed that their applications had been accepted.⁹⁰ Those who were not accepted left the service in the following months. Those accepted had already experienced a reduction in rank (often as many as two pay grades) in order to bring them into step with the Bundeswehr's promotion system, which was a great deal slower than the NVA's had been. These officers could now request consideration for professional status in order to remain in the service indefinitely. For these officers, much would depend on the single officer efficiency report they would receive from their commanders the following April, as well as on the findings of the independent Gauck commission, which was searching for evidence of Stasi collaboration.

Officers in leadership positions and noncommissioned officers, the majority of whose requests for two-year service status had been accepted because of the shortage of noncommissioned officers in the new states, underwent "supplemental training," which consisted of courses at an officers' or noncommissioned officers' school to bring them up to the level of leadership ability corresponding with their ranks, courses at a branch school to become proficient with the duties required by their positions, and practical experience with their sister units in the older states before returning for duty with their own commands. For field grade staff officers, however, this training consisted of a two-week course on *Innere Fuehrung* and on-the-job training.⁹¹

A typical course would begin with an introduction to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*, then concentrate on leadership for the next two days. Subjects covered under the heading of leadership included leading through mission-type orders and by example, providing for the welfare of the soldier, responsibility for subordinates, the tension between individual freedom and duty accomplishment, group dynamics, views of oneself and of others, and interpersonal communication. These officers were made familiar with their legal rights and duties as soldiers through classes covering the constitutional basis for the Bundeswehr, legal protections for the soldier (to include the parliamentary ombudsman and complaint procedures), the legal basis for giving orders and what constitutes a legal order, and the responsibilities of a superior officer. Finally, they learned the principles of political training in the Bundeswehr and about the resource of counseling and care, which they had not had available to them in the NVA. Much of this was done through practical exercises that forced the officers to take positions, think about them, and defend them.⁹²

In the new states, as time was found for political training in the units, it consisted largely of instruction on how to get along and survive in the chaos of democracy and capitalism. Here, former NVA company commanders were at a disadvantage, because they knew no more about their new society than their soldiers and had the added disadvantage of continually having to defend their past service. Even after attending leadership and *Innere Fuehrung* courses, officers and noncommissioned officers had difficulty understanding the principles and explaining them to others.⁹³ An after-action report for one of these courses stated that the participants only half-heartedly adopted the principles and aims of *Innere Fuehrung* and that their acceptance was based on the pragmatic formula: "If it helps me, it's all-right."⁹⁴ In any case, young soldiers from old and new states did not like to serve under officers and noncommissioned officers of the old NVA.

Even if some soldiers were having trouble grasping the formal lessons on *Innere Fuehrung*, and even before things settled down enough in the units to conduct political training, these soldiers were witnessing the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* being lived by the soldiers who came from the old states. The very decision to send so few soldiers from the West was based on a desire not to insult the dignity and feelings of the officers and men of the old NVA any more than was necessary, and this desire was rooted in the central principle of *Innere Fuehrung*. The same was true of the decision of the Commander, Bundeswehr Command, East, concerning the uniform. There were enough fatigue uniforms to clothe everyone in his command, but not enough dress uniforms. Lieutenant General Schoenbohm, with permission of the Minister of Defense, ordered that all soldiers in the Bundeswehr East wear fatigues, to include himself and his staff officers. From the very beginning, visibly at least, there was to be no difference between soldiers of the old NVA and the old Bundeswehr; there were to be no second-class soldiers.⁹⁵

NVA soldiers were repeatedly surprised by the openness and frankness of the Bundeswehr soldiers. For an army who had conducted its business behind closed doors and with highly formalized and rigid speech patterns, and whose officers were inaccessible to the enlisted men, the informality and accessibility of officers like Hans-Peter von Kirchbach and the commander of Bundeswehr East himself, Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm, came as a pleasant surprise. This kind of working environment was encouraged within the Bundeswehr and was repeated often, at many levels. Most Bundeswehr commanders welcome questions from subordinates; if they have information, they pass it on; if they do not, they say so, and soldiers usually have no fear of asking tough questions or requesting assistance. This openness was a key asset for Bundeswehr soldiers in dealing with their counterparts from the East.⁹⁶

The openness extended to the public sphere and to people who had been enemies of the military during their entire professional lives. Bundeswehr commanders opened the installations for visits of civilians, and they visited mayors, pastors, priests, school principals, and other prominent citizens of the towns in an attempt to establish the sort of contact and support they enjoyed, at least to some extent, in the old states. They had public swearing-in ceremonies for the new conscripts and recruits and invited their families and the public. One local commander worked with his local chamber of commerce to set up retraining activities for his soldiers and find them jobs in the civilian economy as they left the military.⁹⁷

As money began to flow in to upgrade barracks and other facilities, contracts went to local firms, providing jobs in the local economies. Although not usually considered part of the Bundeswehr's purview, where NVA installations had provided services to communities, that agreement continued for the time being. This included providing heat to homes from central boilers on the installation, running athletic halls and swimming pools, and even stationing units in areas where the economy had been dependent on the NVA units previously stationed there, whether or not there was an operational need to do so.⁹⁸

This public relations work was generally well received. The swearing-in ceremonies were well attended, school children visited open houses hosted by the soldiers, and the Catholic church in the new states contracted to provide a ministry for soldiers in the installations, which is how the Bundeswehr has traditionally managed such care, rather than having a military chaplains' corps.

The Protestant Church, however, has yet to agree to provide formal, pastoral support in the installations. Despite repeated attempts by local commanders as well as the Commander, Bundeswehr, East to bring the pastors into the military community, they have remained at arm's length. This attitude is not difficult to understand, since the Protestant clergy were among the leaders of the opposition to the GDR throughout its existence. As one pastor told General Schoenbohm, "You know, I have spent my entire professional life fighting the state; my family had to pay bitterly for this . . . and now all of a sudden I should work for a state, that I don't even know . . . you must understand, we need time."⁹⁹ This is an unfortunate, if understandable, attitude, and one can only hope that the clergy's opinion of the military will change through experience with the Bundeswehr, and that this will be the case as well with the rest of the population in the new states.¹⁰⁰

As far as draftees were concerned, little could be done with soldiers conscripted in January and May of 1990, but those conscripted by the GDR in September were to receive basic training to Bundeswehr standard. It was impossible for officers and noncommissioned officers of the old NVA to carry

out this training effectively, so the units relied heavily on their sister units in the West for teams of trainers, especially noncommissioned officers, to support this training. The first soldiers conscripted by the Bundeswehr in the East, called up in January 1991, all received their training in the West, thus raising the training standard and giving them a chance to meet soldiers in the old states. This changed rapidly so that while in the first quarter of 1991, 75 percent of the soldiers from the new states were trained in the West, by the third quarter the number was down to 49 percent and dropping, as training standards rose and more equipment became available for training in the East.¹⁰¹

By mid-1992 a mixed training unit of 218 soldiers, 60 percent from the new states, 40 percent from the old, was formed at an old NVA air force installation at Dietersdorf in Saxony-Anhalt. The basic and advanced individual training provided was considered successful, especially in terms of the ties of comradeship built among the young soldiers.¹⁰² Combining Eastern and Western soldiers in this one training unit may have been done because of a concern about the Bundeswehr in the East's becoming a somewhat separate and second-class army in an armed force in which draftees would usually serve near home and have no opportunity to meet soldiers from somewhere else. Time will tell whether this was no more than just an experiment or is an answer to such a problem, but once the leadership personnel and equipment were available to the Bundeswehr in the new states, the training standards there rose quickly, and the conscript soldiers had experiences comparable to those of the soldiers in the West, such as training at the center at Shilo, Canada.

For the officers of the old NVA, 1992 was a difficult year. The two-year probation period would come to an end, and for those who wished to stay, the officer efficiency report they would receive from their commanders, any academic reports they received from Bundeswehr schools attended, and finally the decision of an independent, citizens' screening board would be key to their future careers. Commanders must have had a difficult time making recommendations. The officers were often away from the unit at training courses or in training with the sister units in the West; there were often two or three officers in one duty position, which made it difficult to know what they could do on their own and which also led to a great deal of one-upmanship among the officers being rated; and it was impossible to determine who was really trying to come to terms with the new circumstances and what it meant to lead in an army in a democracy, and who was merely being opportunistic. Eventually, approximately 3,000 officers, usually younger, lower-ranking officers, were selected for career or long-term (six to twelve years) service. When one considers that 32,000 officers had still been serving with the NVA on 3 October 1990, this action amounted to a purge of the NVA officer corps.¹⁰³ That any

officers were accepted, given the problems of downsizing the forces and the political baggage these officers brought with them, is a credit to the leadership of the Bundeswehr and its belief in the effectiveness of *Innere Fuehrung* in attacking the problematic legacy of the GDR and the NVA.

Whether this faith is justified may still be an open question. Certainly *Innere Fuehrung* had special strengths which favored its use as a tool in this mission. First and foremost it attacked the broken relationship between leader and led in the NVA, which reflected broken human relations in the society of the GDR as a whole. By treating the soldier as an individual with dignity and rights as well as responsibilities, *Innere Fuehrung* forced officers and noncommissioned officers to try to understand and empathize with their troops. That difficulty in dealing with people, along with an understandable problem of grasping the soldier's responsibilities vis-à-vis a democratic state, were the two biggest hurdles the remnant of the NVA in the Bundeswehr had to overcome, and the concepts of *Innere Fuehrung* dealt specifically with them.¹⁰⁴

Coming to grips with the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* also forced those who remained to confront their past and their role in supporting the SED regime. In doing this, they did not always receive the support they should have expected from the soldiers of the old Bundeswehr, many of whom were very judgmental of their Eastern counterparts and boorish in dealing with them. But the overall extent of the Westerners' openness and willingness to work together usually became evident to the more perceptive officers of the old NVA when they considered what they would have done had history taken a different turn and the NVA had taken over the Bundeswehr.¹⁰⁵

Innere Fuehrung's greatest strength may well be that it has become a central tenet of the Bundeswehr's world view and permeates so many aspects of its training and activities. Thus, if the classes were boring or not understood, one could still come to an understanding—through the actions of soldiers of the old Bundeswehr—of what it meant to serve in an army in a democracy. There were many examples of mere time-serving and arrogance among the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Bundeswehr who served in the new states, and this was certainly true when more than just volunteers were required, but by and large the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* were probably taught more effectively by example than through classroom instruction.

The Bundeswehr still faces problems in the new states, some that concern the tenets of *Innere Fuehrung* and some that threaten the very acceptance of these tenets by soldiers in the East, whether they are from the old NVA or are new conscripts or recruits. From its very inception in the 1950s, a central tenet of *Innere Fuehrung* has been that the only acceptable traditions for the Bundeswehr are those that support the ideals of an army in a democracy and that

even soldierly virtues of bravery and loyalty have little meaning separate from the aims for which soldiers fight. Thus, in his letter of instruction of 24 September 1990 concerning the establishment of unified German armed forces, the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr wrote that as the NVA had been, until 9 November 1989, an “Army of the Party and instrument of a dictatorship,” it would cease to exist and . . . “Symbols, uniforms, and traditions of the NVA will not be transferred” to the Bundeswehr.¹⁰⁶

The problem, as the Bundeswehr found in relation to the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, is that traditions do not die that easily; many who served in the NVA, whether they are still in the Bundeswehr or are now in the civilian world, feel that they served honorably in defense of their land and had certain virtues which it would behoove the Bundeswehr to acknowledge. They have disdain for what they perceive to be the Bundeswehr’s nine-to-five attitude toward duty, and indeed, during the logistical support for the U.S. deployment to Saudi Arabia, young former NVA officers often demonstrated greater willingness to endure long hours and hardship than did some officers of the old Bundeswehr.¹⁰⁷ This sort of professionalism may be a quality that an army like the Bundeswehr, which has been criticized for being too “occupational” in its outlook and too closely tied to civilian society, should not dismiss out of hand.

Perhaps the right attitude here is General von Kirchbach’s view that while the NVA’s forty-year existence does not constitute tradition, it is part of German history and should not be ignored. Indeed, as the experience of the GDR proved, to ignore portions of history merely because they are uncomfortable or do not fit into a preconceived story is very dangerous. As von Kirchbach notes, the NVA was a very professional and competent army, at least in some areas, with experience in assistance to the civilian sector that included industrial production in the last years of the GDR, and these facts should be recognized as positive achievements in German military history.¹⁰⁸

In recognizing these positive aspects, however, the Bundeswehr must steer clear of encouraging a tendency for NVA veterans to deny complicity in the SED regime. Some of them are attempting to rationalize their previous actions in the light of information now available to them. Thus, after an initial shock that their high readiness rate seemed to be for nothing, some veterans are now arguing that since the NVA was essentially a defensive army, it had to remain constantly on guard against a Bundeswehr which could afford to take weekends and holidays off because, as the aggressor, it could pick the time and place of its attack.¹⁰⁹ This sort of argument and other myths, including those concerning the reasons for the NVA’s lack of action during the Turning Point, must be met with the hard truth both within the armed forces and in the public. This complex of problems, however, falls well within the competencies *Innere Fuehrung* has

encouraged in the armed forces, and questions of denial and tradition have been previously dealt with in the Bundeswehr's short history. More intractable, because not amenable to solution by the military alone, is the problem of second-class citizenship and the resulting danger of an army within an army.

Second-class citizenship, the feeling that one is being treated shabbily in one's own country, has been prevalent throughout the new states. Once the euphoria induced by unification wore off, East Germans began to feel they were being annexed by the West and that their worth as people was being attacked. High unemployment rates and the failure of Bonn to deliver on what had seemed to be a promise of instant prosperity, along with the arrogance and lack of empathy of many West Germans, including members of the Bundeswehr, have caused some East Germans to overlook the progress that is being made and to long for a security lost with the fall of the GDR. Within the Bundeswehr, these feelings were aggravated by a differential in pay between Bundeswehr East and West, and by what was perceived to be a poor pension plan for NVA retirees. The pay for conscripts became uniform in July 1991 and is becoming equitable for the officers and noncommissioned officers. However, pay, poor facilities, and career uncertainties led to many complaints to the parliamentary ombudsman,¹¹⁰ and continued perceived inequities could play into the hands of NVA veterans who have their own agendas.

Many of these veterans are members of the Bundeswehr professional association, the Association of the German Armed Forces (Verband der Deutschen Bundeswehr), based on their short service as Bundeswehr soldiers in the months following unification. NVA officers who have left the service are still living in housing areas with active-duty former NVA officers, because there is nowhere else for them to go. Retired senior NVA officers are still in contact with their past subordinates, and very senior officers (i.e., generals and admirals) are essentially unreconstructed in their attitudes.¹¹¹ Although powerless now and probably more interested in pay and pension issues than anything else, they could still become a force to be reckoned with should the Bundeswehr in the new states become ingrown and provincial.

In his present position as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Army, Brigadier General von Kirchbach does not believe this will happen to the new states. In April 1993, the first two hundred officers from the new states were transferred to duty in the old states, and normal rotations between old and new states will prevent the Bundeswehr in the East from becoming an army within an army. Newly commissioned officers from the new states attended basic courses in the West in 1993, as well, and in 1994 Eastern officers began attending staff officer courses.¹¹² There are still problems with housing for officers going in both directions: in the West housing is difficult to find and it

is expensive; in the East it is substandard or non-existent. The problem, however, may not be with the officers but with the noncommissioned officers who do not move very much from duty station to duty station in the Bundeswehr, and the conscripts, who generally serve close to home. The distinct possibility that the Bundeswehr may become a volunteer army in the near future could obviate the problem, if volunteers are forced to move, it could, however, make the problem worse if the present policy of seldom moving noncommissioned officers and soldiers continues, because as volunteers, soldiers will be serving longer terms than would conscripts and might not move at all during their enlistments.¹¹³

Innere Fuehrung does not directly address economic difficulties and feelings of second-class citizenship, or the danger that part of a nation, and thus part of its armed forces, could become a backwater ripe for reactionary propaganda. In fact, Baudissin pointed out under similar circumstances in 1956 that soldiers who have problems with pay, facilities, and benefits are going to have difficulty dealing with the higher concepts of *Innere Fuehrung*.¹¹⁴ The Bundeswehr leadership, however, found imaginative solutions to at least some of these problems. Soldiers from the new states who were sent on the United Nations mission to Cambodia, for example, were brought to the old states en route to Cambodia, making them eligible for comparable pay because soldiers from the East, when stationed in the old states, receive the same pay as their Western counterparts. There is some evidence of a sort of unofficial affirmative action program for soldiers from the new states, and if anything, these soldiers may be given the benefit of the doubt to ensure success in their new careers.¹¹⁵ That the building of the Bundeswehr in the new states is regarded as a great peacetime challenge, and that it will be career-enhancing for a Western officer who serves¹¹⁶ in the East, should continue to attract officers of high quality from the old states to the new.

New Missions for *Innere Fuehrung*

THE PROBLEMS JUST OUTLINED pale in comparison to the civil-military challenges in countries to the east of Germany. The countries of the Warsaw Pact, including those in Central and Eastern Europe and of the old Soviet Union, have all approached the Bundeswehr for information about civil-military relations in a democracy. Over two hundred officers from the old Warsaw Pact countries have already attended courses at the Center for *Innere Fuehrung* in Koblenz, and the Center has a two-year memoranda of agreement with the defense establishments of these countries to provide a variety of courses, seminars, and familiarization visits on the theme of "The Soldier and the Armed Forces in and for Democracy." These countries have approached the Bundeswehr because of its proximity and, in the case of countries like Hungary, historical ties. The Bundeswehr is also a conscript army like theirs and has had immediate experience in dealing with a socialist army, the NVA, with similar organization, ethos, and problems.

Yet another reason given for interest in the Bundeswehr and *Innere Fuehrung* is the belief that the Bundeswehr is an example, perhaps the only example, of an army successfully growing out of totalitarianism and into the service of a democratic society. This is not true, however, because as we have seen, the Bundeswehr came into existence a decade after the fall of the Third Reich, and even so, its birth as an army in a democracy was difficult enough. Whether the armed forces of the old Warsaw Pact can make the transition, especially facing problems such as the breakup of their countries and the need for soldiers to decide which state they will serve, is yet to be seen.¹¹⁷ Given the failure of the NVA to reform itself with its old leadership still in place, the prospects are doubtful. Perhaps the best one can hope for is that the need to reduce radically their militaries for budgetary reasons will act to some extent as a purge of the old guard in these countries.

The United States is also assisting in the endeavor to establish proper civil-military relations in these countries, and an understanding of *Innere Fuehrung* in addition to our own traditions of civilian supremacy could only enhance these efforts. Moreover, the armed forces of the United States should

not be so smug as to believe they have nothing to learn in this area. A recent award-winning article in *Parameters* indicated that perhaps in light of the armed forces' changing relationship to civilian authority and growing isolation from the mainstream of American society, greater emphasis should be placed on the sort of training *Innere Fuehrung* has always stressed in the Bundeswehr.¹¹⁸

The principles of *Innere Fuehrung* were born in a difficult time, proved themselves in the old Bundeswehr against hard challenges in every decade leading to unification, and, if not the complete answer to the needs of the Bundeswehr in the new states, they have certainly provided a compass for the first soldiers who went East after 2 October 1990. It has also been a basis upon which soldiers from the new states, whether former NVA or new recruits, can build their understanding of the meaning of their service and their relation to their society. Besides the challenges it now faces in the new states, the Bundeswehr and its guiding principles are confronted by major new challenges.

With the waning of the Cold War and the inception of a dangerous and unknown new world, the Bundeswehr faces the challenge of preparing itself for missions outside the traditional framework of NATO. Whether the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* can be translated to cover the exigencies of out-of-sector missions may be open to debate, but the underlying principle that the soldier is a thinking individual who must understand the "why" even more than the "how" of what is asked of him is leading to discussion within the Bundeswehr, as well as the public, of what should in fact be asked of him. In the public this is being reflected in a record number of conscientious objectors, which peaked during the Gulf War. This negative response among young Germans called into question the basis for the Bundeswehr's personnel planning, even before it became evident that the armed forces will sink well below the ceiling of 370,000 troops agreed upon between Chancellor Kohl and Premier Gorbachev, raising the spectre of a volunteer force.¹¹⁹

If the Bundeswehr does become a volunteer army, the concepts of *Innere Fuehrung* will more than ever have to tie the soldier to his society, because the link of universal military service, which bound the soldier and civil society together, will have been broken. The idea of universal service, dating back to the Prussian reformers of the Wars of Liberation, according to which all able-bodied male citizens served their nation through a term in the military, has become more of a myth in recent years, as fewer soldiers have been needed to fill the ranks, but it remains an important myth in a society seeking to avoid the creation of a military caste. Whether soldiers are recruited or conscripted, if the leadership of the Bundeswehr is to retain the fragile support of the German people, it will have to explain clearly and compellingly the need for a military to protect the interests of a sovereign state, even when those interests lie beyond

its borders. If the Bundeswehr can meet these challenges, it will in no small part be due to the concepts of an army in a democracy enunciated in the principles of *Innere Fuehrung* and used so effectively in its mission in the East.

Notes

1. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 43, no. 2, 2nd Quarter, 1992, p. 170.
2. Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988), p. 45.
3. Potsdam Agreement, 2 August 1945, quoted in Ralf Zoll, "The German Armed Forces," in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, eds. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 213.
4. Quoted by Gordon A. Craig in his introduction to Abenheim, p. xvi. For a modern refrain of this sentiment, see the remarks of an unidentified foreign ministry official concerning the present debate within Germany over out-of-area operations for the Bundeswehr: "Our national values were torn apart by the Nazis, and we have truly taken our post-war pacifism to heart. Moving away from that is and should be a painful process." Quoted in Marc Fisher, "Germans in Somalia: Combat Role Debated," *The Washington Post*, 23 April 1993, p. A18.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Bellamy Press, 1957), p. 2.
6. In a survey conducted in 1950, 70 percent of the male students at the University of Bonn said they would not serve in the military. In 1955, the year in which the first soldiers were sworn into the Bundeswehr, 45 percent of the West German public polled in an opinion survey were opposed to having an army. This number rose to 71 percent among people who identified themselves with the Social Democratic Party. Wayne C. Thompson and Marc D. Peltier, "The Education of Military Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16, no. 4, Summer 1990, p. 589.
7. Abenheim, chapters 2-4, pp. 47 ff.
8. Article 1 (1), *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany* (Wolfenbuettel: Roco-Druck, GmbH, 1990), p. 8.
9. Donald Abenheim points out that this tradition of abuse died hard. In 1956 fifteen paratroopers were killed in needlessly harsh training in Bavaria, and in 1963 a recruit was killed near Stuttgart under a training regimen of forced marches and physical abuse. Abenheim, pp. 172-4, 202-3.
10. Quoted in Abenheim, p. 82.
11. Paragraph 7, "Gesetz ueber die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Soldatengesetz)" in *Politische Bildung und Bundeswehr: Beitrage einer Fachtagung*, eds. Hannelore Kaerber and Bernard Tripp (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 1984), p. 261.
12. Paragraph 8, "Soldatengesetz," p. 261.
13. Paragraph 11, "Soldatengesetz," p. 261.
14. Quoted in Huntington, p. 123.
15. Huntington, p. 99.
16. There have been two decrees to outline what constitute acceptable traditions within the armed forces. One was promulgated in 1965 and one in 1982; both drew a great deal of criticism from within the military, and in 1983 a White Paper was published preparatory to the promulgation of yet a third. This one has yet to appear. Abenheim, pp. 208-10, 281-6.
17. "Approval of German membership in NATO has increased rather consistently, reaching peak, and not minimum, values in the 1980s. In fact, support for NATO membership in the 1950s and 1960s usually was even lower than in the 1970s, so that there has been a continuous upward trend for about three decades." Hans Rattinger, "Change versus Continuity in West German Public Attitudes on National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the Early 1980's," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 4, Winter 1987, p. 500. See also Figure 3, p. 502.
18. See for instance General Heinz Karst comments in Klaus Hornung, "Streitkraefte in Demokratie: zum Verhaeltnis von Militaer und Politik," in Kaerber and Tripp, pp. 30-1. See also Hornung's own comments, pp. 29-30.
19. Harry Summers, "Humanitarian Mission Could Signal Collapse of Fighting Spirit," *Army Times*, 14 December 1992, p. 35.

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20. Bernhard Fleckenstein, "Federal Republic of Germany," in Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, *The Military—More Than Just a Job?* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1988), pp. 177–90.

21. Thompson and Peltier, p. 598.

22. Fleckenstein, p. 188.

23. Thompson and Peltier, pp. 596–7.

24. Zoll, pp. 221–2, 227.

25. Discussion with Colonel Rieck, Director, Division 2, Center for *Innere Fuehrung*, Koblenz, 19 January 1993. Colonel Rieck was Deputy Commander, 42d Home Defense Brigade, headquartered in Potsdam, from January 1991 to October 1992. The 42d was formed from the remnants of the NVA's 1st Motorized Rifle Division, whose mission in wartime had been to cut off the western approaches to Berlin.

26. Siegfried Grimm, . . . *der Bundesrepublik treu zu dienen: Die geistige Ruestung der Bundeswehr* (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970), pp. 120–5.

27. Discussion with Colonel Dieter Francke, Director, Division 3, Center for *Innere Fuehrung*, Koblenz, 18–19 January 1993. Colonel Francke, who leads the Center's division responsible for political education, believes this to be the case.

28. Articles 45b, 87a & b, 96(2), & 115a & b, *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*.

29. Abenheim cites a number of examples of actions and words of military and political leaders raising fears of the military's falling back into the old ways. One of the more famous instances was the comment of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Hans Hellmuth Grashey, in March 1969 to the effect that *Innere Fuehrung* had only been a "mask" to sell the military to the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and Protestant church. (Abenheim, pp. 50, 242). See also the 1964 comments of Parliamentary Ombudsman Hellmuth Heye: "The trend towards a state within a state is unmistakable." (Quoted in Abenheim, p. 203). More recently Lieutenant General Werner von Scheven's official condemnation of an innocuous exhibition about the pacifist author Kurt Tucholsky in Rheinsberg, Brandenburg, as a "relic of the anti-capitalist battle" opened the Commander of the Corps and Territorial Command, East (the army command in the new states) to criticism that he is trampling on civil rights. ("Zensor mit drei Sternen," *Der Spiegel*, vol. 46, issue 42, 12 October 1992, p. 150.) The *Spiegel* article about this incident is a good example of how the German press deals with these kinds of stories: the general is referred to as "aristocratic," and the article mentions that he was formerly responsible for *Innere Fuehrung* training in the West. See also, the *Spiegel's* reaction to proposals to set up a joint command structure as "The Megalomania of the Generals" (Groessenwahn der Generale), *Der Spiegel*, vol. 46, issue 15, 6 April 1992, pp. 18–21.

30. Dietmar Schoessler, "Phasen der NVA—Geschichte," in *Erbe NVA—Eindruecke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende*, eds. Volker Koop and Dietmar Schoessler (Waldbroel: Akademie der Bundeswehr fuer Information und Kommunikation, 1992), pp. 259–64. The standard work in English about the history and organization of the NVA has been Thomas M. Forster, *The East German Army: The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1980). Portions of the book are now dated by information available following union, but the leadership of the NVA itself considered Forster to be largely correct. See Manfred Backerra, ed., *NVA—Ein Rueckblick fuer die Zukunft: Zeitzeugen berichten ueber ein Stueck deutscher Militaergeschichte* (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1992), p. 17.

31. Forster, p. 51.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Forster, pp. 236–7; Abenheim, p. 153. See also Wilfried Hanisch, "In der Tradition von Muentzer, Scharnhorst, Engels und Thalmann?" in Backerra, pp. 255–68.

34. Peter Lange, "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben," *Truppenpraxis*, no. 5, September–October 1990, p. 436.

35. For one example among many, see Joerg Schoenbohm, *Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1992), pp. 87–8.

36. Hans Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, *Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den Neuen Laendern* (Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 1992), p. 73.

37. Quoted in Forster, p. 276.

38. For examples of this sort of material, see Schoenbohm, p. 79; Dietrich W. Streitparth, "Das Ethos der Bundeswehr wird verletzt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 August 1990; and Joachim Nawrocki, "Jeder Tatbestand hat ein Gesicht," *Das Parlament*, 11 September 1992.

39. Koop and Schoessler, pp. 20–4. Also, discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Ickenroth, Center for *Innere Fuehrung*, Koblenz, 19 January 1993. LTC Ickenroth had the duty of closing down the NVA's school for political officers, the Wilhelm Pieck Institute, Berlin. The institute had both a *Stresskabinett* and a *Feindbildkabinett*.

40. This argument was advanced to me by Mr. Frithjof Knabe in a discussion in Leipzig, 21 January 1993. Mr. Knabe was formerly a political officer on the staff of the NVA's Military District III with headquarters in Leipzig, whose major units were two motorized infantry and one armored division in the southern part of the GDR (Forester, p. 116).

41. Guenther Poeschel, "Seefahrt macht frei! Leider nicht immer. . . : Ueber die Volksmarine der NVA," in Backerra, pp. 161–2.

42. Von Scheven, p. 165.

43. The 98 percent figure is from Klaus-Juergen Engelen and Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wer bist Du—Kamerad," *Truppenpraxis*, no. 6, November–December 1990, p. 651. A lower Party membership rate of 96 percent for officers is provided by Ruediger Volk and Torsten Squarr, "Zum Inneren Zustand der NVA," in *Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr*, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 1992), p. 236. According to the authors the fact that 100 percent of the officers were not party members may have been due to officers' waiting for membership—the alibi function of some to show one did not have to be a member of the party to be an officer, or the desire to be able to show an increase of members in later years. Volk and Squarr's total officer strength includes "Faehnrüch," a sort of ensign rank which does not have an equivalent in Western armed forces and which draws its population from the noncommissioned officers. The comparatively low percentage of noncommissioned officers reflects their unimportance in the NVA leadership structure. Noncommissioned officers in the NVA were technicians and specialists, not the leaders found in Western armies. Only about 11 percent of the enlisted soldiers were party members. These percentages are also from Volk and Squarr.

44. Koop and Schoessler, pp. 69–72.

45. Herbert Koenig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," *Truppenpraxis*, No. 3, May–June 1992, p. 235–6.

46. See Forester, p. 165 for a diagram of the party structure in the military and pp. 167–70 for a discussion of the SED's and Free German Youth Association's activities.

47. See, for instance, Colonel Karl-Heinz Marschner's reminiscences in Farwick, pp. 206 ff.

48. Koenig, p. 235.

49. A company with at least one hundred soldiers would have one political officer; at battalion level there were two; at the regiment there were four to six; and at division level there were fourteen to sixteen. At still higher headquarters there would be staffs of forty-five to fifty officers, and in the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of National Defense, the table of organization called for ten generals, eighty-eight colonels, and seventy-one other officers, along with one hundred twenty enlisted and civilian workers. There were also many political officers who were involved in research, education, and editing and publishing the various publications dealing with political training, and assigned to cultural institutions, including some outside the armed forces. Kurt Held, Heinz Friedrich, and Dagmar Pietsch, "*Politische Bildung und Erziehung in der Nationalen Volksarmee*," in Backerra, p. 209.

50. Discussions with Francke, Knabe, and Lieutenant Colonel Klaus-Juergen Engelen, Executive Officer, Division 3, Center for *Innere Fuehrung*.

51. For an expression of the former position, see the views of former NVA officers in Engelen and Reeb, p. 651. Mr. Knabe, having been a political officer, argues of course, for the latter view and believes he himself was co-opted into the ranks of the political officers for having asked some difficult questions. LTC Engelen's correspondence file for the period between the fall of the Wall and the unification of the Germanys contains numerous letters from political officers seeking assistance in preparing training for armed services in a democracy. See also, Held, Friedrich, and Pietsch in Backerra, p. 215.

52. Discussion with Brigadier General Hans Peter von Kirchbach, *FueH I*, 1, *BmVg*, Bonn, 19 January 1993.

53. Typically, the regimental commander had from 80,000 to 250,000 marks to give to his troops as bonuses for outstanding duty performance, to include political activities. Awards could be cash or consumer products not normally available on the civilian market, like power tools or coffee services, and they could be given more than once a year. In twenty-six years of service, one officer received fifty-three such awards, another received ninety-three awards in thirty-one years of service, and a third received one hundred fourteen awards and bonuses in thirty-four years of service. Schoenbohm, p. 130.

54. Guenter von Steinaecker, *Studie zum Thema: Nationale Volksarmee und Warschauer Pakt in der schriftlichen und gegenstaendlichen historischen Darstellung und ihre Bedeutung fuer die Traditionspflege der Bundeswehr* (Strausberg: Bundeswehrkommando Ost, 21 February 1991). This is an internal Bundeswehr study conducted by Brigadier General Doctor von Steinaecker, with an interesting addendum by his wife concerning her impressions of life in the NVA from conversations with the wives of former-NVA officers. See this addendum, p. 2. On the subject of pay, for instance, an average salary for a lieutenant colonel before bonuses and awards were added was about 1,800 marks per month. Someone in a comparable civilian position would have received approximately 900 marks.

55. LTC Engelen tells the story of an NVA officer acquaintance who religiously followed the ban but was contacted by his children's teacher who indicated that they must be watching Western television because they talked about the programs at school. He found they were watching television at a neighbor's apartment and had to explain to them why it was important that they not watch. Such discoveries did not always happen accidentally. In some kindergartens children were shown postcards of popular Western cartoon characters to see who could recognize them and thus indicate that they were watching Western programs at home. See "Die Armee die dabeistand," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 263, 10 November 1990. Personal security measures for watching Western TV in housing areas monitored by State Security and political officers, according to former-NVA Colonel Hans-Werner Weber, included always turning off the television before answering the doorbell and, when turning the television off, moving the dial to a GDR channel. See Backerra, p. 51.

These stories illustrate the scrutiny one came under in all areas of life and the need, as Mr. Knabe puts it, to wear two faces in the GDR: a private one in the family and around only the most trusted friends, and a public one, which conformed to what society expected of one. This ability has troubling aspects for judging the sincerity of former NVA officers' conversion to the principles of *Innere Fuehrung*.

56. Brigadier General von Kirchbach indicated that up to 20 percent of these officers might have to be released from service because of the Gauck commission findings. Some branches, like signal, had appreciably more Stasi informers than others. All officers were required to cooperate with the Stasi. The ones who are being released from service are those who signed agreements to be informers.

57. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Engelen.

58. The high readiness rate and its effect on the morale of soldiers and officers is mentioned in most of the literature on the NVA and comes up in practically all discussions about it. See, for instance, Schoenbohm, p. 203; von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, p. 20; and Koenig, pp. 236-7.

59. Discussion with Mr. Knabe.

60. Nawrocki. See also, Weber in Backerra, p. 59.

61. Mr. Knabe points out that units had been ordered to their barracks and had only the information provided by the state. They tended to believe that the demonstrators were hooligans and probably would have followed orders until they realized their mistake. His own wife and children were on the streets of Leipzig trying to find out what was happening, while he was receiving misinformation in the barracks. Former-NVA Colonel Weber feels the NVA did not react because events came too quickly and that by November 1989 the armed forces were themselves disorganized and impossible to lead. See Weber in Backerra, p. 61. For an opposite view, see the remarks of former-NVA Major General Bernd Leistner in "Sie im Westen wussten mehr ueber uns al wir," *Die Welt*, no. 222, 22 September 1990, p. 5.

62. "Zur Traditionspflege in der Nationalen Volksarmee," *Militaerreform in der DDR*, no. 24, 12 July 1990, p. 3.

63. "Rahmenrichtlinie ueber dienstliche und ausserdienstliche Kontakte zwischen Soldaten der Bundeswehr und Angehoerigen der Nationalen Volksarmee," *Militaerreform in der DDR*, no. 20, 7 June 1990, p. 1.

64. Von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 17–22.

65. Discussions with Colonel Francke, Lieutenant Colonel Engelen, and Mr. Knabe. Citizens' initiatives were the means used to attack injustices and problems during the Turning Point, and one could organize and register an initiative with the authorities if seven people were willing to support whatever the initiative wished to promote. It is instructive that Knabe had to find two non-military members for his initiative, because he could only find four out of a staff of fifty political officers who wished to go on record in support of reforms. According to Knabe, older officers were too involved with the system to have any reason to wish to change it, and many younger officers did not understand what was happening or wish to get involved.

66. Weber in Backerra, pp. 62–6.

67. Rupert Scholz, "Deutsche Frage und Europaeische Sicherheit," *Europa-Archiv*, Folge 7, 10 April 1990, p. 245.

68. The speech is quoted in its entirety in *Militaerreform in der DDR*, no. 17, May 1990.

69. In July 1990 Eppelmann made a statement to that effect to the Japanese press, noted in "General Schoenbohm will nicht Eppelmanns Nachfolger sein," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 September 1990. On 2 August he made a similar statement while on a visit to Bonn. See Donald Abenheim, *German Unity and the Soldier: Problems of Command, Personnel, and the Stalinist Legacy*, unpublished manuscript, pp. 29–30.

70. "Ein Truemmerhaufen der Gefuehle," *Der Spiegel*, vol. 44, issue 10, 5 March 1990, pp. 37, 45.

71. Quoted in Christoph Bertram, "Kommt die allgemeine Dienstpflicht?" *Aktuell*, vol. 28, no. 79, 15 October 1992, p. 3.

72. Marschner in von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 50–4.

73. Von Scheven, p. 167.

74. Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991), pp. 323–4, and 334–8. See also Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington, D.C.: The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1993), pp. 221–3.

75. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, p. 76.

76. Schoenbohm, pp. 30–2. Having completed its initial transition mission, Bundeswehr Command, East stood down on 1 July 1991 and was replaced by separate service headquarters. Despite the fact that the Bundeswehr is considered a single entity, the Bundeswehr Command, East was its first experiment with a joint headquarters in command of all three service components.

77. Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Ickenroth, for instance, single-handedly took command of the Wilhelm Pieck Institute in Berlin, which had a complement of eighty instructors and 572 students, and stood it down 21 December 1990. The old commandant, who was still on hand, and his staff, were uncooperative, and Ickenroth had to discover by himself such things as former Stasi operatives working as drivers, mechanics, and electricians for the institute and listening devices in the classrooms and his own office. For the original number of officers posted to the new states and where they went, see Edgar Trost, "Probleme der Personalauswahl," in Farwick, pp. 176–80.

78. Trost in Farwick, pp. 176–80.

79. See for instance Lieutenant Colonel Manfred Meyers, "Umgeplant" in von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 27–30, and Major General Edgar Trost in Farwick, p. 171.

80. See for instance Dietrich W. Streiparth, "Das Ethos der Bundeswehr wird verletzt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 August 1990. This agreed with an earlier article by Guenther Gillessen, the title of which summed up the position of those who felt there was no middle ground between the Bundeswehr and the NVA: "Disband—without a Remnant" (Aufloesen ohne Rest), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 July 1990).

81. Harmut Neumann, "Maerkische Heide, maerkischer Sand," part 1, *Truppenpraxis*, no. 1, January–February 1992, p. 56. See also, Schoenbohm, pp. 62 and 87 and von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 92–7, 115.

82. Christian Millotat, "Man ist sich fremd," *Truppenpraxis*, no. 5, September–October 1992, pp. 492 ff. English translation provided by Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College. *Truppenpraxis*, No. 1, January–February 1993 had five pages of letters concerning the article, a number accusing Colonel Millotat of broad generalizations, lack of soldierly discretion, and of making the process of building an “army of unity” more difficult.

83. Harmut Neumann, “Maerkische Heide, maerkischer Sand,” part 2, *Truppenpraxis*, no. 2, March–April, 1992, pp. 165–6. See also, von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, p. 81.

84. Millotat and Francke believe it was not; Neumann describes the “stopwatch” mind-set he found when he took command of the 3d Motorized Rifle Regiment in Brandenburg (Part 2, p. 166). Rieck felt that in some individual soldier skills, NVA soldiers were both better trained and equipped than their Bundeswehr counterparts.

85. For other sources of friction, see von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, p. 69.

86. Some East Germans believe that tigers do not change their stripes and that the retention of NVA officers and noncommissioned officers in the Bundeswehr is another example of the old cadres’ retaining their positions of privilege in the new society. People, whether military or civilian, who make the change from communist to democratic principles too easily and quickly are tagged with the descriptive term “*Wendehals*,” as if, like the bird of that name, they could turn their heads around 180 degrees on their necks. A Berlin joke runs: “Why do so many people wear turtle-necks? So you can’t see the screw threads on their necks” (quoted in Mrs. von Steinaecker’s addendum to her husband’s report, p. 5). For an example of how this attitude affects the Bundeswehr, see General Schoenbohm’s own experience of being mistaken for a former-NVA officer (Schoenbohm, p. 138). An acquaintance in Auerbach, Saxony summed up the civilian attitude toward NVA officers: “They were all Stasi” (discussion on 22 January 1993).

87. “Hans, das ist unsere Demokratie,” *Der Spiegel*, vol. 44, issue 39, 24 September 1990, pp. 86–90.

88. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Siegfried Frei, German Army Liaison Officer to the Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia, 30 October 1992.

89. Discussion with Colonel Francke.

90. Trost in Farwick, p. 194.

91. Von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, p. 118.

92. Program of Instruction for “Ergaenzungslehrgang Innere Fuehrung mit Stabsoffiziere,” conducted at the Center for *Innere Fuehrung* in Koblenz, 4–15 November 1991.

93. Schoenbohm, pp. 136–7.

94. After Action Report for “Ergaenzungslehrgang ‘Innere Fuehrung mit Stabsoffizier,’” conducted at the Center for *Innere Fuehrung* in Koblenz, 4–15 November 1991.

95. Schoenbohm, pp. 33–4.

96. Discussion with Colonel Francke.

97. Schoenbohm, p. 178.

98. This argument can be made for stationing the 41st Home Defense Brigade in Eggesin in Mecklenburg–Vorpommern, previously home of the 9th NVA Armored Division. The army is the largest employer in this economically depressed region. See Karl Feldmeyer, “Truppenalltag in Eggesin,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 September 1992

99. Quoted in Schoenbohm, p. 143. See also Lieutenant Colonel Neumann’s frustrating attempts to provide pastoral services for his troops, and the opposition among the clergy, especially female pastors, to any connection with the military. Neumann caustically concludes that anyone who rejects his profession so totally as does the Protestant clergy really has no business being on his installation. Part 2, pp. 166–9.

100. See Chapter 7, “Bevoelkerungsgruppen” in Hans-Viktor Hoffman, *Demoskopisches Meinungsbild in Deutschland zur Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1991* (Waldbruel: Akademie der Bundeswehr fuer Information und Kommunikation, 1992), pp. 167–80, which argues that on military and security topics the opinions of citizens in old and new states are very close but that citizens in the new states have yet to understand the importance of security questions for them and to understand the institutions of the Federal Republic, including the Bundeswehr. As of 1991 there were differences, however. For instance, 21 percent of East Germans would have had Germany leave NATO versus 10 percent of the West Germans.

Forty-six percent of East Germans thought NATO was no longer important and 47 percent thought European armies in general were no longer important. p. 179.

101. Koop and Schoessler, p. 311.

102. Volker Gruss, "Kameradschaftlich der Vereinigung ein weiteres Stueck naehrgekommen," *Aktuell*, vol. 29, issue 5, 19 January 1993, p. 3. See also, Manfred Meyers, "Ausbildung" in von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vost, pp. 114–16.

103. This was the term used by Dieter Detke, Executive Director of the Friedrich Ebert Institute in Washington D.C. at a seminar at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1 March 1993. The exact figures for the Army (not including the Air Force or Navy) are: 1,067 career commissioned officers, 598 career warrant officers, and 576 officers with six to twelve-year commitments, for a total of 2,241 officers. This total is still subject to become smaller if more evidence of Stasi connections are found. Discussion with Brigadier General von Kirchbach.

104. Discussions with Brigadier General von Kirchbach and Colonel Francke.

105. Schoenbohm, p. 138. Answers to the question range from NVA officers saying they would not even have shaken hands with Bundeswehr officers to the problem of shaking hands never coming up, because all the Bundeswehr officers would have been in prison camps. Discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Frei.

106. Quoted in Farwick, pp. 180–1. The *Zentrale Dienstschrift 10/1: Hilfen fuer die Innere Fuehrung*, the regulation providing guidance to the troops on *Innere Fuehrung*, is presently under revision, but will almost certainly state that NVA traditions are unacceptable to the Bundeswehr.

107. Discussion with Mr. Knabe and Abenheim manuscript, *German Unity and the Soldier*, p. 44.

108. Von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, pp. 169–70. In his book, von Kirchbach goes on to say that traditions of Bundeswehr units disbanded in the old states should not be transferred to units in the new states, and that his own 41st Home Defense Brigade should remember that it was formed out of the 9th NVA Armored Division, not out of love of tradition but because it is history. In discussion he mentioned that he had kept equipment from the 9th Division on hand, ignoring directives to turn it in, with the objective of eventually establishing a unit museum. On the subject of NVA assistance in civilian production, it should be noted that as the GDR's economy collapsed, more and more soldiers were diverted from military duties to service in factories and mines, often doing work in conditions too dangerous for civilian workers, until 55,000 soldiers were working in the civilian economy. The units still had to remain at 85 percent readiness despite this loss of manpower.

109. Discussion with Colonel Francke.

110. Holger Arnold, "Zunehmend sozialer Zuendstoff in der Truppe," *Neue Zeit*, 18 September 1992.

111. Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Frei, Lieutenant Colonel Ickenroth, and Mr. Knabe. In connection with his doctoral work at the University of Leipzig, Mr. Knabe interviewed fifteen former-NVA generals and admirals. According to his findings the majority of them had not changed their views and felt that socialism had only been incorrectly implemented. Some of them also told him that they had considered a putsch at the time of the Turning Point but had decided not to carry it out after the Soviet Forces in Germany told them they would not support it and because they had no idea what they would do if they took power. Concerning membership of former-NVA officers in the "Verband Deutscher Bundeswehr," I found divided opinions among Bundeswehr officers. Some felt that since they had served, even if only two or three months, they had a right to be there. Others felt that membership gave them an air of respectability which they did not deserve.

112. Discussion with Brigadier General von Kirchbach.

113. For discussion of the possibility of a volunteer Bundeswehr, see "*Wehrpflicht am Ende?*" *Der Spiegel*, vol. 47, issue 6, 8 February 1993, pp. 36 ff.

114. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, pp. 171–2.

115. Discussion with Colonel Bernd Mueller, Army Attaché, German Embassy, Washington D.C., 18 December 1992. In both his book and in discussion, Brigadier General von Kirchbach makes no secret of the fact that he is a "booster" of the soldiers from the new states, and takes every opportunity to present them in a favorable light. That he also

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understands the ongoing difficulties, which *Innere Fuehrung* must address, is evident in a speech to the officers of the 41st Home Defense Brigade reprinted as "Offizier im Heer der Einheit," *Truppenpraxis*, no. 4, July–August, 1992.

116. Discussion with Colonel Rieck.

117. Discussion with Colonel Francke.

118. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, vol. 22, no. 4, Winter 1992, pp. 10–11, 15.

119. "Gewehr unterm Baum," *Der Spiegel*, vol. 47, issue 2, 11 January 1993, pp. 34 ff.

Glossary

Image of the Enemy	<i>Feindbild</i>
Association of the German Armed Forces	Verband der Deutschen Bundeswehr
Bundeswehr	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany
Citizen in Uniform	<i>Staatsbuerger in Uniform</i>
Civilian Control of the Military	<i>Primat der Politik</i>
<i>Die Wende</i>	Turning Point
<i>du</i>	Familiar form of "You"
EK	<i>Entlassungskandidat</i> (candidate for discharge)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
<i>Innere Fuehrung*</i>	Inner Leadership
National People's Army	National Volksarmee (NVA)
NVA	Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army)
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
Parliamentary ombudsman	<i>Wehrbeauftragter</i>
<i>Primat der Politik</i>	Civilian Control of the Military
Reichswehr	Imperial Army (Term for the German Armed Forces prior to 1935)
SED (<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland</i>)	Socialist Unity Party
<i>Staatsbuerger in Uniform</i>	Citizen in Uniform

The Newport Papers

Turning Point

Verband der Deutschen Bundeswehr

Wehrbeauftragter

Wehrmacht

Die Wende

Association of the German
Armed Forces

Parliamentary ombudsman

World War II German Army

*See text referring to note 2 for Dr. Donald Abenheim's description of *Innere Fuehrung*.

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