Boko Haram

Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups

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Boko Haram

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Maps

Nigeria and Surrounding Areas

Boko Haram

Origins and History

HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS CONNECTIONS TO BOKO HARAM

This article is an overview of Boko Haram’s operations, territorial control, allegiances, and socioeconomic impact on Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. The article covers its growth and evolution since its creation in 2002, and the steps taken by Nigerian and partner counterterrorism forces to disrupt Boko Haram operations during this time.


The BBC’s Nigerian country timeline lists key events in the country’s history and provides context with regards to the rise of Boko Haram.


This Nat Geo article was written by a British colonial official. He explains how the history of violence in northern Nigeria has led to the brutality put forth by Boko Haram. This type of radical fundamentalist violence has been occurring for many years prior to the official existence of Boko Haram. It provides a history of north Nigerian conflict.


This article points out that Boko Haram traces its roots in northern Nigeria to over ten years. It describes the group’s origins as going all the way back to an anti-Western radical preacher named Mohammed Marwa. The group’s ideology is derived from the anti-western culture preaching’s of Mohammed Marwa and how his followers began dissenting against the government in the town of Kano. The article provides excellent information on the topic.

OVERVIEW

The Counter-Extremism Project’s Nigerian Country Profile provides a holistic analysis of  
Nigerian extremist groups and regional counterterrorism efforts. The overview also has a  
tracker of major incidents and domestic counter-extremism operations and policy  
initiatives.

http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553.

Provides a detailed brief about the group’s operations, leadership, goals, and history. The  
Militant Map also shows the groups relationship with other militant organizations such as  
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Sreenivasan, Hari., and Nick Schifrin. “Poverty, Corruption Fuel Boko Haram in Nigeria.” PBS,  
November 29, 2015.  

This video presentation and accompanying transcript looks at several of the issues that  
Nigeria is facing, and how they are impacting the population there. Boko Haram is a  
serious threat and according to the article they have killed more people than the Islamic  
State. In addition to the attacks of Boko Haram, Nigeria is dealing with high levels of  
corruption and widespread poverty despite growing wealth and an expanding middle  
class. There are also concerns regarding human rights issues and fair treatment of its  
citizens.

News.” April 19, 2014.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DqRlcrqU3-A

This is a brief BBC video providing a general overview of Boko Haram.

Forest, James. “Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria.” Joint Special  

A 178-page JSOU report on the armed group, accessible online and in-print (multiple  
copies are available in CIWAG). It provides an overview of modern Nigerian political  
history, Boko Haram grievances, and the implications of the insurgency for SOF.  
Goals/Strategy
ATTACKS

This article by the BBC provides infographics, maps, and charts derived through statistical analysis of Boko Haram activity in 2016 and 2017. Despite the Nigerian government’s public claims of progress and its near defeat of Boko Haram, in 2017, Boko Haram was able to maintain or increase its levels of activity in most regions of Northeastern Nigeria.


This link contains maps that showcase Boko Haram’s fight against the Nigerian military. It also mentions 4 critical stages of violent activity.

OVERVIEW OF THREAT LEVEL TO U.S.

This is a House Homeland Security Committee report on the potential threat Boko poses to the U.S. homeland. It discusses in a detailed manner Boko’s potential to go international, its connection to Al Qaeda, the Nigerian offensive, etc. The link leads to the website with the PDF.


A congressional hearing on the threat the group poses to the U.S. Looks at its origins and evolution, its tactics and collaboration with other armed groups, and its communications and media strategies. Also considers US options for engagement.

OVERVIEW OF RECRUITING AND FINANCING

Analysis of extremist groups often focuses on their ideologies, but the study of regional
economic factors is equally important in understanding how these groups operate. Disenfranchised youths are the demographic most vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment - extremist groups give them a place to go when they have no other options. Forbes interviews a Nigerian entrepreneur who focuses on developing agricultural communities to employ local young people and keep them out of the hands of terrorist organizations.


The Mercy Corp spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram, community members living under Boko Haram’s rule, and youths that were in their sphere of influence but did not join the group to ascertain how Boko Haram recruits its members and interacts with the community. The key findings from these interviews revealed that there was no typical demographic profile for Boko Haram recruits, and many joined because they perceived Boko Haram as providing more opportunity for long-term financial security and business growth than through other means.


This is a report by the Combating Terrorism Center specific to Boko Haram activity in the Lake Chad region. It provides excellent discussion on the group’s financing, recruitment, and arms trafficking in the area.


This article observes how the development deficiencies in Nigeria serve to support Boko. It argues that the government must address these economic problems in order to defeat the group.


This article points out that Nigerian officials have announced the existence of a female wing of Boko Haram. Authorities also released photos of some prominent female recruiters.
**OVERVIEW OF SECURITY THREATS TO THE AREA**


The Nigerian Security Tracker catalogues data from extremist violence in the region in a series of maps, graphs, and charts to provide an easily digestible and visual representation of the security situation in Nigeria. The data that is primarily displayed in the data set demonstrates the magnitude of fatalities as a result of Niger Delta and Lake Chad region militants.


TRAC provides an assessment of violent extremism in Africa and breaks down the impact of armed groups on African states. In Africa, Boko Haram is responsible for more violent events than any other group, resulting in over 10,000 deaths in 2015 alone.

**FOREIGN FIGHTERS**


Cases, Trends and Implications: CIWAG case study author Jacob Zenn examines Boko Haram’s Senegalese network to evaluate how extremism is growing in Africa’s Sahel. So far, 29 Senegalese citizens have been arrested on charges related to supporting Boko Haram, and these case studies provide key insights into the network’s operations.


This article highlights footage found in captured Boko Haram camps by Nigeria’s military show the influence of foreign fighters in the Islamist militant group’s leadership. This provides the clearest indication to support the claim that Boko Haram has been receiving outside support in its six year-long insurgency.

**STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

This statistical analysis study was carried out by START. It contains a variety of statistics on Boko as of 2013.


This article contains various figures regarding the Boko insurgency up until 2014. It also provides some basic information on the group.

**Leadership**

**Abu Bakar Shekau**


This backgrounder on the Emir of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekakau, provides an overview of Shekakau’s life, and his road to becoming the leader of Boko Haram in the Yobe State.


This article discusses how Abubakar Shekau has been rumored to be dead for the past few months. However, in a video published in October several Boko members stated that he was still alive. They also re-pledged their allegiance to ISIL.


This video claims to interview individuals who knew Abu Bakar Shekau. It contains brief interview excerpts.

**Other Leadership**
OVERVIEW

This report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point analyzes the leadership of Boko Haram as well as its breakaway faction, Ansaru. It examines rifts between the leaders.

ABU QAA-BH SPOKESMAN

A summary of a British newspaper’s 2012 interview with Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Qaqa. Includes links to the original piece, as well as other Guardian reports on the armed group.

BOKO HARAM FRACTIONALIZATION & LEADERSHIP CHANGES


Abubaker Shekau released a book providing the direction and history of Nigerian jihad from the perspective of Boko Haram. The book was released in response to works published by other Islamist groups in the region: Ansaru and Abu Mus’b al-Barnawi’s Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA). Shekau’s book provides insight to his theology and perspective on Nigerian politics and how the Islamic caliphate should be run. The article and counter narratives provide a unique perspective to the divide between the three major groups in Nigeria.

- Read the English translation of Abubaker Shekau’s book here.
- Read the English translation of Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi’s history “The Islamic State West Africa Province vs. Abu Bakr Shekau” here.
- Read the publication of Ansaru’s history here.


ISIL’s biggest and deadliest franchise outside the Middle East, Boko Haram, fractured in recent weeks over ISIL’s decision to replace its notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau. This
split, while weakening Boko Haram in the immediate term, could have dramatic consequences for how jihadists continue their struggle in Nigeria and in neighboring countries.


In the summer of 2016, Boko Haram split into two groups that have at times clashed with each other. One of the groups remains adhered to Abubakar Shekau, who was Boko Haram’s leader since 2009 and the other group follows Abu Musab al-Barnawi who has been recognized by ISIS as the leader of the group. Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram kidnapped almost 300 schoolgirls and would regularly use them to carry out suicide attacks. Attacks would be carried out against any soft target regardless of its affiliation or significance. Barnawi’s faction more closely adheres itself to ISIS and sees itself as representing the Islamic State West Africa Province. This faction seeks to only target Christians and follow what it refers to as “true jihad.” The two factions have fought each other regarding their tactics and end goals.

**Major Attacks**

**ATTACKS IN NIGERIA**

*KIDNAPPING OF SCHOOL GIRLS*

A recent abduction of over 100 schoolgirls in Dapachi, sheds light on the group’s reasoning and practice of conducting mass kidnappings. Some estimates suggest that the group has also abducted nearly 10,000 boys, who frequently join Boko Haram’s ranks as child soldiers. Women, who become radicalized by the group and join of their own free will, or are forced to join the group serve a variety of different roles in Boko Haram. Many contribute by serving as recruiters or assist in the group’s logistics, while others become fighters or suicide bombers, participating in kinetic attacks against the government or dissenters.

The Nigerian government is in the process of negotiating for release of 83 of the schoolgirls taken by Boko Haram from Chibok in 2014. Boko Haram released 21 of the abducted girls previously yet there is an even larger group that does not want to leave. It is possible that not only have they been brainwashed during their captivity but also are afraid of the potential for being ostracized and the stigma placed upon them by their communities if they return.


The Nigerian government was able to negotiate the release of 21 of the almost 300 abducted schoolgirls from Boko Haram. With Boko Haram splitting into two factions, negotiations have been more difficult and the government is concerned that the captured girls may be spread out amongst different areas that Boko Haram controls.


This article is on the news coverage regarding the mass kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok, close to the border with Cameroon. The article also points out that many schools across Northern Nigeria have been closed due to fear of Boko attacks.

**COLLECTION OF ATTACKS**


Nonpartisan Nigerian blog that lists Boko Haram’s attacks and major operations from 2009 through January 2017.


This article recaps a week of violence by Boko Haram which killed over 200 people during Ramadan. While the regional coalition has retaken most of the territory from the insurgent group, northeastern Nigeria is still prone to consistent, high-casualty attacks.

This is a CNN link that provides summaries to the major Boko attacks of 2013 and some in early 2014. The link also contains video footage of some of the major attacks through this time.

**Borno Village Attack**

This article points out how Boko attacked a village in Borno, killing 56 people. The article cites the state’s governor as saying that Boko Haram is a threat to both Christians and Muslims.

**Abuja Attacks**

Coordinated suicide bomb attacks by Boko Haram members at a mosque and market in the Abuja province left at least 30 people dead. The attacks occurred during afternoon prayer and was the largest magnitude attack of its type in the Abuja province since 2015. The attack underscores the ability of Boko Haram to invest minimal human and material resources to disrupt state operations and the lives of civilians in Northeastern Nigeria.


This article discusses another major Boko attack that occurred recently in October of 2015. The article points out that well over 1,000 people died from May to October 2015. Since 2009, 2.5 million people have been displaced due to the fighting.

**Baga Attack**
This article discusses one of the deadliest Boko attacks that left up to 2,000 people dead. The attack occurred over multiple days.

**INCREASED USE OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS**


Several young women share first-hand accounts of their ordeals as would-be suicide bombers for Boko Haram, and how they foiled the acts of terror their captors planned for them. Boko Haram has increased their use of child bombers, particularly girls, whose garments can more easily hide explosives. A campaign has launched in Nigeria to let captured children know they have the option to surrender, but some are too naive or too terrified and carry out Boko Haram’s orders. Terror in the region has led to the deaths of many children who were suspected of, but ultimately not carrying suicide bombs. Those who do surrender can face ostracization from people who think of them as part of a Boko Haram organization for carrying the bombs, regardless of their unwillingness to do so.

Aminu Abubakar. “Suicide Bombing In Nigeria Kills 8.” *CNN*, November 23, 2015  

This article discusses a deadly suicide attack in the town of Diwka. The town was recently liberated from Boko but suicide attacks are still a threat. The victims were mostly women and children at a military checkpoint.


This piece looks at the attacks conducted by Boko Haram and how they are responsible for the deaths of more civilians than ISIS is. The attacks are conducted in neighboring states and have included mass kidnappings, conventional assaults, bombings, but mostly suicide bombings. The attack strategies have shifted, whereas previously attacks were mainly conducted with firearms in previous years, as of 2015 suicide bombings have increased. The article also expresses concern regarding increased attacks due to Boko Haram’s allegiance to ISIS.

**FOCUS ON SOFT TARGETS**

This report originally comes from the Department of State Services in Nigeria, warning residents of Abuja that they had received several reports regarding potential attacks from Boko Haram targeting places of worship and marketplaces. Letters and text messages were sent to individuals and different religious leaders warning them of this and provide numbers residents could call to report anything suspicious.

**CLASHES AGAINST NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT**


Boko Haram members attacked and seized a small military base in northeast Nigeria. Initial reports state that 13 soldiers were wounded and several are unaccounted for. A spokesman for the Nigerian army claims that this is a minor setback and operations are underway to find the missing soldiers and push Boko Haram out of the base. This is the third attack in the month of October on a military target. The assailants are suspected to be a splinter group of Boko Haram that calls itself the “West Africa Province of the Islamic State.”

**ATTACKS IN CHAD**


Violence by Boko Haram has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Chad, exacerbating conflicts between its traditionally migratory communities. Vigilantes have played a role in fighting Boko Haram, but a return to state control and influence is necessary to build cooperation with neighboring countries and take measures to counter extremists. Among other actions, the Chadian government must find effective, humane ways of screening and dealing with suspected Boko Haram members it has taken prisoner; improve communication between itself and its populace; and propose a long-term development for the Lake region that will grow its economy.

Boko Haram released a message claiming the attack made on a religious procession of Shiite Muslims near Kano. They threatened to continue these attacks until they have killed all Shiites.


Enhance government powers were put into place in order to control the movement of people and vehicles, in response to Boko Haram attacks. There have been several attacks in areas around Lake Chad and other areas. Chad may be a continued target due to its hosting the regional force established to fight Boko Haram.


This article discusses one of the most recent Boko suicide attacks in Chad. 2 Chadians were killed in the attack. Boko, once again, used women suicide bombers.


In a major cross border attack, Boko haram fighters attacked and killed 11 Chadian soldiers. The Chadian soldiers had taken up positions just one mile from the Nigeria-Chad border.


This article describes a major Boko attack in N'djamena where an alleged Boko operative dressed in a Burka and blew himself up. In response to attacks such as this, Chad eventually banned the use of Burkas in some areas. The attack killed 15 people and injured 80 others.

**Niger**


This article points out how Boko fighters killed 2 Niger soldiers in a cross border attack. As of October, 2015, the Diffa region in Niger witnessed 57 attacks. The government has placed Diffa in a state of emergency due to the attacks.
The article uses statistical analysis and large-n data to find trends in the activities of Boko Haram in Cameroon. The report found that due to losses suffered by Boko Haram in 2016, the group was unable to maintain its operational tempo from 2015. A lull in Boko Haram recruitment, and an inability to maintain supply lines has hindered their sustainment and weakened the capacity of the group to wage conventional warfare capabilities. Since 2015, the group has primarily resorted to asymmetric and hybrid warfare to keep pressure on the government and dissident vigilante groups and communities.

An attack conducted by Boko Haram in northern Cameroon killed 11 people. It is reported that two female suicide bombers attacked a military base near the Nigerian border and then conducted a separate attack on the village of Gouzoudou. Northern Cameroon was victim to a Boko Haram attack the previous week and the article states that in 2014 alone, 6,644 people were killed by Boko Haram.

This article discusses one of Boko’s latest attacks against Cameroon where five suicide bombers attacked various targets in northern Cameroon. The attackers were female suicide bombers, a hallmark of Boko Haram. At least 12 people have been killed. The Boko insurgency has killed 20,000 people and displace more than 2 million.

This article describes a major Boko attack in Cameroon that killed 30 people and injured 145 others. The attack took place in the northern Cameroonian town of Kerawa. The article also cites a government official as saying that Boko’s tactic is now to target civilians in quick raids instead of engaging troops.

This article describes Cameroon's struggle with Boko. It points out that Boko killed five people in Cameroon in retaliation for an operation against Boko. The government also announced that it would bolster troop presence in the northern parts of the country.

**Use of Child Soldiers**


Surviving al-Shabab: The Boy Who Escaped the World's Most Ruthless Terror Group:Abdi, a former child soldier of al-Shabaab, talks about his experience as an al Qaeda-affiliated militant in Somalia and the treatment he received at the hands of the group. For al-Shabaab, child soldiers are useful because they are impressionable, easy to manipulate, and disposable on the front lines. In 2017 the group recruited 1,770 child soldiers.


This article cover the abduction and brainwashing of close to 10,000 boys by Boko Haram with the end goal of using them as fighters and suicide bombers. The information comes from the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments, Human Rights Watch, and children who escaped from Boko Haram. Boys are kidnapped, beaten and trained to use weapons. They are often thrown against government forces with few weapons and drugged on opiates. Those who escape are either too scared to go home, are afraid of endangering their families or of being captured by the government. Many are also forced to live in hiding due to the continuous threat of Boko Haram and the local populace labeling them as spies for the group.

**Affiliations**

**AQ-ISIL-BOKO**

This article points out how Boko, AQ, and ISIL recruits are training together in two training camps in Mauritania. It provides various forms of evidence that fighters belonging to AQIM are training Boko Haram fighters and ISIL supporters in camps in Mauritania. The article also states that Boko relies on AQ in Mauritania for weapons supply lines.

**ISIL AFFILIATION**


Analyzes the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) document ‘Slicing Off the Tumour’ – a response to Shekau’s extremist policies and practices as part of the Boko Haram leadership in Nigeria. The piece takes a harder stance against Shekau, in contrast to a 2011 document from AQIM written during a time of Boko Haram-al-Qaeda affiliation, which speaks on Shekau’s policies in a more diplomatic manner (See: AQIM Advice to 'Boko Haram' Dissidents: Full Translation and Analysis). The authors consider the question of Boko Haram’s existence as a result of local structural issues versus the result of global jihadi influence.


This article points out that ISIL formally accepted Boko’s pledge of allegiance. The acceptance was posted on pro-ISIL websites and was not able to be immediately verified.


While the Nigerian military may defeat Boko soon, its ties to ISIL may cause some of its fighters to foray into neighboring states as they may continue to be motivated to carry out jihad by ISIL. The article also provides other analysis on the group.

**AQ AFFILIATION**

Provides a full translation of a text written by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to advise Boko Haram dissidents skeptical of Abu Bakr Shekau’s extremist policies. The main body of the text (excluding the 2017 introduction) was written at a time when Boko Haram affiliated itself with al-Qaeda, and the document attempts to reconcile Shekau’s methodologies with al Qaeda’s practices. The translator provides analysis in the context of a recent debate between Boko Haram scholars that argues the importance taking into account primary and secondary source materials together to piece together a more complete narrative. With that in mind, the author suggests the introduction is equally important as the main text, coming from an al Qaeda operative six years after the original text was written. Both offer insights into the history of Boko Haram.


The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise, maps the group’s many factions, loyalties, splintering, and re-formations. It provides insight into the seams and gaps that exist, and how strategic and tactical motivations have propelled an armed group to regional importance. The study dissect how the group’s evolution has taken place under the watchful eye, and often directing hand, of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham and highlights its starring role in a new international rivalry: the uncivil war between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.


This article from 2014 discusses Al Qaeda’s links to Boko. It points out that as far back as 2002 Bin Laden began developing connections to Salafi groups in West Africa, including what would become Boko Haram. It provides various interactions of Boko and AQ throughout the years.

**Counterterrorism**

**Nigerian Efforts**

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari discusses his nation’s recent efforts to tackle their growing problem of Islamist extremism. He referenced his nation’s partnership with the U.S. and neighbors to counter extremist rhetoric and develop rehabilitation programs.
to reintegrate former members of Boko Haram into the general population. He also touched on the negotiated release of schoolgirls captured by Boko Haram, and new programs established to reintegrate former members of Boko Haram back into society.


The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) announced that they conducted an airstrike on what was described as a “mass gathering” of Boko Haram members in Borno State. In addition to this, NAF representatives stated that they destroyed a weapons storage area, a bomb-making factory, vehicle workshop, and several vehicles as well. The air campaign has continued to play an increasing role in the fight against Boko Haram.


Although Boko Haram has been steadily losing ground, it continues to carry out high profile bombing attacks throughout the region. The military push into Boko strongholds is causing its fighters to disperse and rely more on suicide bombings. The group generally uses women as suicide bombers.


The Nigerian government recently released a poster for the top 100 most wanted Boko terrorists. The poster resulted in the arrest of Chindo Bello. He was boarding a flight at Abuja airport when police arrested him after a tip off.


This article by CFR describes how Boko has steadily been losing territory. However, it says that while they lose territory, Boko has been able to show flexibility in unconventional tactics. It points out that the group has increased its use of suicide bombers and other unconventional tactics following its loss of territory.
This brief article quickly describes how President Buhari is aiming to define a clear goal against Boko Haram. It briefly describes changes made by the top leadership of the armed forces, creating a coalition, and growing the economy.


This is a documentary by Vice News that observes the Nigerian Army’s efforts to counter Boko Haram. A reporter is embedded with a Nigerian unit battling for control over Konduga. It also shows interviews with Nigerian troops and their views on fighting Boko Haram.

**REGIONAL GOVERNMENT CLAIMS SUCCESS**


Four main factors have influenced Boko Haram’s decrease in attacks: failure to expand its territory, loss of popular support, poor strategic thinking, and improved counterinsurgency operations. However, the war against Boko Haram will require more effective regional counterinsurgency coordination to end this conflict.


Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai of the Nigerian army stated that Boko Haram has been greatly diminished and has lost its former mobility. According to Buratai, the group’s capabilities have been reduced and all media purporting their numbers and abilities are solely propaganda.

**TACTICS OF NIGERIAN LAND FORCES**

This article examines a report by Amnesty International which documents the extrajudicial executions and mistreatment during detention of civilians by Nigerian security forces and allied militiamen. The Nigerian government is under constant criticism for not adequately carrying out its counterinsurgency campaign.


This article discusses the increasing role of Niger and Chad in the regional fight against Boko Haram, as its forces liberate areas within Nigeria without the presence of the Nigerian security forces. The lack of Nigerian troops after the liberation of insurgent strongholds portrays the Nigerian government as an unwilling partner in the counterinsurgency campaign.


This is a video documentary by Frontline PBS that discusses the fighting against Boko Haram by the military and pro-govt Muslim militias. It conducts various interviews regarding the militias and provides information that shows them as very useful in fighting Boko. It also contains evidence of atrocities committed by the militias and how these atrocities lead to more people joining Boko.


This is another Frontline PBS video that points out the heavy handed tactics used by the Nigerian military. It points out how the military falsely accuses people of being involved with Boko.

**ANALYSIS OF CT CAMPAIGN**


In order to counter Boko Haram in Nigeria, the state has adopted a number of policies and practices that allow its military to harass and ultimately alienate its population. The military is used to round up and detain civilians and kill them without due process. These
practices are enough to drive people into the arms of radical groups like Boko Haram to escape harassment. The article suggests that in order to salvage the relationship between the state and its people, the counterinsurgency strategy must shift to adhere to current human rights norms, the Nigerian military must be held accountable for its actions, and a dialogue must be opened between the public and the leadership.


This article evaluates the causes behind the limited impact of the Nigerian military on Boko Haram expansion. No serious progress was made on countering the group until troops from Niger and Chad became involved in the campaign. The failings of the counterterrorism actions against Boko Haram (until outside intervention) are attributed by the author to poor military and civilian leadership along with failing military professionalism.


The author of this article seeks to evaluate the impact, effectiveness, and consequences of Nigeria’s counterterrorism campaign against Boko Haram. Nigeria is no stranger to conducting operations against non-state actors and has been with few breaks since its independence in 1960. The author looks at the origins, tactics and strategy of Boko Haram and applies the three sub-types of hybrid warfare (fourth generation warfare, compound wars and unrestricted warfare) to the different phases of the conflict between Nigeria and Boko Haram. This conflict has not been solely relegated to Nigeria. Chad, Niger and other neighboring countries have been attacked by and are involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The author concludes that Nigeria’s initial response was lacking and allowed for the expansion of Boko Haram. Corruption and limited training plaguing the Nigerian military along with a misinterpretation of the conflict by the government. Outside training and military aid have been essential in the fight against Boko Haram.

This is an analysis piece on Nigeria’s efforts against Boko. The author provides various suggestions for the security forces to become better at combating the group.

**Potential Negotiations**


This article points out that President Buhari might be open to enter negotiations for the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls. The article cites President Buhari as saying that if Boko can prove the girls are alive, they are willing to enter negotiations.

**Regional Efforts/AU**


This short briefing from the European Parliament Research Service outlines the efforts being under taken by the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter the cross-border threat of Boko haram in the Lake Chad basin which has created a humanitarian disaster in the region.


This article points out how a regional task force has been set up between Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Benin and Nigeria. The task force is being designed for offensive operations against Boko Haram on Nigerian soil. As of February, 2015 the 8,700 strong taskforce’s strategy had not been finalized.

**Creation of the Force**


https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-african-union-readies-an-army-to-beat-boko-haram-694150ba6ebb#.y0y3h6r1h
This is another article discussing the AU Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko. It points out that Chad may be the most valuable partner in the Task Force. Chadian troops are said to be highly experienced in counter-insurgency.

**Leadership**


This article points out how a Nigerian commander will head the taskforce against Boko. It also states that the taskforce will be stationed out of N'djamena, Chad. It also points out that Nigeria accused Cameroon of not doing enough to destroy Boko safe havens on its side of the border.

**Regional Access**


This article points out that the regional governments working against Boko have developed more trust amongst each other. The regional force will now be able to cross borders between these states as a result of this developing trust. It also points out that Boko has lost many of its strongholds but is turning more to suicide bombings.

**Chad**

**Counterterrorism**

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsyM6p2hNqE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsyM6p2hNqE)

This video details the Chadian fight against Boko Haram. It points out that Boko Haram fighters cross Lake Chad and attack various villages. It says how lakeside residents in Chad have been kidnapped and killed, prompting a Chadian military response. The video follows a Chadian unit that has been deployed to the Cameroon-Nigeria border area to prevent Boko infiltration.

This article points out that the Chadian military is highly experienced in counter-insurgency warfare. However, the article also points out some issues the Chadian military may have. It states that the Chadian military performed extremely well against Islamists in Mali. However, during deployments to CAR the Chadian military was hit with many human rights violations and was even accused of allowing the Seleka rebels to roam free. Chad had agreed to deploy 2,000 troops to fight Boko.

**ARRESTS BY CHAD CF FORCES**

http://www.aol.com/article/2015/07/01/chad-forces-arrest-boko-haram-leader-hold-74-others/21203991/

This article points out that a Boko leader, Bahna Fanaye, was arrested by Chadian security forces. It says that Fanaye was coordinating weapons transfers between Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon. A further 74 other Boko suspects were also arrested.

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/boko-haram-chad-arrest-foreigners-terrorism-crackdown-following-ndjamena-attack-1507312

This article points out how Chad responded by rounding up many foreigners after twin bombings blamed on Boko. Chad also banned face veils for women, arguing that it allows attackers to “camouflage” themselves.

**WESTERN EFFORTS**

**FRANCE**


This article discusses France’s increasing role in the fight against Boko Haram.

**REQUEST FOR U.S. TROOPS**

This article points out that Nigeria’s previous president, Goodluck Jonathan, wanted U.S. troops to get involved against Boko Haram. He claims that Boko Haram has connections to ISIL. The article points out that former President Jonathan requested combat troops and advisors.

**U.S. Contreterrorism Efforts**


This case study explores U.S. assistance in the Lake Chad region to demonstrate the effectiveness of defense, development, and diplomatic missions on states in crisis. The report is intended to educate policy members on the methodologies for supporting at risk states. Due to the complex nature of the Lake Chad Basin’s Boko Haram insurgency and other regional militant organizations, the report focuses heavily on how the “3Ds” (defense, development, and diplomacy) can be wielded to combat various threats and better enable local stability operations.


This article points out that U.S. troops have begun deploying to Cameroon to support the regional fight against Boko. 90 troops have already been deployed and an additional 300 will be sent to provide intelligence support. The article also cites POTUS as saying that the troops will remain in country for an indefinite amount of time.


This CFR special report provides various U.S. policy recommendations to counter the Boko threat.

**Local Impact**

*Living in Fear*

Areas formerly controlled by Boko Haram are still suffering despite being liberated. They are still at risk for new attacks and are facing regular food shortages. Many are living in old public buildings and makeshift shelters because their hometowns are not safe to go back to.


This article describes the aftermath of living in a town that has been recaptured from Boko Haram. Everyone is still nervous and cannot go about all aspects of daily life for fear of another attack or that Boko Haram might be waiting for them outside of time. Vigilance is important and locals are asked to report anyone who does not belong to their town or village.


This article features firsthand accounts from individuals who survived Boko Haram attacks. The attacks have become so frequent and have caused so much damage that the residents do not have time to mourn and recover. Since so many businesses have been lost and families impacted, trading and stores open up just a day or two after the attacks because the inhabitants still need to buy food and go to work. In addition to the loss of life, many people are losing jobs due to lost business or are let go due to the expenses of operating in the area.

For additional individual accounts, and the difficulties faced as a refugee, see: Vinograd, Cassandra., David Lom, and Keir Simmons. “Boko Haram Massacre Survivors Flee Nigeria to Island in Lake Chad.” *NBC News*.  

*DESTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS*

“Boko Haram Destroyed More Than 1,000 Schools This Year.” *Al Jazeera*, November 16, 2015.  
This article points out that Boko destroyed 1,000 schools in 2015. The group’s name means “Western Education is forbidden.”

**SOCIAL MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA**


Social media sites are rapidly becoming more frequently used by extremist groups to release propaganda messaging, and although Boko Haram was slow to adopt digital media, they now have a robust social media presence. The organization is outperforming its local rival Ansar by posting videos on Facebook and Telegram, and using sympathetic media outlets to distribute its message and enhance its recruiting efforts.


This article analyzes the similarities in propaganda between Boko and ISIL. It points out how pro-ISIL online operatives started promoting Boko’s newly launched Al-Urwah Al-Wuthqa. The article observes various similarities including the increasing sophistication of Boko’s online media.

**COMPETING JIHADI GROUPS**

**ANSARU**


This article points out how an emerging Jihadi group, Ansar, is enemies with Boko Haram. It describes Ansar as an Islamic terrorist outfit; however, it is fighting against Boko Haram because the latter is attacking Muslims in addition to Christians. Ansar seeks to only target Christians.


This link is a profile of the Ansar Islamists. It points out that the group is motivated on a radical Islamist ideology and has the stated goal of “defending Muslims in Africa.” It also wants to bring Islamist law to all of Nigeria. Ansar is said to be an offshoot of Boko Haram. Ansar’s followers believe that Boko Haram is inhumane as it brutally attacks
Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Ansaru tries to portray itself as a more rational and less brutal alternative to Boko as it does not believe in killing innocent people.