1-1-2017

Trans-Sahel Armed Groups

Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups

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CENTER ON IRREGULAR WARFARE AND ARMED GROUPS

Reading List

Trans-Saharan Armed Groups
Last updated January 2017

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Maps

The Sahel and North Africa

PART I: Armed Groups and Associated Threats/Issues

Trans-Sahel

**OVERVIEW**

http://www.wsj.com/articles/jihad-comes-to-africa-1454693025

With the political map of West Africa largely one of weak and under-delivering postcolonial governments, militant strains of Islam have been moving to fill the vacuum, fostering the growth of terrorist groups seeking to gain and assert power over large swaths of the continent.

**BOKO HARAM**


The activities of Boko Haram in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria have highlighted the need for more effective counter-strategies. Nigeria’s difficulties in defeated Boko Haram has security ramification that go beyond its borders, especially for West Africa. This article applies the concepts of hybrid war, compound war, fourth generation warfare and unrestricted warfare to the confrontation between the Nigerian state and its Islamist challenger.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/nigeria-boko-haram/

Several infographics detail Boko Haram’s attacks on civilians since 2011, the group’s evolution throughout the years, and internally displaced persons from Nigeria.


A map serves to illustrate the locations of bombings involving females used by Boko Haram since June 2014. A total of 113 female suicide bombers have been used as of May
13, 2016. The majority of these suicide bombings have occurred in Nigeria, however, the violence has spread to other countries.


Instead of burning homes and abducting hostages, Boko Haram fighters gathered livestock and any kind of food they could round up. After rampaging across the region for years, Boko Haram appears to be falling victim to a major food crisis due to 2 million people fleeing their homes and farms.


This video presentation and accompanying transcript looks at several of the issues that Nigeria is facing, and how they are impacting the population there. Boko Haram is a serious threat and according to the article they have killed more people than the Islamic State. In addition to the attacks of Boko Haram, Nigeria is dealing with high levels of corruption and widespread poverty despite growing wealth and an expanding middle class. There are also concerns regarding human rights issues and fair treatment of its citizens.


This BBC video documents the role of and challenges faced by the Cameroonian Army and the coalition of African countries that are fighting Boko Haram. As the campaign against Boko Haram in Nigeria has seen more success, the terrorist group has expanded its area of attacks into neighboring countries. Success on the military front has made an impact, but the complete destruction of the group is difficult not only due to their remote bases in mountain caves but by their integration into the population. Thus, coalition forces have to look for threats from inside the cities and towns and in the more remote areas as well.

Bauer, Emma and Meghan Conroy. “Boko Haram: Nigerian Military Crackdown Prompts Terror Group To Adapt.” *Jamestown Foundation*, April 15, 2016. [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45323&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=374968081b2118dc24ab0c9d92d61fe2](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45323&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=374968081b2118dc24ab0c9d92d61fe2)
The Boko Haram insurgency has shifted its tactics away from conventional warfare and toward more asymmetric tactics over the past year as it battles Nigerian security forces under the new leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari. The group’s use of children and women pose a more unpredictable and difficult threat for the Multinational Joint Task Force.


While Ansaru has been fairly quiet for the past couple of years, Nigeria’s military claimed in April 2016 to have captured its leader. The splinter group’s strength, importance, and relationship with Boko Haram are chronicled.

**Niger Delta Avengers**


This article examines the economic impact of the Niger Delta Avengers on the Nigerian state. The damage has tipped Abuja toward recession and has cost its position as the continent’s top oil producer. Criminal groups in the Niger Delta have targeted oil companies for profit for several years, yet these attackers are more interested in undermining the Buhari administration than they are in oil revenues. NDA has sabotaged at least 10 separate oil installations in the past month. The article presents an overview of the grievances between the Niger Delta residents and the Nigerian government.


The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) has declared war on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure, with an upsurge in attacks coinciding with a dramatic fall in oil production in Africa’s biggest petrostate. The group’s membership is likely made up of disaffected ex-militants who have not benefited from the presidential amnesty program that brought the previous campaign of anti-oil militants to a close in 2009.
An overview of the Niger Delta’s long history of militancy is chronicled dating back to
the early 2000s until the present day. Underwater bombings of oil pipelines, likely by
divers, highlight the technical sophistication of the NDA’s attacks who are
simultaneously running an extensive social media campaign against the Nigerian
government.

AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

content/uploads/2016/09/Mali.pdf

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s objectives, close ties to al Qaeda, support
from aggrieved populations, and ability to field and regenerate advanced attack
capabilities are making it a potent long-term threat to Western interests. The increasing
sophistication of AQIM’s attacks is a dangerous sign that the group is gaining strength
despite ongoing international counterterrorism operations.

Zenn, Jacob. Dario Cristiani. “AQIM’s Resurgence: Responding to Islamic State.”
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45164&cH
ash=2521bec5032d67e675f7434856109ab3#.V087YLgrJ9A

AQIM and its allied militant groups have undergone an operational revival since late
2015, expanding their area of operations and mounting high-profile attacks in Burkina
Faso and Mali. Local and regional concerns play a role in these, but a more significant
factor is the growing rivalry with Boko Haram and ISIL’s other affiliates in Africa.

Region.” CTC Sentinel, January 19, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-hotel-
attacks-and-militant-realignment-in-the-sahara-sahel-region

The attack on Bamako’s Radisson Blu Hotel in November 2015 shocked Mali and
confirmed the reach of jihadist group al-Mourabitouen and the continued challenges to
security in the region. The attack also marked the absorption of al-Mourabitouen into
AQIM amid tests to the latter’s position from fighters who have pledged allegiance to
ISIL. AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operations outside of their traditional stronghold in Mali, a trend that will likely continue in 2016.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/beyond-grand-bassam-terrorism-on-the-west-african-coast/

AQIM has shifted their lethal focus to hotels frequented by tourists and Western expatriates. Any successful counterterrorism strategy must consider local governance, economic opportunity, and regional intelligence sharing, as the threat of terrorism becomes the new normal for littoral West Africa.


Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the official franchise in the region, but it tolerates the existence of several other semi-autonomous terror groups within its sphere of influence -- and in some cases it purportedly facilitated their creation. AQIM and its affiliates have conducted high-profile attacks outside Mali in the face of French counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Saharan.


This article presents an interactive map illustrating approximate locations of al Qaeda-linked attacks in Mali and neighboring countries since 2014. Included are IED attacks, rocket attacks, suicide bombings, attacks, and “other”. IED attacks in the northern corridor continued through 2016 in addition to being utilized in the south-central. The number of rocket attacks increased in 2015 to regions not targeted the year prior, however AQIM’s primary targets continued to be in the north. The number of attacks with small arms / light weapons spread central, south, west, and cross-border against villagers and government targets.


Al Qaeda and its many allies and affiliates launched at least 257 attacks in Mali and the wider West African region in 2016, nearly a staggering 150% uptick from the group’s
106 assaults in the 2015 calendar year. The large number of attacks also represents a resurgent al Qaeda-led insurgency in northern Mali, which has been able to penetrate into southern Mali with greater frequency than in previous years.


This article discusses the Radisson Blu hotel siege in Mali. Mali has announced 3 days of national mourning after gunmen stormed the Radisson Blu hotel and took guests hostage, killing up to 27 people. Malian and international troops stormed the hotel in order to free the guests. So far, three different groups claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Esso, Gaëlle and Laura Burloux. “Video: Hunting Down Jihadists In The Malian Desert.” France 24, 

More than 3,000 French troops remain on the ground and have managed to drive jihadist groups out of some zones, but they and their Malian counterparts lack the manpower to control the whole desert.

Northern Africa

Overview


Al Qaeda affiliates are experiencing increasing competition with ISIL franchises as jihadists reach deeper into Africa. Analysts fear this will push local jihadist groups to coalesce into pan-regional threats. France has 3,500 troops across five countries in the Sahel to exert pressure on jihadist communication and supply lines.

There were six attacks by ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula, mostly directed at security checkpoints army and police positions. There was also an attack on the Swiss-Inn hotel in el-Arish and the downing of the Russian passenger jet in October, 2015.

ISIS in Libya have attacked military checkpoints, hotels, embassies, military training camps, and towns. They have expanded their presence in Libya.

**WEAPONS**


This report is the product of field investigations conducted over ten months, in eight countries, to reveal sources of weapons for armed groups and Islamist fighters across North and West Africa. It identifies a network of Sahelian trafficking routes stretching as far afield as Syria, Mali, and Ivory Coast.

**LIBYA**

**OVERVIEW OF MILITIAS**


With nearly 2,000 militias operating in Libya, this article offers a primer on the non-jihadist groups (i.e. Libya Dawn, Libya Shield); jihadist groups (IS, Ansar al-Sharia); and pro-government groups of the internationally-recognized authorities (Libyan National Army; Zintan, al-Sawaig, al-Qaqa brigades), including anti-Islamist militias.


A former high-ranking officer in Gaddafi’s military, Haftar returned to Libya in 2011 where he became a key commander of the makeshift rebel force in the east. He called on Libyans to rise up against the elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), after it failed to confront the Islamists. In May 2014 Gen Haftar launched Operation Dignity against Islamist militants in Benghazi and the east. In March 2015 Libya’s elected parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) – which had replaced the GNC – appointed him commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Although successful in pushing the Islamist militants out of much of Benghazi, Haftar still opposes the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA).
A justice ministry statement announced that the Tripoli-based administration would stand down to prevent further bloodshed, less than a week after the arrival in Tripoli of a UN-backed national unity government. The Tobruk-based administration, formed by the House of Representatives, still opposes the UN-backed body.

The U.S. and its allies have been forced to court unreliable allies from among a patchwork of Libyan militias that remain unaccountable, poorly organized, and divided by region and tribe. Three groups: the Libyan National Army, Zintans, and Misuratis are profiled in this article.

This shows the logistics shortages and the difficulties in coordinating between the anti-ISIS militias (The Benghazi anti-Terrorism Unit) and the Libyan military. ISIS has a solid foothold in Benghazi and the regular army and militias are fighting to remove them. Yet the inefficient communications and coordination, lack of ammunition and outdated weapons greatly hinder the ability of the militias. The militias believe that unity between the various anti-ISIS forces and better equipment would allow them to retake the district from ISIS and then move on to other districts. The commander of the militia force argues that ISIS is not only better equipped but has better training and tactics, if they are not checked in Libya they will spread to Egypt, Tunisia and other parts of Africa, following that he believes it will spread to Italy and other parts of Europe. It also shows how the inhabitants have learned to try to go about their lives in the midst of the fighting.

If the security situation in Libya deteriorates, any foreign intervention into IS’ strongholds in the north would likely have unforeseen consequences for southern Libya, a strategically vital region that supplies most of the country’s water and electricity. Militants could react by targeting this infrastructure or fleeing southward, destabilizing
the region. An overview of the tribal situation and strategic sites in southern Libya are presented in this article.

**IS AFFILIATES AND STRATEGY IN LIBYA**


To ensure its economic sustainability, IS has attempted to capture energy infrastructure in the east, in addition to spreading south and west into the remote desert regions to secure access to lucrative smuggling routes running through the vast Sahara desert. In addition to drawing foreign terrorist fighters to its Libyan stronghold, IS also pressures defectors from Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) and splinter affiliates of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to join its Libyan franchises.


This article offers a primer on Libya’s IS affiliates including their strength, reach, notable attacks, and essential background information.


IS is laying the groundwork to abandon Sirte and will then pursue an alternative course of action to continue its campaign in North Africa without its Libyan stronghold. IS will most likely seek to build a safe haven in southwestern Libya, but it also has the dangerous option to escalate its campaign in neighboring Tunisia.


A little-known group of battle-hardened and highly capable Libyans are the common factor behind many of the major terrorist attacks in Europe and North Africa since 2014, including the Paris attacks last November.

ISIL and another militant group known as Revolutionary Punishment have both claimed responsibility for an attack that killed a group of police officers, illustrating how mainland Egypt has become a hotbed of militant activity. Meanwhile, the government laid blame on the Muslim Brotherhood.


Attacks by ISIL in Egypt show two clear trends: attacks on the security services and targeting of tourists and the tourism industry. Terrorism in the country is rising despite intensive counter-insurgency campaigns, while the government simultaneously panics from the seeds of social movements planted by the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011.


ISIL is taking steps to destabilize mainland Egypt by steadily making inroads. ISIL has struggled in advancing its Egypt agenda but recent trends indicate ISIL could consolidate mainland militants’ efforts and escalate insurgency in the future by providing the training, weapons, and leadership.


Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 crashed over the Sinai Peninsula late October after a bomb was placed on board allegedly by ISIL. The bomb killed all 224 people on board.
**Tunisia**


There have been an increase in infiltrations from Libya into Tunisia after a U.S. airstrike on an ISIL training camp outside the Libyan city of Sabratha, near the Tunisian border. From its positions in Libya, ISIL will likely continue to utilize its large contingent of Tunisian fighters to carry out attacks intended to undermine Tunisian stability.


Dozens of ISIL fighters from Libya snuck into Tunisia and attacked an army barracks and police bases in the town of Ben Guerdane, further indicating the how Libya’s chaos has spilled over into its neighbor. Between 4,000-6,000 Tunisians have left to fight for ISIL in Syria, Iraq, and Libya are now beginning to return to the country to carry out attacks on their homeland, including attacks on a beach hotel and a museum security forces believed were carried out by Tunisian gunmen who trained in Libya.

**AFRICOM Update**


The official website of AFRICOM provides updates on their mission statement, operations, and coordination with local partner nations.


This summary with some selected quotes lays out the key points of the 2016 AFRICOM Posture Statement by General David M. Rodriguez. In the statement, Gen. Rodriguez describes the growing economy, population and influence of Africa and how it is important that the U.S. to assist with the security of the continent. The overall lack of democratic governments and limited employment options are both factors in the rise of violent extremists in Africa. Gen. Rodriguez provides an overview of the current situation
and threats in the different regions of Africa. In particular to Libya, its lack of a central government and uncontrolled borders provide an environment for violent extremists to expand, especially Islamic State-Libya (IS-Libya). In Western Africa, Boko Haram continues to be the main threat. He continues by praising the role of the different multinational coalitions involved in combatting violent extremists in Africa. Other concerns include the destabilizing roles of China and Russia, in regards to China’s resource harvesting and both China and Russia selling weapons on the continent.

PART II: Role of China in Africa: Involvement, Economic Strategy and Investments

Involvement


Some 4,800 miles from Beijing, China is constructing its newest naval base in Djibouti, giving the Asian nation its first overseas military outpost. This will grant Beijing access to the Arabian Peninsula and allow it to project force near its investments in sub-Saharan Africa.


There is growing evidence that some Chinese firms that leap into Africa are struggling with the same problems Africa has long given Western investors, despite significant investment in airports, copper mines, oil rigs, and civic infrastructure. Chinese firms experience difficulties in dealing with the national and local governments as the latter sometimes refuse to honor the international agreements of the former. However, the total stock of Chinese investments grew twenty-fold between 2005 and 2014, from $3.2bn to $32bn, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.
Economic Strategy


Though not in the Trans-Sahel region, China has played a serious role in infrastructure construction and copper mining in Zambia in particular. Starting in 2008, with the building of the TAZARA Railway and the “Special Economic Zone” in Zambia, China has invested close to 11% of Zambian total GDP of $26.8 billion. It is mostly in construction, infrastructure, manufacturing, and copper mining. In addition to its role in infrastructure, China in 2014 began funding Mandarin instruction in Zambian government secondary schools.


China has become Africa’s biggest trade partner, as of 2015 exchanging $160 billion in good a year and up to one million Chinese workers moving to Africa. However, India is fast catching up with goods exchanges set to reach $100 billion this year.

Investments


China’s investment in Nigeria is having significant economic, political, and social ramifications that are creating a fertile recruiting ground for terror groups like Boko Haram. Chinese-funded infrastructure projects rely on construction materials imported from China rather than local firms, while Chinese trade theft of Nigerian textile designs has led to a thirty-fold Nigerian job loss in that sector over the past twenty years.

Johnson, Steve. “China By Far The Largest Investor In African Infrastructure.” Financial Times,
Chinese institutions are already the largest single source of funds for African infrastructure, accounting for $13.4bn in 2013, with state-run development finances accounting for 80 per cent of the funding in Africa.

PART III: Populations Trends and Immigration

Nigeria Population Trends


Nigeria is Africa’s most populated country and with an estimated 130 million inhabitants, one in every five Africans is a Nigerian.


Population forecasts from the United Nations point to a new world order in 2050. The number of people will grow from 7.3 billion to 9.7 billion in 2050, 100m more than was estimated in the UN's last report two years ago. More than half of this growth comes from Africa, where the population is set to double to 2.5 billion. Nigeria's population will reach 413m, overtaking America as the world's third most-populous country. Congo and Ethiopia will swell to more than 195m and 188m respectively, more than twice their current numbers. India will surpass China as the world's most populous country in 2022, six years earlier than was previously forecast.


The United Nations estimates that Africa's population will double to 2.5 billion by 2050. About 400 million of these people will live in Nigeria alone.
Refugee and Migrant Trends

Pogatchnik, Shawn. “Libyan Smuggling Route Grows 1 Year After Mass Drownings.”
Associated Press, April 17, 2016.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/03c3f57f911645cb8e355ac051e79c20/libyan-smuggling-route-grows-1-year-after-mass-drownings

One year after Europe’s deadliest migrant disaster, humanitarian and security efforts off the lawless coast of Libya face a growing challenge to catch smugglers and bring asylum-seekers to safety. However, crackdowns on migration at other EU borders are increasing the traffic at the southern Mediterranean crossing. Libya’s paramilitary chaos may make the North African nation a particularly attractive launching point for Europe-bound migrants.


From Agadez in central Niger, hundreds of thousands attempt to cross the Sahara and reach Europe. But more die in the desert crossing than do in the Mediterranean and many are kidnapped by traffickers or bandits and subjected to physical or sexual abuse in the process.