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## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN—EXCEPT WHAT'S NEW

*Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century*, by Andrew L. Oros. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2017. 320 pages. \$90.

Andrew Oros, director of international studies at Washington College, opens his new book provocatively, proclaiming that in security policy “Japan is back.” He then describes a series of government decisions made in the last decade that indicate a shift away from Japan’s postwar reliance on soft power and economic diplomacy toward a more pragmatic and militarized national security posture.

Oros uses the Western European Renaissance as a self-admittedly imperfect framework for understanding the threshold-crossing transitions that have taken place within Japan’s incremental evolution. He draws four general parallels between the two renaissances. First, both situations blossomed after cultural taboos were challenged in public. Second, both were directly related to changes in the global order. Third, just as Western Europe’s Renaissance was entwined with a growth in interest in the region’s classical legacy, many groups in contemporary Japan are reevaluating their views of history, particularly their perspectives on the nation’s military and cultural accomplishments. Finally,

both transitional eras were marked by significant advances in communications technology that enabled a more rapid exchange of ideas and greater access for previously marginalized sections of society to participate in political discourse. In Europe, this technology was the movable-type printing press; in Japan, it is Internet-based social media.

A decade ago, Richard J. Samuels’s *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Cornell, 2007) described the nascent formation of a new political consensus in Japan under which realpolitik policies would supplant the long-standing Yoshida Doctrine as the nation’s predominant security paradigm. Oros’s book focuses on the years since the publication of *Securing Japan*, a period bookended by Shinzo Abe’s terms as prime minister, to describe a Tokyo where such a consensus has taken hold and the security community now partakes in “a level of realistic and practical discussion of Japan’s defense needs unimaginable in previous decades.” *Japan’s Security Renaissance* analyzes elements of this new consensus, including a series of decisions ranging

from the 2007 establishment of the Ministry of Defense, the 2009 development of Japan's first overseas military base, the 2014 relaxation of arms-export controls and a constitutional reinterpretation to allow the limited exercise of collective self-defense, and the 2016 security legislation, to the continued buildup of advanced defense systems.

The book also makes the important point that this shift in thinking is not confined to a handful of leaders or a single political party, but is influential across major parties and throughout much of Japan's policy community. Oros explains that these changes arrive in a context in which Japan is viewed as a declining power in Asia, and are underwritten by three historical legacies: contested memories of imperial Japan and the war, postwar antimilitarism, and the unequal nature of the alliance with the United States.

Organizing the book into six chapters, Oros presents his argument in scholarly, but never pedantic, writing. The reader is impressed by the author's knowledge and benefits from his large network of informed Japanese contacts. In addition, his argument is both convincing and of considerable significance, given that in the same decade the Asian security context has grown more complex. The author's largely positive conclusion discusses implications for Japan, the United States, the Asia-Pacific region, and the rest of the world.

Oros also hints, however, at potential uncertainty and risk ahead. Contemporary students generally view the European Renaissance in a positive light, as it gave rise to new ways of thinking, including the empiricism

that in turn sowed the seeds for the Enlightenment. However, a thorough analysis of the Renaissance shows that the process was also painful, as seen in the wars of religion that ravaged Europe in the seventeenth century. While Oros does not venture a value judgment, he cautions the reader to consider some of the more disturbing possibilities this new renaissance may bring for Japan, the United States, and Asia's delicate security balance.

The book is not without its faults. It includes a chapter of theoretical reflections that seems a bit misplaced. That chapter's discussions of political worldviews lack the foundational explanations needed by those without training in international relations theory, while the narrative descriptions of the subsequent chapters will disappoint academically inclined readers hoping to learn Oros's thoughts regarding the conceptual implications of Japan's new security posture. Perhaps a more vexatious complaint is that the author relegates valuable information and analysis to endnotes, which forces the reader to flip pages continually or risk missing some of the book's most insightful facts and assessments.

Still, this book will stand out as one of the most important studies of the Japanese security landscape published in English in recent years. A highly readable treatment of Japan's last decade, *Japan's Security Renaissance* provides a useful starting point for those seeking to understand what is going on in Japan and an essential read for specialists keeping track of the many changes in Asian security dynamics.

JOHN BRADFORD AND MATT NOLAND



*The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War against Radical Islam and Its Allies*, by Michael T. Flynn and Michael Ledeen. New York: St. Martin's, 2016. 208 pages. \$26.99.

General Michael Flynn rose from relative obscurity to become President Donald Trump's first national security advisor—only to be forced to resign just thirty-four days after Trump's inauguration. While Flynn's White House tenure was brief, his views align with those of Trump's inner circle—few of whom have public writings of their own. Flynn's 2016 book *Field of Fight*—part memoir, part strategic vision—therefore provides insight into a White House that eschews foreign policy conventions. Unfortunately, what *Field of Fight* offers is a breathless portrayal of global conspiracies and civilizational clash with Islam, and policy recommendations not developed much beyond slogans.

Michael T. Flynn is a career Army intelligence officer (also an alumnus of the Naval War College and a Middletown, Rhode Island, native) who reached the three-star rank of lieutenant general. His coauthor, Dr. Michael Ledeen, has authored numerous books and articles on U.S. Middle East policy. The two are listed as coauthors, but the book is written in Flynn's first-person voice throughout.

The first third of *Field of Fight* is a memoir of Flynn's career. Of greatest interest are Flynn's assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan, among them serving as chief of intelligence for General Stanley A. McChrystal. By all accounts, Flynn played a key role in developing intelligence-led, quick-exploitation

operations. Flynn sketches his innovations, offers a few stories, and trumpets his “maverick” nature and dislike of rules. There are few new insights, however. Those interested in the operational angle will find better treatments in recent books by James Kitfield and Sean Naylor or McChrystal's memoir.

The book then shifts to the global threats facing America. And a threatening world it is, as Flynn and Ledeen see imminent existential challenges from terror groups such as ISIS and Hezbollah, plus rogue nations such as Iran, Russia, North Korea, China, Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia. They contend that these actors—Sunni and Shia, Levantine and Latin—cooperate as an anti-U.S. axis. While dissimilar states and groups do sometimes have operational links—e.g., cooperation on sanctions busting—the book's portrayal of an axis is overdrawn. Moreover, Flynn seems to use loudness of rhetoric rather than capability to measure threat. Near-peer China is ignored, while worries about basket case Venezuela are raised several times.

Flynn considers “radical Islam” the primary danger, in that losing the fight literally would mean the U.S. government overthrown, ISIS's flag over the White House, and 350 million Americans either converted or beheaded. Tautologically true, perhaps, but laughable as serious threat assessment (one recalls the 1984 movie *Red Dawn*). The definition of *radical Islam* is slippery, but Flynn and Ledeen place Iran squarely at the center. They contend that the Shia-Sunni divide, let alone ethno-national differences, means little. ISIS and Al Qaeda are portrayed as generally collaborating with senior

partner Iran. (Who, then, has been fighting in Iraq and Syria is not clarified.) Flynn claims to distinguish between radical Islam and Islam as a whole, but repeatedly blurs that line, building to a four-page jeremiad on the “spectacular failure” of the “Muslim world” writ large.

Flynn’s ultimate strategic concept is that the United States ought to foster a theological “reformation” of Islam. Problems with the parallel aside—the Christian world engaged in global conquests *after* the Reformation—Flynn recognizes that the goal is aspirational. Our near-term approach should be mostly political, he writes. While Flynn emphatically wants to “take the gloves off” counterterror operations, he opposes regime change by military means, as occurred in Iraq and Libya. Instead, top priority would be political support of Iranian opposition groups (coauthor Ledeen long has claimed the Iranian regime could be brought down rapidly, à la 1989 in Eastern Europe). Overall, Flynn’s campaign plans are vague and contradictory. The threat is imminent and requires World War II–style military mobilization, yet it will involve a decades-long competition of ideas. Promoting liberty and democracy is the key, but the United States should back strongly such autocrats as Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Flynn is curiously opaque about the Saudis, and ignores Turkey’s Islamist government).

*Field of Fight* was written after Flynn became a contributor to Russia’s RT network and appeared with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, among the Russia connections that eventually triggered his resignation. Yet Flynn’s book has few kind words for Russia: Moscow is a leader in the anti-American axis, Putin is an aggressor, and President Obama failed to criticize Russia strongly

enough. There are hints, though, that Flynn sees potential for rapprochement. He says Russia’s true interest would be to join the United States against Iran and radical Islam, but Russian leaders suffer confusion from ingrained anti-Americanism and a dearth—Flynn asserts—of expertise on Islam. There is no suggestion that other “axis” members could be played against each other, nor much discussed regarding potential anti-Islamist allies such as India. Despite those hints, the tone of Flynn the author is hard to reconcile with the eager Russia outreach of Flynn the adviser. Perhaps the first-person voice obscures disagreement with coauthor Ledeen, who in his own works is dubious of Moscow—probably the more realistic view.

Overall, the book is thinly sourced. Many claims simply are asserted, and the few references often point to bloggers, op-ed writers, or advocacy groups. The book makes no pretense of being scholarly, but even a general audience would benefit from more evidence—and more fact-checking. As one example, Flynn and Ledeen claim that seven to thirteen million people of Lebanese ancestry live in the Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina triborder region, whereas the correct number is around 25,000.

As a work of strategy, *Field of Fight* is forgettable. The literatures on jihadism, Iran, illicit transnational networks, etc., are replete with more-thoughtful, well-researched works. The recommendations seem more intended to back up campaign speeches than to support actionable plans. As a window into the Trump administration’s national security thinking, the book provides value—but not much reassurance.

DAVID T. BURBACH



*Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the Rise of Modern New York, 1817–1898*, by Jon Scott Logel. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 2016. 280 pages. \$45.

The idea of civil-military relations generally is framed in terms of the relationship between the government of a state and the military that serves that state. Whether the construct is the *objective control* posed by Samuel Huntington or the *unequal dialogue* of Eliot Cohen, the discussion largely focuses on how the civilian sector influences the actions of the military. In his new volume, *Designing Gotham*, Jon Scott Logel offers a window on a long-neglected aspect of the relationship: how the military wields influence in civilian society.

The book begins with an interesting account of the rise of Sylvanus Thayer and his vision for refashioning West Point into the first institution of higher education in the United States dedicated to teaching the principles of engineering. Professor Logel also discusses the inherent tensions between Thayer's narrow view of a curriculum focused on military engineering and the public clamor of the Jacksonian era for West Point to graduate engineers trained in civil engineering. The compromise solution—adding a limited number of civil-engineering courses to the program at the academy—set the stage for the influence of West Pointers on the development of New York City. It is the influence of these men that forms the core emphasis of the book.

Through a series of well-crafted chapters, Logel describes the influence of U.S. Military Academy graduates on both the professionalization of engineering and a series of projects

that helped shape modern New York. Tracing the progress of these public works, the chapters also trace the social and political changes in the relationship between the military-trained engineers and the civilian society in which they moved. The dramatic increase in political involvement by these officers after the Civil War is another subtheme. Weaving these ideas together, the book offers an interesting social history of the effects these military men had on New York society and the effects society had on these West Pointers. The cast of characters is populated with men made famous by the Civil War, such as George B. McClellan and Fitz-John Porter, as well as more-obscure graduates such as Egbert L. Viele and John Newton, who arguably were more important in the development of the city's infrastructure.

The author does not delve deeply into the details of the engineering projects. This is not necessarily a shortcoming, as the development of engineering as a profession, not its development as a science, is a theme of the work. If the book has a weakness, it is the graphics. The only maps are reproductions of Viele's famous "Water Map" of 1865 and his plan for Central Park. A map highlighting the various projects might have been more valuable than the common, recognizable photos of Porter and McClellan that are included.

Jon Scott Logel has offered a unique perspective on the relationship between civil society and the graduates of West Point. His insights remind us that, while our civil government controls the military in the United States, our military institutions have a powerful influence on our society—recognized or not.

KEVIN J. DELAMER



*Duel au large: La guerre de Sécession devant Cherbourg (19 juin 1864); Enquête et récit*, by Jacky Desquesnes. Condé-sur-Noireau: Éditions Charles Corlet, 2014. 247 pages. \$20 paperback.

Jacky Desquesnes's book on the Civil War naval battle between CSS *Alabama* and USS *Kearsarge* is a useful contribution to understanding that event. The book's publication coincided with the 150th anniversary of the battle, an event the French press covered extensively in a nationally circulated magazine, *L'express*, and well-known regional newspapers such as *La Manche libre*, *La presse de la Manche*, and *Ouest-France*. Although the book was published in France more than three years ago by a regional publisher, it seems to have been ignored entirely in the United States and by American naval historians. At the time of this review's writing, WorldCat showed only one library in the United States that had acquired a copy: Harvard University's.

Numerous other books deal with this subject—in English. The author has used most of the standard American documentary sources in print, as well as the digital materials now available online. Among these are the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* and the published memoirs of the participants, plus one unpublished memoir from the collection at Mystic Seaport. While the author does not cite all the published secondary sources in English that he might have used, the book's importance is in its use of French sources that American scholars have consulted only rarely. Chief among these are the reports of the battle in the local and

national French press and the archives of the French navy (series BB<sup>4</sup> 1346).

Desquesnes, currently a lecturer at the Université populaire de Caen in Normandy and formerly a regional inspector of pedagogy, has placed his subject in the wide context of the Civil War, Franco-American relations, international law, and the concept of the duel. Many people at Cherbourg observed the action, and their impressions appeared in the popular press. In French eyes, Raphael Semmes seemed a gentleman who fought the battle like a classic duel, and the press popularized this metaphor, which the maritime prefect at Cherbourg used to describe the action as he observed it.

In his closing chapter, Desquesnes makes an important contribution in discussing the cultural afterlife of the battle in memory and commemoration. In this, he places Édouard Manet's masterful painting of the event within the wider context of the popular images of the day. He goes on to discuss the local monuments, mentioning the unknown grave site at Cherbourg of William Carpenter of *Alabama* and the surviving and restored monuments of George Appleby, William Gowin, and Edward King, along with the commemorations held there over the years. Interestingly, he points out connections that have developed among these sites and those of American war dead in other parts of France, from John Paul Jones's sailors at Nantes to those lost in the First World War. The volume ends with a brief discussion of the work of Captain Max Guérout of the French navy, the CSS *Alabama* associations in Washington and Paris, and the underwater archaeology that led to the recovery of many objects from the wreck of *Alabama*.

Jacky Desquesnes's volume makes a useful contribution to the literature, one that deserves to be read more widely by American naval historians. It is also a reminder of the value and importance of the insights for naval history that are readily available in other languages, but too often are overlooked.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF



*NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence*, ed. John Andreas Olsen. Whitehall Paper 87. London: RUSI, released by Taylor and Francis, 2017. 104 pages. \$13.55 paperback.

As Russia's naval posture and its restored naval and air capabilities have become more evident, the North Atlantic has reemerged over the last couple of years as a hot topic for researchers. For two decades the region and the idea of high-end naval threats to the NATO allies were almost entirely off the table, but the North Atlantic has reemerged as a key topic in NATO headquarters as well. Both the Wales Summit Declaration (2014) and the Warsaw Summit Declaration (2016) bring forward the North Atlantic as a renewed area of concern.

However, NATO and American allies largely lack the capabilities to deal with the increased threat that Russia's new and modernized capabilities pose. Russia's long-term intentions are difficult to assess, and most likely will change over time anyway. Still, there are some geopolitical constants, and it is possible—and important—to notice, keep track of, and understand the current threats and potential future ones as they evolve. Naval and air capabilities take a long time to develop, with regard to both

technology and competency. Naval strategists and readers should reconsider this reemerging challenge, and several new reports from think tanks in the United States and the United Kingdom provide a good starting point.

Highly recommended are the following recent publications: "Updating NATO's Maritime Strategy" (Atlantic Council, 2016); *Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe* (CSIS, 2016); *NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence* (RUSI Whitehall Paper 87, 2017); and "Forgotten Waters: Minding the GIUK Gap" (CNAS, 2017). Each of these is beneficial, but readers should note especially the present book under review, *NATO and the North Atlantic*. It is edited by John Andreas Olsen, contains a foreword by Philip M. Breedlove and an introduction and conclusion by Olsen, and consists of six chapters.

Olsen is an experienced book editor, always getting high-level experts on board his projects. For this project he has created a good team of experienced North Atlantic and Russian military experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The book connects historical and geopolitical military perspectives with more-current "post-Brexit" consequences and modern hybrid threats.

In his chapter, "The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Contribution," Rolf Tamnes brings back the classical "bastion concept" for the protection of Russian strategic submarines. Even though nuclear deterrence has been off the radar of academics and strategists for a couple of decades, it has always "been there." We clearly should give more attention to this fact, and try to understand and appreciate how the nuclear deterrence forces of



today shape how the great powers play, be it in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere.

As John J. Hamre and Heather A. Conley argue in their chapter, “The Centrality of the North Atlantic to NATO and US Strategic Interests,” the North Atlantic is in fact the ocean that physically and metaphorically binds North America and Europe together. The book’s focus and main themes are intended to explain this to readers and to argue that NATO must retain the capability to secure freedom of maneuver across the sea and keep the waterways between the continents open for reinforcement and resupply of matériel and personnel in times of peace, crisis, and war. The alliance, as a guarantor of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, must be prepared to counter any potential threat to the North Atlantic Ocean.

As do the studies recommended above on Russia and the North Atlantic, this project clearly points out Russia’s increasingly provocative rhetoric and behavior over the last few years. Coupling this with the fact that Russia has introduced new classes of conventional and nuclear attack submarines and is modernizing its Northern Fleet through the addition of long-range, high-precision missiles provides great reason for concern. The Russian navy could challenge NATO’s command of the high seas, and thereby put both Europe and North America at existential risk.

The book argues that now is the time for NATO and American allies to get a grip on the strategically important North Atlantic Ocean, in addition to the current, very Eurocentric focus on air and land forces in the Baltic States and on Russia’s land borders. The North Atlantic is in fact the northwestern part of the current NATO 360 perspective,

but it needs to be reckoned as such. The challenges in the North Atlantic are of a very different nature from those NATO experiences in the east and south, but no less important. Arguably, in the longer perspective, these high-end threats may prove existential, and need to be acknowledged. It takes a long time to develop the countertechnologies and expertise necessary to meet Russia’s modernization of its submarines and missile systems. Fittingly, the last chapter before the conclusion and recommendations is Admiral James Stavridis’s “The United States, the North Atlantic and Maritime Hybrid Warfare.”

In the concluding chapter, Olsen offers some clear recommendations, arguing that NATO should renew its maritime strategy, reintroduce extensive maritime exercises and sustained presence, reform its command structure, invest in maritime capabilities and situational awareness, enhance maritime partnerships, and prepare for maritime hybrid warfare.

Overall, this book provides an excellent starting point from which to start discussing the North Atlantic challenges that are emerging as the Russian naval (and air) forces continue to make considerable progress toward modernizing for the future.

GJERT LAGE DYNDAL



*The Leader’s Bookshelf*, by Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), and R. Manning Ancell. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pages. \$29.95.

*The Leader’s Bookshelf* is unique in its style and structure and outstanding in its personal and confident presentation.

There are literally hundreds of books on leadership, including memoirs of former CEOs, guidebooks to leadership from professional athletes, and personal commentaries from men and women who have succeeded in their fields of business, education, politics, and government; but this presentation is different. Admiral Stavridis, whose culminating military assignment was as supreme allied commander at NATO, and his highly competent coauthor, R. Manning Ancell, have designed a wide-ranging collection of books and essays within a relatively brief volume that exudes commitment to meeting the challenges of leadership and confidence regarding the qualities necessary.

The content and structure of the book are what make it different, especially worthwhile, and a great reading experience. The method taken was to invite each of fifty different military leaders to recommend his or her favorite book on leadership and explain the reasons for the choice. The coauthors add brief comments about the book's author and the book itself, and select brief quotations and passages from the recommended work. But the heart of the work is the "Leadership Lessons Summarized," which are developed and summarized by Stavridis or Manning. Suffice it to say, the quality and value of these lessons learned are truly inspiring.

The range and diversity of the fifty recommended books are remarkable. Military leaders, mostly contemporaries and colleagues of the coauthors, have recommended authors and books as varied as Rudyard Kipling's *Captains Courageous* and William Manchester's *Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War*. The recommended authors include Carl von Clausewitz, Sun

Tzu, Mark Twain, S. L. A. Marshall, Harper Lee, Thomas L. Friedman, H. R. McMaster, and dozens more. This book can be a great companion on deployments—it can be rejoined quickly after interruptions.

While the fifty presentations are the heart of the book, much more is included that is highly valuable but unfortunately not discussed widely and presented only infrequently. These five brief chapters—"Reading Lists," "Writing and Publishing," "What Young Leaders Are Reading," "Building a Personal Library," and "Reading and Writing: The Big Lessons"—are the "secret passages" to success, clues to how not just to get promoted but to live an enriched and meaningful life. These chapters show Admiral Stavridis's own passion and commitment to his profession and his important, mentor-like dedication to midrange professionals who aim high and try harder to become great leaders.

"But wait, there's more!"—a bonus, so to speak. An afterword offers an important discussion of how more-formal literature, specifically poems and plays, can provide valuable leadership lessons. In "A Play and Two Poems," Admiral Stavridis writes (p. 259), "In terms of impact, word-for-word, a beautifully crafted poem can deliver the most meaningful of reading experiences and provide startling insights for a reader. Plays, which are of course essentially scripts written to be performed in front of us, often give us powerful voices to listen to and therefore sharpen our leadership skills."

In a brief but brilliant analysis of *The Persians* by Aeschylus, William Butler Yeats's poem "The Second Coming," and Constantine P. Cavafy's poem "Sailing to Ithaca," Admiral Stavridis describes the intense and deep revelation of meaning

attained through creative literature and recommends the challenge of developing an active, creative imagination in reading intellectual literature as an important role of leaders. He writes (p. 266) that “in the end the very best effective leaders use hope to inspire us in the long voyages on which we all must sail. Poems and plays each have a role in helping leaders find their way not only to challenges, but to hope.”

At a program sponsored by the Naval War College Foundation a few years ago, Admiral Stavridis commented that during his tour of duty as Commander, Southern Command, he arranged to be tutored daily in Spanish because he thought a better understanding of the language essential to the success of his mission. This was a singular commitment to effective leadership, just as *The Leader’s Bookshelf* is a singular and valuable contribution to developing effective leaders.

JOHN J. SALESSES



*A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and Strategy in the United States Navy and the Royal Navy, 1960–2015*, by Anthony R. Wells. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 264 pages. \$35.

At its heart, this book both espouses the value of a global maritime strategy as seen from the perspective of two historically close allies, Great Britain and the United States, and acknowledges the enormous costs of maintaining one. It is not a history book, although it covers a historical period and provides context. It is more of a thematic illustration of the extraordinary measures necessary—across the entire span of professional

and political discourses—to nurture and maintain such partnerships. Above all, it highlights the need for trust: a shared understanding of goals and a willingness to cooperate at all levels that rises above what the author terms “the minefield of opponents, skeptics and those with ill-conceived agendas . . . who simply have little or no knowledge of the basics of maritime strategy.” Given the current interest in enhancing naval presence and the consequent drive toward an enlarged naval fleet, this is a timely message and one that deserves careful consideration from naval professionals.

Anthony Wells is perhaps uniquely qualified for this work. As an intelligence specialist, he has served both in the Royal Navy (RN) in uniform and later for the U.S. Navy as a civilian analyst, and has been involved personally in much “special intelligence sharing at the most sensitive levels.” His first chapter, by far the most valuable, outlines the political changes that took place during the 1960s and ’70s, particularly in Britain, that fundamentally altered the way in which naval concerns were represented to Parliament. He explains that although both countries’ defense establishments underwent considerable “centralization” after the Second World War, the loss of hundreds of years of naval influence in the cabinet of Great Britain caused by the sidelining of the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1946 in favor of the defense minister, and the eventual loss of the service ministries altogether in 1964, was immensely damaging to the maritime case. It is no coincidence, for example, that these years saw the reorientation of British defense policy away from global responsibilities and toward an exclusively northern European focus. This in turn led to the

demise of the RN aircraft carrier fleet and loss of RN influence “east of Suez,” adding to the urgency with which the service sought partnerships with the only global player remaining, the U.S. Navy. Although similar “centralization” efforts were under way in Washington, Wells explains that the U.S. Navy was inherently better served, in that the crucial contact between senior serving officers and their political masters was preserved by virtue of the former’s ability to testify to influential congressional committees. In this way, the maritime case continued and continues to be represented in Washington.

Throughout all these upheavals, the real saving grace was the professional links between the two navies that had been forged during the dark years of the world wars. The urgency of the Cold War competition with Soviet Russia and the need to know the opponent’s plans years in advance meant that, to stay ahead, the burgeoning technological energy of the United States needed to be combined with the long-established human-intelligence resources of the United Kingdom. To effect this, both navies continued to talk, no matter what tensions were extant nationally and internationally at the time. As the Soviets increasingly emphasized their submarine fleet as a means by which to conduct nuclear bargaining, Wells was in a prime position to observe and record this exchange. In the remaining chapters he charts some of the high and low points by way of illustration: the acoustic refining of the nuclear submarine, the use of maritime forces to signal resolve during the Six-Day War of 1967, the damage caused by the Walker spy ring, and the extensive cooperation during the Falklands War in 1982, to name a few.

In the end, the sheer importance of the subject matter and its timely appearance will ensure wide readership of this book—which is a good thing. Wells, although fluent, is not an overly engaging writer, and the factual nature of the prose can result in quite a mouthful at times. That said, the work is well researched and accurate, although no doubt still limited by ongoing classification issues. Uncharacteristically, however, the normally flawless Naval Institute editorial process has allowed in a few grammatical errors and, in the Falklands chapter, a minor inaccuracy. The Argentines had four, not three, diesel submarines in 1982: two Type 209s and two old, ex-USN *Balao*-class Guppy II conversions. Of these, only one of each was serviceable, and ARA *Santa Fe* was of the *Balao* class (ex-USS *Catfish*), not a Type 209 as stated on page 147. Luckily, none of these errors detracts in any way from the theme being presented.

This book should be read and discussed by anyone with an interest in maritime strategy or the “special relationship” between the two countries. This special relationship endures, of course, and no doubt in a few years’ time—once the ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class and their F-35Cs are in service—the next chapter in this cooperative story will be told.

ANGUS ROSS



*Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam*, by Mark Bowden. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2017. 610 pages. \$30.

The United States first committed combat-size units (battalions or larger) to the war in Vietnam in March 1965. In the

years that followed, as the United States assumed a greater role in the fighting, its forces in theater continued to grow. By early 1968, the United States had several hundred thousand troops in Vietnam.

Concurrently, North Vietnam's leadership was supporting a growing communist insurgency in the south—that of the Vietcong (VC)—the goal of which was to defeat South Vietnam and bring it under the North's communist regime. To accelerate this process, North Vietnam developed an elaborate plan to infiltrate thousands of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops into South Vietnam and, with the VC, capture and hold South Vietnam's major cities and U.S. and South Vietnamese military installations. No objective was given a higher priority than the old imperial Vietnamese capital of Hue.

The resulting Tet Offensive was, without exception, a battlefield loss for NVA and VC forces. However, Tet was a decisive communist victory on the political front: it turned the American public irrevocably against the war. America's support for the Vietnam conflict and its trust in its elected, appointed, and military leaders—already on shaky ground by early 1968—would become permanent casualties of the Tet Offensive and the battle for Hue.

In the early morning hours of January 31, 1968, the first day of Tet (the lunar new year), nearly ten thousand well-trained, dedicated, and motivated NVA and VC troops clandestinely moved from neighboring forested highlands into Hue. By noon, with the exception of a couple of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (i.e., ARVN) units and the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (i.e., MACV) compound, the city was in

communist hands. It would take nearly a month of bitter street fighting and thousands of casualties (the vast majority to civilians) to return the city to the control of South Vietnam's government.

Mark Bowden's day-by-day chronicle of the battle to retake Hue is detailed and precise and covers both sides. He closely follows Lieutenant Colonel Ernest "Big Ernie" Cheatham, the commanding officer of 2/5 (2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment), whose area of responsibility was south of the Citadel and the Huong River—an expanse that included Hue University, the treasury building, the provincial headquarters, a prison, a hospital complex, and several other structures. Cheatham's basic tactic was to employ tanks, self-propelled "Ontos" antitank vehicles (each carried six deadly 106 mm recoilless rifles), bazookas, 81 mm mortars, flamethrowers, and gas to destroy the buildings across contested streets, while his young infantrymen prepared for the assault. It was an effective strategy: his rifle companies were able to advance. It took his battalion four days to fight from Route 1 to the Phu Cam Canal.

On the other side, Bowden focuses on VC lieutenant Hoang Anh De, commanding Battalion 55, who gave ground only grudgingly. Like many of his fellow NVA/VC leaders, as well as the senior leadership in Hanoi, he soon realized that the expected popular uprising was not going to happen. However, like his compatriots, he knew that the longer he could keep the battle in Hue going, the greater the political victory would be.

Combat operations for control of the city continued until nearly the end of February. Major Bob Thompson's 1/1 (1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment),

assigned the mission of retaking the Citadel on February 11, suffered nearly 50 percent casualties by February 15. Nonetheless, the battalion successfully fought from the north to the south Citadel walls, then west to retake the royal palace and its grounds. Outside the Citadel and to the northwest, elements of the U.S. Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division were assigned the task of attacking the NVA Front's command center in the village of La Chu. One battalion suffered 50 percent casualties in the effort; subsequent attacks prevailed as the communist forces initiated an orderly retreat.

While intelligence on the NVA/VC forces that captured Hue was not good, at least initially, Bowden nonetheless is critical of the senior leaders who failed to see the obvious. Of General William C. Westmoreland he writes, "Never had a general so effectively willed away the facts." Westmoreland simply refused to accept that the NVA/VC actually had captured the city. Bowden notes that the general "continually and falsely assured political leaders in Washington and the public that the city had not fallen into enemy hands." Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, the commanding general of Task Force X-Ray (Marines), was little better, insisting that "there was nothing more threatening in Hue than a handful of snipers."

Bowden has crafted a comprehensive and accurate account of the battle to wrest Hue from the NVA and VC. In his source notes he writes, "For a journalist interested in history the sweet spot is about 50 years. Enough time has gone by for a measure of historical perspective and yet there remain many living witnesses." Bowden personally interviewed hundreds of them, in the process

crafting several compelling portraits of the junior Marines who faced their NVA/VC adversaries at very close range. The testimonies of large numbers of witnesses (in addition to unclassified and formerly classified reports from the National Archives, the Marine Corps Library at Quantico, Virginia, and other sources) serve to enhance the accuracy of the narrative. And from what this reviewer (who spent February 1968 in Hue with 2/5) can tell, the accuracy of Bowden's narrative is unquestionable. He has produced an excellent read of a defining period in our nation's history.

GEORGE HOFMANN



*By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific since 1783*, by Michael J. Green. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2017. 760 pages. \$45.

In the fast-moving world of Washington, DC, capturing and conveying the context of policy choices challenge even the most committed national security professional. For busy senior officials, policy can seem to exist in historical isolation, with institutional memory rarely extending before the start of the current administration. Resources for understanding rarely address the contingencies and considerations that drove those who went before us.

Michael Green, author of *By More Than Providence*, confronted this problem as senior director for Asia on the National Security Council a decade ago. Arriving as an academic with a deep background in the region, he nonetheless was challenged to place proposed policy initiatives in the context

of America's long relationship with Asia. On returning to academia, Green set out to write the book he wished he had had as a policy adviser. The result is an extraordinary overview of how America crafted itself as a Pacific nation, gaining its unique position in the region, as the title states, "by more than providence." Since its birth, America has been tied to the Pacific by "commerce, faith, geography, and self-defense" in a dynamic interplay of interests, hopes, and fears. The process of balancing these forces is the focus of Green's work, and his approach underscores the imperfect nature of any effort to address complex goals in a region of such diversity.

The overall U.S. policy focus historically has swung between Europe and Asia, with Europe benefiting from linguistic and cultural affinities among American elites. Within Asia, U.S. policy makers have cycled between China and Japan when prioritizing relations. These fundamental choices, still at play in the region, date to the earliest days of the United States. In considering this dynamic, Green benefits from his early academic career as a Japan specialist. In an increasingly China-focused field, this distinctive background allows him to place America's critical relationship with Japan in proper context and provides an antidote to recent works that place too much emphasis on China issues.

Even well-read naval professionals will be struck by the central role that maritime issues and the U.S. Navy play in the narrative. From the creation of the first USN Pacific squadron in 1821, naval leaders have been a key outward face of the nation to the region and one of the constant interlocutors in internal U.S. debates. Indeed, Green credits Mahan with articulating the first comprehensive

U.S. grand strategy for the Pacific region, tracing his influence through to the present. More recently, the Reagan administration's Soviet-focused Maritime Strategy had its intellectual roots firmly in the Pacific as the then Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, sought to address a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet. Hayward moved on to become Chief of Naval Operations and, paired with John Lehman as Secretary of the Navy, pushed the strategy into global execution. Naval professionals versed in military history and security issues will benefit from the book's integrated and thoughtful discussion of economic and cultural ties.

*By More Than Providence* provides a balance between conceptual argument and the details of historic events. For example, while placing Nixon's opening to China in broad context, Green also provides an excellent articulation of the assumptions behind the negotiation and signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. His personal experience in the policy arena has given him a sympathetic ear for the challenges our predecessors faced and their often-imperfect efforts. There is criticism of many decision makers across numerous eras, but always tempered with a welcome sense that meaningful statecraft is simply hard. Despite that fact, America has achieved and sustained a unique position in the Pacific. Green's sense of contingency—that events could have unfolded very differently and the U.S. position in the region might be weaker or nonexistent—presents the American reader with a clear if implied challenge: how to maintain this legacy going forward.

At well over seven hundred pages and exquisitely sourced with notes and comments, *By More Than Providence*

represents a substantial investment of time and effort for the thoughtful reader. It is, however, an essential book for any naval professional who wants to understand what lies in our wake before charting our course in Asia.

DALE C. RIELAGE



*The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945*, by Peter Hennessy and James Jinks. London: Penguin, 2015. 864 pages. £30.

*The Silent Deep* is a tell-all history of the Royal Navy's submarine service since World War II. The authors were granted almost unlimited access to Royal Navy (RN) historical files of submarine operations. The discussion of formerly classified operational surveillance patrols off the North Cape of Norway and of the trailing of Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) is eye-opening. As a former USN submarine commanding officer—and a veteran of eight covert surveillance operations in the Pacific during the Cold War—I was stunned to read about British submarine operations in the “other ocean.”

The book is much more than that, though. It begins with a description of the “Perisher” (slang name for the Submarine Command Course), a demanding five-month-long training program for potential submarine commanding officers. Successful graduates normally go on to command; those dropped for lack of demonstrated ability generally leave the submarine service.

The authors describe the startling effect on the Royal Navy of gaining access to German submarine technology

at the end of World War II and the ensuing revelation of the very advanced submarines that were being prepared to attack Allied warships and shipping. The German Type XXI high-speed, long-endurance, diesel-electric submarine was arguably the first modern submarine—a truly submersible warship. By the war's end over a hundred Type XXIs were working up in the Baltic Sea, but they made no operational patrols. In fact, only one operational patrol was made by a boat of this class—*U-2511*—and the war ended before it could make an attack. (A number of Type XXIIIs, the smaller clones of the Type XXIs, did make operational patrols and sank nine ships without loss to their own ranks.)

The Type XXI boat was the model for postwar development of advanced-capability diesel-electric submarines in three navies: the British *Porpoise* class, the Soviet Whiskey class, and the American *Tang* class.

Another German revelation was the Walther boat, a hydrogen peroxide-fueled true submarine, which had not yet become operational. A captured Walther-class submarine, *U-1407*, was commissioned as HMS *Meteorite*, and its trials led to the construction and commissioning of HMS *Excalibur* and HMS *Explorer*, both powered by Walther-cycle machinery. They turned out to be a dead end, however, as technical problems and financial concerns ended the experiments.

The authors also cover the Royal Navy's first looks at nuclear power for submarines and its temporary abandonment in favor of the Walther-cycle propulsion plant. When that avenue proved fruitless, the Royal Navy then turned to the United States—which had



put the first nuclear-powered submarine, USS *Nautilus* (SSN 571), to sea in 1955. In a major exercise named RUM TUB in October 1957, *Nautilus* showed convincingly that RN antisubmarine warfare ships and aircraft were totally unable to detect and track an SSN, owing to its almost unlimited endurance.

The British decisions to acquire SSNs and subsequently SSBNs are discussed in separate chapters, each offering an in-depth look at the design, engineering, management, and political aspects of the respective programs.

The Falklands War of 1982 offered an opportunity for the Royal Navy to employ SSNs in a limited-area, limited-combat role. The Royal Navy's SSNs were the first British warships on scene after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. They provided essential surveillance and intelligence reporting about Argentine forces. On May 2, 1982, HMS *Conqueror* sank ARA *General Belgrano*, an Argentine navy light cruiser, south of the Falklands. That sinking effectively drove other Argentine navy units back inside their twelve-mile limit, a boundary British SSNs were not allowed to penetrate—a political constraint the British placed on themselves, and one that was very frustrating to SSN commanding officers who were anxious to engage Argentina's aircraft carrier, which posed a significant threat to the British surface task force. The reviewer was fortunate to have had lunch recently with HMS *Conqueror*'s navigating officer and to query him directly about the decision of *Conqueror*'s commanding officer to use Second World War-vintage Mark 8 torpedoes instead of the much more advanced Mark 24 Tigerfish torpedoes—a decision discussed in the Falklands chapter.

Subsequent chapters deal with the complicated internal British politics of upgrading the Royal Navy's submarine deterrent force from Polaris to Poseidon, and finally to current-day Trident missiles, as well as the continuing operations vis-à-vis Russia.

This is an outstanding book, well researched and ably written. I highly recommend it for anyone interested in submarine operations or antisubmarine warfare or both. It is a must-read.

JOHN F. O'CONNELL



*21st Century Gorshkov: The Challenge of Sea Power in the Modern Era*, ed. Kevin Rowlands. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 192 pages. \$21.95 paperback.

The published works of Soviet fleet admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov, whose naval career spanned three decades, are ostensibly the subject of this volume edited by the Royal Navy's Kevin Rowlands. Yet the book also could serve as a blueprint for increasing naval prestige, power, and influence. Through the focus on Gorshkov's writing, the reader is afforded an insider's view of the Soviet navy's post-World War and Cold War-era growth. At the same time, Rowlands is interested in how consideration of Gorshkov can help inform questions about the future roles and uses of naval force.

Admiral Gorshkov graduated from the Frunze Naval School in Leningrad in 1931 and showed early promise as a naval officer. His role in the Second World War was as impressive as his peacetime advancement. Unlike many of his peers, Gorshkov not only

achieved great responsibility as a young officer but was able to weather the many changes in the Soviet political environment and emerged as a leading practitioner and theorist of Soviet naval strategy. In essence, Admiral Gorshkov's performance as a naval officer becomes a model for all who aspire to make a lasting contribution to the naval profession and to the security of one's country.

Perhaps Admiral Gorshkov's major military contribution was making the Soviet navy the most powerful navy in Russian history. For example, prior to his leadership the Soviet navy basically had as its major responsibility coastal-defense matters, but Admiral Gorshkov changed that by building the service's capabilities and expanding its role to worldwide responsibility and activity. By modernizing the navy and adopting new technological devices, he substantially increased its power, enabling it to take a first-class position in the world. He constantly tested new naval capabilities and adjusted to make improvements, recognizing that there were good reasons to do so; after all, other nations were making important and substantial changes to their navies. Gorshkov's skills helped the Soviet Union achieve remarkable influence in the world; his bureaucratic skills also helped him gain respect and cooperation when he was involved with military representatives of other countries. The importance of this characteristic is becoming quite evident in today's American military.

Admiral Gorshkov was also a patient politician regarding his role as a naval leader. "When cuts had to be made, he made them. When there were opportunities for growth, he took them" (p. 5). In addition, he had the ability—even when the Soviet navy appeared to be

discredited, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis—to adjust to new high-ranking political leaders who were in a position to replace him if they thought it necessary to do so. His ability to make known in speeches and writings the important role that a navy can play in expanding the power and influence of a country, as well as defending it against potential enemies, was also an asset to him. Yet the admiral also knew that war was not the only context in which a navy could be useful. Even in peacetime it was important to have a strong navy, because possession of such could give a country important advantages, such as prestige and potential. Interestingly, "Gorshkov's genius was not simply to grow his Navy, it was to justify its existence as an arm of the state in peacetime and in operations that fell short of all-out war" (p. 10). He was truly an effective advocate for his chosen profession.

Realistically, this book will be a guide to nations whose intentions include expanding their influence on a global scale via the use of a navy. Although there may be a number of countries in this category, China and India are current examples. Yet perhaps a major benefit of the book is that it provides a learning experience for future naval officers who aspire to a high military position in which they will encounter many challenges similar to those Admiral Gorshkov faced, despite the changing complexities of naval military activity. We always can learn from the past. Hence, a new generation of officers may be helped in the future by becoming aware of the challenges Admiral Gorshkov faced and how he overcame them to make the Russian navy one of the strongest in the world today.

WILLIAM E. KELLY

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## OUR REVIEWERS

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*Angus Ross* is a retired Royal Navy officer and professor of joint military operations at the Naval War College. He is a graduate of the College, received a second MA from Providence College, and is working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War. His recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the dreadnought revolution.

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