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HM 29: New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Nineteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Academy, 17–18 September 2015

James C. Rentfrow

New Interpretations in Naval History

Edited by James C. Rentfrow

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COVER

German U-boat under Attack, *by Charles Malfroy, gouache on paper, courtesy of the Navy Art Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command. The inset (and title-page background image) is a detail of a group photo of the midshipmen of the U.S. Naval Academy's class of 1865 taken in front of the Atlantic House hotel, which the Academy leased when it moved to Newport, Rhode Island, during the Civil War. The class of 1865 was the only one trained entirely in Newport. Three of its members later returned to that city as presidents of the Naval War College (Caspar Goodrich, Charles Stockton, and French Chadwick) and one as a faculty member (Bowman H. McCalla). Naval War College Museum (original in U.S. Naval Academy Museum).*

New Interpretations in Naval History

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

New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Nineteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Academy 17–18 September 2015

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PREFACE

For almost half a century, the generosity of the Bill Daniels and Dr. John McMullen families has ensured that the McMullen Naval History Symposium remains the premier gathering of practitioners of naval history in the Western Hemisphere. The nineteenth McMullen Naval History Symposium took place at the U.S. Naval Academy on September 17 and 18, 2015. In what was yet another record for attendance, over 250 scholars representing eleven countries shared 126 papers in forty-two panel sessions.

A number of signature events have come to define the biennial McMullen Symposia. At lunch on the first day, the Director of Naval History, Rear Adm. Sam Cox, USN (Ret.), presented remarks on the current operations of the Naval History and Heritage Command and on the state of "official" study of naval history within the Department of the Navy. Later that evening, the McMullen Seapower Address was presented by the incumbent Class of 1957 Distinguished Chair of Naval Heritage, Dr. David Rosenberg. In that address Dr. Rosenberg assessed the field of naval history and issued a call for action for future scholarship. The symposium concluded with the Naval Historical Foundation's Dudley Knox Awards Banquet, at which the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award was presented to Dean Allard, Thomas Cutler, and Dr. Kenneth Hagan.

The History Department of the U.S. Naval Academy wishes to recognize and thank its many partners in the daily work of keeping the field of naval history vibrant and productive. The steadfast support of the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1957 continues to produce new and exciting scholarship in the field through generous funding of the History Department's Class of 1957 Distinguished Chair of Naval Heritage and the Class of 1957 Post-Doctoral Fellowship. The Naval Historical Foundation plays a critical role in keeping our Navy's history alive, and the History Department was proud to make the presentation of the prestigious Knox Lifetime Achievement Award one of the symposium events. It is only fitting that our best

naval historians are honored in conjunction with the McMullen Symposium, and we hope that this relationship will continue for many years to come.

The relationship between the Naval Academy Museum, the Naval History and Heritage Command, and the Academy's History Department is a strong one and bears much fruit. The History Department wishes to acknowledge the generosity of the Naval Academy Museum and its director, Dr. Claude Berube, in making the beautiful venue available after hours for the always popular and eagerly anticipated museum cocktail reception. The department also thanks Rear Admiral Cox for his organization's wide-ranging support and participation in the panels and scholarship presented and for his graciously agreeing to address the luncheon each year.

Finally, the collaboration between the Naval War College Press and the McMullen Symposium continues to ensure that the newest work in the field receives the wide publication it deserves. The Naval Academy History Department thanks the Naval War College Press for its support and continued patience with our professor-editors.

I *"If the Political Horizon Thickens"*

Law and Geography in the Caribbean Theater of the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1800

ABBY MULLEN

In April 1798 Samuel Hodgdon wrote to Thomas Truxtun, "I hope and expect your Ship will be the first at Sea if the Political Horizon Thickens." Truxtun was the commander of one of the frigates in the newly formed U.S. Navy. He was preparing his frigate for action against the French, who had recently banned commercial intercourse with the United States and authorized the capture of American vessels.

This period during which the United States and France fought against each other's commerce is often called the Quasi-War. Neither side ever officially declared war. This quasi-belligerent status introduced legal questions that would have easily been resolved if the two nations had officially been at war. These legal questions were especially difficult because the primary threat of war was not on land on the European continent but on the ocean surrounding the French colonies in the Caribbean.

The Quasi-War was waged with the most force in the Caribbean.[1] The conflict between the United States and France was complicated by internal conflicts within the French empire in the Caribbean, where the importance of the sugar colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint-Domingue gave them more independence than other areas of the empire.[2] Turmoil in the administration of the colonies complicated relations with all foreign powers, including the United States.[3]

The Quasi-War with France is sometimes characterized as an "undeclared naval war," but that characterization addresses only a fraction of the actual antagonists. The French navy barely appeared in the Caribbean at all—in July 1798, the Secretary of the Navy believed the total number of heavy French ships in the West Indies to be only three frigates, all of which were blockaded in Cape François by the British.[4] Over the next two years, the French naval force increased a little but not enough to make much of a difference.

The American navy was literally being built from the ground up to face the French threat.[5] This buildup took time; it was not until 1798 that the first naval vessel went on a cruise. When we map the encounters between French and American ships, we see that the Navy's actions accounted for a small fraction of the

engagements between the two countries, leaving the rest to privateers.[6] But why? Why were privateers so active in the Caribbean? Both nations had passed nonintercourse acts against the other; in other words, no American ship could trade with any French port and no French ship with any American port.[7] Those bans on trade were not declarations of war. But making trade illegal opened up the possibility of enforcing the law by taking prizes, an internationally legal and accepted practice.[8] But France was also at war, really at war, with Britain, so the French Directory also made it legal to capture ships coming to or from British ports. And then more and more relaxation of what types of trade and ships were allowable prizes meant that more and more were taken.

Given the huge number of privateers patrolling the Caribbean and a large portion of the rest of the world's oceans, how could the United States hope to control the seas effectively enough to let its commerce roam freely? There were hundreds, possibly thousands, of French ships with official commissions, or letters of marque, and an inestimable number of others operating without official sanction. The map demonstrates that privateers roamed far and wide, around all the most commercially profitable colonies. Yet remarkably, when American warships patrolled the waters of the Caribbean, they saw privateers only infrequently. Even a strategy of capturing as many privateers as possible was ineffective: the privateers seemed quite skilled at staying out of the way of the Navy, as its officers often complained.

Though ships are virtually autonomous on the sea, they have to come back to land at some point. Unlike the heavy ships of the U.S. Navy and certainly the ships of the line of the French and British, privateers were small ships, with small crews, small cargo holds, and limited supplies. Their small size aided them in privateering, because it allowed them to get closer to the many islands in the West Indies, but it did limit the amount of time they could stay at sea. This limitation meant that privateers could not stray too far from friendly ports.

Furthermore, taking prizes adds an extra burden to any ship: the captor has not only to deal with his own ship but also to do something with the ship he has captured. Sinking it was not the most commercially profitable option (and these privateers were in the business for profit, not for love of country). Some privateers plundered their prizes at sea. But lack of storage space limited how often that could be done, a barrier particularly if the privateer intended to continue cruising for prizes. The only way to get any financial reward from the capture was to send it to a port, where, after a local prize court declared it lawfully seized (rather than requiring it to be returned to its owners), the vessel and the cargo could be sold. But to get the captured ship to the port, the captor had to put some of his own men on board to sail it there. This crew depletion again kept privateers fairly close to port, where they could recoup their manpower losses.

The farther privateers ranged from French or friendly ports, the more they risked losing prize money because their captures did not reach the appropriate port. Many things could happen to prevent a prize from reaching the prize court: it could be sunk in a storm, blown off course, or recaptured, either by an insurrection of the captured crew or by a hostile ship. Some privateers chose to take the riskier approach and hunt far out into the Atlantic, but a greater number stayed mostly within a few days' sail of a Caribbean prize court.[9]

AMERICAN STRATEGY

Given these spatial constraints on privateers, the American strategies to disrupt the privateers' business were less about the ships themselves and more about their need to come ashore. Recapturing prizes was much easier than capturing privateers: the prize crew was usually only a few men, and the original crewmen left on board were all too willing to impede the defense put up by the prize crew. Recapturing prizes hit the privateers where it hurt, depriving them of their income, often without their knowledge—prizes were often sent to port by themselves while the privateer continued to patrol.[10] The master would come to the port later to collect his money only to find out that the prize had never made it to adjudication.

Another tactic the U.S. Navy used to keep the privateers under control was to deny them access to their hunting grounds. By patrolling just off commercially profitable ports, the Navy kept the privateers from taking ships when they were most vulnerable—in the somewhat confined spaces of the entrances to harbors or ports. Once a ship was out on the high seas, in the middle of the Atlantic or even in the open waters of the Caribbean, it became much more difficult for a privateer to catch. The best place to take prizes was often right outside the territorial waters of a port. The Navy attempted to cut off access to those waters.

Actually, however, as the map of encounters between American and French ships shows, privateers concentrated in the Caribbean. Yet for the first several months the Navy sent only one major warship to the Caribbean; its other frigates and smaller vessels patrolled the Atlantic seaboard, particularly in the northeast. Throughout 1798, no more than one frigate sailed the Caribbean at a time.[11] When the troubles with France began, the law of the United States permitted no aggressive action of any kind against a power with whom the country was not officially at war.[12] The Navy could act aggressively only within one marine league (about three miles) of American territory. Other than that area, its ships could fire only if directly fired on. Because of the limitations of these orders, the first warship cruising grounds were only between Virginia and Long Island, where it was to be hoped privateers could be caught trying to attack vessels coming into or out of major U.S. ports.[13] The map clearly shows that this cruising area was next to useless. Eventually the Secretary of the Navy saw the need for ships farther south, but for them to be of any use, the law had to be relaxed to allow aggressive action. As more ships headed to

the Caribbean, the president's orders became more expansive, until armed American vessels were authorized to capture any French armed vessel almost anywhere.[14]

These methods proved quite effective. But the Navy could not permanently occupy the Caribbean, so the American government had to negotiate with the powers behind the privateers. Beyond the on-the-spot attempts to control privateers, naval officers also had to navigate the political and legal systems of the West Indies to get official assistance. Working with metropolitan officials was basically pointless, because decisions about prizes and adjudication could not wait for a ruling from France. Therefore, the Navy and diplomats in the West Indies worked closely with colonial officials, particularly in Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue.

The place where colonial administration, mercantile interests, political needs, and international law intersected was the prize court. The activities of the prize courts tell us about relations among empires, within an empire, and among empires and nonimperial powers. Prize courts were found in ports throughout the world, usually comprising a few commissioners who evaluated the papers sent to them on the basis of national and international laws. They often received the papers and made judgments without ever actually seeing the captured ships or any members of their crews.[15]

The offenses for which a prize could be condemned—that is, declared subject to confiscation—were many. The French Directory frequently updated the grounds for condemnation. The declaration of 2 March 1797 listed several: neutral ships could be captured if any part of their cargoes belonged to enemy nationals; if a ship was carrying any contraband, defined as anything that would help an enemy nation arm itself (meaning primarily shipbuilding materials, such as pitch, lumber, sheet copper, or hemp); if it did not have a properly formatted and signed *rôle d'équipage,* or muster roll; or if its papers had any irregularities. Merchandise could be confiscated if it was not "sufficiently proved to be neutral."[16]

Though these regulations seem extremely specific, they were in practice quite fluid. The French privateers used the irregular-papers clause quite frequently, and even when the papers were in order, ships were sometimes detained. In response to a protest by the masters of the captured vessels *Rover* and *Nancy,* Nicholas Maurice Champre, the French consul at Málaga who had condemned them, wrote that because they were "detained not under frivolous pretexts . . . they have, more or less, come within the confiscation clause." But when an American official asked Champre how Americans could keep from being captured, Champre blandly replied that "it will be proper to recur to the ordinances, regulations, decrees, and arrêts of the French Government."[17]

In the environs of Europe, American vessels were most often brought in on charges of not having a *rôle d'équipage*. But in the Caribbean, who was on board a vessel mattered less than where it had been or where it was going.[18] On 7 January

1797 the French had decreed that any ship traveling to or from a British port could be lawful prize. This was particularly problematic for American vessels, because some ports in the Caribbean (such as Demerara, in Guyana) changed hands between the British and other imperial powers with frequency. In addition, any colony that was in rebellion against the French imperial authority was off-limits. So, for instance, when the brig *Harmony* traveled to Port-au-Prince in 1797, it was captured and condemned on the basis of the French Commission's decree of 26 December 1796 declaring Port-au-Prince in a "State of Permanent Siege."[19]

PRIVATEERING AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

The prize system was far from foolproof. The tenets of the law were so easily manipulated that the local authorities became much more important than the law itself. Sometimes those authorities took advantage of the distance between themselves and the metropole, acting in their own best interests instead of in those of the empire. One American captain complained after his ship was condemned on a technicality that no monarch ever wielded such absolute power as the French agent at Cayenne (in modern French Guiana), who had condemned his vessel without a hearing at all.[20]

The main prize courts that dealt with American captures were in the colonies of Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue, though others did also. In both colonies, the agents of France dealt with American shipping differently than the French metropolitan government stipulated, but especially so (and also from each other) in regard to prizes and to privateering in general. Guadeloupe, for instance, was a hotbed of privateers. The French agent there at the beginning of the Quasi-War was a man named Victor Hugues. Hugues was responsible for one of the first surges in prize taking, as a result of his decree of 1 February 1797, which stipulated that American vessels going to or from British ports in either the Windward or Leeward Islands could be captured and condemned and also, more broadly, that any American vessel cleared for the West Indies was fair prize.[21] This ruling was an escalation from the previous ruling by the French commissioners to the Leeward Islands, which had declared only those islands off-limits. Despite his declarations contrary to official French positions, Hugues was allowed to continue to rule as he thought best until his recall to France in the middle of 1798.[22]

His successor, Gen. Edme Étienne Borne Desfourneaux, sounded much more conciliatory toward the United States—one merchant wrote, "The change which has taken place at Guadaloupe offers fair for a good safe speculation," because Desfourneaux seemed more committed to protecting the rights of neutral vessels.[23] However, only a short time passed before his attitude changed. Though American relations with Guadeloupe itself might have been improving, Guadeloupe did not speak for the empire: French privateers continued their depredations, and the U.S. Navy continued to attack French armed vessels. When the USS *Constellation*

captured the *Insurgente* on 9 February 1799, Desfourneaux declared war against the United States—unilaterally, on his own authority.[24] The French administration disavowed the declaration once aware of it, but it took time for news of the declaration to travel to France and for the disavowal to travel back.

In Saint-Domingue, the situation was even more complex. The northern part of the colony was under the control of French agent Toussaint L'Ouverture, whose rebellious rule it was that had caused the colony to be declared in a state of "permanent siege." The French government had appointed a military leader, Gen. André Rigaud, to regain some semblance of control, but the island was convulsed in civil war. Toussaint initially did not wish Saint-Domingue to leave the empire, but he did wish for it to have self-rule. And he acted as though the colony was self-ruled: he made treaties and agreements with both the British and the Americans separate from, and contrary to, French official decrees.

Toussaint's agreements with the British and the Americans revolved around trade. As he gained power, American commerce became more and more important to his plans. He negotiated an exclusive treaty with the British for rights to trade at Jamaica, but he also opened several ports on the north coast of Haiti to American shipping. These arrangements were in direct violation of the nonintercourse that had been ordered with respect to both the English and Americans. Despite there being an official civilian agent at Saint-Domingue, Gabriel d'Hédouville, the Americans chose to negotiate with Toussaint. In this they were following the lead of the British commander, Brig. Gen. Thomas Maitland, and the agreements they made applied to both Britain and the United States.

The United States was reluctant to throw its entire support behind Toussaint—his values of democracy and liberty were appealing, but racial difference was hard to overcome.[25] He did not talk of independence, at least not at this time, because he still wished for France's support as well.[26] Consul General Edward Stevens saw Toussaint's endgame, though: he wrote to Timothy Pickering, the American secretary of state, "All connection with France will soon be broken off. If [Toussaint] is not disturbed he will preserve appearance a little longer. But as soon as France interferes with this colony he will throw off the mask, and declare it independent."[27]

Part of the negotiations dealt with the fitting out of armed vessels. Toussaint's methods diverged from Victor Hugues's in relation to privateers. Where Hugues encouraged antagonism against the United States as a way to get the supplies he needed and the support he wanted from the metropole, Toussaint chose instead to open relations with enemy nations to gain the necessary supplies. He actually forbade the fitting out of armed vessels at any port in Saint-Domingue unless the vessel was in the service of Toussaint and carried a legal passport issued by him and signed by both British and American officials. No privateer or French ship of war was permitted to enter the ports.[28]

Though the agreement negotiated with Toussaint technically applied to all ports of Saint-Domingue, the Americans made it quite clear that they were supporting Toussaint, not Rigaud: merchant vessels were ordered to sell war matériel only at ports controlled by Toussaint.[29] Capt. Silas Talbot instructed one of his captains not to "do any one thing, that may Justly give cause to disturb the Harmony between [Toussaint], and the People of the United States."[30]

WHICH LAW?

In the Quasi-War with France, the law mattered—but which law? Lauren Benton argues that the location and centralization of prize courts made a difference in their adjudication, which I too have argued, but she suggests that reference to the Law of Nations was what helped to bind the imperial systems together.[31] It is true that prize law, writ large, was an invention of the Law of Nations, and the approach to war on the high seas underlying prize law was an outcome of the need for multiple empires to police both imperial space and access to that space. If France had gone to war with the United States officially, the Law of Nations would have taken on a greater significance, especially the parts dealing with wartime ethics. But no war was ever declared.

The Law of Nations did, nonetheless, have significance for both the United States and France. Eliga Gould has argued that in the British Empire, there was a point past which the Law of Nations did not apply—essentially, the colonies. The British were thus able to fight wars against other imperial powers in their colonies while still technically at peace with them at the metropolitan level.[32] The United States did not view the Law of Nations this way. For one thing, the United States was not a European power, so any war waged with it was necessarily not metropolitan. But the United States saw itself as on the same level as the empires of Europe, at least as far as international law was concerned. In fact, violations of the Law of Nations constituted one of the reasons given for suspending commerce between the United States and France in the first place. There was no question that the Law of Nations applied in the Caribbean, but it was only one of the sets of laws that could be applied.

In the case of the Quasi-War, vague references to the Law of Nations almost always related to dealings with nonbelligerent nations (true neutrals), not to dealings between France and the United States. The Law of Nations could establish how prizes should be adjudicated but not why. The question of why prizes could be taken was answered by national laws.

In fact, by using its laws to declare American vessels good prizes if they did not meet a long list of specific criteria, France was trying to extend its empire to include those vessels. The French seemed to expect American ships' captains to be conversant and compliant with imperial edicts, even though even France's own merchant shipmasters probably were not aware of or compliant with all of them. The empire,

though, did not follow its own laws: colonial edicts or interpretations of French law made the prize courts of the Caribbean distinctive.

Butting up against French imperial law was American law. Each U.S. vessel carried with it (metaphorically) the law of the United States as to who could be captured and why; the Law of Nations answered the how. The nonintercourse act of 1798 actually put France and the United States on the same plane regarding trade itself (both nations made French-American trade illegal). But captures were regulated also by national law. In the United States, the first act of Congress regarding this conflict allowed only defensive action against French privateers, but as the Quasi-War dragged on the powers granted to both the Navy and armed merchant vessels became more and more expansive.[33] War meant flexibility in the law for the United States as well, though (unlike in the French empire) all the legal changes came from the central government. For instance, in response to Toussaint's plea for assistance from the United States, Congress gave the president latitude to reopen trade with any place he thought beneficial to the United States—in this case, Saint-Domingue.[34]

On the sea, every ship could be a law unto itself. On both sides, some ships took liberties with the law. Reported incidents of plundering of or brutality on American merchants often went unrepaid, but they were not infrequent.[35] Plundering a ship, though illegal, was sometimes the only way to recoup time and energy spent chasing a vessel that turned out to be less eligible as a prize than originally thought; one group of merchants wrote to Secretary Pickering that privateers would plunder a vessel primarily if they thought they would not get a legal condemnation in a prize court. Even in a non-French port such as Saint Jago de Cuba, acquittal of the prize did not necessarily mean that the privateers would get nothing: merchants complained that even after two ships were cleared and released, their whole cargoes were plundered.[36]

Most privateers need not have worried about not getting favorable verdicts: once American vessels entered the prize courts the likelihood of condemnation far outstripped that of any other outcome.[37] The famed lawlessness of the seas was often encouraged or provoked by ignored law on the land. One French consul, in Cádiz, apparently instructed all French privateers to capture every American they could find, with an absolute guarantee of condemnation at any Spanish port under his jurisdiction. U.S. consul Stephen Cathalan wrote from Marseille that of a hundred merchant vessels brought into that city, not just American but of all neutral nationalities, only six had not been condemned.[38]

But not only privateers could "go rogue," so to speak. If privateers veered too far toward outright piracy, it was easy enough for the government to disavow their actions as private citizens. But when a naval commander disregarded the law, his actions could have significant consequences—not only embarrassment for the Navy

but real diplomatic problems. Against a background of already-fluid enforcement of law on the sea, some U.S. Navy commanders began to overreach their authority in their attempts to assist Toussaint. They began to confiscate French property carried in neutral vessels, which was against the law ("Free bottoms make free goods" was the American bromide).[39] The Secretary of the Navy cracked down on this behavior as quickly as possible. Captain Talbot explained to Capt. George Little, "Mistakes of this kind, will lead us into quarrels with all the world."[40] Following the law in this instance was one way to keep the United States out of all-out war.

But some commanders disregarded the law anyway, whether American, French, or international. Lt. William Maley, captain of the schooner USS *Experiment,* decided that he could take whatever vessel he wanted in whatever manner he wanted. He plundered neutral vessels; he made agreements of protection with both Rigaud and Toussaint and then reneged on both; he pressed American men he found on board British vessels; and he became publicly and frequently intoxicated, to the point of fighting with his own crew.[41] The ranking officer of the Caribbean squadron, Captain Talbot, finally had enough of Maley's shenanigans and sent him home to deal with charges that had "become so numerous, and complicated, that an enquiry into them, appears . . . no longer to be dispensed with."[42] The U.S. government paid out $7,040.55 to Paolo Paoly in repayment for Maley's unauthorized capture and detention of his schooner *Amphitheatre*.[43] Maley was dismissed from the service, although his actions against British neutrals appear not to have had any major deleterious effects on British-American relations.

By the end of the war, the privateers had either been eradicated or grown more wily, Thomas Truxtun complained: "With all this cruising my success has been very limited indeed, for the french have become scarce, so much so, that what I formerly found (chasing) an amusement, and pastime, is now insiped, Urksome & tiresome."[44] Nevertheless, when in December 1800 the Secretary of the Navy wrote to Capt. John Barry about the treatment of privateers, he did not preclude the possibility of coming to peace with the colonies separately from the metropole.[45]

In the end, the United States and France were able to come to an agreement to restore commercial relations. The Convention of Peace, Commerce, and Navigation was signed at Mortefontaine on 1 October 1800. In the United States, one of the legacies of the Quasi-War came out of a decision about the legality of the capture of the *Charming Betsy* (sometimes *Betsey*) by Capt. Alexander Murray of the USS *Constellation* in July 1800. There was some question about what nation the *Charming Betsy* belonged to (purportedly Denmark) when it was captured by the French and then recaptured by the *Constellation*. Questions about neutrality and legality propelled the case all the way to the Supreme Court, where John Marshall ruled, with no precedent whatsoever, against Murray. Chief Justice Marshall's goal was to align American law with the Law of Nations, and he succeeded. Frederick

Leiner argues that Marshall was willing to shove Murray (who was almost certainly not in the wrong as Marshall described him) aside in an attempt to establish the United States as a bona fide participant in the Law of Nations and thus give its government international credibility in a time when it desperately needed that. This case has been cited for more than two hundred years, "primarily in the principle that an American statute should not be interpreted to violate international law unless no other reasonable construction is possible."[46]

In many ways, the Quasi-War was merely a skirmish in the much bigger war between the British and French empires, with the United States caught in the middle of an ongoing conflict for territory and access not only in the Caribbean but across the world. But this undeclared maritime war reduced France's credibility as an empire and widened the divide not just between colony and metropole but also among the colonies themselves. Conversely, this conflict helped the United States to establish itself as a player on an international scale, if not yet an especially powerful player, and to build up naval armament that would, in a fairly short time, become one of the nation's most successful international advocates.

NOTES

1 Samuel Hodgdon, "First at Sea If the Political Horizon Thickens," *Papers of the War Department, 1784–1800,* 2 April 1798, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/docimage.php?id=25762&docColID=28264.

2 For more on the debates over the colonies' legal status (and their laws), see Miranda Frances Spieler, "The Legal Structure of Colonial Rule during the French Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd ser., 66, no. 2 (1 April 2009), pp. 365–408. For more on how the French Caribbean colonies were able to establish a more independent relationship with the metropole, see Kenneth J. Banks, *Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713–1763* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2006).

3 Articles about the various colonial administrations include Carolyn Fick, "Revolutionary Saint Domingue and the Emerging Atlantic: Paradigms of Sovereignty," Fernand Braudel Center *Review* 31, no. 2 (1 January 2008), pp. 121–44; Philippe R. Girard, "Black Talleyrand: Toussaint Louverture's Diplomacy, 1798–1802," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd ser., 66, no. 1 (1 January 2009), pp. 87–124; and Laurent Dubois, "'The Price of Liberty': Victor Hugues and the Administration of Freedom in Guadeloupe, 1794–1798," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd ser., 56, no. 2 (1 April 1999), pp. 363–92, doi:10.2307/2674123.5.

4 *Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between the United States and France,* 7 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935–38) [hereafter *QW* with volume and page], vol. 1, p. 189.

5 For more about the building of the American navy, see Frederick C. Leiner, *Millions for Defense: The Subscription Warships of 1798* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000); Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991); and Ian W. Toll, *Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

6 The interactive web map is located at http://abbymullen.org/projects/Quasi-War.

7 An Act to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse between the United States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, chap. 53, 1 Stat. 565 (1798), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/qw01.asp.

8 For more about prize law and its relationship to empire, see Lauren A. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), chap. 3.

9 I have used this idea of the need for proximity to a prize court to inform my decisions about the locations of some captures on my map, erring closer to land rather than farther away in cases where the location is somewhat vague, like "on her way from Guadeloupe."

10 This practice was described by Consul P. F. Dobree, *QW*1:24.

11 Secretary of the Navy to John Adams, 30 July 1799, in *QW*1:256.

12 *QW*1:75. Secretary of War James McHenry solicited the advice of Alexander Hamilton on the matter of how much authority the president had to allow the Navy by executive order to attack the French. The question of constitutional presidential authority is a very important one but not one within the scope of this paper.

13 Secretary of War to Capt. Richard Dale, 22 May 1798, in *QW*1:77.

14 See Secretary of the Navy to Capt. Daniel McNeill, 5 June 1799, in *QW*3:304. The Secretary of the Navy refers to orders of 29 December 1798, 16 January 1799, and 12 March 1799.

15 B. H. Phillips to Secretary of the Navy, 13 August 1797, in *QW*1:25.

16 U.S. Congress, "Spain, Great Britain, and France. Communicated June 22, 1797," in *Foreign Relations* 02, American State Papers 02, no. 125 (Washington, DC, 1832), pp. 30–31, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxy.bpl.org/iw- search/we/Digital/?p_product=ASPA&p_theme=sset2&p_nbid=V53I5EYRMTQxNzQ0NjYwNi41MTI3MzY6MToxMzoxOTIuODAuNjUu 10A0ED94B5578480@-@3 [hereafter *FR*].

17 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 32.

18 There aren't many data about this claim, but I think it is suggestive that of the eleven condemnations that cite passage to or from an enemy port, only one is not in the Caribbean (see prize-court records at https://docs.google.com/a/lincolnmullen.com/spreadsheets/d/1XFnIfSPtdTSDnS13sBDJYwtuotW8psdsMfPO-bZonos/pub.html). Similarly, the condemnations that cite lack of proper papers are located outside the Caribbean in nine of thirteen cases.

19 *QW*1:30.

20 Letter from Capt. John Cruft, 30 July 1798, in *QW*1:259.

21 *FR*2:28. This document also lists a number of other decrees about the grounds on which Americans could be captured.

22 Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L. McKitrick, *The Age of Federalism* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 652.

23 *Philadelphia Gazette,* 14 February 1799.

24 The text of the *arrêté* declaring war was printed in the *Massachusetts Mercury,* 10 May 1799.

25 For an article exploring Toussaint's diplomacy and the many different characters he had to play in his governance of Saint-Domingue, see Girard, "Black Talleyrand."

26 Ibid., p. 93.

27 Edward Stevens to Secretary of State, 13 February 1800, in *QW*5:184.

28 Edward Stevens to Capt. Silas Talbot, 23 January 1800, in *QW*5:119–20.

29 Alexander DeConde, *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797–1801* (New York: Scribner's, 1966), p. 208.

30 Capt. Silas Talbot to Capt. Christopher Raymond Perry, in *QW*5:94.

31 Benton, *Search for Sovereignty,* p. 159.

32 Eliga H. Gould, "Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 1772," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd ser., 60, no. 3 (1 July 2003), p. 479, doi:10.2307/3491549.

33 An Act to Authorize the Defense of the Merchant Vessels of the United States against French Depredations, chap. 60, 1 Stat. 572 (1798), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/qw02.asp.

34 Donald R. Hickey, "America's Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791–1806," *Journal of the Early Republic* 2, no. 4 (1 December 1982), p. 366, doi:10.2307/3123088. This clause is appropriately called "Toussaint's Clause."

35 See, for instance, the cases of the *Rebecca, Electa,* and *Lovely Lass, QW*1:31; *Hetty Jane, QW*1:235.

36 Masters of captured vessels at St. Jago, Cuba, to Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State, 21 June 1797, in *QW*1:33.

37 See Abby Mullen, "Encounters in the Quasi-War," *Abby Mullen,* http://abbymullen.org/projects/Quasi-War/, for prize-court outcomes; see note linked to the map for further thoughts on condemnation percentages.

38 Stephen Cathalan Jr. to Timothy Pickering, 24 May 1798, in *QW*1:79.

39 This sentiment is explicitly stated in *A Message of the President of the United States, to Congress, Relative to France and Great Britain; Delivered, 5 December 1793* (Philadelphia: Carey, 1795).

40 Capt. Silas Talbot to Capt. George Little, 1 March 1800, in *QW*5:257.

41 For a description of all these things, which happened in the span of about two weeks in May 1800, see *QW*6:44–45. These are only a few of the offenses Maley committed.

42 Capt. Silas Talbot to the Secretary of the Navy, 13 June 1800, in *QW*6:41–42.

43 *QW*6:411.

44 *QW*7:1.

45 *QW*7:14.

46 Frederick C. Leiner, "The *Charming Betsy* and the Marshall Court," *American Journal of Legal History* 45, no. 1 (January 2001), p. 20, doi:10.2307/3185347.

II *Unmanning the Navy*
The Politics of Race and Recruitment in the Antebellum Service

ZACHARY S. KOPIN

In May 1839 Lt. George M. Hooe, a career Navy officer who had been in the service since 1824, came before a court-martial on board the frigate USS *Macedonian*. Hooe faced charges of behavior unbecoming of an officer, stemming from his time serving under Uriah Levy on board the sloop of war USS *Vandalia* in the West Indies Squadron the year before. In an attempt to clear his name, Hooe, a white officer, appealed to President Martin Van Buren to override the court's adverse findings on the grounds that African American sailors had testified against him, something that, Hooe argued, would have been unusual in civilian court. Van Buren's ruling and the subsequent public fascination with the case of Lieutenant Hooe reveal a great deal about what the presence of African American sailors on board U.S. Navy ships signified in the antebellum United States.[1]

Previous historians who have dealt with race in the antebellum Navy have tended toward an analysis of the phenomenon predicated on conceptions of labor. Under this argument the Navy tolerated African American sailors because white sailors would not fill the service's available billets. This paper contends, however, that while this labor analysis is significant and correct, the political implications of Lieutenant Hooe's case suggest a far more complex relationship among African Americans, the antebellum Navy, and the nation at large. Instead, this paper posits that enlistment in the Navy's volunteer force was a route to an informal type of social citizenship through the performance and practice of republican civic ideals.

In the early nineteenth century enlisted African Americans played a critical role in the U.S. Navy. They supplied a surplus labor force not only in wartime, when the privateering industry added to the inducements that drew white sailors away from the service, but during peacetime as well. They served on details with white enlisted men, a rare occurrence ashore. African Americans served in positions of authority over white men as petty officers, something unlikely ashore. White men and African Americans commonly messed together by choice, something that occurred only on the fringes of nineteenth-century American society.

African Americans regularly testified both for and against white sailors and even officers in open court; something that would have been unthinkable and illegal in

the racially bifurcated world of the mid-nineteenth-century United States outside the Navy. For most of the first half of the nineteenth century African Americans afloat experienced social relationships with their white compatriots of an entirely different type than did their counterparts ashore. This pattern of open equality became strained only as racial roles ashore ossified during the first half of the nineteenth century.[2]

The classical explanation for the presence of African Americans on board U.S. Navy vessels before the Civil War is that, as Michael Shawn Davis notes, "African Americans . . . served in the Navy because white sailors would not."[3] In other words, African Americans merely were present on board Navy ships because of a shortage of available white sailors in the labor supply. This analysis, however, minimizes the political implications that intermingling on board ship created. As Rebecca Scott has noted, it is impossible to separate race, politics, and labor in the lives of individuals in the first half of the nineteenth century. The service of African Americans in the antebellum Navy was intrinsically a political act by virtue of the fact that these men volunteered for a national force. They participated in republican civic duties without full benefit of membership within the larger republic, which speaks to aspirations of belonging in an imagined community as much as it does the need for a wage.[4]

This view is reinforced when we assess the relationship of these free sailors of color to the military courts. Matthew Taylor Raffety has argued that "the crews of American antebellum vessels used the apparatuses of the legal system to press their case, to demand redress, and to assert their understandings of the privileges of manhood and citizenship."[5] As it will be seen, whereas in appealing to Van Buren to clear his name Hooe was attempting to assert his racial dominance, in testifying against Hooe the two African American sailors were also asserting their right to a larger role in the governing process. In a desperate bid to save himself from humiliation, Hooe brought this historic relationship of relative equality to the forefront, if only for a moment, of a national conversation about free persons of color in a white-dominated society. In 1840, all of a sudden the national implications of an equitable interracial legal process under the federal government became more than a peculiar tradition: it became a threat.

Lt. George Hooe was a Southerner. As a descendant of George Mason, Hooe came from prominent Southern stock. He was a slaveholder. His residence in Virginia—"Friedland," in King George County—was maintained by numerous bound persons, some quite distinguished in their own rights. As William Lloyd Garrison's *The Liberator* took time to note in the midst of the Hooe controversy, at least one slave could claim to have been present at the birth of the republic. Bacchus, as he was called, served as a "teamster in the war of the revolution, and was in attendance

with his team at the glorious and final siege of Yorktown." As a young man he had watched Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock march off to his demise during the French and Indian War and, up until his dying day, would give a "succinct account of that sanguinary action." In this telling, Garrison sets up a stern contrast between the two men. Bacchus, Garrison seems to suggest, was just as American as Hooe. Yet Hooe had abused his power, where Bacchus had served his country. Was it right, the piece concludes, that one man, who would otherwise be considered the very image of republican virtue, die in bondage while his master defames the government? The answer, at least to Garrison, is clear: no.[6]

As a member of the Virginian aristocracy, Hooe would have been used to getting his way and using corporal punishment when he did not. Nor had Lieutenant Hooe been a stranger to seeing someone court-martialed for an abuse of power. As a younger officer, earlier in the decade, he saw two of his commanders brought before courts-martial for overzealous use of the lash.[7] Yet in 1839 Hooe found himself accused of similar crimes. Hooe's conduct, his superiors believed, was unbecoming of an officer. Moreover, his poor conduct would set off a series of events that would call into question the Navy's integrated practices.

The court-martial itself was a relatively painless affair. Convened at 11:00 AM on 27 May 1839 on board *Macedonian,* seven naval officers, all of them Southerners, heard testimony from members of *Vandalia*'s crew.[8] Hooe stood accused of three charges: unnecessary cruelty to the crew by virtue of overreaching his authority; improper behavior toward his subordinates; and disobedience to orders. Hooe attempted to stymie the court's progress by arguing he did not recognize the court's authority, but the court proceeded. The trial continued through five days of testimony, at which point Hooe once more attempted to upend the proceedings, this time on the grounds that he believed two men's testimony "altogether illegal: because people of color should not be allowed to testify against white men." The tribunal, however, ignored the protest and rendered a verdict of partial guilt on the latter two charges. The verdict carried a penalty of expulsion from the West Indies Squadron and formal reprimand.[9]

Hooe, however, believed that his last objection was the key to being reprieved. Under the state law of Florida, the state in which the court-martial physically took place, African Americans could not testify against white men. Hooe argued, therefore, that the testimony of the African Americans was illegal and inadmissible and therefore nullified the trial. What the issue came down to in Hooe's mind, unsurprisingly for a Southerner of the age, was that the local state law superseded federal administrative and legal tradition.

When the court ruled against him, George Hooe felt that his rights had been violated. In an attempt to save face he made an appeal to President Van Buren and the press in the hope that the commander in chief would intercede on his behalf.

Van Buren, however, announced in December 1839 that he "found nothing in the proceedings in the case of Lieut. Hooe that required his interference."[10] While Hooe was unwilling to tolerate having aspersions cast on him by his racial inferiors, Van Buren considered it a mere cost of doing business. Hooe relied on Van Buren to reassert Hooe's dominance in the way of things. Van Buren's unwillingness to assert white dominance would end up costing Van Buren greatly, as Hooe was not alone in his beliefs. Southern politicians and papers did not at all look kindly on the president's decision.

Indeed, the antebellum South did not look kindly on the very idea of free seamen of color challenging the authority of white planters. The South's limitation of the rights of free seamen of color in the period evidences how dangerous some areas of the country believed them to be. In the state of South Carolina the Black code required all African American seamen to be jailed upon entry into port and to be held there until such time as their vessels left the city. The mere presence of free African American sailors in port was so threatening to the white-controlled social order that even a single free Black sailor needed to be dealt with. While it is possible to make a case that this law was intended to keep the sailor away from the two things in which sailors most often indulged in port, adult beverages and women of the night, social forces alone should have restricted such behavior. In effect, the sailor was quarantined because the equity he experienced on board ship made him a carrier of a social disease, equality. It was as though these African American sailors carried within them the threat of equality because of their experiences on board ship and this alone were reason enough to make them criminals.[11]

After all, sailors had a long history of expressing displeasure at improper treatment through extralegal means. It is no accident of history that the American War of Independence began in and around Boston. As historians Pauline Maier and Paul Gilje demonstrate, sailors' conceptions of liberty were drawn from both economic and social concerns as the increasingly capitalistic world of the late eighteenth century saw the abandonment of the "moral economy" that had protected sailors from stressors in the past. The Southern states, at least historically speaking, were not wrong in believing that an energized body of sailors who believed themselves to be the inheritors of rights they were not granted by law would take those rights by force.[12]

The June following Van Buren's note, John Botts, a congressman from Virginia, raised the issue of Hooe's conviction on the floor of the House of Representatives. He challenged the House to support a motion informing the president that supporting Black testimony against white men "will not be justified." Not finding strong support among his colleagues, Botts had the court case read into the congressional record and, having made his point, dropped the issue.[13]

Botts's failed attempt at addressing what he saw as an unjustifiable act of racial equalization did little to calm the emotionally charged political landscape. As the *Richmond Whig* explained, the issue "hits at the gut" of every American, because "the elevated stations of those who set the example, and the high authority with which they are invested, conspire to attach more importance to their precepts and practices." The paper goes on to charge the Van Buren administration with reducing "every gentleman in the American Navy to a *quasi* level with free [B]lacks." Furthermore, the paper asks, "if negro testimony is admissible in the Navy, is it not admissible in the Army, and even in the Federal courts!"[14]

There is of course a flip side to the threat the *Whig* saw in white officials degrading themselves—that is, the elevation of African American seamen to the same level as whites. If participation in the administration of justice asserts a state of belonging to a civil body, as Raffety suggests, then that participation in the court-martial had been a recognition of legal standing and therefore of some form of citizenship, surely implying that these African Americans were politically more significant than mere laborers.

Both political parties seized on the controversy as a way to push their agendas. The case quickly became fodder for the electoral campaign of 1840. While politicians pandered to white crowds, the result of the contest had very real implications for the free Black community in the United States. In the balance hung the fate of free African Americans in relation to the state for the next two decades.[15]

After being picked up by the press leading up to and during a presidential election, a court-martial that would have otherwise been a brief exercise of military justice became a drawn-out political affair. Ultimately, the racial implications of the case, along with the concurrent and far more famous *Amistad* saga, helped bring several solidly Democratic states, such as Louisiana, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, over to the Whigs. It is not an anomaly that the election of 1840 is one of only two in which the Whig Party won the White House. The Whigs did not win on their platform alone. They were helped along by the ineffectual managerial behavior of Martin Van Buren on a number of fronts, the Hooe case among them.

The legacy of the Hooe case did not end with the election. In 1842 Senator John C. Calhoun, attempting to minimize the role of African American sailors in the Navy, cited the Lieutenant Hooe case as an example of the need to protect those who "sustain honor and glory" in the name of the United States. Calhoun was talking about protecting white men from Black men. He wanted to protect them specifically because they participated in an all-too-critical republican act: voluntary defense of the state. Calhoun ignored, of course, the fact that the African American sailors participated in the same act. Furthermore, Calhoun acknowledged to his fellow senators that there were "in the service good [B]lack sailors." Calhoun felt, however, it was more important to protect white sailors from degradation to the

perceived level of Black sailors in a body representative of the federal government by excluding the latter than to "retain those negroes, however well qualified to perform maritime service." Calhoun's efforts succeeded in the Southern-dominated Senate but failed in the Northern-controlled House, where white fear over the potential effects of unreified racial social strata might have been less.[16]

Lieutenant Hooe's court-martial raised issues more critical than the proper behavior of an officer. The case and its political aftermath shone a light on the role African American sailors had been filling in the Navy, not only physically but symbolically. Could these men both serve along with and be subservient to whites? To Calhoun and his conservative friends, the answer was no.

Historiographically, Hooe's case points to the importance of using a varied set of historical tools when assessing long-term trends. Seen through a discursive lens, the case of Lieutenant Hooe points toward a larger story of the struggle in the United States throughout the nineteenth century over who was entitled to what rights and privileges on the basis of perceived race. By participating in the naval legal process these African American sailors made a claim, wittingly or not, about what their role in society should be—a role that did not extend to the franchise, but was not one of irrelevance either. It was something in the middle, a type of social citizenship, but even that was too threatening to racialized power dynamics of nineteenth-century America to be tolerated.

In September 1839, just months after the USS *Macedonian* incident, the Navy Department imposed a 5 percent quota on African American enlistments. Nevertheless, the Navy would find it hard not to rely on African American seamen. African Americans would once again serve in extraordinary numbers in the war with Mexico. Despite the limit, a thousand African Americans served in a navy of only eight thousand men.[17] In other words, during the Mexican-American War African American seamen constituted 12.5 percent of the Navy's total strength, a proportion two and a half times greater than officially allowed. While accurate records are no easier to obtain for this period than for previous ones, the numbers that are available are telling.

The Navy, as its disregard for its self-imposed quota during the Mexican-American War indicated, could have enlisted as many African American seafarers as it wanted. Furthermore, since the Navy was authorized to expand its force for the war by four thousand men but only could recruit an additional two thousand, African Americans could have had those billets if they wanted them.[18] But since the imposition of the quota a culture of distrust between African American seafarers and the state had arisen. Amid the backdrop of the Compromise of 1850 and the new Fugitive Slave Act, the state came to see social citizenship for free African Americans as a threat, while African Americans came to see service to the American state as a waste of effort and sacrifice. In a republic, those who protect it are supposed to

benefit. As race relations worsened, African Americans became reluctant to serve a country that would see them sold into slavery just because of their skin. By the time of the Civil War, African Americans accounted only for a little more than 2 percent of the Navy's enlisted men, a tenth of what they had a half-century earlier.[19] In the end, it is within this larger story that we must historiographically view the case of Lieutenant Hooe and the entire subject of African American service in the U.S. Navy prior to the Civil War. Without it, we risk minimizing the impact and significance of what that service meant.

NOTES

1 Edward W. Callahan, *List of Officers of the Navy of the United States and the Marine Corps 1775–1900* (New York: L. R. Hamersly, 1901), p. 237.

2 The position of power African Americans held in the early U.S. Navy is well-known within the field and has been discussed in both monographic and article forms. Nevertheless, it has failed to penetrate not only the walls of academe but the even smaller world of maritime military history itself. This raises an important question: Why has this important relationship failed to gain much acknowledgment despite the large number of scholars interested in race in the early republic? The reason may be, in part, the relatively low positions of maritime and military history in the academic hierarchy. It is also possible that these fields have failed to utilize properly their means to spread the message. This paper attempts to address this issue. For more information on the relationship of African American petty officers to the rest of the crew, see Michael J. Crawford, "U.S. Navy Petty Officers in the Era of the War of 1812," *Journal of Military History* 76, no. 4 (2012), pp. 1035–52.

3 Michael Shawn Davis, "'Many of Them Are among My Best Men': The United States Navy Looks at Its African American Crewmen, 1755–1955" (dissertation, Kansas State Univ., 2011), p. 11.

4 Rebecca J. Scott, *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), p. 2.

5 Matthew Taylor Raffety, *The Republic Afloat: Love, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 212.

6 William Lloyd Garrison, "In the Residence of Lieut. Geo. M. Hooe," *The Liberator* (Boston), 8 May 1840.

7 George M. Hooe, Journal, 1832–1833, Independence Seaport Museum, Philadelphia, PA.

8 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *A Copy of the Record of Proceedings of the Naval Court Martial, for the Trial of Lieutenant George M. Hooe,* 30 June 1840, Doc. No. 244 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1840).

9 Ibid.

10 "Pro-slavery Retreat," *National Anti-slavery Standard,* 22 October 1840.

11 For more information see Philip M. Hamer, "Great Britain, the United States and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822–1848," *Journal of Southern History* 1 (1935), pp. 3–28.

12 Historians debate the extent to which sailors themselves were free actors. However, in this case whether they were pawns in the political games of artisans or true partisans on the road to independence is irrelevant. What matters is that sailors in North America since the late eighteenth century had established a pattern of political involvement in the streets. For more on the relationship of the lower classes to revolt, see Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776* (London: W. W. Norton, 1972), and Paul Gilje, *Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). The concept of the "moral economy," an economic system that cared for the poor in difficult times, as a predecessor to the capitalist developments of the later eighteenth century was first developed by Marxist historian E. P. Thompson and later applied to the American colonies, specifically Boston, by Gary Nash. The theory holds that as capitalism developed it further distanced those on the top of the socioeconomic ladder from those on the bottom, thereby minimizing the perceived need for those at the top to help those at the bottom in rough times. In real terms this meant that the working classes (read artisans) were more likely to revolt when stressed. For more on the development and extinction of the moral economy see E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), and Gary Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986).

13 *Congressional Globe,* 8 July 1840.

14 *Richmond Whig,* n.d., repr. William Gannaway Brownlow, *A Political Register: Setting Forth the Principles of the Whig and Locofoco Parties in the United States* (Jonesborough, TN: Jonesborough Whig, 1844).

15 *Proceedings of the Naval Court Martial.*

16 John C. Calhoun, "Remarks on the Enlistment of Negroes in the Navy," in *The Papers of John C. Calhoun: Vol. XVI, 1839–1843,* ed. Clyde N. Wilson (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1985), pp. 341–43.

17 Steven J. Ramold, *Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 19–24.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

III *Freedom of the Seas in the Caribbean*
A Dispute between Great Britain and Nicaragua, 1904–1905

SHARIKA CRAWFORD, ADRIANA AYALA, AND BRISSA MEDINA

On 19 March 1904 Nicaraguan authorities traveled to an offshore reef in the Caribbean Sea to detain and charge the captains of five Caymanian schooners with unlawful turtle fishing within territorial waters.[1] Over the two previous decades, clashes had intensified between British West Indian turtlemen (the Cayman Islands were at the time a dependency of the British Crown Colony of Jamaica) and Nicaraguan officials over the right to harvest green and hawksbill turtles within miles of the Atlantic coast, a contested maritime space. Unlike previous incidences, this particular dispute triggered the arrival of the British protected cruiser HMS *Retribution* (1891). Watching from afar, international observers in the United States were so alarmed by the brewing conflict in the Caribbean that Secretary of State John Hay called on the British ambassador, Sir Mortimer Durand, to explain the situation in Nicaragua.[2] For British Foreign Office functionaries, the maritime dispute between Caymanian turtlemen and Nicaraguan officials rested on two interrelated questions. Did British West Indian fishermen violate the national sovereignty of territorial waters? Or did Nicaraguan authorities disobey international customary law of the sea, which defined high-seas waters as open and free to all? The answer to these questions greatly varied with the perspective of the historical actor. To be sure, Caymanian fishermen and British officials had to mount a substantial defense of a maritime tradition that potentially weakened the geopolitical and economic ambitions of new Central American republics with Nicaragua. For their part, Nicaraguan officials were unwilling to accept foreign domination of a turtle fishery in their national territorial waters.

The history of British-Nicaraguan relations is complicated. Prior to the birth of an independent Nicaragua in 1838, Nicaraguan nation builders and their forefathers contested British influence over the Mosquitia—an autonomous region of indigenous and Afro-indigenous kingdoms that extended across the Caribbean coasts of the modern-day countries of Honduras and Nicaragua.[3] Despite Spanish colonial efforts to diminish British influence in the region and the subsequent withdrawal of British settlers, Spain and later Nicaragua contested for informal European political and cultural control over the Mosquitia.

By the late nineteenth century, Managua's perspective toward the Caribbean lowlands changed from benign neglect to active interest with the arrival of American investment in the fledgling banana industry there. This miniboom attracted the eyes of modernizing Nicaraguan elites seeking to benefit financially from the culturally and physically isolated Mosquitia. While much of the scholarship on the region has accurately characterized it as a contested space, the bulk of that scholarship focuses on events prior to the nineteenth century.[4] In contrast, studies on the nineteenth century concentrate too much on the role of American presence in helping to consolidate Nicaraguan authority over the Mosquitia.[5] Scholars view the incorporation of the Mosquitia into Nicaragua in 1894 solely through the lens of the banana, rubber, or gold industry. In doing so, they miss an opportunity to analyze a long series of Nicaraguan state actions to claim both terrestrial and maritime Mosquitia.

This study of the British-Nicaraguan dispute over an ocean fishery and territorial waters fits nicely into a steadily growing body of literature on turtles and turtle fishing. Driven mostly by studies from geographers, oceanographers, archaeologists, and anthropologists, this scholarship has charted the origins and decline of turtle and turtle fisheries, especially in the Atlantic Ocean. Most scholars note the importance of turtle meat in processes of reciprocity among indigenous cultures in the Atlantic rim of Central America and as a source of animal protein for European settlers and enslaved Africans in the Caribbean islands.[6] Reasons for the decline of turtle and turtle fisheries in the Atlantic basin have been bifurcated into overfishing of turtle, on one hand, and on the other mid-twentieth-century conservationist efforts to categorize sea turtles as endangered species and ban the turtle fishery.[7] Fewer studies have seriously considered the role of states limiting and challenging fishermen's access to marine resources as an additional important factor in the decline of turtle fishery in the Western Hemisphere.[8] Our paper offers a corrective. We seek to provide a ground-level analysis of the protracted and deeply conflictive disputes over the issue of territorial waters and harvesting of marine resources. This 1903–1905 conflict foreshadowed subsequent and more-varied challenges to the principle of freedom of the seas, which Great Britain had defended and tried to maintain.

Finally, this study also engages with a fledgling body of scholarship focused on the origins of the law of the sea, which replaced the principle of freedom of the seas as an international law in 1973 and was renewed in 1982 at the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea. Scholarly attention on the creation of the law of the sea centers on three key moments. First, the 1930 Hague Conference began the groundwork for developing a maritime law after the League of Nations called for uniformity to resolve and avert disputes among member states. Second, a 1945 proclamation by President Harry S. Truman claimed natural resources found

on the seabed and subsoil of the sea along the contiguous coastline of the United States. This led several other nations, particularly in Latin America—such as Mexico (1945), Argentina (1946), Costa Rica (1948), Honduras and Brazil (1950), Nicaragua (1961), and Uruguay (1969)—to make similar claims. Third and finally, the 1958 UN conference finished what the 1930 Hague Conference had started with plans to create an oceanic law. The UN conference led to additional meetings with the UN International Law Commission in 1960, 1967, 1973, and 1982. This paper contributes to a growing body of scholarship that historicizes current maritime laws and how the fisheries shaped much of the law of the sea of today.[9]

EARLY DISPUTES OVER THE TURTLE FISHERY, 1880s–1890s

In 1883, E. W. Jennett, the master of the schooner *Mary Ellen,* filed a complaint against the commandante at Cape Gracias a Dios. The captain claimed that a Nicaraguan claiming to be that official had demanded that he pay thirty dollars to obtain a fishing license for that vicinity or he would take actions against him for illegally fishing in territorial waters. Jennett had refused, having already, he claimed, paid eighty dollars to fish green turtle *(Chelonia mydas)* around Mosquito Cay, about fifty miles south of Cape Gracias a Dios and thirty miles east of the Nicaraguan mainland. Jennett claimed the commandante ill-treated him and that his schooner capsized.[10] The offshore cays there were well known as turtle fishing grounds (see map). Alerting a British authority in Grand Cayman to his experience, Jennett demanded compensation for damage to his schooner and ill-treatment he suffered fishing thirty miles from Mosquito Cay.

British authorities investigated Jennett's allegations against the Nicaraguan authorities. The British minister in Guatemala, John Webster, initially dismissed the case and placed blame on the sea captain: "England had no claim to the place [Mosquito Cay]," he quickly concluded. Despite this initial response, the outcome of Captain Jennett's case was favorable to him. The Nicaraguan authorities acknowledged that the commandante had acted arbitrarily, removed him from his position, and took legal action against him. Moreover, Nicaraguan authorities informed Webster that they were willing to compensate Jennett for incurred damage.[11] Three years after the incident, Jennett settled for half of the six-hundred-dollar claim that he had presented to the Nicaraguan government.[12]

Jennett's case reveals the highly contested nature of the Mosquitia's offshore banks, cays, and reefs. In responding to the Jennett investigation, Nicaraguan authorities reminded the British minister of an 1869 Ordinance of Cape Gracias a Dios. This Nicaraguan law permitted collection of a ten-dollar fishing-license fee and the levying of a thirty-dollar fine against violators.[13] Nicaraguan officials drew attention to it to maintain their claims to the Mosquitia and its adjacent maritime space. Yet British officials and Caymanian fishermen both directly and indirectly challenged that claim. In 1885, J. C. Panton, the *custos*



(governor) of the Cayman Islands, inquired of the colonial secretary of Jamaica, Sir Edward Noel Walker, whether Mosquito Cay was in Nicaragua's jurisdiction.[14] Walker queried the Admiralty in London, only to receive a minute from the office of the private secretary to the First Lord admitting, "It is strange that I cannot

find any positive information on the point."[15] British officials' uncertainty about the sovereignty of Mosquito Cay only supported Caymanian fishermen's more direct challenges to Nicaraguan claims.

Writing to obtain guidance on how to approach Nicaragua's turtle fishery in 1888, William A. Bodden, captain of the schooner *Peerless,* reported that Caymanian turtlemen had settled Mosquito Cay and flown a British flag for the past nine years.[16] Bodden was implying that this territory belonged to Great Britain and that British authorities should take action in the face of Nicaraguan interlopers. Such a claim from a turtle fisherman like Bodden directly undercut Nicaraguan claims of territorial sovereignty over Mosquito Cay, which reflected the even greater tenuousness of the state's grasp on the Mosquitia writ large. Caymanian turtlemen continued to claim rightful occupancy of Mosquito Cay. By 1888 they had organized themselves as "Owners, Masters, and Mariners of the Cayman Islands" and were urging British authorities to protect Mosquito Cay from "extreme danger from certain Nicaraguan free booters" who claimed that they and their ancestors had owned Mosquito Cay for the past century. The turtlemen insisted that further investigations be conducted to determine whether they themselves were indeed trespassers and needed to pay a license fee.[17]

Caymanian territorial claims reflected the turtlemen's long history in the Mosquitia. Many fishermen recalled the rich turtle grounds of their former homes in the Mosquitia, which they had been forced to evacuate in the 1786 Convention of London.[18] Caymanian turtlemen had eventually returned to harvest turtle there. Around 1840, British settler Thomas Young observed that Grand Cayman schooners "fish for turtle near the Mosquito Kays, about forty or fifty miles away from the Cape, and . . . seldom return without a rich harvest."[19] The American ethnologist Ephraim George Squier described these banks and shoals as "stud[ding] the sea of the Antilles." Although they were a "terror of the mariners who navigate it," Squier acknowledged, "none of these cays are inhabited, nor are they ever frequented, except by the turtle fishers."[20]

By the 1850s, Nicaraguan and Mosquitia authorities were enacting and enforcing regulations for turtle fishing in the region. In 1855 a North American filibuster and self-declared president of Nicaragua, William Walker, decreed that all turtlemen pay sixteen dollars to obtain fishing licenses and five-dollar fines if they destroyed turtle nesting grounds.[21] This suggests an effort to address overfishing and depletion of the turtle populations of the Mosquitia. Charles Napier Bell, an English resident of the Mosquitia at that time, described efforts of the Miskitu, the indigenous people of the region, to enforce a turtle tax also. During a visit to Cape Gracias a Dios, the Miskitu king instructed Bell to take a quartermaster and twelve men to a cay some twenty miles to the southeast and deliver to two fishing captains a letter demanding payment of the turtle tax. Upon arrival, Bell ordered the quartermaster

to deliver the letter. One of the captains replied that he was a "free and independent British subject, and he would be d——d if he would pay a tax to any waik[n]a, King or no King."[22] Undeterred by his task, Bell, the Miskitu agents, and the quartermaster traveled five miles southward to the turtle kraals, which were "made of mangrove posts driven into the sand, and lashed together by withes, in about 4 feet of water." While the quartermaster and twelve Miskitu men dismantled the kraals and harpooned eight female turtles, an enraged turtle fisherman threatened to shoot them with his "fowling-piece." Bell recounted that the quartermaster and his men were also armed with guns and machetes. They threatened to "pull down every kraal as fast as it was built unless the tax was paid."[23] Villagers later feasted on four turtles that the Englishman and Miskitu men left them.

Despite Caymanian turtlemen's claims, it is clear that efforts to regulate turtle fishing in the waters adjacent to Mosquitia had been long familiar. Without consistent enforcement from either Nicaraguan or Mosquitia authorities, however, Caymanian and other foreign turtle fishermen benefitted from messy and contested maritime boundaries as well as from the lack of state presence out at the cays until the late nineteenth century. Jennett's claim for damages opened Nicaraguan authorities to further challenges to territorial sovereignty over Mosquito Cay and the Mosquitia at large.

Nicaraguan extension of authority over the Mosquitia was fragile and had occurred only a few decades earlier. In 1860, the British had agreed to the Anglo-Nicaraguan Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Managua, to end their protectorate over Mosquitia and recognized Nicaraguan sovereignty over the entire eastern portion of the region. However, the Miskitu maintained some political autonomy and were considered inhabitants of a reserve extending from Cape Gracias a Dios in the north to Bluefields in the south.[24] The Nicaraguan government was obliged to pay the Miskitu an annual stipend of support. Notwithstanding this jurisdictional realignment, Managua officials made few practical changes. It took them roughly three decades to establish the state infrastructure. In 1887, they created military posts and opened a post office in Bluefields.[25] The slowness of the Nicaraguan state reflected its unfamiliarity with the region both demographically and physically.

Without maps and legal documents outlining the country's specific maritime boundaries, British authorities appeared more willing than they might have been to investigate their subjects' challenges regarding Nicaraguan sovereignty. Geographer Karl Offen notes that cartographic representations of the Mosquitia were largely drawn from the perspectives of outsiders, such as the British, and never really reflected the region's actual spatial limits. British travelers often noted species, fruits, and terrain that were of interest to their extractive plans for the region. Much of that interest was focused on terrestrial resources, although such products as tortoiseshell and turtle meat had niche markets. In 1863, Nicaragua's first official

map failed even to include the Mosquitia.[26] Spatial delimitations of terrestrial and maritime zones could have served as valuable evidence to support claims vis-à-vis Caymanian turtle fishermen.

Into the 1890s, Caymanian fishermen continued to display recalcitrance toward Nicaraguan state efforts to regulate the turtle fisheries. In 1897, Caymanian turtle fishermen W. J. Bodden, U. Jackson, E. Alley, and A. A. Thompson forwarded petitions to the *custos* of the Cayman Islands. Nicaraguan authorities had, the petitions charged, wrongfully seized their vessels, carried the men to the mainland, and placed them in jail, where they experienced brutal maltreatment. While hunting turtle along the Miskito Cays, their schooners had been boarded by armed Nicaraguan representatives demanding to see fishing licenses and payment of fifty cents per turtle. With the exception of Thompson and Alley, the captains had failed to procure fishing permits, though they were now willing to pay the duty on each turtle. The officials directed the fishermen to Great River (Río Grande), where Commandante Carlos Solez fined them five thousand dollars.

Captain Alley was released to secure funds or find assistance in Bluefields, but the commandante kept the rest locked up as "security." Upon his return, Alley secured the release of the other turtlemen on the condition that they pay a duty of fifty-eight cents per turtle.[27] Captains Jackson and Bodden claimed their jail had been filthy and that no food or care had been given to them, resulting in the subsequent death of one of their crew, the cook.[28] These men now sought from the governor of Jamaica the equivalent of five thousand dollars in pounds in compensation. In London, the secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, dismissed the turtlemen's demands for compensation, but he asked the British minister at Guatemala to obtain an explanation for the "unusual and arbitrary conduct of the Nicaraguan officials" and determine the necessary requisites for a license to fish turtle in Mosquito Cay.[29]

Sir Audley Gosling, now the minister at Guatemala, discovered only "scanty information" regarding Nicaraguan regulation of the turtle fisheries. However, it appeared that in the years between 1883 and 1897 Nicaraguan officials had taken seriously the Caymanian claims of territorial sovereignty over Mosquito Cay and had reinforced state presence in the maritime zone. By 1897 Caymanian turtlemen were reporting a Nicaraguan presence not formerly seen around the cays. The "Owners, Masters, and Seamen of the Cayman Islands" noted that whereas for nearly a century they and their ancestors had fished undisturbed there, in March of that year Managua officials had placed armed guards at Mosquito Cay to impose a fifty-cent tax on all turtle.[30] According to Sir Audley, Nicaraguan officials now asserted greater oversight over the turtle fisheries because "the Nicaraguan Government viewed with extreme jealousy the presence of these British fishing vessels."[31] To consolidate Nicaraguan control over the extraction of this marine resource, the

Liberal government of President José Santos Zelaya promoted the idea of leasing turtle fishing rights as a three-year-term concession to Caymanian fishermen—for the exorbitant price of three thousand dollars annually.

Since the Jennett case in 1883, Nicaraguan authority had substantially strengthened over the offshore turtling grounds around Mosquitia generally. In 1893, the year he ascended to the presidency, Zelaya took immediate action to place Mosquitia firmly under the control of Managua officials. He appointed Carlos Lacayo and Rigoberto Cabezas—two Liberals eager to incorporate the region—as commissioner and regional intendant, respectively. Zelaya assigned them administrative and military responsibilities over Mosquitia, which led to the subsequent arrival of two hundred Nicaraguan soldiers—to the deep concern of the Mosquitia king. By February 1894 Cabezas had occupied Bluefields, established martial law, and dismissed the local government. The American and Creole populations rallied and called for U.S. or British intervention, but neither nation would intervene.[32] Nicaraguan authority was finally consolidated over the Caribbean coastal region.

In many ways, the 1894 incorporation of Mosquitia meant stronger state oversight of the region's economy. Zelaya negotiated commercial terms with foreign businesses and issued concessions over gold mines, banana plantations, and mahogany fields. His administration paid close attention to both the terrestrial and maritime extractive economies, such as the turtle trade. For Managua officials like Zelaya, the unwillingness of British West Indian subjects to respect Nicaraguan regulation of the turtle fisheries smacked of the formerly powerful role of the British in Mosquitia—and of Nicaragua's past impotence.

To end the previous state of weakness, President Zelaya took action to control the turtle fishery in the maritime Mosquitia. On 20 January 1903 Zelaya enacted Decree 20, which outlined the specific regulations for the turtle and sponge fisheries. Within three months, Caymanian turtlemen had launched complaints to British authorities of onerous and exorbitant fees. The commissioner of the Cayman Islands, Frederick Shedden Sanguinetti, explained that Decree 20 would ruin Grand Cayman, "which is almost wholly dependent on the Turtle Industry." Under article 2 of the decree, said the commissioner, each member of a turtle fleet had to register for a permit that cost two dollars per day. He gave as an example that a crew of seven men who fished for fifteen days would owe $210 for the permit. Typically, turtle fleets spent about twelve weeks fishing.[33] The license fees for three months could easily be equal to the gross for the entire catch, which excluded expenses such as nets, tools, and food for the crew. Jamaican merchants involved in the turtle trade also expressed concern. Thomas K. Bellis, the leading English purchaser of turtles, warned of an exorbitant price hike for Nicaraguan turtle and threatened to

purchase turtle instead from Cuba and other islands.[34] Caymanians and the British colonial officials agreed that Decree 20 was ruinous to the livelihoods of turtlemen.

THE 1904 INCIDENT

On 19 March 1904 the Nicaraguan commandante at Cape Gracias a Dios along with armed patrollers detained five Caymanian schooners with captains and crews "crawling," or storing, turtle at Old Mohegan (also known as Muerto) Cay. Joseph T. Mason, the master of the schooner *Martel Mason,* described a violent interaction between the Nicaraguan authorities and turtlemen. "I said to them come on deck but leave arms in the canoe. Scarcely had I uttered these words when I was seized by them. . . . One shoved a bayonet through my pants. One of them spoke in English saying shoot him," reported the captain.[35] Mason as well as the captains of the other four schooners was taken first to Cape Gracias a Dios and later jailed at Bluefields. According to the testimony of captains and crew, Nicaraguan authorities accused them of violating the Nicaraguan law of 1903.[36] The authorities claimed that the fishermen had neither bought fishing permits nor paid associated duties on crawled turtle.

Caymanian turtlemen once again sought help from British authorities. Urial Jackson, the master of the schooner *Dreadnought,* passed by the Old Mohegan during the incident en route to Grand Cayman but avoided detention. Since he had faced similar problems with Nicaraguan officials in the 1890s, it is likely that he informed other turtle fishermen and the commissioner of the Cayman Islands of the capture; within weeks, British Foreign Office and colonial officials launched an inquiry. Edward Thornton, now the British minister at Guatemala, had one question: Where had the fishermen captured the turtle? He surmised that "the mere fact of having Turtle on board, could not be sufficient proof that they had been caught in Nicaragua waters."[37] Caymanian turtlemen claimed to catch turtle on the high seas beyond the three-mile limits. Nicaraguan actions suggested that Managua considered its maritime territory to extend as far as twelve miles from the coast. That concerned British foreign and naval authorities, who found that interpretation of maritime sovereignty overly expansive—restrictive of the rights of British subjects and out of step with the status quo.

The British foreign minister called on Capt. Herbert Lyon of HMS *Retribution* to review nautical maps, visit the cays, and meet with the Cape Gracias a Dios commandante. Although the press considered the arrival of the protected cruiser an alarming development, diplomatic records show that the Royal Navy was present to supply nautical expertise.[38] That being said, the cruiser's presence also represented a concentration of force along the Mosquitia, which gave the impression that the British were prepared for a direct conflict. Writing to his superior, Adm. Sir Archibald Lucius Douglas, Lyon concluded that Nicaraguan actions were unjustifiable. He refuted Nicaraguan claims that Old Mohegan and Mosquito Cays were

inhabitable. Though Caymanians crawled their turtle along these places, Lyon considered Old Mohegan "an uninhabited rock close to a sand bar . . . [and] Mosquito Cay is so infested with sandflies that no one can live on it."

Underlying the aggressive Nicaraguan assertions of sovereignty was anger over the loss of turtle revenue. In response to Decree 20, Caymanian turtle fishermen no longer placed their crawls within the three-mile limits. "[The Nicaraguans] have committed this piratical act, hoping it would simply end in paper correspondence: I think they out [*sic*] to be very severely dealt with to prevent repetition of the same."[39] After reviewing Lyon's report, Caymanian testimonies, and other records, Thornton saw little evidence to support allegations of poaching by Caymanian turtlemen. Following the orders of the British Parliament, he demanded an "immediate release of the fishermen, and the rescission of all penalties and to reserve for future examination any doubts which may have arisen as to justification."[40]

Nicaraguan authorities balked at this challenge to the country's sovereignty over the cays. Commandante Casimiro Gonzalez explained to Commissioner Sanguinetti that President Zelaya had called for the detention and arrest of Caymanian fishermen who unlawfully fished in Nicaraguan waters. The turtle fishermen, he insisted, had violated article 593 of the Civil Code, which authorized Gonzalez to police out to and beyond twelve miles off the coast. Zelaya pardoned the five Caymanian turtle captains, but Foreign Minister Adolfo Altamirano, so informing Thornton, insisted that the fishermen's previous payment of fees showed their acceptance of Nicaraguan sovereignty over the cays. "The clear and explicit confessions made by the captains, and crews, of the captured schooners, and the continuous and immemorial possession of the lands, and waters, clearly prove the unquestionable rights of dominion of Nicaragua over all the Mosquito Isles, Islets, and Banks, with their corresponding territorial waters."[41] This line of argument was eventually to cause territorial disputes with close and far neighbors, including Honduras, Costa Rica, and Colombia. It was an effort to maintain a claim of sovereignty over a contested space.

In Guatemala, the British minister realized that the case of the Caymanian fishermen in disputed waters had the potential to hamper London's relations with Managua. "A misunderstanding has arisen in consequence of a confusion in terms & the Gov't [in Managua] appear to think that we dispute their jurisdiction over all the islands of the Atlantic coast," he reported. Thornton sought Foreign Office guidance on whether the dispute centered on the particular banks and cays considered to be in the high seas and thus open to Caymanian fishermen without restriction. On a more practical note, Herbert Harrison, the chargé d'affaires in Managua, saw greater cause for concern regarding British interests beyond turtle fishing. "The ill-feeling caused by the constant question between England and Nicaragua has made it most difficult for British subjects to live here, to the great advantages of

other foreigners," he wrote. The chargé urged the Foreign Office "to do away with these sources of friction," as it would "be a real practical advantage to all our fellow countrymen in Nicaragua."[42]

However, British colonial officials (answerable not to the Foreign Office but to the secretary of state for the colonies) supported the position of Caymanian fishermen and sharply questioned Nicaraguan territorial claims to the rich turtle fishing grounds. The governor of Jamaica, Sir James Alexander Swettenham, refused to concede to Nicaragua sovereignty of the banks, cays, and reefs twelve miles and farther from the mainland. He subsequently made an even bolder claim: "The Cayman Islanders possessed at least equal rights with the Mosquito Indians, who are now recognized since 1860 as Nicaraguan subjects, to all fishery in dispute. Nicaragua derives its claim through these Indians and can have no greater rights than they possessed." Swettenham insisted that the Foreign Office put an end to the islanders' starvation—caused in fact by the British—and instructed Caymanian fishermen to avoid hunting turtle out at these disputed cays until they had preserved their right to the turtle fishery.[43]

Caymanians gave the governor of Jamaica plenty of evidence regarding their lawful right to the turtle fishery. Their claims were quite simple. Mosquito and Old Mohegan Cays belonged to neither Nicaragua nor the Miskitu, because neither had ever physically occupied or defended the cays until very recently. As early as 1888, Caymanian turtlemen had insisted that they were the "lawful owners" of these cays. In that year Captain Bodden, on the occasion mentioned above, explained that Cayman Islanders had "for over 100 years enjoyed the most perfect immunity in the use of the Kay for obtaining water, and building the turtle crawls adjacent."[44] He reported that the first possessor of Mosquito Cay had been a Caymanian, Wade Bennett Watler, who settled there to plant and later export coconuts. Watler always hoisted the British flag, and neither he nor his subsequent business partner had met with interference until 1884 in connection with the Nicaraguan harassment of Captain Jennett (described above).[45]

Other venerable and veteran turtlemen also testified to Caymanian possession of the cays. John A. Conolly, a fifty-five-year-old resident of Grand Cayman and mate of a turtling boat, claimed never to have seen a flag hoisted or "a Spaniard" out at the cays in his thirty-five years of fishing.[46] Seventy-seven-year-old John Jennett of Grand Cayman concurred with Conolly in not having seen a Nicaraguan there, though, he said, the Miskitu Indians sometimes stole his turtle.[47] Octogenarian Capt. Daniel Taylor had never seen either Miskitu or Nicaraguans out at Old Mohegan Cay in his fifty-five years of turtling.[48] Others made similar statements.[49] With these declarations, Caymanian turtle fishermen insisted on their right to fish turtle undisturbed in a maritime space of which they saw themselves as the original possessors. According to them, the Nicaraguan state was the true interloper.

Given the deeply entrenched views of the Nicaraguan officials and Caymanian turtle fishermen, it is no surprise that it took an additional twelve years to obtain agreement from all parties, marked in 1917 by the Regulation of the Turtle Fishing Industry in the Territorial Waters of Nicaragua as Regards Fishing Vessels Belonging to the Cayman Islanders. In this treaty, Caymanian turtle fishermen agreed to pay a separate fee of $2.50 in gold to fish and crawl turtle in Nicaraguan territorial waters plus a duty of fifty cents in gold per turtle crawled at a cay. It was incumbent on the captains of the turtle fleet to obtain a certificate from a local Nicaraguan authority accurately indicating the number of crawled turtles. Violators were considered smugglers and faced criminal charges. The agreement was in effect for twenty years.[50]

It is likely that desperation compelled Caymanian turtle fishermen to agree to such hefty fees. In the years 1904 to 1912, Caymanian fishermen had continued to fish turtle out at the cays, but with trepidation, as they awaited a favorable resolution between the British and Nicaraguan governments. Some had stopped because of inconsistent or arbitrary regulations over the fishery, causing financial hardship to many on Grand Cayman Island. W. T. Eden, self-identified as "the largest dealer in turtle," lamented the slow pace of negotiations, noting that Cayman Islanders "were entirely dependent on the industry for a livelihood." Eden had his own, self-interested reasons for nudging British authorities to resolve the dispute: his own business. "There is great reason to fear that if the fisheries are not reestablished very shortly, the whole business in England will be so demoralized that there will be no demand for the turtle when caught," Eden wrote.[51] Governor Swettenham concurred with Eden's description of Caymanian dependence on the industry: "The islands afford very little scope for agriculture, and the hurricane of 1903 assisted by a disease has well nigh exterminated the cocoanut trees from which they used to derive an income on Grand Cayman."[52] A decade of lost profits proved devastating to an island so dependent on the hunt of the green flesh.

Ultimately, between 1894 and 1917, Nicaraguan authorities were to manage through dogged focus to secure their claim over the adjacent banks, cays, and shoals of Mosquitia between 1894 and 1917. Although Nicaraguan state efforts to assert control over this maritime zone had been largely nonexistent prior to the 1890s, the seizure and arrest of alleged violators of the turtle fishery thereafter increasingly showed Nicaragua's ability to defend territorial claims there. In doing so, it generated an important body of hydrographical knowledge of a largely frontier space. Nicaraguan officials rejected the status quo of the three-mile limit from inhabited land and extended territorial claims to twelve miles and beyond. This was done in part to defend sovereignty claims as well as to enjoy the profits of the turtle fishery.

Although Caymanian turtle fishermen likely had indeed long occupied and controlled extractive marine resources from these banks and reefs with little interference, they lacked the British support necessary to realize their claims against challenge. In part, the reason was that the British government was divided on the issue. Local colonial authorities in the Cayman Islands and Jamaica were more sympathetic to the plight of the turtle fishermen than were Foreign Office representatives in Central America. This is not surprising, since the governor of Jamaica and commissioner of the Cayman Islands had to concern themselves with local revenues and the financial solvency of their colonies. For the Foreign Office, the viewpoint was broader. The British minister at Guatemala and chargé d'affaires at Managua paid more attention to whether Nicaraguan officials usurped the right of commerce on the high seas and impacts on trade than to claims on isolated banks and cays. As a result, Caymanian turtlemen failed to convince the British that their ownership of the banks, cays, reefs, and shoals was vital to the larger interests of the empire. By the early twentieth century, Caymanian turtle fishermen were witnessing the closing of a once open turtle fishery.

NOTES 1 Commissioner Frederick Shedden Sanguinetti to Colonial Office Secretary, United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter UKNA], 12 April 1904, FO 56/67, folio 227.

2 Newspapers around the Caribbean reprinted reports of the incident. See "Trouble with Nicaragua," *Limon Weekly News,* 7 May 1904.

3 The region holds various names. Spanish records call it Mosquitia, whereas the English-speakers called it the Mosquito Shore, or Coast. For standardization, we call the general region Mosquitia. We refer to the indigenous people as the Miskitu and their language as Miskito.

4 Caroline Williams, "Living between Empires: Diplomacy and Politics in the Late Eighteenth-Century Mosquitia," *Americas* 70, no. 2 (2013), pp. 237–68; Karl H. Offen, "Creating Mosquitia: Mapping Amerindian Spatial Practices in Eastern Central America, 1629–1779," *Journal of Historical Geography* 33, no. 2 (2007), pp. 254–82; Frank G. Dawson, "William Pitt's Settlement at Black River on the Mosquito Shore: A Challenge to Spain in Central America 1732–87," *Hispanic Historical Review* 63, no. 4 (1983), pp. 677–706.

5 Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2005); Craig L. Dozier, *Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore: The Years of British and American Presence* (Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1985); Robert Naylor, *Penny Ante Imperialism: The Mosquito Shore and the Bay of Honduras, 1600–1914* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1989).

6 For a pioneering study of the human relationship with turtles and of indigenous and European use of the turtle, see James J. Parsons, *The Green Turtle and Man* (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1962), pp. 11–13. For an ethnohistorical account of catching turtle to use as part of a gift-exchange culture of the Miskitu of Nicaragua, see Bernard Nietschmann, *Between Land and Water: The Subsistence Ecology of the Miskito Indians, Eastern Nicaragua* (New York: Seminar, 1973).

7 The earliest work to document the decline of turtle because of overfishing is Archie Carr, *The Windward Road: Adventures of a Naturalist on Remote Caribbean Shores* (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1956). To see more recent discussions of human causes of the decline of sea turtles, see Osha Gray Davidson, *Fire in the Turtle House: The Green Sea Turtle and the Fate of the Ocean* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), and Alison Rieser, *The Case of the Green Turtle: An Uncensored History of a Conservation Icon* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2012).

8 For an extended discussion of these issues, see Sharika Crawford, *The Last Turtlemen of the Caribbean: Waterscapes of Labor, Conservation, and Boundary Making* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2020), pp. 84–115. Past research on Caymanian turtle fishermen has paid some attention to treaty struggles between Great Britain and Latin American states such as Nicaragua and Cuba. See Roger C. Smith, *The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands* (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 2000), pp. 79–81; and Michael Craton, *Founded upon the Seas: A History of the Cayman Islands and Their People* (Kingston, Jamaica, W.I.: Ian Randle, 2003), pp. 179–81.

9 Lissa Wadewitz, *The Nature of Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2012); David F. Arnold, *The Fishermen's Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2008); Micah Muscolino, "The Yellow Croaker War: Fishery Disputes between China and Japan, 1925–1935," *Environmental History* 13, no. 2 (April 2008), pp. 305–24; Joseph E. Taylor, *Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2001).

10 Clerk Vestry Cayman Islands to Colonial Secretary Office, UKNA, 7 May 1883, FO 56/68, folios 184–85.

11 British Minister John Webster to Colonial Secretary Office, UKNA, 11 November 1883, FO 56/68, folio 184.

12 British Minister John Webster to Colonial Secretary Office, 17 May 1886, FO 56/68, folio 186.

13 Webster to Colonial Secretary, UKNA, 10 March 1884, FO 56/68, folio 184.

14 J. C. Panton to Colonial Secretary, UKNA, 14 November 1885, FO 56/68, folio 185.

15 Commodore's Secretary to Colonial Secretary, UKNA, 1 June 1886, FO 56/68, folio 186.

16 William A. Bodden to Custos J. C. Panton, UKNA, 24 March 1886, FO 56/68, folio 186.

17 Owners, Masters, and Mariners of the Cayman Islands, UKNA, 25 November 1888, FO 56/68, folio 187.

18 British authorities withdrew claims to Mosquitia and relocated British itinerant settlers in exchange for control over British Honduras and the mahogany trade. See Frank G. Dawson, "The Evacuation of the Mosquito Shore and the English Who Stayed Behind, 1786–1800," *Americas* 55, no. 1 (July 1998), p. 68.

19 Thomas Young, *Narrative of a Residence on the Mosquito Shore, during the Years 1839, 1840, & 1841* (London: Smith, Elder, 1842), p. 17.

20 Ephraim George Squier used a pseudonym. Samuel A. Bard, *Waikna; or, Adventures on the Mosquito Shore* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1855), p. 38.

21 It is unclear whether this legislation was generated by American interest in the trade or concerns of the Mosquitia residents. See Eleonore von Oertzen, Lioba Rossbach, and Volker Wünderich, eds., *The Nicaraguan Mosquitia in Historical Documents, 1844–1927: The Dynamics of Ethnic and Regional History* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1990), pp. 96–98.

22 *Waikna* is a Miskito term for Miskitu. Bard, *Waikna,* p. 363.

23 Charles Napier Bell, *Tangweera; Life and Adventures among Gentle Savages* (London: Edward Arnold, 1899), p. 295.

24 Naylor, *Penny Ante Imperialism,* p. 187.

25 Ibid., p. 204.

26 Offen, "Creating Mosquitia," p. 279.

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IV *The Impact of War and Counterinsurgency on the Marine Corps Image, 1914–1922*

MARK R. FOLSE

It has been asserted that a singular, positive, and elite warrior image of Marines emerged during the World War I era.[1] This argument is true but incomplete, considering several distinct kinds of Marine imagery came out during this period that communicated different ideas. Three main kinds came about in the late 1910s and early 1920s: visual images made by Marines for Marines; visual images made by Marines for civilians; and written images that came from outsiders (American civilians and foreigners) about the Marines. The first two communicated rather clear images of racialized masculinity, martial prowess, and paternalism. The third type echoed what Marines said about themselves for the most part but also painted an entirely different, negative, image of the Corps. All of them show that ideas of masculinity—often racialized ideas of masculinity—made up the foundation of how Marines saw themselves, how they wanted the public to see them, and what they believed they contributed to American society.

INTERNAL IMAGERY: HOW MARINES SAW THEMSELVES

The images that Marines made for each other illuminate a particular cultural/institutional worldview. These images, found in the *Marines Magazine* and the *Marine Corps Gazette,* reveal a service that believed itself to be exceptional and elite among the other services (figure 1). They show that Marines believed themselves to be the beau ideal of American manhood. When it came to service in the Caribbean, Hispaniola especially, Marine imagery promoted a kind of racial paternalism. When it came to war, these images reveal that Marines believed they were crusaders, taking up arms to save civilization and defeat the enemies of democracy and liberalism.

Some of the most consistent imagery that Marines shared with each other through institutional magazines and journals came from the tropics of Latin America and the Caribbean. Throughout the decade of 1910–20 the U.S. government deployed elements of the Navy and Marine Corps to Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Cuba to guard naval stations, suppress revolutions, protect American interests, and keep European powers from establishing too much influence in the region.[2] These images inspired by Caribbean deployments, again especially

to Hispaniola, usually portrayed a tough, disciplined Marine having to deal with backward and recalcitrant natives who did not know how to behave.



Fig. 1
Source: Marines Magazine 2, no. 5 (April 1917).

Marines saw themselves as missionaries of sorts, sent to spread democracy and teach Haitians and Dominicans how to run a peaceful government. Implicit in these beliefs were racial assumptions that quickly placed Haitians and Dominicans in a status inferior to that of U.S. Marines. The validity of Gail Bederman's assertion that white men linked "whiteness to male power" is evident here.[3] Paternalism, underscored by these assumptions, tended to color the lenses through which Marines saw the native populations of both countries.[4] These elements are present in the image below (figure 2), captioned "The Missionary," from a 1917 issue of *Marines Magazine*. A comically large Marine kneels on a tropical beach holding an armed and obstreperous but small Latino man. "Listen Son!" the Marine barks as an adult might to a fractious child. "Do unto your brothers as you'd hav'em do unto you. Savvy?"

The next image (figure 3) tells the same story but infantilizes the people of the Dominican Republic even further. Uncle Sam, wearing a Marine Corps uniform, has a wailing child, the words "Santo" on one leg and "Domingo" on the other, across his knees. The story that this image and the previous one tell is Uncle Sam sent U.S. Marines down to the unruly governments in Hispaniola and

Fig. 2
Source: "The Missionary," *Marines Magazine* 2, no. 5 (April 1917).

Fig. 3
Source: "A Bad Child," *Marines Magazine* 2, no. 5 (April 1917).

taught them a lesson the way a stern but benevolent father would teach a child. Portraying Haitians and Dominicans as children only bolstered Marines' concepts of their own masculinity in this image. As historian Michael Kimmel argues, among American men at the turn of the last century "manhood had been understood to define an inner quality, the capacity for autonomy and responsibility, and had historically been seen as the opposite of childhood."[5] This kind of imagery was not original; Americans had infantilized Latinos and Filipinos to make military interventions seem benevolent since at least the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars.[6]

Imagery that portrayed Marines as Uncle Sam's favorites is indicative of how they liked to see themselves in relation to the other branches of the military. In "Uncle's Pet Nephew" (figure 4), Uncle Sam is standing in, apparently, a backyard watching a group of children playing, representing the Militia, Army, Navy, and Marines, respectively. "Some boy!" Uncle Sam exclaims, watching with admiration the pluck and exuberance of the boy in a Marine uniform, who proclaims proudly, "Whee-e! I'm fightin' spicks!" A frightened dog (perhaps representing Dominican or Haitian rebels) runs away. The Navy child is overweight and clueless. The soldier, with his glasses and a toy howitzer, timidly complains, "He's too rough to play with." Finally, the Militia boy, sitting down sipping his drink, is simply baffled. Marines loved to tell stories of themselves as more active and more experienced than the other services, as possessing the qualities that Uncle Sam—that is, the nation—wanted most in fighting men. They used their frequent deployments to the Caribbean and Latin America as testaments to this notion and as ways to tell each other that they were the service that was "always ready" when Uncle Sam needed it (figure 5).

Fig. 4
Source: "Uncle's Pet Nephew," *Marines Magazine* 2, no. 5 (April 1917).

World War I gave Marines opportunities both on and off the battlefields of France. First and foremost, the war afforded Marines a chance to fight in a large, modern, deadly, and terrible conflict that would test their mettle as an institution: their usefulness would be judged in the court of public opinion. It also gave them the opportunity to construct images of themselves like none they had before. Pre–World War I Marine imagery advertised a distinct and attractive masculinity through images of sharply dressed, disciplined, and brave sea soldiers. With the entry of the United States into

the war, Marines transformed themselves into crusaders and elite warriors.

Another image (figure 6), which came out in the June 1917 issue of *Marines Magazine,* is a strong example of Marines directly connecting themselves to the Crusaders of the Middle Ages. In the foreground is a clearly marked U.S. Marine charging through fire and smoke from the arched door of, perhaps, a church. Behind him advances a Crusader, armored head to foot and weapon raised. This drawing indicates that the artist saw the Marines as the modern-day equivalent of the Crusaders of old: sent to fight for a high and holy cause (democracy, in this case) in a foreign land against infidels (that is, Germans, the enemies of democracy). This image implies a belief that in the Great War civilization was in peril and that the Marines, the new Crusaders, sure of their cause and confident in the outcome, would fight to save it.

Fig. 5
Source: "Uncle Sam Knows," *Marines Magazine* 2, no. 5 (April 1917).

Figures 7 and 8 pursue the same theme of Marines coming to the rescue of Western civilization. The first depicts a small, brave Marine with bayonet fixed chasing a monstrous embodiment of the European war who flees in terror. Above the Marine is a feminine angel of peace. In figure 8 a Marine again confronts perceived barbarism, this time that of the Teutonic enemy (identified by his *Pickelhaube* helmet and arrogantly curled mustache), to save civilization, personified here as a helpless yet resolute woman on the ground. Behind them is all of Europe at war, burning. Both highly romanticized and symbolic images convey what Marines believed regarding their place in the world: they saw themselves as exceptional men out to defend all that was civilized. They believed that they would not only serve with honor in the Great War but potentially win it, if given the chance, and they used masculine imagery to convey that conviction.

Fig. 6
Source: "The Crusaders: The Old and the New," *Marines Magazine* 2, no. 7 (June 1917).



Fig. 7
Source: Marines Magazine 2, no. 11 (October 1917).

CONSTRUCTED PUBLIC IMAGES: THE PUBLICITY BUREAU

The images that Marines created for the public's consumption were designed to attract recruits and win the hearts of society. Marines strategically placed recruiting posters and pamphlets to draw people's attention to who they were and what they had to offer the young men of America. They wanted potential recruits and their parents to know several things: that Marines were soldiers who served afloat with the Navy, neither completely sailor nor soldier but a mix of both and better than either; that the Marine Corps offered young men not so much a singular trade, which is what the Army and Navy promoted around this time, but habits such as personal efficiency, discipline, and masculine bearing;[7] and that all of these things were good for the potential recruit and useful in any vocation a man might choose if he returned to civilian life.



Fig. 8
Source: "The Rescuer," *Marines Magazine* 2, no. 9 (August 1917).

Leading up to World War I, the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau promoted images of Marines as "sea soldiers"—sharply dressed usually in either "khakis" or "dress blues," carrying Springfield '03 rifles at port arms, at order arms, or at the ready. These posters all have elements that demonstrate the Marines' salient masculine/soldierly qualities while strongly connecting them to the Navy. The poster (figure 9) of a Marine noncommissioned officer, his rifle at right shoulder arms, alertly guarding, apparently, a naval station is a prime example. He is tall, upright, impeccably dressed, walking with a confident gait in front of a moored battleship. His face conveys a calm determination. Recruiters designed this particular poster to be placed around police stations and firehouses.[8] The sources are not clear as to why Marines believed that this particular poster would attract the most attention at those locations. The Marine in this poster appears ready for

anything, and that may be the association with police and fire stations. Policemen and firemen, whose jobs require flexibility and readiness to respond to any emergency, might well have been expected to identify with and be intrigued by this appeal to those very qualities.

Figure 10 is another mix of sea soldiery and Marine confidence but imbued with patriotism and aimed at a different audience than the previous image. It shows a color guard of four Marines, members of a landing party sent ashore by warships visible in the distance, advancing U.S. and Marine Corps flags. These Marines are not marching; rather, they are pushing quickly forward, rifles at the ready, as though toward the enemy. Behind them is a beach, lined with palm trees (that is, not in Europe but by implication anywhere), full of craft bringing support. The message here is that Marines are not just security guards at naval stations or on ships. They are soldiers of the sea, warriors who carry their nation's flag (and honor) onto foreign shores when their nation needs them to. The creators of this poster designed it to be "expressly provided for store windows."[9] Again, the sources are rather vague on why this poster targeted shoppers, but the reason may have something to do with its general adventurousness. It has been argued that American men in the years leading up to World War I tended to believe that young men and boys of the day who had been overexposed to women (mothers, schoolteachers) were becoming sissies.[10] Men, women, and boys alike could perhaps look at this image and see joining the Marines as a way for young men of military age to achieve manhood and thereby help society as a whole to recapture it.

Fig. 9

A final image, figure 11, is a slightly different representation of the same theme: a Marine displaying masculine/soldierly bearing but this time with, behind him, a formation of Marines standing at attention under the barrels of a battleship's gun turret. Where figure 9 depicts a Marine on guard duty and figure 10 a Marine landing party, this image shows a ship's Marine Detachment, in which Marines very commonly served with the U.S. Navy. This poster "is to be used universally," instructed the Publicity Bureau's writer: "barber

Fig. 10

Fig. 11

shops, pool rooms, cigar stores, neighborhood stores; everywhere and any place you can get it before the public."[11] But this poster did more than convey to the public when and where the Marines planned a recruiting drive. This poster, like the ones above, is about showing audiences not just what men do in the Marine Corps but also what the Marine Corps can do for them: "four years of training which will graduate him into the world equipped with a perfectly healthy body, an erect carriage, a broadened view of life from his contact with people and places, a quick, responsive intellect, a disciplined, reliable individual—an asset to any employer."[12]

The Marine Corps took its target audiences seriously and thought carefully about how such images should come across. But these posters are not just examples of Marine marketing or "salesmanship." They also serve as demonstrations of how the Marines who designed or oversaw the design of posters and many other forms of recruiting approached young men and their elders. To strike a chord with the young men of the World War I–era United States, they used appeals to masculinity. And they chose to interest their audiences not "in the Marine Corps as a mere fighting machine, but as an instrument of the promotion of personal efficiency and the building of manhood."[13]

IMAGERY CREATED BY OUTSIDERS

The third category involved the evocation by text of images based on Marine actions abroad, images that outsiders constructed independently of the desires or plans of Marines, images that might either affirm or contradict Marine narrative. Two main kinds emerged during this period. First, there were the very positive images that came out of the Marines' battlefield actions in France in the summer of 1918. American newspapers showered the Marine Corps with praise for their martial prowess at Belleau Wood, Soissons, and Blanc Mont Ridge. This kind of imagery created the myth that the Marines alone had stopped the German advance at Château-Thierry in June 1918, saved Paris, and won the war. That story told tales of Marine valor, toughness, determination, and sacrifice, and it is one of the reasons why the battle of Belleau Wood holds such cultural significance for the Marine Corps to this very day.

But soon after the war, images of Marine brutality against Dominicans and Haitians (based on actual instances of unauthorized heavy-handedness) surfaced in newspapers and in Senate investigation hearings. Marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic were now placed in images of bullying, illicit violence, torture, theft,

and murder. Therefore, while one popular image affirmed what Marines had said about themselves all along, the other brought acrimony and scorn on the Marines and the government.

In the summer of 1918, the Marine Corps was ubiquitous—in an adulatory way—in American newspapers. Much of this praise was associated with Floyd Gibbons, a journalist for the *Chicago Tribune* who reported on the successful Marine assault on Hill 142 during the battle of Belleau Wood.[14] Gen. John J. Pershing, commander of American Expeditionary Forces in France, forbade the press to identify specific American combat units. Pershing's press officers allowed soldiers and Marines to be associated not with their units but only with their branches of service. Thus, through an unintended consequence of policy, Marines took most of the credit for America's first major combat success in World War I. Newspapers reported that Marines had stopped cold a major German offensive at Belleau Wood—and thereby, as the story went, saved Paris and the allied war effort. The *Atlanta Constitution* headlined, "U.S. Marines Finest Troops in the World."[15] The *Washington Post* claimed that at Belleau Wood "American marines vanquished the flower of the Kaiser's army."[16] In all its history, from 1775 to 1917, the Marine Corps had never enjoyed such public admiration.

The press told a story independent of deliberate Marine designs but one that Marines wanted nonetheless. A lieutenant in (ironically) the U.S. Army published a piece in *Scribner's Magazine* stating that when the Marines went in against the "onrushing horde of Germans at Château-Thierry[,] [the] Germans were stopped. Paris was saved. The turning-point in the war was reached. The Marines [had] made themselves immortal."[17] Also, journalists affirmed Marine notions of manhood: "What sort of men are they?" asked Reginald W. Kauffman, a journalist for the *Living Age*. "'The best,' they will say—and, after living among them, I am not so sure that they are wrong."[18] Marine historians tend to agree that World War I brought more positive attention to the Corps than any other event in the service's history.[19] It did so in no small part because Marine actions in France lived up to the stories they had told about themselves through imagery.

The Woodrow Wilson administration had sent naval and Marine forces to Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915 and 1916, respectively, to protect American interests and halt the violence that had erupted in both countries over various political, economic, and social issues. These were separate campaigns, each with its own, unique causes and consequences, but Marines went to work in both countries taking over governments, establishing native constabularies, and fighting counterinsurgencies. While there, especially during and immediately after World War I, some Marines treated natives harshly. In Haiti, Maj. Clarke H. Wells stood accused of ordering prisoners executed without due process.[20] A Marine named Ernest Lavoie allegedly ordered the execution of nineteen prisoners.[21] In the Dominican

Republic too, Marine officers Thad Taylor and Charles Merkel committed illicit acts of violence against citizens.

In September 1919, the commandant of the Marine Corps, Maj. Gen. George Barnett, ordered an investigation of Marines in Haiti after hearing of the court-martial of two Marines for killing a native prisoner. The court-martial led Barnett to believe that "practically indiscriminate killing of the natives has gone on now for some time."[22] That investigation led in turn to subsequent investigations into Marine behavior in the Dominican Republic as well.

From late 1919 through 1921, newspapers in the United States ran stories that caused a publicity nightmare for the Marines. "The military record in Haiti is a blot on the administration and a stain on the honor of the American people," wrote one columnist for the *New York Evening Post*. News of Marines indiscriminately killing Haitians "is a shock to those who have cherished the conviction that American military rule did not imitate the coercive methods of some experienced and more callous governments," declared the author (the allusion being to Germany). The *Philadelphia Public Ledger* charged, "While we were 'making the world safe for democracy' [in France] we were ruthlessly practicing machine gun imperialism." And regarding the Dominican Republic, the *Cleveland Gazette* reported "Outrage after Outrage Perpetrated in the Little Mulatto Republic: As in Haiti, So in Santo Domingo."[23] The author accused Marines in the Dominican Republic of using "Belgian Congo, or Prussian-Belgian methods of eliciting information," such as burning and torturing natives.[24] "I did not meet a single Dominican who did not want the Americans out, band and baggage," claimed the author.[25]

In 1922, during the "Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo," testimony of several witnesses portrayed Marines not as benevolent teachers sent to help their countries but as brutes and thugs who "commit murder, burn, and concentrate the poor peasants of entire regions [into camps], depriving them of their lands and water for the benefit of despicable Yankee corporations."[26]

Marines took these charges very seriously, in part because charges of murder made them look less like the masculine exemplars they wanted to seem and more like savages. Maj. Gen. George Barnett claimed, "I was shocked beyond all expression to hear of such things and to know that it was at all possible that duty could be so badly performed by Marines."[27] The *New York Times* interviewed a retired Marine major, Philip T. Case, who tried to persuade readers that what they had read about Marines in Hispaniola was wrong: "Time and time again when I was with my men down there . . . we would be fired upon by natives without returning fire because we did not want to injure women and children."[28] Case proclaimed that despite the tough nature of the Hispaniola deployments, for the most part Marines showed remarkable restraint and professionalism—in keeping with their masculine

image.[29] Capt. Charles Merkel, who allegedly tortured and murdered civilians in the Dominican Republic in the summer of 1918, committed suicide while in confinement awaiting a court-martial, to "save disgracing the Marine Corps."[30]

CONCLUSION

Imagery that Marines made for each other told stories of brave and heroic men out to save the world and teach "lesser men" how to live peacefully. Imagery made by Marines for the public tried to convince society of their view of who they were and that they could turn the young men of America into paragons of white masculinity. Beginning in the early 1920s, however, the imagery created by outsiders often told a different and quite negative story about the Marines, one that challenged their reputation and by implication ideas of their own manhood.

All of these stories, to a very significant degree, are about notions of manhood, something that Marines took very seriously both on and off the battlefield. Therefore, these images reveal how important masculinity was to World War I–era Marine identity and culture. Overall, one significant impact on the Marine Corps of World War I and postwar counterinsurgency was cultural. These campaigns affirmed and challenged Marine identity by affirming or challenging the Corps's claims of manhood, an important cultural medium through which it maintained positive ties with American society. Research on this subject is incomplete, but it appears that cultural understandings and beliefs about race, paternalism, and manhood in particular are especially important to understanding U.S. military institutions and their historical relationships with society.

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V *The Naval Alliance of Peru and Chile, 1865–1866*

JORGE ORTIZ-SOTELO

The achievement of independence of the Spanish colonies in America was a long and complex process that began in 1809 with the first "Cry of Freedom" in Quito and ended in early 1826 when the last defenders of Spain, at Callao and Chiloe, finally surrendered. Following the defeat in 1829 of a four-thousand-man expedition in Tampico, Mexico, the Spanish government realized that recognition of the newly formed republics was the only reasonable path, the path that must be followed.

Negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between each of the new republics and Spain took different paths over different timelines, but economic interest, driven largely by shared personal and family ties, moved faster than the diplomats. By the late 1820s some of the Spaniards began to return to America to take care of their properties and interests, and shortly afterward Spanish merchant ships reestablished trade with several American ports.

By the 1860s most of the former Spanish colonies had already established diplomatic relations with Spain, but that was not the case for Peru. Despite the presence of Peruvian consular agents in several Spanish ports since 1841, the visit to Callao of the Spanish navy frigate *Ferrolana* in 1851, and negotiations undertaken by two Peruvian diplomatic missions sent to Spain in 1853 and 1856, Spain did not officially recognize Peru as a sovereign country.[1]

Even so, unofficial relations were friendly, but this situation began to change in the early 1860s. In March 1861 the Dominican Republic renounced its independence, and Spanish rule was restored. In the following year a combined British, French, and Spanish force occupied Veracruz, Mexico, to obtain payment of certain debts from the Mexican government. Although the British and Spanish shortly withdrew, leaving the French forces in Mexico on their own, the Hispanic American republics felt their independence threatened by European imperialism.

The better to face this threat, the Peruvian government convened a conference of nations to create a "defensive Alliance to reject a new conquest in the event that it is intended, whatever the name it takes and the power attempting it."[2] In addition to government efforts, in Lima, Montevideo, and Santiago—the capital cities

of (respectively) Peru, Uruguay, and Chile—societies were formed to defend the independence of Hispanic America.[3]

The situation became more delicate in late 1862, when the Spanish government announced that three warships would visit its former colonies along the Pacific coast. The voyage was putatively a scientific expedition. The squadron, under the flag of Adm. Luis Hernandez Pinzon, was well received at Valparaiso and Callao in April and July 1863. Nonetheless, after doubts about Spain's real intention dissipated, the Peruvian government decided to reinforce its military and naval forces; the result was the construction of two ironclads (the frigate *Independencia* and monitor *Huascar*) and the acquisition of the corvettes *Union* and *America*.[4]

A number of factors, including serious mistakes by both sides that were largely precipitated by the Spanish congressman Eusebio Salazar y Mazarredo, produced a crisis between Peru and Spain. In April 1864, Pinzon took the Chincha Islands, the main source of Peruvian guano. This action marked the start of a period of tension that lasted until January 1865, when an agreement was reached.

The incident was over, but there had been a serious slight to Peruvian honor and significant costs to Peru's budget. Peruvian nationalists accused President Juan Antonio Pezet of passivity, and by late February Col. Mariano Ignacio Prado had risen in revolt in Arequipa, aiming to restore national honor. The Restoration Revolution, as it is known in Peruvian history, formally recognized the leadership of Vice President Pedro Diez Canseco but was really headed by Prado.

Part of the Peruvian navy, led by the young and very politically minded Lt. Cdr. Lizardo Montero, joined the rebels, and after ten months of civil war, on 8 November President Pezet resigned in favor of Diez Canseco. A few days later, on the 25th, Prado took power and was proclaimed dictator.

In the original Peruvian-Spanish crisis, the Chilean government and society had sympathized with Peru. Though officially neutral, Chile refused any support to the Spanish ships. In June 1864 almost two hundred Chilean volunteers sailed to Callao and joined the Peruvian navy, which assigned them to serve on one of its vessels. Some of these volunteers were military pensioners, and others had relatives in Peru, but in a general sense their presence reflected a growing animosity among Chileans toward the Spanish squadron.[5] Most of the volunteers returned to Chile early in 1865, but some of them joined the revolutionary forces of Prado and remained in Peruvian service.

In September, on his government's instructions, Adm. José Manuel Pareja y Septien, who had relieved Admiral Pinzon as commander in chief of the Spanish squadron, demanded explanations from the Chilean government of these displays of support for Peru. The Chilean government, under President José Joaquin Pérez-Mascayano, refused to provide them, and on 24 September Pareja declared the Chilean coast under blockade. On the following day the Chilean government

declared war, and a new conflict started in the Pacific, one that eventually involved Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador as well, although only Peru and Chile took part in the fighting.

Pezet's government remained neutral in the conflict with Spain, but Chile supported the Peruvian revolutionaries, allowing arms and powder to be shipped to them and establishing informal relations with the government of Vice President Diez Canseco through the Chilean minister in Lima and other envoys. Among the latter were Domingo Santa Maria and Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, who arrived at the rebels' headquarters early in October trying to convince Diez Canseco and Prado to join their naval forces with the Chilean squadron and attack the Spanish warships blockading Coquimbo and Caldera.[6]

By mid-October, Diez Canseco had agreed to send the revolutionary squadron to Chile, but it had to wait for a Chilean flotilla under Capt. Juan Williams—the corvette *Esmeralda* and steamer *Maipú*—which would join at the Chincha Islands (about twelve miles off the Peruvian coast and 120 miles south of Callao) with volunteers to complete the Peruvian ships' crews. However, realizing that this expedition would weaken the revolutionary forces, which now had to face two enemies—Pezet and the Spanish forces—a small group of moderates managed to convince Diez Canseco to postpone any hostilities against Spain until the final defeat of Pezet. Commander Montero, with the frigate *Amazonas* and the schooner *Tumbes,* would have an embarrassing time explaining that decision to Captain Williams, who arrived with the Chilean ships at Chilca on 29 October.[7]

Almost one month later, on 26 November, shortly after returning to Chilean waters, the *Esmeralda* captured the smallest warship of the Spanish squadron, the schooner *Virgen de Covadonga.* Humiliated by this loss, Pareja committed suicide; command of the Spanish squadron fell to Brigadier Casto Mendez Nuñez, commanding officer of the powerful ironclad *Numancia*. He gathered his scattered forces and headed south, aiming to destroy the Chilean warships.

One day before the capture of the *Virgen de Covadonga,* Prado became the ruler of Peru and revived the plan to join naval forces with Chile. This time the intent was to preserve by whatever means the allied squadron until the arrival of the brand-new Peruvian ironclads *Independencia* and *Huascar,* recently completed and commissioned in Great Britain. With these two ships the allied squadron would be in a better condition to confront the Spanish.

On 3 December, two days before Peru and Chile signed an Offensive and Defensive Alliance Treaty, the frigates *Amazonas* and *Apurimac* departed Callao for Valdivia. On the night of 11 January 1866 they were followed by the corvettes *Union* and *America*. Three days later, once the treaty was ratified by both governments, Peru declared war on Spain, thereby making clear the intentions of its warships in Chilean waters. At Callao there remained five smaller Peruvian warships (*Tumbes,*

Loa, Victoria, Sachaca, and *Colon*), which would play an important role in the defense of that port on 2 May.

The treaty stated that the commander in chief of the allied squadron would be from the country in whose waters it was operating. Captain Williams, a Chilean, was appointed to that position. Despite his naval abilities, Williams was a strict disciplinarian and a tactless man, a poor combination in the commander of any binational force, particularly involving Peru and Chile. That was clear from the very moment the Peruvian frigates reached Valdivia to join his squadron. The commander in chief of the Peruvian division was the veteran Capt. Manuel Villar, who had begun his naval career six years before Williams was born. Understandably, he felt uncomfortable serving under Williams.

The complicated relationship between Williams and Villar has to be understood as part of the long-term friction between Peru and Chile. It reflected many prejudices from colonial times, when the powerful Peruvian viceroyalty had dominated and even belittled provincial Chilean society, to a point that the latter's independence was more from Peru than from Spain. The long process of winning independence, initiated in 1810 and finished in 1826, produced both friendships and frictions between Peruvians and Chileans, and very soon the young republics were mercantile competitors. Open warfare broke out in 1836 between the two over control of commerce and trade. It lasted until 1839 and was won by Chile.

Peru's endemic political instability had affected the organization and operations of its navy. Despite this, new economic resources from the growing guano trade allowed the Peruvian government to acquire several warships by the late 1840s, while the Chilean navy was substantially diminished. Thus, in 1865 the Chilean squadron comprised only the corvette *Esmeralda,* the captured schooner *Virgen de Covadonga,* and the four small steamers *Maipú, Independencia, Maule,* and *Lautaro* (the former Peruvian *Lerzundi*). The Peruvians had two frigates, two corvettes, and five smaller vessels, as well as two modern ironclads.

On 16 January 1866, having taken his squadron with the Peruvian frigates to Ancud, about one hundred miles southward, Williams decided to move to the channel formed between Point Challahue and Abtao Island, facing the Codihue Cove in the northernmost part of the Gulf of Ancud. To reach that place the squadron had to traverse treacherous and uncharted waters, and the *Esmeralda* hit the bottom and remained aground for almost an hour. Less lucky was the frigate *Amazonas,* which hit a rock south of Abtao Island and was lost. All hands managed to abandon the ship, and during the following five days its thirty-two guns and several other pieces of gear were recovered.[8]

On 4 February the corvettes *America* and *Union* arrived at Abtao, and Captain Villar transferred his flag from the former to the frigate *Apurimac*. Having to resupply both corvettes and confident in the security of his squadron's position, on

the following day Williams departed for Ancud with the *Esmeralda,* expecting to be back in two days with fresh food, coal, and troops to reinforce the defenses on land. This was a gross mistake, less because it subtracted the *Amazonas*'s twenty cannon from the allied squadron's weight of broadside fire than because it deprived the squadron of its commander in chief when the Spanish ships could appear at any time. In any event, Williams left Abtao, and command of the squadron was taken over by Villar.[9]

Meanwhile, the Spanish frigates *Blanca* and *Villa de Madrid* had left Valparaiso in search of the allied squadron, heading first to the Juan Fernandez Islands and then to Chiloé, the waters around which were explored from 4 to 6 February. The Spaniards learned of the loss of the *Amazonas* and early on the 7th obtained information on the location and composition of the allied squadron. Capt. Claudio Alvargonzalez, in command of the Spanish frigates, decided to attack and steamed into Codihue Cove.

The smoke and masts of both Spanish vessels had been sighted by lookouts on the heights of Abtao Island early that day, and Villar was able to deploy his ships for defense. The frigate *Apurimac,* corvette *America,* schooner *Covadonga,* and corvette *Union,* in that order, formed a line, with the small steamers *Lautaro* and *Maipú* at the extremes. Some Chilean officers were taken on board the Peruvian ships, and Peruvian crews were reinforced with Chilean marines.[10] Because of the configuration of the cove and the height of Abtao Island, the Spanish frigates would have to approach very near to the allied squadron to see its ships directly and so would have a very limited time to engage them.

The engagement started at 4:15 PM and lasted until 5:30 PM, when the Spanish frigates steamed out of the cove. The exchange of fire was at ranges of between 1,500 and 2,500 meters. Some 1,500 shots of different calibers were fired that afternoon, producing little damage on either side. The only fatalities were two sailors of the *Union,* Demetrio Teodoro and José Naranjo.[11] *Blanca* had two wounded and the *Villa de Madrid* another ten.[12]

The result of this engagement has been evaluated differently by Spanish, Chilean, and Peruvian historians. Some consider it indecisive or unimportant, others a clear allied victory. The fact is that the Spanish frigates failed to fulfill their mission, which was to destroy the allied squadron, while the Peruvian-Chilean squadron achieved its goal of preserving its integrity for future action when the Peruvian ironclads reached the Pacific. This, in military terms, was a victory for the Peruvian-Chilean forces over Spain.

At least 847 Peruvians and 125 Chileans fought that day, either on board ship or in batteries set up on the island.[13] Thirteen years later many of them would fight each other in the War of the Pacific, and some would die defending their country from the other. Among them would be the Peruvians Miguel Grau, Guillermo

More, José Sanchez Lagomarsino, Manuel Ferreyros, Elias Aguirre, Enrique Palacios, Diego Ferre, Decio Oyague, and Leoncio Prado; and the Chileans Arturo Prat, Manuel Thomson, and Carlos Condell de la Haza.

Two days after the engagement, Villar congratulated his squadron: "The Republican America will properly appreciate this action." Williams now returned to the scene.[14] He congratulated the Peruvian chiefs and officers "for their courage and serenity shown during the two hours that the fight lasted . . . and for the result achieved, which was owed to the Peruvian squadron."[15]

But congratulations notwithstanding, the fact remained that the allied position was known to the Spanish, leading Williams to move the squadron from Abtao on the 12th. After a few days in Ancud he turned back eastward, past Abtao Island, to the Huito estuary, a four-mile-long narrows between steep hills, half a mile across at the widest and only a quarter mile at its entrance. There a strong defensive position was organized. The mouth of the estuary was half-closed with the anchor chain of the *Amazonas* and mined with explosive devices, while the *Lautaro* and a small launch were prepared to be sunk to close the mouth entirely if the Spanish attempted to enter. On either side of the mouth two small forts were erected, being named Naval and Peruano, and provided with a number of guns, while other pieces were located in several other places as well, all sited to make it more difficult to enter the estuary. Inside were the *Apurimac, America, Union, Esmeralda, Covadonga,* and *Maipú*.[16]

Having learned of the Abtao engagement, the Spanish commander, Mendez Nuñez, then blockading Valparaiso, steamed south with the *Numancia* and the *Blanca,* aiming to intercept and destroy the allied squadron. On 1 March the Spanish ships reached Huito, but Mendez Nuñez realized that any attempt to attack would be not only dangerous but fruitless and steamed back to Valparaiso. Following his government's instructions, and although the Chilean city was defenseless—by the decision of its own government, aiming to avoid the attack—on 31 March the Spanish squadron bombarded the port. Having fulfilled that part of his instructions, which earned severe criticism from neutral naval forces that witnessed the attack, Mendez Nuñez headed north, to do the same at Callao.

By late April the Spanish squadron was off Callao. It was composed of seven warships: the ironclad *Numancia,* the frigates *Blanca, Resolución, Berenguela, Villa de Madrid,* and *Almansa,* and the corvette *Vencedora,* plus seven auxiliaries and three transports. At Callao the Spaniards found a rather different situation than at Valparaiso: the port defenses strong and the defenders willing. Beside the military, a large number of volunteers, not only Peruvians but from many other Latin American countries, manned three forts, six batteries, two armored towers, and five warships, two of which were protected by steel armor plates. At some distance inland were infantry, cavalry, and artillery units deployed to intervene in the very

unlikely case that the Spaniards attempted to land. Electric mines were placed in the southern part of the bay as well. The Spanish squadron mounted a total of 252 guns, most of them sixty-four-pounders, while the port was defended by sixty-three guns, among them five five-hundred-pounders and four three-hundred-pounders.

The attack on Callao, the main Peruvian port, took place on 2 May, and this time the Spanish squadron found stubborn resistance. Instead of keeping his force concentrated and beating down the port defenses one by one, Mendez Nuñez deployed his force in three groups, to attack the northern and southern defenses and engage the Peruvian warships simultaneously. It is likely that he did so to refute the accusations of cowardice made after his attack on the undefended port of Valparaiso.

The fighting was initiated at noon and lasted for almost five hours. During the first ninety minutes the Spanish ships suffered several hits, forcing three of them to retire. Mendez Nuñez on the *Numancia* was wounded. On the Peruvian side, one of the armored towers blew up, killing José Gálvez, the Peruvian minister of war and marine. Later, the Peruvian warships steamed out and briefly engaged the Spanish ships. By five o'clock the remaining Spanish ships had withdrawn to their anchorage at San Lorenzo Island a few miles west.

Both sides suffered several casualties, forty-three Spaniards and an estimated two hundred defenders dead. More than 120 Chileans fought that day in the batteries and forts; eight were killed.[17] A few days after the fighting, having buried its dead and done urgent repairs, the Spanish squadron departed Callao in two groups, one heading to the Philippines and the other to the Atlantic.

Both sides considered themselves winners. This engagement had little impact in distant Spain, but the Peruvians and Chileans celebrated the victory in many ways, in both official and popular expressions of joy.

The war was not over, however. The allied squadron remained in Huito until mid-May, when Williams decided to dismantle the land defenses there and move to Ancud to wait for the Peruvian ironclads. After a long and difficult voyage, the ships finally joined the allied squadron early in June, finding it under Vice Adm. Manuel Blanco Encalada's flag, as by that time both Captains Williams and Villar had been removed. Seventy-six years old and in poor health, Blanco Encalada was too infirm to command; he was, however, a well-respected officer, having served both Chile and Peru during their wars of independence, and was more acceptable to the Peruvian officers than Williams had been.

The new commander moved the allied squadron to Valparaiso, where it anchored on 21 June. Vice Admiral Blanco resigned his command on 14 August, and Rear Adm. John R. Tucker, a former Confederate naval officer hired by the Peruvian government, was appointed as the new commander in chief of the allied squadron. A few days before, Tucker had relieved Montero, now a captain, as commander in chief of the Peruvian division and had replaced more than thirty officers, including

all the commanding officers, who had resigned their posts rather than serve under a foreigner.[18]

Inevitably, hiring a foreign naval officer and placing him in command of the squadron produced friction. Friction between the allies had begun even earlier, in late 1865, when instructions issued by the Chilean government to Williams were considered by the Peruvian commanding officers incompatible with those of their own government.[19] Furthermore, Williams's and Villar's personalities clashed, and by February 1866 both governments had realized that "unpleasant disagreements [had already appeared] among the heads of both divisions."[20]

Politicians had intervened. The Chilean minister of war, Col. José Manuel Pinto Arias, and the Peruvian minister in Santiago, José Pardo, traveled to Huito to evaluate the situation and support Villar.[21] This led Williams to resign; it was then that, as mentioned earlier, Vice Admiral Blanco Encalada was appointed to replace him. On the Peruvian side, Captain Villar was replaced by Capt. José Maria Salcedo upon his arrival with the *Huascar* and *Independencia*.[22]

Those changes took place in June, but since late March the Peruvian minister in the United States had been searching for a naval officer to lead the allied fleet.[23] Ideally, that officer should have war experience and be flexible enough to combine discipline and diplomacy in handling Peruvian and Chilean officers and crews. The ex-Confederate Tucker seemed to fulfill those requirements.[24]

When he finally arrived in Peru on 15 June 1866, the *Numancia* and the other two ships of the Spanish squadron had already reached Manila, where they were under repair. Others were in Atlantic ports awaiting further orders. The latter could be reinforced from Spain and, acting with those in Manila, create a new and greater threat to Peru and Chile. Consequently, some action had to be taken, and both governments began to make plans to attack the Spanish ships in the Atlantic or in Manila, while creating a distraction in Cuba, where they proposed to send forces in support of the Cubans fighting for their freedom. The Peruvian division remained for almost a year in Valparaiso after returning from Huito in preparation for an expedition to the Philippines.

The idea of supporting the Cuban revolutionaries was developed even before the battle of Callao. At that time, there was consideration of sending a joint force of two thousand men by the way of Panama, buying warships to operate in the Caribbean, and convincing Venezuela to allow the use of Puerto Cabello as an allied naval base. By early 1867, these ideas were far from becoming real, but even so the Peruvian government had managed to buy the small wooden ship *Rayo,* which was provided with torpedoes (as naval mines were then known) and commissioned under Colombian colors. The idea was to send this ship to Cuba in support of the revolutionaries. This never happened; by late the same year the offensive intentions of the allies had vanished, and the *Rayo* was sold.[25]

President Prado meanwhile considered the best course of action to be sending the ironclads and two frigates to attack the Spanish ships in the Philippines or, failing to find them, bombard Manila. The Chilean government had a different idea: either send an expedition to the Atlantic to attack the Spanish ships there or station it in Chilean waters ready to defend against a possible Spanish expedition from the Atlantic. Negotiations lasted until mid-August; finally the two governments agreed that Tucker should prepare the squadron for an expedition to the Philippines.

Peruvian and Chilean ships trained together until March 1867, when Tucker resigned after a number of problems relative to his relations with the U.S. Pacific Squadron. The alliance itself was weakened, as Chile had lost interest in the expedition and Prado's political situation had become more complicated. Finally, on 5 October, both governments agreed that the Peruvian division should return to Callao. It remained at Valparaiso for a further three months, finally reaching Callao in January 1868. For more than a year the Peruvian *Independencia, Huascar, Union,* and *America* had been in Chilean waters with the Chilean *Esmeralda* and *Covadonga,* officially forming a new operational force. Naturally, many links were established between the officers and men of each group, as well as with local society, mainly of Valparaiso. However, Peruvian and Chilean historians have paid little attention to this period.

The Peru-Chile alliance was a response to a common threat that led both countries to put aside their mutual distrust. However, as happens in most alliances, a number of problems arose during joint naval operations. In this particular case, these problems were made more acute by the characters of the two flag officers.

In 1864, an unofficial alliance was put into effect as Chile supported Peru when the Spanish took the Chincha Islands. From January to June 1866, the allied squadron's mission was to preserve itself while waiting for the two new Peruvian ironclads; that operational goal was achieved, in spite of growing frictions between Williams and Villar. Between June 1866 and October 1867, the allied squadron remained in Chilean waters, being prepared by Admiral Tucker for the Philippines expedition. Although difficult, the expedition could have succeeded, but this time there were political and international problems as well. There is little information on the cooperation between Peruvian and Chilean navies during those months, but it is likely that officers and men of both squadrons acquired a better knowledge of their counterparts' characters and personalities, something that no doubt influenced their own performance during the War of the Pacific between Peru and Chile from 1879 to 1883.

NOTES

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VI *A King's Navy*

The World War I Education of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King

DAVID KOHNEN

The transatlantic alliance between the British Empire and United States redefined global maritime affairs. Informal collaboration among Royal Navy and U.S. Navy personnel matured into an unprecedented "special relationship" during the first fifty years of the twentieth century. This grand maritime alliance persisted to define global affairs into the twenty-first century. Although Britannia had ruled the waves for nearly five hundred years, the American navy filled the vacuum that followed the steady decline of the British Empire. This was not an easy process. Notwithstanding long-standing traditions of Royal Navy supremacy at sea, the U.S. Navy progressively assumed this role during two world wars and into a cold-war era. To understand the transformation from an imperial system into a grand Anglo-American alliance, it is useful to study the motivations of the key figures who crafted it. Among these personalities, the U.S. Navy's Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King stood among the most significant. Paradoxically, he also remains among the most obscure and misunderstood in popular memory.

King embraced American concepts of sea power, but he developed a broader understanding that recognized the multifaceted functions of the U.S. Navy as both a peacetime guardian and wartime offensive force. Recalling problems of Royal Navy and U.S. Navy collaboration during World War I, King had a strongly negative view about intermixing American warships with those of foreign navies. In World War II, as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy (CominCh) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), King drew lessons from that earlier experience and warned against the practice of organizing warships of various nationalities and dissimilar capabilities as "mixed forces."[1] These general themes are developed in the autobiography *Fleet Admiral King* and the biography (by Thomas Buell) *Master of Sea Power*. Accordingly, the following paper will primarily examine how service in the European theater between 1917 and 1919 shaped King's approach to Anglo-American strategy between 1941 and 1945.

King worried about foreign allies gaining controlling influence over the military policy of the United States. In his World War I experience, the Anglo-French allies had largely absorbed U.S. Navy warships and personnel into a unified combined

organization. As a result, American commanders had lost control over their forces at the front. As CominCh/CNO during World War II, King sometimes placed American warships under British commanders. However, he generally strove to avoid this practice—particularly after the combined Australian-British-Dutch-American debacles in the spring of 1942 when U.S. Navy warships sailed under a confused multinational command with no clearly focused strategic purpose that also served the interests of the United States. Reminded of similar debacles of World War I, King avoided placing U.S. warships under foreign commanders for the remainder of World War II.

In historiography, King is widely misrepresented as an obstructive personality with an Anglophobic approach to negotiating combined strategy. For example, the journalist Ralph Ingersoll described King as a rabid Anglophobe in his book *Top Secret (*1946).[2] "King is said to have opened the first meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff by announcing flatly that he had served under the British in the last war and now wanted it understood [that] he would never serve under them again, or permit any of his ships to serve under them 'if he could help it.'"[3] Such accounts drove King to issue rebuttals that he "never said or *thought* these remarks about the Royal Navy."[4] King told the historian Samuel Eliot Morison that the account by Ingersoll was "wildly inaccurate."[5]

Nevertheless, King gained a reputation for Anglophobia within the ranks of the Royal Navy. In the memoir *Very Special Intelligence,* Patrick Beesly described King as "a very forceful character, devoted to his Service and determined that it should not again play second fiddle to the Royal Navy."[6] "If not actually anti-British," Beesly argued, King "was certainly not over-receptive to ideas and suggestions from the Admiralty."[7] Beesly's supervisor in the Admiralty submarine tracking room of World War II, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve captain Rodger Winn, described King in official reports as "a facade, without much behind him. . . . [King] knew how to make a decision and stick to it, and he could inspire fear in his subordinates." Winn "got no impression of a really first rate mind" but rather of a man who was "insanely vain and a megalomaniac."[8]

King's personal papers and official correspondence, however, refute his popular portrayal as an Anglophobe. Detractors failed to understand King's actual role in navigating the complex waters of multinational naval collaboration. In framing the alliance with the Royal Navy during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on King to balance combined strategy against the strategies of the United States and, more specifically, the U.S. Navy. In this respect, Roosevelt and King generally worked in tandem to frame the grand transatlantic alliance. Roosevelt held overall command, as King served as CominCh/CNO without full congressional approval but rather, under two executive orders, at the pleasure of the president. For

these reasons, contemporary historians must reexamine the Anglophobic myths that have influenced popular postwar interpretations of King.

EDUCATION BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Service with the Atlantic Fleet before the U.S. declaration of war against the Central powers defined King. The traditional home of the Atlantic Fleet was in those days the anchorage at Narragansett Bay—under the shadow of the Naval War College campus in Newport, Rhode Island. The scholarly aura of the Naval War College balanced against the practical training at the nearby naval station by which sailors earned proficiency ratings in specified fields of technical interest before joining the crew in the warships of the U.S. Navy. As a junior officer, King viewed Newport as a second home. He generally lived the life of a transient, living in ships or temporary barracks barges. King's wife and family of six daughters and a son remained firmly established in their permanent home at 45 Franklin Street in Annapolis, Maryland.

Given his long separations from his family, King thrived in the monastic culture and seagoing traditions of the Navy. In particular, he developed a close alliance with Lt. Cdr. Dudley W. Knox. Serving together under their mutual mentor Rear Adm. Hugo Osterhaus in the 2nd Battleship Division, King and Knox developed a lifelong friendship. Their relationship centered on their shared fascination with maritime history, naval technology, and strategic affairs. Indulging these interests, King and Knox used their time on Osterhaus's staff to write articles for publication in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* and for presentation as wardroom lectures.

Service in seagoing staffs provided opportunities for King to earn the trust of senior patrons. Osterhaus in particular placed King on the path to accelerated promotion. Having graduated with the Naval Academy class of 1901, King passed the requisite examinations and screened for promotion to lieutenant commander by 1913. However, his promotion remained contingent on securing a place within the authorized number of officers in a given rank. Thus, King formally assumed the rank of lieutenant commander only on taking command of USS *Terry* (TBD 25) in the spring of 1914. He commanded *Terry* in the protection of merchant shipping in Mexican waters during the Veracruz expedition. In July, Lt. Arthur L. Bristol relieved King in *Terry* in Florida, from where King traveled to Boston to relieve Lt. Cdr. Harris Laning as skipper of USS *Cassin* (DD 43). Bristol remained among King's closer associates in organizing surface and air operations.

King assumed command as *Cassin* entered the shipyard for extensive repairs and detached seasoned crewmen for other assignments. *Cassin* was weather-beaten and in need of repair following operations off Veracruz; King faced substantial challenges getting them completed in the Boston Naval Shipyard. Complicating matters, King received surprise orders to report to Newport as aide to the Commander, Destroyer Flotilla, Atlantic Fleet (ComDesFlotLant), Capt. William S. Sims. Upon receiving these orders, which he hoped were temporary, King left the executive

officer, Lt. Claude B. Mayo, in acting command. King feared the prospect of losing his seagoing command for duty on a staff. However, Sims refused to release King from the ComDesFlotLant staff. King, for his part, considered that "Captain Sims himself was an officer of extraordinary energy, but given to speaking with exaggeration," for whom "all matters were clear white or dead black."[9] King "was never one of the group of Sims's devoted disciples and followers."[10]

Thanks to personal connections inside the Navy Department, Sims had considerable leeway in forming the ComDesFlotLant staff. He established USS *Birmingham* (CL 2) as his flagship, assigning the skipper, Capt. William V. Pratt, collateral duty as aide. Sims dragooned not only King but Bristol as well to serve as his aides. King met Bristol on the pier at Newport, where both awaited a boat to the anchored flagship. Reporting to Pratt, both immediately requested release from the ComDesFlotLant staff to focus on their respective ships. Pratt understood, yet Sims refused to release either. Sims instead offered them the devil's choice of continuing in command—King in *Cassin* and Bristol in *Terry*—while performing double duty with ComDesFlotLant.

So King balanced the huge responsibilities of the skipper of a broken warship with the detailed administrative functions of a ComDesFlotLant aide, commuting daily between *Birmingham* in Newport and *Cassin* in Boston. Nevertheless, King rallied *Cassin* to outpace other destroyers in the flotilla. King's crew ultimately earned trophies as the top-performing warship in the flotilla for engineering readiness and tactical proficiency. Still, King grew deeply annoyed with his seniors for, on one hand, failing to provide much assistance while, on the other, meddling in his ship's daily routines. He complained about the constant requests for urgent updates on the status of *Cassin*. Superiors increasingly abused for such purposes the new technical wonder of radio communications. "If we had been able to say, 'you can use only seven radio messages a day' everything would have been simplified," King thought. His radio "logs are full of unimportant matters—only five percent of what they contain is important."[11]

The U.S. Navy lacked mature procedures for transmitting radio messages among the seagoing forces. Communications specialists saw themselves as an elite branch of the regular line, which further annoyed King. Recalling an early experience, King told of the ComDesFlotLant radio officer, Lt. (j.g.) Robert Lavender, who "came on board *Cassin* and without saying anything to anybody went into the radio room and told the radio man to cut this out and to do that."[12] Upon discovering these unauthorized modifications to his ship, King immediately took a launch to the ComDesFlotLant flagship and demanded an explanation from Lavender, who thought that "line officers could use radio only if radio officers agreed and approved."[13] In response, King screamed, "Of all the goddamned things I have ever heard of!"[14]

King, who was of course senior to Lavender, subjected him to a tirade of epic proportions on the decks of *Birmingham*. Sims observed from the bridge above the quarterdeck as King lectured Lavender on the traditional role of a seagoing commander, the irrefutable prerogative of senior officers, and the obvious breach of protocol that had been committed. The spectacle King created reflected the frustrations of many seagoing professionals in their relations with technical specialists within the line. A classmate of King's, Lt. John V. Babcock, intervened, King later recalled, "as he was concerned that I might throw young Lavender overboard."[15] Finally, Sims stepped in, ruled in King's favor, and encouraged Lavender to consider offering an apology. Instead, the junior officer simply walked away without saying anything, deepening King's disgust. For the remainder of their careers, King and Lavender sparred at the Navy Department. Lavender later earned a law degree and ascended the ranks as a staff officer on the coattails of future admirals Husband E. Kimmel and Adolphus Andrews.[16]

King harbored particular disdain for professional staff officers and technocrats as impediments to the seagoing mission of the service. Himself doing double duty as the skipper in *Cassin* and as an aide to Sims, King thought, as he later recalled, that "staff duty for its own sake did not lead anywhere."[17] Given King's attitude, service with Sims on the ComDesLantFlot staff built a firm foundation for a bright future within the service. Meeting at the same time so many responsibilities in *Cassin* earned him the deep respect of fellow destroyer skippers in the flotilla, including Harry Yarnell, Harold R. Stark, and William F. "Bull" Halsey Jr.[18]

Sims encouraged junior officers serving with the Atlantic Fleet to pursue assignment as students at the Naval War College. "It was at the Naval War College that Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his great works on sea power"; King recalled that the "ablest officers were all anxious to take the course at the War College, even though there were still a few die-hards who fought against it."[19] As for King himself, Sims refused to lighten his workload, encouraging him in addition to complete the Naval War College correspondence courses in naval strategy. These studies coincided with the Sims vision of creating a "War College afloat." Among King's other duties, Sims supervised him in organizing within the flotilla tabletop war games, professional discussions, and healthy debates.[20] Ultimately, Sims and his staff developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroyers in unison using a wireless "signal book" of fewer than thirty-one words.[21]

Sims's "band of brothers" commanding Atlantic Fleet destroyers in the shadow of the Naval War College employed the new tactics and signals to examine various scenarios for application in larger fleet operations. Sims used historical case studies as a vehicle for examining problems of contemporary relevance. He encouraged his subordinates, like King, to pursue a deeper understanding of the ideas of Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Sims encouraged King to accept a voluntary position as

secretary-treasurer of the Naval Institute (working by mail with its office in Annapolis). In this role, he also edited and reviewed articles for the Naval Institute's professional journal, *Proceedings*. King gained in this way wider exposure within the naval community, as he interacted with authors and fellow naval officers. He fostered closer ties with officers with reputations as intellectuals, such officers as Knox, Yarnell, and William S. Pye. Among other examples, King highlighted the historical essay that Knox published in *Proceedings* "The Great Lesson from Nelson for Today."

The professional alliance of King and Knox blossomed especially on the fertile intellectual grounds of maritime history. King and Knox also examined the writings of such European and American strategic thinkers of the period as Winston S. Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, and Bradley Fiske. Following the opening of the Panama Canal, King explored the strategic ramifications of U.S. Navy operations beyond the American sphere of influence. He translated from the German an article by Professor Dr. Fritz Zadow of the University of Greifswald predicting that the "Japanese Empire presents an obvious war danger [and that] progress of the United States in carrying out its present day paramount imperialistic policy, will soon be the cause of a tremendous conflict."[22] King encouraged *Proceedings*' readers to consider such foreign perspectives on American naval strategy.

The cosmopolitan approach of King and Knox, translating foreign texts about maritime history and contemporary strategic policy, ranged far beyond the technical dimensions of naval operations. Having examined the German perspective on the burgeoning naval rivalry between imperial Japan and the United States, King studied the rise of the British Empire in maritime affairs. In an introductory preface, King alerted readers to the central argument within a Knox essay examining the unique challenges inherent in naval leadership. In it Knox used the career of the British naval hero Horatio, Lord Nelson as an allegory of deeper points and transcendent questions. Knox challenged ranking U.S. Navy readers to avoid micromanagement. He criticized them for using mathematical approaches to questions of war, for "concentration on fractions."[23] Knox published such ideas in the prize-winning essay "Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare" in 1915. He pressed readers to encourage the "initiative of the subordinate."[24] "Intelligent cooperation," Knox argued, is of "infinitely more value than mechanical obedience."[25]

Knox and King gained notoriety by challenging the routines of the service, encouraging fellow naval professionals to reject micromanagement by senior commanders. Knox maintained close contact with King while serving on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) under the first CNO, Adm. William S. Benson.[26] King, still a lieutenant commander in 1916, sought another destroyer command, thinking that "I was looking for the main chance [not] to get staff duty just to be on a staff." His longtime mentor Osterhaus advised King to "look over

the fellow you are going to work for." Osterhaus arranged orders for King to serve as the fleet engineering officer on the seagoing staff of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet (CinCLant), Vice Adm. Henry T. Mayo. Later characterizing his mentors, King thought that "Sims was flighty, Osterhaus steady, and Mayo was the man for me."[27]

TRANSATLANTIC CROSSINGS

Officers affiliated with Sims and Mayo gelled into a cadre that progressively gained influence within the U.S. Navy. Among other close associates from the ComDesLantFlot staff, King maintained strong connections with Knox, Yarnell, Stark, and Halsey. By the fall of 1916, Sims was President of the Naval War College. In this role, he interacted with the Atlantic Fleet forces in Narragansett Bay. King, on the CinCLant staff, again served with Yarnell. Together, they developed procedures for monitoring wear and tear on warship engines that later became standard throughout the Navy. King also rekindled ties with Pye. Having returned from the Asiatic after commanding a gunboat, Adolphus Andrews revived an earlier rivalry with King, one that would continue throughout their time together on the CinCLant staff of World War I.

The U.S. Navy stood unprepared to participate on an equal basis with foreign allies in European waters. In March 1917 the CNO, Benson, directed Sims to travel incognito to London in anticipation of organizing Navy operations in Europe. "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes," Benson warned Sims; "we would as soon fight them as the Germans."[28] Sims requested officers with recent seagoing experience and "War College training."[29] Among others, he recruited Lt. Col. Louis McCarty Little, U.S. Marine Corps—the son of retired Navy captain William McCarty Little, who had perfected wargaming methods at the Naval War College. He also requested Knox, Yarnell, Stark, and King. Despite Sims's significant influence within the Navy Department, Mayo retained King on the Atlantic Fleet staff.

Sims was given ambiguous authority for establishing basic lines of transatlantic communication between the Admiralty and Navy Department. He arrived in London before the American declaration of war on 2 April 1917.[30] The following month he assumed the title of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in conjunction with the establishment of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) headquarters under U.S. Army general John Pershing.[31] The AEF, hastening to join the war, fell under a multinational headquarters wherein foreign commanders controlled the planning and execution of operations at the front. Pershing fought a losing battle for independence; the allies resisted changes to the preexisting combined organization.[32] As the AEF trickled into Europe, Sims concluded that the "only effective way to throw the weight of the U.S. Navy into the war without delay was to use its available units to strengthen the weak spots in other Navies and thus effect a more vigorous conduct of the war already so thoroughly underway in all areas. There

would have been much wasted effort and time if any attempt had been made to take over any particular area and operate it entirely with U.S. Naval Forces."[33] Sims embraced the preexisting Anglo-French strategy, placing U.S. Navy tactical forces at the disposal of the allies. This arrangement was largely influenced by the First Sea Lord, Adm. Sir John R. Jellicoe, who greatly impressed Sims. Jellicoe had earned celebrity status after the battle of Jutland two years earlier.

Notwithstanding the grand-strategic differences between the Admiralty and Navy Department, Jellicoe encouraged Sims to take the lead in organizing American naval operations. Jellicoe, concerned with the global scope of the British Empire and Royal Navy operations, treated Sims as a broker handling the U.S. Navy portfolio—not at all what Benson expected in terms of Anglo-American cooperation. Characterizing their relationship, Jellicoe later employed what rather sounds like the "royal we" in describing the "great admiration which we in the British Navy felt for the spirit of self-effacement displayed by the senior American naval officers in placing themselves so unreservedly under the command of British naval officers, in order to ensure unity of control in British waters."[34]

The Admiralty suffered from strategic wartime shortfalls as the Royal Navy was obliged to continue to operate worldwide to protect the empire rather than focus on Europe. Accordingly, the Royal Navy employed U.S. Navy warships to augment the Grand Fleet, defend home waters, and perform secondary operations on other fronts.[35] In April 1917, Jellicoe immediately accepted an offer by Sims to augment the Royal Navy with American destroyers. Jellicoe formally requested these forces from the CNO and CinCLant. From a technical standpoint, sending oil-burning destroyers presented new challenges for the Atlantic Fleet staff. Coal-burning battleships and cruisers of the Atlantic Fleet could make the transatlantic passage. Oil-burning battleships remained in reserve to defend the American hemisphere. Submarines and destroyers lacked the range to reach British waters without refueling in the North Atlantic.

Mayo directed his staff to organize the logistical support of the six Atlantic Fleet destroyers that would go first to Europe. The operation required extensive coordination. King, as fleet engineering officer, had a key role in procuring spare parts and assisting the destroyer engineers in preparations for the voyage. Among others, he consulted the executive officer of the Atlantic Fleet oiler USS *Maumee* (AO 2), Lt. Cdr. Chester W. Nimitz. In the spring of 1917, King and Nimitz worked together as *Maumee* completed repairs in the Boston Naval Shipyard. Acting with Mayo's authority, King approved the plans for reconfiguring *Maumee* for the novel tactic of replenishing warships at sea without stopping.

Underway replenishment remained an untested concept, and the U.S. Navy lacked formal procedures for it. The transatlantic passage of the American destroyers provided an opportunity for experimentation.[36] King and Nimitz identified the

optimal location for *Maumee* to meet the destroyers in the central Atlantic. The warships would make their passage along the traditional great-circle route south of Iceland, on which the Gulf Stream worked in their favor. The CinCLant staff produced a detailed plan, with specific rendezvous points and meticulous timetables. King reviewed the draft plans and directives and found them overly constraining. As a result, Mayo revised the directives to enable his subordinate commanders to make their own decisions during the transatlantic passage.

In their final form, Mayo's sailing orders simply assigned to the destroyer skippers the general task—that of making the transatlantic voyage for the purpose of initiating U.S. Navy offensive operations in Europe—and provided the rendezvous location with *Maumee*. In a first for U.S. Navy operations, *Maumee* refueled destroyers thirty-five times in the stormy seas of the North Atlantic without stopping, thereby hastening their arrival. The destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet ultimately constituted the cornerstone of a transatlantic convoy system.[37] King and Nimitz continued refining U.S. Navy tactics for refueling at sea through World War I and beyond.

QUESTIONS OF COMMAND

The Royal Navy assumed strategic control over U.S. Navy forces upon arrival in European waters. Over nearly four centuries, the Royal Navy had become accustomed to assuming strategic command over foreign naval forces in wartime. The First Sea Lord at the Admiralty, Jellicoe, held the equivalent of five-star rank, whereas Sims as the presiding American naval representative at the "London Flagship" had been given temporary wartime three-star rank. Their lopsided relationship further blurred the already complex U.S. command relationships in Europe. Benson, as CNO, empowered Sims to represent the AEF as the Commander, U.S. Navy Forces in Europe, yet the formal authority to command Atlantic Fleet warships remained with CinCLant, Mayo.[38] For its part, the Admiralty worked with the Navy Department through Sims and the London Flagship, *not* Mayo and the CinCLant staff or Benson and OpNav. Further complicating the situation, Sims remained junior in permanent rank and lineal standing (relative seniority among those of the same rank) to Mayo, who was senior by three years, enjoyed the traditional seniority of CinCLant, and had recently assumed temporary wartime rank as a four-star admiral. Mayo, tied to the chores of defending the American sphere of influence, in this role facilitated collaboration with the allies—hosting visiting dignitaries on board Atlantic Fleet battleships based in New England and in Hampton Roads in Virginia.

These shipboard "wine-and-cheese events" seasoned King in the arts of multinational naval collaboration. Coincident with the Fourth of July 1917, the Royal Navy's Commander in Chief, North America and West Indies Station, Vice Adm. Sir Montague Edward Browning, visited the Atlantic Fleet anchorage in Hampton Roads. King helped organize a junket ashore. In the spirit of Anglo-American

collaboration, he went to great lengths to avoid drawing attention to the Yorktown battlefield and the Victory Monument commemorating Washington's 1781 defeat of Cornwallis that effectively ended the American War of Independence. Nevertheless, Browning insisted on visiting the battlefield. At the monument, he read the heroic portrayals of Washington's victory aloud. King was deeply impressed with Browning's gesture.[39]

Anglo-French overtures toward their American allies frequently centered on the mythologized heroism of Revolutionary heroes. In the summer of 1917 King spent most of his time as an Atlantic Fleet staff officer planning not wartime operations but high-level diplomatic events involving U.S. Navy warships in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and Yorktown. Not to be outdone by his British allies, Marshal Joseph Joffre and other members of the French military mission to the United States staged a triumphant return to Yorktown. King recalled the challenges involved with hosting Joffre on board the Atlantic Fleet flagship, USS *Pennsylvania* (BB 33), at anchor off Yorktown. Having in mind the constricted space in the fourteen-inch-gun turrets, King worried when Joffre requested a tour of the ship. "His [Joffre's] substantial figure made it impossible"; King's superiors wished to avoid the "undignified spectacle of a Marshal of France getting stuck in a space too small for him!"[40]

In this way, however, King gained unique experience in coordinating allied naval relations. He also witnessed the problems of U.S. Navy command, especially that the Secretary of the Navy and CNO routinely undermined the authority of CinCLant over his own warships, communicating directly with subordinate commanders. King recalled Mayo's great frustration with the situation, as the interventions of seniors did not relieve CinCLant of responsibility for managing Atlantic Fleet operations. In the summer of 1917 King explained the circumstances to Knox, then in the Office of Naval Intelligence subsection of the OpNav staff.

Knox understood the challenges involved with balancing the expectations of the CNO with the realities of relations with foreign allies and that the Navy, lacking experience in multinational naval strategy, was generally in uncharted waters in organizing its operations in Europe. In efforts to soothe relations between CNO and CinCLant, Knox and King collaborated with the OpNav Aide for Operations, Captain Pratt. The CNO acquiesced to the solution of rotating Atlantic Fleet staff liaison officers through OpNav.

That left the ambiguous situation of U.S. warships in European waters. By formal authority and by tradition, Mayo retained the prerogative to circumvent Sims and assert direct command over Atlantic Fleet forces, wherever operating. Mayo secured permission to visit the European theater, bringing selected members of his staff, including King. Mayo and his entourage arrived in August in Liverpool, where they were greeted by Sims. In London, before the initial meetings with the

First Sea Lord, Mayo requested details about past mistakes as a preparation for discussions on "what is proposed to do."[41] In this tactful way Mayo reasserted his command authority over Atlantic Fleet warships in European waters. Yet he was somewhat uninformed about the delicate arrangements between the operations and intelligence subdivisions of the Admiralty, Sims's headquarters (the London Flagship), and the Navy Department.

For instance, with respect to operational intelligence from high-grade sources, the Admiralty had the upper hand, controlling its acquisition and dissemination. In essence, the London Flagship was simply a clearinghouse for filtering information to U.S. Navy forces. Out of necessity, then, the London Flagship overshadowed in this respect the traditional role of the Atlantic Fleet staff. Sims explained the unusual relationship between the subsections of the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division and the London Flagship: The "organization of the British Admiralty includes a highly efficient Intelligence Division."[42] Just as, Sims explained, "there is a direct telephonic communication between the British and French Admiralties," now "special telephone and telegraph wires have been installed between the Admiralty and the U.S. Navy Headquarters."[43] Therefore the operational forces, although under Mayo and the Atlantic Fleet, relied for information on Sims and the intelligence subsections of the London Flagship—through whose good offices Mayo and his staff now gained an informed understanding of the opportunities and difficulties of multinational naval operations.

Another challenge concerned the emerging roles of electrical communications and rudimentary electronic sensors, still unfamiliar and unproven elements of naval warfare among seagoing professionals. Frustratingly, tactical communications among Royal Navy and American warships remained limited. British wireless equipment was inferior to that employed on board American warships yet was the standard for allied forces in European waters. American radiomen were obliged to adapt their equipment and procedures to communicate with Anglo-French and Italian warships.[44] Dominion navies too followed standardized communications procedures, which contrasted with U.S. Navy practices.[45] Conversely, however, collaboration promised strategic benefits, as the U.S. Navy gained technical experience. One British innovation was Anti-Submarine Investigation Committee (ASDIC) technology, which the Royal Navy gave to the U.S. Navy. As the intended reference was actually to the antisubmarine division of the Admiralty, which managed the equipment, the term was not an acronym for an actual "committee." For clarity, the Americans eventually abandoned the term ASDIC and instead created the acronym SONAR (SOund Navigation And Ranging).[46]

Standardization of design, matériel, and procedures enabled the Royal Navy to operate and support warships on a worldwide scale, with a network of land bases that centered on the Admiralty in London. For instance, bases in Hong Kong carried

the same standardized parts and facilities as those in Singapore. Capt. Sir Dudley Pound, who coordinated the Royal Navy supply system at the Admiralty, explained the relationships between the Admiralty and subordinate regional headquarters. The U.S. Navy lacked similar facilities to conduct sustained operations in foreign waters and so, as Mayo now understood, operated under precarious arrangements with "Allied Governments by which our ships can put into any of their naval bases and obtain urgent supplies just as if they belonged to the Navy of the country."[47] During these meetings Pound and King developed a strong working relationship, collaborating to organize support for U.S. warships in European waters.[48] King and Pound ultimately established lasting ties between the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy in operations at sea.[49]

Mayo, with few alternatives to the arrangements negotiated between the Admiralty and the London Flagship, adapted to the multinational organization of allied command in Europe. Because official status loomed large in the relations among Anglo-American naval commanders in the European theater, and although Sims remained a very important individual, Mayo, who was senior to him in rank and had greater influence in the Navy Department, drew much interest among the Anglo-French allies while he was present. As representatives of Mayo during tours of the front, King and Pye gained special access to various allied commanders. Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch of France hosted Sims and Mayo for a luncheon in Paris, with Knox, King, and Pye in attendance. Although the Americans understood French, King recalled "having a good deal of difficulty understanding Foch."[50] Sims experienced similar difficulty, as Foch's accent was accentuated by numerous bottles of wine.

There were also sailors and Marines ashore who fell under the AEF headquarters of the U.S. Army, and King accompanied Mayo to visit them that fall. In a whirlwind tour of the theater they visited Atlantic Fleet sailors and naval aviators based in Queenstown on the southern Irish coast, then traveled to the Mediterranean, across the Riviera, up to Paris, and along the western front. During these tours the CinCLant chief of staff, Capt. Orton Jackson, was severely injured in a car accident, and King assumed his duties. In this capacity he accompanied Mayo in meetings with European monarchs, politicians, and policy makers.[51] To witness personally the problems inherent in dissimilar national strategies, rivalries among personalities, and differences of political organization was invaluable seasoning for a junior staff officer.

Mayo also permitted King and Pye, who was the fleet tactics officer, to accept an opportunity offered them to observe the Royal Navy's yearly Grand Fleet maneuvers. Such wartime exercises served as a strategic deterrent, demonstrating allied supremacy as a warning to the German High Seas Fleet to stay in port. The Grand Fleet's commander, Adm. Sir David Beatty, explained to Sims and Mayo

the scenario for the exercises at the London Flagship, as the battleships and battle cruisers that were to participate assembled in Scotland. During this meeting Beatty invited King and Pye to sail with him on board the flagship, HMS *Queen Elizabeth*. Beatty, who had attained international fame as the heroic commander of the British battle cruisers during the battle of Jutland just over a year earlier, greatly impressed King and Pye.

Beatty planned to replicate in the exercise his success at Jutland by maneuvering the Grand Fleet into position to surprise the "opposing force"—destroyers and aerial scouting forces under Vice Adm. Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee that represented the High Seas Fleet. As he had during the battle of the Falklands three years earlier, Sturdee used the weather to obscure his force and caught Beatty off guard. In a feat akin to that of Nelson in the 1797 battle of the Nile, Sturdee cornered Beatty's force from two directions, then "crossed the *T*," systematically dividing Beatty's line of battle. The battle had been merely simulated, but the Grand Fleet had been humiliated and its commander's pride shaken. Beatty, however, acted as though his mistake had been part of an elaborately planned ruse and maintained his commanding presence. King and Pye privately chuckled at the spectacle.[52]

In discussions of multinational naval command and organizations during his European visit, Mayo greatly influenced the perspectives of his staff. They all gained a detailed understanding of the situation on the front ashore and in European waters. In September, having developed clear opinions of what needed to be done, Mayo decided to return to America and provide the secretary and CNO a full report. Seeking to reinforce the collaborative spirit before he did so, the First Sea Lord intercepted Mayo at Dunkirk. Jellicoe invited Mayo and his staff on board the flagship of the Royal Navy's Dover Patrol, the destroyer HMS *Broke*, to observe the bombardment of the German bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. In a gesture of Anglo-American solidarity, Jellicoe ordered the Stars and Stripes flown with the Royal Navy's White Ensign. Recalling the scene, King noted it was also the "first occasion on which the four-star flag of a United States admiral had flown in a British man-of-war."[53]

Jellicoe used the opportunity to encourage closer coordination with Mayo and the seagoing CinCLant staff. Jellicoe was worried, as King later recounted, about the increasing influence of wireless communications in operations at sea and had been "somewhat hampered in his command of the Grand Fleet by an excess of gratuitous advice and detailed suggestions from the Admiralty."[54] On this point, King, as has been seen, fully agreed; in general, the seagoing professionals of the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy shared his frustration at the overuse of electronic communications, the broader influence that it enabled of headquarters ashore in operations at sea, and the potential ramifications with regard to safeguarding tactical intelligence sources.

Mayo now understood the reasons for exercising command relationships between the Admiralty and Navy Department through the London Flagship. Also, having discussed the strategic situation with Jellicoe and the foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, during secret meetings held at Admiralty House in London, Mayo identified three general missions that could be handled with relative autonomy by the U.S. Navy and the Atlantic Fleet staff. First, he envisioned an expanded role for American convoy escort and antisubmarine operations. Second, he saw the North Sea Mine Barrage as an opportunity for the Atlantic Fleet to make a unique contribution. Finally, Mayo sought means to learn as much as possible about allies and adversaries through the routine collection of information, the acquisition of new technology, and the development of unique intelligence sources.[55]

CONSOLIDATION OR COOPERATION?

The Anglo-American naval command evolved from the shaky foundations of differing national strategic interests and personality problems. An American expatriate working in London for Herbert Hoover in the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Tracy Barrett Kittredge, recalled that the Woodrow Wilson administration had entered the war "without any definite political objectives and without any agreed strategic plans." Rather than join the war effort in equal partnership with the Anglo-French allies, Wilson characterized the United States as an "associated power," specifying that naval forces sent to European waters operated to secure "British strategic naval objectives under British strategic command and that any token army forces sent to France would conform their strategy to that of the French Army's and would serve under the high command of a French generalissimo."[56] Under this hastily framed arrangement, American forces fought to secure foreign strategic objectives that perhaps ran against the national interests of the United States.

The relationship between the Anglo-French allies and the associated power, the United States, was the source of significant difficulties among commanders of the U.S. Army and Navy forces, which fell into the ambiguously defined catchall AEF organization. The leading representative of the CNO in the London Flagship, Sims, followed the philosophy that the "word 'cooperation' ought to be struck out from the war dictionary and the word 'consolidation' written in its place[;] . . . the preservation of its individual identity by one force or another is all wrong."[57] Mayo recognized the importance of a unified command but emphasized "unified methods of signal and radio procedure . . . to ensure efficiency in joint operations with the British."[58] From a practical standpoint, then, Sims and Mayo took different approaches to questions of multinational naval command. Sims generally favored a unified front, whereas Mayo preferred the flexibility inherent in decentralized command. Sims placed priority on consolidating alliances in the European theater, Mayo on the prestige of the Atlantic Fleet as a cornerstone of American naval strategy and an irreplaceable safeguard of the national interests of the United States.

Mayo directed his staff to evaluate the strategic requirements, the missions assigned to Atlantic Fleet warships, and the use of intelligence information to streamline operations. King and Pye assisted in producing the "Estimate of the Situation with Regard to the Efficient Development of Operations of the Atlantic Fleet." Among other findings, the study concluded that "Allied difficulties have mostly been caused by lack of foresight."[59]

In the age of sail, fleet commanders had customarily accompanied their forces and asserted direct command over operations. Now, recognizing the revolutionary influence of electronic communications, Mayo and the CinCLant staff conceptually redefined U.S. Navy fleet organization. Mayo recast CinCLant's role with a directive emphasizing the "decentralization of authority and initiative of the subordinate[,] . . . passing down the chain of command the handling of all details to the lowest link which could properly handle them."[60] Mayo also required subordinate commanders to supply to CinCLant information and reports that could be used to "inform all units of the fleet."[61]

Regarding Europe, Mayo sought—in contrast to the Sims vision of consolidated allied command—to unify the efforts of allied forces by establishing clear chains of national command within designated zones of responsibility. King helped compile the basic information, which Mayo presented to the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, and the Assistant Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Having found that the British, French, and Italians viewed the AEF as subordinate within the combined command, Mayo sought autonomy for U.S. Navy forces in Europe. Mayo pressed his superiors to assume responsibility for the North Sea Mine Barrage. He envisioned the Navy in a leading role in the transatlantic convoy system. Also, though he respected the authority of Royal Navy admiral Lewis Bayly as Commander, Western Approaches, Mayo envisioned a separate antisubmarine headquarters for U.S. aviation and destroyer forces based in Ireland.[62] In general, however, the fact that the U.S. warships were sailing under the overall control of the Royal Navy greatly enhanced the appearance of allied command at sea.

Mayo hoped to return to the European theater and take personal command over these missions. To his chagrin, Daniels and Benson required Mayo to remain with the Atlantic Fleet in American waters. As an interim measure, Mayo placed King and Pye, in an ongoing rotation, in the European theater. From there King coordinated with others on the Atlantic Fleet and subordinate staffs on a number of matters: convoy routing with Arthur Bristol; communications between the London Flagship and Atlantic Fleet forces with the CinCLant fleet communications officer, Cdr. Russell Willson, and his replacement Leigh Noyes; and long-range submarine operations in European waters with Chester Nimitz, now a commander and the aide of the commander of the Atlantic Fleet's submarine force, Rear Adm. Samuel

Robison.[63] In such ways experience on the Atlantic Fleet staff solidified the professional ties between King, Pye, Bristol, Willson, Noyes, and Nimitz.

Mayo, perceiving the importance of battleships in the Anglo-French strategy of containing the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, recommended the symbolic gesture of deploying coal-burning battleships of the Atlantic Fleet to assist. Upon securing the requisite approvals at the Navy Department, Mayo dispatched Battleship Division 9 (BatDiv 9), under Rear Adm. Hugh Rodman. Arriving in European waters by December 1917, these warships formed a subdivision of the Grand Fleet. Within the Grand Fleet organization, BatDiv 9 was the "Sixth Battle Squadron" and in line of battle steamed in the rear.

Rodman emphasized professional appearance over substantial achievement for his battleship squadron. Perhaps carrying the spirit of collaboration to an extreme, he avoided communications with Mayo and openly disregarded Sims. He supplied glowing reports about the performance of his battleships directly to the Navy Department. Rodman established a cozy relationship with the Commander in Chief, Grand Fleet, who recommended in direct correspondence to the CNO and the secretary his promotion to three-star rank.[64] Beatty treated U.S. Navy counterparts as allies worthy to be among the forces of the British Empire—wherein the complacent assumption of British superiority greatly annoyed Wilson, Daniels, Roosevelt, Benson, and Mayo.

Meanwhile, Royal Navy commanders below Beatty's level ridiculed the sloppiness of U.S. battleships in fleet maneuvers and their low proficiency in gunnery exercises.[65] Rodman harangued the BatDiv 9 staff to improve his battleships' gunnery to Royal Navy standards but failed to seek the assistance of his U.S. senior, Mayo. It was only through informal channels that the BatDiv 9 flag lieutenant, Jonas H. Ingram, and the staff gunnery officer, Lt. Roland M. Brainard, were able to report the difficulties to King (who was in Europe as the CinCLant liaison) and others on the Atlantic Fleet staff. Ingram and Brainard were to remain trusted confidants of King throughout their service in the Atlantic Fleet during World War I and beyond.

Consolidated operations with the Royal Navy essentially truncated the U.S. Navy chain of command. As has been seen, Mayo was required by Benson to leave Navy Department liaison in London to Sims, and Rodman avoided Mayo and ignored Sims, frequently corresponding directly with the Admiralty and Navy Department. Also, Rodman was obscuring the problems affecting his battleships in European waters. Even when Rodman's flowery reports began to be contradicted by other evidence in the spring of 1918, Mayo was obliged to rely on the liaison officers he had sent to the Grand Fleet, alternately King and Pye, for accurate estimates of the situation.

King learned through Capt. Charles F. Hughes, commanding officer of Rodman's flagship, USS *New York* (BB 34), that the U.S. Navy's system of logistics, known

as the Fleet Train, was completely inadequate to sustain the deployed battleships. Parts and supplies were running low, and Royal Navy equipment was frequently incompatible. But King found the whole situation there problematic: he thought Rodman, against whom he clearly harbored a personal grudge, unequal to his task. He was worried about Rodman's ability to command the Atlantic Fleet battleships in combat should the Grand Fleet engage the High Seas Fleet. King characterized Rodman as an "officer with very little taste for reading and no sympathy for a theoretical approach to his profession[,] . . . a stickler for smartness of uniform."[66]

King found Rodman overly focused on safeguarding the reputation of the Atlantic Fleet battleships and insufficiently concerned with their readiness for actual combat.[67] King duly submitted his observations to Sims at the London Flagship, then in September 1918 proceeded to Ireland to meet CinCLant and members of the Atlantic Fleet staff who arrived in the oil-burning battleships USS *Utah* (BB 31) and USS *Texas* (BB 35).

These newer battleships—among them the newest, USS *Mississippi* (BB 41), whose executive officer was, much to King's chagrin, his rival Andrews—symbolized the growing influence of the U.S. Navy in relation to its European partners. King was able to demonstrate to Mayo and staff a unique understanding of the British perspective, having traveled to the Grand Fleet maneuvers with the minister of national service, Brig. Gen. Sir Auckland Geddes, and Royal Marine lieutenant colonel Alan George Barwys Bourne (whose company, he would recall, "made the journey rapid and agreeable").[68] In their conversations, the brigadier described his vision of the future reconstitution of the British Empire, arguing that "only the British Commonwealth *plus* the United States could hold out[;] . . . if such an alliance could be made to stick, even the most bellicose aggressors would think twice before going to war."[69] To King the "idea seemed at least worth considering."[70] In following years, King maintained correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Bourne—who was and would remain closely associated with the former First Lord, now the minister of munitions, Winston S. Churchill.

The amalgamation of Grand Fleet and Atlantic Fleet battleships was the iconic image of Anglo-American solidarity. Yet the underlying differences between the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy persisted in operations at sea. Although the hastily framed Anglo-French and American alliance emerged from a spirit of collaboration, working so closely with the Royal Navy also forced American naval officers like King to grapple with the prospect of future Anglo-American naval cooperation. At dinner in the flag mess on board *Pennsylvania* he challenged fellow CinCLant staff officers to consider his earlier conversation with Geddes and Bourne. King solicited opinions on whether the "United States should join the British Commonwealth so as to produce a union that could resist any attack."[71] The idea was far from popular: "Naturally, all hands were against even considering

such a premise," King would recall. He joked that the "capital of the reunited British Empire would be in Washington, D.C."[72]

Royal Navy strategy emphasized the preservation of the British Empire, not the growing role of the United States. Inevitably, therefore, if perhaps inadvertently, British partners sometimes insulted their American counterparts. For roughly four centuries the British Empire had defined global maritime affairs. Britannia had famously ruled the waves—and waived the rules to suit Britannia. The influence of British naval strategy on American concepts of sea power was such that World War I experiences were to shape, in various ways, the perspectives of U.S. Navy professionals. King, for one, developed a "very strong (personal) opinion [against] 'mixed forces.'"[73] Although acknowledging the benefits that could be gained under certain conditions from consolidated effort under strategically unified command, King saw also the inherent problems of coalition operations, arising from differences of doctrine, technical capability, and national interests.[74]

As the U.S. Navy refocused on peacetime routines, the Navy selected a small number of officers to retain their accelerated wartime ranks. This ruling particularly affected the postwar careers of Knox, King (who had become a captain in September 1918), Stark, and Nimitz, who found themselves victims of their own wartime service: there were fewer opportunities for officers of their ranks in the rapidly reduced Navy. Their professional mentors, Mayo and Sims, remained champions of the careers of King and other protégés from the London Flagship and Atlantic Fleet staff, but they were anticipating their own retirements following World War I, and their influence within the service began immediately to fade. Upon relinquishing command of the Atlantic Fleet, Mayo reverted to two-star rank and served in semiretirement on the General Board of the Navy. Sims, who had achieved temporary four-star rank in December 1918, requested in 1919 to be assigned as the President of the Naval War College—and so, by implication, to be demoted to the two-star rank associated with that position. The request received the requisite Navy Department endorsements: as Sims noted, his decision "relieves them from the embarrassment of not knowing what to do with me."[75] From the General Board and Naval War College, Mayo and Sims coached their protégés to examine problems of multinational naval command during the postwar era. On these questions King developed a seasoned perspective and a carefully defined professional vocabulary. King would later recall an example of the precision of his new lexicon: "The term 'joint' was applied to the operations of one country," whereas "the term 'combined' [referred] to British and U.S."[76]

EDUCATION AFTER A "GREAT WAR"

King understood the rules governing the competition for promotion, which often hinged on associations with higher-ranking patrons. Now awaiting assignment at the Atlantic Fleet anchorage in Newport, he, like many others, sought seagoing

orders. He briefly reverted to commander before receiving permanent appointment as a captain.[77] In King's later quest for promotion to flag rank, his postwar service in submarines and naval aviation would be significant factors; however, these aspects of his naval career must remain beyond the scope of this analysis.

In 1923, the reduction of the size of the Navy brought the dissolution of the geographically fixed staffs of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The Navy reconfigured its seagoing forces under the newly created four-star headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (CinCUS) and restricted the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, of the same rank, to the Navy Department. The seemingly arbitrary division later inspired King to suggest that the "Chief of Naval Operations, in the form passed by Congress, represented the ashes of a once good idea."[78] King strongly disagreed with the decision to abandon the CNO's original strategic purpose of orchestrating global U.S. Navy operations. Nevertheless, the bifurcation was to define the organization of the Navy Department until in February 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt combined the two roles, in the person of King.

Acronyms like "CinCUS" gained remarkable significance in defining relationships among various American naval commanders and their headquarters. Their use inspired a unique jargon, which naval personnel used in operational communications both verbal (such as voice radio) and written. Pronunciation therefore became particularly significant. For brevity, naval communicators developed special codes and abbreviations. This practice had sometimes created confusion between cooperating navies in World War I. Where "the Royal Navy used 'initial letters,'" King recalled, the U.S. Navy instead adopted "abbreviations composed of initial 'syllables.'"[79] American personnel generally pronounced CinCUS as "Sink Us" throughout the 1920s and 1930s, with sardonic humor, especially as the CinCUS staff frequently embarked in warships and became burdensome to their crews.[80] When ten days after the Pearl Harbor disaster President Roosevelt appointed King as CinCUS by Executive Order 8984, King would immediately change the acronym to "CominCh," finding CinCUS a "little too appropriate in sound."[81]

As the Navy sailed into the doldrums of the 1920s, King concentrated on the doctrinal issues of "unity of command" and "unity of effort."[82] For the Royal Navy, theoretically, clear chains of unified command ran from the seagoing forces to the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty. During the war, however, wireless communications had enabled such headquarters elements as Room 40 (the cryptanalysis section) and the London Flagship to influence operations by the intelligence they disseminated. As previously discussed, these communications sometimes created confusion in the fleet: American naval professionals like King worried that "radio has stripped the skipper of the initiative and responsibility which was his in the old days," while, paradoxically, tying seagoing commanders to the "apron strings of the Navy Department."[83]

King brought these lessons to his next assignment, as head of the Naval Postgraduate School, then in Annapolis. There King sought innovative solutions to problems of command, communications, intelligence, and logistics, establishing an exchange program whereby Postgraduate School students could pursue advanced degrees at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, Columbia, Yale, the University of Chicago, and the University of Michigan. For King, his tour at the Postgraduate School was simply "marking time" while awaiting a seagoing command. Nevertheless, he used that time to begin writing a philosophical essay, drawing from his wartime experiences, on naval leadership; it later appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* as "A Wrinkle or Two in Handling Men."[84] More fundamentally, King recognized in this period that shortcomings in education were undermining creativity in the Navy. He shared these ideas in correspondence with Sims, who in turn directed Knox, now a captain on the Naval War College faculty, to establish a board to make formal recommendations for improving the service's training and education organization. Knox recruited King and Pye, now a commander, to assist. By 1920, what became known as the "Knox-King-Pye board" had published in *Proceedings* an article arguing that the average American naval professional was profoundly ignorant in strategic matters, having been "'educated' only in preparation for the lowest commissioned grade."[85] The recommendations of the Knox-King-Pye board, although not sponsored by the Navy Department as such, would largely shape the educational curriculum for U.S. Navy personnel in the 1920s and 1930s.

Ever fascinated by the influence of sea power on naval history, King explained (in various writings) basic principles of naval leadership by referring to the "sea dogs" and naval heroes of the British Empire. He rejected rigid concepts of command and emphasized the importance of empowering subordinates. He recounted the 1757 execution of Royal Navy admiral John Byng "for not conducting battle [as] prescribed in regulations; a striking contrast occurred forty years later when [Horatio] Nelson's initiative at the Battle of St. Vincent was heartily approved by [Adm.] Sir John Jervis."[86] King frequently invoked the misquoted orders of the American naval hero John Paul Jones to "make the best with what you have."[87] Characterizing King's philosophy of command by delegation, his friend Knox described King as an American Nelson, "who never does anything himself that he can get anyone else to do for him."[88]

Less weightily, the Royal Navy uniform inspired changes in those of the U.S. Navy. American army and navy uniforms after World War I changed (at least for winter) from the high-collared Germanic tunic to the British-style double-breasted suit jacket after World War I.[89] Like the British, the U.S. Army adapted a "Sam Browne" belt (as the Marine Corps already had) and an open collar with a tie. The postwar Navy uniform regulations introduced broader-brimmed officers' caps with

"English braid."[90] King would recall these superficial changes in uniform as unpopular among many American naval officers. He personally, however, took advantage of the shift to the British style as a way of annoying senior U.S. Navy officers.[91] For example, as Knox later described, King emulated Admiral Beatty by wearing "his cap at a slight angle, a handkerchief in his top pocket, and often appear[ing] with his hands in his jacket pockets."[92]

King saw the Royal Navy as a model for organizing the two-ocean U.S. Navy, which would stand second to none. However, from his wartime collaboration with Dudley Pound during World War I, King recognized the strategic vulnerability of the Royal Navy in that the "British relied heavily upon a global network of bases ashore, which required direct defensive support from land and air forces."[93] King recalled the attitude of the minister of munitions at the time: "Mister Churchill did not like the American word, 'logistics.' . . . 'What is that?!'"[94]

King clearly respected Royal Navy counterparts like Pound, with whom he had worked very well: "Dudley was absolutely first rate," King would remember. "When some important point came along he would hit it at once."[95] Their wartime collaboration inspired King during the 1920s and 1930s to encourage the U.S. Navy to invest in strategic logistical forces. He also developed doctrine and procedures to train and equip warships to operate at sea for extended periods without access to bases ashore. Unlike the Royal Navy after World War I, King's navy fully prepared itself to operate in the next war without constant wireless communications or shore-based supply. This capability would prove decisive when the Navy would operate simultaneously in vastly separated theaters, Atlantic and Pacific.

The British Empire and the United States remained economic rivals. Writing at the Naval War College as late as 1932, King warned that even "Great Britain must be considered a potential enemy . . . not in questions of security, but as to matters involving our foreign trade, financial supremacy, and our dominant position in world affairs."[96] Nevertheless, the British and Americans had strategic interests in common that provided a basis for continued, peacetime collaboration at sea. King now, by experience and study, had a clear-eyed view of the risks and difficulties: "History records all too many instances where political objectives have conflicted in time or in space with the correct military (naval) objective in war."[97] One risk was inherent in "the advent of radio," which increased the "flexibility of strategy both as to transmission of important information about the enemy and adaptation of orders."[98] This flexibility, exercised by individual allies without coordination, might place multinational naval forces in such a situation that the strategic advantages of unified command "are more than nullified by the ~~lack of unity~~ (handicap) of effort that ~~results~~ (is inherent) when forces of different nations, with different customs and systems of command, are brigaded together."[99]

King's experiences working with Anglo-French and other associated navies in World War I were to inform his philosophy in negotiating transatlantic naval strategy through World War II and beyond. King's "Anglophobia" of those years is a myth that should not be reinforced. King, reflecting in 1945 on two world wars, acknowledged that the "British have been managing world affairs for well over three hundred years . . . ever since the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588."[100] But from his perspective, whereas in the first world war the defense of Britain was a prerequisite for victory, King's job during World War II required him to take a broad view and balance U.S. Navy resources. He explained,

> I personally felt that the "Allies" would lose the war against the Japanese unless we stopped them in a few weeks or months, that the "Allies" should provide troops, planes, and ships as soon as possible, and that they must stop the Japanese at the earliest possible time. It seemed to me that the British "egged" the U.S. on to accept their ideas since they were already fighting the Nazi's [*sic*, as transcribed] when the U.S. entered the war and also since the Nazi's were close by and the Pacific was far away. . . . I can't get over the idea that most of the U.S. People [*sic*] had been sold a "pig in a poke" at that time and were in the well-known situation of having been worked into a concept (even a real obsession) of British origin rather than to look out for the basic interests of the U.S.A. throughout the entire world![101]

As CominCh/CNO in World War II, King did not feel obliged to acquiesce to British views or the ideas of the Admiralty or to adopt for the sake of standardization the procedures of the Royal Navy.[102] However, he remained dedicated to the underlying strategic mission of securing a common victory over mutual enemies of the British Empire and United States.

King ultimately personified the complex naval relationship between the British Empire and the United States. Not infrequently he refused during World War II to allow British counterparts to direct combined strategy or assume direct tactical control over U.S. Navy resources.[103] It was for this reason that King progressively earned, as noted, his reputation as an Anglophobe. The official Royal Navy historian, Capt. Stephen W. Roskill, from personal experience knew King to be a deeply complex figure. He offers an important counterpoint:

> [The view that] King was anti-British, though very prevalent at the time, is certainly an over-simplification of his attitude, and possibly an unfair stigmatism [*sic*] of a man who did, after all, repeatedly send help to the Royal Navy. It is probably nearer the truth to say that in his heart he admired the other service's traditions and fighting record, but was determined that it should not deprive the United States Navy, in whose creation he himself had played such a great part, of the glory of victories which he felt to be its right.[104]

King's closest advisor in antisubmarine operations during World War II, Rear Adm. Francis S. Low, offered the similar conclusion that "anti-British—he was *not* . . . [but he was] sometimes apprehensive [when] the British would try to take over both strategic and tactical direction."[105] King ultimately viewed the Axis powers of the Tripartite Pact as three dissimilar adversaries constituting a single threat. In maritime strategy, operations in the Atlantic directly influenced actions in the Pacific, each of the theaters of the global war effort "being one part of the larger whole."[106]

King ultimately unified the grand maritime strategies of Great Britain and the United States by delineating clearly their respective areas of command. This proved absolutely decisive for synchronizing operations in the global war at sea under the principle of "Europe First."[107] Although King embraced the late-nineteenth-century vision of Captain Mahan of a U.S. Navy second to none, he also ensured the success of Anglo-American naval collaboration during the first fifty years of the twentieth century. In this way, King also set the foundations for the Cold War–era "special relationship" that defined the Anglo-American alliance. It is only by ignoring evidence to the contrary and taking analytical shortcuts that historians have consistently asserted that King was an Anglophobe.[108]

While harboring deep appreciation for Royal Navy traditions, King successfully balanced the dissimilar strategic war aims of the British Empire, the United States, and the other Allied naval powers of World War II. His service at the highest levels of combined command during World War II as one of the only four American fleet admirals (five stars) has obscured the foundational prewar experiences that defined King's later view of Anglo-American strategy. In actuality, his seasoning during World War I loomed very large as King negotiated combined Anglo-American strategy, framed U.S. Navy operations, and refined the strategic war aims of the United States.

World War I action in European waters also produced strong and lasting professional alliances among Royal Navy officers and U.S. Navy veterans of the London Flagship and Atlantic Fleet. Similarly, Franklin D. Roosevelt was to draw clear conclusions from his experiences in Europe, where he frequently interacted with members of the London Flagship and CinCLant staffs.[109] Significantly, Roosevelt remained very interested in the careers of Knox, Stark, and King. As president of the United States, Roosevelt solicited advice from Knox on naval policy after 1933. Stark too, as CNO after 1939, shaped the Roosevelt style of Anglo-American naval collaboration. As for King, it was he whom Roosevelt empowered after 1941 to execute American maritime strategy, coordinate combined operations, and establish the U.S. Navy as the foundation on which the American vision of a United Nations after World War II would be constructed.

NOTES

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VII *General Dickman's Navy*
The Marine Rhine River Patrol

ALEXANDER F. BARNES

One of the more unusual missions in Marine Corps history took place from November 1918 to August 1919. While the idea of Marines performing as police and civil administrators was certainly nothing new, this time was different. This time it was not Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or Nicaragua. Instead, it was to be in the heart of Europe, specifically the German Rhineland. Also different this time was the size of the Marine contingent: a fully equipped brigade that counted among its members five future Marine Corps commandants as well as a number of other Marines who would become legends of the Corps. Nevertheless, in spite of the size of the force, the importance of the mission, and the (later) celebrity status of some of the participants, the Marine Brigade's service in the post–World War I occupation of Germany is practically unknown and virtually unappreciated.

Under terms of the Armistice, an area of western Germany with a million inhabitants was assigned to the United States for postwar occupation. The U.S. Third Army was to set up positions in a sector running from the Luxembourg border to a semicircular section on the east side of the Rhine River that would soon be known simply as the "Coblenz bridgehead."

At 0700 on 1 December 1918, with the 5th Marine Regiment leading the way, the Marine Brigade crossed the Sauer River into Germany. The regimental colors and guidons, which had been cased, were now unfurled to allow the Germans to see who was marching through their country—a sign of the Marines' awareness that they were now on enemy soil.[1]

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND

By 11 December all of the allied forces had reached the Rhine in their designated occupation zones. After a short pause for reorganization, they crossed in large numbers on the 13th to establish positions on its eastern shore.[2] The Marine Brigade, still serving as the extreme left flank of the Third Army as, formally, the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Division, crossed the Rhine via the Ludendorff railroad bridge at Remagen, a structure that would assume even greater significance in World War II. On their left flank the Marines established and maintained contact with the



Fig. 1
The four occupation zones: Belgian (B), British (E), American (A), and French (F).
(Karte von Rheinland und Westfalen, *ca. 1920, author's collection)*

Canadian Corps, which represented the extreme right flank of the British zone. When the main force of the Third Army arrived, its headquarters was established in Coblenz, in a large German government building complex located on the waterfront on the west bank of the Rhine.

To keep the allies and the German army apart, a ten-kilometer-wide (6.2 miles) "demilitarized zone" had been established from the Netherlands to the border of Switzerland between the allied zones and unoccupied Germany. This region was known by all as the "Neutral Zone." Germany was allowed to keep civilian police in the towns of the Neutral Zone. However, the Germans were not allowed to make any infrastructure changes or improvements. This meant they were not allowed to fix roads, upgrade railroad tracks, or run telephone lines without permission from the French army, the nominal overseers of the entire Neutral Zone.

For their part, the soldiers and Marines of the 2nd Division were kept in a constant state of vigilance and training: "Outpost positions and patrols were established, and a strict guard maintained."[3] Almost immediately after arrival in their designated sector, the Marines of the 4th Brigade conducted a series of training exercises to integrate some newly arrived replacements and also maintain their veterans' hard-won combat skills.

THE FORMATION OF THE RHINE RIVER PATROL

During this period, the Marines also drew a mission that was greatly to their liking: the Rhine River Patrol. Known officially as the "Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol, Third Army Water Transportation Service," the Marines were to work for the Inter-Allied Waterway Commission. The original agreement among the allied armies had called for the British and French to maintain the river patrol for all the occupied zones. Subsequently that agreement was rescinded, and the Americans were ordered to patrol a portion of the river—thus the new assignment.[4]

Estimates of the number of commercially operated German boats on the river at the time ranged over twelve thousand, including a number of sailing ships and barges. There were almost thirty-five thousand civilian sailors working on these boats. Some oceangoing cargo ships were able to navigate as far south as Remagen before the river became too shallow. Obviously so many people, operating vessels that could travel from Rotterdam in the north all the way through the allied occupied zones to Mannheim in the south, would require strict monitoring and military oversight. Also, with the blockade of Germany still in effect under the terms of the armistice, it was important to ensure no contraband cargo could slip by water through the occupation zones.

One of the clauses of the armistice forbade German policemen in the four occupied zones to carry weapons. However, an armed force would be required to meet the threats of river pirates, armed smugglers, and Bolsheviks using the river to transport weapons or infiltrate agents. It was for these reasons that the Third Army



Fig. 2
The USMC Rhine Patrol's section of the river; the gray star marks the patrol's Andernach headquarters and the white star is the Third Army headquarters.
(Map courtesy First Division Museum, Wheaton, IL. Overlay graphics by author.)

Fig. 3
Capt. Gaines Moseley and the crew of the Mosel.
(HRB Marine Corps University)

chose to patrol its part of the river with armed Marines, in confiscated German patrol boats and riverboats. Marines from the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion were assigned to man the boats and their deck cannon and machine guns. They were to regulate river traffic, perform courier and escort duty, and arrest smugglers on the thirty-mile stretch of river from Rolandseck in the north down to the Horchheim Railway Bridge, just south of Coblenz. The French Rhine River patrol was responsible for the section of river from the Horchheim Bridge down to the southernmost part of France's sector near Mainz. The section of river from the railway bridge to Bingen was nominally under the command of the American forces although the French ships patrolled it. Therefore, close coordination with the French was required, and French patrol boats were a common sight in Coblenz.

The American Rhine River Patrol consisted of fourteen boats and an ad hoc staff of eight officers and 190 enlisted Marines. From 18 December 1918 to 1 March 1919, the River Patrol was commanded by Capt. Robert H. Shiel. He was succeeded by 1st Lt. (later captain) Lloyd A. Houchin, who led the detachment until 8 July 1919. Perhaps the most remarkable member of the patrol was a sixteen-year-old American boy named Joseph Frengar. Originally from Lincoln, Nebraska, Joe had been trapped in Germany at the outbreak of the war while visiting relatives. He spent the war in Germany until, eventually, he encountered the American army near Trier as it marched into the German Rhineland in 1918. At first a mascot of a military police unit, he ended up in Coblenz after the "MPs" returned to the States. The Red Cross representative in Coblenz introduced him to the executive officer

Fig. 4
The SS Preussen*, flagship of the patrol and commanded by 1st Lt. William L. Harding Jr. (Private collection)*

of the River Patrol, First Lieutenant Houchin, who added him to the crew of the SS *Rheingold*.[5]

THE SHIPS AND LAND STATIONS OF THE RHINE RIVER PATROL

The actual makeup of the force changed frequently as Marines were detailed either to the patrol or away from it on other duties. However, the vessels remained fairly constant. Table 1 lists the vessels, land stations, and their commanding officers.

Table 1

SS *Mosel*	Capt. Gaines Moseley
SS *Preussen*	1st Lt. William L. Harding Jr.
SS *Mainz*	1st Lt. Harold W. Whitney
SS *Borussia*	2nd Lt. Guy D. Atmore
SS *Elsa*	[multiple commanders]
SS *Rheingold*	2nd Lt. Morris C. Richardson
SS *Albertus Magnus*	2nd Lt. George R. Rowan
SS *Frauenlob*	2nd Lt. James E. Stanners
Stadt Düsseldorf Station	2nd Lt. Elmer L. Sutherland
Andernach Station	2nd Lt. Louis Cukela (18 December 1918–22 March 1919) 2nd Lt. John T. Thornton
Remagen Station	2nd Lt. Vernon Bourdette

Source: Edwin N. McClellan, "Fourth Brigade of the Marines," *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1919), p. 363.

The largest of the boats was the *Preussen,* formerly the official vessel of the Rhineland *Überpräsident,* a high-ranking and influential German official equivalent to the governor of a large American state. The *Preussen* was used by Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman (Commanding General, Third Army) on his inspection tours of the bridgehead.[6] The *Preussen* had a working crew of twenty-nine Marines and six Germans and was heavily armed, with two 37 mm cannon and six machine guns. In addition, the *Preussen* was noted for its "graceful lines and elaborately laid out and beautifully paneled saloon, cabins and dining room." Among the first things the Marine crew did, after cleaning its "filthy" spaces, was to repaint it "battleship gray."

The *Mosel* was the second-largest of the vessels and was the first of the River Patrol boats to fly the American flag on the Rhine. It too was armed with machine guns and could "carry a sufficiently strong body of men to cope with any disturbances ashore." It was also used as a supply boat for carrying provisions for the patrol stations and troops stationed along the river. The *Mainz* was used primarily by the members of the Inter-Allied Waterway Commission in the performance of their duties regulating commercial river traffic. Five other boats—*Borussia, Elsa, Rheingold, Albertus Magnus,* and *Frauenlob*—were river-cruise boats and were still used as such at times to provide outings for Third Army soldiers and Marines. There was a large houseboat, the *Stadt Düsseldorf,* usually stationed at Andernach, which served as the brig or guardhouse for lawbreakers brought in by the patrol. Andernach Station was also the headquarters of the Marine River Patrol. The patrol shared a building with the U.S. 3rd Division's post office a short distance from the river. At the time Andernach had one of the best-equipped river port complexes on the Rhine River with a series of warehouses and five cranes for loading and unloading cargo.

In addition to the nine vessels mentioned above, there were five or six much smaller vessels known simply by their hull numbers. Two of them had steam engines (including *Boat 2*); others were gasoline driven *(Boats 5, 6, 10)*. Using these smaller craft the Marines of the patrol were able to monitor most aspects of river traffic and to make, in January 1919, their most controversial arrest.

It all started simply enough: two German citizens, Mathias Scheid and Jacob Ring, attempted to smuggle by boat from Oppenheim into Coblenz some seven hundred cases of cognac worth a million marks. The two men hid their illegal cargo under what appeared to be a full shipment of rocks and gravel. Unfortunately for the two, the Marines regulating traffic on the river that day grew suspicious. Very quickly they removed the layer of camouflage and found the cognac, a form of alcohol expressly forbidden in the U.S. zone because of its high alcoholic content. The two were arrested but pleaded "not guilty" to a number of smuggling and fraudulent-documentation charges. Following four days of hearings, they were

found guilty and sentenced to hard labor for a year and a fine of 250,000 marks. The punishment was later reduced by Major General Dickman to six months of hard labor and a 100,000-mark fine.

Their trial was a major event; it even received coverage in the *Stars and Stripes,* published in Paris. Scheid and Ring were two of the wealthiest citizens in the bridgehead area, and the Americans intended their arrest and trial to show that the law was being applied equally to rich and poor. From the German perspective, however, it was an example of the harshness of American justice. As one German wrote, "The American is very fond of large fines. I saw copies of the *'Coblenzer Zeitung'* in which the lists of fines covered columns. No fines were less than 100 marks and many of them mounted into the thousands. Two respectable merchants were given two years imprisonment and 200,000 marks fine for smuggling cognac and this sentence was 'mercifully' commuted to six months imprisonment and 100,000 marks fine."[7] Obviously, the nationality of the observer influenced the spin put on the story. For his part, the commander of the Third Army had decreed that no cognac would be sold in his zone, and the two smugglers would have six months in jail to let that message sink in.

Another notable event took place in February when all the vessels of the patrol were assembled for the first time for a review by the Third Army commander. Joining Major General Dickman on the Andernach reviewing stand was Franklin



Fig. 5
The Mosel *passes in review for Major General Dickman and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Assistant Secretary of the Navy).*
(HRB Marine Corps University)

Delano Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. To maximize the impression made by the review, all the craft were filled with doughboys in Coblenz on "R&R," providing them with a Rhine cruise and a chance to see their commanding general at the same time. Adding to the excitement, a squadron of aircraft from the nearby Weissenthurm airfield performed aerial maneuvers over the flotilla, including two German Taubes flown by American pilots. It was for many of the Marines and doughboys their first view of enemy aircraft since the Meuse-Argonne campaign.[8]

The Marines of the River Patrol spent a great deal of time outdoors in the continually inclement Rhineland weather securing the Rhine and the Neutral Zone. However, they, like all members of the Marine Brigade, considered service in the occupation good duty. One Marine of the 4th Brigade said this in a letter home about his living conditions: "We, four of us, have a good billet now. The [German] people here are very good to us. . . . The old man here has a fine collection of [animal] horns. In our room there are 15 pairs and in the front parlor there are about 20 or more all sizes, also [stuffed] hawks, ducks, cranes, woodpeckers and a fawn."[9] As the German army completed its demobilization on the other side of the Neutral Zone much of the early tension had dissipated, and German-American relations in the U.S. zone were generally congenial. This proved to be only a short reprieve, however. Soon the 2nd Division and the rest of the Third Army would find itself seriously preparing for war.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE END OF THE MARINE RIVER PATROL

The underlying cause of the potential for renewed hostilities was the unwillingness of the German government to sign the Treaty of Versailles. The problem was quite simple: many of its officials considered the surrender documents and the peace treaty negotiated at Versailles to amount to a second capitulation to the allies. Fearing for their reputations and even—in an increasingly angry and violent postwar Germany—their lives, they were understandably hesitant to sign. They hoped to delay matters and soften the terms through long-drawn-out negotiations. Unfortunately for them, the allies were not having any of that. Maréchal Ferdinand Foch, the supreme allied military commander, began issuing orders to the French, Belgian, British, and U.S. armies to plan for offensive movement out of their occupation zones. The tension intensified when the German navy scuttled its High Seas Fleet, which had been interned at the British naval base at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. All the allied occupation units went on wartime footing, and units of the Marine Brigade moved to jump-off points at the edge of the Neutral Zone in the villages of Horhausen, Herschbach, and Hartenfels in preparation for a 23 June renewal of the war. The boats of the patrol continued their daily rounds but expected to be called on to ferry allied troops over the river in support of a new offensive farther into Germany. Recognizing the hopelessness of its position, a newly

formed German cabinet agreed early on the 23rd to sign the treaty, and a continuation of the war was averted with just nine hours to spare.

In spite of this potential for renewed war, the combat divisions of the Third Army had been redeploying to the United States since April. By early July, only the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions remained. The Third Army became "The American Forces in Germany," and a new commander, Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen, took over. The 4th Division departed the U.S. zone on 12 July, and the 2nd Division began to leave a short while later, on the 21st. With the departure of the Marines, the majority of Rhine River Patrol duties were taken over by the remaining French and British patrol craft. The signing of the Treaty of Versailles abolished many of the cargo restrictions, and so the constant need to monitor all river traffic lessened.

So, then: What are we to think of the Marine Rhine River Patrol? It was a truly remarkable opportunity for the Marines to showcase finally their nautical skills in what had been primarily a landlocked theater of operations. The Marines made the most of that opportunity and performed their duties with skill and tenacity—certainly hallmarks of a professional organization.



Fig. 6
Military humor: before leaving the German Rhineland a soldier or Marine leaves his mark on a castle wall. (Private collection)

NOTES

What became of the vessels of the Rhine River Patrol remains something of a mystery. Some (the *Borussia, Rheingold, Elsa, Albertus Magnus,* and *Frauenlob*) returned to service as Rhine River cruise boats and continued to entertain (as they had in the commanding general's review) the doughboys who came to the Coblenz area on R&R. Some lasted on the river until World War II, when they were sunk by the Allies. Undoubtedly the smaller boats were turned back over to the German waterway authorities, but to date no record has been found of the final dispositions of the *Preussen, Mosel,* or *Mainz*. It is, however, ironic that the patrol boats used by the British and French river patrols had been manufactured in the United States and Canada, while the U.S. River Patrol performed its duties in German-made craft.

1 George G. Strott [Lt., USN], *The Medical Department of the United States Navy with the Army and Marine Corps in France in World War I: Its Functions and Employment* (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1947).

2 See Alexander F. Barnes, *In a Strange Land: The American Occupation of Germany, 1918–1923* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2011), pp. 70–74.

3 "Report of the Secretary of the Navy," in *Miscellaneous Reports 1919* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1920), p. 119.

4 U.S. Army Dept., *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces Germany* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1943), p. 52.

5 "River Patrol Has American Lad as Official Mascot," *AMAROC News,* 8 June 1919.

6 "Marines Afloat Once More, Man Fleet on Rhine," *Stars and Stripes,* 31 January 1919.

7 *Stars and Stripes,* 23 May 1919; *New York Times,* 3 March 1919.

8 "Rhine Squadron, Soldier Laden, Passes before Third Army Chief," *Stars and Stripes,* 14 February 1919.

9 Pvt. Clinton Vann Peck, 77th Company, 6th Marines, 2nd Division, to his father, William H. Peck, Constantia, NY, 3 July 1919.

VIII *German U-boat Operations in the Central Atlantic during World War I*

AUGUSTO SALGADO AND JORGE RUSSO

During World War I, imperial German submarines operated mainly in the North Sea, around the British Isles, and in the Mediterranean Sea with a high degree of success. Unknown to many, they also operated out in the Central Atlantic around the Portuguese Atlantic islands of Cape Verde, Madeira, and the Azores. Some of these U-boats even went all the way to the east coast of North America. The Imperial German Navy was able to conduct these long-range operations without additional logistics facilities, although there were suspicions that neutral countries, such as Spain, were assisting it.

These submarine operations in the Atlantic are being studied by the Portuguese Navy Research Centre (CINAV), in a project related to an incident in April 1917 in which the *U-35* sank four vessels off Cape Sagres, Algarve, well inside Portuguese territorial waters. Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière was the submarine's captain, and the tonnage he sank is still unsurpassed.

To give a sense of how the war at sea was fought in the vast Central Atlantic area and of the role the Portuguese navy played in it is the aim of this paper.

THE GERMAN SUBMARINE THREAT

During the first ten years of the twentieth century, the ultraconservative German Naval Staff steadily increased the amount of money invested in the submarine arm. The real value of this new weapon became obvious to the German navy only when the few U-boats present in a 1914 German naval exercise "sank" most of their "opponents." German submarines were far ahead of the submarines of other nations. That superiority was achieved by virtue of, first, their blast-injection engines, made by Krupp-Mannesmann, which were more reliable, produced less smoke, and gave German submarines greater endurance than those of other navies; second, their larger-caliber torpedoes (500 mm, compared to the British 457 mm); and third, their Telefunken radios, with ranges of 140 miles, against the forty miles of the British equipment.[1]

The British had more submarines, but the Admiralty saw them as only "defensive" weapons; even Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, considered

that submarines would not be effective when used in accordance with international laws, particularly those relating to "prize warfare" or "prize regulation."[2] For him, submarines would never be used against merchant ships, because no civilized nation would violate those laws. On the German side, everything changed early in the war, and the German submarines soon started to be regarded as "offensive" weapons. The change occurred less than one month after the war started, when on 3 September 1914 the *U-21* sank the first British warship, the cruiser HMS *Pathfinder*.[3]

As is well known, when the British naval blockade stopped virtually all sea trade with Germany and destroyed all German surface forces outside the North Sea, the U-boats became the only weapon that could be used against allied trade routes.[4]

In August 1914, although Germany was fully aware of the importance of the Central Atlantic—especially the area of the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, and Madeira Islands—its submarines had enough range to conduct operations only around the British Isles.[5] As the war progressed and as U-boat performance was improved, German submarines began to operate to the west, all the way to the U.S. East Coast, and south to the then-Portuguese Cape Verde Islands.

However, the first German submarine to pass down the Atlantic coast of the Iberian Peninsula did so in 1915, on its way to the Mediterranean. Such voyages were very near the limit of a U-boat's operational range. This was the main reason why the allied nations always suspected that neutral nations were giving the German U-boats some kind of logistical support. Spain was the main "suspect," as there were strong pro-German feelings in that country. In southern Spain the principal ports used by U-boats were Cádiz and Huelva, and in the north, Vigo.[6] Portuguese ships were also suspected of helping the German cause, especially before 1916.[7]

The first U-boat to make the trip between the North Sea and the Mediterranean was the now-veteran *U-21,* which departed from Germany on 25 April 1915 and arrived at Cattaro (in modern Montenegro) eighteen days later. The *U-21* had an uneventful voyage, traveling on the surface for four days, between Finisterre and Gibraltar, although keeping out of the usual shipping lanes. It passed through the Strait of Gibraltar without detecting any allied surface patrol.[8] However, to guarantee that the *U-21* had enough fuel to complete the transit it had been resupplied in the north of Spain, near Cape Finisterre, by the Hamburg-Amerika steamer *Marzala,* both ships having entered the Corcubión Estuary—well inside Spanish territorial waters.[9]

THE PORTUGUESE NAVY

Although Portugal entered the war officially only in March 1916, seizing seventy-two German and Austro-Hungarian merchant ships that had taken refuge in its harbors, Portuguese troops had already fired at German opponents.[10] The first Portuguese casualty to a German bullet had been suffered almost two years before,

in Mozambique—a navy chief petty officer stationed in a frontier garrison.[11] The reasons why Portugal entered World War I are complex and both internal and external.[12] Internally, the Portuguese government wanted to unite the population to the republican cause, as against the monarchists.[13] Externally, it wanted to make Portugal heard again in the international forum.[14]

At sea, until March 1916 German U-boats had sunk only two Portuguese commercial vessels, but those "warnings" were not enough to cause war preparations to be implemented. Therefore, when war started the small Portuguese navy was heavily dependent on support promised by the British government.[15] Just days after Portugal entered the war, England sent a naval mission to help establish modern maritime defenses of major Portuguese ports, mainly Lisbon and Leixões (north of Oporto).[16]

New measures were needed to face the "new" threats—mines and submarines—as the Portuguese navy only had four small "cruisers" (only one could really be called that), one oceangoing gunboat, three destroyers, three torpedo boats, a brand-new submarine built in Italy, and several small colonial gunboats.[17] Therefore Portugal, as many other nations had already done, implemented such emergency measures as requisitioning civilian vessels, including fishing trawlers to be used for both patrol and minesweeping.[18]

Britain could not, or would not, send all the aid Portugal wanted or needed, so France stepped in. France, more than England, needed to keep open the inshore waters between the French Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. France also wanted to increase its political and economic influence over Portugal. This is why during the war French naval equipment, ships, and even airplanes were sent or allocated to several places along the Portuguese coast. France established a small antisubmarine patrol boat squadron in Leixões and an aviation center in Aveiro, to the south. As late in 1917 antisubmarine warfare moved to a new air "dimension," France helped Portugal create the first Portuguese naval aviation center, in Lisbon.[19]

On its south coast, in spite of its geographic importance, Portugal had stationed only some light vessels. To increase the protection of the area, Portugal authorized both the British and French navies to use whatever facilities they needed in the Algarve (from Cape Saint Vincent to a point about fifty miles eastward). The Royal Navy usually, at least from the second half of 1917, stationed there, in Sagres, one auxiliary cruiser and two torpedo boats, and the French, two submarines.[20]

Meanwhile, for the protection of commercial ships in the wide Atlantic area from Portugal's mainland to the Azores and Cape Verde there were only reduced naval forces, both small in size and lacking in adequate antisubmarine resources. Nevertheless, the Portuguese navy implemented zigzag plans and darken-ship procedures when escorting Portuguese commercial ships. Such escorts could be provided, however, only for major merchant ships and then more for morale than true

protection. Several of those escorts reported detecting and "prosecuting" possible German submarines, but the only loss for either side was the patrol boat *Augusto de Castilho,* sunk by the *U-139* in October 1918 while on an escort run from Funchal to the Azores.[21]

As for personnel, the Portuguese navy started the war without adequate numbers to fulfill all its needs even as they were then. Numbers of new cadets entering the Naval Academy had been sharply declining since the mid-nineteenth century and only began to rise after 1914, not in time to fill the navy's immediate needs. The Portuguese navy had to rely on civilian volunteers with naval backgrounds. With these personnel and calling up others in the reserves, the navy was able to increase its numbers by more than 750 men.[22]

GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITY IN THE PORTUGUESE AREA

With German submarines highly active and effective around the British Isles, England could not spare escorts to operate far from its coasts. Therefore, in June 1915 England asked Portugal to increase the antisubmarine surveillance on its coast, even though Portugal was not yet in the war. The Portuguese navy's task would be to intercept the "possible" supply boats that the British Admiralty suspected to be coming from either Spain or Portugal. Without clear instructions, especially regarding what the Portuguese ships would do in case of finding a German submarine, and having no antisubmarine armament, Portugal refused to aid England.[23]

German submarines started transiting to the Mediterranean from the middle of 1915, and the first ship sunk by submarine near Portuguese waters was lost in September that year almost a hundred miles southwest of Cape Finisterre. It was the British steamer SS *John Hardie*.[24] As soon as Portugal entered the war, the 3,580-ton Norwegian steamer *Terje Viken* was sunk in the entrance of the Tagus River by mines laid by the *U-73*.[25] During the war German submarines laid sixty mines in Portuguese waters, the great majority around the Lisbon approaches. One of these mines was responsible for the first Portuguese navy ship to be lost in the war. She was the converted minesweeper *Roberto Ivens,* sunk on 26 July 1917, twelve nautical miles south of Cascais. The sinking left fifteen dead out of a crew of twenty-two, including the commanding officer.[26]

In view of the lack of defense forces in the major Portuguese ports, apart from Lisbon and Leixões, and of the increasing distance from U-boat bases at which attacks occurred, it was inevitable that German submarines would strike there, sooner or later. The first to be attacked was Funchal, on Madeira Island, on 3 December 1916. The *U-38* sank three ships, including a cable repair ship, and also fired some shots into the city with its deck gun. The few old guns placed ashore to protect the harbor were no match for the submarine's heavier (10.5 cm) gun. Almost a year later the *U-156* attacked the harbor and the city again but without major effect, as the port was empty of big ships.[27]

The first and only direct attack against the Azores occurred on 4 July 1917, when the *U-155* presented itself in front of Ponta Delgada and opened fire against the city. More precisely, the target was an area where the United States was going to establish a coaling station. The old, short-range Portuguese shore batteries were not able to prevent the attack. Fortunately for the city, the collier USS *Orion* was in port, unloading coal for the future base. It was the 100 mm gun of the American vessel that stopped the submarine attack.[28] This attack proved that the Azores needed better defenses, and as England was unable to provide any antisubmarine ships to the area, the United States decided to send, in October 1917, four submarines of the K class (*K-1, K-2, K-5,* and *K-6*) and a submarine tender, USS *Bushnell*.[29] The presence of these American submarines did not stop the U-boat activity around the islands, but there were no more attacks.[30]

As for the Cape Verde Islands, the Royal Navy withdrew its surface forces there—Cruiser Squadrons D and I—in 1917, as it had done in Funchal right after Portugal entered the war. The British forces moved to Sierra Leone, where they stayed until the end of the war.[31] During most of 1917, German submarines patrolled the waters around the islands. Their most effective attack occurred on 2 November 1917, when the *U-151* sank two Brazilian merchant ships, just a few days after Brazil had entered the war on the allied side.[32]

Studies have indicated that the German submarines operating in the wide area between the Portuguese mainland, the Madeira Islands, and the Azores were mainly of the *U-151* type, the largest of World War I, originally designed as cargo carriers. These boats usually attacked with their heavy artillery firepower—two 15 cm and two 88 cm deck guns. Several survivors reported that the submarines had opened their attacks from a range of several miles, possibly in case their target was one of the deadly British Q-ships. This procedure was not their most effective option, and it allowed several of the more daring merchant ships to escape, but avoided unnecessary risks, such as of being repelled by the target's own guns, as occurred in the cases of the British steamers SS *Coblenz* in July and SS *Ryde* in September 1917.[33]

THE *U-35* OFF THE ALGARVE

After the end of 1916, but especially after February 1917, when unrestricted submarine warfare was declared by Germany, U-boats were quite active along the Portuguese mainland coasts, as they were in all other war theaters. The allies tried to increase their patrol forces along the Portuguese coast, but they were not very effective.[34] An action involving the German submarine *U-35,* under the command of "ace of aces" Lt. Cdr. Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière, off Sagres in the Algarve is a good example.

Although some of its batteries could not be completely charged, the *U-35* sailed from Cattaro on 31 March 1917, returning only on 6 May after thirty-six days at sea. During this long trip, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière sank twenty-three ships

and evaded a torpedo attack by an unknown allied submarine.[35] This study is concerned with the last part of the mission, mainly on the events of 24–25 April, when the *U-35* sank several merchant ships around Cape Sagres.

At first light on the 24th the *U-35* was close inshore to Cape Sagres when she encountered two neutral steamers, halted them, and inspected their documentation. The first, at 0850, was the Danish steamer SS *Nordsöen,* 1,055 tons, traveling between Bergen and Genoa with a cargo of herring.[36] At 0915 it was the turn of the Norwegian 1,667-ton steamer SS *Torvore,* en route from Swansea to Naples with a cargo of locomotive coal. As both ships were under British charter, both were sunk. As usual, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière used his 10.5 cm deck gun (a quite different procedure from that of U-boats in the North Sea) to halt the ships and explosive charges to sink them.[37] The charges placed on the SS *Torvore* sank the ship immediately, but the SS *Nordsöen* stayed on the surface.

While the *U-35* was sinking these steamers, she was attacked by what Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière first thought was an armed Portuguese fishing vessel. It was in fact a small tug, *Galgo,* pressed into service by the Portuguese navy and under the command of a naval officer, Lt. Alberto Carlos dos Santos.[38] It was quite bold of Lieutenant Santos to attack the big submarine and its 10.5 cm gun with his single, tiny 37 mm gun-revolver (i.e., of the Gatling type). Neither ship was hit during the exchange of fire that followed, and Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière, with his boat's superior speed, managed to keep the *U-35* out of the *Galgo*'s range.

Apparently, the tug was the only military ship in the area. The night before, a British auxiliary cruiser and four torpedo boats had passed through on a southeasterly course but were now out of reach. Not being able to engage the *U-35, Galgo* spent the rest of the 24th and the 25th collecting the crews of the ships sunk by the German submarine.

After the exchange of fire with the Portuguese tug, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière halted three other steamers—the SS *La Castreja, Cataluña,* and *Triana,* all from neutral Spain. All were allowed to continue their voyages, as they proved not to be carrying "war contraband." The only casualties of these two days, one dead and one injured, were suffered by the *Triana* when a warning shot hit the ship by mistake.

At 1040, another neutral ship was halted, but as she was under British charter, she was sunk. This was the 3,715-ton Norwegian steamer SS *Vilhelm Krag,* in transit from Genoa to Barry in ballast. During this action the French armed merchant ship SS *Caravellas* passed by and exchanged shots with the submarine but managed to escape unharmed. After giving up the pursuit of the French ship, the *U-35* halted another steamer, again a Spanish ship, the SS *Elvira,* which was also allowed to proceed.

Meanwhile, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière found that the SS *Nordsöen* had foundered on the Portuguese coast. It developed that the explosives had not exploded and that the unmanned ship had drifted until striking the rocks on the coast. As the ship still could have been saved, the German captain sent a boarding party to place new explosive charges, and these finally destroyed her.

After this action another Spanish steamer, the SS *Italica,* was stopped, her papers checked, and allowed to proceed. Around 1610 an Italian sailing ship of 265 tons, the *Bieneimé Prof. Luigi,* was stopped about ten nautical miles southeast of Cape Sagres. She was an enemy ship, sailing between Genoa and Fowey, England, and was sunk immediately after being inspected. That left the *U-35* only twenty-four rounds of deck-gun ammunition and no more torpedoes. It was time to return home. The *U-35* passed Gibraltar eastbound on the evening of 25 April and arrived at Cattaro on 6 May after an uneventful voyage, sinking no more ships.

In this mission of thirty-six days, of which we have detailed only a small part, the *U-35* sailed 5,551 nautical miles, fired all nine of her torpedoes, shot 541 of her 10.5 cm shells, and used twenty-nine explosive charges. She inflicted on the allies the loss of twenty-three ships, a total of 67,989 tons: sixteen ships from enemy nations (twelve English and four Italian) plus seven from neutral countries (three Greek, two Norwegian, one American, and one Danish). Although Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière acted mainly in a very "civilized" way, forty-four members of the merchant ships' crews died. All twenty-three vessels sunk are to be found in *Lloyd's War Losses*.[39]

As far as is known, this cruise marked the closest a German submarine or members of her crew got to the Portuguese mainland during the war. The German sailors who destroyed the wrecked *Nordsöen,* indeed, had approached so close that the Majoria General da Armada later asked if there had not been any military garrisons or finance police nearby that could have shot at them.[40]

There are few references to the Portuguese navy in histories of World War I at sea. Also, as no major battles happened in the Central Atlantic, few lines are dedicated to naval events that happened there. Even the U-boat activity in the Central Atlantic was linked to events around the British Isles. But in fact the submarine problem there was both complex and strategically important. U-boats reached the area from both Germany and the Mediterranean, and others passed through it in transit to and from the "inner sea." Similarly, all major shipping either from or to the South Atlantic or the Mediterranean had to cross there.

In this vast area, without strong allied forces and there being only a small Portuguese navy to fight German submarines, the most present U-boat type was the *U-151*. But further study is needed. The *U-35*'s cruise is less important as a military action than as a concrete example of how fragile the defense of the Portuguese coast

was, how aggressively—and yet rather chivalrously, in comparison to the North Sea—German submarines operated in those waters, and how global World War I truly was.

NOTES

1 Edwyn A. Gray, *The Killing Time: The German U-boats, 1914–1918* (London: Pan Books, 1972), pp. 17–21.

2 "Prize regulation" established rules for military vessels' operations against merchant ships in a time of war. It established safeguards for the crews and declared that merchant ships could be sunk only when they could not be apprehended or if carrying "war contraband."

3 Gray, *Killing Time,* p. 30.

4 Ibid., pp. 40–43.

5 In the years before the outbreak of World War I, Germany tried to establish a naval base in the Central Atlantic, first in Morocco and afterward at Madeira. On both occasions the Germans failed, because England, though not interested in using either of those places, did all it could to prevent them from being used by any other country.

António José Telo, *Os Açores e o controlo do Atlântico* (Lisbon: Edições ASA, 1993), pp. 88–95.

6 J. C. Inso, *A Marinha Portuguesa na Grande Guerra* (Lisbon: Edições Culturais da Marinha, 2006), p. 56. This issue was often mentioned in documents and newspapers of the war years, but it has been very difficult to find hard evidence, as the following authors mention: Lino J. Pazos, *Submarinos al acecho: Guerra submarina en Finisterre* (Pontevedra, Sp.: Damaré Ediciónes, 2008), and José Antonio Tojo Ramallo and Sergio Tojo González, *Cazadores de Barcos: Historia de los submarinos alemanes en las costas de Galicia durante la Primera Guerra Mundial* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2008).

7 Sérgio Alberto Fontes Rezendes, "A Grande Guerra nos Açores: Memória histórica e património militar" (master's thesis, Universidade dos Açores, Ponta Delgada, 2009), p. 104.

8 Lowell Thomas, *Raiders of the Deep* (Penzance, U.K.: Periscope, 2002), p. 59.

9 Gray, *Killing Time,* pp. 95–97.

10 Decrees 2236 of 24 February; 2240 of 25 February; 2243 of 1 March; 2251 of 3 March; 2257, 2258, 2259, and 2260 of 6 March; 2332 of 14 April; 2358 of 29 April; and 2496 of n.d. [July]; all 1916.

11 Bessa Pacheco, "A marinha na I Guerra Mundial," *Anais do Clube Militar Naval* 144 (July–December 2014), pp. 457–58.

12 On why Portugal entered World War I, see Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Portugal e a Grande Guerra," in *Nova história militar,* ed. Nuno Severiano Teixeira (Rio de Mouro, Port.: Círculo de Leitores, 2004), vol. 4, pp. 14–34.

13 Since 1908 Portugal had been in a "semipermanent" state of civil war that led first to the end of the monarchy and then to several changes of political direction.

14 António José Telo, "Erros e ilusões sobre a beligerância portuguesa," in *A Grande Guerra: Um século depois—Colóquio da Academia Militar,* ed. António José Telo (Porto, Port.: Fronteira do Caos, 2015), pp. 229–63. Portugal had been a republic only since 1910, and in all Europe there were only two others, France and Switzerland.

15 Telo, *Açores e o controlo do Atlântico,* p. 96.

16 For the Royal Navy mission, see Augusto Salgado, "British Naval Aid to Portugal during the First World War," *Mariner's Mirror* 102, no. 2 (2016), pp. 191–202.

17 David A. Silva, "A marinha e a 'Paz Armada': Planos navais 1897–1916," *Anais do Clube Militar Naval* 144 (July–December 2014), pp. 397–98. Soon it was clear to all that the Portuguese navy needed more units, but after two years of war no vessels were available. Portugal was able to purchase only three more submarines, which were already being built in Italy. António José Telo, "Estratégia naval portuguesa (1916–1918)," in *Portugal e a Grande Guerra,* ed. Aniceto Afonso and Carlos de Matos Gomes (Vila do Conde, Port.: Verso da História, 2013), pp. 250–51.

18 Admiral de Sallis's report from 12 May 1916, ADM 137-1203, The National Archives, Kew, U.K. [hereafter TNA].

19 António José Telo, *Homens, doutrinas e organização, 1824–1974, Book I* (Lisbon: Academia de Marinha, 1999), pp. 250–53.

20 Inso, *Marinha Portuguesa,* pp. 62–63.

21 Several examples are in José Agostinho de Sousa Mendes, *Setenta e cinco anos no mar (1910–1985),* vol. 12, *Draga-minas, caça-minas e lança-minas* (Lisbon: Comissão Cultural de Marinha, 2002).

22 Salgado, "British Naval Aid to Portugal during the First World War."

23 Inso, *Marinha Portuguesa,* p. 16.

24 "Ships Hit during WWI: *John Hardie,*" Uboat.net, https://www.uboat.net/wwi/ships_hit/3177.html.

25 Inso, *Marinha Portuguesa,* p. 48.

26 See Augusto Alves Salgado and Jorge Russo, "Submarinos alemães na costa portuguesa. O caso do *U-35*," in Telo, *A Grande Guerra,* p. 181.

27 Inso, *Marinha Portuguesa,* pp. 71–72.

28 Telo, *Homens, doutrinas e organização, 1824–1974,* pp. 113–15.

29 ADM 137-614, p. 991, TNA.

30 Telo, *Homens, doutrinas e organizaçã,* pp. 163–64; ADM 137-615, p. 626, TNA.

31 Note from 29 January 1917, ADM 137-1204, TNA.

32 Marcelo Monteiro, *U-93* (Porto Alegre, Braz.: BesouroBox, 2014).

33 ADM 137-1394, pp. 25ff, 92–93, TNA.

34 Note nº 1974, 18 September 1917, box 1394, fol. 21/59, Portuguese Navy Archive, Lisbon [hereafter PNA].

35 This is not the attack by the French submarine *Faraday* on 6 November 1917 in which torpedoes were fired against the *U-35* and all missed. Thomas, *Raiders of the Deep,* pp. 154–58.

36 This information, from Lloyd's records, does not match the German documentation.

37 Depending on the sources and date, the *U-35* had either one or two 10.5 cm deck guns, with 550 rounds for both in total.

38 The *Galgo* was a small tug, 25.59 meters long and displacing 82.99 tons, built in 1857 by Ross & Duncan of Glasgow. "Tug *Galgo,* History and Characteristics 1916/1919," box 264, 5-XII-8-2, PNA.

39 See Salgado and Russo, "Submarinos alemães na costa portuguesa," pp. 186–90.

40 Book 2, note 147, box 320, 6-IV-6-2, PNA.

IX *Supporting the Trident*
U.S. Naval Bases, 1898–1916

SEAN D. GETWAY

At the turn of the twentieth century the battleship was the predominant warship type and as such the primary constituent of naval power. These vessels caught the attention of the public and were the measure of the relative strengths of navies. In the United States, the fascination with battleships resulted in their being built in disproportionately large numbers at the expense of smaller warships and support facilities. After the Spanish-American War the United States authorized a minimum of one battleship per year. Along with increasing the sizes and numbers of ships and recruiting greater numbers of seamen the Navy expanded and modernized its shore establishments. Naval bases provided mooring and dry dock facilities, along with repair shops and supply warehouses to keep the new fleet active and adequately repaired. However, in later years and through the early twentieth century, while construction of new battleships continued in varying annual numbers, no corresponding increase in naval facilities was funded. Without an increase in number and size of facilities ashore the new ships the United States built would soon have been incapable of sailing; as the ships grew, longer piers and deeper harbors were necessary to moor them safely.

Funding and support for bases were always affected by political considerations, and an understanding of the interaction between politics and military requests can be achieved through the examination of base growth and funding proportions. Numerous factions inside Congress, from heartland senators to coastal congressmen, weighed in and competed for limited funding. These deliberations concerned the proper degree of support needed for the Navy, the distribution of naval bases, and the cost of moving or closing bases and opening new ones so as to move naval spending into new political regions. Changes in congressional leaders, executive personnel, and admirals and shifts in the political environment fostered uncertainty for long-term funding. Overseas bases lacked political support; the concept of large navy yards abroad threatened congressmen from coastal states with the diversion of resources—that is, overseas bases would take work and federal money away from their domestic programs.[1] Pearl Harbor was the only overseas base that had begun to be built to the level of a navy yard by 1916.

The Navy enjoyed moderately steady support during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency. Support decreased under William Taft's administration, as politics shifted the focus to dollar diplomacy and the remaining naval funding to more battleships. Naval base infrastructure received new attention but no increase in funding during Woodrow Wilson's first term.[2] Total naval expenditures remained a steady 15–20 percent of total federal spending. The Army made up another 20 to 25 percent of federal expenditures. The Spanish-American War expenses caused a spike in the relative shares of total expenditures. In the years that followed, several patterns emerged from the funding breakdowns. The percentage of the naval budget spent on base public works dropped from a peak of 9 percent in 1901 to 3 percent in 1908, remained fairly steady until 1910, rose briefly in 1911, and then sharply declined to 1 percent in 1916. As for the maintenance of both the bases and ships, funding accounted for a fairly constant percentage of naval spending, close to 1 and 7 percent, respectively.

During the same period, however, the percentages of naval expenditures that went to ship construction and pay increased dramatically. Pay increased on a consistent line from 13 percent in 1898 to 26 percent in 1916. Ship construction grew as well but not so consistently: it peaked at 40 percent in 1904, decreased to 15 percent in 1913, and rose again in the next three years to 30 percent with the major building program approved in 1916. Facilities did not keep pace, and overseas support lagged the most. In the end the United States built a large battle fleet but not an operationally deployable navy, one that could be used in operational areas distant from naval bases.

The Spanish-American War stretched the existing U.S. base infrastructure to its absolute limit, and numerous problems were aired after the peace settlement during debates over naval base expansion. First, and in reaction to the broad geographical dispersion of naval action during the Spanish-American War, the Navy now called for an expansion of base infrastructure along the Gulf Coast and the creation of bases and repair facilities across the Pacific Ocean. The preparations in Hong Kong that Adm. George Dewey had found necessary before sailing for Manila demonstrated the lack of American naval support in the Pacific.[3] Second, action in the Caribbean proved that the facilities of the Southeast were inadequate to support a battle fleet, even in waters that the United States viewed as its own. Finally, the voyage of the battleship USS *Oregon* from the West Coast around Cape Horn served as a prime example of the strategic necessity of building a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. These three lessons spurred the creation of overseas bases.

In these years Congress appropriated funds for the creation of several naval stations in the Caribbean and the Pacific to meet the demands of increased naval presence abroad. Overseas naval stations enabled the American fleet to patrol and visit distant locations without relying on foreign support. In time of war or increased

tension, these new stations, when properly set up, would allow repairs and outfitting closer to possible areas of operation. The first wave of these overseas stations encompassed San Juan, Puerto Rico; Guam; and Cavite, in the Philippine Islands—these were initiated immediately after the conclusion of hostilities in 1898. Over the next couple of years, Hawaii was annexed, and funding was provided for a naval installation at Pearl Harbor. Another base was established at Tutuila, Samoa, in 1900. Installations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Olongapo, on Subic Bay in the Philippines, were established in 1901.[4] The new bases were on U.S. territory, which helped the Navy to start to make itself independent of foreign infrastructure and supply chains.

These overseas bases extended the U.S. Navy's global network for the support of the fleet's diverse needs in peace and war, from emergency battle repairs to provisions for goodwill missions. The initial funding for overseas bases in the four years following the Spanish-American War totaled $672,715, compared with the total public works spending of $19,072,006.[5] These newly established stations received just 3.5 percent of the improvement money spent on bases. Further limiting the expenditures for naval base expansion overseas was indecision by naval leaders about where to locate bases and lack of communication between the naval leaders and Congress. Without clear arguments for overseas spending, congressmen focused on their own constituencies, allowing the lion's share of the improvements to continue to go to existing navy yards.

A case in point was Portsmouth Navy Yard, located in Kittery, Maine, across the Piscataqua River from Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The improvement of Portsmouth demonstrated the importance of policies and politicians in naval funding. Eugene Hale of Maine, the chair of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, sought extra funding for New England. While there were two other major navy yards in the region, at New York and Boston, funding totaling $1,250,000 for a new dry dock at Portsmouth was approved in 1899. The new dry dock was large enough to fit the largest warship, but it was discovered after the dock's completion that the channel to it was too shallow. It cost another million dollars to rectify this defect.[6] Within the next three years the channel's depth again became an issue because of the draft of new battleships already on the drawing board.[7] The rationale for Portsmouth's expansion baffled even naval officers. In 1908, Connecticut congressman George L. Lilley of the House Naval Affairs Committee asked the chief of the Bureau of Yards, Rear Adm. Richard C. Hollyday, "What is the object of your spending any more money on the Navy Yard at Portsmouth?" To this Hollyday replied, "As long as we have a navy-yard there we have to spend money on it."[8] Hollyday's testimony exemplified the general mood in the Navy: existing facilities always required funding for maintenance and gainful employment of officers and men. Previous decisions on establishments' locations and purposes were rarely questioned by officers.

Yet already that was changing; the relative importance of each naval station was beginning to be challenged by and debated among politicians and naval officers. Congress became increasingly reluctant to fund these newly established naval stations.[9] The majority of public works funding continued to go instead to navy yards during the years immediately after the establishment of the overseas bases. In 1902, the new station on the island of Guam had received no funds for new construction and only saw funding for repairs and preservation of $12,258, after averaging $11,000 in the same category for the previous two as well. The small naval station at New London, Connecticut, was allocated $26,107 in improvements in addition to $2,494 in repair and preservation for 1902 alone.[10] In 1903, Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody sought increased funding for the overseas bases. He reminded Congress in the Navy Department's annual report that there was a large fleet in "Asiatic waters" that had "no naval base . . . nearer than Puget Sound or San Francisco Bay" and therefore depended on foreign-owned and -controlled facilities in Japan and Hong Kong that might not be available in crisis or hostilities.[11] In such a case, Moody warned, "without a sufficient naval base of our own in Asiatic waters, the position of our fleet there would be untenable."[12] Bases across the Pacific would enable the American fleet to be repaired quickly near a probable area of operation or to continue routine patrols around the globe.

Disagreement within the Navy, rivalry with the Army, and lack of political support caused further problems for Pacific expansion. The Philippines were viewed by the United States as its bastion in the Far East, and both services looked to expand to and protect them. While Cavite Naval Station, in Manila Bay, with its new floating dry dock USS *Dewey,* received the most funding of all the newly established bases initially after the war, it was deemed too small to become the large repair facility envisioned by the naval leaders.[13] The General Board of the Navy urged the Bureau of Yards and Docks and Congress to move Cavite's facilities to Olongapo. Leading the charge for the shift was Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, hero of the battle of Manila and president of the General Board. Dewey's support arose from the lessons of his victory at Manila: Cavite had proved to be poorly located and weakly defended. Manila Bay was too small, in Dewey's opinion, and the site at Cavite had too little land to support the large base proposed for the Philippines. Subic Bay offered a larger sheltered harbor, and there was enough land at Olongapo to support a large base. Dewey argued that if the Spanish fleet had taken shelter in Subic Bay he would not have been able to defeat it.[14]

The U.S. Army, however, played a role in determining the location of the naval base in the Philippines. Initially the Army left the decision to the Navy as solely a naval matter. In 1906, the Army changed its position in reaction to the Russian loss of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War and the questions it raised over defense of harbors.[15] After surveying the possible harbors and their surroundings the Army

pushed for Manila as the stronghold of the Philippines, finding Subic Bay too difficult to defend from a landward attack. It asked the Navy to shift the proposed main base to Cavite, which would fall within the defenses of Manila, thus allowing a consolidated fortification plan. The Navy vehemently disagreed, regarding Subic Bay as possessing compelling advantages as a naval base. The Joint Army and Navy Board, created in 1903, debated the defense of the Philippines and the location of the naval base for three years, from 1907 to 1910. Congress refused to fund significant improvements at either Cavite or Subic Bay until the Joint Board reached a decision.[16]

While the debate over the Philippines occupied the Army and Navy, the question of Hawaii awaited the outcome. The key issue about Hawaii was whether a significant base or small one would be constructed there. By 1903, allocations for the creation of a base at Pearl Harbor had appeared in the budget; however, its future size remained undetermined.[17] The General Board had by 1907 shifted its interest to Hawaii and saw Pearl Harbor as a great location for a large naval yard. Included in that year's budget proposal was a dry dock that would be the largest constructed by the Navy to date, along with all the requisite machine, steam, and manufacturing shops to outfit and repair the battle fleet. With the Philippine debate still unresolved, regarding both where a naval station would be and its level of repair capability, a base at Pearl Harbor had become in the board's eyes essential for fleet operations across the Pacific. Backed by the board's arguments, Roosevelt pushed Congress for the money.[18] In 1908, funding was duly allocated for the construction of a dry dock, an initial outlay of a million dollars with another $1,200,000 to follow the next year.[19] The advocacy for Pearl Harbor raised questions in Congress as to whether Olongapo or Pearl Harbor would become the main yard in the Pacific. These questions would not be answered until the Joint Board made its recommendations in 1910.[20] Pearl Harbor represented the first significant expenditure for base improvements outside the continental United States; finally, an overseas base had received funding equivalent to that given major navy yards in the United States.

An example of the interaction of politics and base expansion involved Port Royal and Charleston in South Carolina. Senator Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina sought to increase naval spending.[21] The existing naval station at Port Royal had been expanded shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War; following the war, extensive improvements had been made, including repair facilities, storage sheds, barracks, and finally a large wooden dry dock. Senator Tillman was the main actor in securing the funds for the dry dock, which he saw purely in terms of increasing the flow of federal money to South Carolina. As he stated bluntly, "I am trying to get a little for Port Royal because, if you are going to steal, I want my share."[22] The dock was completed in 1895, just in time to aid in the naval mobilization for the Spanish-American War.[23] At completion the dry dock was capable of

handling the largest battleships then in commission. However, it faced several issues, including the need for constant dredging of the channel to it.[24] In any case, this initial work at Port Royal in hand, Tillman's political wrangling shifted from Port Royal to creating a new base at Charleston.

Tillman sought a navy base in Charleston, although he had just pushed for expanding Port Royal, to strengthen and broaden his base of political support.[25] Naval leaders viewed Charleston as a better location and threw their support behind the creation of the new base there. In the closing years of Secretary of the Navy John D. Long's tenure, Tillman's proposal gained traction. A naval committee created in 1900 to assess for Congress the relative merits of Tillman's request reported in favor of Charleston, and a navy yard was established in 1901. Port Royal's funding that year saw over a 50 percent decrease.

As with other base-expansion proposals, political support for expansion was tenuous. Presidential administrations changed, and so did support for Charleston Navy Yard. In 1903, Secretary Moody argued in Congress that the Navy did not desire Charleston and had no business maintaining a base there.[26] But Moody moved on, becoming the attorney general in 1904, and was replaced for a year by Paul Morton and then by Charles Bonaparte. As a direct result of this discontinuity the South Carolina bases issue languished.[27] Funding for Port Royal dwindled to $23,000 in 1903, doubled to over $48,000 in 1904, and then shriveled to $5,000 in 1905. During the same years, Charleston saw an 800 percent increase, from $61,000 in 1903 to $494,000 in 1904, and its much higher level of funding continued thereafter. In 1915 the Port Royal facility became Parris Island Marine Corps Training Depot, after nearly a decade as an underfunded naval installation.[28] The decision between Charleston and Port Royal exemplified the political nature of base expansion during this period.[29]

In 1909 William Taft was sworn in as president and appointed George von Lengerke Meyer as the new Secretary of the Navy.[30] Indecision and lack of resolution over naval base expansion carried over from Roosevelt's presidency. Taft in his inaugural address acknowledged a requirement for "a suitable Army and a suitable Navy" and stated that he would address any situation "growing out of the Open Door [the U.S. policy on trade with China] and other issues."[31] During his presidency, however, Taft never specified what constituted a "suitable navy," and his administrative policies shed no further light on these definitions. During the four years of Taft's administration, naval budgets went from $124,618,800 to $130,644,900. Yet national expenditures outstripped that growth; the percentage of the national budget spent on the Navy decreased from 21 to 18 percent.[32]

One of the causes of this shift was a change in congressional control. The principal contribution of Secretary Meyer's tenure was not to ensure continual funding of dry docks, in which he failed, but to reform the Navy Department in ways that

made its operations more businesslike. Soon after Meyer took office he directed retired rear admiral William Swift to convene a board tasked with investigating naval reorganization and methods to improve efficiency—specifically, to reduce operating costs to liberate funds for increased battleship construction. Infrastructure improvements would be approved only if the reductions were large enough.[33] The Swift Board's most significant recommendation concerned base closures. The board held that an excess of bases was resulting in inefficient use of appropriations.[34] However, its report made no specific recommendations, leaving to the General Board the question of which bases to request congressional approval to close.

Meanwhile, navy yards saw sharp reductions in funding, as Meyer sought to shed naval stations. From 1910 to 1911, funding for the League Island Navy Yard in Philadelphia was reduced by 50 percent and Mare Island in California by 80 percent. Nevertheless, several bases saw boosted funding during the same period. These yards were on the East Coast, especially in the mid-Atlantic (Norfolk, Virginia) and northeastern states, which had traditionally received support. The New York Navy Yard's funding increased 50 percent, the Norfolk Navy Yard almost threefold.[35] The largest base improvement allocation was for Pearl Harbor, now settled on as the site for the main Pacific Ocean naval base. In 1910 Pearl Harbor received $900,000 in improvement funds and the next year $2,500,000, almost one-third of all such funding that year.[36]

Navy yards whose funding was cut under Meyer's tenure soon faced closure as well. In his annual reports of both 1911 and 1912 Meyer argued that only two navy yards would be required on the East Coast once the Panama Canal opened.[37] That view was supported by the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1912. Guantanamo Bay would become an essential rendezvous station and repair facility for the fleet. Key West would remain open as the main station for torpedo boats and would secure the approaches to the canal and the Gulf of Mexico, in conjunction with Guantanamo Bay. Charleston would become the secondary home of torpedo boat squadrons. Two navy yards large enough to shelter the entire fleet as well as dry-dock the largest battleships were required, one at Norfolk and one north of Delaware. New York was retained as the primary yard owing to its size and location, as well as League Island for its unique freshwater basin (wherein corrosion and fouling of hulls were slower).[38]

As noted above, Meyer pursued base closures and streamlining to reduce costs so as to realize Roosevelt's battleship program, and in that, to a large extent, he succeeded, even as overall naval funding diminished. With national interest shifting away from shipbuilding to domestic needs, naval leaders and congressional navalists fought for more money for new ships. Ships, viewed as the direct measure of naval strength, remained their top priority. The portion of funding allocated to bases varied over Taft's four-year term, and ship-repair funds decreased.[39] Taft's

administration brought rapid changes to naval organization and bureaucracy, but funding for the Navy dropped.[40]

In 1913, Woodrow Wilson was sworn in as president. He appointed Josephus Daniels as the Secretary of the Navy.[41] The administration's first naval policy statement came from Daniels's 1913 annual report: the Navy would "save ashore for expenditure afloat."[42] Yet over the next several years Daniels found the issue of naval infrastructure more complicated. Base buildings and hospitals were among Daniels's biggest targets for reductions, but after a spring 1913 tour of bases across the United States the expansion of repair and dock facilities became a major concern for him. He realized that Meyer's focus on ship construction had led to deficiencies ashore.[43] In 1913, there was only one navy yard capable of constructing a battleship, that being New York Navy Yard. Nevertheless, at the end of the same paragraph in his 1913 annual report Daniels stated, "In any matters of doubt as to whether an estimate should be made for money to be expended ashore or afloat, I have resolved the doubt in favor of increasing the strength of the Navy afloat."[44] Ship construction remained as central to Wilson-era naval policy as it had been in both Roosevelt's and Taft's presidencies. Daniels's affirmation of the battleship-first position of the previous administrations meant the U.S. Navy remained focused on fleet expansion at the expense of operational capability.[45]

Daniels reversed the standing view on shipbuilding at navy yards. Meyer's office had moved away from new construction at navy yards, feeling that the private sector was cheaper and more efficient, that healthy competition between navy and private yards kept both running efficiently and reduced costs. Only one battleship, *New York,* was authorized for construction at a navy yard in Meyer's tenure, but Daniels had three battleships built at navy yards within two years of taking office.[46] *Arizona* and *Tennessee* were authorized in 1913 and 1914, respectively, for construction at New York Navy Yard and *California,* in 1914, at Mare Island.[47]

Moving construction back to navy yards required keeping these bases up to modern standards and providing them dry docks large enough to hold the newly designed battleships. With Congress incapable of putting aside political differences, Daniels sought to define the base infrastructure needs of the planned fleet. Looking to Europe for precedents, he discovered that it was not enough to judge relative naval power in terms of ships and the numbers of bases: what was required was an analysis of facilities. A main area that proved lacking in the United States was dry docks. The United States had eleven naval shipyards, Germany had three, and Great Britain six. Yet the total length of the dry docks in the United States was only an eighth that of Britain's home royal dockyards.[48] The U.S. Navy had numerous yards but had not built them up to meet their intended purpose. In the Navy's favor it could at least be said that it understood that purpose: "Navy yards have, as a rule, been located and developed to meet the possible requirements of the fleet in

time of war, and the plant available is much in excess of that required for ordinary peace-time condition."[49] Indeed, excess operating capacity during peacetime was crucial for yards. Base infrastructure could not be rushed into existence in wartime, unlike manpower and certain supplies. Pier accommodations and outfitting services were essential to repairing and fitting out vessels during a time of conflict, and demand then would greatly exceed that of peacetime. Further, while in peacetime base services were scheduled out over the course of a year or more, wartime demands were immediate and often unpredictable.

Remarkably, the Navy's infrastructural shortfalls still existed against the background of the outbreak of war in Europe; the political will in the United States to build bases adequate to meet the demands of war continued to lag. As Daniels had found, political infighting further hampered expansion of the infrastructure. Oftentimes politicians with bases in their constituencies pressured the rest of Congress to approve appropriations for their bases. One senator (not from South Carolina) reported in 1915, "I have never failed in 18 years to vote for the appropriations for the Charleston Navy Yard, knowing all the time that I could not get an adjournment of Congress until I did so."[50] The upshot of these impasses and the pressure to build battleships was that bases remained disproportionately located in the Northeast and overseas bases remained too small to support wartime repairs and outfitting.[51]

Increased attention to the question of what constituted an adequate level of base infrastructure would follow in late 1916 as Congress passed the Naval Act of 1916, but until then, base funding decreased by 30 percent, from $4,348,000 in 1914 to $3,042,000 in total spending.[52] The Naval Act called for the construction of ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, nine fleet and fifty-eight coastal submarines, and eleven auxiliary vessels.[53] Hailed by many as the final step toward a "Navy Second to None," the bill raised serious questions about the unbalanced nature of the Navy and its ability to support the planned battle fleet. Officers and politicians all sounded a call for a complete overhaul of naval infrastructure. While the bill was in deliberation in Congress, many in and connected to the Navy pushed for a corresponding increase in naval base budgets.

For 1917, with the passage of the Naval Act of 1916, appropriations for base improvements rose 270 percent to $8,330,000. Naval base capacity, it was now accepted, was required to meet the needs of the fleet expected in the next five years, and continuous funding of base expansion was essential. The estimate for 1918 was just over thirteen million dollars, an increase of 60 percent over 1917. Daniels's office stated that the shipbuilding program dictated this expansion of bases and that because of the time required to build the facilities the expansion could not be delayed.[54]

As the American fleet grew during the early twentieth century, naval bases and their facilities improved to support it. However, while the number of bases and the

size and number of dry docks increased, they did not keep pace with the growth of the battleship force. Expansion of American capacity abroad was largely based only on lessons from the Spanish-American War and not on anticipated future operations. Domestic bases saw improvements as well, largely as a result of political demands. Fiscal constraints over time prompted the Navy to economize; bases across the Pacific and Caribbean were systematically closed or reduced in size. These moves were opposed by naval strategists, who wanted for these bases large facilities and docks to support battle fleets operating in wartime far from coastal America. Reversing this downward trend in naval bases required a massive shipbuilding program, which made unmistakable for Congress and the Navy Department the inadequacy of base infrastructure. Bases needed to be able to support the new ships being built, in both normal steaming as well as emergency and wartime repairs. Capability could not be grown overnight, even with the required political backing.

As the Navy progressed through the first two decades of the twentieth century, its leaders continually sought whatever funding they could obtain. Their rationales ranged from diversifying naval infrastructure as a hedge against wartime losses to simply gaining more federal funding for a given area. Many learned from the embarrassing experience of the Spanish-American War that there was no meaningful difference between peace and war for the Navy, that ensuring the availability of the ships and infrastructure needed to implement foreign policy required a standing force. Furthermore, a force could not be summoned rapidly at the outbreak of war by the comparatively small American shipbuilding industry. These views, however, often fell short of convincing Congress; congressmen feared that their constituents would lose contracts and ship-repair work to overseas bases and instead sought the equivalent programs for their districts.

The leaders of the Navy and Congress ignored the unpalatable fact that the building of a fleet is not equivalent to the creation of a functional navy. A navy requires maintenance facilities, supplies, and trained personnel if it is to function properly. Ignoring any one of these categories could cripple a navy in either peace or combat. When the Naval Act of 1916 was passed the American navy possessed a large battle fleet but not a globally deployable one. Lacking large dry docks overseas as well as large, defended bases near areas of probable conflict, the battle fleet could not fight effectively and would have focused too much on damage aversion to combat an adversary effectively. The call for change came as a result of the 1916 act. Only when the U.S. fleet was going to rise in numbers to global supremacy did Congress take the matter in hand, increasing naval bases as well as facilities across the board.

NOTES

1 While congressmen and senators often cited diplomatic and economic reasons behind their basing decisions, at the core was their preference for spending money in their own regions, or at the least within the continental United States.

2 Especially influential in this support (though see note 21, below) was Senator Ben Tillman, whose son edited the *Navy Yearbook,* frequently cited here.

3 *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO] for the Department of the Navy, 1898) [volumes of this annual publication hereafter cited as DON, *Annual Reports* and covered year]; George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940; repr. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), pp. 86–98.

4 DON, *Annual Reports 1905.*

5 B. R. Tillman Jr., *Navy Yearbook: Embracing All Acts Authorizing the Construction of Ships of the "New Navy" and a Résumé of Annual Naval*

Appropriation Laws from 1883 to 1916, Inclusive, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1915), pp. 560–76.

6 Daniel J. Costello, "Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the Navy, 1900–1914" (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968), pp. 176–78; Tillman, *Navy Yearbook,* pp. 179, 196, 210.

7 Costello, "Planning for War," p. 178.

8 U.S. Congress, House Naval Affairs Committee, *Hearings on Appropriation Bill Subjects,* 60th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 4, 16 January 1908 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1908), pp. 214–15.

9 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1966; repr. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), p. 322.

10 DON, *Annual Reports 1900–Annual Reports 1902.*

11 DON, *Annual Reports 1903,* p. 13.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ronald Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 164–65.

15 Brian M. Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 83–85.

16 Robert T. Davis, ed., *U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security: Chronology and Index for the 20th Century* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 29–31; John B. Lundstrom, "Subic Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands," in *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas,* ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985), pp. 310–14.

17 Tillman, *Navy Yearbook,* pp. 530–55.

18 Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire,* pp. 166–71.

19 Tillman, *Navy Yearbook,* pp. 530–55.

20 Davis, *U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security,* pp. 29–31.

21 Senator Tillman, nicknamed "Pitchfork Ben" for his brashness, was a longtime member of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, serving as the chairman during Wilson's presidency. He was a Democrat and opposed overseas territorial expansion, yet he supported his fellow senators who had navy yards in their states. Francis Butler Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1944), pp. 510–14.

22 Quoted in Costello, "Planning for War," p. 180. The Congressional Record gives the remark slightly differently.

23 William M. Darden, "Parris Island South Carolina," in *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic,* ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985), pp. 416–22.

24 DON, *Annual Reports 1900–Annual Reports 1901.*

25 Lyon G. Tyler, review of *Charleston's Navy Yard: A Picture History,* by Jim McNeil, *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 88, no. 3 (1987), pp. 79–85.

26 Ibid.

27 George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 36–42; Davis, *Navy Second to None,* pp. 175–80; Sprout and Sprout, *Rise of American Naval Power,* pp. 320–26.

28 DON, *Annual Reports 1901–Annual Reports 1905;* Darden, "Parris Island South Carolina," pp. 416–22.

29 The Great White Fleet stopped at Puget Sound during its round-the-world cruise in 1907–1909. Its ships needed few repairs before the trip across the Pacific Ocean. However, the fleet depended on British coal throughout, receiving the majority of it by foreign ships because the U.S. Navy owned only two modern colliers. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power,* p. 47; U.S. Navy Dept., *Preliminary Report of the Navy Yard Commission* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1916).

30 Paolo E. Coletta, "George von Lengerke Meyer," in *American Secretaries of the Navy,* ed. Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 495–98.

31 Quoted in Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power,* p. 47. There are small orthographic differences in the earliest published versions.

32 DON, *Annual Reports 1910–Annual Reports 1914.*

33 Ibid., *1910.*

34 Fred T. Jane, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships 1910* (New York: Sampson Low, 1910).

35 DON, *Annual Reports 1910–Annual Reports 1911.*

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.; DON, *Annual Reports 1912.*

38 DON, *Annual Reports 1912.*

39 Tillman, *Navy Yearbook,* pp. 530–45; DON, *Annual Reports 1910–Annual Reports 1912.*

40 Tillman, *Navy Yearbook.*

41 Paolo E. Coletta, "Josephus Daniels," in Coletta, *American Secretaries of the Navy,* vol. 2, pp. 525–26.

42 DON, *Annual Reports 1913.*

43 Coletta, "Josephus Daniels," pp. 525–27.

44 DON, *Annual Reports 1913.*

45 Davis, Navy Second to None, pp. 168–70, 184–95.

46 DON, *Annual Reports 1914;* Robert Gardiner, ed., *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships: 1906–1921* (London: Conway Maritime, 1985; repr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 116–18.

47 DON, *Annual Reports 1914.*

48 DON, *Annual Reports 1913–Annual Reports 1914;* Coletta, "Josephus Daniels," p. 532.

49 DON, *Annual Reports 1913.*

50 Senator Boies Penrose, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess. *Congressional Record* 52, pt. 5, p. 4713.

51 DON, *Annual Reports 1913–Annual Reports 1916.*

52 Ibid.

53 Tillman, *Navy Yearbook,* pp. 480–81.

54 DON, *Annual Reports 1916.*

X *Chinese-Soviet Naval Cooperation in the 1950s*

MILES MAOCHUN YU

The decade after the start of the Korean War witnessed a wholesale Sovietization of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) military forces, collectively known as the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This process was accomplished through massive Soviet military aid to construct the Chinese military into a modern force that would be the foundation for today's PLA. Newly declassified archives of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) indicate that during this period, Moscow was spending about 3.5 percent of the Soviet Union's entire gross domestic product on arming and modernizing the PLA.[1]

Today, China is the world's second-largest naval power, and the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can trace its roots to the 1950s, when it was literally created by the Soviet Union. This paper tries to illuminate this Soviet genesis of today's Chinese navy by focusing on two of the PLAN's institutional pillars: the establishment of its primary naval training and educational institution, the Dalian Naval Academy ("China's Annapolis"), and the acquisition of its first functional fleet as a result of the Soviet transfer of naval assets to the PLAN at Port Arthur (Lü Shun), on the Liaodong Peninsula.

Historians of the Chinese military, in China and in the West, have written at length about the Soviet Union's massive military assistance to China in the 1950s from the perspectives of air and ground forces, which were fundamentally shaped by the combat nature and operational experiences of the Korean War, in which ground and air battles played the preponderant role.

In contrast, there has been precious little, if anything at all, of substance in the English language that deals directly with the epic story of the Chinese-Soviet naval cooperation during this decade and how this cooperation impacted the larger aspects of the Cold War in Asia in general and the Chinese-Soviet relationship in particular. In recent years, with the warming up of the China-Russia relationship and the establishment of a Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership, more and more original materials have become available in China that can help reconstruct the scope and meaning of the significant naval cooperation between the two countries in the 1950s.

THE SOVIETS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHINESE NAVAL ACADEMY

Soviets played a crucial role in the establishment of the Dalian Naval Academy, the PLA's first and foremost naval officers training institution, widely known as the cradle of the PLA Navy. The first PLA naval command was led by Zhang Aiping, who had received favorable attention from Stalin while in Moscow for treatment of a head wound suffered in a battle against the Chinese Nationalist troops. In March 1949 Zhang returned to China and was immediately appointed to form and lead the PLA's first-ever naval command, the PLA East China Field Army's Naval Command. During the following two years, Zhang established a nascent PLA maritime force composed of 134 riverine warships, including frigates, gunboats, landing craft, and minesweepers, and more than thirty thousand personnel.[2]

The An Dong Naval School was established in May 1949 near An Dong, a northeastern Chinese city at the mouth of the Yalu River, just across from Soviet-occupied North Korea. However, the An Dong Naval School was not focused on naval and professional training; it was primarily an ideological indoctrination camp for naval personnel. The school was necessary because the PLA had to reregister, reeducate, and reassess a large number of naval turncoats from the Nationalist, or Kuomintang (KMT), regime. Toward the end of the Chinese Civil War, in February 1949, the Chinese Communist forces had received a windfall—a mass defection from the KMT navy, mostly smaller warships, close to four dozen, and 3,800 men.[3]

While political indoctrination in Marxism, Leninism, and "Mao Thought" was the main task for the An Dong Naval School, its technical departments and naval curriculum were mostly staffed and taught by former KMT officers. In fact, the school's superintendent, Capt. Deng Zhaoxiang, had been the commanding officer of the KMT cruiser *Chongqing*.[4] While the CCP was forced to use these defectors, their political purity and Marxist understanding were thought to be inadequate, and the An Dong school was set up just for redressing the problem.

The An Dong Naval School was situated in the geographical heart of the Soviet sphere of influence in postwar China, but it lacked a strong professional training curriculum and a long-term strategy. The Soviets were not happy with the setup and decided to start all over again and build a brand-new naval training institution for the PLA. In July 1949, Stalin asked Mao Zedong to send to the Soviet Union two PLA senior officials, one for the future Chinese navy and the other for the air force. On 1 August Mao sent Zhang Aiping and Liu Yalou to Moscow (Zhang and Liu had spent considerable time there) to seal a long list of Soviet military aid packages for the then-nonexistent PLA navy and air force. In early September 1949, Zhang Aiping signed a series of agreements with the Soviet navy authorities in Moscow concerning a large naval base construction plan, several naval weapons production lines, and the establishment of a formal naval academy.

In late October, the first group of Soviet naval personnel, senior naval scholars, and technicians arrived in the newly proclaimed People's Republic of China to build the first naval academy for the PLA. The Soviet delegation took their Chinese protégés on a low-altitude flight along the coast of the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf to decide on a site for the new naval academy.[5] The aircraft took off from Port Arthur and surveyed the major potential locations, including Qingdao, Yantai, and Dalian, for a naval academy that would be close to a sea exit and near the Soviet command center in East Asia.

Dalian, a port city still effectively under Soviet military occupation and only a short distance from Port Arthur, was chosen. The new Chinese naval academy was to be situated on an imposing hill overlooking the equally grand convergence of the Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea. On the site was a Japanese coastal-defense fort built after the rout of the Russians in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War but now used by a Soviet artillery regiment as its barracks. The Soviet naval delegation immediately requested Moscow to have the regiment move out. Stalin promptly ordered the move. The Dalian PLA Naval Academy officially opened for business in December 1949.

The Dalian Naval Academy was initially staffed with eighty-four Soviet experts. Some were academic administrators in charge of strategic planning and curriculum, but most were instructors in various disciplines, especially commandership, seamanship, steam engineering, and internal combustion engineering. There were only fifteen Chinese instructors at the academy, all of them former KMT naval technical experts.

THE PLA'S FIRST FUNCTIONAL FLEET

The Chinese Communist Party's first-ever functional sea fleet was given by the Soviets, and it came through a shift of strategic focus from "liberating Taiwan" to a sustained naval buildup. In Chinese Communist Party orthodoxy, total victory of the "revolution" over the enemy could not be claimed until Taiwan was "liberated." The urgency and preeminent importance of "liberating" Taiwan became Mao Zedong's primary military obsession after the founding of the PRC in October 1949. However, the PLA's Taiwan invasion planning was forced to fold, because of two extraordinary factors.

The first was the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, which prompted the United States to send the Seventh Fleet immediately into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the Chinese communists from attempting any amphibious assaults on Taiwan, and the Nationalist government there from attacking mainland China, thus escalating the conflict. The U.S. Navy was the world's mightiest after World War II; the subsequent U.S.–Republic of China (Taiwan) Mutual Defense Treaty completely obviated Mao Zedong's Taiwan invasion plan.

The second factor that tempered the CCP's triumphal plan for amphibious warfare against Taiwan concerned its earlier fiascos in such battles. The People's Liberation Army was overwhelmingly a ground army, incapable of launching any meaningful naval and amphibious operations. Much more chagrining to the PLA high command were defeats in various daring amphibious assaults against the KMT-dominated offshore islands, most disastrously Quemoy in October 1949.[6]

As a result, throughout much of the 1950s, instead of rushing to "liberate" Taiwan, which would necessarily involve naval and amphibious capabilities that the PLA did not have, the PRC's military high command concentrated on building a PLA navy with direct Soviet help. The key element of that help comprised the crucial naval assets of the Soviet navy at the Chinese port of Lü Shun, more widely known as Port Arthur.

Port Arthur had been coveted by Russia since the time of Peter the Great. It is a deepwater, nonfreezing, well-protected port located at the end of the Liaodong Peninsula, a strategic choke point overlooking the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the Bohai Gulf, which in turn guards the entrance to the Chinese capital city of Beijing. In 1904 and 1905 Japan and Russia had fought fiercely for control of Chinese Manchuria, in which Port Arthur is located. After the war, a victorious Japan occupied the city; in World War II it became a key Japanese naval port.

During the last days of the war, the Red Army swept through Manchuria and took control of Port Arthur from the Japanese. Using the Chinese Communists as his bargaining chip, Stalin forced Chiang Kai-shek to sign over Port Arthur to the Soviet navy in August 1945. By both the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements the Soviet troops were to withdraw from Manchuria, but Stalin was determined to hold on to Port Arthur as Moscow's Far East military outpost in direct confrontation with the American forces across the narrow Yellow Sea in Japan. Stalin's strategic calculation was that the Soviet navy would not leave Port Arthur until Japan and the USSR signed a peace treaty and the U.S. forces withdrew from Japan.[7] When the Chinese Communists took over and established the People's Republic, Moscow and Beijing were "in honeymoon." At the time, the United States was still occupying Japan, and the Soviet Union and Japan had not signed a peace treaty—in fact, Moscow and Tokyo have never signed a peace treaty, even up to today.

The issue of Port Arthur resurfaced in talks between Stalin and Mao. During December 1949 through February 1950, Mao Zedong made a pilgrimage to Moscow to meet Stalin and stayed in the USSR for more than two months. One of the most tangible results of Mao's stay was a PRC-USSR agreement on the terms of the Soviet Union's continuing use of Port Arthur. On 14 February 1950 Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC and Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinsky of the USSR signed a landmark agreement allowing the Soviet Pacific Fleet to continue to occupy Port Arthur until such a time that Japan signed a peace treaty with both signatories. But

there was a crucial catch: by this agreement the Soviet troops would withdraw from Port Arthur no later than the end of 1952 regardless of any other circumstances and hand over all naval assets there to the Chinese government, at a nominal cost to be covered by the Soviet military loans to the new Chinese government.

Essentially, this was Stalin's plan to create a navy for his Chinese comrades, who did not have any meaningful fleet at all. The Soviet naval assets at Port Arthur were substantial, amounting to no less than a fleet in themselves. Once the transfer of Soviet naval assets at Port Arthur was complete, Stalin would send more vessels and weapons to the Chinese at Port Arthur and other places.

However, the outbreak of the Korean War four months later greatly affected the planned transfer. As time moved closer to the end of 1952—the deadline for the Soviets to withdraw from Port Arthur, leaving their ships behind—the Chinese government began to panic, suspecting that Stalin might use the scheduled transfer as an excuse to withdraw all Soviet forces, including naval units, as a way to extricate himself entirely from the Korean imbroglio and let the Chinese and the North Koreans deal with the mess alone. But more importantly, Mao Zedong feared that a Soviet naval withdrawal from Port Arthur would certainly embolden American naval operations in the nearby waters off the Korean Peninsula and possibly those near China.

Subsequently, in August 1952, the Chinese dispatched a sixty-person military delegation headed by Zhou Enlai to Moscow, essentially to beg Stalin to keep occupying Port Arthur indefinitely.[8] Stalin approved the request. Then, on 5 March 1953, Joseph Stalin suddenly died; four months later, the Korean War was over. The Soviet occupation of Port Arthur resurfaced in talks among Chinese and Soviet leaders. Nikita Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, was a proponent inside the Soviet ruling elites for dramatically strengthening China's economy and building up its military so that the Soviets would have an ideological and military ally in East Asia with which to combat the Americans.[9]

Weeks after Stalin's death, China's vice-premier, Li Fuchun, led a delegation to Moscow to finalize a series of far-reaching Soviet aid agreements, including an offer to build within China 141 large enterprises in a wide range of economic and industrial sectors, such as metallurgy, nonferrous metal making, oil refining, automobile production, and electric and power generation.[10] But Khrushchev was even more generous militarily. Post-Soviet archives indicate the scope of military assistance under Khrushchev, as recounted by historian Sergei Goncharenko:

> The Soviet Union was ready to perform design work, to deliver equipment, and to render assistance in construction of fifteen new defense enterprises, and to help in construction of the next fourteen new industrial enterprises, including a plant producing up to 600 control devices for antiaircraft missiles per year. The Soviets also agreed to render assistance in design and delivery of equipment for heavy ground and air artillery, including new forms of artillery. In addition, Moscow delivered some of its own draft proposals regarding modernization of separate types of armaments (jet-propelled aircraft MiG-17s, antiaircraft guns,

and tank diesel engines). In some cases Chinese plants were able to start production of such improved armaments before the arms industry in the Soviet Union itself.[11]

During the Korean War, the Soviet Union greatly beefed up its naval assets at Port Arthur, and the Chinese eagerly coveted them. When the Korean War was over, Mao Zedong did not waste much time in pressuring Khrushchev to return Port Arthur to the Chinese and, most importantly, to turn over all the Soviet naval assets there as originally stipulated in the 1950 Stalin-Mao agreement.

In late September 1954, Khrushchev, newly anointed as Stalin's successor and in need of Mao's support within the world communist movement, arrived in Beijing for a lavish celebration of the fifth anniversary of the founding of its communist government. At the first meeting of the visit Mao immediately raised the issue of Port Arthur, telling Khrushchev that "during the Korean War, Comrade Stalin, upon our request, postponed the withdrawal of the Soviet navy from Port Arthur, for which we are very grateful. Now our missions [in Korea] have been accomplished, we will wholeheartedly say good-bye to our Soviet naval personnel in Lü Shun."[12] Khrushchev replied, "Comrade Mao Zedong is right," and he offered, in addition to the naval assets at Port Arthur, Soviet coastal-defense artillery batteries to be installed along China's coast.[13]

On 12 October 1954, in Beijing, in the presence of Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan (first deputy premier of the USSR), Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai, a joint Soviet-Chinese joint agreement was signed officially ending Soviet occupation of Port Arthur and transferring all Soviet naval assets and facilities in the port, built up for nearly a decade, to the PRC, free of any charge. The entire transfer would be completed by 31 May 1955.[14] Mao Zedong was elated and immediately ordered over ten thousand Chinese infantry and armed policemen to take over the Soviet fleet at Port Arthur in what was to be a prolonged, friendly, and complicated process. The troops would be trained directly by the Soviet naval personnel to handle and operate the ships and weapon systems.

The initial transfer of naval assets at Port Arthur was substantial. In the first year, the Soviets handed over to their Chinese comrades assets from the Soviet Pacific Fleet that included thirty-nine torpedo boats, eleven frigates, eighteen support and logistical ships of various types; seventy-eight naval surveillance, antisubmarine, and antiship aircraft; fifty-four coastal artillery pieces and 122 antiaircraft artillery batteries; and various shore facilities.[15] The entire package was worth more than 300 million rubles at the time.

The Port Arthur transfer gave the Chinese communists their first functional naval fleet, from which has grown today's modern and rapidly expanding PLAN, the world's second-largest and arguably second-strongest navy.

EPILOGUE: THE BIG PICTURE

Between 1949 and 1959, over 3,400 Soviet naval officers and engineers were dispatched to China to supervise the construction from the ground up of a naval force that by the end of the decade would include surface, underwater, and naval aviation arms, totaling 519 ships and 515 aircraft. During this period five Soviet admirals served as China's naval advisors in chief, overseeing the establishment of a large PRC naval enterprise that inaugurated ten naval academies and naval research institutes across the nation. Port Arthur was the hub of Soviet naval support and assistance to the PLAN.

Ironically, the massive Soviet naval assistance of the 1950s to China was to play an important role in the final breaking up of the two largest communist countries. As China's navy became stronger, Nikita Khrushchev grew increasingly reluctant to satisfy Mao Zedong's requests for yet more and larger, and more crucial, naval technologies and operational systems. This wariness eventually led to Moscow's rejection in 1958 of a request for a wholesale replication in China of the Soviet navy's still-developmental nuclear submarine program. That rejection knocked out the cornerstone of the Chinese-Soviet naval relationship, marking the end of a long "honeymoon" and contributing to Mao Zedong's historic rejection of Khrushchev's request to establish a Soviet-Chinese joint fleet and base it in China, as well as a long-wave joint submarine communications system.

However, the Soviet-Chinese naval cooperation of the 1950s shaped the structure, doctrine, officer training, and basic operational ethos of the Chinese navy in fundamental and lasting ways, apparent even today. Soviet assistance not only established China as a large conventional naval power but also instilled doctrinal and operational concepts that are still at the heart of the Chinese navy. The Chinese navy's predominant emphasis on submarines can be directly traced to the Soviet naval doctrine of the 1950s. Virtually all of China's current nineteen naval academies—including the PLAN's flagship school, the Dalian Naval Academy—are modeled after those of the Soviets in the 1950s. China's strategic and operational principles of surface, submarine, and antisubmarine warfare, of naval aviation, and of coastal and maritime defense were also formulated and developed in the 1950s, with overwhelming Soviet influence. Even the Chinese navy's rank system is a direct copy of Soviet practice of that decade.

NOTES

1 Sergei Goncharenko, "Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation," in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963,* ed. Odd Arne Westad (Redwood City, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998), p. 160.

2 Wu Dianqing, comp., 蓝色档案: 新中国海军大事纪实 [*The Blue Archives: A Chronicle of Main Events of New China's Navy*] (Taiyuan, PRC: Shanxi People's Press, April 2015), pp. 29–75.

3 On one occasion, the entire Second River Defense Fleet of the KMT, thirty riverine warships and over a thousand personnel, defected in a single day, led by its commander in chief, Lin Zhun, See ibid., p. 61.

4 Formerly HMS *Aurora,* a Royal Navy light cruiser given to the KMT government in 1948. It was the largest Chinese naval vessel at the time, with a displacement of 5,220 tons and a speed of thirty-two knots.

5 Wu Dianqing, *Blue Archives,* p. 78.

6 See Miles Maochun Yu, "The Battle of Quemoy: The Amphibious Assault That Held the Postwar Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait," *Naval War College Review* 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016), pp. 91–107.

7 Wu Dianqing, *Blue Archives,* p. 151.

8 Ibid., pp. 152–53.

9 Goncharenko, "Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation," pp. 145–46.

10 Ibid., pp. 146–47.

11 Ibid., p. 147.

12 Wu Dianqing, *Blue Archives,* p. 153.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., pp. 153–54.

15 Ibid., pp. 156–57.

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