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U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980's

John B. Hattendorf

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The Naval War College complex on Coasters Harbor Island, in a photograph taken about 2000, looking roughly north-east. In the center foreground is Luce Hall, with Pringle Hall to its left and Mahan Hall hidden behind it; behind them, to the left, are Spruance, Conolly, and Hewitt halls. In the center, partly obscured by Conolly Hall, is McCarty Little Hall. On the extreme right in the foreground is Founders Hall, in which the College was established. In recent years the College has expanded into parts of several buildings of the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, on the northern part of the island. In the middle distance are facilities of Naval Station Newport (the decommissioned aircraft carriers ex-Forrestal and ex-Saratoga are visible at Pier 1) and, beyond that, of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. In the far distance can be seen parts of the towns of Portsmouth and Tiverton, Rhode Island.

Photograph © 2008 by Onne van der Wal Photography, Inc.
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s
Selected Documents

Edited with an Introduction by
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Naval War College
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CNA

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Foreword

*U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents* is the thirty-third in the Naval War College Press’s Newport Papers monograph series, and the third in a projected four-volume set of authoritative documents relating to U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning during and after the Cold War. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, a distinguished naval historian and chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval War College, this volume is an indispensable supplement to Professor Hattendorf’s uniquely informed narrative of the genesis and development of the Navy’s strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986*, Newport Paper 19 (2004). It continues the story of the Navy’s reaction to the growing Soviet naval and strategic threats over the decade of the 1970s, as documented in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents*, Newport Paper 30 (2007), and sets the stage for the rethinking of the Navy’s role following the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, as presented in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents*, Newport Paper 27 (2006). Both of these volumes were also edited by John Hattendorf. A fourth volume, of documents on naval strategy from the 1950s and 1960s, will eventually round out this important and hitherto very imperfectly known history.

This project will make a major contribution not just to the history of the United States Navy since World War II but also to that of American military institutions, strategy, and planning more generally. Including as it does both originally classified documents and statements crafted for public release, it shows how the Navy’s leadership not only grappled with fundamental questions of strategy and force structure but sought as well to translate the strategic insights resulting from this process into a rhetorical form suited to the public and political arenas.

Finally, it should be noted that all of this is of more than merely historical interest. In October 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, unveiled (in a presentation to the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College) “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the first attempt by the sea services of this country to articulate a strategy or vision for maritime power in the contemporary security environment—a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growing global economic interdependence. It is too early to tell what impact this document will have on the Navy, its sister services, allies and others abroad, or the good order of the
global commons. To understand its meaning and significance, however, there is no better place to begin than with the material collected in this volume and its forthcoming successor.

CARNES LORD
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
Acknowledgments

The explanatory notes and introduction to this book of documents from the 1980s and to its predecessors on the 1990s and the 1970s are all adaptations and extensions of the information initially gathered by Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Alexandria, Virginia, which he used in developing a PowerPoint presentation covering the history of the U.S. Navy’s strategic documents over the thirty-eight-year period between 1970 and 2008. The version used for reference in this work was that dated 24 July 2008.*

Captain Swartz presented his briefing widely, extensively circulating it during its development and garnering new insight and information at each iteration over more than three years. Additionally, in order to support our work in preparing this volume, the 2006 and 2007 CNA strategy conferences devoted considerable time to the strategy documents included in this volume. We are particularly grateful to Christine Fox and Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt of CNA for their permission and encouragement to use and to elaborate upon these materials.

In essence, the introduction and the explanatory notes in this volume are a composite and the editors’ attempt to reconcile the various recollections and comments of a variety of the participants who shaped the process of writing these documents. As such, this volume is only a limited contribution toward a complete and detailed history of naval thinking in this decade, one that will need to be written in the light of the additional documents and materials that will progressively become available in the future for historical research and open publication.

We are grateful to all who have provided their insights at various points about strategy development during the 1980s, either in terms of the evolution of Peter Swartz’s briefing, during the CNA conferences, or in subsequent e-mail correspondence with one or the other of us, including Captain Roger Barnett, USN (Ret.), Captain Joe Bouchard, USN (Ret.), Captain Linton Brooks, USN (Ret.), Commander Mitch Brown, USN (Ret.), Captain John Byron, USN (Ret.), Hon. Seth Cropsey (CNA), Colonel George M. Dallas (MCCDC chief of staff), Captain Tom Daly, USN (Ret.), Commander Steve

Our special thanks are due to CNA’s Michael Gerson and OPNAV N3/N5’s Vice Admiral John Morgan, Commander Paul Nagy, and Lieutenant Brian Kawamura—especially Lieutenant Kawamura—for their vision, tenacity, and bureaucratic skill in obtaining the declassification of all the versions of the Maritime Strategy.

At the Naval War College, we thank Captain Richard Suttie, USN (Ret.), and Dr. Carnes Lord, who suggested undertaking this series of volumes for the Naval War College Press; Mrs. Alice Juda, reference librarian in the Henry Eccles Library at the Naval War College, who provided valuable assistance in locating copies of the documents published here; Pelham Boyer, managing editor of the Naval War College Press, who undertook a myriad of tasks in connection with the production of this volume; and Ken DeRouin, Susan Meyer, Albert Fassbender, and Shannon Cole for the typesetting and proofreading.
Introduction

The decade of the 1980s was the decade of “the Maritime Strategy,” the U.S. Navy’s widely known and publicly debated statement that was associated with President Ronald Reagan’s buildup of American defense forces and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s efforts to create “the six-hundred-ship navy.” The strategy is most widely understood only in terms of the Navy’s January 1986 public statements published in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* and summarized in testimony that the Navy’s leaders had given to Congress. This volume is designed to complement and extend the previously published history of *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986,* and to present publicly for the first time the detailed changes and developments that occurred during the decade in the five (now declassified) official versions of the strategy and three directly associated unclassified public statements by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations that were made in the years between 1982 and 1990.

At the outset, it is important to understand that all the internal versions of the Maritime Strategy were designed as secret-level classified briefings, using a prepared text that was linked to graphics and presented to groups through Vu-Graph slides projected on a screen. All of these statements involved the use of graphics that contained images, words, and short phrases carrying the outline of the meaning of the prepared text. The internal secret-level publications that were published and distributed within the Navy for official use were printed copies of these same presentations. Beyond this, there were no other overarching, conceptual, or analytical statements at the classified level, but there was some activity at higher levels of classification to deal with certain aspects of intelligence information and perception management. There were also a number of important explanatory and supplementary thoughts that were included in the public statements of Secretary Lehman, Admiral James Watkins, General P. X. Kelley, and Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost in the key articles published in *Proceedings* and that are included among the eight documents presented in this volume.

The purpose behind creating the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s was primarily to inform the U.S. naval officer corps and to provide a consistent and widely agreed-upon
strategic rationale to be used throughout the Navy in order to provide a sound and realistic operational basis, built upon a careful analysis of intelligence on current naval threats, with which to make force-structure decisions and budgetary plans. The strategy was designed to show the Navy’s role in a global campaign in terms of geography as well as in its sequential and cumulative effects. It was designed to be inclusive of a wide range of naval functions. While it explained how the U.S. Navy would actually be used in the event of a third world war in global-scale, forward operations against the Soviet Union (not merely the Soviet navy), it also involved three phases in such a war with options for horizontal escalation. In addition, the strategy also dealt with peacetime operations, crises management, and war-termination issues.

Intelligence analysis and technical assessments of the Soviet navy and its capabilities played an essential role in creating the Maritime Strategy. This work was initially done in several places, including at the Vice Chief of Naval Operations level. There Admiral William Small and his executive assistant, Captain William Studeman, coordinated through the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP), and the ATP’s Soviet Strategy Study Group, created in 1982, with Captain Linton Brooks and others initially involved at the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-095), headed by Vice Admiral Kinnard R. McKee; the Office of Naval Intelligence, under Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, with Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., and Commander Stephen Kime; Captain Thomas A. Brooks at the newly established Fleet Operational Intelligence Office at Fort Meade; “Team Charlie” in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-009J), with Rich Haver and Alf Andreassen; the Center for Naval Analyses, with James M. McConnell; and the Naval Intelligence Detachment in the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College.

The process of creating the strategy took place in 1982–84 through a series of ever-changing briefing slides that summarized as well as elicited opinions, information, and judgments that began to develop a consensus from existing theater war plans, concepts of operations, intelligence, the results of war-gaming experiences, the results of operations, fleet experience, exercise results, and advanced training as well as the perceptions of the Navy’s strategic thinkers and debates on the subject in unofficial fora within the Navy, such as Secretary of the Navy Lehman’s “Young Turk” lunches in the early 1980s, U.S. Naval Institute symposia organized by Proceedings editor Fred Rainbow, Center for Naval Analyses symposia, and the Navy Discussion Groups convened by Commander James Stark in the middle and late 1980s. This initial and lengthy process eventually produced a document signed by the Chief of Naval Operations in May 1984. As this document began to go through further changes, refinements, and improvements, in both classified and unclassified versions, the Maritime Strategy developed an additional...
role for the U.S. Navy to play—managing the Soviet perceptions of the Navy through public release of information.

The U.S. Navy’s strategic thinking of the 1980s can be traced to the experience, developments, and perceptions that accumulated throughout the 1970s. Specifically, in this context it was a direct outgrowth and extension of initiatives that Admiral Thomas B. Hayward had begun as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (1977–78) and Chief of Naval Operations (1978–82), and of the SEA PLAN 2000 study commissioned by then-Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and then–Under Secretary of the Navy James Woolsey. The U.S. Navy’s strategic thinking of the 1980s was not a sudden revelation thrust upon the naval services by the political leadership of the day but rather part of an evolution of strategic thinking within the naval services, an evolution facilitated by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations’ policy guidance and objectives.

As the documents in this volume show, the Maritime Strategy was not an orchestrated public relations campaign designed solely to justify a large naval force but rather a series of initiatives of the Navy and Marine Corps, in the context of the day, to align naval forces within the framework of a joint and cooperative national military strategy that would make effective use of them. The purpose was to achieve national objectives and align all aspects of the naval services, from procurement and force levels to training and operations, with policy and strategic guidance, in order to create realistic and achievable expectations for the naval contribution to national defense.

Although the staff officers supporting naval leaders, as well as the naval leaders themselves, were making every attempt to cast the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s in broad national terms as the maritime component of a national military strategy and as the consolidation of the Navy’s generally accepted thinking on the employment of naval forces, the fact that it was a product of the Department of the Navy made other services suspicious. Outside the Navy, many assumed, without careful consideration of the substance of the strategy, that the arguments of the Maritime Strategy were visionary and made at the expense of the other services. In part this was due to the fact that the other services had not yet put into place similar or complementary approaches to their own strategic thinking; also, at the same time that the Navy had momentarily moved into the lead with such an approach, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was making strong public statements critical of the initiatives that eventually led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1 October 1986.

This resulted in fierce public debates over congressional resource allocations to the Navy and Marine Corps versus the Air Force and the Army. This also raised similar debates about the utility of naval forces, the optimal operations for the defense of the sea lines of communications, deterrence versus provocation, nuclear stability,
horizontal escalation, and the roles of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Some criticized it as an old idea with no innovative ideas, while others characterized it as too radical and as giving away too much information publicly.

The reputation of the Maritime Strategy during the past two decades has alternated. By the mid-1990s, later strategists characterized all these earlier attempts to conceptualize naval strategy as obsolete in the post–Cold War period, while at the same time, the U.S. Marine Corps momentarily moved away from concentration on such closely integrated, strategic, high-end warfighting cooperation with the Navy to develop more independent or Marine Corps–led operational concepts focused on lower-intensity regional contingencies. Within the Navy, however, the Maritime Strategy became a standard against which later strategic capstone documents were judged. Subsequent U.S. naval capstone statements have cited the Maritime Strategy, such as The Navy Policy Book (1992); Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (1994); and Sea Power 21 (2002–2003). The official background information for the U.S. Navy’s most recent strategic statement, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (October 2007), states that “the world has changed since 1986 when the last maritime strategy was developed.”

When the process of strategic development had been fully developed in the mid-1980s, a number of people within the Navy saw the process that lay behind the Maritime Strategy as a significant historical development in naval thinking. It appeared to mark a renaissance in maritime strategic thinking within the U.S. naval officer corps and was a clear and comprehensive statement that drew together for the first time many past and contemporary strands of thinking. Among the new aspects that it presented were detailed discussions of the roles of the U.S. Coast Guard, military sealift in support of naval operations, and the employment of allied and friendly tactical aviation. The 1984 version first identified terrorism as an issue for naval forces to be concerned about. The 1988 version first identified drug trafficking as a naval threat and also mentioned for the first time the U.S. Navy’s capability for humanitarian support operations. All of these have continued to be part of American naval strategic thinking since that time.

The Navy Staff’s desire to record the development of the Navy’s strategic development in these years proceeded in two ways. The first was to measure, record, and learn from public response and debate about the strategy. The second was to record the internal process by which the strategic thinking process had developed and record it for future development.

Captain Peter Swartz—the action officer for the Maritime Strategy in the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) between 1982 and 1984 and on the staff of Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., in the Office of Program Appraisal in 1984–86—took up the
first challenge and began to track the public debate on the subject to help ascertain its effects and provide a means for the U.S. Navy to learn from them. This resulted in a series of cumulative bibliographies that Swartz published in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 2004. In addition, Swartz extended this task to a broader project in a PowerPoint presentation in which he attempted to summarize naval strategic thinking through its series of capstone documents between the 1970s and 2007, as a tool for educating current and future staff officers in the process. This PowerPoint presentation evolved over a number of years in several expanding iterations, and it has been the starting point for this series of documentary volumes.

In addition, there was a desire to try to make a concurrent analytical historical record of the events. To do this, Captain Larry Seaquist, then Head, Strategic Concepts Branch, recommended to Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), that he commission Professor John Hattendorf of the Naval War College to undertake this task. As a result, Vice Admiral Lyons wrote the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral James E. Service, asking that Hattendorf be assigned to this task. Seeing this as a particularly challenging assignment at a point when a number of senior and influential figures were each claiming to be the sole “father of the Maritime Strategy,” Hattendorf requested and was granted the authority to reach his own academic conclusions in regard to the development of the strategy, based on the historical evidence. When Hattendorf completed his history in 1988, President of the Naval War College Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth requested authority from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost that the Naval War College Press be granted permission to publish an article-length, unclassified version. Admiral Trost personally approved the Naval War College’s request, and the article appeared in the Naval War College Review. The Naval War College Press published the full history in 1989, in a series of classified papers. This classified document was declassified and published in 2004 with additional supplementary materials. Additional historical insights into and details of the process used for the Maritime Strategy were recorded in articles by Captains John Byron and Peter Swartz and by Dr. David Alan Rosenberg. None of these efforts were conducted in isolation; there was extensive collaboration among Hattendorf, Swartz, Byron, Rosenberg, Linton Brooks, and others on these and related projects throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

To understand the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, it is essential to place it in the context of its time and examine the manner in which that same changing context influenced its evolution. Three different levels of thematic focus are essential to this understanding: the changing world situation of the 1980s, national security developments within the United States during the 1980s, and developments within the U.S. Navy during the 1980s.
The Changing World Situation of the 1980s

The world of the 1980s, as the Maritime Strategy characterized it, was an era of violent peace. The global scene was dominated by the bipolar ideological, political, military, and economic rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the outset of the 1980s, the Cold War appeared to be deepening, with the Soviet navy showing significant growth, increasing strength, and more tendencies toward belligerence at sea. The nuclear balance remained stable, with no further nuclear proliferation during the 1980s. One modifying influence in the tension was the success of nine years of negotiation during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and its conclusion of the multilateral United Nations law of the sea convention of 1982, establishing new legal regimes governing general as well as specific sea areas. In retrospect, it appears that after a long period of steadily increasing tension in the Cold War at sea, this situation began to relax in the middle of the 1980s with the appointments of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Admiral Chernavin as Admiral Gorshkov's replacement in 1985, and with the beginning of the Soviet naval arms control offensive from 1986 onward. To contemporary American naval eyes, however, the Soviet success in producing increasingly quiet submarines; the Soviet navy's increasing use of the former U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam; and the revelation of the major loss of secret and highly sensitive U.S. naval information to the Soviets through the Walker spy leak in 1986 gave the U.S. Navy reasons for pause. This was followed between 1989 and 1991 by major changes in Soviet and Warsaw Pact leadership and policies, changes that resulted in dramatic deterioration of the Soviet naval threat.

In Asia, the People's Republic of China demonstrated high economic growth and was, at that point, energy sufficient. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government had decided that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat. The People's Liberation Army Navy changed its posture from one of anti-Soviet coastal defense and announced instead a naval doctrine of “Offshore Defense” with operations farther out to sea. By 1987, the Chinese had deployed their first nuclear-power ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN). While this was going on, Taiwan was isolated but showed increasing economic growth and political liberalization. In 1989, the Chinese government showed its hold on the country during the Tiananmen Square incident. On the Korean Peninsula, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under Kim Il Sung continued to receive Soviet support; it had organized the assassination of Republic of Korea officials in Burma. At the same time, Muslim separatist insurgencies remained active in Mindanao and the southern Philippines.
In the Middle East, Israeli antiair-warfare capabilities had demonstrated their effectiveness in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, and the Arab-Israeli situation remained at status quo with the Palestinian intifada developing from 1987 onward. In Iran, following the fall of the shah in 1979 and the U.S. hostage crisis of 1979–80, the Iranian theocracy remained hostile to the West. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continued in power with Soviet support, while the Iran-Iraq War continued for most of the decade between 1980 and 1988, including a “tanker war” component. In Afghanistan, civil war raged from 1979 until 1989, during which U.S.-backed insurgents fought the communist government and Soviet forces, which became increasingly bogged down.

In Africa, General Siad Barre continued to rule in Somalia and in 1989 an anti-U.S. Islamic army faction came to power in Sudan. In Libya, the anti-Western Gadhafi regime continued in power and was responsible for backing terrorist bombings, including the bombing of a Pan American Airlines plane over Scotland in 1988. In 1986, the United States conducted air strikes on Libya, but most of America’s NATO allies did not support these operations and denied the U.S. base access and overflight permission.

In the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro’s Cuba remained antagonistic to the United States. The United States invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, to oust a Cuban-backed government. In Haiti, “Baby Doc” Duvalier was ousted, and civil unrest followed in 1986.

In other dimensions of the global scene, there was a slow rise in reported climatic and natural humanitarian disasters across the world. Reports of piratical attacks on merchant shipping were beginning to be heard from places like the Strait of Malacca, but they appeared insignificant at this point.

National Security Developments within the United States during the 1980s

The 1980s were predominantly the years of Republican president Ronald Reagan. His first term of office, from 1981 to 1985, was marked by initiatives against the Soviet Union, while his second term, from 1985 to 1989, was marked by a gradual relaxation of the anti-Soviet stance. His Republican Party successor from 1989 to 1993, President George H. W. Bush, was principally concerned with managing the end of the Cold War era and the transition to the follow-on period. During most of this period there was divided control of the Congress, with the Democrats controlling the House of Representatives and the Republicans controlling the Senate from 1981 to 1987.

Reagan’s presidency was marked by the resurgence of strong domestic popular support for the U.S. armed forces, but with the end of the Cold War in sight by the late 1980s there developed a strong popular desire for a “peace dividend,” to be found in cutting the funding for national defense.
TABLE 1
Key Figures for National Security and Naval Policy, 1981–90

| Secretaries of the Navy | John F. Lehman, Jr., 5 February 1981–10 April 1987
|                    | James H. Webb, Jr., 1 May 1987–23 February 1988
| Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | General David C. Jones, USAF, 21 June 1978–18 June 1982
|                    | General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, 18 June 1982–30 September 1985
|                    | Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, 1 October 1985–30 September 1989
|                    | General Colin Powell, USA, 1 October 1989–30 September 1993
| Chiefs of Naval Operations | Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, 1 July 1978–30 June 1982
|                    | Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, 1 July 1986–29 June 1990

In 1981, the Department of Defense’s expenditure represented 5.1 percent of the gross domestic product; the department’s total overall allocation was $422 billion (as expressed in constant Fiscal Year 2009 dollars). This rose in 1983 to 6 percent, with an allocation of $495 billion, and was at 5.9 percent, the highest allocation of the decade, $539 billion, in 1985. From that point, these figures gradually decreased to 5.6 percent in 1988, $514 billion in the last year of Reagan’s presidency, and 5.1 percent, with $489 billion, in 1990.

The overall approach of the United States to its national security situation in the 1980s was initially to continue its focus on one overarching global threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The administration’s initial goal was to oppose and even roll back the Soviet Union through greatly increased U.S. defense spending that involved significant military pay raises in 1980 and 1981. In this, the Department of Defense placed its primary focus for planning and force sizing on the contingency of having to deal with the Soviets in the European theater and supporting NATO. At the same time, the Department of Defense had come to agree with the Navy’s opinion that
such a war would be a global war, with a significant Asia-Pacific dimension. The Defense Department’s planning scenario postulated that the war would start in Southwest Asia and spread, but the Navy felt that such a scenario was an ill-advised one on which to concentrate exclusively. At the same time, the U.S. intelligence community was unusually confident and united in its assessment of the Soviet naval threat, as expressed in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-15-82D of 15 November 1982. Some of the strategic problems and ideas that eventually emerged in the Maritime Strategy were already being discussed at the highest levels of the government. As early as 18 May 1982, President Reagan recorded in his personal diary,

Lunched with Joint Chfs of Staff and Cap W[einberger]. It was a good meeting with a sound discussion of strategic problems—for example—the importance of the sea above Norway and what Iceland means in the Navy strategy should there be conflict on the NATO front.

As the United States conducted a variety of different small-crisis operations during the decade—in Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Central America, Libya, and the Persian Gulf—the confrontation between the United States and Iran continued. The United States showed some preference for supporting Iraq in the parallel Iran-Iraq War. During the 1980s the Defense Department also made some small improvements in its counterinsurgency capabilities. In other areas, in response to Soviet deployment of mobile medium- and intermediate-range missiles, the United States deployed Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and BGM-109G Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) to Europe in 1983–84, but this deployment was reversed by the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty negotiations in 1985–87. In the 1980s, the United States resisted proposals for conventional naval arms control but led with proposals for the establishment of a voluntary international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In terms of new defense technological developments, the Chief of Naval Operations, his staff (OPNAV), and naval research and development played a major role in the Reagan administration’s ballistic-missile defense policy and the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

As terrorism incidents began to rise and require responses from the United States, the State Department fine-tuned its 1979 list of state sponsors of terrorism, which at that point included Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. In 1982, it dropped Iraq and added Cuba; in 1984 it added Iran; and in 1988, it listed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China began to normalize in the years following the U.S. formal recognition of China in 1979 and that same year the Taiwan Relations Act, which required the United States to maintain the capacity to protect Taiwan. U.S. military assistance to Taiwan was henceforth limited only to defensive arms. By the mid-1980s, Washington was providing assistance for mainland Chinese military modernization.
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created major developments that fundamentally changed Department of Defense command relationships. Most important among them was the enhancement of the roles of the regional and functional unified and specified joint combatant commanders in chief at the expense of the service chiefs, including the Chief of Naval Operations. The act also enhanced the advisory powers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the individual service chiefs and created a new four-star position for a vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, it mandated joint duty for all officers, including naval officers, and mandated a requirement for the president to provide Congress with an annual Presidential National Security Strategy Review.

Along with these changes came a series of major changes in the combatant and Navy component commands. The first of these was the establishment of the U.S. Central Command in 1983, with its naval component command, to deal with the geographical areas that stretched from Egypt and Israel, over the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf, to Pakistan. At the same time, Africa south of the Sahara remained the responsibility of the U.S. European Command, with its naval component. These changes were followed in 1985 with the reestablishment of a naval component for U.S. Southern Command to deal with Latin America. In 1985, the U.S. Space Command was also established, with its naval component, Naval Space Command. In 1987, the U.S. Special Operations Command was established, with its naval component, Naval Special Warfare Command. Also in 1987, the U.S. Transportation Command was established, bringing under it the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Forces Command. Most of these changes were opposed by the Navy, which saw them as threats to the necessary operational autonomy of naval commanders. All of these changes had a direct impact on the Navy, which itself saw numerous internal developments.

**Developments within the U.S. Navy during the 1980s**

In the 1980s, the U.S. Navy was clearly the world’s strongest naval force, but it was challenged by a very strong Soviet navy. Throughout the decade, the U.S. Navy continued extensive, varied global operations and exercises. At home, the Navy's budget allocation rose incrementally until the middle of the decade, after which it remained steady before beginning to decline from 1988. In total funding allocation, the Navy Department (including the Marine Corps) usually received incrementally more than the departments of the Army or Air Force, but its allocation was closely matched by the Air Force’s, which exceeded the Navy’s in 1984 and 1985.

In the period between 1981 and 1988, the U.S. Navy’s force structure goal was the “six-hundred-ship navy,” which would comprise fifteen carrier battle groups (CVBGs), four battleship surface action groups, one hundred nuclear-powered attack submarines
SSNs), ballistic-missile submarines, amphibious-force ships capable of carrying and landing a Marine amphibious force (MAF) as well as a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB), one hundred to 110 frigates, and thirty-one mine countermeasures ships, with sufficient auxiliary support ships, such as repair tenders, fleet oilers, and supply ships, for a force of this size. In addition, the plan called for fourteen active carrier air wings (CVW) of aircraft and two reserve carrier air wings.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations funded large new fast sealift and prepositioning forces to support global Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps operations, especially in Southwest Asia. Included in the new sealift force were two T-AH hospital ships, designed for wartime duty but capable of peacetime and crisis response operations as well. The 1987 maiden transoceanic cruise of USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) was, in fact, a humanitarian assistance deployment.

The nation’s basic naval deployment strategy was similar to that of the preceding three decades—to have two permanent ready fleets in home waters, one on each coast, which could surge forward if required, and two permanent forward fleets, one that was forward deployed (in the Mediterranean) and the other forward based (in the western Pacific). The Navy planned aggressive forward operations with its SSNs and deployed its SSBNs within range of their wartime targets. During this period, the Navy—together with the Coast Guard—also developed a renewed focus on defense of home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget Authority</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>$57,446,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>$68,607,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>$81,534,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$81,709,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>$99,015,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$99,977,000,000</td>
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TABLE 3
U.S. Navy Active-Ship Force Levels, 1981–90

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<td>Destroyers</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
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<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>117</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface warships</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total active</td>
<td>521*</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>SSBNs</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>Command ships</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface warships</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total active</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>594*</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The high (1987) and the low (1981) total figures for active warships.
All figures are shown as of the end of the fiscal year for each year: 30 September.
waters. In addition, a forward hub of operations was developed in the Indian Ocean to maintain permanent, combat-credible presence in that area of operations.

Fleet operations during the 1980s were greatly enhanced by the experience gained by the Navy in operating the numerous transformational new ship, aircraft, and weapons systems that had entered and were entering the fleet from the mid-1970s on: F-14 and S-3 aircraft; *Los Angeles*- and *Ohio*-class submarines; *Nimitz*-class carriers; *Ticonderoga*-class cruisers, *Spruance*-class destroyers, and *Perry*-class frigates; the *Tarawa*-class general-purpose landing helicopter amphibious assault ships (LHAs), and the air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC); and Aegis and Tomahawk missile systems (to name only the most prominent). To fight all these new systems required revolutionary new operational methods, especially the Composite Warfighting Concept. This concept’s categorization of naval operations at sea by warfare task was also reflected in a new naval “warfare appraisal” process back in Washington, similarly organized and aimed at influencing the Navy’s program and budget decisions, as well as in the organization of several versions of the Maritime Strategy.

Among the services, the Navy’s strength in manpower increased slightly across the decade, to more than five hundred thousand total active-duty men and women, but then began to decrease from 1989. The active manpower strength of the Marine Corps remained relatively constant at under two hundred thousand during the decade, while the Coast Guard remained steady at around forty thousand.

During most of the decade, the Navy and Marine Corps maintained close relations. They carried out routine operations together, as well as crisis-response operations with

### Table 4

*Inventory of Active Aircraft, 1981–88*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL INVENTORY</th>
<th>TOTAL OPERATING</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6,327</td>
<td>4,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6,269</td>
<td>4,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>6,118</td>
<td>4,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6,025</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>6,222</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6,338</td>
<td>4,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6,313</td>
<td>4,356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5
U.S. Navy Personnel Strength, 1981–90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>NURSES</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>OFFICER CANDIDATES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>64,580</td>
<td>2,713</td>
<td>466,388</td>
<td>5,541</td>
<td>536,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>66,579</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>475,147</td>
<td>5,582</td>
<td>547,308</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>68,764</td>
<td>2,744</td>
<td>489,495</td>
<td>5,361</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>70,382</td>
<td>2,896</td>
<td>497,837</td>
<td>5,298</td>
<td>573,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>71,079</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>503,072</td>
<td>5,443</td>
<td>579,594</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>72,890</td>
<td>3,029</td>
<td>510,713</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>589,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>74,064</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>523,071</td>
<td>5,608</td>
<td>602,743</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>74,115</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>523,106</td>
<td>5,395</td>
<td>602,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>74,374</td>
<td>2,989</td>
<td>526,018</td>
<td>5,410</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>74,557</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>525,159</td>
<td>5,707</td>
<td>605,423</td>
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</table>


forward-deployed Marine Corps units in U.S. Navy ships. Both services focused on the NATO flanks and the Soviet Far East in their operational planning. Their close relationship was further demonstrated when both services opted to buy and fly F/A-18 C/D aircraft. This allowed for an easy collaboration on the early versions of the Maritime Strategy between 1982 and 1986, with Marine Corps Commandants General Robert Barrow and General P. X. Kelley working closely with their counterpart Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward and Admiral James Watkins. These early versions of the Maritime Strategy reflected the Marines’ development of over-the-horizon assault and prepositioning concepts that culminated in the Amphibious Warfare Strategy of 1985 and General Kelley’s article in the Proceedings Maritime Strategy insert of January 1986.

Toward the end of the decade, the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps began to drift apart. As the global scene began to change, the Marine Corps Commandant from 1987 to 1991, General Al Gray, refocused the Marine Corps on warfighting contingencies in the third world to replace the earlier focus on anti-Soviet operations in NATO and northeastern Pacific campaigns. Emphasizing these changes of focus in 1988, the Marine Corps replaced the term it used to describe its own forces, shifting from “amphibious forces” to “expeditionary forces.” Its Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) became “special operations capable,” but unlike the U.S. Navy’s SEALs, the Marine Corps was not included in the new U.S. Special Operations Command. In 1989, the Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, shifted its focus to maneuver warfare. Additional changes showed the Marine Corps desire to increase its autonomy from—and equality with—
the Navy, with the appointment of the first Marine Corps general as a joint unified commander, as well as the renaming and reorganization of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command to be the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in 1987. Subsequently, a new Marine Corps University was established in 1989 and a new Marine Corps War College in 1990.

In the early 1980s, the U.S. Coast Guard was under the Department of Transportation and did not participate in the Reagan administration’s big defense-budget and military-manpower increases. Nevertheless, the historical link between the two services had not been forgotten. In 1980, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward and Coast Guard Commandant John B. Hayes initiated the establishment of a Navy–Coast Guard board for policy coordination. In 1984, a memorandum of agreement was signed between the two services to establish Maritime Defense Zones (MARDEZs) for port security, harbor defense, and coastal warfare. When activated in wartime, the Coast Guard area commanders would report to the U.S. Navy’s fleet commanders as MARDEZ commanders. The development of joint Navy–Coast Guard counterdrug operations, with Coast Guard personnel deployed in U.S. Navy ships starting in 1982, facilitated increasing cooperation and interrelationships between the two services. By the end of the decade in 1989, Coast Guard flag officers were leading drug-interdiction joint task forces under both the Atlantic and Pacific commanders in chief. The Navy and Coast Guard also worked together dealing with the boatloads of refugees from Cuba in May 1980; the recovery operations following the Soviet shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL-007 in September 1983; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaskan waters in March 1989.

The decade of the 1980s saw increased dialogue and cooperation between the Navy and the Air Force, with memorandums of agreement on various subjects being signed between the two services in 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1988. Many in the Air Force—especially in the Pacific—saw the Maritime Strategy as complementary to their own evolving concepts. Nevertheless, the Navy of the 1980s strongly preferred to plan for and exercise coordinated, cooperative, and deconflicted (but separate) sea-based antiair and strike campaigns rather than integrated tactical aviation (TACAIR) over-land and overseas operations under one powerful central operational theater air commander, who would probably often be, in many important scenarios, a U.S. Air Force officer.

In 1986, in the most significant joint operation between the Vietnam War and the Gulf wars, the Navy and the Air Force conducted simultaneous joint strike operations in Libya. In that operation, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force made geographically separate strikes under separate commands, but care was taken to deconflict each service’s operations from interfering with one another. In 1987–88, during Operations
EARNEST WILL and PRAYING MANTIS, Air Force tankers refueled naval tactical aircraft operating over the Gulf and Air Force transport aircraft carried Marine Corps units to forward positions. In 1985–89, Air Force B-52 aircraft based at Loring Air Force Base in Maine and Anderson Air Force Base on Guam became fully capable of using the Harpoon air-to-surface antiship missile. As joint commands began to proliferate, key supporting components of the U.S. Navy came under Air Force general officers, with the Naval Space Command under Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command and the MSC under Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command.

In the 1980s, oceangoing sea transport for the armed forces had become an important issue for the Navy. In 1981, the position of Commander, Military Sealift Command, was restored to three-star rank and in 1984 Secretary of the Navy Lehman declared that military sealift was a distinct naval function, along with sea control and power projection. As military development and control for military cargoes became in this period the favored approach over the earlier reliance on subsidized commercial shipping, a new Strategic Sealift Office (OP-42) was established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. While there was an increase in government and privately owned American-flag ships suitable for military cargoes as plans moved ahead to create a fast sealift fleet with thirty-seven vessels and to expand prepositioned fleets, the Navy also planned to continue to use allied shipping. A preposition force was established in the Indian Ocean in 1980, with seven ships on station at Diego Garcia and an afloat staff. In 1983, plans were made for three Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons to support the Marine Corps, with additional ships for support of the Army and Air Force. In the early 1980s, the Navy took a number of additional steps to support these moves. These included converting containerships to crane ships (T-ACSs), which were placed for future use in the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, and developing other sealift-enhancement features to adapt containerships for military use.

In 1981, the Maritime Administration was moved from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Transportation. The total number of ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (renamed a Force in 1982) rose from 303 in 1980 to a high of 386 in 1984, and then began to fall, reaching 329 in 1990. At the same time, the ships within that force designed for rapid sealift deployment rose steadily from twenty-four in 1980 to sixty-five in 1985 and ninety-six in 1990. Beginning in 1983, the Office of Management and Budget encouraged government reliance on the commercial sector. This development was paralleled by the continued transfer of the Navy’s Combat Logistics Force ships to the Military Sealift Command’s civilian-manned naval fleet auxiliary force, contracting out the operation of MSC special mission ships, and placing into service eighteen Military Sealift Command Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) ships between 1984 and 1990. In October 1989, the new Bush administration issued National Security
Directive 28 on sealift, giving broad policy guidance to support the American ocean- shipping industry.

A depression in merchant shipping continued until late in the 1980s with the U.S.-flag commercial merchant marine comprising only 4 to 5 percent of world fleet tonnage, steadily declining from 849 oceangoing vessels of over a thousand gross tons in 1980 to 748 in 1985 and 635 in 1990. At the same time, merchant shipping effectively under U.S. control also declined precipitously, dropping from 466 vessels in 1982 to 326 in 1986 and to 228 in 1989, as a 1986 tax law acted to reduce American investment in U.S.-owned foreign-flagged vessels. Paralleling this, the overall number of American merchant mariners also continued to drop, from 19,600 in 1980 and 13,100 in 1985 to 11,100 in 1990. These trends caused concern within the Navy, as the activation of the Ready Reserve Force was contingent on the availability of American civilian merchant mariners.

Additionally, the American shipbuilding industry was also in decline. Although the Navy was building ten to twenty-three ships each year during the 1980s, the construction of merchant shipping in the United States dropped sharply, from some twenty ships in 1980 to none between 1988 and 1990.

The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s was produced by officers of the U.S. Navy in the context of international events and through a careful appreciation of the capabilities of the Soviet naval threat in that decade, along with American national security concerns and developments within the U.S. Navy and its sister services and agencies. It was the product of the complex interaction of many broad forces affecting the Navy, both externally and internally. The Maritime Strategy established a general approach to the most effective use of naval forces in the context of a range of specific maritime situations that American naval planners considered the most likely if a major war with the Soviet Union were to occur in the 1980s. In their time, the maritime-strategy documents created for the Navy a consensus approach that filled a need for clarity and consolidation of thinking in a way that naval leaders found well aligned with thinking within the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as with national defense policies.

Notes


2. See ibid., chap. 2. See also Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.), and Capt. William Manthorpe, USN (Ret.), “Setting the Record Straight: A Critical Review of Full
from Glory,” Naval Intelligence Professional’s Quarterly 12, no. 2 (April 1996).


15. The article duly appeared in the Naval War College Review (Spring 1988), pp. 7–28, but through a printer’s error two pairs of pages were exchanged inadvertently. The Review issued an erratum notice pointing out that the text on page 18 should have been on page 17, page 17 should have been page 18, and that the text on page 22 should have been on page 21, while that on page 21 should have been on page 22. A fully corrected version with an updated bibliography and small changes appeared in John B. Hattendorf, Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays (Malabar, Fla.: Krieger, 2000), pp. 201–28. This corrected version should be used in preference to the original version.


Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982)

This document comprises the original prepared text and Vu-Graph slides for the first major briefing of the Maritime Strategy, on 4 November 1982. *Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-06), gave the secret-level briefing to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins, and Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow.

The idea to prepare such a briefing can be traced to a series of three memorandums sent by Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William N. Small. † The first, in December 1981, was addressed to the director of Navy Program Planning and suggested that the Navy needed to change its planning process so that a clear strategic plan drove the process for ships and weapons acquisition instead of the kind of analysis that stressed the worst-case scenario. Then, on 1 March 1982, Admiral Small sent a memorandum to the director of the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-95), Rear Admiral William R. Smedberg IV, and OP-06, then Vice Admiral Sylvester Foley, in which he pointed out that strategic thinking seemed to be dormant in the Navy but that type of thinking might change current assumptions about future needs and should be a shared responsibility between their two offices. Reacting to this, Smedberg and Foley agreed that Foley’s office should take the lead in preparing a briefing on maritime strategy and fleet employment options in the event of a war. While these memos created consensus about the need for such a strategic vision, Admiral Small signed on 2 August 1982 another memo that directly resulted in the preparation of this briefing. This memo, drafted by Rear Admiral John A. Baldwin in Systems Analysis Division (OP-96), was sent to all four flag officers directly concerned with developing the forthcoming annual program objective memorandum, or POM, which set the Navy’s budget objectives. In this memo Admiral Small repeated his earlier

* This document was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 16 July 2007.

thoughts on the need for a strategic appraisal as the basis for defining the Navy’s goals and objectives. As the draft memorandum went through the chain of command en route to Small’s signature, Vice Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, the director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090), commented on the route-slip, “We really need this to get the entire OPNAV [i.e., Chief of Naval Operations] staff moving in the same direction.”*

The memo was passed to the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), headed by Captain Elizabeth Wylie. Within that office, she selected Lieutenant Commander Stanley Weeks as the action officer. Taking it on initially as another routine chore, he soon found that it was turning into a massive project to connect national strategy with defense programming. As the complexity and scope of the project became plain, Commander W. Spencer Johnson was assigned, so as to create a team effort. Johnson was the officer within OP-06 who coordinated the policy issues with the programs and budget process with the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense, while Weeks had recently staffed Secretary of the Navy Lehman’s Posture Statement to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on 8 February 1982. For Weeks and Johnson, Lehman’s concept of a six-hundred-ship Navy based around fifteen carrier battle groups provided background, but it was not the sole source for the briefing they developed. A number of other concepts were involved, including the current war plans that the various fleet commanders in chief had developed, the basic directives on current national defense policy, and up-to-date intelligence estimates of the Soviet threat. In developing this briefing, Johnson and Weeks received inputs from a variety of people, including Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Commander Kenneth McGruther, and later Commander Thomas Marfiak.

Before this briefing was given on 4 November 1982, early versions were briefed to the OPNAV Program Development Review Committee and the Chief of Naval Operations’ Executive Panel. Meanwhile, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, Jr., called each joint commander in chief to come to Washington and brief him on the concept of operations that lay behind the war plans for each respective theater. Johnson and Weeks were able to obtain the briefings for the Atlantic and Pacific and thus to understand the essence of the latest thinking of each operational commander in chief for his area; they were able to work relevant ideas into their maritime strategy briefing.

At the annual conference of the fleet commanders in chief, which took place at the Naval War College on 26–29 October 1982, the fleet commanders in chief collectively agreed that the maritime strategy brief should be presented to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Warmly received at the 4 November briefing, the document took on a new life of its own. As a result, a project that had begun two months before to produce merely another document to support the budgetary program and planning process was suddenly catapulted into recognition as the U.S. Navy’s strategy.

* Quoted in ibid., p. 67.
1. Good morning Mr Secretary, General Barrow, Admiral Watkins, gentlemen. The purpose of this presentation is to provide a framework for subsequent discussion on maritime strategy.

2. This vugraph outlines the major elements of today’s discussion. The first part will provide the overall national guidance within which we must construct our maritime strategy.

3. **MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE**
   - NATIONAL STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS
     - NATIONAL STRATEGY GUIDANCE
   - CURRENT FORCE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR
     - CINCS WARPLANS/PREFERENCES
     - GLOBAL WARRIING STRATEGY
       - ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
       - NOTIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENTS
       - COMPLICATING FACTORS


   NSDD-32 is the presidential directive which establishes our global objectives and priorities and was issued by the president on 20 May of this year. The global strategy objectives it contains are displayed here.

5. (NSDD-32) As you see, in NSDD-32 the likelihood of any war with the Soviets being a global war is explicitly acknowledged, but due to our limited capabilities and resource constraints, planning for prioritized, sequential operations is directed. It is
implicit in the presidential directive that no theater is to be relinquished to the Soviets by default.

NSDD 32
PRIORITIES FOR WARTIME RESOURCE ALLOCATION

“DUE TO THE GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGIC THEATERS, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ANY US SOVIET CONFLICT WOULD EXPAND BEYOND ONE THEATER TO OTHER THEATERS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND PLANNED FOR. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGE SOVIET FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY ON ALL FRONTS. RATHER, THIS MEANS PROCUREMENT BALANCED FORCES AND ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS AMONG THEATERS TO ENSURE THAT WE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ALLIES, APPLY OUR MILITARY POWER IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY.”

NSDD 32
REGIONAL PRIORITIES FOR WARTIME PLANNING

- NORTH AMERICA
- NATO AND SUPPORTING LOCS
- ACCESS TO OIL IN SWA
- DEFENSE OF PACIFIC ALLIES AND LOCS FOR IO AND PACIFIC OCEAN
- DEFENSE OF FRIENDLY NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA

CAVEAT: POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATIONS AT THE TIME OF WAR WILL BEAR HEAVILY ON STRATEGIC DECISIONS

In considering these priorities it is important to note that, first, these priorities for planning have been established by presidential directive and are the same as those contained in the DG. Secondly, the documents acknowledge that the political and military situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions that may alter these priorities. Now let’s go to the defense guidance.

7 (DG P27–28) The defense guidance provides more detailed guidance from the Secretary of Defense on our military priorities and objectives. It also provides both peacetime and wartime strategic guidance. The peacetime strategy guidelines contained in the DG are summarized in this vugraph. The emphasis on forward deployment of our forces and surge deployment capabilities underscores the fact that US strategy is a forward one.
8 (DG P30) The DG provides wartime strategic guidance in three categories: (1) conflict not involving Soviet forces; (2) conflict involving the USSR; and (3) global conflict. In a conflict not involving Soviet forces we see emphasis placed on limiting the scope of the conflict, a dependence on our allies to provide combat forces, and a clear reluctance to introduce US ground combat forces. Navy, Marine and air forces, on the other hand, play a significant role.

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DEFENSE GUIDANCE
PEACETIME STRATEGY GUIDELINES

- CONVENTIONAL FORCES
  - FORWARD DEPLOYMENT EMPHASIZED
  - ABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY WHERE NECESSARY
- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: SUFFICIENT FOR RETALIATION AFTER SOVIET FIRST STRIKE
- THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES:
  - FORWARD DEPLOYED
  - CAN PLAN FOR FIRST USE, RELEASE WILL BE NEITHER IMMEDIATE NOR AUTOMATIC
- CW: DETER BY DEVELOPING CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE IN KIND AND TO OPERATE IN CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT

9 (DG P30–31) For a conflict involving the Soviet Union, shown here, two sub-categories are defined: first aggression in areas of US advantage and, second, in areas of Soviet advantage. In the latter case, emphasis is placed on counter offensive operations and war-widening options. The likelihood that such a conflict would become global in nature is acknowledged in the next to last objective.
10 (DG P32) The global conflict strategy guidelines contained in the DG are provided in order of the regional planning priorities. We see that naval forces have a key role to play in our own hemisphere, a role made more difficult by the growing capabilities of a strategically located Soviet proxy in Cuba, the unstable nature of Central America, and the great distance to the South Atlantic SLOCs.

11 (DG P32) In the NATO-European theater, naval and air forces have, as first order of business, the control of the North Atlantic SLOCs. A key role is assigned in securing the flanks of the Northern and Southern region, affecting the weight of attack the Soviets may bring to bear on the Central Front.
12 (DG P33) In the Southwest Asia region naval and air forces are tasked to establish air and sea superiority, confront the Soviet attack, and defend Arabian Peninsula oil resources.

**DEFENSE GUIDANCE**
**GLOBAL CONFLICT**
**SOUTHWEST ASIA**

- Establish naval and air superiority in region
- Special ops forces impede Soviet advance until US ground forces introduced
- US forces rapidly projected to confront Soviet attack and assist regional allies in defense of oil fields and Arabian Peninsula

13 (DG P31-32) In the Pacific, the SLOCs from the West Coast to the Persian Gulf must be controlled. Offensive operations to tie down Soviet forces in a defensive role would be undertaken, and counter-offensives against Vietnam, the Soviet coast and North Korea staged.

**DEFENSE GUIDANCE**
**GLOBAL CONFLICT**
**PACIFIC**

- Defend Alaska, Hawaii and CONUS LOCS
- Naval and air forces control East and South China Sea and LOCS to Persian Gulf
- Conduct offensive operations to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities
- Exploit opportunities for counteroffensives against N. Korea, Vietnam, and Soviet coastal areas

14 (DG P34) In Africa, naval and air forces would again carry a major burden in carrying out our strategy.

**DEFENSE GUIDANCE**
**GLOBAL CONFLICT**
**AFRICA**

- Employ air and naval forces to neutralize Soviet or hostile forces in strategic locations
- Protect access to and deny Soviet use of resources, key facilities, and LOCS.

[Presentation omits items 15 and 16.]
17 (DG P43) Force planning guidance in the DG section is by service. You see here Navy planning guidance goals. The force planning section of the DG recognizes that our limited current force capabilities lag significantly the ambitious strategy goals we have just reviewed. The DG Navy planning guidance goals, shown here, lay out the requirements for our naval forces—these will also bound our global maritime strategy.

**DEFENSE GUIDANCE**

**NAVY PLANNING GUIDANCE GOALS**

FULL ACCESS TO SLOCS AND SUPPORTING CAMPAIGNS ON LAND:
- Seek out and destroy enemy naval forces
- Control vital sea areas and protect vital SLOCS
- Provide sealift for power projection and mobility
- Establish and maintain local superiority
- Seize and defend advanced naval bases
- Conduct land or air operations as essential to success of naval campaign
- Provide reinforcing firepower to land forces
- Suppress enemy sea commerce

18 (DG P43) More specific DG planning guidance is shown in this vugraph.

**DEFENSE GUIDANCE**

**NAVY FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE**

- Objective is regaining essential margin of maritime superiority
- Forces should be sized on the basis of warfighting requirements
- Procurement plans based on:
  - 14 CVBG
  - BB
  - Requisite SSNs and surface combatants
  - Amphibious lift for AE of MAF plus MAB
  - Essential support ships
- Readiness and sustainability top priority
- SWA force requirements specified
  - Up to 3 CVBG
  - MPS/NTPS for 2 MAB by end FY 84; 3 MAB by FY 87

19 From the foregoing, it is apparent that our force limitations require a prioritization of our strategic objectives and a sequencing of our offensive operations—a fact that the DG recognizes as necessary and the JCS continue to reiterate. This completes
our treatment of NSDD-32 and the DG. We will now turn to a more specific consideration of war plan requirements and current naval force employment.

**MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE**

- NATIONAL STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS
  - NATIONAL STRATEGY GUIDANCE
- CURRENT FORCE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR
  - CINCs WARPLANS/PREFERENCES
  - GLOBAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
    - ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
    - NOTIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENTS
    - COMPLICATING FACTORS

The gap that our CINCs must bridge is between that “reasonable assurance” naval force of 22 deployed carriers, derived from the CINCs’ requirements statements, and this real-world force of 13 deployable carriers, only 11 of which (6 Atlantic, 5 Pacific) are actually available in the first weeks of conflict. Our presentation assumes full readiness for our deployable forces and the degree of sustainability necessary to ensure their fighting capability for a protracted period.

**AVAILABLE FORCES**

This vugraph summarizes how we will assume that the Soviets posture their threat on a global scale. *(Read)*
This vugraph summarizes the likely contribution of allied naval forces in a global conflict. Despite the real assistance these allied forces provide in covering their local or regional waters they may contribute only modestly to the U.S. Navy’s forward offensive counter to the global Soviet blue-water threat. (Read) Nevertheless, we must ensure that our allies’ capabilities are strengthened insofar as possible and their forces fully integrated into our plans and operations.

**ALLIED NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS**

- **OVERALL:** ALLIED NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS ASSIST IN COVERING LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.
- **PACIFIC:** JAPANESE (NEAR HOME WATERS) ASW, ESCORT, MCM; ASSIST MINING OF SOJ EXITS. ANZUS ALLIES ASW, ESCORT, TACAIR CONTRIBUTION IN SE ASIA, SOUTH PACIFIC.
- **INDIAN OCEAN:** LIMITED ASW/ESCORT AUGMENTATION FROM ANY IN-PLACE FRENCH, UK, AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND FORCES.
- **ATLANTIC/BALTIC:** ASW, ESCORT, AND MCM IN EASTLANT/ENGLISH CHANNEL/ NORTHERN NORWEGIAN SEA. FRG/DENMARK MINING OF BALTIC EXITS, SS OPS IN BALTIC.
- **MEDITERRANEAN:** POTENTIAL FRENCH CV SUPPORT AND SS OPS IN WESTMED. SPANISH, ITALIAN, GREEK, TURKISH SURFACE, SUBSURFACE, AND MCM CONTRIBUTION IN OWN REGIONS OF MED. TURKISH MINING OF BLACK SEA EXITS.

The **CINC**s are responsible for developing their general war plans, based on the taskings and force allocations in the JSCP. Although all three principal CINC’s are presently tasked to provide war plans without augmentation, until very recently each CINC’s general warplan has been based on conflict originating in his theater, with augmentation by swing forces from other theaters.
Adding up (on the diagonal in the orange) the CINCs’ existing general war plans, with these augmentation forces, we find a total of 10 carrier battle groups in Europe, 3 in SWA, and 9 in the Pacific to fight a global war. We don’t have this total of 22 carrier battle groups, and in fact have only 11 of the 13 shown in the JSCP available in the first weeks of conflict. Thus, our current force maritime strategy for a near-simultaneous global war cannot be simply the sum of existing CINCs’ general warplans.

CONCLUSION
MARITIME STRATEGY FOR NEAR-SIMULTANEOUS GLOBAL WAR IS NOT THE SUM OF CINCS’ CURRENT PLANS.

The Joint Chiefs have recently emphasized the need to plan for a war which would rapidly become global. CINCLANT and CINCPAC have now been tasked to supplement their current general war OPLANs with OPLANs for the employment of unaugmented forces. However, naval forces required for operations in the IO will have to come from LANT and PAC assets.

First we will review each CINC’s strategy and perspectives in his theater.

This vugraph summarizes the force deployments in the current CINCLANT general warplan. (Pause) CINCLANT emphasizes early establishment of sea control in the Atlantic and the key role that the defense of Iceland and Norway assumes in this strategy. Note the importance of early deployment to Iceland of Marine ground forces and additional Air Force fighter squadrons and AWACS. Keeping the majority of Soviet forces confined north of the GIN Gap is essential to limit our own force requirements.
The force employment concept for CINCLANT’s CVBGs is highlighted here. (Pause)

CINCLANT CVBG EMPLOYMENT

- IN BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF GIN GAP, POSITION FOUR CVBGS TO INTERDICT SOVIET FORCES TRANSITING S. NORWEGIAN SEA
  - ESTABLISH CLEAR AIR SUPERIORITY IN NORWEGIAN SEANORTH ATLANTIC WITH:
    - EARLY ARRIVAL OF 2 CVBGS SOUTH OF GIN GAP
    - DELAYED ARRIVAL OF 3RD CVBG (AFTER CUBAN/CARIBBEAN/SOLANT TASKING)
    - 4TH CVBG (DEPENDENT ON MEDIOPACOM TASKING)

CINCLANT’s convoy strategy depends initially on independent sailing on the southern route, followed by convoy escort from Madeira north. This southern route strategy is necessary because of an escort shortage of 65 to 103 ships. Admiral Trost* recently highlighted this shortage in forwarding the escort requirements study. Defense of the

CONVOY STRATEGY

- AZORES ESSENTIAL
  - ELIMINATE SOVIET AIR AND SUB THREAT SOUTH OF 40 DEGREES NORTH
  - ALLOWS INITIAL SHIPPING TO SAIL INDEPENDENTLY TO MADEIRA, THEN CONVOYS NORTH
  - WHEN PACOM AUGMENTATION (6 CGS, 29 DD/FF/DDG/FFG) RECEIVED, CONVOYS FROM PUERTO RICO TO MADEIRA, THEN NORTH

* Vice Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost was then serving as director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090).
Azores, as a vital base to support our sea and air LOCs, and holding the Soviet air and sub threat north of 40 degrees are prerequisites to this LOC defense strategy. Here you see CINCLANT’s concerns about prompt neutralization of Cuba. (Pause)

CUBA

- PREVENT CUBAN ATTACK OF VITAL SHIPPING
  - HALF OF INITIAL SHIPPING TO NATO FROM GULF PORTS

- NEUTRALIZE CUBAN THREAT EARLY
  - PERMITS TRANSIT OF SHIPPING, RELEASES FORCES
  - WORST CASE IS CUBA DECLARES NEUTRALITY, WAITS UNTIL US FORCES REDEPLOYED, THEN ATTACKS

- CINCLANT FORCES AVAILABLE:
  - NAVAL FORCES DIVERTED FROM OTHER TASKS
  - 2 USAF B-52 SQUADRONS

CINCLANT’s strategic priorities for support of his Atlantic maritime strategy are summarized here.

CINCLANT’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

1. SUPPORT FOR ICELAND AND NORWAY
2. SUPPORT FOR MID-ATLANTIC LOC (AZORES)
3. PROTECTION IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION
4. PROTECTION OF SOUTH ATLANTIC

In the Mediterranean and southern region of NATO, these are CINCUSNAVEUR’s tasks. (Pause) Here is CINCUSNAVEUR’s concept of maritime operations to carry out those tasks. Note the importance of early Marine and Air Force TACAIR and AWACS deployments, as well as potential allied land-based TACAIR support, to help attrite the Soviet air threat. This concept emphasizes early positioning of CVBGs in the central
Med, then moving east for offensive operations as the Soviet threat is attrited. Note the threat posed by Soviet forces operating from Libyan bases—a threat that only the Sixth Fleet is prepared to counter since Libya lies south of NATO planning boundaries.

CINCUSNAVEUR CONCEPT OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

- Position CVBGS in CENTMED
- USMC/USAF TACAIR to TURKEY/GREECE/ITALY
- Locate and trail SOVIET SSNs
- TURKISH CLOSURE OF STRAITS
- COUNTERATTACK IMMEDIATE SOVMEDFLT THREAT
- AWACS/US AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SAM BARRIERS ATTRITE AIR THREAT FROM CRIMEA
- NEUTRALIZE SOVIET FORCES IN LIBYA IF REQUIRED
- DESTROY RESIDUAL SOVMEDFLT THREAT
- SECURE MED LOCS
- OFFENSIVE AIR/AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TO SUPPORT LAND CAMPAIGN

(Pause) The ability of our Mediterranean forces to fulfill the strategy requirements in the southern region are shown here. Note that CINCUSNAVEUR desires 4 CVBGS or additional land based TACAIR augmentation to operate with two or three CVBGS in the eastern Mediterranean.

CINCUSNAVEUR COMMENTS ON ABILITY TO EXECUTE STRATEGY

- 2 CVBGS CANNOT SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN HIGH THREAT ENVIRONMENT OF EASTMED WITHOUT EITHER:
  - EARLY CVBG AUGMENTATION
  - EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF USAF LAND-BASED TACAIR/AWACS TO GREECE, TURKEY, AND SOUTHERN ITALY
- OTHERWISE, 4 CVBGS NEEDED TO OPERATE IN EASTMED WITH “HIGH CONFIDENCE”
- ALSO NEED ADDITIONAL SSN AND MPA
Here is a summary of CINCPAC’s current General War Concept of Operations. (Pause)

CINCPAC GENERAL WARPLAN
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- DEPLOY PACOM FORCES TO ALEUTIANS, JAPAN, ROK
- DESTROY SOVIET NAVAL FORCES
- ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND ROK
- CONDUCT OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY OF HAWAII, ALEUTIANS, GUAM, LOCS
- CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST USSR
- DEPLOY MARINE, ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
- SWA/IO: PROTECT ESSENTIAL LOCS AND, WITH OTHER CINCS, COUNTER SOVIET AGGRESSION

CINCPAC stresses the importance of defense of the Aleutians. Soviet seizure of one of the Aleutian airfields could bring Hawaii and the US West Coast within easy Soviet air attack range. The early dispatch of Marine ground and land based air forces for the defense of these key islands must preclude this eventuality. Recent and future combined arms exercises in the northern Pacific will underscore the importance of defending this strategic area. Elsewhere, CINCPAC must destroy or confine Soviet naval forces in the northwest Pacific, assist our allies in Korea and Japan, control vast reaches of SLOCs, and operate in support of any SWA action. In CINCPAC’s recent presentation of his strategic concepts to the JCS, he concluded that “swing”, by redeploying over half his carriers, cruisers, destroyers and all but six of his amphibious ships, would jeopardize even the capability to defend the US. Likewise, CINCPAC also concludes that the

IMPORTANCE OF ALEUTIANS
deployment of major forces to the SWA region would prevent any forward defense in the NW Pacific.

**CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

**CINCPAC CONCLUSIONS**

- SWING "...IGNORES THE INCREASED SOVIET THREAT IN THE PACIFIC AND EXACERBATES THE INADEQUACY OF FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PACOM."
- "DEFENSE OF NE ASIA ALLIES AND THE PACOM LOCS SHOULD BE GIVEN HIGHER PRIORITY THAN ENSURING ACCESS TO SWA OIL IN A GLOBAL WAR SCENARIO."
- DIFFERENT APPROACH PREFERRED.
  - NO "SWING" ASSUMED
  - PRIORITY TO NE ASIA ALLIES

In fact, CINCPAC prefers a different strategy approach, and has developed an alternative strategy which would carry out the four strategic priorities shown here. Basically, the SWA SLOC protection mission would be deferred in favor of engaging Soviet Far East forces well forward. The objective would be to keep Japan and Korea as active allies, maximize our own use of Korean and Japanese forces and bases and, at a minimum, deny the use of these bases to the Soviets. Early offensive strikes on the Soviets would support these key allies, strike at areas of exposed Soviet weakness and keep the Soviets preoccupied with homeland defense. CINCPAC’s sequence of operations, shown here, highlights the initial importance of the Aleutians, additional USAF TACAIR to northern Japan followed at some point by offensive mining, and strikes on Soviet client bases. In the initial operations phase, the IO CVBG would attack the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron as it redeployed out of the IO. A force of 3 CVBGs would generate in the vicinity of Guam and begin to sweep key SLOCs and position for subsequent strike operations. Korean and Japanese forces make major contributions in self-defense in this phase, while our own offensive naval operations confine and attrite Soviet Far East forces. In the subsequent offensive operations phase, the forces would help stabilize the situation in Korea. Then they would move forward to further increase the pressure on the Soviets, adding to their perception of our resolve to bring the consequences of aggression home to them until the war is terminated. This strategy
assumes that the PRC as a minimum will serve as a force-in-being and will therefore tie
down significant Soviet forces.

**CINCPAC PREFERRED STRATEGY**

- **INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS/STRIKES**
  - USMC GROUND/TACAIR TO ALEUTIANS
  - TACAIR TO N. JAPAN
  - MINE JAPANESE STRAITS
  - UAV/AIR STRIKES ON SOVIETS IN VIETNAM/PDRY/ETHIOPIA

- **INITIAL OPERATIONS**
  - IO: CVBG ATTACK SOVIET IO SQUADRION, REDEPLOY TO NW PACIFIC
  - SOUTH CHINA SEA: TRANSIT STRIKE BY REDEPLOYING CVBG
  - JAPAN/KOREA: MAJOR CONTRIBUTION IN SELF-DEFENSE
  - SOVIET FAR EAST: ATTRITE NAVAL THREAT, SUB BARRIER OPS, STRIKE VULNERABILITIES

- **SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**
  - KOREA: STABILIZE DEFENSE, MAXIMIZE DAMAGE TO N. KOREAN FORCES
  - JAPAN: CVBGs ADVANCE UNDER COVER OF INCREASED AIR DEFENSE SHADOW OF JAPAN
  - STRIKE OPS: JOINT AIR STRIKES, UAV STRIKES

This CINCPAC alternative strategy would suggest a change in the current presidential
and SECDEF regional prioritization of access to SWA oil over the defense of Pacific
allies. Also, CINCPAC would require the full use of his 5 initially available carriers as
well as some additional USAF force tactical fighter and B-52 squadrons.

**FULL FORWARD PRESSURE**

**MARITIME STRATEGY**

**BASIC PREMISES**

- ESSENCE OF NATIONAL STRATEGY GLOBAL FORWARD DETERRENCE
  - GLOBAL: CEDE NO REGION TO SOVIETS BY DEFAULT
  - FORWARD: KEEP OPEN SLOC TO EURASIA, FULL COOPERATION WITH US FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES AND ALLIES
  - DETERRENCE: TO DETER IS TO THREATEN. REQUIRES CONTINUING PRESSURE ON SOVIET CORE VALUES (HOMELAND,
BASES, CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC FORCES).

Up to this point, you’ve seen the national strategy requirements and the regional
taskings and perspectives of the CINCs. Now we will review an overall maritime strategy
for the employment of current forces in a near-simultaneous global war. We have
tried to tie together the strategic requirements and the key aspects of the CINCs’ cur-
rent strategy preferences into a logical and balanced strategic concept employing joint
and combined forces.

The essence of our national strategy is global forward deterrence. Sequential employ-
ment of our global maritime force is necessary. But we do not have the luxury of ceding
any major region to the Soviets by default—even SWA. The forward aspect means that
we must keep the SLOC’s open to Eurasia, provide reinforcement/resupply shipping, and support fully our other services and allies. The third element—deterrence—must be viewed not only in its peacetime or strategic nuclear context, but also in terms of our threatening pressure on the Soviets which reinforces or restores deterrence in crisis or wartime. Continuing pressure on Soviet core values such as their homeland, bases, conventional and strategic forces is essential to our military and political strategy objectives. We want to ensure the maritime strategy contributes to our objective of war termination on favorable terms. First, we must keep sufficient offensive pressure on the Soviets to convince them of no gain in continuing their aggression. Second, we minimize the attraction of the escalation option to the Soviets by having in being strategic nuclear forces to provide a secure reserve, and sustained capabilities in our conventional forces. Third, we use our inherently flexible and mobile battle group and amphibious forces to carry the fight to the enemy, to gain or regain territory and strike Soviet vulnerabilities. The result desired is to gain some negotiating advantages of our own and preclude the Soviets just “sitting on” their initial territorial gains.

FULL FORWARD PRESSURE MARITIME STRATEGY

BASIC PREMISES

- OBJECTIVE OF WARFIGHTING IS WAR TERMINATION ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO US
  - WAR TERMINATION REQUIRES SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON SOVIETS TO CONVINCE THEM OF NO GAIN IN CONTINUING AGGRESSION
  - FAVORABLE TERMS TO US MEANS:
    - SOVIETS SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN FURTHER ESCALATING CONFLICT
    - REQUIRES SECURE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RESERVE
    - REQUIRES SUSTAINED CAPABILITIES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
  - CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY TO:
    - GAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
      - NORWAY? JUTLAND?
      - THRACE?
    - KOREA?
  - STRIKE VULNERABILITIES
    - STRATEGIC RESERVE?
    - SOVIET AIR DEFENSES?
    - SOVIET C3?

We will now discuss a notional force employment reflecting current forces centered on 11 initially available, fully ready, carrier battle groups. Over the POM period, the additional carrier battle group and other programmed force enhancements and force multipliers would augment obvious needs but probably would not change the essence of the CINCs’ strategy or basic force employments. This force employment is based on a striking symmetry between key elements of the LANT and PAC strategy. Both CINCs
place fundamental importance on a forward defense pivoted on keystone northern islands that control access to the U.S. and lie above the vital transoceanic sealanes. If these islands are lost, the roof collapses on our links with NATO and the key Pacific allies. Early forward U.S. and allied land based TACAIR helps attrite the air threat while the submarine and surface threat is confined and attrited by early forward SSN barriers and offensive mining by the US and its allies. Note how early offensive mining of choke points would play a vital role in holding back the enemy’s numerical weight to enhance U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE 1980S
our own forces’ ability to quickly move the offense forward. As shown here, our allies can play a key role, and their capabilities factor heavily in our choke-point mining plans. SSNs with mining capability would be the primary means to mine Soviet ports like Petropavlovsk and heavily defended coastal areas, while TACAIR, P-3s, and B-52s would be used to lay mine barriers in lower threat areas and oceanic choke points. The early offensive pressure on the Soviets is essential to defend the vital flank allies and deny their bases to the enemy. Then once the initial attack is blunted, we would hope to use our Navy/Marine Corps team to bring decisive offensive pressure on the enemy from forward positions, leading to war termination on favorable terms.
With this symmetry of the existing LANT and PAC CINCs’ strategies in mind, let’s look at a notional current force employment in the Atlantic and Pacific to support an overall strategy. The length of the prehostilities phase is critical, and will allow insertion of land-based TACAIR in such crucial areas as Iceland, the Aleutians, Japan, SWA, as well as Europe and Turkey. If we have even a week of prehostilities movement, it makes the second phase of blunting the initial attack much easier. But, an extended prehostilities phase might become a double-edged sword for us if the Soviets should contradict our assumptions about holding back the bulk of their submarine forces and, instead, surge these south into our sealanes.

Our strategy keeps forward pressure on the Soviets to blunt the initial attack and then to conduct offensive operations. (Pause) First we support our own and allied forces to stabilize the land battle. (Pause). Then our Navy/Marine Corps team carries the fight to the enemy to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and to gain or regain territorial areas essential to our war termination leverage.

The precise timing of the commitment of our carrier battle groups to the land battle in both these phases is a critical but highly scenario-dependent decision. We must
preserve our flexibility to intervene in a decisive manner, and employ our battle groups
to *make the strategic difference*.

**BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE**

Turning from the Atlantic and Pacific to the Mediterranean and SWA, we are dealing
with situations in which our maritime forces are primarily supporting non-maritime
CINCs. The key issue in both regions is somewhat similar: how early do we need to
to control the SLOC’s in more limited areas? This overall strategy would concentrate
initially on *denying* the Soviets sea control in the eastern Mediterranean and Indian
Ocean. *But* we do not interpret sequential operations to mean uncontested withdrawal
from the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions.

Maintaining our initially deployed battle groups in the central Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean has two benefits: *First*, we complicate the Soviet ability to rapidly shift
and concentrate their backfire threat in either region. *Second*, in Southwest Asia such
in-place forces are likely to have a *decisive* effect on the Soviet *decision* to continue their
initial aggression. Our national interest is not in Iran, *per se*, but in maintaining access
to the oil of the Arabian Peninsula. We might do well, then, to avoid getting our strat-
gency thinking bogged down in debates over regional priorities and accept the fact that
the SWA region will be contested to the extent possible, with the Navy/Marine Corps
forces available to the region at the outset of conflict playing the key initial role mili-
tarily and signalling our political resolve to counter Soviet aggression in the region.

In the worst scenarios, our one deployed carrier battle group, MIDEASTFORCE, and
7th MAB/NTPF may initially have to carry out the SWA regional mission without aug-
mentation. Despite the great risk, they may have to destroy Soviet naval forces in the
Indian Ocean and *could* have to cover the insertion of the NTPF MAB at least into Oman.

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT**

**SOUTHWEST ASIA**

- **FORCES IN-PLACE:** 1 CVBG/MEF/NTPF
- **POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION FORCES:**
  - 2nd CVBG
  - Land-based TACAIR to Oman
  - Additional SSN/MPA support
- **MUST DESTROY SOVIET IO FORCES**
- **OPTION FOR REGIONAL LODGEMENT**

With more prehostilities time, we would have the option of surging a second carrier into the IO, to cover the insertion of limited land based TACAIR into at least Oman and surging additional SSNs and MPA support.

In summary, a global war scenario may *require* us to execute a limited strategy in SWA with in-place maritime forces. This strategy recognizes the need to engage Soviet forces early on with US forces in place at that time, and would keep offensive pressure on the Soviets and position our forces to eventually regain access to Persian Gulf oil.

**FORCE EMPLOYMENT**

**MEDITERRANEAN**

- **PREHOSTILITIES**
  - Position 2 CVBGs in CENTMED
  - USMC/USAF TACAIR/AWACS to Italy/Greece/Turkey
  - Locate and trail Soviet SSNs
- **BLUNT THE ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE**
  - Turks Mine Straits
  - USAF, USMC, and Allied land-based TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE help attrite Soviet air threat
  - CVBGs in CENTMED AREA ATTACK: Unattrib tract SUBAIR THREATS, maintain sea control
  - 2 CVBGs, when joined by third CVBG, might risk move forward in East Central Med for offensive ops to:
    - Help blunt land attack
    - Keep pressure on Soviet southern flank/forces
- **CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY**
  - Navy/Marine Corps thrusts to gain or regain territory (Thrace, Adriatic)

Our force employment strategy in the Med recognizes the priority given to protecting the trans-Atlantic SLOC’s to the Med with our 3 CVBG forward pressure strategy in the North Atlantic, the realities of only 6 Atlantic CVBGs available, and the need to neutralize any threat posed from Libya. We *would* augment the deployed Med CVBG
with a second CVBG as soon as possible, as we are committed to chop two Med CVBGs to SACEUR at NATO SIMPLE ALERT. The third battle group for the Med might well be required to delay enroute to conduct transit strike on Cuba.

If we then elect to move forward into the eastern Med with the 3 available CVBGs to control the SLOCs, support the land battle, and bring pressure closer to the Soviet homeland we would do so at higher risk.

I will now conclude this review of our forward offensive maritime strategy with a consideration of two factors that complicate our force employment requirements.

First, Cuba poses a threat to both the continental United States and to over half of our initial reinforcement/resupply shipments to Europe. There are no naval forces specifically allocated in the JSCP to neutralize Cuba, yet it must be neutralized early to ensure scheduled transit of reinforcement shipping. CINCLANT’s force employment preference would be to use USAF B-52 squadrons and land-based attack aircraft to strike a crippling blow on Cuban air and naval bases at the outset of the war. One deploying carrier battle group could also participate in a coordinated initial strike with the Air Force. If required, the last of the carrier battle groups deploying to the Med or North Atlantic could participate in other coordinated follow-on strikes.

Thus, the need for early neutralization of the Cuban threat, and the need to minimize the diversion of our CVBGs from their forward offensive roles suggests an innovative
look south in our joint planning, emphasizing land-based TACAIR and surveillance cooperation with the Air Force. Air Force air cover for our PHM and other surface assets can contribute greatly to continual protection of the SLOCs in this Caribbean area where we may not have battle group forces to allocate.

The second complicating factor is Soviet forces operating from Vietnamese bases. Our three battle group forward offensive pressure on Soviet forces in the NW Pacific will prevent the Soviets from augmenting their forces in Vietnam. This would help us in dealing with a finite threat from Soviet forces. This Soviet South China Sea threat to the vital umbilical SLOCs from the Indian Ocean must be eliminated at the outset of conflict. The strategy would coordinate our surveillance and strikes with USAF B-52 assistance from Philippine and Guam bases, using an additional CVBG enroute to the Indian Ocean for an early strike if possible.

**COMPELLING FACTORS**

**VIETNAM**

- Threat of Soviet forces/facilities
- Keep Soviet threat finite by forward offensive pressure in NW Pacific
- Destroy Soviet South China Sea forces at the outset
- Offensive Force Employment:
  - Early coordinated USAF/USN surveillance/strike

The strategy and force employment presented illustrates clearly that the U.S. Navy is making a major strategic difference in our peacetime deterrent posture and will make a major strategic impact in the conduct of wartime operations. In order to ensure the latter, we must learn how the Soviets think, tactically and strategically, and use superior tactics and strategy to maximize the warfighting capability of our smaller naval forces. We must ensure that our current forces are ready to fight, across the board, now—and that the necessary sustainability items are there to keep them in battle for extended periods. We must pursue short-term objectives that enhance our warfighting capabilities—force multipliers—to bridge the gap between current and required force levels as best we can. We must work in complete concert with the other services and our allies, ensuring that their contributions to maritime operations are not overlooked or misused. The achievement of the foregoing, along with the force structure growth and modernization we need, will further ensure that our Navy and Marine forces will continue to make the strategic difference.
The Maritime Strategy, 1984

The 1984 Maritime Strategy was the first that was made into a formal publication and circulated throughout the Navy. From its initial development in 1982 until 4 May 1984, when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, issued this publication, it had only been an evolving and unsigned staff briefing, as the key figures had all agreed at the conclusion of a briefing on 4 November 1982. In Admiral Watkins’s letter of distribution, he noted that “it [the Maritime Strategy publication] outlines the Navy’s role in our national military strategy, especially in the event of a global conventional war with the Soviet Union.” In addition, he declared, “It has formed the basis for the development of [the] Navy POM-86 [Program Objectives Memorandum 1986], testimony in support of Navy budgets and programs, and joint and allied cooperative planning efforts.”

The development of the publication began in 1983 with the appointment of Captain Roger Barnett as head of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and, within that office, Commander Peter Swartz as action officer for the Maritime Strategy, to replace both Lieutenant Commander Stanley Weeks and Commander W. Spencer Johnson, who went on to new assignments. These changes coincided with the beginning of a new phase of congressional testimony to support the Navy’s budget and programs in the POM-86 process. At this juncture, Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, the outgoing Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-06), took great and direct interest in the plans for the next step to the strategy. In particular, he wanted to advance the conceptual underpinning of the strategy and to move from an emphasis on carrier battle groups so as to include other types of naval forces, allied navies and air forces, and joint U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force strategy. In addition, the new version was to be more closely connected with the intelligence community’s understanding of Soviet naval strategy in both crises and in wartime. In general, it included the need to include what the


† Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-84, serial 00/4S300236, 4 May 1984, paras. 2 and 3. This publication was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 7 February 2007.

Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College had been thinking about in terms of northern Norway and the Mediterranean in relationship to naval support of NATO, the strategic relationship of naval operations to the European Central Front, the role of Pacific Fleet battle forces, and the importance of the sea lines of communication in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas.

As the action officer for the Maritime Strategy, Swartz’s principal task was to meet Vice Admiral Moreau’s requirements as well as to turn the Weeks-Johnson briefing into a publication. In this, he wanted to represent the collective thought of the U.S. Navy’s high command, to flesh out the initial concepts with additional information on the national strategic, joint, and allied aspects of the strategy. Meanwhile, he sought to preserve and build upon the essence of Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson’s pathbreaking effort. As he approached this task, he was influenced by the concepts contained in Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie’s 1967 book Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control and particularly by Wylie’s view that military control cannot be isolated from other factors.*

After looking through the materials available to him, Swartz concluded that Admiral Robert Long’s Pacific Command campaign plan—one of the plans that the joint commanders in chief had recently briefed to General Vessey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and which had been consulted and used by Lieutenant Commander Weeks—provided a model that he could apply in global terms. This choice reemphasized the line of thought that had arisen, in its turn, from concepts that Admiral Thomas Hayward had developed in his “Project Sea Strike” as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and that Admiral Long, as Vice Chief of Naval Operations overseeing the work on SEA PLAN 2000, had also applied. Both Barnett and Swartz were familiar with these documents from earlier Washington assignments. In addition, Barnett had written his doctoral dissertation on Soviet military thought and had studied the issue of Soviet strategic reserves; Swartz had conducted predoctoral research on U.S. Navy–NATO navy relationships and plans.†

Swartz’s expansion of the Maritime Strategy into a publication with an intentionally eye-catching bright yellow cover was developed through the summer and autumn of 1983 as a result of pointed feedback from a succession of briefings and “murder-board sessions” at the working level of strategically minded commanders and captains. Among key people who provided input to Swartz at this time were Commander James R. Stark, who had worked on SEA PLAN 2000 in 1977–78, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Wilkerson and Major Tony Wood at Marine Corps Headquarters.

Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), gave the first major briefing of this new version to Admiral Watkins and six former Chiefs of Naval Operations and other key figures on board USCGC Chase (WHEC 718), during the America's Cup race off Newport, Rhode Island, on 13 September 1983. In October, it was briefed to the OPNAV Program Development Review Committee and the CNO Executive Board. On 19 January 1984, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and Admiral Watkins presented the briefing to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Then, on 14 March, Secretaries Weinberger and Lehman presented the briefing to the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Between 13 September 1983 and 4 May 1984, when the final version was signed, the draft publication had evolved through seventy-five detailed briefings, some to allied chiefs of navy, representatives of other American armed services, and war college students.

Barnett and Swartz felt that the 1984 publication achieved a number of things. First, they had made connections with key staff members who worked war plan issues on the various commanders in chief’s staffs and were confident that the 1984 strategy was not contrary to their thinking and would not be opposed for those reasons. Second, this version of the strategy was the first to mention and to lay out in any detail the role of naval forces in the direct defense of the American coasts and ports, in what would later come to be called homeland defense, and cited the assets of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Naval Reserve as the primary tools for these operations. This theme was picked up and continued through all the following versions of the Maritime Strategy. Third, this version was the first capstone document specifically to identify terrorism as a threat that naval forces could help to counter. From this point onward, terrorism remained listed as a threat, although it was not given the highest priority as long as the Soviet Union held that position. Fourth, they had organized the strategy by warfare tasks, which related to the Composite Warfare Commander concept that governed the way in which naval officers tended to think about operations and to the categories by which the Warfare Appraisal portion of the Navy’s program-planning process was organized. Fifth, they chose a distinctive map projection to illustrate the strategic ideas. Instead of using separate theater maps, they chose a single map that placed the Soviet Union in the center of the projection, thereby stressing the global nature of the strategy while simultaneously showing the key flanking oceanic areas in the Norwegian Sea and in the Northwest Pacific. At the same time, constant repetition of this particular map projection throughout each briefing provided a single clear picture that showed how the Navy made a strategic difference in a future war. Finally—building on the concept of “complicating factors” introduced by Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson—they had institutionalized an “uncertainties” section within the strategy, emphasizing the contingent nature of many of the strategy’s assumptions, and stressing the importance of critical thinking in implementing the strategy.
This is the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy's current determination as to the best overall conventional maritime strategy for global war today. It is the Navy’s preferred strategy, considering national and coalition guidance, the threat, force levels, and trade-offs among conflicting aims. It is a baseline strategy, around which our other strategic options are centered.

USES OF NAVAL POWER

Before discussing the role of the Navy in a conventional global war, it must be emphasized that the Navy serves the U.S. government across the entire range of conflict possibilities: from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. While the strategy outlined here focuses on global conventional war, the Navy’s role in it cannot be understood completely without some mention of other kinds of conflict. Therefore, it will initially focus briefly on the Navy’s two other major roles: peacetime presence and crisis response.

The Navy’s peacetime presence is constant and worldwide. While naval units naturally spend much time operating in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific, a major presence is also maintained in the Western Pacific. Permanent deployments, in force, are made to the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The Northeast Atlantic and North Pacific are also not neglected, since those are vital areas from which naval forces must be prepared to fight.

At any point in time, over 110 thousand Navy men and women are at sea, in many parts of the world, plus three to four thousand civilian mariners providing afloat logistics support.

Naval forces underline American commitments and interests around the globe every day. Their forward presence is a physical demonstration of our will; encouraging allies and friends; deterring and reducing the influence of enemies; influencing neutrals; and
asserting and reinforcing principles of international law and freedom of the seas on a continuous basis.

**U.S. NAVY**

**MAJOR EXERCISES FY83**

Throughout the year naval forces participate in a demanding series of *peacetime exercises*. Dozens are held each year; often with allies and other services. This chart shows only some of the most important ones last year, the largest being *FLEETEX 83-1* in the North Pacific and the sequence *UNITED EFFORT/OCEAN SAFARI* in the Atlantic.

These exercises contribute to alliance cohesion, enabling U.S. naval units to operate routinely with sister services and allied forces, and to test and update joint and combined procedures.
One measure of the Navy’s peacetime presence role is the number of diplomatic port visits. Note that the dots on this chart only represent countries visited—over 65. To show the individual ports themselves would be impossible on such a small chart.

These routine port visits are conducted not only to ensure adequate crew rest and relaxation; but also to promote better relations between the United States and the allied, friendly, and neutral countries visited; and to demonstrate American military strength, professionalism and support.

Crisis response is the next major U.S. Navy role. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has been used for this purpose more often than any other service: over 200 times, in more than 80 percent of the crises in which the United States has been involved.

Carrier battle groups and amphibious forces have been the primary instruments of naval crisis response, but most other types of naval forces can also be so used. Naval
forces are sometimes used in crises in conjunction with other U.S. services, but less so with allied forces, and then usually outside formal alliance frameworks.

U.S. Navy crisis response can range from varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of force in support of national objectives. Naval forces can be used across the full spectrum of responses to crises, from countering acts of state-supported terrorism, to engaging in single-theater wars.

U.S. NAVY/soviet navy
CRISIS RESPONSE CY 83

During the last year alone, U.S. naval forces were used at least six times, as part of the U.S. national response to crises: off Central America, in Grenada, off Libya, in Lebanon, off Korea in response to the assassination of the Korean Government officials in Burma, and off Northern Japan to help locate the Korean airliner downed by the Soviets.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT
MAJOR ELEMENTS JAN–MAR 84
Naval forces are able to conduct such extensive forward peacetime and crisis operations, while preparing for the possibility of global war, because of their great mobility and flexibility. This chart shows the movements of major U.S. naval forces during just a 3-month period this past winter.

Under the FLEXOPS deployment concept, naval commanders have completely reorganized their methods of peacetime scheduling. This allows for more realistic multikerrier and amphibious operations, greater flexibility for theater commanders, and far more useful training; while at the same time reducing the time out of homeport for Navy and Marine Corps personnel. This new concept of operations made it possible for naval units to undertake the major peacekeeping operation in Lebanon and the regional security operation in Grenada without disrupting or reducing peacetime deployments elsewhere in the world.

Peacetime Deployments and Crisis Response, while lower in intensity than the Navy’s global warfighting role, nevertheless affect the strategy for carrying out that role. The Navy continually tests and evaluates the Maritime Strategy through exercises, war games, and from “lessons learned” from crisis and single-theater war operations, such as those that took place in the Middle East and the Falklands. More importantly, the Navy’s global deterrent and warfighting strategy influences its peacetime and crisis activities.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY:
A DYNAMIC CONCEPT
Feedback from these operations, as well as the strategy itself, highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the current naval force structure and, in turn, influences research and development and procurement plans. Conversely, actual procurement—the forces available—acts to bound the strategy, as shall be seen.

USES OF NAVAL POWER

The primary concern here is the U.S. Navy’s baseline strategy for fighting a global conventional war with the Soviets. At the conclusion, some of the implications of escalation to nuclear war, both theater and strategic, will be examined.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

This is an overview of what is to follow. The first portion underscores the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and national strategy. The Maritime Strategy is integral to our national strategy, for if the United States must go to war, it must go to sea. The Maritime Strategy, however, is not an independent strategy, although it can be described independently.
The Maritime Strategy flows from and contributes to the national strategy, and is sensitive to Soviet strategy. It is not determined, but it is definitely bounded, by force capability. Consideration of these factors, therefore, is necessary as a prelude to discussing the strategy itself. Before concluding, the uncertainties inherent in this strategy will be considered. The uncertainties are very difficult to predict. They may well prevent the strategy from being implemented as preferred.

**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

- DETERRENCE
- FORWARD DEFENSE
- GLOBAL COALITION WARFARE

Those who say that the United States has no national strategy are simply wrong. The national strategy is constructed upon this foundation: deterrence first, but if this fails, then defense as far forward as possible, worldwide, in conjunction with our allies.

**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

**SOURCES**

- NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVES (NSDD)
- DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DG)
- JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT (JSPD)
- JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)

The sources of our national strategy are diverse. This is a list of the most important of them as they relate to the maritime strategy.

The NSDD’s are presidential decisions on national strategy. The DG is annual Secretary of Defense guidance on strategy and programs. The JSPD and JSCP are annual JCS documents which recommend strategy to the National Command Authority, and provide guidance to the unified and specified commanders, respectively.

The Navy contributes to the development of these documents, and naval forces are among those responsible for their execution.
NSDD-32 (20 MAY 82)  
"US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY"

- SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT
- SOVIETS THE THREAT
- WAR LIKELY TO BE GLOBAL
  - SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS NECESSARY
- INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
  - BALANCED FORCES
  - INCREASED DEPLOYABILITY FORWARD
- INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES
- FORWARD PEACETIME POSTURE

NSDD-32, a national security decision directive signed by the President, is the basic document setting forth the national strategy. Essential points have been extracted here. It is a clear, direct document, with which naval strategic thought is largely in harmony. In it, the importance of *global*, *conventional*, *balanced*, and *forward deployed* forces is highlighted.

DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DG) FY 86–90

- SIGNED BY SECDEF
- PUBLISHED 2 MAR 84
- PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR POM-86 DEVELOPMENT

Within the Department of Defense, the Secretary promulgates guidance annually. Its primary purpose is to guide the annual Program Objectives Memorandum.

DG 86–90

- GLOBAL APPROACH
- MARITIME SUPERIORITY
- LISTS WARFIGHTING TASKS
- REVISES REGIONAL PRIORITIES
- ONLY ONE PLANNING SCENARIO
  - SWA WAR PRIOR TO GLOBAL WAR
  - SPECIFIES SWA FORCE LEVELS
The current Defense Guidance is very positive in its guidance on maritime posture.

It contains, however, a global war planning scenario that has the war commencing with a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia, and then spreading to Europe and Korea sixteen days later.

What troubles the Navy is that this scenario can be used to influence planning and programming to an unwarranted degree. Actually fighting a global war against the Soviets the way the scenario depicts would be very unwise.

**DG 86–90 PRIORITIES FOR GENERAL PLANNING**

This year’s Defense Guidance has updated the listing of earlier regional priorities for general Department of Defense planning. The Secretary of Defense has now placed defense of our Pacific allies and lines of communication on an equal footing with access to oil in Southwest Asia. He has also clarified the position of friendly Caribbean and Central American states as part of North America, our top defense priority.

DG 86-90 provides the Navy with clear force planning guidance warfighting goals, emphasizing destruction of the enemy fleet, control of vital sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific), power projection ashore, and sealift.
It commits the Department to a goal of Maritime Superiority.

Another source for the national military strategy is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which constitutes Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) near-term planning guidance to the unified and specified commanders (CINCS). The current JSCP, signed in the spring of 1984, derives from NSDD-32 and the current DG. It apportions Fiscal Year (FY) 85 forces for use in war planning.
JSCP FY 85 charges the CINCs with war planning for three distinct global scenarios. These include, as in the DG, a global war originating in Southwest Asia; but also global wars originating in Europe and in the Pacific. JSCP CINC force apportionments for each scenario differ.

**ALLIANCES, TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS**

Besides these strictly national documents, we also have alliances, treaties, and formal agreements that together form the skeletal frame of global coalition warfare, another of the bases for our national military strategy. It is a fundamental tenet that by defending our allies, we defend ourselves.

In addition to the states shown here with which we have formal defense treaty relationships, there are others with whom we have common military interests and which affect their maritime strategy. These will be discussed later. *The maritime strategy takes the requirements of coalition warfare fully into account.*

**THE MARITIME STRATEGY: GOALS**

- DETER WAR/ESCALATION
- IF DETERRENCE FAILS:
  - DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
  - PROTECT US/ALLIED SEA LINES
  - SUPPORT US/ALLIED LAND BATTLES
  - SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION
All of the guidance the Navy has received can be distilled into a few basic goals. It is to implement these that the Maritime Strategy has been developed.

**MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE**

- NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
- SOVIET MARITIME STRATEGY
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY
- UNCERTAINTIES

Next, Soviet strategy must be considered. This is a necessity, since strategy is not a game of solitaire.

**SOVIET NAVY ACTIVE GLOBAL PEACETIME POSTURE (FY 84)**

This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels. Note especially the size and composition of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the position of Soviet SSBN’s, and the worldwide disposition of the Soviet Navy. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Navy is normally deployed away from home waters.
These naval forces are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant ships, the most militarily adaptable merchantmen in the world, also deployed globally. They are supplemented in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets and in the Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies.

**SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY**

NIE 11-15-82D  MARCH 1983

- WAR WITH WEST GLOBAL AND ESCALATORY
  - CRISIS ANYWHERE
  - LEADS TO CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE
  - SPREAD TO FAR EAST LIKELY
  - NUCLEAR WAR LIKELY
- PRIMARY SOVIET TASKS
  - STRATEGIC STRIKE
    - SEA CONTROL IN PERIPHERAL WATERS
    - GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROTECT SSBNs
  - STRATEGIC DEFENSE
    - SEA DENIAL OUT TO 1000 KM
    - ALL NONSUBFACET SURFACECRAFT THREE QUARTERS OF SUBS
- SECONDARY TASKS
  - SUPPORT LAND BATTLE (BALTIC/BLACK SEA FLT)
  - SLOC INTERDICTION

The highlights of the agreed *National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE) on Soviet naval strategy, presented here, illustrate the best current agreed estimate by the U.S. intelligence community, including the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Soviets believe that war between the coalitions will be global in scope. There is an emphasis upon strategic strike, including defense of their SSBN force and of the maritime approaches to the USSR, as primary tasks. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the mid-ocean sea lanes are seen as secondary tasks.

Therefore, according to the NIE, only a relatively few forces—primarily diesel submarines—would probably be allocated to open ocean SLOC interdiction roles in the early days of a global war.

It should be noted that Soviet maritime strategy, like our own, is executed as part of an overall unified military strategy, and cannot be properly understood outside that context.
Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2000 kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones *engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and several of our allies, extending far out into “blue water”*. They would, if achieved, sever the vital sea lines of communications.

In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea denial zones, largely air and subsurface; beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsurface.

While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy are not seen as changing appreciably over the next 15 to 20 years, their ever increasing capabilities mean that, by the next century, the zones would possibly extend out to 3000 kilometers.

That the Soviet Navy has *some capabilities in excess of their zone defense needs* is clear, but this represents the best current estimate of their intentions. The implications of what could happen if they adopt a different strategy will be discussed later. In any event, the Soviets intend, without doubt, to challenge our forward strategy.

The Soviets have *optimized their force capabilities* for operations within their desired sea control and sea denial zones, and are a formidable foe. Yet they are not invulnerable, and have weaknesses that can be exploited during war.
Our current force posture is a significant portion of the basis for the Maritime Strategy. The U.S. Navy is, of course, the centerpiece, but all U.S. military services, of necessity, contribute to the strategy, and the allies play an important role as well.

**SOVIET NAVY**

- **STRENGTHS TO BE ATTRITED/AVOIDED/NEUTRALIZED**
  - Defense in depth within 2000 km of homeland
  - Theater nuclear capability
  - ASW
  - Mines
  - **C3**

- **WEAKNESSES TO BE EXPLOITED:**
  - Air defense outside land-based air range
  - SSBN/some SSN vulnerability
  - ASW
  - Anti-Cruise Missile Defense
  - Geography
    - Fleet fragmented
    - Long transit times to open ocean
    - choke points
  - Sustainability

The Maritime Strategy—like CINC war planning—addresses *current forces*, that is, those available at the end of Fiscal Year 84. This avoids uncertainties as to the attainability of forces now planned or programmed for out-years, while not—as will be discussed later—appreciably affecting the shape of the anticipated future strategy.
The major FY 84 Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are assigned to fleet commanders and are normally deployed as shown. In accordance with national strategy, a significant portion—about a third—is routinely forward deployed. The force levels include units in overhaul, but not in the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).

It is initially assumed here that all hulls and airframes could be usefully employed in warfighting. Readiness, sustainability, availability, and attrition decrements will be addressed later. The Tomahawk weapons system, a significant change to our strike and anti-surface warfare posture, continues to begin to phase in during this period in its anti-ship (TASM) and nuclear land attack (TLAM-N) forms. Conventional land attack weapons (TLAM-C), however, do not enter the fleet until after the period discussed here.

The previous chart depicted the worldwide mobility of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces. The more theater-oriented U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force also play important roles in the development of the Maritime Strategy. Shown here are some aspects of their worldwide postures, as they relate to that strategy. In addition to the Army...
posture, it shows Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and AWACS aircraft, and those B-52 squadrons with a current secondary mine-laying and anti-surface missile capability.

The *U.S. Army* is not only a main beneficiary of the Navy’s achieving maritime superiority in vital ocean areas, but also has essential roles to perform in securing island keystones and littoral areas. These roles are important to the prosecution of the Maritime Strategy.

The *U.S. Air Force* can also be a significant asset in the strategy, especially its potential anti-air warfare (AAW) capability in forward areas. In drawing up the current Navy–Air Force Memorandum of Agreement on maritime operations, the Navy identified AAW as the most important area in which the Air Force can make contributions at sea. The Air Force is also concerned with enhancing its anti-surface warfare capability. There are other benefits to be derived, however, as shown here. They are being pursued [as] well.

Dependence on and utilization of the forces of sister services must, however, be tempered with the realization that they are *not optimized* for maritime support operations.
USN-USAF MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) (9 SEP 1982): JOINT EFFORTS TO “ENHANCE USAF CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME OPS”

MISSION AREAS

- ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW)/COUNTER-AIR OPERATIONS*
- ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW)
- INDICATIONS AND WARNING (I&W)
- SURVEILLANCE AND TARGETING
- COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3)
- AERIAL MINELAYING
- ELECTRONIC WARFARE
- SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES DELIVERY
- AERIAL REFUELING

* USAF PROVIDES MOST IMMEDIATE GAINS

Their geographical emphases often differ, as do their warfare priorities. And they—like the Navy—have serious force level deficiencies in critical warfare and support areas.

OTHER SERVICES: QUALIFICATIONS

- GEOGRAPHICAL EMPHASES DIFFER
  - CENTRAL EUROPE VS FLANKS/ISLANDS
  - EUROPE VS GLOBAL
- MULTIPLE TASKING
  - GROUND SUPPORT VS AAW
  - LAND/AIR OPS VS SUPPORT FOR MARITIME OPS
  - STRATEGIC BOMBING VS MINING WARFARE
- CAPABILITIES SHORTFALLS
  - ARMY AIR DEFENSE
  - AIR FORCE LIFT

The U.S. global alliance force structure must also be counted when the naval forces available to fight are tallied up. Full commitment of all allies to the war effort is assumed here, including the French, Japanese, and others.
This chart and table show the current peacetime disposition of those allied naval forces that could be expected to play a significant role in a global war. Note the predominance of the smaller blue-water surface combatants and mine counter-measures vessels. Note also that the bulk of our allies’ forces are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters. Although we have no formal allies in the Indian Ocean area save Australia, some British and French naval units are continuously assigned there.

Allied merchant marine assets will be required. In certain areas (like Norway, Turkey, and Japan), allied coastal defense forces would also be helpful. Certain allies, notably the British and Dutch, possess limited amphibious assault forces.

Certain forward land-based allied air superiority and air defense forces could help significantly in reducing the air threat to our maritime efforts. NATO air forces could assist on the European flanks, as could the Japanese and Koreans in East Asia and the French squadron at Djibouti in the Indian Ocean.

Allied airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft—RAF Shackletons and Nimrods, NATO AWACS, and Japanese E2’s—could provide us with additional search and targeting capabilities. Allied ground radar systems—the NATO, UK, and Basic (Japanese) Air Defense Ground Environments (ADGE)—could do the same.
Likewise, the British and French have significant aerial refueling capabilities which could assist U.S. naval air operations if made available.

**ALLIED FORCES: QUALIFICATIONS**

- National duties will be uppermost
- Few "high-mix" ships
  - Low threat areas/tasks only
  - Falklands example
- Air forces multi-tasked
  - Anti-air warfare vs ground support
  - Support for maritime ops vs land/air battle
  - Strategic vs conventional roles
- Limited sustainability
- Geographical imbalances

As with the other U.S. services, our consideration of allied forces is *not without qualification*. They must adhere to their own national duties, and even the more advanced of them have limitations. In the Falklands, for example, the Royal Navy exhibited far lower fleet airborne early warning, air defense in depth, and damage control capabilities than
will be required in global warfare with the Soviets. Today, the British maintain significant naval and air forces in the Falklands, forces that degrade the ability of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to support naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic.

Also, as was shown, the naval forces of the allies are concentrated largely in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, putting a greater relative responsibility on U.S. naval forces in the Pacific.

### SUMMARY

**STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE**

- **NATIONAL POLICY**
  - GLOBAL
  - FORWARD
  - FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
  - MINIMUM WAR AIDS
  - CRISIS/SMALL WAR ORIGINS
  - ALLIES/OTHER SERVICES
  - CEDE NO AREA BY DEFAULT
  - PRESERVE/RESTORE US/ALLIED TERRITORY

- **soviet strategy**
  - SEA CONTROL/SEA DENIAL ZONES: NE LANT/NW PAC/E MED
  - strengths and weaknesses
  - escalation through theater nuclear
  - GLOBAL
  - EUROPE CRUCIAL

- **FORCE LEVELS**
  - USN/USMC/USCG
  - USNR/USMCR
  - USAF/USA
  - ALLIES
  - MERCHANT MARINE

### BOTTOM LINE: FULL FORWARD PRESSURE STRATEGY

To summarize the three topics discussed to this point, they comprise an architecture for building a maritime strategy. National policy gives it direction, but Soviet strategy and the size and capability of U.S. and allied forces provide the boundaries. The product is a full forward pressure strategy.

The strategy itself will now be developed, after which the important uncertainties—many already noted—will be addressed. They result in more reservations about the strategy than would be wished.
The Maritime Strategy is designed to help achieve the national objective of war termination on favorable terms, in the event deterrence fails. Our national strategy to accomplish that—like all strategies in response to aggression—can take four forms:

1. We can meet force with like force at the point of attack;
2. We can escalate the intensity of the conflict;
3. We can alter the geographic scope of the conflict; and/or
4. We can control the duration of the fighting.

Holding at the point of attack does not by itself generate pressure to end the war. Escalation is an effective deterrent option, but if used is fraught with enormous risk. It is the last two dimensions that give flexibility and maneuver options to the national military strategy, and at the heart of these two dimensions is the Navy–Marine Corps team. Our primary objective early on is to limit expansion of any conflict. If it cannot be limited, however, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and duration will become necessary. These are the two forms of response in which a Maritime Strategy makes the strategic difference.

Making the strategic difference by altering the geographical breadth of the conflict means that—with maritime superiority—we can deny the Soviets any advantage through expansion, and permits us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area or areas where they do not want to fight.

The Maritime Strategy is a mobile, forward, flanking strategy of options. While the battle is joined in Central Europe, the Maritime Strategy enables the Western alliance to...
secure the sea lines of communications, defeat attacks on the European flanks and in the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy there. This will hurt Soviet ability to reinforce the center, while ensuring the buildup of U.S. and allied countervailing power there. Moreover, in the Far East, the possibility of Chinese involvement in the war is fostered by the existence there of strong and credible U.S. maritime forces.

**MARITIME STRATEGY**

- **PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR**
- **PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**
- **PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY**

The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases. There are deliberately no time frames attached to them, since they represent the *direction in which the Navy prefers to go*, not a timetable.
How the Transition to War is addressed is significantly influenced by the various sources of the national military strategy discussed earlier. Competing—and often conflicting—interpretations are contained in the DG, the JSCP, the U.S. Reply to the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), and the preferred concept of operations of each unified commander. Some have explicit scenarios, and all imply them in their apportionment of forces for planning to subordinate commanders in the field.

**MARITIME STRATEGY**

**PREFERRED CURRENT CINC CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS**

Unified Commander (CINC) preferred concepts diverge, for example, on the relative importance of the various theaters in a global war; on the amount of time assumed as available for pre-hostilities measures; and on the number of current force CVBG’s,
MAFS, and sealift assets that each CINC feels is his minimum requirement in the development of the global campaign.

For example, there are only 13 deployable battle groups available to the CINC—11 in the first few months—yet their current expressed bottom line requirements add up to 15. The Maritime Strategy must be consonant with the JSCP and current CINC war planning, but because of overlapping requirements must transcend an uncritical compilation of these preferred concepts of operations. The 15-CVBG/600-ship Navy is the minimum requirement, but it will not be available until the end of the decade. The Maritime Strategy must therefore look elsewhere in the near term for augmenting forces to achieve war termination on favorable terms.

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**THE TRANSITION TO WAR**

**NO ONE SCHOOL SOLUTION**

What the Maritime Strategy does is to meld the frequently divergent approaches in the DG, the JSCP, the DPQ, and CINC concepts, and present a central preferred baseline strategic course of action, starting with the Transition Phase. It is assumed initially, for example, that there would be at least two weeks of transition to global war. That there are serious implications if a greater or lesser period is assumed, will be addressed later.

Phase I, the Transition Phase, includes rising tensions, and could include one or more crises, and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. Here are the general principles that guide the strategy in this phase. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.

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**MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE I**

**TRANSITION TO WAR**

- **WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR**
- **DETER ESCALATION**
- **PREPARE FOR GLOBAL WAR**
  - POSITION FORWARD
  - INCREASE READINESS
  - DECREASE VULNERABILITY
  - AVOID MALDEPLOYMENT
  - SERVICE RESOURCES
  - MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME
  - CeDe NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT

The principles will be tempered by the obviously conflicting demands of each, and tradeoffs are inevitable. Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely political decisionmaking will be crucial.
It should be noted that even “small wars” can involve the Navy in operations in high-threat areas, given the large and sophisticated forces of many third-world states.

**PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR
SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE**

In this phase we would expect the Soviets to *sortie into their sea control and sea denial areas*. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South China Sea forces, especially with submarines, and intermingle in those areas with U.S. and allied naval forces. We would probably detect all this movement fairly early on, and have about two weeks warning before their initial worldwide attacks came.

Their aviation strike forces would redeploy to their dispersal bases, and the Black and Baltic Sea fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact navies would prepare to support joint operations ashore. The Soviet merchant fleet would chop to naval control, to provide intelligence and lift. The Soviets, in short, would *posture for global war, world-wide*.

U.S. naval forces would redeploy as well, forward. This chart *illustrates some timeframes involved* in considering moving naval afloat forces into position, and is helpful in discussing what follows.

Note also that whereas total U.S. and allied naval and air orders of battle were listed earlier, some 18 to 24 percent of the units mentioned would probably be unavailable in the early months of the war due to conversions, overhauls, and shakedowns.
Throughout the Transition to War there would be global forward movement of U.S. naval forces, a complex operation. SSN’s would move into far forward positions, including the Arctic, deep in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas. Battle groups would begin to form into multi-carrier battle forces, since a single carrier battle group would almost never be operated in a major forward theater by itself in wartime. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, demonstrating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.

**PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR**

**MOVEMENT OF USN/USMC FORCES**
Battleship and other surface action groups, the patrol hydrofoil squadron, and special warfare groups would move out. VP would redeploy forward, worldwide, and intensify surveillance.

Regarding mining plans, the CINCs would have to make hard trade-offs, assigning mining missions to scarce multi-role platforms, and commencing mine loadout. Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness, and lead portions of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned equipment. Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout. Sealift of multi-service reinforcements would commence.

PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF FORCES: COAST GUARD AND RESERVES

During the Transition Phase, activation of reserves is anticipated. Twelve modern Coast Guard high-endurance cutters would be made available to the CINCs for SLOC protection duties, and other Coast Guard units would prepare for coastal defense duties. Marine Reserves would also be activated, under CINCLANT. This table shows only the major Coast Guard and Naval Reserve ships and aircraft, and does not depict the totality of the important contribution that Coast Guard and Reserve personnel would make.

Our key allies would increase their readiness and, in accordance with plans, deploy some of their forces. The NATO Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Channel
would increase readiness, and the Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean would be constituted. The Royal Navy would send SSN’s forward and a British ASW task group, centered around at least one carrier, would put to sea in EASTLANT. French carrier task groups and submarines could be expected to put to sea in the Western Mediterranean.

The West German Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic, and the Turkish Navy, especially its submarines, would do the same in the Black Sea. The Italian Navy would deploy in the North Central Med, and a Spanish ASW carrier task group would also get under way in the Atlantic.

British and Dutch Marines would reinforce Norway. The Japanese and other allies would sortie also. On a worldwide basis, combined ASW tracking by maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) would intensify, and readiness would be increased. NATO and other allies would begin to marshal sealift assets, to support U.S. and other reinforcement movements.

U.S. and allied armies and air forces would be active as well in moving to support the Maritime Strategy.

While the U.S. Army’s central focus would be on reinforcement by airlift and sealift of the European Central Region, it is envisioned that active or reserve Army infantry
brigades would reinforce the Aleutians and Iceland, and an Army military police battalion would reinforce Iceland and the Azores. Retaining control of these islands is vital to the success of the Maritime Strategy. There are allied army deployments important to the Maritime Strategy as well, including movement of the British Mobile Force and the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.

U.S. Air Force TACAIR would also focus on the Central Region, but it is anticipated that some reinforcements would go as well to the NATO flanks, Iceland, the Azores, Japan and Korea. Some U.S. Air Force fighters would probably deploy to Southwest Asia; Canadian and British TACAIR would reinforce Norway; and U.S. and Allied AEW aircraft (AWACS, NATO AWACS, Nimrods, Shackletons, and E-2's) would take up stations. The U.S. AWACS in Saudi Arabia would probably redeploy to Europe.

With enemy and allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major Soviet attack could occur and actual large-scale warfare between the Soviet Union and the U.S. would commence. If so, it would probably spread among a number of theaters, especially at sea.

Strategically, one side or the other would find it to its advantage to expand the war geographically—either to concentrate its forces or to prevent its enemy from doing so. It is hard to visualize U.S. naval units from Yokosuka and Soviet ships from Vladivostok, for example, proceeding to the Indian Ocean or beyond without incident, while fighting was occurring elsewhere.
This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to *seize the initiative, as far forward as possible*. It is preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy.

**SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME MAJOR LAND/AIR AREAS OF OPERATIONS**

The war at sea cannot be discussed without some *consideration of the land/air battle*. This chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation clearly transitioned to global war. The primary Soviet thrust would be in *Central Europe*. Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to *seize Northern Norway* and the *Turkish Straits*. A limited offensive is also possible in *Eastern Turkey*, to try to draw off forces defending the straits.

In the Far East, the Soviets would pressure the Japanese to deny the U.S. the use of naval and air facilities. Failing in this, if the U.S.-Japanese alliance holds (as the Maritime Strategy assumes), they would *attack Japan, initially by air*. *North Korea* might take the opportunity to attack the South. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the
Chinese into entering the war against them but would not let their guard down in Asia. Even if the Chinese came in, however, the Soviets’ focus would nevertheless remain on Europe.

The Soviets are unlikely to initiate hostilities in Southwest Asia as a precursor to global war, and any hostilities which might occur there during a global war would likely involve mainly unreinforced and less capable forces.

MARITIME STRATEGY

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

- GOALS
  - ATTRITION OF THE ENEMY
  - FORWARD PROTECTION OF THE SLOCs
  - SURVIVAL OF USN/OTHER SERVICES/ALLIES
  - FAVORABLE POSITIONING
  - MAINTAIN INITIATIVE

- TASKS
  - PRIMARY: MIW ASW AAW ASW
  - SECONDARY: STRIKE AMPHIBIOUS SPECWAR

At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces, and seize the initiative. Vital sea lines of communication would be defended as far forward as possible. Mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-air warfare (AAW) would assume primary importance, at this stage, in destroying enemy forces, and ensuring the protection of our own forces and of U.S. and allied reinforcement and resupply shipping, in anticipation of Phase III.

Note that while this strategy describes each warfare task separately, they would actually be implemented more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one geographic theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may well move to Phase III very quickly. These considerations confirm that the geographical focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding treatment of any single theater exclusively.

Fundamental to our eventual success is destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet, as far forward as possible. As shown here, a coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
initiative is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons systems, and tactics.

*Forward and barrier ASW operations* would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet submarines operating in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas as well as those seeking to break out to attack reinforcement and resupply shipping farther out. SSNs would conduct ASW operations far into the Soviet sea control zone, against the range of available targets, requiring operations under the Arctic ice cover. Allied task groups would perform area ASW operations. U.S. and allied mine and submarine barriers would be initiated at key choke points. Selective mining of Soviet port area approaches would also be implemented.

Forward-positioned maritime patrol aircraft, in conjunction with SOSUS, and augmented by mobile passive acoustic systems, would operate, especially in barrier operations, to the extent they could without suffering unacceptable attrition, and without interfering with SSN operations. Sonobuoy availability is an important uncertainty here.

*Failure to provide adequate forward ASW protection* early on in the war would open up reinforcement and resupply shipping to direct attacks, such as happened in *World War II* to Japan in the Pacific and to the *U.S. in the Atlantic* (depicted here, at the height of the U-boat campaign against U.S. shipping).
During that time frame over 450 merchant ships were lost in the Atlantic to a German force that at the time averaged just 50 operational boats, with only 14 on patrol in the Western Atlantic.

The requirement for concomitant close-in ASW protection will be addressed later.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
ANTI-AIR WARFARE
In the initial anti-air warfare (AAW) campaign, carrier battle force thrusts would seize the initiative, engaging Soviet air attacks as far forward as possible in outer air battles, to cause maximum attrition. Available land-based TACAIR would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. The MAB in Norway, for example, would probably include two F-4 squadrons. Joint CVBG/USMC/USAF operations would also be possible in the Indian Ocean to meet any threat there. Land-based TACAIR could also address any Cuban air threat, if necessary.

It should be noted that our 1984 AAW capabilities are enhanced by the presence of the two initial Aegis cruisers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW)

The French carriers would probably operate in the Western Mediterranean, possibly securing Western Mediterranean SLOCs and providing backing for the U.S. carriers moving east, while retaining their primary national theater nuclear reserve role.

The initial intermingling of Soviet and U.S. and allied forces in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans would ensure early and intense anti-surface warfare (ASUW) engagements in those areas. Effective rules of engagement (ROE) and innovative tactics should be utilized to complicate Soviet targeting and seize the initiative. In the Indian Ocean, the Middle East Force would probably chop to the battle group commander, but other surface action groups may be constituted elsewhere.

West German naval and naval air forces would make immediate contact with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces moving across the Baltic. Surface action group and/or PHM battles may occur in the Caribbean, and similar surface clashes are possible elsewhere.
Soviet AGI’s as well as combatants would be sought out and destroyed, and merchantmen sunk as targets of opportunity.

U.S. and allied surface, subsurface, and air assets would be engaged, including ASM-equipped allied TACAIR. U.S. Navy submarines, mines, and Harpoon-equipped P-3’s, although primarily engaged in ASW, could contribute—especially TASM-equipped SSN’s. TASM will also be available on a few surface combatants. If Harpoon-equipped B-52’s are made available, they could contribute as well, if required.

Even though the campaign would still be in Phase II and the massed power of the carrier battle forces and amphibious forces would not yet be in a position to strike the Soviets far forward, certain initial projection operations could nevertheless occur. This chart shows various options that could be mounted from the maritime theaters in this phase.

Should it be necessary, air strikes and offensive mining may be conducted against Cuba, Libya, Vietnam and Korea, possibly by CVBF’s enroute to higher threat areas. Strikes will be necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, and Japan.

USAF and allied support would be particularly useful here, and in the Pacific against Soviet dispersal bases and allies. Soviet targets in Asia are more accessible to direct U.S. attack than those in Europe at this stage.
MARITIME STRATEGY

- PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR
- PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
- PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

SPECWAR surveillance, intelligence and raiding options, for instance against C3 sites, would be valuable supplements. U.S. and allied Marine operations in Norway and—possibly—amphibious insertions elsewhere are also options.

MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

- GOALS
  - PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE
  - DESTROY SOVIET FORCES
  - RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
  - KEEP SLOCs OPEN
  - SUPPORT LAND/AIR CAMPAIGN

- TASKS
  - CONTINUE MIW
  - CONTINUE ASW
  - CONTINUE AAW
  - ACCELERATE STRIKE OPS
  - ACCELERATE SPECWAR OPS
  - ACCELERATE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
  - COMMENCE FORWARD ASW

Success in Phase II would allow the Navy to carry the fight to the enemy. In this third phase the tempo of strike, amphibious, and unconventional warfare operations would be accelerated, while anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and forward anti-surface warfare would be continued. Again, some geographic theaters may see movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

The goals are quite straight-forward. Sustainability and attrition are the critical variables, of course, and will be addressed later.
Heavy strikes on the flanks culminating in attacks on Soviet territory would be conducted as battle forces massed and moved farther forward with reduced risk and higher confidence of success. In accordance with DG 86-90 policy, in Europe the Navy would now be projecting power ashore in support of the land battle; and in East Asia denying to the Soviets a secure flank.

Of the 13 deployable FY-84 CVBG’s, two would be in overhaul and 11 at sea. Therefore, three or four would probably be available for Norwegian Sea battle force operations; a similar number for the Northwest Pacific; two or three (plus the French) for the Mediterranean; and zero to one for the Arabian Sea. Thus full global pressure would be applied.

This assumes, however, no attrition, and all units capable of contributing to the war effort. Delayed and sequential operations would be necessary if we have lost battle groups, or if enemy threats from Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, or Korea have complicated the equation. Sequential operations are also likely if early destruction of the Soviet INDRON and its support facilities leads to redeployment of most U.S. naval forces from the Indian Ocean to the Northwest Pacific.

The combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct Marine Amphibious Brigade-sized assault operations in two forward ocean areas simultaneously. Assault operations requiring an entire Marine Amphibious Force, however, would require the concentration of
amphibious ships in one forward ocean area or the other. This justifies the high priority accorded defense of the Panama Canal and its approaches in DG FY 86–90.

Additionally, Marine Amphibious Brigade operations utilizing the Near-Term Prepositioned Force and newly deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships could be conducted in appropriate theaters. Some allies, especially the British, have small amphibious assault capabilities to supplement ours.

The two battleship surface action groups could be employed to good advantage in a naval gunfire support role. Surface combatants, construction battalions, and special operations and mine warfare forces have important roles to play here as well. Amphibious operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage for war termination, securing strategic choke points, or recovering territory lost to Soviet attack.

In all three phases, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would be utilized to support the total war effort. Sealift from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is, of course, central to American and allied success. Over 95 percent of the American reinforcement and resupply dry cargo and 99% of the petroleum must go by sea. Also, the oil and other economic shipping SLOCs are important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially by the allies. These SLOCs must be defended.

The primary defense would be made well north of the major transoceanic SLOCs, as has been shown, but a certain close-in threat would always be present, especially pre-deployed submarines and those that slip through U.S. and allied forward and barrier operations. Without close-in support, even a small number of submarines operating in the SLOCs can pose a serious threat, as World War II showed.
The routing of the major military reinforcement and resupply SLOCs depicted here also seeks to minimize the risk of Soviet land-based air attack. Should the forward AAW and ASW battles go favorably, the SLOCs could be shifted northward.

**GLOBAL WAR: STRATEGIC SEALIFT**

1030+ SHIPS

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**GLOBAL WAR: CRITICAL SLOCs**

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**G L O B A L  W A R :  C R I T I C A L  S L O C s**
Reinforcement and resupply sealift for all services and our allies would be provided by the U.S. Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet, other ships of the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet, merchant ships requisitioned by the Department of Transportation, and allied vessels.

Also, rapidly deployable, prepositioned equipment aboard the Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) remains an important ingredient in our forward strategy. Thirteen NTPF ships are concentrated at Diego Garcia with one at Guam, two at Subic Bay, and one in the Mediterranean. The first set of four MPS ships will be prepositioned in EASTLANT. If no major threat materializes in Southwest Asia, as seems likely, then Marine-dedicated NTPF and MPS ships would be used to support the introduction of Marine Forces in Europe, the Atlantic, and/or the Pacific. The remaining depot ships would sustain Army, Air Force, and Navy units.

Support functions for these prepositioning ships have been assigned in large measure to Naval Reserve forces.

GLOBAL WAR: WARTIME ECONOMIC SHIPPING

Economic shipping would also need to flow. Not only oil, but also strategic minerals and industrial products would have to pass by sea to support the western alliances.

In peacetime, the United States imports over 12 percent of its gross national product; the figures for allied nations are considerably higher. To illustrate, the table shows U.S.
peacetime dependency on strategic mineral imports. Estimates of U.S. and allied wartime dependency vary, but what is clear is that some level of imports would be necessary, becoming increasingly more vital as a war progressed. These imports would have to come across a number of SLOCs with—if peacetime patterns hold—more imports coming in from East Asia than from either Europe, the Mideast, or Latin America.

To successfully defend this shipping is to give the U.S. and its allies the upper hand in determining how long a war would last.

GLOBAL WAR
NAVAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING (NCAPS)

Currently envisioned responsibilities for close-in protection and control of military shipping along these SLOCs are as shown. Naval protection of shipping (NPS) against submarine, air, and surface attack could include a variety of options: not only convoys (which are escort-intensive), but also protected lanes, independent sailings for fast steamers, etc. U.S. forces required are primarily destroyers and frigates (active and reserve), Coast Guard high endurance cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft.

U.S. responsibilities would be focused upon the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the Western and Central Atlantic, the Central Pacific, and the Northern Indian Ocean. The allies would have similar responsibilities in adjacent areas. They do not, however, have sufficient escort forces. Encouraging the allies to fulfill—and expand upon—their current escort commitments and force levels is a major on-going USN task.
Naval control of shipping (NCS) is a worldwide allied effort, with Naval Reserve personnel playing the major U.S. Navy role.

GLOBAL WAR MINE COUNTERMEASURES

Besides the threat of open-ocean attack, a major threat to these SLOCs would be mines at the terminals. The primary mine countermeasures campaign will be as far forward as possible, targeting delivery platforms to prevent mines from being sown at all. For those that get through and must be swept, envisioned U.S. and allied mine countermeasures responsibilities are depicted here. It is anticipated that the allies would bear the lion’s share of the task.

There are clearly not enough U.S. or allied assets to clear all our areas of responsibility simultaneously. Also, many additional critical choke points and ports would be uncovered as well. Any threats to those areas would have to [be] countered by redeployment of scarce assets from elsewhere.

Other threats to the SLOC terminals—small submarines and surface craft, special warfare teams, saboteurs, etc.—must also be dealt with. The allies would secure their own inshore waters. For the United States, coastal defense responsibilities would fall to units of the U.S. Naval Reserve and U.S. Coast Guard, operating in Maritime Defense Zones under the Fleet Commanders.
Mobile, flexible naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances, or at high rates of engagement, without mobile and shore-based forward logistics support, backed up by sealift and bases in CONUS.

U.S. and allied mobile logistics support force ships would be formed into Underway Replenishment Groups (URGS), supported in turn by military sealift “Consol” tankers. Tenders would be deployed forward. U.S. and allied surface combatants would be required as escorts.

Current forward bases would be reinforced with Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFC’s) to provide battle group logistics support; sustain P-3 operations; and...
provide hospital, repair, and construction support. New major bases would probably have to be established in Western Europe. Host nation support would be used, worldwide, to the maximum extent possible, especially to provide cargo handling and port services. U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions would also be required. Advanced forward bases, especially for P-3’s and Marines, would require Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEE) Support.

The Navy and Naval Reserve provide the primary carrier onboard delivery (COD) and intra-theater airlift support to our forward combat forces.

Primary inter-theater air logistics support would be provided by the Military Airlift Command along these notional routes, supplemented by U.S. and allied civilian aircraft. This will be especially critical for VP support, mine countermeasures helicopter and SPECWARGRU deployments, and critical spare parts and personnel movements. Thus the U.S. and allied cargo airlift asset shortfall could degrade the Maritime Strategy.

**THE GOAL: WAR TERMINATION ON FAVORABLE TERMS**

The desired culmination of this strategy is war termination on favorable terms. This requires putting sufficient conventional pressure on the Soviets to convince them that they would have no gain in continuing aggression and in fact should retreat, while giving them no incentives to escalate to nuclear war. For the Navy, this means neutralization or destruction of the Soviet Navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian flanks; sea control; and intervention in the land battle.

*What happens at sea is important primarily as it can contribute to the land battle ashore or to a favorable settlement of the conflict. For example, Pacific operations should prove critical to keeping Japan in the war, defending Korea, and ensuring that China*
maintains an at least aggressively neutral, and possibly even a combatant, posture. This ties down considerable Soviet forces which could otherwise move West.

The outcome of the land war is problematical; superior seapower must be correctly employed in order to make the strategic difference. While a loss in Central Europe could be catastrophic for the U.S., loss of control of the sea would be fatal.

THE U.S. NAVY: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

- Defends the United States
- Solidifies Western Alliance
- Influences neutrals
- Forecloses Soviet options
- Multiplies Soviet uncertainties
- Blunts Soviet attacks
- Carries war to Soviets
- Hinders Soviet redeployments to center
- Provides war continuation means
- Provides war termination leverage

The strategic difference that the Navy makes is, as has been shown, multi-faceted.

The Navy provides the visible and essential linkage between ourselves and our forward allies and forces, and bolsters the position of neutrals. The Navy, by foreclosing options and multiplying uncertainties for the Soviets, forces them to focus on only a narrow range of strategic choices. The Navy precludes Soviet flanking operations, surrogate support, and SLOC interdiction, and protects against attacks on our shores.

The Navy likewise forces the Soviets to commit resources to the defense of otherwise secure flanks, against the entire range of naval offensive capabilities; and the Navy meets any Soviet attacks on the flanks as well. This all hinders redeployments of Soviet forces to the center.

Moreover, the Navy is also the service that provides the nation with the ability to continue the war for as long as the National Command Authority desires, as well as leverage at war’s end.

It must, however, be reiterated that this strategy demands more than the U.S. Navy forces now at hand for high confidence of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
recommenced “Planning Forces” in JSPD 86-93. The difference between the Navy “Planning Force” and the Navy “Current Force” is a discrete measure of our strategy-force mismatch. The CINC “Minimum Risk Force” and the “Program Force” are points of comparison.

This table emphasizes that carrying out the strategy with current forces will be risky, and that pursuit of additional forces or army, air force, and allied force multipliers must be tenacious.

Also, while achievement of the “Program Force” will certainly fill quite obvious needs, it will not appreciably change the essence of the Maritime Strategy.

**STRATEGY-FORCE MATCHMAKER OPTIONS**

- LESS AMBITIOUS STRATEGY
  - CEDES AREAS BY DEFAULT

- INCREASED CAPABILITIES
  - 600-SHIP/15 CVBG MINIMUM
  - SEALIFT ENHANCEMENT

- SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS
  - RISKY

- USE OTHER SERVICES/ALLIES
  - PREFERRED STRATEGY WITH CURRENT FORCES
  - INHERENT UNCERTAINTIES
Given the Strategy—“Navy Current Force” Mismatch, what can be done about it? Scaling down the strategy appears unacceptable if defeat of the Soviet Union remains the goal. Increasing capability will take time, and the Navy will, in fact, reach its minimum goal of a 600-ship, 15 CVBG Navy by the end of this decade.

Sequential operations is the approach taken in NSDD-32, the DG, the JSCP, and—to a certain extent—the Maritime Strategy. Such operations would enable most U.S. naval forces to be moved out of the Indian Ocean to assist in the Northeast Asia campaign, then possibly back in again. They would also ensue if Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, or North Korea were to enter the war. Other inter-theater sequential operations, however, require lengthy swings and are risky; they could, in some cases, cede critical initiatives to the Soviets and cause allies to waver or fall. It is strongly preferred not to sequence North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Mediterranean operations.

The primary approach taken by the Navy in the Maritime Strategy has been not only to sequence some operations, but also to maximize use of the assets of other services and allies, while pushing hard for increased future capability.

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**MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE**

- National Military Strategy
- Soviet Maritime Strategy
- Current Force Posture
- Global Conventional Warfighting Strategy
- Uncertainties

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It now remains to take a hard look at the uncertainties inherent in the strategy as it has been outlined.

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**WAR = UNCERTAINTY**

- Nuclear Escalation
- Warning/Reaction Time
- Wartime Changes to Peacetime National Guidance
- Soviet Strategy
- Soviet Allies
- Other Service Contributions
- US Allies & Neutrals
- Readiness/Sustainability/Attrition
This is a list of the most important uncertainties—all those tough-to-come-to-grips-with items set aside earlier. Some the Navy can control somewhat, and is striving to do so. Most it cannot. They are not listed in any particular order of priority.

To the extent that these uncertainties work in the Navy’s favor, it will be able to execute the strategy with greater confidence. To the extent that they go against the Navy, naval commanders will have to revert to more defensive, more sequential actions. The Navy tries, in its planning and in its procurement, to hedge against a range of possibilities in each area of uncertainty. Resource and time constraints, however, prevent the Navy from being able to meet all contingencies with an equal degree of confidence.

At the top of the list of uncertainties is escalation to nuclear war, including nuclear war at sea. This is a great uncertainty for the Navy, one it clearly would like not to have to deal with.

**UNCERTAINTY: ESCALATION: THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE**

- USN PROBABLY HAS CONVENTIONAL EDGE
- NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA DISADVANTAGEOUS TO US
- US SHOULD NOT INITIATE NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA
- NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA WILL NOT NECESSARILY REMAIN LIMITED TO THE SEA
- USE ON LAND WILL DRIVE USE AT SEA

Since nuclear war at sea would be disadvantageous to the United States, it would probably not initiate one. And if the Soviets were to attack the United States at sea, it is U.S. policy that nuclear war would not necessarily remain limited to the sea.

Any nuclear exchange at sea, however, would probably result from land battle decisions. E.g.: If the Soviets are doing well ashore, they will probably not want to escalate there, and therefore will not do so at sea either.

Also, the Flexible Response strategy of NATO is likely to put U.S. naval forces in a bind. If the U.S. and its allies were to initiate land-based theater nuclear strikes, in accordance with NATO strategy, then U.S. and allied naval forces at sea would almost certainly suffer in any retaliatory Soviet nuclear attack.

Consequently, the Navy must have the defensive measures, offensive systems, and tactics to hedge against such an attack. Naval commanders must be alerted early should
there be serious consideration of any nuclear release ashore. Once this were to occur, it is difficult to project exactly what course the war might take.

**UNCERTAINTY: NUCLEAR ESCALATION; STRATEGIC WARFARE**

**ISSUES:**

- ANTI-SSBN OPERATIONS
- ANTI-HOMELAND STRIKE OPERATIONS
- ANTI-HOMELAND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The possibility of still further escalation exists. The ultimate deterrent to such escalation lies with the U.S. strategic forces, particularly the invulnerable SSBN force (31 in the Atlantic and four in the Pacific).

The Soviets are *not believed* to consider that the destruction of potential strategic assets, such as SSBN’s, during conventional war would by itself *trigger an escalation* to the use of nuclear weapons. Decisions, however, to use U.S. naval forces to *attack Soviet strategic nuclear forces or the Soviet homeland* carry—or may be seen by the National Command Authority to carry—some measure of *risk of escalation*. Thus they would be subject to tight control by the National Command Authority.

This would also apply to any conventional use of B-52’s, since this might also be considered as open to Soviet misinterpretation.

**UNCERTAINTY: WARNING/REACTION TIME**

- WARNING TIME UNCERTAIN
- REACTION TIME UNCERTAIN
- INITIATING COMBAT THEATER UNCERTAIN
- PROBLEM AREAS
  - COMPETING REQUIREMENTS FOR SENSORS
  - SENSOR VULNERABILITY
  - INITIAL MALDEPLOYMENT
  - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

The Maritime Strategy assumes about two weeks of warning time and a period of transition to full global war.

The war plans, however, assume more compressed timeframes. There would probably be sufficient warning time, but uncertainties as to timing of political decisions lead the
JCS and CINCs to plan otherwise, i.e. on the basis of mobilization, force movement, and combat beginning simultaneously (M=C=D).

There are other areas of concern here as well, especially regarding sensor utilization and vulnerability, and the adequacy and consistency of our peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) in the transition to war.

**UNCERTAINTY:**
**POTENTIAL WARTIME CHANGES TO PEACETIME NATIONAL POLICY**

- “POLITICAL WILL” ISSUES
- GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIZATION: SIMULTANEITY/SEQUENCING OF OPS
- DIRECTION/TIMING OF SUPPORT FOR LAND/AIR BATTLE
- EARLY DEPLOYMENT
- RESERVE ACTIVATION
- CIVILIAN LIFT REQUISITION

It has been assumed so far that current peacetime guidance will hold during the war. As mentioned earlier, there are tradeoffs, implicit in the response to crises and the transition to war, that the National Command Authority must make. Additionally, changes to the guidance may be made.

Some issues susceptible to policy changes are listed here. Will the nation, for example, in fact execute a reserve call-up, and in time for it to support the strategy? And how quickly will civilian lift assets be requisitioned?

**UNCERTAINTY: SOVIET UNPREDICTABILITY**

![Map showing anti-sLOC capability, unfueled backfire capability, strike/specwar capability, and amphibious assault capability.](map.png)
Would the Soviets act as the NIE predicts? They have some capabilities that exceed those necessary just to carry out the intentions attributed to them in NIE 11-15. The NIE describes how the Soviets think they would initially operate if the war goes in accordance with their expectations. If this does not occur, the NIE judgements could be nullified.

Should they operate in a manner different than that anticipated, it would provide new challenges, although it would also yield new opportunities to exploit.

Would the Soviet European satellites stay in the Soviet camp? More importantly for the Maritime Strategy, would certain key pro-Soviet states participate in the Warsaw Pact campaign?

UNCERTAINTY: ASSISTANCE & OPPORTUNISM
SOVIET ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND SURROGATES

Any of the states shown here at the bottom has the capability to seriously degrade the strategy—especially if they also allow the Soviets to work from them—while forcing the reallocation of scarce U.S. and allied assets urgently needed elsewhere, i.e. sequential operations. Threats to U.S. and allied naval forces and to reinforcement, resupply, and economic shipping are possible.

An imaginative mix of forceful joint and allied diplomatic and military incentives applied early on will be necessary. To be successful ultimately in the global war, maritime forces must avoid being deflected from their primary operational theaters.
Operations against these states should be mounted with maximum allied and other service participation, using economy of force so as to have the least impact on the war elsewhere. The U.S. Air Force, for example, would have a key role in operations against Cuba, while French and Italian forces would be useful against Libya.

**UNCERTAINTY:**

**OTHER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY**

The uncertainty as to Army and Air Force contributions is of crucial importance to the viability of the Maritime Strategy. Without these contributions, sequential—and therefore late—operations, or abandonment of commitments, are unavoidable. And yet there are real shortfalls in Army and Air Force capabilities, some of which have already been noted.

For example: the recent planned replacement of Marine reinforcements by the Army in the critical islands results in a degradation of previously planned air defense capabilities. AWACS and air superiority TACAIR squadrons have a number of threats to deal with, not only those threatening our naval forces. The Military Airlift Command has nowhere near enough lift assets to satisfy CINC requirements, especially early in the war. The NCA may well not release B-52’s for mining and ASUW roles. Although that will not greatly degrade overall ASUW capabilities, they are badly needed for Mine Warfare.

It is clear that the other services may not be able to meet all their maritime requirements. To the extent they cannot, the risk to our forces and the likelihood of more sequential operations increases.

*The United States*’ own alliances require consideration, and the intent and capability of those not aligned must be assessed. The stance assumed by France and Japan, for example, will be pivotal. Any allies that choose not to join in the war effort will weaken total capabilities to carry out the strategy. In addition, antagonisms among some allies could
degrade their ability to completely commit themselves to a common cause. Allied force capability deficiencies have already been addressed.

Returning to the discussion of escalation, both France and Britain have naval strategic and naval theater nuclear forces, and reserve the right to escalate unilaterally. This, of course, presents both the U.S. and the Soviets with substantial uncertainty.

Regarding the neutrals, the Maritime Strategy counts on China and the European neutrals to exercise—at a minimum—an armed neutrality, and to oppose vigorously any violation of their territory. The defense of North Norway, for example, becomes much more problematic if the Soviets are allowed to transit Sweden unopposed; and Southwest Asia may increase in importance if Iran collapses and the Soviets move in.

**UNCERTAINTY: SUPPORT FROM STATES FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES**
The uncertainties as to allies cut two ways, however. There are a number of nominally non-aligned states with which the United States enjoys close military relations and common interests, and which therefore may prove of great help in a global war with the Warsaw Pact.

None of them possesses a blue-water fleet capable of contributing significantly to the maritime campaign. Many, however, could afford U.S. Navy units valuable access to facilities and strategically placed choke points. Some—especially Israel—possess land-based air arms which could prove helpful in maritime anti-air warfare.

**UNCERTAINTY: READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY/ATTRITION**

- **EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES**
  - AVCAL
  - AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

- **EXPENDABLES**
  - THREAT AMMO
  - SONOBuoYS
  - LOE AMMO
  - MINES

- **FORCE LOSSES**
  - AIRCRAFT ATTRITION
  - SHIP ATTRITION

It was noted earlier that sufficient readiness and sustainability, and no attrition, were assumed in discussing the strategy. This is, of course, unrealistic. Yet readiness, sustainability, and attrition factors accurate enough to be useful are largely scenario-dependent.

What is certain, is that the Navy does not have enough sustainability assets. Assessments of the size of the deficiency, however, depend upon assumptions about the intensity of combat—not necessarily the Navy’s choice—and the effectiveness of U.S. Navy weapons, as well as upon the admittedly insufficient stocks on hand.

The Navy needs to continue increasing these stocks, but naval commanders would, in time of war, prioritize, pool, share, substitute and otherwise manage their limited assets to achieve results.
As an illustration of the extent of the sustainability problem regarding stocks on hand, this graphic compares Navy ordnance assets to the Navy programming objective. As is evident, POM-86 investment will provide dramatic improvement in sustainability, but the present position is still seriously deficient. Note also that the apparent improvements seen here will be delayed in reaching the fleet because of the two year procurement lag time.

Likewise, serious deficiencies in the aviation consolidated allowance list (AVCAL) and in aviation weapons handling equipment are also addressed in POM-86. For now, however, there is only enough AVCAL for ten out of thirteen deployable carriers, without spreading the deficiency across the board.

**UNCERTAINTY: PERSONNEL READINESS**

- MANPOWER STRENGTH
- TRAINING
- MORALE
- LEADERSHIP
- EXPERIENCE
- ATTRITION
The final uncertainty concerns people. Will the Navy have enough of them? Will they be trained well enough? Will they have exercised in the right locations, in the right force packages, and under the right conditions? Responsibility in this area is split among the Navy, the unified and specified commanders, the Defense Department, and the Congress.

**MARITIME STRATEGY**

- TASKS ARE GLOBAL/DIFFICULT
- SOVIET STRATEGY/FORCES ARE FORMIDABLE
- EVEN WITH ALLIES/OTHER SERVICES, MARITIME FORCE LEVELS LOW
- STRATEGY IS CLEAR: FULL FORWARD PRESSURE
- MARITIME FORCES MAKE A STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

To conclude, this is a recapitulation of the major points of the Maritime Strategy.

That strategy is consistent with national and coalition policy and provides the flexibility of response that has always been expected of the U.S. Navy. Full forward pressure is required of the Navy. It is risky, but it is doable.

The Navy must, however, have the forces, the sustainability assets, and the assistance of allies and the other U.S. services.

In that event, the Navy will make the strategic difference.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1985

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General P. X. Kelley, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, jointly promulgated “The Amphibious Warfare Strategy” on 26 June 1985.† In their joint letter, the two service chiefs announced that the purpose of this document was
to outline the role of amphibious forces in support of the Maritime Strategy as set forth in the reference [i.e., “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” see chapter 2], and by extension, the contribution [that] naval forces can make to the execution of the national military strategy. The Amphibious Warfare Strategy addresses the uses of naval amphibious forces across the spectrum of conflict while focusing on a global conventional war with the Soviet Union.‡

Turning to the future development of the ideas in the document, General Kelley and Admiral Watkins noted:

It is envisioned that this document will continue to be developed by an iterative process in conjunction with the...Maritime Strategy. The objectives in so doing are twofold: (1) To develop an Amphibious Warfare Strategy that is both a subset of and fully complementary to the Maritime Strategy and; (2) To provide a basis for future program development, a baseline reference for use in support of testimony concerning budgetary matters and a primary source for ongoing joint and allied cooperative planning efforts.§

In addition, they intended that this document would be revised on the same schedule as that for the Maritime Strategy, soliciting comments and suggestions for the next revision.**

The principal staff drafters of the strategy were Captain Larry Seaquist, USN, as head of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and Colonel Phil Harrington, USMC, a special assistant to the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Operations, Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC. Under Seaquist’s leadership, the officers in the Strategic Concepts Branch had begun to consider a number of different possible

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† Joint Letter of Distribution: CNO 3340 Ser 00/5S300245 and CMC 3340 of 26 June 1985.
‡ Ibid., para. 2.
§ Ibid., para. 3.
** Ibid., para. 4.
complementary strategies to the Maritime Strategy. These included thoughts about developing an Army-Navy strategy, an Air Force–Navy strategy, a special operations strategy, and a logistics strategy. But among them, only the amphibious strategy reached fruition as a formal document involving substantive strategic planning. *

An important impetus for undertaking the project for a Navy–Marine Corps amphibious strategy in the context of the Maritime Strategy can be traced back to the work of Strategic Studies Group III, working at the Naval War College, in August 1983 to June 1984. Seaquist had been a member of that group, along with Marine colonel Edward Badolato. When that group briefed the initial results of their studies on third-world crisis management to the naval commanders in chief’s conference at Annapolis, Maryland, in the spring of 1984, Admiral Watkins had commented as an aside to the Group that, with the Maritime Strategy, he had nearly everything that he needed to testify to Congress to explain everything that the Navy needed and how much it needed. But what he lacked was a similar explanation for the relationship of the Marine Corps to the Navy and the reasons why the Navy invested in an amphibious capability. Watkins mused about the need for this but gave no direct order to have the work done. Nevertheless, when Seaquist and Badolato were assigned to participate in the Global War Game in the summer of 1984, they took it upon themselves to think further about Watkins’s challenge. †

Seaquist and Badolato led a large support group that operated in parallel with the main Global War Game. Located adjacent to, but separate from, the main players in the game, this group had a variety of functions. Among them was to look at alternative employment of amphibious operations. At any one time, the group had some twenty or more Marine and amphibious warfare specialists from the staffs of the various naval commanders in chief, OPNAV, and Marine Corps Headquarters.

This group explored alternative campaigns involving amphibious operations in three separate geographical areas: the eastern Mediterranean; the North Atlantic flank, with a focus on Scandinavia and the Baltic approaches; and the northwest Pacific flank, with a focus on the southern Kurile Islands and Sakhalin Island.

The northwest Pacific issue provided the initial impetus, based on the assumption that in the case of a World War III, Japan might have a primary interest in recovering the southern Kuriles, which it had lost at the end of World War II. With this in mind, those working in this unit gamied out the thought that the United States could possibly coordinate with the Japanese, forestall a Soviet attack on Hokkaido by preempting the Soviet attempt to make a preemptive attack on Japan, and reach over Japanese operations to take and hold Sakhalin Island with the southern Kuriles. The group’s gaming suggested

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* This and the following paragraphs are based on Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Swartz and Hattendorf, 12 August 2007, with attachment by Seaquist, “Notes on the Origins & Impact of Phibstrat.”

that if these amphibious operations were executed decisively, they could secure the Sea of
Okhotsk for American naval operations against the Soviet submarine bastion that was
believed to be located in that area.

While the unit’s examination of potential amphibious operations in the eastern Mediterranean did not reveal any issues that could result in a war-winning move, its examination of possible amphibious operations in the North Atlantic did. The unit’s members focused on a scenario in which Warsaw Pact forces initiated an attack through the Central Front, and they examined what amphibious operation that allied forces could use to deflect or to spoil a subsequent Soviet move to turn northward and to envelop and neutralize allied positions in Scandinavia, including the naval forces at sea carrying out portions of the Maritime Strategy. The members of the unit who participated in gaming these ideas generally concluded that the Marines could be inserted skillfully and quickly at the base of the Jutland Peninsula. This, they saw, identified a major decision for allied commanders to face in the early stages of World War III. It would be a high-risk operation in which a major part of the Marine Corps might be lost but that, if successful, had the potential to change Soviet perceptions of the dynamics of the Central Front, a basic principle and main intent behind the Maritime Strategy.

Upon completion of his participation in this work in Newport, Colonel Badolato moved on to become Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy (1985–89), while Captain Seaquist stayed in the maritime strategy business and moved to Washington, D.C., to take up his new assignment as Head, Strategic Concepts Branch. In this job, his main focus was to complete the next iteration of the Maritime Strategy, but before that document was released in November 1985 he and colleagues in the Marine Corps were able to build the cooperative effort required to complete the Amphibious Warfare Strategy and have it signed in June 1985, five months ahead of the new version of the Maritime Strategy.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy of 1985 later helped to form the basis of two early 1990s documents, “From the Sea” and “Forward . . . from the Sea,” providing a starting point for later discussions between the Marine Corps and the Navy for the cooperation that resulted in those two important documents.

* Captain Seaquist relieved Commander James R. Stark, who in turn had briefly relieved Captain Roger W. Barnett


‡ Printed in ibid., chap. 5, pp. 149–58.

This is the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. It is the Navy and Marine Corps’ determination of the best overall conventional Amphibious Warfare Strategy for global war today. It is the naval services’ preferred strategy, given current national and coalition guidance, the threat, force levels and trade-offs among conflicting aims. This strategy is intended to flow from and be fully complementary to the Maritime Strategy—the baseline strategy around which the other strategic options for naval forces are centered.

This strategy concentrates on amphibious forces: the Navy–Marine Corps Team. Its central focus is on operations that involve the use of amphibious shipping with battle group support; however, the strategy contains options for the uni-service employment of Marine forces. The strategy is further focused on naval warfare today and addresses only current forces and capabilities, although some recognition of evolving capabilities is made.

Finally, it should be recognized at the outset that amphibious forces are a national strategic asset—as such they should be considered to be a valuable, mobile national force and employed accordingly. That is to say, that the optimum employment of amphibious forces may not be achieved through their commitment to sustained operations ashore.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

- **MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW**
- **AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW**
- **CURRENT FORCE POSTURE**
- **GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY**
- **SUMMARY**

This is an overview of what is to follow. The first portion underscores the relationship between the Amphibious Strategy and the Maritime Strategy, with emphasis on the precept that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is an integral part of the Maritime Strategy. Accordingly, the *Amphibious Warfare Strategy is not to be considered as an independent strategy*, although it can be described independently.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy flows from and contributes to the Maritime Strategy. It is not determined, but it is definitely bounded, by force capability. Consideration of these factors, therefore, is necessary as a prelude to discussing the strategy itself.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:

The current military strategy acknowledges that the United States is already engaged in peacetime competition with the Soviet Union and that a war with the Soviets would probably be global and may be lengthy. Emphasis is directed toward limiting a United States–Soviet
confrontation to conventional means while strengthening and integrating appropriate nuclear and chemical deterrents. The strategy provides reasonable assurance that, should deterrence fail, the Soviets will not increase their territorial domination without incurring extreme risks and unacceptable costs to them. In a global war, the Soviets and their allies will be isolated from the rest of the world, their vulnerabilities exploited and the full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities mobilized, built-up and applied until U.S. objectives are attained. Because our forces are insufficient to achieve all military objectives simultaneously, the strategy has an inherent degree of risk and will require difficult choices involving sequential operations. Many of those choices cannot be made in advance because they are dependent on the political and military situation at the time. While this strategy, by both timing and force levels, supports many existing national and coalition plans, its development is not driven by requirements to support specific plans.

**MARITIME STRATEGY: GOALS**

- **DETERRENCE**
- **IF DETERRENCE FAILS:**
  - **FORWARD DEFENSE**
  - **GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL COALITION WARFARE**
    - DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
    - PROTECT U.S./ALLIED SEA LINES
    - SUPPORT U.S./ALLIED LAND BATTLES
    - SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION

The foundation for the Maritime Strategy is the national military strategy, which is based upon policy directives from the NCA, the Defense Guidance and appropriate JCS planning documents. This is as it should be: It is our intent to employ all naval forces in such a way as to fully execute the national military strategy.

In large measure, the present composition of naval forces is designed to be consistent with the foundation of the Maritime Strategy as set forth herein. That is to say:

deterrence first, but if this fails, then defense as far forward as possible, worldwide, in conjunction with our allies.

These are the Navy’s present force planning warfighting goals. They emphasize destruction of the enemy fleet, control of vital sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific), power projection ashore and sealift.

These Navy force planning goals are designed to serve as objectives of the Maritime Campaign in the event of a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is in consonance with these objectives. Indeed, many of them cannot be accomplished without the proper application of the power extant in amphibious forces.

These objectives commit the United States to a goal of maritime superiority.

Key to an understanding of our own Maritime Strategy is an analysis of Soviet naval power. In examining the force structure, deployment posture, strategic precepts and strengths/weaknesses of the Soviet Navy, U.S. naval efforts at the global and theater levels can be placed in context and the opportunities for the effective employment of amphibious forces then become more apparent.

This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels. Note especially the size and composition of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the position of Soviet SSBN’s and the worldwide disposition of the Soviet Navy. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Navy is normally deployed away from home waters.

These naval forces are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant ships, the most militarily adaptable merchantmen in the world, which are also deployed globally. They are supplemented in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets and in the Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies.

The highlights of the agreed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval strategy, presented here, illustrate the best current agreed upon estimate by the U.S. intelligence community, including the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Soviets believe that war between the coalitions will be global in scope. There is an emphasis upon strategic strike, including defense of their SSBN force and of the maritime approaches to the USSR, as primary tasks. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the mid-ocean sea lanes are seen as secondary tasks.
Therefore, according to the NIE, a small but significant number of forces would probably be allocated to open ocean SLOC interdiction roles in the early days of a global war. It should be noted that Soviet maritime strategy, like our own, is executed as part of an overall unified military strategy and cannot be properly understood outside that context.

Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2000 kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones engulf

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME AREAS OF OPERATION

- **WAR WITH WEST GLOBAL AND ESCALATORY**
  - CRISIS ANYWHERE
  - LEADS TO CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE
  - SPREAD TO FAR EAST LIKELY
  - NUCLEAR WAR LIKELY
- **PRIMARY SOVIET TASKS**
  - STRATEGIC STRIKE
    - SEA CONTROL IN PERIPHERAL WATERS
    - GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROTECT SSBN’s
  - STRATEGIC DEFENSE
    - SEA DENIAL OUT TO 2000 KM
    - ALL NORFLT / PACFLT SURFACE/AIR; THREE QUARTERS OF SUBS
- **SECONDARY TASKS**
  - SUPPORT LAND BATTLE (BALTIC/BLACK SEA FLTS)
  - SLOC INTERDICTION
most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and several of our allies, extending far out into “blue water.” These zones, if occupied, would sever the vital sea lines of communications.

In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea denial zones, largely air and subsurface; and beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsurface. While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy are not seen as changing appreciably over the next 15 or 20 years, their ever-increasing capabilities mean that, by the next century, the zones would possibly extend out to 3000 kilometers.

That the Soviet Navy possesses capabilities in excess of their zone defense needs is clear, but this represents the best current estimate of their intentions. In any event, the Soviets intend, without doubt, to challenge our forward strategy.

The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations within their desired sea control and sea denial zones and are a formidable foe. Yet they are not invulnerable and have weaknesses that can be exploited during wartime.

**SOVIET NAVY**

- **STRENGTHS TO BE ATTRITED/AVOIDED/NEUTRALIZED**
  - Defense in depth within 2000 km of homeland
  - Theater nuclear capability
  - ASW
  - Mines
  - C3

- **WEAKNESSES TO BE EXPLOITED:**
  - Air defense outside land-based air range
  - SSBN/Some SSN vulnerability
  - ASW
  - Anti-cruise missile defense
  - Geography
    - Fleet fragmented
    - Long transit times to open ocean
    - Choke points
    - Sustainability

A detailed analysis of Soviet goals and capabilities, when combined with the objectives of our National Military Strategy, provides a firm foundation for the construction of the Maritime Strategy.
The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases. There are deliberately no time frames attached to them, since they represent the direction in which the Navy–Marine Corps Team prefers to go, not a timetable.

Phase I, the Transition Phase, includes rising tensions and could include one or more crises and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. These are the general principles that guide the strategy in this phase. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.

The principal objective during this phase is political: persuading the Soviet leadership that escalation to general war is not in their best interest. In order to contribute to creating this perception in the minds of the Soviet leadership, the strategy envisions that naval forces should rapidly displace to forward operating areas. The presence of naval forces capable of threatening the Soviet flanks accrues the added benefits of reassuring our key allies and providing a clear signal of U.S. resolve.

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**MARITIME STRATEGY**

**PHASE I**

**DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR**

- **WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR**
- **DETER ESCALATION**
- **PREPARE FOR GLOBAL WAR**
  - POSITION FORWARD
  - INCREASE READINESS
  - AVOID MALDEPLOYMENT
  - HUSBAND RESOURCES
  - MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME
  - CEDE NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT

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**MARITIME STRATEGY**

**PHASE II**

**SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

**GOALS:**
- ATTRITION OF THE ENEMY
- FORWARD PROTECTION OF THE SLOCs
- SURVIVAL OF US/OTHER SERVICES/ALLIES
- FAVORABLE POSITIONING
- MAINTAIN INITIATIVE

**TASKS:**
- PRIMARY: MIW ASW AAW ASUW
- SECONDARY: STRIKE AMPHIBIOUS SPEC.WAR
These objectives may be characterized by conflicting demands and trade-offs will be inevitable. Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely political decisionmaking is crucial.

This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative as far forward as possible. Our actions during this phase must be complementary to and preparatory for our subsequent moves in Phase III.

At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces and seize the initiative. Vital sea lines of communication would be defended as far forward as possible. Anti-surface warfare (ASUW), mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) would assume primary importance at this stage in destroying enemy forces and ensuring the protection of our own forces and of U.S. and allied reinforcement and resupply shipping, in anticipation of Phase III. Strike, amphibious and special warfare options would be executed, as required, to support our Phase II goals. For example, amphibious forces could seize an advanced naval base that could then be used by naval aircraft to prosecute the ASW campaign, execute the initial strike options, if required, or to replenish ships tasked with seakeeping missions.

Note that while this strategy describes each warfare task separately, they would actually be implemented more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one geographic theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may well

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**MARITIME STRATEGY
PHASE III:
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY**

**GOALS:**
- PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE
- DESTROY SOVIET FORCES
- RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
- KEEP SLOCs OPEN
- SUPPORT LAND/AIR CAMPAIGN

**TASKS:**
- CONTINUE MIW
- CONTINUE ASW
- CONTINUE AAW
- ACCELERATE STRIKE OPS
- ACCELERATE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
- ACCELERATE SPECWAR OPS
- COMMENCE FORWARD ASUW
move to Phase III very quickly. These considerations confirm that the geographical focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding treatment of any single theater exclusively.

Success in Phase II would allow the Navy to carry the fight to the enemy.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

- MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW
- AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW
- CURRENT FORCE POSTURE
- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY
- SUMMARY

In this third phase the tempo of strike, amphibious and unconventional warfare operations would be accelerated, while anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare and forward anti-surface warfare would be continued. Again, some geographic theaters may see movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

Having conducted a brief overview of the Maritime Strategy, we will now turn to a general overview of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy itself.

THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY: GOALS

- DETER WAR/ESCALATION
- IF DETERRENCE FAILS
  - DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
  - AID IN STRIKING/SEIZING SOVIET/WP TERRITORY
  - AID IN PUTTING SOVIETS ON DEFENSE
  - NEUTRALIZE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS
- PROTECT U.S./ALLIED SEA LANES
  - BOLSTER ALLIES AND FRIENDLY STATES
  - INFLUENCE NEUTRALS
  - WIDEN SOVIET STRATEGIC PROBLEM
  - CONTRIBUTE TO ATTAINMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY
- SUPPORT U.S./ALLIED LAND BATTLES
  - ASSIST IN RESTORATION OR DEFENSE OF ALLIED TERRITORY
  - SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION
  - GAIN LEVERAGE TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

These are the basic goals of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. The scope of these goals precludes their simultaneous pursuit. Appreciation of the broad range of actions required to attain these goals confirms the sequential character our naval operations will have to adopt. It is to pursue these goals in maritime theaters and to fully support the Maritime Strategy that this strategy has been developed.
This strategy will attempt to exploit the advantages inherent in amphibious forces by positioning forward to create pressure at either a single point of decision or along multiple axes. In so doing, we intend to seize and hold positions well within the Soviet sea control/denial areas. Success in forward positioning at points of our choosing will, in the early stages, allow us to disrupt the correlation of forces and ultimately gain needed leverage for use in war termination.

These Marine Corps force planning goals have been extracted from the FY 86–90 Defense Guidance and are designed to serve as objectives of the amphibious campaign in the event of global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The nature of the stated goals speak to the unique contribution that amphibious forces can make in support of the Maritime Strategy.

Having taken a brief look at both the goals of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy and the warfighting objectives assigned to amphibious forces, the following section will focus on those contributions that amphibious forces can make in a peacetime or crisis environment by full exploitation of their current posture. Before discussing the role of amphibious forces in a conventional global war, it must be emphasized that those forces serve the U.S. government across the entire spectrum of
conflict possibilities: from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. While the strategy outlined herein focuses on global conventional war, the role of amphibious forces in it cannot be understood completely without some mention of other kinds of conflict. Therefore, it will initially focus on two other major roles for amphibious forces: peacetime presence and crisis response.

The peacetime presence of amphibious forces is constant and worldwide. This presence underlines U.S. commitments and interests around the globe on a daily basis. This forward presence is a physical demonstration of our national will, encourages allies and friends, deters and reduces the influence of potential foes, influences neutrals and reinforces the principles of international law and freedom of the seas so vital to our national interests.

The Maritime and Amphibious Warfare Strategies, like CINC war planning, address current forces, that is, those available at the end of Fiscal 85. This avoids uncertainties as to the attainability of forces now planned or programmed for the out-years, while not appreciably affecting the shape of the anticipated future strategies. It should be noted that while this chart depicts only naval forces, all U.S. military forces of necessity will contribute to the strategy and the allies play an important role as well. The major FY 85 Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are assigned to fleet commanders and are normally deployed as shown. In accordance with the Maritime Strategy, a significant portion of these forces, approximately one third, are routinely forward deployed.
One measure of the peacetime presence role that amphibious forces play is the number of port visits routinely conducted each year. Note that the dots on this chart only represent countries visited, over 45 of them. Many of these countries received visits at more than one port-of-call.

These routine port visits promote better relations between the United States and the allied, friendly and neutral countries visited and demonstrate American military strength, professionalism and potential support in time of crisis.
Throughout the year amphibious forces participate in a demanding series of peacetime exercises. Dozens are held each year, often with allies and other services. This chart shows some of the most important peacetime exercises held on a continuing basis, the largest being RIMPAC in the North Pacific and SOLID SHIELD in the Atlantic.

These exercises contribute to alliance cohesion, enable U.S. naval units to operate routinely with sister services and allied forces, and to test and update joint and combined operational procedures.

Central to our ability to execute the strategy is the requirement to conduct large scale amphibious exercises, as well as joint/combined exercises, in every clime and place we may be expected to fight in war. Development of an exercise program within the context of the strategy will allow us to: (1) Test/refine the strategy, (2) identify future requirements, which in turn will, (3) influence the direction of Research and Development efforts and (4) serve as a visible signal of U.S. resolve to support friends and oppose foes.

Crisis response is the next major role of amphibious forces. Crisis responses by amphibious forces can range from varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of force in support of national objectives. Amphibious forces can be used across the entire spectrum of responses to crises, from a show of force, through the countering of acts of state-supported terrorism, to engaging in single theater wars. In addition, MPS MABs offer a significantly increased capability to rapidly respond to a crisis situation with a credible force when employed as a preconflict deterrent or to reinforce ongoing amphibious operations after the outbreak of hostilities. Most recent examples of a
maritime response to crises can be seen in the use of amphibious forces in both Lebanon\(^*\) and Grenada.\(^\dagger\)

With the foregoing as a backdrop, we will now turn to a discussion of the strategy itself.

**AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE**

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In the event deterrence fails, both the Maritime and its component Amphibious Warfare Strategy are designed to help achieve the national objective of war termination on favorable terms. Our national strategy to accomplish that, like all strategies in response to aggression, can take four forms: (1) We can meet force with like force at the point of attack; (2) We can escalate the intensity of the conflict; (3) We can alter the geographic scope of the conflict; and/or (4) We can control the duration of the fighting.

\(^*\) For details of this operation, see Benis L. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1987) [Editor].

\(^\dagger\) For details of this operation, see Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997) [Editor].
RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION

- MEET FORCE WITH LIKE FORCE HEAD-ON
- ESCALATE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT
- ALTER GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT
- CONTROL DURATION OF THE CONFLICT

Holding at the point of attack does not by itself generate pressure to end the war. Escalation is an effective deterrent option, but if used is fraught with risk. It is the last two dimensions that give flexibility and maneuver options to the strategies and at the heart of these two dimensions is the Navy–Marine Corps Team.

Our primary objective early on is to limit expansion of any conflict. If it cannot be limited, however, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and duration will become necessary. These are the two forms of response in which the Amphibious Warfare Strategy can complement the Maritime Strategy in making the strategic difference.

Maritime superiority will allow us to alter the geographical breadth of the conflict and deny the Soviets any advantage through expansion. This strategic difference will also permit us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area or areas where the Soviets do not

THE NAVY–MARINE CORPS TEAM: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

- DEFENDING/ATTACKING ON THE FLANKS WORLDWIDE
- TAKING PRESSURE OFF THE CENTER IN EUROPE
- PROTECTING/MAINTAINING THE SLOCs
want to fight. Further, the application of naval power is not intended to be accomplished in isolation. To take full advantage of the synergism that that accrues from coordinated, mutually-supporting combat actions, the employment of naval forces, to include power projection forces, must be done in full concert with all U.S. and allied forces.

*The Amphibious Warfare Strategy Component, like the Maritime Strategy, is a mobile, forward, flanking strategy of options.* While the battle is joined in Central Europe, our strategy enables the Western alliance to secure the sea lines of communications, defeat attacks on the European flanks and in the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy there. This will influence the Soviets’ decision to reinforce the center, while ensuring the buildup of U.S. and allied countervailing power at the strategic point(s) of decision. Moreover, the roles and influence of the Chinese in the war will be, in part, influenced by the strong and credible actions of U.S. maritime forces.

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**THE PHASES OF WAR**

- **PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR**
- **PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**
- **PHASE III:**
  - **CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY**
  - **PRESS HOME THE ADVANTAGE**
  - **WAR TERMINATION**

Presently, the Maritime Strategy frames the conflict within three phases. The phases shown here are not constrained by specific timelines, nor should they be. Indeed, it is anticipated that a global, conventional war with the Soviet Union may be of protracted duration. This assumption, in turn, exposes additional Soviet vulnerabilities to be exploited by allied forces in the later stages of the conflict. As will be shown, the judicious application of naval power at key points of Soviet vulnerability can contribute to pressing home the strategic advantages accrued and, along with other coalition forces, bring about war termination on terms favorable to this Nation and its allies.

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**PRINCIPLES**

- **THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY IS A COMPONENT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY**
- **AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ARE VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MARITIME CAMPAIGN**
- **THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY MUST BE CAPABLE OF GLOBAL, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE**
- **THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY MUST SUPPORT NATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES THROUGHOUT ALL PHASES OF THE CONFLICT**
Inasmuch as the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a component of the Maritime Strategy, it will be articulated in the same manner: the war and the strategy will be subdivided into phases characterized by the level and type of conflict.

The combat power of an amphibious task force, with attendant Carrier Air, Mine Countermeasure and Naval Surface Fire Support, when employed in concert with allied forces, provides for flexible response across a wide range of options. If properly applied, amphibious operations can make a vital contribution to both the conduct of maritime and land operations, and in so doing, contribute to the successful execution of the Maritime Strategy.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a global strategy which emphasizes full forward pressure in all phases of a global conventional war. It employs the flexibility of response which has always characterized naval forces. Our response options must include both sequential and simultaneous operations conducted in one or more theaters.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is designed to support the national objectives of deterrence or war termination on favorable terms. We will attempt to accomplish this by offering strategic options which may alter the scope and duration of the war. Furthermore, the employment of amphibious forces should be exercised within the context of the overarching strategic requirements that may emerge as the conflict expands. That is to say, that amphibious forces must be available to contribute to the attainment of the ultimate objective of war termination on favorable terms. Additionally, amphibious forces must be postured in such a way to respond to changing national aims which may call for the maximum application of naval power at various junctures across the breadth of the conflict. It is critical that these individual decision points take into account that the employment of amphibious forces at a given place and time may foreclose the option of their employment at another place and time.

In the global war scenario upon which this strategy is based the most efficient use of amphibious forces is for the projection of power along the Soviet flanks or Rimland. While our focus will be on amphibious operations along the flanks, our strategy must provide options that strike against the Soviet Heartland or, at a minimum, allow for incursions into the strategic centers of Warsaw Pact and Soviet surrogate states, if required.

**PRINCIPLES**

- **FOCUS OF STRATEGY IS ON APPLICATION OF FORCE AGAINST THE FLANKS (RIMLAND)**
- **THE STRATEGY MUST SUPPORT MULTI-THEATER OPERATIONS**
- **AMPHIBIOUS FORCES MAY BE CALLED UPON TO SWING FROM ONE THEATER TO ANOTHER**
- **MARINE FORCES MAY DEPLOY AS MABs, BUT WILL FIGHT AS MAFs WHEREVER AND WHENEVER REQUIRED**
- **THE STRATEGIC MOBILITY OF MPS MABs WILL BE FULLY EXPLOITED**
In order to maximize the strategic advantage provided by the unique flexibility of maritime forces and to support the goal of exerting full forward pressure, amphibious warfare options must address multi-theater operations, both simultaneously and sequentially.

To accomplish the foregoing, the “swing” of amphibious shipping, Marine forces and other supporting naval forces cannot be arbitrarily ruled out. However, the risk inherent in the intertheater swing of naval forces, with the attendant loss of options in other theaters, should not be taken without an assessment of the strategic advantages to accrue from such a decision.

Close examination of the potential threat suggests that whenever and wherever possible a minimum of a MAF-sized force will be required to conduct forcible entry operations. However, an assessment of our present lift capability indicates that little more than a MAB’s worth of lift is extant in each ocean. We cannot tie ourselves to only sequential operations and, therefore, must be prepared to conduct MAB-size amphibious operations simultaneously with or without MPS reinforcement, in remote or single theaters when a strategic advantage may accrue by doing so. In this employment sequence, the amphibious MAB may well serve as the lead element of the ultimate amphibious force.

Within the context of general war, the strategy must provide a range of options for the deployment/employment of the MPS Squadrons and their associated MABs which cover the spectrum from pre-hostility insertions to reinforcement of amphibious MAGTFs or the massing of multi-MAB forces, under a single MAF Headquarters, for the conduct of independent operations.

Phase I is a transition phase characterized by rising tensions, regional crises, regional wars involving either the U.S. or Soviets and positioning our forces for a possible general war. Our objectives during this period are three: first to terminate the conflict by winning the small war or managing a crisis and thereby prevent escalation, secondly, to prepare for general war through increases in readiness and deploying forces as far

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**PHASE I**

**TRANSITION TO WAR**

**OBJECTIVES:**
- DETER SOVIETS/CLIENTS FROM ESCALATING THE CONFLICT
- PREPARE FOR GENERAL WAR
- BOLSTER ALLIES AND FRIENDLY STATES

**TASKS:**
- OCCUPATION OF STRATEGIC CHOKEPOINTS
- DENIAL OF KEY ISLANDS AND BASES TO ENEMY FORCES
- INTEGRATION WITH ALLIED NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES AT KEY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS
- STABILIZATION THROUGH PRESENCE, OF AREAS KEY TO THE CONTROL OF GLOBAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
- ENHANCEMENT OF KEY ALLIED DEFENSIVE POSTURES
forward as possible and third, in so doing bolster the confidence of our allies and other
friendly states. Competition between these objectives is inevitable: early national-level
decisionmaking is crucial to the attainment of adequate force levels and to avoid
maldeployment of naval forces prior to the conclusion of this phase.

Throughout the Transition to War there would be global forward movement of U.S.
naval forces, SSNs would move into far forward positions, including the Arctic, deep in
the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas. Battle groups would begin to form into
multi-carrier battle forces. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, demon-
strating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.

**PHASE I**
**TRANSITION TO WAR: MOVEMENT OF POWER PROJECTION FORCES**

Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness and lead portions
of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned
equipment.* Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout. Sealift of
multi-service reinforcements would commence.

Amphibious forces may not be engaged in combat during Phase I. Nonetheless, there are
actions that must be taken early in order to produce the capability to fight immediately, if
required or be prepared for engagement with enemy forces early in the following phases.

*When completed in FY 89, the Norway Prepositioning Program will include major items of equip-
ment and 30 days of sustainability for a MAB specifically tailored to accommodate the mission, ter-
rain, environment and perceived threat. In the interim, essential equipment and supplies not yet
prepositioned will deploy with this MAB.
Prepositioning forces, both land and maritime, can have a major impact during Phase I, both in deterrence/conflict limitation and in positioning/preparation for general war. As early as possible, a MAB configured for the Norway prepo mission would be airlanded to Norway prepared for subsequent employment. The two MABs currently associated with the MPS Squadrons can be airlifted into regions such as: (1) the Jutland Peninsula to aid in the defense of Denmark, (2) Greek or Turkish Thrace to add stability to the area and to deter the opening of a second front by the Soviets, (3) to strategic straits and choke points, e.g., the Dardanelles, Hormuz, (4) to strategic forward bases or islands, (5) to forward locations such as the United Kingdom or Japan to prepare for subsequent operations, (6) reinforce ongoing amphibious operations or (7) establish a stabilizing presence in peripheral crisis areas. Additionally, the massing of the two MPS MABs in a single theater, under a MAF Headquarters, if the tactical situation dictates, is a capability that should be considered.

PHASE I
TRANSITION TO WAR

Amphibious forces will increase readiness, commence embarkation and move forward during Phase I. Atlantic Fleet amphibious shipping will embark the Marine Forces available to I MAF while Pacific Fleet amphibious ships are embarking the maximum number of Marines from I and III MAF. The 4th Division–Wing Team may be activated, as well as Selected Reservists from various Navy amphibious warfare units who may be called up and embarked with deploying Amphibious Task Forces. Additionally, those commercial/USNS ships earmarked for use as Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE) shipping will sail for ports of embarkation, load out and sail in trace of their

* FOC in FY 89.
respective assault echelons. Finally, forward deployed and overseas homeported amphibious units will move to join those amphibious forces sailing to forward positions.

A significant range of strategic options emerge which are directly attributable to the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces. II MAF forces may be initially employed to stabilize crisis situations developing in locations such as: the Caribbean Basin or the Mediterranean littoral, sail to critical forward positions in the island chains of the G-I-N Gap, to ports in Great Britain, to ports on the continent or, indeed, swing their forces into the Pacific Ocean. Likewise, I and/or III MAF forces may sail directly to Japan, into the Indian Ocean, or swing their forces into the LANTCOM Area of Operations. Finally, forward deployed forces may rendezvous with ATF’s underway from CONUS ports, egress from potential Mare Clausum, e.g., Med Sea, Sea of Japan or sail independently to positions in the vicinity of friendly ports to aid in reinforcing our deterrent posture or avoid/create a perception of the potential for escalation.

In the final analysis, the strategic moves decided upon must commence early in Phase I. Since our principal objectives in this phase are to deter war and if that fails to be in optimum position to commence hostilities, amphibious forces must be in position to engage at the point(s) of decision around the globe. At a minimum, the following force disposition should be expected: (1) an airlanded MAB will be in position in Norway,* (2) an amphibious MAB positioned forward in each ocean or in transit to form a MAF.

* FOC in FY 89.
in a single theater, (3) sustaining AFOEs steaming in trace or positioned in close proximity to their assault echelons, (4) MPS Squadrons moving to potential offload/employment locations and (5) the balance of active forces commencing closure of the major theaters of operation.

The key to success during Phase I of the Amphibious Strategy is readiness: readiness of ships and Marine units to embark and move forward on short notice, of selected naval reserves to support early movement of MPS MABs and of the command structure to make the early decisions which permit amphibious forces to assume their critically important forward positions.

**PHASE II**

**SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

- **OBJECTIVES:**
  - CONTRIBUTE TO ATTAINMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY
  - DEFEND ALLIED TERRITORY

- **TASKS:**
  - SEIZURE, OCCUPATION, AND DEFENSE OF ADVANCED NAVAL BASES
  - OCCUPATION, NEUTRALIZATION OR STABILIZATION OF TERRAIN VITAL TO THE SECURING OF A NAVAL FLANK
  - CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE OF KEY ALLIED TERRITORY
Phase II begins for amphibious forces when the Phase I objective, to be in position to engage worldwide, has been achieved, and the Soviets have initiated an attack on U.S. and/or allied forces. The arrival in theater(s) of amphibious MABs, MPS Forces, MAF Headquarters Elements, AFOE shipping, residual Marine units and reserves will permit the organization of Composite MAFs forward.

Amphibious forces, if far enough forward to seize the initiative, will be positioned to accomplish their Phase II objectives. Prepositioned forces can assist in the attainment of maritime superiority by securing naval flanks and/or occupying and defending advanced naval bases. Selected aviation assets of the employed MAGTF(s) can assist in the attainment of maritime objectives by supporting Strike and TASMO operations.

The MAB positioned in Norway,* along with allied forces, will be fully engaged in defense of allied territory. Additionally, these Marine forces can directly contribute to the attainment of maritime supremacy in the Norwegian/Barents Seas area by denying the use of airspace to Soviet surveillance aircraft engaged in fixing/targeting U.S. surface fleets.

Uncommitted but ready amphibious forces will succeed in complicating the Soviets’ strategic equation. Depending on the levels of sea control established in proximity to selected littorals, amphibious forces, up to MAF-size, will be capable of assault operations at key points of decision; thereby causing the Soviet forces to withhold reserve forces which could otherwise be better employed by contributing to the conduct of their theater offensive.

**PHASE II**

**SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

- **OBJECTIVES:**
  - Widen the Soviet strategic problem
  - Aid in putting the Soviets on the defense
- **TASKS:**
  - Contribute to air defense of waters adjacent to occupied littorals
  - Conduct assault operations to seize key terrain for the introduction of U.S./allied follow-on forces

During the initial stages of Phase II, the forward posture of amphibious forces constitute a direct threat to the Soviets by increasing the level of uncertainty and severely complicating the Soviet decisionmaking process. Depending on the deployment sequence chosen, the Soviets will be required to react to the possible simultaneous deployment of amphibious forces on their Northern, Southern and Eastern Flanks. Such deployments represent the potential for the conduct of amphibious operations which may lead to the introduction of U.S./allied follow-on forces.

* FOC in FY 89.
Strategic options available to amphibious forces as Phase II unfolds range from limited objective amphibious raids, up to MAB-sized in scale, to near MAF-sized amphibious assaults to secure territory adequate for the introduction of other service or allied follow-on forces or reinforcement of engaged ground forces. This capability may become critical if we are unable to effect the bilateral agreements necessary to sustain our naval forces or, for whatever reason, an existing agreement is abrogated.

Depending on our ultimate force disposition during this Phase, the aforementioned options could be executed against the Soviet Rimland in such diverse locations as North Norway, the Southern Kuriles, both the North and South coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean littoral or Southeast Asian havens for Soviet combatants.

Coordination with other U.S. services, with NATO and with the armed forces of other allied or associated nations is critical as we begin to conduct amphibious operations. Amphibious warfare forces will have to exercise this coordination on a continuous basis regardless of whether or not they are engaged in joint/combined operations.

As the Soviet offensive is gradually contained, allied forces will have the opportunity to launch decisive counterattacks to seize the strategic initiative and to begin the progressive rollback of Soviet/WP forces. Beginning during Phase III and continuing until the end of the war, amphibious warfare is a primary task for maritime forces. Amphibious warfare accelerates and builds on the success achieved previously to prosecute the campaigns.
PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

- OBJECTIVES:
  - Assist in restoration of Allied territory
  - Ensure that critical SLOCs remain open
  - Aid in striking/seizing Soviet/WP territory
  - Gain leverage to terminate hostilities
  - Police remaining trouble spots

initiated during Phase II. The objectives for amphibious forces are broad and permit consideration of an ever-widening series of options. Objectives are to regain lost territory, to ensure that critical SLOCs remain open or to seize and occupy Soviet territory in a series of war termination actions. During this phase, sufficient attrition of Soviet forces may have occurred to permit assaults, or the threat thereof, directly into the homeland.

It is from the early stages of Phase III through the termination of hostilities that the value of amphibious forces as a strategic reserve becomes clear. While these forces were most probably insufficient to decisively affect the early outcome of a European war, their potential for shifting the strategic center of gravity against a battered and exhausted Soviet force is enormous. The level of uncertainty created by such a mobile force and the threat of its employment in assaults on the vulnerable Soviet pressure points combine to make amphibious forces a valuable tool in gaining leverage for war termination on favorable terms. Accordingly, the selection of employment options during phases I and II should consider retaining the capability for decisive use of amphibious forces throughout the duration of Phase III.

Execution of the stated tasks is largely contingent upon the residual air and ground combat power resident in previously engaged, but now massed amphibious forces. Their success is dependent upon the availability of carrier and/or land-based Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, naval surface fire support platforms, integrated C3 systems,

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PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TASKS

- Conduct amphibious assaults to restore key naval facilities to Allied control
- Support U.S./Allied counteroffensive operations
- Conduct amphibious assault operations to assist in the restoration of Allied territory
- Conduct amphibious assault operations in support of U.S./Allied operations to seize Soviet/WP territory
- Redeploy to stabilize remaining trouble spots
mine countermeasure assets, cargo off-load and discharge units and the logistical sustainability resident in both AFOE shipping and follow-on strategic lift assets. Finally, large scale employment of amphibious forces must be taken under the umbrella of coalition warfare. That is to say, amphibious operations must be conducted in concert with, supporting of, and supported by, available U.S./allied forces. Moreover, the selection of employment options during the early phases should consider retaining the capability for decisive use of amphibious forces late in the war; although this retention should not preclude forward deployment of amphibious forces at the earliest practicable opportunity.

As previously noted, the combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct MAB-sized assault operations in two forward ocean areas simultaneously. If an early decision to concentrate available amphibious shipping in a single theater has been taken, then the massing of amphibious shipping to conduct a MAF-sized amphibious assault is clearly possible.

**PHASE III**

**CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE OPTIONS**

Additionally, MAF or MAB-sized operations utilizing the Near-Term Prepositioned Force and newly deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships could be conducted in appropriate theaters. Some allies, especially the British and South Koreans, have limited amphibious assault capabilities that may be used to supplement our own.
The battleship surface action groups could be employed to good advantage in a naval surface fire support role. Surface combatants, construction battalions, special operations and mine warfare forces have important roles to play here as well.

In addition to the execution or exploitation of the range of options outlined previously, the effects of mobilization on both the industrial base and the manpower pool now allow for large scale offensive naval operations.

Among the strategic options available to accomplish our objectives during the later stages of Phase III are MAF-sized amphibious assaults on such diverse geography as the Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin Island, the Baltic littoral of the Warsaw Pact states, restoral of BENELUX ports to allied control or, in conjunction with an allied counteroffensive, direct incursions into the Soviet homeland, such as: an attack through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles into the Black Sea. Exercise of these options could accrue such benefits as: (1) Blocking Soviet/WP ability to apply pressure on allied flanks, (2) Assist in rolling back or amputating Soviet reach, (3) Seizing or disrupting activity at key logistical chokepoints, thereby degrading the Soviets’ ability to resupply WP units, with the resultant potential to fragment WP solidarity/combat effectiveness and (4) contributing to warfighting objectives in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.

Most particularly in these later phases of the conflict, naval forces must be fully prepared to fight in concert with active and reserve forces of all U.S. services and friendly
states. Additionally, they must be most responsive to objectives perhaps as yet undefined, set by the civilian leadership of U.S., allied and friendly forces.

Having presented the Amphibious Warfare Strategy, the following will provide a brief summary of the key points set forth within the strategy.

**AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE**

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- GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY
- SUMMARY

It is critical that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy remain fully complementary to the Maritime Strategy. This precept is vital if we are to translate these strategies into programming and planning documents that will allow the Navy–Marine Corps Team to both apply resources to its warfighting deficiencies and develop plans and policies which are in consonance with national warfighting objectives and force capabilities.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, as it is translated into operational policies, tactical plans, force disposition and closure sequences, must take into account the considerable support amphibious forces require from other naval forces; support that may not be forthcoming until the accomplishment of other missions these forces must carry out either prior to or in conjunction with the introduction of amphibious forces. Accordingly, amphibious planning must be carefully integrated into all warfighting strategies at the theater level.

The most valuable characteristic of amphibious forces in a global war is the flexible way in which they can respond to accomplish missions across a wide spectrum and in geographically-dispersed areas. This Amphibious Warfare Strategy seeks to exploit that flexible response capability by offering a wide range of strategic options while avoiding foreclosure on a given option due to malpositioning, ineffective early employment or less productive expenditure of this national strategic asset.

**SUMMARY**

- THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY IS A COMPONENT OF AND COMPLEMENTARY TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY
- THE STRATEGY IS SUPPORTED BY AND SUPPORTIVE OF NAVAL FORCES AND THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS AND MISSIONS
- AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AT THE THEATER LEVEL
The execution of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy hinges on the readiness of amphibious forces to forward deploy, their ability to sustain themselves while engaged, and their capability to operate in consonance with other naval, sister service and allied forces. Continued emphasis on these areas, along with the attendant application of resources to insure their maintenance or future enhancement, will ensure that this strategy remains a viable one.

Amphibious forces must be continuously postured to respond to changing national aims. Therefore, it is critical that at every decision point in which the deployment/employment of amphibious forces is considered, such decisions must be taken within the context of the power projection/amphibious assault requirements that may emerge at any point along the continuum of conflict.

A global war fought against a determined and able Soviet foe will be a conflict of unprecedented ferocity requiring the total and unswerving commitment of the Western alliance if eventual victory is to be achieved. Amphibious forces can make a material contribution to the early success of Allied efforts by threatening vulnerable Soviet flanks and causing a resultant divergence of enemy forces from the main focus of effort in Central Europe. With the stabilization of the front on the European Continent, Navy–Marine Corps amphibious task forces will play a key role in seizing the strategic initiative by striking at key points of Soviet weakness to liberate conquered territory and, if need be, carry the fight to the doorstep of Russia itself. By assisting in the attainment of Alliance goals, U.S. naval forces and the hammer of decision resident in its amphibious striking arm, can truly make the strategic difference.

**SUMMARY**

- **OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND RISKS: EARLY AND LATE EMPLOYMENT**
- **AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER NAVAL FORCES CAN MAKE THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE AND SUCCESSFUL ATTAINMENT OF ALLIED WAR GOALS**
On 1 November 1985 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, signed the letter distributing a new version of the Maritime Strategy that superseded the one circulated a year and a half earlier, in May 1984.* In forwarding the 1984 version Admiral Watkins had announced his intention to do this, noting that “comments and suggestions for the FY 85 revision are requested. It is anticipated that the FY 85 revision will be presented initially at the beginning of the next programming cycle in October 1984, and briefed at the October 1984 Fleet Commanders in Chief Conference.”

In August and September 1984, work began on the new version.† By that time, routine officer rotation had begun to bring in a new team in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to deal with the Maritime Strategy issues. Commodore T. J. Johnson had become Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), Captain Larry Seaquist had become Head, Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and Commander T. Wood Parker was the new action officer for the Maritime Strategy.

At this point, a number of the commanders in chief were becoming critical of the strategy. When Commodore Johnson had given the briefing at the October 1984 Fleet Commanders in Chief Conference he had received some negative reactions, comments that dismissed it as “brochuresmanship,” a “PR job—not a strategy,” “not executable,” and “lacking operational insight.” While having great respect for what had already been done—and being determined to leave its basic structure (and map projection) intact—Seaquist and Parker agreed on three principal goals: to enhance the substance of the strategy; to get both the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters staffs to use the Maritime Strategy as the common starting point for all their efforts in policy, strategy, tactics,

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* Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-85, serial 00/5S300379, 1 November 1985. This document was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 16 July 2007.

† Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-84, serial 00/4S300236, 4 May 1984, para. 4.

budget, and procurement; and to “spread the gospel” throughout the Navy by widespread briefings and writings.

Parker’s goals, as action officer, in reaction to the criticism were to get greater involvement from the fleet commanders in chief for the next version; to describe more effectively the idea of “war termination on favorable terms”; to expand on the portions that dealt with peacetime operations, crisis-control operations, and transition to war; to include both anti–Soviet SSBN operations and U.S. Navy SSBN operations as part of the overall concept for the strategy; to deal with questions of time phasing and nuclear war that had been omitted earlier; and to explain further the uncertainties involved in the strategy.

At the same time, Vice Admiral James A. Lyons—Vice Admiral Moreau’s successor as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy (OP-06)—came up with the idea of “strategy stoppers”: procurement problems and issues that, if not funded, would weaken the strategy or make it difficult to execute. The point was to reinforce the strategy as a source of basic guidance and cohesiveness for the entire program acquisition process.

As the discussions continued, however, Seaquist and Parker concentrated on combating the misperception that the Maritime Strategy was merely a budget document designed to increase the size of the Navy, explaining it as rather the maritime component of the national strategy, complementing the other services. As part of this effort, Admiral Lyons and Commander Parker briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee and members of the House Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, effectively explaining the issues to some of the Navy’s most difficult critics.

Seaquist and Parker had completed the main work of revision by July 1985, at which point Commander Albert C. Myers relieved Parker. Myers’s task was to compile the final recommendations and changes emerging from a conference of working-level OPNAV and fleet staff planners and then submit the final draft document up the chain of command for Admiral Watkins to sign. In the letter circulating this third version of the Maritime Strategy, Admiral Watkins pointed out that this version “has been refined to address more fully: (a) Contributions of our allies and sister services, (b) Uncertainties associated with the execution of our strategy, (c) Strategic lift in all phases.”

Going farther, Watkins emphasized, “The Maritime Strategy is the cornerstone of our profession. It describes our role in executing national military strategy, is the basis for the development of the Navy POM, for testimony in support of Navy budgets and programs, for joint and allied cooperative planning efforts and for tactical development and warfighting plans in the Fleet.” Finally, he pointed out that “for the Maritime Strategy to remain dynamic, our leaders must understand it; therefore, the strategy must be subject to study and continued evaluation.”

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4 Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-85, para. 1.
5 Ibid., para. 2.
6 Ibid., para. 3.
This is the *Maritime Strategy, Global Maritime Elements of U.S. National Military Strategy*. It is the Navy’s preferred Maritime Strategy. It considers national and coalition guidance, the various threats, force levels, and the inevitable trade-offs which occur during crisis and non-crisis operations. It is a *baseline strategy* that is the nucleus from which our other strategy options emanate.

Why do we have a Maritime Strategy? What are its purposes? Primarily, it provides a *global view of fleet operations*, for deterrence and crisis control. Should deterrence fail, it is the *baseline integrated naval strategy* for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union, with war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. (The Maritime Strategy is the foundation for the *development of the annual naval program* and *budget submission*.) It is also the foundation for the U.S. Navy’s day-to-day fleet operations: routine fleet deployments; exercises; war games; and frequent requirements from the national command authority for response in times of international crises. The strategy is also the basis for the
development of the annual naval program which drives the priorities of our research and development programs and the complex decisions regarding force structure.

The Maritime Strategy is derived from and contributes to our national policy and strategy. The Soviet threat poses a constant challenge to our national strategy and its maritime component. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts of the unified commanders and their naval component commanders.

The strategy is based on several key concepts. It is important to consider what is meant by “strategy.” Strategy is a design for applying means to ends. In the Maritime Strategy the means are military forces. These are forces which are not only available today, but are also those which are seen to be available in the foreseeable future. This point is important because the Maritime Strategy is a real-time strategy. It can be executed today, with existing forces. The additional importance of the strategy is that its fundamental tenets will remain valid for years to come. Therefore, the Maritime Strategy can not only be based on current forces and the present-day threat, but it can also serve as the basis for the development of the POM which looks toward future forces and threats.

The objectives of the Maritime Strategy are deterrence across the range of conflict possibilities and escalation control. If deterrence fails and conflict between the West and the Soviet bloc occurs, the objectives of the strategy then become war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and our allies.
The premises of the strategy are several. The strategy is a *global*, coalition strategy, fully incorporating the forces of our allies and sister services. It is designed to achieve our national objectives using *conventional* means while simultaneously *avoiding nuclear war*. Should deterrence fail, the strategy assumes a *protracted, conventional war*. It is based on the concepts of *forward posture*, *high readiness* and the advantages of *advanced technology*. The strategy also exploits (to the maximum extent possible) the inherent attributes of naval force *flexibility and mobility*.

**MARITIME STRATEGY FRAMEWORK**

The Maritime Strategy framework has four parts. The first underscores the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and the *national strategy*. The Maritime Strategy is integral to our national strategy, because if the United States must go to war, it must go to sea.

The second part addresses *Soviet Strategy*. The Maritime Strategy is not developed to support the operations desired by the U.S. Navy. Rather, it was developed as a *counter* to the strategy of the Soviet Union.

With these two areas in mind, we then proceed to the *third* part, the development of the actual strategy, which includes analyses of peacetime and crisis operations as well as *global conventional war with the Soviet Union* if deterrence fails. Some of the implications of conventional forces to nuclear deterrence are also examined.

The fourth part of the Maritime Strategy framework considers the *uncertainties* inherent in the strategy. Uncertainties are not only difficult to predict, but they are also issues over which we have very little, if any, control.
Now to the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and our national strategy. The essential elements of our national strategy are deterrence, and if this deterrence fails, defense as far forward as possible in a posture of global coalition defense.

There are two principal sources for our development of national strategy: National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which are presidential decisions on national strategy; and the alliances, treaties and agreements we have with countries around the world.

Several other documents or sources which reflect the national strategy are also illustrated here. The Defense Guidance (DG) is the biennial Secretary of Defense guidance on strategy and programs. The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are annual JCS documents that recommend strategy to the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense), and provide guidance to the unified and specified commanders, respectively. The concepts and plans of those commanders describe the strategy for their respective theaters and functions.

The Navy and Marine Corps contribute to the development of these documents, and naval forces are among those responsible for their execution.
One of the principal National Security Decision Directives is NSDD-32, signed by President Reagan in May 1982. It is the basic document setting forth the current national strategy. NSDD-32 indicates that our principal threat is from the Soviet Union and that a war with the Soviets would likely be global in scope. The importance of global, conventional, balanced and forward deployed forces is highlighted, as is the vital importance of our allies in our national strategy.

Sequential operations in different theaters may be necessary because we do not have the superiority of forces and resources, particularly in view of the capabilities of the Soviet forces, necessary to do everything we need to do, everywhere, simultaneously. “Sequential” in this context also applies to intratheater operations. The idea of “rolling the enemy back” in a sequential manner will become clear as the Maritime Strategy is discussed.

The Maritime Strategy is in harmony with NSDD-32, but the strategy is not limited to the threat of the Soviet Union. There are other NSDDs which address regional threats and other concerns, and the Maritime Strategy also takes them into account.
The first of the documents reflecting the national strategy which will be discussed is the Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance (DG) is published biennially by the Secretary of Defense with the primary purpose of guiding the development of the annual Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).

The DG also establishes regional priorities for general Department of Defense planning. Our top defense priority is North America including the Caribbean Basin. The remaining regional priorities in descending order are: NATO and its lines of communications; then, the coequal priorities of access to oil in Southwest Asia, security of our Pacific allies, and the security of Pacific and Indian Ocean lines of communications; followed by the security of friendly nations in South America and Africa; and then in other parts of the world.

The DG contains only one global war planning scenario. It has the war commencing with a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia, then spreading to Europe and the Pacific sixteen days later. The DG scenario is useful in sizing certain U.S. forces and establishing capability requirements driven by the most demanding distance-related scenario,
but it is not intended as a force employment guide for U.S. forces. One concern is that this scenario can be used to influence planning and programming to an 
unwarranted degree.

The current Defense Guidance is very positive in its guidance on maritime posture. It provides the Navy with clear force planning guidance and warfighting goals. It emphasizes destruction of the enemy fleet (even in high threat areas), control of vital sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea, Northwest Pacific), sealift, and power projection ashore. It commits the Department of Defense to a goal of allied maritime superiority.

MARITIME STRATEGY—GLOBAL MARITIME OPTIONS

The Maritime Strategy does not purport to tell the regional CINCs how to fight in their respective theaters. The actual execution of the war will be carried out by the CINCs and Major NATO Commanders (MNCs). The Maritime Strategy, therefore, provides a set of global maritime options that could be executed by the CINCs and MNCs.

The Maritime Strategy must be in consonance with the JSCP and current CINC war planning, but because of overlapping requirements it must transcend an uncritical compilation of these preferred concepts of operations. The Maritime Strategy melds the frequently divergent approaches in the DG, the JSCP, the DPQ, and CINC concepts, and presents a central, preferred baseline strategic course of action.
Besides the strictly national documents and the plans and concepts of the CINCs, we also have alliances, treaties and formal agreements with countries around the world. These alliances and treaties together form the skeletal frame of global coalition warfare, another of the bases for our national military strategy. It is fundamental that by defending our allies, we defend ourselves.

In addition to the seven formal defense treaties which include forty-three separate nations, we have common military interests with other countries which affect the Maritime Strategy. For example, there are nineteen other countries outside the formal alliance system with which we have significant Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements. These defense treaties and other agreements result in a set of global commitments and interests for the United States. The Maritime Strategy takes these commitments and interests and the requirements of coalition warfare and combined operations fully into account.
An exceptionally important part of our coalition strategy is, of course, NATO Strategy. NATO’s overall strategic concept is contained in a NATO Military Committee document known as MC 14/3. The primary goal of this NATO Strategy is to preserve the peace through the credible deterrence of any threatened or actual aggression against the North Atlantic Treaty Signatories from covert war to nuclear war. If deterrence fails, NATO’s first objective is to counter the aggression without escalation and preserve or restore the integrity and security of the NATO area. The NATO Strategy also states that NATO must be prepared to escalate to nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) of the three Major NATO Commanders—SACLANT, CINCHAN and SACEUR—is designed to counter the maritime operations of the WARSAW PACT and to support the land battle with carrier air strikes and amphibious assaults. The protection of the vital sea lines of communication is emphasized throughout the document, with the ultimate goal being to “win the new peace.”
The Maritime Strategy is based on the concept of joint and combined operations. To be successful against the combined forces of the Soviet Union, it is essential that U.S. and allied air forces, land forces and naval forces operate jointly. Naval operations support land forces, and land and air operations support maritime forces. There is one common, unifying goal for all of our forces—favorable war termination.

Illustrative of the progress the United States is making in the area of joint operations is this listing of the United States interservice cooperation initiatives. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force addresses the maritime roles of the U.S. Air Force especially in air defense, but also in aerial mining and anti-surface warfare. The Navy-Army MOA discusses the overall subject of sealift. The Army–Air Force MOA contains eleven initiatives in which the Navy is actively involved, with the ultimate objective being enhanced interoperability. The Navy–Coast Guard MOA establishes the United States Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ).
All of the guidance the Navy has received can be reduced to a few basic goals for the Maritime Strategy. This strategy has been developed to implement these goals.

The operations within the Maritime Strategy must be planned and executed in close conjunction with our allies and sister Services.

**MARITIME STRATEGY FRAMEWORK**

- **OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH ALLIES AND SISTER SERVICES**
  - PROVIDE POSITIVE PEACETIME PRESENCE
  - CONTROL CRISIS
  - DETER WAR

--- IF DETERRENCE FAILS

- **CONTRIBUTE TO FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION**
  - DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES
  - PROTECT SEA LINES
  - SUPPORT LAND BATTLES

All of the guidance the Navy has received can be reduced to a few basic goals for the Maritime Strategy. This strategy has been developed to implement these goals.

The operations within the Maritime Strategy must be planned and executed in close conjunction with our allies and sister Services.

The Maritime Strategy was developed as a counter to the strategy of the Soviet Union. In order to understand the Maritime Strategy, a review of Soviet strategy is essential.
This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels today. The orders of battle for the four principal fleets and a representative order of battle for each of the Soviets’ normal out of area deployments are illustrated. The patrol areas of Soviet SSBNs and SSGNs off the U.S. coasts are notionally represented, and the normal operating areas of other submarines, surface ships and aviation forces are also shown. Note especially the Soviet worldwide disposition.

The Soviet Navy continues to increase in size and capabilities. Its aviation strike forces are supplemented by the Soviet Air Force (SAF) which can also be used for strikes against carrier battle forces or other forces in the maritime theaters. Soviet naval forces are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant ships, the most militarily adaptable merchant fleet in the world, deployed globally. Soviet naval forces are supported in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets, in the Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian navies, and elsewhere by other forces friendly to them.

The Soviets have learned to employ their Navy to exert political influence in peacetime, and they are doing it effectively. The Soviet Navy, with its increasing capabilities for global operations, has been an important factor in the Soviet Union’s long range and heretofore successful strategy of encroachment throughout the world.
The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strategy illustrates the best current agreed estimate by the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Soviets believe that war between the coalitions will be global in scope. They state that nuclear escalation is likely, because they believe that NATO will escalate. However, the Soviets also believe that a prolonged conventional war is possible.

The NIE states that the Soviets primarily emphasize strategic strike, including the use of general purpose naval forces to defend their SSBN force, and strategic defense in depth of the maritime approaches to the USSR, as primary tasks of the Soviet Navy. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the sea lanes are seen as other, initial tasks. Therefore, according to the NIE, relatively few forces would be allocated to open-ocean SLOC interdiction at the beginning of a global war.

Soviet naval strategy, like our own, is part of an overall unified military strategy and cannot be properly understood outside that context.
Initial estimated Soviet wartime operating areas provide for Sea Denial Zones to 2000 kilometers. Within these Sea Denial Zones are Sea Control Zones. The Sea Denial Zones engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and those of several of our allies, as they extend far out into “blue water.” If secured, the zones sever the vital sea lines of communication.

In the Sea Control areas, the Soviets would present a multi-platform threat. In the Sea Denial Zones, the threat would largely be air and subsurface. Beyond the Sea Denial Zones, the threat would largely be subsurface.

While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy should not appreciably change over the next 15 to 20 years, the Sea Denial Zones will probably extend another 1000 kilometers to 3000 kilometers by that time.

It is clear that the Soviet Navy has capabilities in excess of their current sea control/sea denial zone defense needs, but the NIE represents the best current estimate of their doctrine. The implications of what could happen if they adopt a different strategy and the question of what their strategy will be as the conflict unfolds will be discussed later in this presentation. But there is no doubt that the Soviets intend to challenge our forward strategy.
ATTACKING THE SOVIET STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy is designed to defeat the strategy of the Soviets by precluding their successes, interrupting their time lines, attriting their forces, and exploiting their sensitivities and vulnerabilities.

The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations in their desired Sea Control and Sea Denial Zones. They are a formidable foe. Several of their strengths are listed here. In addition to their large numbers of forces and their design for a combined arms defense in depth, the Soviets possess and utilize an offensive operational mentality. Their objective is to seize the initiative, or to gain an advantage over an adversary through deception, initiative and massive strikes. Their offensive operations plan to execute their primary tasks of providing a secure strategic strike force and defending the maritime approaches to the homeland. The Soviets attempt to anticipate every contingency, then carefully and completely plan their operations to meet those contingencies. Their training programs are closely orchestrated to ensure the preparation of their naval forces to carry out those plans.

But the Soviets are not invulnerable, and they have weaknesses that can be exploited during war. We define sensitivities as those things about which the Soviets are especially concerned, and vulnerabilities as the weaknesses that we perceive to be particularly troublesome to the Soviets. The objective of our Maritime Strategy is to exploit Soviet sensitivities and vulnerabilities so that the Politburo will stop its military actions, reevaluate its intentions, analyze whether it can achieve its objectives through military means, and desist from initiating additional actions and from continuing or escalating the conflict.
The strategy itself will now be developed. Although the focus of the Maritime Strategy includes a careful examination of global conventional war with the Soviet Union, the strategy encompasses the applications of naval power in peacetime and during crisis response operations as well.

**APPLICATIONS OF MARITIME POWER**

Maritime forces serve the U.S. across the entire range of conflict possibilities, from peacetime presence to strategic nuclear war.
The U.S. Navy’s *peacetime presence* is constant and worldwide. The objectives of peacetime operations are *enhancing deterrence*, supporting the *diplomatic objectives* of the U.S., and sustaining the *high readiness* and *rapid response* capability of the overall strategy.

The Navy’s peacetime presence is an important counter to the strategy of the Soviet Union—*encroachment*. The Maritime Strategy recognizes this process and addresses it in the U.S. Navy’s peacetime presence operations.

Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s forward peacetime operations are designed to deter acts of *state sponsored terrorism*, and if that deterrence fails, to be positioned to respond to terrorist acts rapidly and effectively.

Naval forces *underscore American commitments and interests* around the globe daily. Their forward presence is a physical demonstration of U.S. will, encouraging allies and friends, deterring and reducing the influence of enemies, influencing neutrals, and asserting and reinforcing principles of international law and freedom of the seas on a continuous basis.

**MAJOR PEACE TIME NAVAL COMMITMENTS**

Why does the U.S. Navy go to sea? The foremost reason is that it has numerous *commitments* requiring forward operations around the world. Some of these commitments are illustrated here. The circled numbers represent thousands of ship operating days at sea or in
port in areas where they are assigned, to a considerable extent accrued as the result of meeting the various commitments.

Because of training requirements, naval units naturally spend much time operating in the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific. A major presence is also maintained in the western Pacific. Permanent deployments, in force, are made to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Naval operations are also conducted in the northeast Atlantic and north Pacific, because those are vital areas to places where naval forces must be prepared to defeat the enemy.

At any point in time, a full third of the fleet is at sea with over 110 thousand Navy men and women. In addition to Navy operations in many parts of the world, there are three to four thousand civilian mariners providing afloat logistics support.

PEACETIME PRESENCE—ACTIVE USN/USMC FORCES

Satisfying the multitude of commitments and other requirements demands a naval presence that is forward and mobile. The global mobility of naval forces is illustrated here with the order of battle of the major FY 85 Navy and Marine Corps forces. These forces are assigned to Fleet Commanders and are normally deployed as shown. These force levels include units in overhaul, but not in the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).
The Maritime Strategy—like CINC war planning—addresses current forces, that is, those available at the end of Fiscal Year 85. This avoids the uncertainties concerning the attainability of forces now planned or programmed for the future.

The Tomahawk cruise missile weapons system enhances the capabilities of the forces depicted here. It is a significant change to our strike and anti-surface warfare posture. *Tomahawk* continues to be phased in during FY 85 in its anti-ship (TASM) and nuclear land attack (TLAM-N) forms. The USS New Jersey will soon have an Interim Operational Capability (IOC) for employment of the conventional land attack version (TLAM-C).

**MAJOR U.S. NAVAL EXERCISES**

In addition to the commitments already addressed, naval forces annually participate in a demanding series of *peacetime exercises*. Dozens are held each year, often with allies and other services. This chart shows only a few of the most important ones conducted last year. The largest of them were the Fleetex’s in the Pacific and the sequence Solid Shield/Teamwork in the North Atlantic.

These exercises enable U.S. naval units to operate routinely with sister services and allied forces, and also to test and update joint and combined procedures. The exercises
thereby strengthen *alliance cohesion*, enhance *interoperability*, improve *combat effectiveness*, and demonstrate joint and combined *capabilities which enhance deterrence*.

*PEACETIME POSTURE—ACTIVE U.S. ARMY/AIR FORCES*  
*FY 85*

A previous slide depicted the worldwide mobility of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team. The more theater-oriented *U.S. Army* and *U.S. Air Force* also play important roles in the development of the Maritime Strategy. A significant number of their forces are stationed overseas. Shown here are some aspects of their worldwide posture, as they relate to the Maritime Strategy. In addition to the Army posture, it shows Air Force Tactical Fighter Squadrons, AWACS Aircraft, and B-52 Squadrons with a current minelaying or anti-surface missile capability.

There is a close interrelationship between maritime and land campaigns. Naval operations support land forces, and land/air operations support maritime forces. For example, the U.S. Army reinforces the Aleutian Islands, Iceland and the Azores during a global crisis with the Soviet Union. Maintaining control of these strategic locations would be crucial to successful maritime operations in a global war.
The U.S. global alliance force structure must also be included when the naval forces available to fight are counted. Full commitment of all allies is assumed here, including the French, Japanese, and others.

This chart and table show the current peacetime disposition of those allied naval forces that could be expected to play a significant role in a global war. There is a predominance of smaller blue-water surface combatants and mine counter-measures ships. The bulk of our allies' forces are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters.

When viewed in isolation, it could be concluded that the naval forces of our allies are mainly at the lower end of the capabilities spectrum. But when they operate in conjunction with U.S. naval forces, there is a synergistic effect, and allied naval forces make exceptionally important contributions to the overall Maritime Strategy.

Certain forward land-based allied air superiority, air defense, airborne early warning, and ground radar forces could help significantly in reducing the air threat to the maritime effort. NATO Air Forces and ground radars could assist in the European flanks, as the
Japanese and Koreans could assist in East Asia, and the French squadron at Djibouti could assist in the Indian Ocean.

Allied merchant marine assets will be also required. In certain areas (like Norway, Turkey, and Japan), allied coastal defense forces would be important. Certain allies, notably the British and Dutch, possess limited amphibious assault forces.

IN PEACETIME—GLOBAL, FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE

This chart illustrates the normal peacetime operating areas of both the U.S. and Soviet general purpose naval forces, including those areas in which the two Navies “overlap.” Also indicated are calendar year 1984 diplomatic port visits. These port visits are an important aspect of our peacetime naval presence. The dots represent only countries visited—108. To show the individual ports themselves would overwhelm such a small chart.

Routine port visits are conducted not only to ensure adequate crew rest and relaxation, but also to promote better relations between the United States and the allied, friendly, and neutral countries visited. Additionally, the visits demonstrate American military strength, professionalism and support.
The Maritime Strategy is designed to meet the national commitments assigned to the Navy, provide the forward presence called for by our national strategy, bolster deterrence across the spectrum of conflict possibilities, counter Soviet encroachment, and reinforce alliance cohesion.

Crisis response is the next major U.S. Navy role. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has been used for this purpose more often than any other service: In the past forty years, the Navy has participated in approximately 80 percent of the crises in which the United States has been involved.

Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Forces have been the primary instruments of naval crisis response, but most other types of naval forces could also have been used. Naval forces are sometimes employed in crises in conjunction with other U.S. services, and to a lesser extent allied forces, usually outside formal alliance frameworks.

The objectives of the strategy are to support national policy objectives, protect American interests, provide flexible options to the National Command Authority, and control escalation of the crisis.
This chart locates many of the over 200 crises in which U.S. Naval forces have been involved since World War II. The majority of these crises have occurred in the Middle East and Caribbean/Central America regions. Regrettably, we live in an era of “violent peace” in which crises and armed conflicts, especially in the Third World, will continue.

Naval forces are forward, ready and mobile, and they provide a broad range of strong options to the National Command Authority. Navy crisis response can range from varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of force in support of national objectives. Naval forces can be used across the full spectrum of responses to crises, from countering acts of state-supported terrorism, to engaging in single-theater wars.

The Maritime Strategy is designed to respond quickly to crises, avoid maldeployment of forces when responding to a crisis, control the crisis and ensure that it does not escalate, and apply the lessons learned in all crisis operations to ensure that the strategy is validated continuously.
From peacetime presence and crisis response operations, the U.S. Navy's baseline strategy for fighting a global conventional war with the Soviets can be developed. The strategy is designed first to deter such a war. If deterrence fails, the objectives are to fight successfully, prevent nuclear war, and contribute to the war's termination on favorable terms.

At the conclusion, some of the implications for escalation to nuclear war will be discussed.

The Maritime Strategy is separated into three phases. Phase I is a period of rising tensions, crises, or a serious confrontation between the superpowers. The operations envisioned by the strategy during Phase I are for the purpose of deterrence. The objective in Phase I is to control escalation of the crisis and to deter the outbreak of outright hostilities.
If deterrence fails and the Soviets have attacked, the Maritime Strategy moves into Phase II, during which U.S. and allied maritime forces would operate to seize the initiative. The objective during Phase II is the establishment of maritime superiority in key ocean areas.

Success in Phase II will enable the United States to move into Phase III, when maritime forces can take the fight to the enemy. The objective of Phase III is war termination on favorable terms. War termination is by no means restricted to Phase III. If the war can be stopped on favorable terms during Phase II, it will be, of course, terminated as soon as possible.

There are deliberately no time frames attached to these three phases, because they represent the general direction in which the Navy would prefer to go, not a timetable.

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**PHASE I**

**MARITIME STRATEGY**

**“DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR”**

**GOALS**
- DETER THE WAR
- CEDE NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT
- PREPARE FOR GLOBAL WAR

**TASKS**
- POSITION FORWARD
- BEGIN STRATEGIC SEALIFT
- AVOID MALDEPLOYMENT
- INCREASE READINESS
- HUSBAND RESOURCES
- MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME

**SPEED AND DECISIVENESS ESSENTIAL**

**NEED: ACTIVATION OF RESERVES**

**ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY**

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Phase I, the deterrence or transition phase, includes rising tensions and could include one or more crises, a serious confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. The goals of the strategy are listed on the left and the tasks to achieve those goals are listed on the right. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.
The tasks will be tempered by the apparently conflicting demands of each. For example, positioning forces forward and ensuring no maldeployment could be mutually exclusive. The point to be made is that in a Phase I situation, tough decisions will have to be made and tradeoffs are inevitable.

Timely and firm political decision making will be crucial. The U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) and the leadership of the allies will probably be attempting to make decisions in very ambiguous circumstances. Nonetheless, in a grave crisis which may result in open conflict between the West and the Soviet Bloc, speed and decisiveness are essential if all the available political-military incentives are to be brought to bear to control the crisis and deter conflict. Several items that will be especially important are the early forward movement of naval and air forces, timely activation of reserves, implementation of Maritime Defense Zone plans, requisition of civilian sealift and airlift assets, and consistent alliance cohesion.

For deterrence to be successful, our national and coalition leadership will have to act quickly and collectively, exerting maximum political-military leverage. All of the diplomatic and military options will have to be closely and effectively coordinated.

**PHASE I**

**SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE**

In this phase we would expect the Soviets to sortie into their Sea Control and Sea Denial areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South China Sea forces, especially with submarines. We would probably detect all this movement fairly
early, and have about two weeks warning before they would be in their desired positions for their initial worldwide attacks.

Soviet aviation strike forces would redeploy to their dispersal bases, and the Black and Baltic Sea Fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact Navies would prepare to support joint operations ashore. The Soviet Merchant Fleet would chop to naval control to provide intelligence and lift. The Soviets, in short, would *posture for global war, world-wide.*

**GLOBAL USE OF MOBILE, FLEXIBLE FORCES**

U.S. Naval forces would reposition as well, forward. This chart *illustrates some timeframes involved in considering moving naval afloat forces into position, and is helpful in discussing what follows.*

The important implication of these closure times is that *timely political decisions are essential.* The *canals are important* in Phase I, and the *forward posture* of our naval forces is vital in terms of rapid response to crisis.

The NCA may desire to move forces forward during conditions of ambiguity. Phase I may be just such a condition. One approach may be to conduct a no-notice naval exercise, moving forces to forward locations without the constraints *that might otherwise be imposed.* The unique mobility of naval forces makes this option particularly desirable when in ambiguous and dangerous circumstances.

Although U.S. and allied naval and air orders of battle were depicted previously, some 18 to 24 percent of the units mentioned would probably be unavailable in the early months of the war due to conversions and overhauls in progress.
Throughout the deterrence or transition to war phase there would be global forward movement of U.S. Naval forces, a complex operation. SSNs would move into far forward positions, including the Arctic, deep in the Soviet Sea Control and Sea Denial areas. Battle Groups would begin to form into multicarrier battle forces to prepare to move forward at the proper time. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, demonstrating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.

Battleship and other surface action groups, the Patrol Hydrofoil Squadron, and Special Warfare Groups would move out. Land based patrol aircraft (VP) would reposition forward, worldwide, and intensify surveillance. Regarding mining plans, the CINCs would have to make hard trade-offs, assigning mining missions to scarce multi-role platforms, and commencing mine loadout. Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness, and lead portions of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would move to Norway to join their prepositioned equipment. Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout, and sealift of multi-service reinforcements would commence. Rapidly deployable, prepositioned equipment aboard the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) and other pre-positioned ships is an important ingredient in our forward strategy. MPS Squadron One is pre-positioned in EASTLANT, and MPS Squadron Two will be set up in Diego Garcia. Several former NTPF ships (now called Afloat...
Positioning Ships) remain ready in the Indian Ocean. MPS Squadron Three will be set up in Guam outside the time frame covered by this document.

Again, the purpose of this global forward movement is deterrence, but if deterrence fails, naval forces need to be forward to transition to warfighting rapidly.

**PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR**

**MOVEMENT OF COAST GUARD AND RESERVES**

Because of the seriousness of the scenario envisioned, *activation of reserves* is anticipated during Phase I. The Army and Air Force are much more dependent on reserve activation than the Navy, but the Maritime Strategy relies to a significant degree on the capabilities and contributions of the Naval Reserve, as well as on protection of U.S. harbors and coastal Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) by the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) commands. Reserve patrol aircraft squadrons and the U.S. Naval Reserve surface combatants move forward, and Reserve Minesweepers prepare for mine countermeasures in U.S. ports, harbors and coastal areas. The reserves perform several other critical functions such as cargo handling and Naval Control of Shipping.

The question of whether the 100,000 Reserve personnel call-up would be adequate would depend upon the circumstances at the time. Timely activation of reserves is crucial.

Twelve modern *Coast Guard High-Endurance Cutters* would be made available to the CINCs, and other Coast Guard units would prepare for coastal defense duties. The
Commanders, Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific, in their roles as Commanders, U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific, responsible to Navy Fleet Commanders-in-Chief, will implement their plans for conducting coastal defense and for protection of coastal SLOCs.

Marine reserves would also be activated, under CINCLANTFLT. This chart shows only the major Coast Guard and Naval Reserve ships and aircraft, and does not depict the totality of the vital contribution that Coast Guard and Reserve Personnel would make.


PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR
MOVEMENT OF US/ALLIED ARMY/AIR FORCES

U.S. and allied armies and air forces would be active as well in moving forward in conjunction with operations supporting U.S. national military strategy.

While the U.S. Army’s central focus would be on reinforcement by airlift and sealift of the European Central Region, it is envisioned that active or reserve Army infantry brigades would reinforce the Aleutians and Iceland, and an Army military police battalion would reinforce the Azores. *Retaining control of these islands is vital* to the success of the Maritime Strategy. Allied Army deployments are also important to the Maritime Strategy including movement of the Ace Mobile Force, UK/NL Amphibious Brigade, and the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.

**U.S. Air Force TACAIR** would also focus on the Central Region, but it is anticipated that some reinforcements would go to the NATO flanks, Iceland, the Azores, Japan, and Korea. Some U.S. Air Force fighters would deploy to Southwest Asia, the Aleutian Islands, and Florida (opposite Cuba). Canadian and British TACAIR would reinforce Norway. U.S. and Allied AEW aircraft (AWACS, NATO AWACS, Nimrods, and E-2’s)
would also take up stations. The U.S. AWACS in Saudi Arabia would probably redeploy to Europe.

**PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR**

**MOVEMENT OF ALLIED NAVIES/MPA**

Our allies would probably increase their readiness and, in accordance with plans, reposition some of their forces in accordance with agreements in force. The NATO Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Channel would increase readiness, and the Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean would be constituted. The Royal Navy would send SSN’s forward and a British ASW task group, centered around at least one carrier, would put to sea in EASTLANT. French carrier task groups and submarines could be expected to put to sea in the Western Mediterranean.

The Federal Republic of Germany’s Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic. The Turkish Navy, especially its submarines, would do the same in the Black Sea. The Italian Navy would deploy in the north central Mediterranean, and a Spanish ASW carrier task group would get under way in the Atlantic, positioned near Gibraltar.

British and Dutch Marines would reinforce Norway. The Japanese and other allies would also sortie. On a worldwide basis, combined ASW tracking by maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) would intensify, and readiness would be increased. NATO and other
allies would begin to marshal sealift assets, to support U.S. and other reinforcement movements.

**PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR**

**STRATEGIC LIFT AND LOGISTICS**

Mobile, flexible naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances without mobile and shore-based forward logistics support. This support is essential in all three phases of the strategy.

To support the forces that are forward deployed during Phase I, U.S. and Allied mobile logistics support force ships would be formed into *Underway Replenishment Groups* (URGs), supported by strategic sealift and shuttle shipping.

Forward bases would be reinforced with Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFC’s) to provide battle group logistics support; to sustain P-3 operations and to provide hospital, repair, and construction support. Host nation support would be used, worldwide, to the maximum extent possible, especially to provide cargo handling and port services. U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions would also be required. Advanced forward bases, especially for P-3’s and Marines, would require Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEES) support. Also illustrated is the massive sealift that would be necessary if full reinforcement of Southwest Asia was required.
The result of all of the reinforcements and forward movement of forces is as depicted. Mutually supportive land and air forces converging at strategic locations in conjunction with a wide range of options provided by forward positioned maritime forces produce strong leverage to control crises, and simultaneously, full preparedness for war if these deterrent actions fail.

Note the northern Arctic areas in which U.S. and allied nuclear powered attack submarines would be operating, as well as the notional depiction of Poseidon and Trident SSBNs that would be providing the essential strategic nuclear deterrent backdrop to the overall crisis.

The growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been constant and significant, and that growth is continuing. Given the relative lack of U.S. forces in the Alaskan area, the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet poses an increased threat to the Aleutian Islands. Thus, an important objective is to increase the size and capabilities of the forces that are assigned to defend the Aleutian Islands.

The purpose of the operations envisioned by the Maritime Strategy in Phase I is deterrence of war; we hope this is the final phase.
With enemy and Allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major Soviet attack could occur. In that event, actual large-scale warfare would commence. If so, it would probably spread among a number of theaters, especially at sea.

It is the Soviet Union’s aversion to multi-theater war which enhances the deterrent represented by the global presence of U.S. forces in peacetime. If we withdraw forces from key theaters, confining the conflict may be possible, but the likelihood of the conflict occurring would also be dramatically increased.

This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative, as far forward as possible. The objective of operations in Phase II is the establishment of maritime superiority in key ocean areas. Protection of U.S. harbors and coastal SLOC’s through Maritime Defense Zone commands is an important supportive element in achieving that objective. Phase II is preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy.

The war at sea cannot be discussed without consideration of the land/air/battle. This chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation

GLOBAL WAR
SOVIETS INITIATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
transitioned to global war. The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central Europe. Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the Turkish Straits.

In the Far East, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific. They would also pressure the Japanese to deny to the U.S. the use of naval and air facilities. If they fail because of the U.S.-Japanese alliance (as the Maritime Strategy assumes), they would attack Japan, initially by air. North Korea might take the opportunity to attack South Korea. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the Chinese into entering the war against them but would not let their guard down in Asia. Even if the Chinese attacked the Soviets, however, the Soviet focus would nevertheless remain on Europe.

The Soviets are unlikely to initiate hostilities in Southwest Asia as a deliberate precursor to global war. Any hostilities which might occur during such a war would involve mainly unreinforced and less capable forces.

PHASE II
MARITIME STRATEGY

“SEIZE THE INITIATIVE”

GOALS
- Counter First Salvo
- Attrite Enemy Forces
- Protect SLOCs
- Continue Reinforcement and Resupply
- Improve Positioning

TASKS
- Conduct
  - ASW
  - ASUW
  - C3I
  - STRIKEOPS
- Attrite
  - AAW
  - MIW
  - SPECOPS
  - PHIBOPS
- Improve
  - Positioning
  - SEALIFT

ESTABLISH FORWARD MARITIME SUPERIORITY

At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces, and seize the initiative. Vital Sea Lines of Communication would be defended as far forward as possible. Protection of U.S. harbors and coastal SLOCs would be provided by Maritime Defense Zone commands. Naval forces would improve their positioning as they move forward throughout Phase II ready to move into Phase III in the event that favorable war termination was not achieved.
The tasks of Phase II are listed on the right. While this strategy describes each warfare task separately, each would actually be implemented, more or less, simultaneously. While operations in one geographic theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, operations in another area may well move to Phase III very quickly. The priority of warfare tasks would depend on the theater and the circumstances at the time. These considerations underscore the fact that the geographical focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding exclusive treatment of any single theater.

**PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

**ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**

The destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet, as far forward as possible is fundamental to our eventual success. As shown here, a coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) initiative is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons systems, and tactics.

*Forward and barrier ASW operations* would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet submarines operating in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas and submarines seeking to break out to attack U.S. reinforcement and resupply shipping further out. SSNs would conduct ASW operations far into the Soviet sea control zone against the range of available targets, requiring operations under the Arctic ice cover. Allied task groups would perform area ASW operations. U.S. and allied mine and submarine barriers would be initiated at key choke points. Selective mining of Soviet port area approaches would also be implemented.
Forward-positioned maritime patrol aircraft, in conjunction with SOSUS, and augmented by mobile passive acoustic systems, conduct ASW operations to the maximum extent possible, without interfering with SSN operations.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
ANTI-AIR WARFARE

In the initial anti-air warfare (AAW) campaign, as our carrier battle forces move forward, they would be attacked by Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation Strike Forces. The carrier battle forces will seize the initiative, engaging Soviet air attacks as far forward as possible in outer air battles, to cause maximum Soviet attrition. Land-based TACAIR would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific.

The AAW campaign is not limited to defeating air and missile attacks against carrier battle forces. The Soviets will, of course, conduct strikes against land targets as well. Joint and combined CVBF/USMC/USAF/Allied operations will be necessary in all theaters to counter these strikes. Land-based TACAIR could also address the Cuban air threat, if necessary.

Maritime operations in the various theaters pose problems to the Soviet leadership, in that the Soviets will have conflicting demands as to where they should send their aviation reserves.

French carriers would probably operate in the western Mediterranean possibly securing western Mediterranean SLOCs and providing backing for U.S. carriers moving east, while they retain their primary national theater nuclear reserve role.
When hostilities commence there will be a number of early and intense anti-surface warfare (ASUW) engagements, especially in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Effective rules of engagement and innovative tactics will be used to complicate Soviet targeting and to seize the initiative. As U.S. and allied maritime forces move forward, they will continue to attrite opposing Soviet surface forces.

The Federal Republic of Germany’s Navy, naval air force and air forces would make contact with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces moving across the Baltic. Battleship surface action group and/or PHM Battles may occur in the Caribbean. Similar surface clashes are possible elsewhere. The U.S. objective will be to eliminate all out of area Soviet forces. Soviet intelligence gathering ships (AGIs) as well as combatants would be sought out and destroyed, and merchantmen will be sunk as targets of opportunity.

U.S. and allied surface, subsurface, and air assets would be engaged, including ASM-equipped allied TACAIR. U.S. Navy submarines, mines, and Harpoon-equipped P-3’s, although primarily engaged in ASW, could contribute—as could TASM-equipped SSN’s. TASM will also be available on a few surface combatants. Harpoon-equipped B-52’s, if made available, could also contribute.
Even with the campaign still in Phase II, and the massed power of carrier battle forces and amphibious forces not yet in a position to strike the Soviets far forward, *certain initial projection operations* could nevertheless occur. This slide shows various *options* that could be mounted from the maritime theaters in this phase to support the major land action in progress.

If necessary, *air strikes* and *offensive mining* may be conducted against Cuba, Libya, Vietnam and Korea, possibly by CVBF’s enroute higher threat areas. Strikes may be necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, and Japan. *USAF and allied support* would be particularly useful, especially in Asia. Soviet targets in Asia are more accessible to direct U.S. attack than those in Europe at this stage.

*SPECWAR* surveillance, intelligence and raiding options, for instance, against C3 sites, would be valuable supplements. U.S. and allied Marine *operations* in Norway and—possibly—amphibious insertions elsewhere are also options.
Mine Warfare (MIW) includes both offensive mining and mine countermeasures operations. The U.S. and allied offensive minefields illustrated here are almost exclusively employed against Soviet submarines in choke points or in their SSBN patrol areas.

The primary mine countermeasures campaign will be as far forward as possible, targeting delivery platforms to prevent mines from being sown at all. For those that get through and must be swept, envisioned U.S. and allied mine countermeasures responsibilities are depicted here. It is anticipated that the allies would bear the lion’s share of the task.

Besides the threat of open ocean attack, a major threat to the SLOCs would be mines at the terminals. The allies would secure their own inshore waters. For the United States, coastal defense responsibilities would fall to units of the U.S. Naval Reserve and U.S. Coast Guard, operating in Maritime Defense Zones under the Fleet Commanders.

There are clearly not enough U.S. or allied assets to clear all our areas of responsibility simultaneously. The slide also indicates many additional critical choke points and ports considered to be of interest to the Soviets and where shipping could be disrupted by them. Any threats to those areas would have to be countered by redeployment of scarce assets from other areas.
The Soviets recognize that U.S. Naval forces will generally be moving forward in the three ocean areas as depicted here. Their Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) is global in scope and is used to detect, locate and track the movement of U.S. naval forces. Several of the elements of the SOSS are listed.

The neutralization of the SOSS is extremely important for the success of U.S. and allied air, surface and subsurface naval operations. C’I countermeasures programs and operations are designed to *confuse*, *deceive* and *disrupt* the SOSS, thereby precluding its effectiveness and making the targeting of naval forces much more difficult. Some of the options available to the on-scene commander include force dispersal, emission control, deception, decoys, and the destruction of AGIs and tattletales as well as the neutralization of Soviet C’I nodes.
The importance of space in the Maritime Strategy is inexorably increasing. All naval warfare missions depend to a degree on the use and control of space for essential I&W, reconnaissance, command and control, navigation, weather and environmental data for executing all phases of the Maritime Strategy.

Because of Soviet capabilities, the focus of strategy vs. strategy must have a space component. The Soviets view space as an extension of terrestrial theaters of operation—one to control and dominate. Soviet current capabilities include an ocean reconnaissance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT, SALYUT), a global command and control network, a worldwide navigation system, and an anti-satellite system. They also have a quick launch system for mission essential naval warfighting C3 systems.

The objective of a “space strategy” is to exploit the unique benefits of space and control it through all levels of conflict, ensuring force enhancement and denying the effective use of space to the Soviets.
The use of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would continue to be critical throughout Phase II. Sealift from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is central to American and allied success. Over 95 percent of the American reinforcement and resupply dry cargo and 99 percent of petroleum resupply must go by sea. Also, the oil SLOCs are important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially by the allies. Because of stockpiles and conservation measures that would be implemented, the oil SLOCs would not become critical until approximately D+60 to D+90.

Reinforcement and resupply sealift for all services and our allies would be provided by the U.S. Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet, other ships of the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet, merchant ships requisitioned by the Department of Transportation, and allied ships.

All of these SLOCs must be defended. The primary defense would be made well north of the major transoceanic SLOC, as has been shown, but a certain close-in-threat would always be present, especially from Soviet pre-deployed submarines and those that slip through U.S. and allied forward and barrier operations. The defense against this close in threat will be discussed later.
The routing of the major military reinforcement and resupply SLOCs depicted also seeks to minimize the risk of Soviet land-based air attack. Should the forward AAW and ASW battles go favorably, the SLOCs could be shifted northward to reduce the transoceanic distances involved.

**PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

**RESULT: FORWARD SEA CONTROL**

The intended results of Phase II operations are illustrated here. U.S. and allied maritime forces would have achieved *forward sea control* inside the sea denial and sea control zones of the Soviets. These forward operations are the most effective means of protecting the SLOCs and assisting in repelling Soviet attacks on the flanks. They are a vital factor in keeping the alliances intact. As a result of the attrition suffered by the Soviet Navy, plus the *improved position* of U.S. and allied maritime forces, the Soviets’ options are diminished and the *combat stability of their forces is threatened* and their willingness to continue the war could start to be questioned. U.S. and allied maritime forces are now in a position to provide sustained *power projection* according to the directions of the NCA and the joint and combined commanders.
MARITIME STRATEGY
CONFRONTATION/WAR WITH THE SOVIETS

• PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION
  OBJECTIVE: ESCALATION CONTROL
  IF DETERRENCE FAILS: D-DAY

• PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
  OBJECTIVE: ESTABLISH MARITIME SUPERIORITY

• PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
  OBJECTIVE: FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION

Success in Phase II will enable U.S. and allied maritime forces to carry the fight to the enemy. The objective throughout Phase III is to provide conventional pressure and leverage against the Soviet Union in order to force war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. Disruption of Soviet willingness to continue fighting is a purpose of the Maritime Strategy.

PHASE III
MARITIME STRATEGY

“CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY”

GOALS
• PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE
• DESTROY SOVIET FORCES
• RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
• KEEP SLOCS OPEN
• SUPPORT LAND/AIR CAMPAIGNS
• CONTINUE SEALIFT

TASKS
• ACCELERATE
  • STRIKE OPERATIONS
  • AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
  • CONTINUE
    • ASW
    • ASW
    • ASW
    • MIW
    • SPECWAR OPS
    • SEALIFT

WAR TERMINATION ON FAVORABLE TERMS

In this third phase the tempo of strike and amphibious warfare operations would be accelerated. Special warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and forward...
anti-surface warfare would be continued. As before, some geographic theaters may see movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

The goals are quite straightforward, including the ultimate objective, *favorable war termination*. 

**PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY**

**STRIKE OPS/ASUW**

*Heavy strikes on the flanks culminating in possible attacks on Soviet territory* would be conducted as battle forces massed and moved farther forward with reduced risk and higher confidence of success. In accordance with DG-87-91 policy, in Europe the Navy would now be projecting power ashore in support of the land battle. In East Asia the Navy would be denying to the Soviets a secure flank.

Of the 13 deployable FY-85 CVBGs, two are assumed to be in overhaul at the beginning of the conflict. The strategy assumes that these two carriers would be available during Phase III. Therefore, four or five would be available for Norwegian Sea or North Sea battle force operations; four to six for the Northwest Pacific; two or three (plus the French) for the Mediterranean; and zero to one for the Arabian Sea. In this way, *full global pressure* would be applied.

This assumes, however, that there is no attrition of carriers and that all units are capable of contributing to the war effort. *Delayed and sequential operations* would be necessary if we have lost battle groups, or if enemy threats from Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, or Korea complicate the equation. Sequential operations are also likely with early destruction of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron and its support facilities, leading to
redeployment of most U.S. naval forces from the Indian Ocean to the Northwest Pacific or the North Atlantic.

**PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY**

**AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE/SPECWAR OPTIONS**

The combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct Marine Amphibious Brigade–sized assault operations simultaneously in two forward ocean areas. Assault operations requiring more than a brigade, however, would require the concentration of amphibious ships in one forward ocean area or the other. This justifies the high priority accorded defense of the Panama Canal and its approaches in DG FY 87–91.

Additionally, Marine Amphibious Brigade operations utilizing the Maritime Prepositioning Ships and other prepositioned ships could be conducted in appropriate theaters. Some allies, especially the British, have small amphibious assault capabilities which can supplement ours.

The two battleship battle groups and other surface action groups could be employed to good advantage in a naval gunfire support role. Construction battalions, special operations forces, and mine warfare forces have important roles to play as well. Amphibious
operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage for war termination, securing strategic choke points, or recovering territory lost to Soviet attack.

Phase III would see the continuation of sealift, airlift and shuttle shipping from the throughput ports to battle force positions. Maritime Defense Zones would play a key role in keeping U.S. harbors and coastal SLOCs open. Also, notionally shown here are forward deployed tenders for mobile maintenance and forward rearming and battle repair. Protection for these tenders will be an important consideration.

Forward and intermediate bases will be used for repair and refit facilities for battle damage and the receipt and distribution of supplies. These facilities, as well as hospital and construction support, will increase in importance as the conflict progresses. New major bases would probably have to be established in Western Europe.
Currently envisioned responsibilities for close-in protection and control of military shipping along the SLOCs are as shown. Naval protection of shipping (NPS) against submarine, air, and surface attack could include a variety of options: not only convoys (which are escort-intensive), but also protected lanes, independent sailings for fast steamers, and so on. U.S. forces required would be primarily of the destroyer and frigate classes (active and reserve), Coast Guard high endurance cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft.

U.S. responsibilities would be focused on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the Western and Central Atlantic, the Central Pacific, and the Northern Indian Ocean. Our allies would have similar responsibilities in adjacent areas. They do not, however, have sufficient escort forces. Encouraging the allies to fulfill—and expand upon—their current escort commitments and force levels is a major on-going USN task.

Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) is a worldwide allied effort, with Naval Reserve personnel fulfilling the major U.S. Navy role.
If the conflict is of a long duration, international mobilization would become increasingly important. This effort would require continuation of economic shipping and, therefore, the protection of economic SLOCs as shown here. Not only oil, but also strategic minerals and industrial products would have to pass by sea to support industrial production and the war effort of the free world. In addition to providing the tools and equipment for warfighting, mobilization would provide much-needed additional manpower to the battlefields.

In peacetime, United States imports account for over 12 percent of the gross national product. The figures for allied nations are considerably higher. Estimates of U.S. and allied wartime import dependency vary, but it is clear that some level of imports would be necessary, and that imports would become increasingly more vital as a war progressed. These imports, including weapons systems components, would have to come across a number of SLOCs. If peacetime patterns hold more imports [will be] coming from East Asia than from either Europe, the Mideast, or Latin America. Therefore the Maritime Strategy must provide for protection of vital Pacific SLOCs.

As discussed earlier, it is projected that the import of strategic materials would not become critical until approximately six months into the conflict. An ongoing task is encouraging our allies to build up their strategic reserves of raw materials so that the requirement for early protection of economic shipping would be further reduced.
Strategic reserve sufficiency could also be a factor in deterring the Soviets initially, or in causing them to pursue a negotiated settlement should deterrence fail.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES LINKED TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

It is important to point out that although the Maritime Strategy is a conventional warfighting strategy, the theater nuclear weapons of the U.S. Navy are a very important part of the strategy. They are available on a large number of different types of naval combatants—attack submarines, Tomahawk capable surface ships, and aircraft carriers. The combination of the threat posed by these weapons, when combined with the attrition of the Soviet fleet and the forward sea control achieved by the Maritime Strategy, discourages the Soviets from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons and is viewed as an important factor in encouraging the Soviets to accept a negotiated termination.

The Soviets are very conscious of the nuclear capabilities of individual U.S. naval combatants. Indeed, they still view U.S. aircraft carriers as strategic nuclear strike platforms. With their own at-sea nuclear capabilities markedly diminished as a result of the attrition suffered by their fleet, the Soviets will then recognize that U.S. naval forces can employ theater nuclear weapons against not only air and naval targets in the maritime theaters, but also, because of the TLAM(N) weapon, against a wide range of targets ashore. The deterrent effect of these theater nuclear weapons is considerable.
The desired culmination of this strategy is war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. This requires putting sufficient conventional pressure on the Soviets to convince them that they would have no gain in continuing aggression and that they should in fact cease hostilities, while simultaneously giving them no incentives to escalate to nuclear war. For the Navy, this means neutralization or destruction of the Soviet Navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian flanks; sea control; and intervention in the land battle. In this way, maritime forces provide strong leverage for the Soviet Union to accept a negotiated termination of the conflict.

At the end of the conflict, from the Soviets’ perspective, the operations envisioned by the Maritime Strategy would defeat their strategy and amputate their global reach by neutralizing or destroying their fleet. The Communist Party would remain in control of the Soviet Union, and the homeland would be intact, although it would now be threatened. From the viewpoint of the U.S. and its allies, the Maritime Strategy would have been successful, the alliance would be intact, and the strategic reserve (strategic nuclear strike submarines) would also be intact. The United States would also have viable general purpose naval forces in being at the end of the conflict. These forces would be very important to any envisioned post-war world because of the likely continued East-West tensions and heightened Third World instability. These forces would sustain a global forward presence to deter further conflicts and support the interests of the U.S. and its allies.
What happens at sea is important because of its contribution to the land battle ashore or to a favorable settlement of the conflict. If the operations of the strategy are successful, maritime forces will contribute significantly to making a strategic difference in a war with the Soviet Union.

Naval forces provide the visible and essential linkage between ourselves and our forward allies and forces. They also bolster the position of neutrals. In addition to providing strong incentives for deterrence, naval forces, by foreclosing options and multiplying uncertainties for the Soviets, force them to focus on only a narrow range of strategic choices. Naval forces preclude Soviet flanking operations, surrogate support, and SLOC interdiction, and protect against attacks on our shores.

Naval forces force the Soviets to commit resources to the defense of otherwise secure flanks against the entire range of naval offensive capabilities. Pacific operations should prove critical to keeping Japan in the war, defending Korea, and ensuring that China maintains at least an aggressively neutral posture. These operations, in conjunction with operations in the Norway region, tie down considerable Soviet forces which could otherwise redeploy to the Central Front.

Moreover, naval forces provide the nation with the ability to continue the war for as long as the National Command Authority desires, as well as contributing important leverage at war’s end.
We will now take a hard look at the uncertainties inherent in the strategy as it has been outlined.

**WAR EQUALS UNCERTAINTY**

**KEY UNCERTAINTIES**

- Strategy Stoppers
- Political Decisions
- Soviet Strategy
- Nuclear Escalation
- War Termination

A key feature of the framework provided by the Maritime Strategy is its addressal of uncertainty. No strategy can address all the unknowns which will certainly be encountered in crises or war.

This final section of the strategy outlines the five broad areas of uncertainty identified to date. Each of the following slides identifies an area of uncertainty, suggests the
plausible range of that uncertainty, specifies the assumptions made by the strategy, and shows how the strategy is designed to positively counter the uncertainty.

**POTENTIAL STRATEGY STOPPERS**

**POM-88**

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<td>• MINE WARFARE</td>
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The framework of the strategy and the associated CINC-executed operations include uncertainties. Strategy Stoppers are factors which may preclude us from executing the full Maritime Strategy as designed, but ones over which we can exercise some control and thereby reduce the risk. This is a list of the potential Strategy Stoppers developed for the POM-88 programming cycle. This list of current potential Stoppers includes bilateral arrangements that would enable us to move forces forward during a crisis even if the multilateral political decisionmaking process were lagging.

There are also a number of potential Stoppers that need Naval *programming and budgetary attention* to improve our capabilities in several areas. They include strike effectiveness, lethality of weapons systems, long range reconnaissance, targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA), mine warfare, tactical nuclear and chemical capabilities, sustainability, physical and operational security, and interoperability.

The range of options that are available includes decisions to reduce our effort, maintain the present level of commitment, or to increase the level of commitment to reduce risk. In other words, the *Maritime Strategy is executable now, but we must keep improving to reduce the risk.*
In addition to the Strategy Stoppers, there are four other sets of uncertainties over which we have little control. The first of those involves *timely political decisions*.

The Maritime Strategy assumes approximately *two weeks of warning time* and a transition to global war. Although the intelligence system will probably provide excellent I&W to the National Command Authority, the overall environment would be replete with *uncertainty and ambiguity*. In such a situation, the timeliness and decisiveness of political decisions will be a major concern. For example, will the NCA permit the *early forward positioning of forces* and the *timely activation of reserves*? Will the NCA maintain a *global perspective* during a grave crisis or conflict with the Soviets, or will they limit their view to a particular theater of operations? Finally, will the political leadership of the U.S. and its allies maintain the *political will* and the *cohesion of effort and objectives* that will be crucial to the interests of the Free World?

The range of uncertainties runs from slow and uncertain decisions to fast and firm ones. The Maritime Strategy assumes rapid and firm political decisions, although the strategy recognizes that NATO as a collective body will probably lag the decisions made by the U.S. or other individual allied governments.

Naval forces provide *strong, positive and executable options* to the NCA, even in those *ambiguous circumstances* that may preclude our national leaders from the fast and firm decisions postulated. For example, the forward movement of forces in Phase I and afterwards will be a strong enhancer of *alliance solidarity*.
Would the Soviets act as we anticipate they will? The *unpredictability* of the Soviets is another uncertainty, both in terms of their strategy at the initiation of conflict and their strategy as the conflict unfolds. The questions surrounding their initial strategy include the purpose or goals of their actions in precursor crises as well as the questions about what role, if any, their surrogates or clients might play.

There is also considerable uncertainty concerning their follow-on strategy as the conflict progresses. One question that is particularly troublesome is whether and when the Soviets will mount an anti-SLOC campaign primarily using their large submarine and mining forces.

The range of uncertainties for the Soviets’ strategy goes from immediate use of nuclear weapons to an early flush of many conventional forces into the open oceans. The National Intelligence Estimate concludes that the Soviets will adopt an echelon defense strategy with some out of area forces. The Maritime Strategy *limits the options* available to the Soviets by (1) deploying forward early and thereby precluding the Soviets from flushing large numbers of ships and submarines to the open ocean; and (2) defeating their chosen strategy head-on and destroying large numbers of their maritime forces, thereby precluding a later breakout.
UNCERTAINTY ESCALATION TO “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION”

- SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR
- SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE OF BW/CW WEAPONS
- NAVAL FORCE SURVIVABILITY
- VIABILITY OF FORWARD OPERATIONS

CONVENTIONAL WAR
THEATER NUCLEAR WAR
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR

STRAIGHT STRATEGY PREMISES
- NUCLEAR WAR DISADVANTAGEOUS
- SOVIET PREEMPTIVE USE WOULD BE MASSIVE
- USE AT SEA LINKED TO PRIOR USE ASHORE
- U.S. SHOULD NOT INITIATE NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA

MARITIME STRATEGY RAISES NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

The Maritime Strategy focuses on conventional war with the Soviet Union, while it deters escalation to theater and strategic nuclear war. Because nuclear war at sea would be disadvantageous to the United States, the U.S. would in all probability not initiate one at sea. The use of nuclear weapons at sea would probably result from prior Soviet decisions based on campaign progress ashore. If the Soviets do choose to preempt with nuclear weapons, they would do so on a massive scale.

The areas of uncertainty include the question of whether our efforts to deter nuclear war would be successful. A corollary question is whether the operations of the Maritime Strategy would provoke the Soviets to escalate. For example, would the use of naval forces to attack Soviet nuclear forces or the Soviet homeland produce escalatory actions by the Soviet leadership? All of these operations would be subject to tight control by the National Command Authority.

One particular issue that is an important facet of this uncertainty is the subject of attacks against Soviet SSBN submarines. The U.S. intelligence community is clear in its judgment. The Soviets are not believed to consider that the destruction of potential strategic assets, such as SSBNs, during conventional war would by itself trigger an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, they would expect to lose a number of SSBNs.

Other areas of uncertainty are the questions of whether U.S. and allied naval forces could survive nuclear strikes, and whether the forward operations of the Maritime Strategy would remain viable in a nuclear environment. The likelihood of Soviet use of
chemical or biological weapons is another uncertainty. CW/BW use may not be of great concern to naval forces in the open ocean, but chemical and biological weapons are definitely important in terms of amphibious operations and protection of advanced naval bases.

The Maritime Strategy raises the nuclear threshold by achieving its objectives through conventional means while deterring escalation. In addition to the deterrent provided by U.S. and allied ballistic missile submarines and the nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles and aviation weapons, maritime forces can alter Soviet perceptions of the nuclear balance, or to use their term, the correlation of nuclear forces, by destroying their SSBNs and other platforms. The strategy, therefore, discourages escalation and encourages war termination by reducing Soviet confidence in the combat stability of their sea based nuclear strike forces.

**UNCERTAINTY: WAR TERMINATION**

Finally, how will the war be terminated? There has not been a global war between the superpowers in the nuclear age. The duration of the conflict, the character of military operations during negotiations, and the final transition from fighting to the “new peace” are all areas of uncertainty.

Furthermore, the post-war environment is uncertain. East-West tensions would probably continue, and instability in the Third World would probably continue as well. The importance of the Free World having viable naval forces in being at the end of the war is again apparent. These forces will be instrumental in deterring further conflicts and in supporting the interests of the U.S. and its allies.
The Maritime Strategy contributes powerful leverage to terminating the war without escalation to nuclear weapons. Thus, the assumption of the strategy is that the achievement of war termination will fall, within a range of possibilities, somewhere between Soviet victory and Soviet total surrender.

**SUMMARY**

**THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A DYNAMIC CONCEPT**

This model summarizes the Maritime Strategy, illustrating that it is a *dynamic concept*.

The Navy’s peacetime presence and crisis response operations, while lower in intensity than the Navy’s global warfighting role, nevertheless affect the strategy for carrying out that role. In close coordination with the FLEET CINCs and the Naval War College, the Navy continually *tests and evaluates* the Maritime Strategy through exercises, war games, and from “lessons learned” from crisis and single-theater war operations, such as those that took place in the Middle East, Grenada, and the Falklands. Additionally, the Navy’s global deterrent and warfighting strategy influences its peacetime and crisis activities.

The Maritime Strategy provides the context for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the Navy’s force structure, and for driving priorities in plans for research and development and procurement.
U.S. national policy, Soviet strategy and the Maritime Strategy comprise a strategic architecture. The national policy gives direction to the global maritime elements of U.S. national military strategy. Based on deterrence, the strategy is global, forward, and cedes no vital area by default.

The Soviet Union is the principal threat to the United States and the interests of the Free World, and the Maritime Strategy is designed to contribute to countering that threat. The bottom line product for the United States and its allies is a full forward pressure strategy for the employment of maritime forces.

This summary recapitulates several of the major points of the Maritime Strategy, the Global Maritime Elements of U.S. National Military Strategy.

That strategy is consistent with U.S. and coalition policy, and it provides the flexibility of response that has always been expected of naval forces. Full forward pressure is required of maritime forces. It is risky, but it is doable. The Navy must, however, have the forces, the sustainability assets, and the assistance of allies and the other U.S. services.

The Soviets are a very formidable foe, but they are not invincible.

The Maritime Strategy addresses the full spectrum of threats, from peace to crisis to global war. The contributions of the forces of our allies and the other U.S. military
services are vital. The strategy itself is clear—full forward pressure, with deterrence or favorable war termination as the goals.

If the operations envisioned by the strategy are successful—and we are confident that they will be—then maritime forces will make a strategic difference.
The Maritime Strategy, 1986

This document is the widely distributed, unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy that appeared as a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings.* This forty-eight-page pamphlet included four articles, of which the first three are included here:

• Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy”
• John F. Lehman, Jr., “The 600-Ship Navy”
• Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN, “Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography.”†

In first presenting this collection to the public, the Naval Institute’s executive director Captain James A. Barber, Jr., wrote:

Naval strategy has recently received more attention than in any peacetime era since Alfred Thayer Mahan dominated the scene. This unusual prominence stems from the Navy’s attempt to think through and spell out a maritime strategy within the national military strategy. Because the best developed and most detailed statements of “The Maritime Strategy” have been available only in classified versions, public debate between supporters and detractors has often suffered from misinterpretations or exaggerations.

This supplement provides the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified form. They are the nearest thing to a British “White Paper”—that is, an official statement of policy—that we are likely to encounter in the American political system.‡

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As anticipated, a further public debate and discussion did ensue, and an updated bibliography of these comments has been more recently published.

Captain Roger Barnett and Commander Peter Swartz completed a draft of an unclassified version at the same time that they were completing the 1985 classified version (see document 2). Admiral Watkins approved them both at the same time in May 1984, but this unclassified version was not cleared for release at that point. The OPNAV Security Office recommended that it first be cleared for release by the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the other services, since the document made reference to joint warfare, the Army, and the Air Force. The document never cleared this review, as the other agencies saw it as only a parochial force-building argument for the Navy.*

The idea to publish an unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy arose again between January and June 1985, a period when Admiral Watkins was very closely and personally involved with the development and “selling” of the strategy. At this period, the staff officers of the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Executive Panel (OP-00K) were assigned the task of drafting another unclassified version. As the form of the booklet began to take shape, a variety of other influences, events, and people became involved in the drafting and preparation of the various sections that eventually appeared.

In May 1985, the Naval War College sponsored a conference on the Maritime Strategy. One of the participants in that conference, Dr. John J. Mearsheimer of the Political Science Department, University of Chicago, gave a highly critical assessment of the Maritime Strategy.† Another participant in the conference, Captain Linton F. Brooks, at that point assigned to the CNO Executive Panel, came back to Washington from Newport and recommended to Admiral Watkins that an unclassified version would help to offset such criticism. Brooks then went ahead to prepare a rebuttal to Mearsheimer’s remarks that eventually appeared side by side with Mearsheimer’s article later that year in the journal International Security.‡

Energized by Brooks’s report from Newport, Admiral Watkins moved ahead with renewed plans for an unclassified version. Meanwhile, Major Hugh K. O’Donnell, USMC, an officer in the Marine Corps programming office—and a Maritime Strategy “insider”—had been attending a graduate-level course at night at Georgetown University, for which he wrote a paper on the Northern Flank aspects of the Maritime Strategy. O’Donnell’s paper earned high academic marks, and his instructor, Dr. Philip Karber, recommended that he try to publish it. Accepted immediately for publication by the Naval Institute, the paper laid out the general ideas of the Maritime Strategy. It

* Peter Swartz, e-mail to Hattendorf, 18 July 2008.
appeared in September 1985. Preceding publication of the Mearsheimer and Brooks articles, O’Donnell’s article explained the Maritime Strategy for the first time in public, although it concentrated just on the Northern Flank aspects of the strategy.*

About the time O’Donnell’s article appeared in print, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Democratic representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, planned to open hearings on the six-hundred-ship navy. Anticipating that this might become a hostile series of hearings for the Navy, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower Subcommittee and Aspin’s rival for the chairmanship of the main committee, Democratic representative Charles E. Bennett of Florida, convened his own series of hearings in 1985. The hearings began with Secretary of the Navy Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley, followed by both critics and supporters, to become a comprehensive public statement of official views.† These hearings gave Lehman, Watkins, and Kelley their first opportunity to read and hear each other’s strategic concepts in extended detail. All three came away from the hearings with a feeling that they had jointly delivered a powerful and synergistic message. Admiral Watkins immediately concluded that his statement before the committee could form the basis for the unclassified version of the strategy that he had long wanted circulated.

When Secretary Lehman heard of Watkins’s intentions, Lehman wanted to parallel Watkins’s statement with one of his own. Captain Peter Swartz, by then a staff member in the Secretary’s Office of Program Appraisal, recommended that additional statements be included from both the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, but in the end, only General Kelley’s statement was added.

For this new statement, Admiral Watkins decided to make public for the first time the logic and rationale for the anti-SSBN campaign that was part of the Maritime Strategy. Captain Linton Brooks, then serving as director of Defense programs on the staff of the National Security Council, and Commander R. Robinson Harris, on the staff of the CNO Executive Panel, began to draft the unclassified text for Admiral Watkins, with Brooks playing a key role in dealing with the subject of the anti-SSBN campaign. Remarkably, this aspect of Watkins’s article was the first time that any Maritime Strategy document at the secret level of classification or below had discussed this subject, except in the most cryptic fashion.

Dr. Harvey Sicherman and Captain Peter Swartz collaborated to support Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s work as Lehman became personally involved to create his own statement on the six-hundred-ship navy. Major Hugh K. O’Donnell worked directly with General Kelley on the Marine Corps Commandant’s piece while serving as Joint

Matters—Defense Guidance Officer in the USMC Requirements and Programs Division under Major-General Thomas Morgan.* Meanwhile, Captain Swartz and Fred Rainbow at the Naval Institute worked together to select the illustrations and wrote the captions that complemented the written texts, with prominent images that included U.S. Coast Guard cutters, British aircraft carriers, U.S. Air Force tankers, and other images to demonstrate interservice and allied components of the strategy that were not being explicitly mentioned in the articles.

By the end of 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley had all ensured that the draft statements met their own needs and criteria as well as reflected the policies and views of President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the administration. With that done, each submitted the final version of his article to the Naval Institute Proceedings for publication in early January 1986.

When this group of articles appeared in the Naval Institute’s Maritime Strategy booklet, they formed an extremely important statement that clearly demonstrated how very closely the Navy and the Marine Corps were in their strategic thinking. On top of this, Secretary Lehman’s article clearly demonstrated the fundamental interrelationship between the Navy’s goals in force development and the strategy that such a force was designed to carry out, as well as the affordability measures the Navy was undertaking to demonstrate its effective stewardship of the increased resources granted to it by the Reagan administration.

The United States is inevitably a maritime nation, and the United States and its Navy have inescapable global responsibilities. A carefully designed strategy has always been an imperative, but the need for a sound strategy has grown all the more important as the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge U.S. interests worldwide. Accordingly, three years ago, we reviewed our extant strategy—a strategy with broad contours reasonably well understood, but one which had not been submitted to the rigor inherent in codification. The result of that effort was the Maritime Strategy.

The Maritime Strategy, the maritime component of the National Military Strategy, helps us think and plan intelligently for the global use of naval forces from peacetime through global war to war termination. It is a strategy for today’s forces, today’s capabilities, and today’s threat. It also is a dynamic concept. We continually gauge its adequacy through our everyday operations, exercises, and war games, and we apply the lessons learned from these experiences to improve and enhance the strategy.

Before discussing the strategy in detail, it is important to define its bounds and perspective. The Maritime Strategy is firmly set in the context of national strategy, 

* E-mail from Hugh O’Donnell to Hattendorf, 13 August 2008.
emphasizing coalition warfare and the criticality of allies, and demanding cooperation with our sister services. Moreover, the Maritime Strategy recognizes that the unified and specified commanders fight the wars, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and thus does not purport to be a detailed war plan with firm timelines, tactical doctrine, or specific target sets. Instead, it offers a global perspective to operational commanders and provides a foundation for advice to the National Command Authorities. The strategy has become a key element in shaping Navy programmatic decisions. It is of equal value as a vehicle for shaping and disseminating a professional consensus on warfighting where it matters—at sea.

National Military Strategy and the Maritime Role

Our national military strategy is designed: to preserve this country’s political identity, framework, and institutions; to protect the United States, including its foreign assets and allies; to foster the country’s economic well-being; and to bolster an international order supportive of the vital interests of this country and its allies. To achieve these ends, our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity.

Deterrence simply means convincing a potential aggressor that the risks involved in aggression are greater than its possible benefits. The Soviets, or any other potential aggressors, will not be deterred by empty threats and rhetoric. A credible deterrent must have ready and capable forces behind it and the commitment to use them if necessary. Our formal alliances and treaties with 43 nations also require forward posture to reaffirm United States resolve and bolster alliance solidarity, which redounds to the credibility of our deterrence.

As the naval component of the National Military Strategy, the Maritime Strategy is designed to support campaigns in ground theaters of operations both directly and indirectly. Its success depends on the contributions of our sister services and allies. Accordingly, we place great emphasis on joint operations. In addition to our historic relationship with the Marine Corps, we have strengthened our partnerships with the Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the planning, exercising, and executing of joint operations.

An important part of our cooperative effort has been the Memorandum of Agreement I signed with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in September 1982. This agreement accelerated such ongoing efforts as routinely including Air Force units in fleet exercises, developing doctrine and procedures for employment of AWACS and B-52s in maritime missions, and identifying aerial refueling requirements. It also led to several new
initiatives such as data link and communications interoperability, and joint air combat training ranges.

A similar example of cooperative efforts to correct combat deficiencies is the Memorandum of Agreement with the Coast Guard establishing Maritime Defense Zones. Under this agreement, Coast Guard units combined with naval forces, both active and reserve, will defend harbors and shipping lanes along our coasts in time of war.

The Navy has also identified 11 areas in a Memorandum of Agreement signed last year between the Army and Air Force where we can contribute to enhanced joint operational effectiveness, and we are pressing ahead to do so. Efforts like these complement vigorous Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) initiatives including JCS-directed joint exercises and pilot projects on tactical and strategic air support to maritime operations.

The Era of Violent Peace

Preparation for global war is the critical element in ensuring deterrence, but our peacetime operations and response in time of crisis are also crucial contributions to deterrence and stability. Therefore, while the peacetime presence and crisis response components of our Maritime Strategy are less detailed and formal than the warfighting component, they are no less important. In fact, the volatility of today’s international situation suggests that we must expect to employ these elements of our Maritime Strategy in an expanding set of the world’s trouble spots. To understand the scope of their worth, we must recognize the chief characteristic of the modern era—a permanent state of what I call violent peace.

The Soviets do not desire a superpower confrontation, for two principal reasons. First, they recognize that there would be no easy victory and the costs would be high. Equally important, though, and consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they believe that history is on their side and that the West will collapse because of the “natural dialectic.” To channel the course of history, the Soviets foster revolutionary—as well as revolutionary—change, and support proxies and surrogates—such as Cuba, Libya, Angola, and North Korea—who do their bidding. This results in worldwide challenges to the United States and our allies. We may be technically at peace, but the period since 1945 can be characterized as an era of violent peace.

A principal feature of this era is the continuing and widespread existence of localized conflicts and crises, mostly in the Third World, but often with global implications. This profusion of crises and conflicts has been a feature of the international environment since World War II. In 1984, millions of people were involved in more than 30 armed conflicts throughout the world. These ran the gamut from civil unrest in Sri Lanka, to
insurgencies in Central and South America, to civil war in Chad, to direct conflict between states in the Persian Gulf.

These conflicts and other crises with the potential to break into hostilities frequently involve U.S. and allied interests. Transcending the interests of states directly involved, these confrontations often serve as backdrop for potentially more serious conflicts between major powers. A fundamental component of the nation’s success in deterring war with the Soviet Union depends upon our ability to stabilize and control escalation in Third World crises.

As a result, our Navy devotes much of its effort to maintaining this stability. Potential crises and the aftermath of crises have increasingly defined the location and character of our forward deployments. We now maintain a continual presence in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean, as well as our more traditional forward deployments to the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. Although we are not at war today, our operating tempo has been about 20% higher than during the Vietnam War. This indicates increased need for forces-in-being during peacetime, a need made more acute by the probability that, should war come, there will be only a brief time for mobilization. In this age of violent peace, the Navy is on the front lines already, and will be for the foreseeable future.

The international setting is complicated by the proliferation of modern, high-technology weaponry in the Third World. Certainly the most alarming aspect of this proliferation is the growing numbers of nations in positions to acquire mass annihilation weapons—chemical, biological, and even nuclear. Even in the absence of such weapons, impressive conventional arsenals possessed by Third World nations pose an immediate concern. While these weapons do not fundamentally change the causes of instability, they do change the nature of conflict and the threats we face. Naval forces must be prepared to encounter high-technology, combined-arms threats in virtually every ocean of the world.

The rise of state-sponsored terrorism is a new and disturbing phenomenon. Its unpredictability, worldwide scope, and anonymity render it one of the most insidious threats we face today. Terrorism is not new, but the threat has increased because terrorism has, in some cases, become a preferred arm of state action. If not countered, it can be effective against targeted forward-deployed forces. By placing at risk forward-deployed forces, terrorists (and their state sponsors) hope to be able to intimidate us into withdrawing, thereby undermining our credibility.

At the same time, the Soviets exploit instability in the Third World to promote governments that support Soviet ideology, improve the Soviet strategic position, and reduce Western influence. Soviet methods include support and encouragement of limited
warfare by Cuban, Libyan, and North Korean proxies as well as direct crisis response by their own forces.

Since 1948, the Third World has been the most common arena for United States–Soviet competition, and this pattern will continue. U.S. interests and commitments are worldwide, and increasingly focus on the Third World. Our economy and security require oil from the Persian Gulf and Caribbean, and strategic minerals from southern Africa. Our trade with nations of the Pacific Basin now surpasses that with Europe. Obviously, we have vital stakes in what happens in these and other key areas.

As the challenges to peace and stability increase, so do the Soviets’ capabilities for global military reach. Their military airlift and sealift have grown significantly. The Soviet Navy, with a large deck aircraft carrier under construction, is increasingly capable of sustained distant operations. In addition, the Soviets continue to expand and improve their attack submarine force, making it a formidable global threat. They also have enhanced their access to air and naval facilities in key strategic locations, including Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and Vietnam.

Moscow recently established its first fully developed overseas base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. These facilities can support a large concentration of Soviet naval forces, maintaining a permanent naval force astride key sea-lanes to our Pacific allies and friends. From this base Soviet forces can strike key United States and friendly forces and installations as far north as Hong Kong.

Improved power projection forces and global access provide the Soviets a growing capability to intervene militarily in the Third World. They steadily improve their ability to sever vital sea lines of communication, while improving their ability to counter U.S. crisis reaction moves. Responding effectively to Third World crises may well require that U.S. Navy units bring the range of capabilities necessary to deal with Soviet as well as Third World threats.

Soviet Military Strategy

The Soviet Union has an integrated strategy which seeks to use all Soviet military forces in a coherent fashion to meet Soviet national goals. While we are uncertain of the details of Soviet strategy, its broad outlines are clear. The Soviets appear to assume a future war with the West will be global in scope, violent, and decisive. In such a war the total military power of the state will be expected to serve clearly defined political goals.

Even in such a war the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons lightly, preferring to achieve their goals with conventional means. Nuclear weapons nonetheless have a central place in Soviet military thought. A war between the superpowers may not involve
immediate nuclear weapons use, but it is, in Soviet eyes, still a “nuclear” war in the sense that the nuclear balance is constantly examined and evaluated in anticipation of possible escalation. Because of this aspect of Soviet doctrine, the Soviets place a high priority on changing the nuclear balance, or as they term it, the nuclear correlation of forces, during conventional operations.

The probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in global war would be a combined-arms assault against Europe, where they would seek a quick and decisive victory. As prudent military planners, the Soviets would, of course, prefer to be able to concentrate on a single theater; a central premise of U.S. strategy is to deny them such an option.

Soviet overseas clients and surrogates outside the Warsaw Pact may join in an attack. Figure 1 shows that some of these clients sit astride critical sea lines of communication. Any Western strategy must, of necessity, hedge against such third country involvement. Naval forces are ideally suited to provide such a hedge. Routinely forward deployed in the vicinity of these nations, naval forces possess the required warfighting capability to accomplish the task and move on to more demanding requirements.

While Soviet ground and air forces conduct a massive offensive, a critical Soviet Navy role in a future conflict would be to protect the Soviet homeland and their ballistic missile submarines, which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic reserve. Consistent with its overall stress on the nuclear balance, Soviet doctrine gives high priority to locating and destroying Western sea-based nuclear assets, including aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and Tomahawk-equipped platforms. The Soviets

**FIGURE 1**

*Soviet Clients and Surrogates*
would particularly like to be able to destroy our ballistic missile submarines, but lack the antisubmarine warfare capability to implement such a mission. Other roles, such as interdicting sea lines of communication or supporting the Soviet Army, while important, will probably be secondary, at least at the war’s start.

This view of the Soviet Navy’s role in overall Soviet strategy suggests that initially the bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small fraction deployed forward. Soviet exercises confirm such an interpretation. Figure 2 shows the areas in which these exercises take place. It is important to recognize that these arcs encompass Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Thus, the option some advocate, of holding our maritime power near home waters, would inevitably lead to abandoning our allies. This is unacceptable, morally, legally, and strategically. Allied strategy must be prepared to fight in forward areas. That is where our allies are and where our adversary will be.

FIGURE 2
Soviet Naval Exercise Areas

The Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Presence

Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable component of our forces for deterring strategic nuclear war. The Maritime Strategy provides a framework for considering all uses of maritime power. Among the greatest services we can provide the nation is to operate in peacetime and in crises in a way that will deter war. Figure 3, which illustrates the spectrum of conflict, draws attention to the importance of the lower levels of violence where navies are most often the key actors.
By its peacetime presence throughout the world, the Navy enhances deterrence daily. Our forward deployments maintain U.S. access on fair and reasonable terms to oil, other necessary resources, and markets, and deter and defend against attempts at physical denial of sea and air lines of communications critical to maintenance of the U.S. and allied economies. They provide a clear sign of U.S. interest in a given nation or region, and of U.S. commitment to protect its interests and its citizens.

One key goal of our peacetime strategy is to further international stability through support of regional balances of power. The more stable the international environment, the lower the probability that the Soviets will risk war with the West. Thus our peacetime strategy must support U.S. alliances and friendships. We accomplish this through a variety of peacetime operations including naval ship visits to foreign ports and training and exercises with foreign naval forces.

In 1984, for example, the Navy and Marine Corps visited 108 countries and conducted joint exercises with 55 foreign countries. Often taken for granted, port visits and joint training and exercises have a material impact around the world in stabilizing peace, reminding friend and foe alike that we are able and have the will to defend the interests of ourselves and our treaty allies.

The Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response

The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with the Soviets ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control. Our ability to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability to prevent global conflict.
Crisis response has long been the business of the Navy and Marine Corps. Between 1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of American military forces, naval forces constituted the principal element of our response in about 80% of the crises. Reasons for selecting naval forces as the instrument of choice for crisis management and deterrence of conflicts are illuminating:

- Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make naval forces readily available at crisis locations worldwide, providing significant deterrent value and reducing the likelihood of ambiguous or short warning.
- Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.
- Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister services.
- Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.
- Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence. Capabilities demonstrated in actual crises include maintaining presence, conducting surveillance, threatening use of force, conducting naval gunfire or air strikes, landing Marines, evacuating civilians, establishing a blockade or quarantine, and preventing intervention by Soviet or other forces.
- Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control. Naval forces can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn. The flexibility and the precision available in employing naval forces provide escalation control in any crisis, but have particular significance in those crises which might involve the Soviet Union.

The peacetime and crisis response components of the Maritime Strategy are evolving, robust, and designed to foster a stable international setting. This is important for deterrence. Although deterrence is most often associated with strategic nuclear warfare, it is a much broader concept. To protect national interests, we must deter threats ranging from terrorism to nuclear war. This requires a credible peacetime and wartime capability at the level of conflict we seek to deter. Our national interest also requires an extended deterrent capability. Perhaps most importantly, protecting national interests while preventing war requires the ability to control escalation, and naval forces and our peacetime strategy are ideally suited for that purpose.
If our peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well, deterrence is far less likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the Navy would be used in a global war against the Soviets.

The Maritime Strategy: Warfighting

Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy the United States must counter. The key to doing so is to ensure that they will have to face the prospect of prolonged global conflict. Maritime forces have a major role to play in this regard. The strategy setting forth their contribution consists of three phases: deterrence or the transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy. There are no fixed time frames associated with these phases; they provide a broad outline of what we want to accomplish, not an attempt to predict an inherently unpredictable future.

Phase I: Deterrence or the Transition to War: The initial phase of the Maritime Strategy would be triggered by recognition that a specific international situation has the potential to grow to a global superpower confrontation. Such a confrontation may come because an extra-European crisis escalated or because of problems in Europe. In either event, this phase of the Maritime Strategy deals with a superpower confrontation analogous to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where war with the Soviet Union is a real possibility.

The goal of this phase is deterrence. Through early, worldwide, decisive use of sea power we—along with sister services and allies as appropriate—would seek to win the crisis, to control escalation, and, by the global nature of our operations, to make clear our intention to cede no area to the Soviets by default and to deny them the option to engage in hostilities on their terms. While seeking to enhance deterrence at the brink of war, we must also consider that deterrence may fail. Thus preparing for the transition to war, specifically to global war, is an integral aspect of this phase.

Keys to the success of both the initial phase and the strategy as a whole are speed and decisiveness in national decisionmaking. The United States must be in position to deter the Soviets’ “battle of the first salvo” or deal with that if it comes. Even though a substantial fraction of the fleet is forward deployed in peacetime, prompt decisions are needed to permit rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis. Table 1 indicates the times required for illustrative movements of combatants and support ships throughout the world and illustrates the importance of the Panama and Suez Canals in facilitating repositioning. Such early deployment is reversible and not necessarily provocative.
The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be prepared to fight. Aggressive forward movement of anti-submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines. This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive, early attempt to interdict our sea lines of communication and counters such operations against them that the Soviets undertake.

Early embarkation of Marine amphibious forces takes advantage of their flexibility and would be matched with forward movement of maritime prepositioning ship squadrons toward most likely areas of employment. Moving one Marine amphibious brigade by air to rendezvous with its prepositioned equipment and reinforce Norway provides a convincing signal of alliance solidarity.

Early forward deployment of sea-based air power also is essential to support our allies, particularly Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Early forward movement of carrier battle forces provides prudent positioning of our forces in order to support the requirements of the unified commanders and to roll back Soviet forces, should war come. It does not imply some immediate "Charge of the Light Brigade" attack on the Kola Peninsula or any other specific target.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>STEAMING DAYS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. East Coast</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. East Coast</td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. East Coast</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. West Coast</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic</td>
<td>31¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. West Coast</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. West Coast</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>21¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Subtract 6 days by using Suez Canal
2. Subtract 13 days by using Panama Canal
3. Subtract 15 days by using Suez Canal

Note: Based on closure times at 20-knot speed of advance.
Forward deployment must be global as well as early. Deployments to the Western Pacific directly enhance deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe, by providing a clear indication that, should war come, the Soviets will not be able to ignore any region of the globe. Should deterrence fail, such deployments tie down Soviet forces, especially strike aircraft, limiting the Soviets’ ability to concentrate their forces on Central Europe. Thus, even in its earliest phase, the Maritime Strategy, by exerting global pressure on the Soviet Union, can help ease the burden for NATO forces in Europe.

In addition to allowing rapid deployment, speed and decisiveness in national decisionmaking are crucial to the strategy’s overall execution. As more functions are transferred to the reserve forces, execution of the President’s authority to call up reservists (currently limited to 100,000 in number) becomes increasingly crucial to successful implementation of the strategy. Virtually the entire Navy cargo-handling capability, for example, and all Navy combat search and rescue capability depend on reservists. Their prompt call-up is imperative. In a similar fashion, an early decision to place the Coast Guard under Navy command and control will have a major impact on the rapidity with which the strategy can be implemented.

An important aspect of the strategy’s initial phase is sealift. In 1984, the Secretary of the Navy established sealift as the third primary mission of the Navy, along with sea control and power projection. This increased emphasis recognizes the importance of both economic and military resupply. By the end of the decade, we will have adequate sealift for the movement of military forces. But we will neither be able to tolerate attrition typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we will require. For this reason, early and effective uses of existing sealift are essential.

Phase II: Seizing the Initiative: We cannot predict where the first shot will be fired should deterrence fail, but almost certainly the conflict will involve Europe. If war comes, we will move into the second phase of the strategy in which the Navy will seize the initiative as far forward as possible. Naval forces will destroy Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients if required, and fight our way toward Soviet home waters.

Seizing the initiative is vital for several reasons. First, it demonstrates to our allies this country’s determination to prevail and thus, contributes to alliance solidarity. Second, the history of war tells us that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying an opponent’s forces. Finally, seizing the initiative opens the way to apply direct pressure on the Soviets to end the war on our terms—the new goal of our strategy once deterrence has failed. Indeed, it is possible that, faced with our determination, the Soviets can be induced to accept war termination while still in this phase.
The Soviets will probably focus their offensive on Central Europe, while attempting to maintain a defensive posture elsewhere. Instead, we must dilute their effort, divert their attention, and force them to divide their forces. We must control the type and tempo of conflict, making sure the Soviets understand that they can take no area for granted. To accomplish this, maritime forces must counter a first salvo, wear down the enemy forces, protect sea lines of communication, continue reinforcement and resupply, and improve positioning. We must defeat Soviet maritime strength in all its dimensions, including base support. That converts to classic Navy tasks of antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, counter command and control, strike operations, antiair warfare, mine warfare, special operations, amphibious operations, and sealift. Each is essential if the strategy is to succeed.

One of the most complex aspects of Phase II of the Maritime Strategy is antisubmarine warfare. It will be essential to conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as well as to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using maritime patrol aircraft, mines, attack submarines, or sonobuoys, to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the open ocean where the Western Alliance’s resupply lines can be threatened. Maritime air and anti-submarine warfare units will be involved, along with offensive and defensive mining. As the battle groups move forward, we will wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. This aggressive action ensures that we prevent such losses as the Germans inflicted on allied shipping.

FIGURE 4
U-Boat Victories, January–July 1942
between January and July of 1942 when 14 of 50 then-operational German U-boats sunk 450 ships, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Antiair warfare is equally complex and equally important. It demands both offense and defense in depth, long-range indication and warning, long-range interception and surveillance, and base neutralization, and is an area where the contribution of our allies and sister services is particularly important. The overriding goal is to counter the Soviets’ missile-launching platforms, to shoot the archer before he releases his arrows. Not only is it easier to destroy bombers than missiles, but the bomber destroyed today cannot return with more missiles tomorrow. Our strategy envisions making extensive use of jamming, deception, and decoys to counter the enemy’s targeting capability. Area defensive weapons will deal with in-bound missiles or, in some cases, aircraft that leak through our offensive thrust. No single approach will be sufficient; countering the Soviet air threat through offensive antiair warfare demands a layered approach.

Antisurface warfare involves carriers, submarines, cruise missile–equipped surface ships, and land-based forces eliminating forward-deployed Soviet surface ships at the outset of conflict. This requires appropriate rules of engagement at the brink of war to avoid losing the battle of the first salvo which is so important in Soviet doctrine. Our allies also have a critical role to play in antisurface warfare. Germany, for example, will bear the brunt of the campaign in the Baltic while the Turks will be key players in the Black Sea. As our forces move forward, antisurface warfare will continue, with as a goal the elimination of the Soviet fleets worldwide.

Successes in antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare are crucial to effective prosecution of offensive strike warfare. The battle groups are central to defeating Soviet air, submarine, and surface forces. To apply our immense strike capability, we must move carriers into positions where, combined with the U.S. Air Force and allied forces, they can bring to bear the added strength needed on NATO’s Northern or Southern flanks, or in Northeast Asia. Further, selective use of naval forces on the Central Front could have an important stabilizing impact. The strike power of carrier battle forces can also be augmented with conventional land-attack Tomahawks launched from submarines or surface ships. All of these would be brought to bear as the unified commanders direct. The strategy does not envision automatic attacks on any specific targets, but the main threats to our fleet during this phase are the “Backfires” and other missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. The United States cannot allow our adversary to assume he will be able to attack the fleet with impunity, from inviolable sanctuaries.

The nature of these battle force operations is not always understood. One often hears self-appointed strategic experts suggest that elimination of a carrier battle group would
be a simple task and that such a group represents a single target. In attempting to explain the evolution of battle force formations since World War II, I sometimes use pictures like Figure 5, showing the Eastern United States on the same scale as the 56,000 square miles that a typical carrier battle group formation might occupy.

**FIGURE 5**

*Carrier Battle Group Dispersed Formation*

In amphibious warfare, the United States has the flexibility of conducting a Marine amphibious brigade size raid or forcible entry by the 55,000 men of a Marine amphibious force. Such operations could be conducted alone or in conjunction with the allied marine forces, as directed by the unified commanders. The principal requirement would be to seize a beachhead for the introduction of follow-up forces, either from other services or from other countries.

Mine countermeasures form yet another important aspect of the strategy. The West must be ready to clear mines whenever and wherever necessary. Mine warfare provides a striking example of the importance of our allies to the Maritime Strategy. The Commander, Mine Warfare Command, executes a very aggressive cooperative program with our allies, traveling to roughly 40 nations every year to ensure that we integrate both allied mine-clearing and allied offensive mine-laying operations.

In addition to these traditional combat tasks, implementing Phase II of the Maritime Strategy depends on other efforts. It is crucial that we counter the Soviets’ capability both to control their forces and to locate and target ours. Maritime forces, working with other assets, must confuse, deceive, and disrupt Soviet command and control.
They must also deny the Soviets a targeting capability through platform destruction, jamming, dispersal, and emission control.

Finally, we must support our forces as we fight. Mobile logistic support forces, sustained sealift, and the use of Navy Seabees to establish advanced bases all play a role in a forward logistic support concept which is a prerequisite for seizing the initiative. Logistics and sustainability are integral to the success of any strategy; they are especially vital in one such as ours which demands aggressive, sustained, forward operations.

Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy: The tasks in this phase are similar to those of earlier phases, but must be more aggressively applied as we seek war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Our goal would be to complete the destruction of all the Soviet fleets which was begun in Phase II. This destruction allows us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters, with both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite credible to the Soviets. At the same time, antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.

During this final phase the United States and its allies would press home the initiative worldwide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sealift, and keeping sea lines of communication open. Amphibious forces, up to the size of a full Marine amphibious force, would be used to regain territory. In addition, the full weight of the carrier battle forces could continue to “roll up” the Soviets on the flanks, contribute to the battle on the Central Front, or carry the war to the Soviets. These tough operations close to the Soviet motherland could even come earlier than the final phase.

I have discussed various tasks separately, but they must be implemented simultaneously on, over, and under the sea. Our forces combine in a synergistic way, both to deter and to win if deterrence fails. One of the truly unique aspects of naval warfare is its awesome complexity, as forcefully portrayed in Figure 6.

The complexity of the tasks makes it essential that we not attempt to micro-manage the war from Washington, but rather that we provide options and broad concepts to assist the unified commanders in implementing their detailed plans. Command, control, communications, and intelligence combine to form the glue that binds this entire effort together. And space is an essential factor in command, control, communications, and intelligence. The Navy is the number one tactical user of information from space. We recover the information, fuse it in real time, and continuously disseminate it to all tactical users at sea. Although we have long understood the importance of space
intuitively, the Maritime Strategy clarifies the essentiality of space for a Navy with global responsibilities.

Maritime Strategy and War Termination

The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy, particularly of Phase III, is to use maritime power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination on favorable terms. In a global war, our objectives are to:

- Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the conflict will be neither short nor localized.
- Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and a necessary step for us to realize our objectives.
- Influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power.
- Terminate the war on terms acceptable to us and to our allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces.
The Soviets place great weight on the nuclear correlation of forces, even during the time before nuclear weapons have been used. Maritime forces can influence that correlation, both by destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines and by improving our own nuclear posture, through deployment of carriers and Tomahawk platforms around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Some argue that such steps will lead to immediate escalation, but escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable, given the Soviet land orientation. Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no useful purpose for the Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the United States' retaliatory posture would be enhanced. Neither we nor the Soviets can rule out the possibility that escalation will occur, but aggressive use of maritime power can make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every day.

The real issue, however, is not how the Maritime Strategy is influenced by nuclear weapons, but the reverse: how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation. As our maritime campaign progresses, and as the nuclear option becomes less attractive, prolonging the war also becomes unattractive, since the Soviets cannot decouple Europe from the United States and the risk of escalation is always present. Maritime forces thus provide strong pressure for war termination that can come from nowhere else.

Our strategy is not without risk. The strategy depends on early reaction to crisis and the political will to make difficult decisions early. It will require flexibility to meet the inevitable changes in Soviet strategy. To some, that aspect of the strategy which focuses on altering the nuclear balance may seem dangerous. But the risks exist for both sides; that is the nature of deterrence.

**Executing the Maritime Strategy**

Strategy is a design for relating means to ends. The ends are clear: deterrence or—should deterrence fail—war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. The means are also clear: the 600-ship Navy. The warfighting capabilities of our ships, aircraft, and submarines, and the immense advantage of American sailors with their well-known pride and professionalism, provide powerful means. But can the design work? Will the means be sufficient? My answer to both questions is yes.

I am confident that we can succeed if put to the test because of the vast intelligence and experience that has been brought to bear in the Maritime Strategy's development. It is based on the collective professional judgments of numerous flag officers, especially those in command positions in the fleet. It has benefited from the efforts of the Strategic Studies Group, top-performing Navy and Marine Corps officers who spend a year in Newport working directly for me in refining and expanding our strategic horizons. It has been reviewed, examined, and improved by military and civilian scholars inside
and outside of government. Thus, our strategic thinking represents the collective judgment of the very best thinkers.

I also have confidence in the Maritime Strategy because we test it in exercises, in war games, and in real-life scenarios. In 1984, for example, the Navy participated in 106 major exercises, 55 of which involved our allies. Such exercises are an integral part of our deterrent strategy and a major source of my confidence that, should deterrence fail, maritime forces will have the skill, capability, and experience to prevail.

We augment these exercises with war-gaming, especially at the war-gaming center in Newport. These games stress the combined-arms nature of war and involve our allies and our sister services. Recently, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a crisis war game in which all the joint chiefs and all unified commanders personally participated.

Finally, I am confident we can implement our strategy because we measure it against the real world. For example, recent lessons from the Falklands, air action in the Bekka Valley, Grenada, and the mining of the Red Sea have all been incorporated in our dynamic approach to strategy implementation. To give but one example, in 1984 Secretary Lehman and I instituted the Naval Strike Warfare Center (“Strike University”) in recognition of our need to develop more aggressive strike capabilities in implementing our forward strategy.

Summary

The basic strategy of the United States, fully supported by the Maritime Strategy, is deterrence. Through worldwide peacetime operations and the ability to react in crisis, maritime forces play a major role in binding together alliances in preventing escalation. If we continue to do our job properly, our strategy for global conventional war will remain a theoretical topic.

In establishing the maritime component of national strategy, we have been guided by several principles:

- Maritime Strategy is derived from national military strategy and is an integral component of that strategy. The purpose of our strategy is deterrence; should deterrence fail our strategy relies on forward defense and allied cooperation to bring about war termination on terms favorable to ourselves and our allies.

- Maritime Strategy must counter Soviet strategy and deny the Soviets the luxury of fighting the type of war they choose. Our strategy must accomplish the difficult feat of using sea power to influence the result of a land battle, both directly and indirectly. To do this, the Maritime Strategy effectively integrates all elements of
United States military power in the maritime arena in order to make the greatest possible contribution to the unified commanders’ mission.

- Maritime Strategy must consider the nuclear balance even during the conventional phase of the war. Our strategy must seek war termination leverage; maritime power may be the only source of such leverage.

Despite the violent peace which characterizes our age, we have been able to maintain our security while avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence has worked. Our goal is to ensure that it continues to do so. Should deterrence ever fail, maritime power, imaginatively employed, can help bring about war termination and restore the freedom and security of the United States and our allies.

THE REAL REFORMERS

The development and application of maritime strategy profoundly affect today’s Navy in many ways. Perhaps the most important of these is the way in which our revitalized emphasis on strategy provides a focus for substantial reform of the Navy from within. The Navy has changed; the Navy is changing; and the Navy will continue to change. This change, however, is neither mindless or directionless, nor is it a defensive reaction to criticisms from outside the Navy. The evolution of our Navy is today based on the recently developed Maritime Strategy, consciously adopted by the Navy’s leadership. We are, in fact, the real reformers.

It appears, however, that these fundamental and substantial developments are invisible to those outside the profession. Public perceptions frequently seem to be shaped by the superficially appealing manifestos of self-proclaimed civilian defense reformers, who assert that those of us in uniform have become bureaucrats rather than strategists and tacticians, that we have no strategy, and that we are incapable of reforming ourselves from within. To be sure, we carefully and repeatedly rebut unfair criticisms and specific arguments which we find objectionable. But to many people, our rebuttals seem to show us to be against a great many things without being for anything other than the status quo. There is a real danger that our critics have gained the intellectual high ground, too often causing us to appear defensive and reactive, rebutting their arguments in the perceived absence of clearly enunciating an alternative vision.

This is why it is important to understand the nature of reform itself, and the relationship of change and continuity in the naval profession. Reform is almost by definition a good thing, and continual reform is essential to the vitality of the Navy. Indeed, most naval officers can point with pride to some reforms in which they have personally participated, ranging from changes in the way a particular ship or squadron is run, to major changes in the Navy as a whole.

But continuity and stability are also important. We cannot lightly undertake reforms and endure a high percentage of failures. The consequences of failed reforms are not simply economic; they can manifest themselves in personnel and organizational turbulence that may persist
for many years, even resulting in significant damage to military preparedness. Some Navy experiences of the early 1970s provide object lessons in damage caused by well-meaning reforms that failed in execution.

Further, tradition and continuity are crucial to our organizational culture and identity, and to our ability to perform consistently. Our professional ethic, standards, and codes of behavior are the legacy of 200 years of naval tradition. We depend on this legacy to provide us perspective, help us through difficult periods, and bind together the community of seagoing men and women. Over the past several years, we have seen the payoff of programs to rebuild a once mislaid sense of pride and professional competence. Interestingly, most of these programs were simply a return to our traditional values and ideals.

Recent emphasis on the Maritime Strategy as the focus for our profession represents a significant change in the contemporary naval establishment and a continuation of the traditions of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and the great naval reformers of a century ago. It is worthwhile to consider how reforms have been tied to the strategy.

The most striking and far-reaching trend within the naval profession in recent years has been the emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval thought, planning, resource allocation, and operational employment. Since its beginning, development and application of the Maritime Strategy have been and continue to be efforts by naval officers. After decades of abdicating strategic thinking to civilian academicians and armchair strategists, naval officers are again at the forefront of developing strategy and strategic concepts.

Further, development of the Maritime Strategy has been an internally generated, active effort to understand new global realities, and to relate means and resources to national objectives in a changing world. In struggling with this formidable task, the Maritime Strategy has developed several important characteristics, some of which represent a substantially changed strategic vision from that which existed five or ten years ago:

- The Maritime Strategy is fully consistent with the national strategy documents and directives of this administration which emphasize the importance of maritime superiority to our national defense.
- It is a global strategy designed to meet a global and diverse threat, embracing all possible theaters of operation and their complex interrelationships, in peace, crisis, or war.
- It is a forward strategy, keeping with the national policy of forward defense and drawing on the forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility of naval forces.
- It emphasizes the importance of alliances and coalitions, relying on their major contributions to national security. Further, the Maritime Strategy recognizes the crucial role that naval forces play in binding together our alliances and coalitions.
• It emphasizes the criticality of joint operations with our sister services, an emphasis reflected in exercises and operations, and in a growing number of interservice memoranda of agreement.

• It focuses primarily on the central strategic issue of deterring and, if deterrence fails, fighting a global war against the Soviet Union.

• It increasingly grapples with the issue of diversified violence in an era of violent peace, and considers how to provide deterrence across the entire spectrum of possible conflicts.

• It presents a cohesive menu of global options for controlling escalation, drawing on the flexibility and range of capabilities inherent in naval forces, avoiding reliance on nuclear weapons, and recognizing potential impacts of altering the balance by conventional means.

Clearly, the Maritime Strategy has generated substantial interest in maritime forces both within the naval profession and beyond. It has helped us explain the Navy’s purposes to a number of audiences. Most important, it has produced substantial—though not highly visible—reform of the Navy from within. These reforms can be divided into three general categories.

Program development. First, the Maritime Strategy has rationalized, disciplined, and focused Navy program development, budgets, and procurement to a degree that would have seemed remarkable five years ago. Since 1982, the annual Navy program development cycle has commenced with a presentation of the Maritime Strategy. Strategy now drives the entire process and the resulting procurement and research and development decisions. The strategy presentation raises a number of key issues that must be resolved in the budget process. The strategy also provides the foundation for subsequent warfare appraisals, which identify critical requirements to execute the strategy in terms of antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and other warfare areas as well. Finally, the strategy provides a clear framework against which all budget proposals are judged and a common reference point for all related discussion.

This process of applying the Maritime Strategy to program development has produced a number of important organizational and programmatic spinoffs. For example, we recently consolidated responsibility for all electronic warfare programs into a single office under the Director of Naval Warfare. The impetus for this reform came from appraisals of electronic warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy. These appraisals had clearly shown the need for a cross-platform viewpoint—one that avoided piecemeal solutions.

Another example is the recent Master Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy. A review of long-range antisubmarine warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy showed the need for a comprehensive reexamination of our antisubmarine warfare programs to deal with the rapidly advancing Soviet submarine threat. This process has already led to significant changes in antisubmarine warfare research and development programs, and will provide the rationale for our assignment of cross-platform organizational responsibilities.
Yet another example is a growing awareness of the importance of space-based systems to maritime forces. For too many years, we viewed space as a technological and scientific playground outside the mainstream of naval warfare. But the process of developing a global, forward strategy and using it to drive Navy programs has brought into sharp focus the essential tactical contributions of space-based systems across all mission areas and platforms. This awareness led to the establishment of the Naval Space Command to direct space-related operations, the formation of a Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command to manage procurement and research and development, and formulation of programmatic actions to develop new systems and make better tactical use of existing ones.

Strategic and tactical thought. The Maritime Strategy has produced significant reform in a second fundamental way, by stimulating strategic and tactical thinking among the Navy’s leaders. Strategic matters now infuse the informal, everyday discussions among senior naval officers. This simply was not the case five years ago, and it represents a noteworthy change in our organizational culture.

Further, we are building institutional reinforcements for this revival of strategic thinking. Many involve the Naval War College, which once again is the crucible of strategic and tactical thought that it was a century ago. Within the past several years, we began sending virtually all of our commanding officers to the Naval War College on completion of their command tours. This enables these officers to reflect on strategic issues in light of their recent operational experience, and also offers the benefits of their experience to students in other programs.

We have also invigorated the Wargaming Center at the Naval War College. This is the most advanced such facility in the world, and allows us to test alternative strategies and tactics. It is heavily used both by shore- and sea-based organizations.

Also important is the work of the Strategic Studies Group, associated with the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. During the past five years we have selected a small group of Navy captains and Marine Corps colonels who have distinguished themselves as strategists and tacticians. These officers deal with major issues of direct relevance to Maritime Strategy for a full year. They report directly to me and have full access to top Navy leaders, including the fleet commanders-in-chief. Through this interaction, their work has materially affected the ongoing development of the strategy.

The Naval War College’s role in strategic thinking illustrates an important point. Development of the Maritime Strategy has consistently benefited from a wide variety of opinions and perspectives from multiple and disparate centers of thought. The operating Navy—commanders-in-chief and fleet commanders—has contributed as much as the Washington headquarters and such research centers as the Naval War College. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust strategy—one that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic issues and the validity of multiple perspectives. This experience is directly relevant to the development of national strategy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reform issue. The process of national strategy development and advice must involve multiple centers of thought and plurality of advice if the resulting thinking is to be truly vigorous and reflective of the complexity of
issues involved. The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly
American. It works, and it must be preserved.

Emphasis on warfighting. A final way in which the Maritime Strategy has
served as a focus for reform is by shaping an emphasis on tactics and
warfighting at the operational level. For too many years, our fleet exercises
suffered from a lack of realism and focus, and our routine operations
seemed to be lacking in purpose. But the Maritime Strategy now forms a
framework for planning realistic, purposeful exercises, and provides a stra-
tegic perspective for daily fleet operations in pursuit of deterrence.

Largely as a result of the Maritime Strategy, we have begun emphasizing
exercises with multiple carrier battle forces, which would be required in a
major war. We have increased our exercises in the Northern Pacific and
Norwegian Sea, to build our base of experience in these key areas. We
have begun exercising our submarines in Arctic waters, where they might
be called upon to execute portions of the Maritime Strategy.

Thus, the Maritime Strategy has produced substantial reform. It has fo-
cused Navy program development, stimulated strategic and tactical think-
ing, and engendered an emphasis on tactics and warfighting in the fleet.
The Navy can take considerable pride in the substance of these reforms,
and in the strategic vision that they represent. We can also take
pride in the fact that these reforms are clearly ours. We initiated
them, and we sustain them—without much hoopla and without the
help of self-appointed military reformers outside our profession, who are
more adept at criticism than at proposing realistic solutions.

We have met the real reformers, and they are us. We have implemented,
and will continue to implement reforms, to meet new realities based on a
continuously evolving strategic vision. Our critics may take issue with our
strategy. We welcome such debate. But they cannot argue that we have
no strategy, or that we are not capable of reform.

The Maritime Strategy is a powerful statement of what we stand for, and a
focus for reform that is in keeping with our finest traditions.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy
GENERAL P. X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, AND
MAJOR HUGH K. O’DONNELL, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS

I also predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never occur again.

—GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, 19 OCTOBER 1949

When these words were uttered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before a House Armed Services Committee hearing on unification and strategy, many in the audience must have concluded that the day of the amphibious assault, and perhaps of the Marine Corps, was fast drawing to a close. General Bradley’s pronouncement not only carried the credibility of his position as the nation’s senior military officer, but was reinforced by the fact that he had led the great amphibious assaults onto the beaches of Sicily and Normandy.

Omar Bradley’s prediction mattered little to General Douglas MacArthur when his United Nations forces were being pummeled by the North Korean Army less than one year later. Within days of the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, MacArthur knew that an amphibious assault in his enemy’s rear would create the opportunity for decisive victory that a frontal offensive could never offer. On 15 September 1950, the hastily assembled First Marine Division spearheaded MacArthur’s landing at Inchon, breaking the back of the North Korean offensive and reaffirming the effectiveness of the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious striking arm in support of the national military strategy.

The 35 years since Inchon have reverberated with echoes of Bradley’s words from other corners, mostly characterized by a cynical scorn for a form of warfare which these critics deride as being outmoded or suicidal in the modern age. Some of these wolves have even tried to don sheep’s clothing by maintaining that the Marine Corps didn’t need to be tied to the Navy and that there was plenty for the Corps to contribute in the battles for Central Europe without being shackled to an amphibious mission. Absent such a change in mission and focus, we were told, the Marine Corps would become strategically irrelevant.
Fortunately, this siren's song went unheeded. The last six years have witnessed a reawakening to the strategic need for both U.S. naval power and its capability to conduct amphibious forcible entry operations. Where once Marine participation in NATO training exercises was only thinly tolerated, we now have Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) exercising in Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Turkey, on a regular basis. Where once there were no new amphibious assault ships scheduled for construction—to replace a rapidly aging and deteriorating fleet—we now have a solid program of ship-building that will give us an expanded and modernized amphibious lift capability by the mid-1990s. Where once there were initiatives that would have “heavied-up” the Marine Corps to create a mechanized clone of existing Army divisions, today we are in the middle of an expansive modernization program that will allow MAGTFs to be lethal and mobile, but still light enough to maintain their amphibious character.

What has caused this resurgent emphasis on maritime and amphibious power? Why are naval forces now being viewed as central—rather than secondary—elements of our military strategy? What role will the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team be called upon to play in the execution of this strategy across the spectrum of conflict? Is the Marine Corps capable of fulfilling the requirements a maritime-oriented strategy has thrust upon it?

We believe that an examination of the issues underlying these questions will illuminate the reasons behind the rediscovery of the strategic utility inherent in the Navy–Marine Corps team. Although the demands and responsibilities of our strategic role are great, Marines have been long accustomed to the challenges and hazards associated with being our nation’s force-in-readiness. We would have it no other way.

The World Environment

The greatest threat to the security and well-being of the Western Alliance lies in the quest for world domination by the Soviet Union. Emerging from the devastation of a valiant and costly victory over the German Wehrmacht in 1945, the Soviets have constructed a military machine that is equaled only by our own. This gives substantial credibility to their stated goal of eventual global conquest.

The Soviet military effort has gone through a number of stages since the end of World War II. Until the time of Stalin’s death, the focus was on relearning the lessons of the Great Patriotic War, building massive conventional armies, and playing catch-up in the development of nuclear weapons. Soviet deficiencies in nuclear armaments and naval power caused them to fear the might of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the flexible striking power of U.S. amphibious forces above all other possible threats.

Khrushchev dispensed with much of Stalin’s political style and brought radical reform to the arena of military affairs, as well. Believing that nuclear weapons had made
conventional forces an expensive and useless commodity, he placed top priority on the
formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces; cut the numbers of ground formations; and
brought a halt to the construction of new naval warships. As a consequence—lacking
the naval capability to counter a U.S. maritime blockade—the Soviets suffered the
humiliation of having to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. Dissatisfied with the
entire focus of a nuclear-only defense program, the Russian military subsequently
played a central part in the removal of Khrushchev from power in 1964.

The changes in Soviet military strategy since 1965 have been both profound and trou-
bling. Continuing Khrushchev’s expansion of strategic nuclear forces, Brezhnev also
launched a massive modernization program for both ground and naval forces. While
the United States had its attention focused on Vietnam, the Soviets soon surpassed us
in the numbers of nuclear launchers and warheads and boosted the existing imbalance
of conventional forces even more in their favor. Huge naval complexes in the Kola Pen-
insula and the Northwest Pacific indicated that the Soviets intended to use their new
fleets to actively contest American maritime supremacy on the high seas.

After Vietnam, as America withdrew into an isolationist shell, forever foreswearing any
future foreign involvements, a new and distinctly more ominous Soviet capability
began to appear: power projection. No longer satisfied with being a “continental”
power, the Soviets began to use their navy for the battles of political influence that have
come to characterize the Cold War. Naval bases in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Libya, and
Angola provided stark reminders that the Russian bear had gone to sea and was pre-
pared to use his naval power—both in general war and for crisis leverage—much as we
had for the previous 30 years.

The picture that confronted the West in the late 1970’s was not at all comforting.
Somewhat belatedly, we realized that we were faced with a multidimensional super-
power with ambitions beyond the continent of Europe and with the military means to
carry them out. Without the element of nuclear superiority, which we had enjoyed
until 1970, the conventional might of the Soviet Union, now including its expansion to
the world’s oceans, took on a menacing import that demanded serious consideration
by Western military planners.

Related to the extension of Soviet global military reach has been the growing number
of conflicts in the Third World. Wars of national liberation, whether in Central Amer-
ica, the Middle East, or Asia, have received varying degrees of support and encourage-
ment from the Soviets. We may have been soured by our Southeast Asian experiences,
but we still recognize the fact that many of these countries are important to the eco-
nomic health of the West. We have also recognized the need for a means of rapid U.S.
response, should a developing crisis in one of these countries worsen.
Another element of instability in the world environment has been the emergence of terrorism as a means of achieving political ends. The shocking murders during the Munich Olympics in 1972 were a foretaste of the wanton violence we have subsequently witnessed in Europe and the Middle East. Whether seeking political anarchy, a homeland to call his own, or the overthrow of a hated regime, the international terrorist has exhibited a devotion to his cause (even unto death) that respects neither social mores nor rules of law. His reach is global, and his targets are rarely involved in the immediate resolution of his struggle. The demonic unpredictability of this threat makes it perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all to counter and negate.

How, then, has the world environment changed as it relates to Western interests? We are now engaged in competition with a Soviet Union that has emerged from a land-locked view to stake a credible claim for its interests, through a global military capability. Soviet instigation of revolutionary fervor in the Third World also threatens key Western economic interests, and aids the expansion of Russian power and influence. If one adds the "wild card" of terrorism to this already worrisome picture, the absolute requirement for a rapidly deployable and flexible U.S. military capability becomes self-evident.

National Military Strategy

As World War II came to a close in September 1945, the Marine Corps could look with satisfaction and pride on its contribution to the Allied victory in the Pacific. Successful amphibious assaults by both Marine and Army forces had led the way to Tokyo through the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters. The development and use of the atom bomb signaled a new era in military affairs, but—at the time—few would have questioned the utility of maritime/amphibious power in the postwar defense of the Free World.

As soon as the guns went silent, however, a new and radically different slant on America's strategic needs began to emerge. Atomic weapons delivered by long-range bombers would provide our principal means of defeating future aggression. This became a strategy with some measure of appeal in an era of American nuclear monopoly. Dependence on strategic assets soon called into question the need for conventional forces, and particular attention was directed toward the Marine Corps. Army and Air Force leaders questioned the need for a "second land army" and recommended that the Marine Corps be limited—both in size and responsibilities—to a police force equivalent.

It was well for the defense of the nation that the Congress and the American people were somewhat more farsighted than the President and his military leaders in sensing
the continuing need for an amphibious force-in-readiness. In passing the National Security Act of 1947, Congress ensured that there would be no piecemeal destruction or limitation of Marine Corps roles, functions, and missions:

The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

This new legislation went on to assign principal responsibility to the Marine Corps for the development of amphibious tactics, techniques, and equipment. An additional charge, unique to the Marine Corps, required the performance of “such additional duties as the President may direct: Provided, that such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.”

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 served notice to the proponents of atomic strategy that not all wars would entail direct confrontation between the major powers. Despite Omar Bradley’s belief that atomic weapons had made amphibious operations obsolete, MacArthur’s brilliant landing of a combined Marine Corps/Army force at Inchon clearly countered the limited vision of such dire pessimists. Marine units went on to fight effectively as part of the United Nations command for the next three years, performing these additional non-maritime duties at the direction of the President.

American national strategy continued to emphasize the massive use of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Korean War. The United States still had a substantial measure of nuclear superiority through the 1950s and ground force levels overseas were reduced to provide a minimal conventional “trip wire,” to trigger massive nuclear retaliation. Congress had amended the National Security Act in 1951, to mandate that a minimum of three combat divisions and three air wings would be actively maintained by the Marine Corps. Without this legislative floor, the “New Look” proponents may have turned their force-cutting cleaver on the Marine Corps as well.

The 1960s brought forth a revision to the national military strategy, initiated by a rejection of the rigid nuclear orientation of the massive retaliation policy. The two-and-one-half war basis of the new strategy of flexible response called for the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent force, along with the conventional capability to fight major wars in Europe (against the Soviets) and Asia (against the Red Chinese) simultaneously with a smaller war at another unspecified location. Due note was taken of the proliferation of revolutionary wars around the world, and concrete programs were instituted to deal with these conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum as well.
Flexible response showed that America recognized that its global responsibilities could not forever be discharged through the threat of nuclear Armageddon, particularly in light of rapidly growing Soviet strategic capabilities. A truly global strategy requires the ability to dominate the world’s oceans, and the flexibility of force employment that only naval forces can provide.

The two-and-one-half war strategy ran aground in the 1960s when America became involved in the fight for South Vietnamese independence. In seeking to quell what may have started as a revolutionary war, we became involved in a large-scale conflict which siphoned off significant numbers of our conventional forces, bringing into serious doubt our ability to support simultaneously major conflicts against the Soviets and the Chinese. Though initially employed in an amphibious expeditionary mode, Marine forces were once again to engage successfully in sustained land combat at the direction of the President.

The Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s reduced the scope of our strategy from a two-and-one-half to a one-and-one-half war commitment. The United States would be prepared to fight a major war in Europe and a minor conflict elsewhere. Our intention was to train and equip regional surrogates to defend our interests in areas outside of Europe. The cry of “No more Vietnams” had found its reflection in this narrow, ostrich-like strategic world view which all but abandoned historic, economic, and strategic ties. In seeking defense on the cheap, we basically told many of our allies and friends that they were “on their own.”

Making a case for an offensively oriented Navy and Marine Corps is not an easy undertaking if Europe is the primary U.S. area of interest. By the middle 1970s, the Navy’s role was cast primarily in terms of sea control and convoy escort for the reinforcement flow to Europe. Talk of maritime superiority was roundly discounted as the United States opted to abandon its geostrategic naval advantages in order to combat the Soviets on the continental ground of their own choosing.

The Marine Corps was also subject to the ordeal of justifying its existence as an amphibious force, while our Europe-oriented strategy demanded more armored and mechanized divisions. Several noted pundits proclaimed that never again would we have interests worth defending in the Pacific, and that Vietnam had made expeditionary forays a politically unacceptable option to the American people. We were told not too gently that we had better abandon our identity as a naval service, buy some more armored vehicles, bring our MAGTFs home from the Pacific, or risk being viewed as a useless anachronism.

By the late 1970s many national security analysts had come to the conclusion that the one-and-one-half war strategy was fatally flawed. Colin Gray and John Erickson...
warned of the tremendous buildup of Soviet naval power on the Kola Peninsula and in the Northwest Pacific, as an indication that the Russians were prepared to take the war to sea on a major scale. Soviet gains in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Cambodia were indicative of a power that was clearly seeking a global sphere of influence. The fall of the Shah, the seizure of American hostages by the Iranian revolutionary government, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally alerted our leaders to the fact that Europe was not the only region whose loss could pose a threat to the United States and its allies.

The proclamation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980, declaring the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf to be a vital American interest, was the first step along a continuing path that has led to the revalidation of a global military strategy for the United States. While trying to form a Rapid Deployment Force to implement the Carter Doctrine, our governmental leaders soon found that carrier battle groups and amphibious forces were the only military assets capable of establishing an American presence in the Arabian region. The equipment for a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) was quickly put aboard a set of near-term prepositioning ships and rushed off to Diego Garcia. Budgets for the naval services, which had previously been cut to fund a ground buildup in Europe, were now increased significantly in recognition of their capability to protect our global interests.

The military strategy that has evolved over the last five years recognizes the importance of Europe and the Pacific—and the energy resources of Southwest Asia—to U.S. security interests. Wrapped around the principles of deterrence, forward positioning of forces, and coalition operations with our allies, our strategy has come to recognize, once again, the necessity for a maritime nation to control vital sea lines of communication through naval superiority. Though our primary threat may come from the Soviet Union, modern and ready Navy-Marine forces give our decision makers the capability to address a wide spectrum of possible challenges, from an all-out Soviet attack to a hostage seizure in a Third World country. Clearly, it is the unexpected crisis that presents us the greatest difficulties and most urgently requires rapid application of the discreet power inherent in naval forces.

That our strategy has once again returned to its maritime focus is no surprise to those of us in the naval services. For the Marine Corps, our refusal to renounce our naval heritage and our amphibious nature has been more than vindicated by the renewed confidence and trust our leaders feel in having a uniquely ready, hard-hitting, and sustainable forcible entry capability from the sea.
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy

The development of strategic concepts for the employment of naval forces is an ongoing joint effort by the Navy and Marine Corps. Three years ago, the first edition of what has come to be called “The Maritime Strategy” addressed the role of naval forces in the execution of the National Military Strategy. Though classified in its initial iteration, the Maritime Strategy has now been publicly briefed to the Congress and has been published in an unclassified form in open sources.

Derived from pertinent policy and strategic directives and taking into account the warfighting requirements of the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (CinCs), the Maritime Strategy provides a planning and programming baseline for the employment of naval forces in a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Currently divided into three phases, this strategy provides a coordinated, sequential framework which seeks to:

- Deter war, if at all possible.
- If deterrence fails: destroy enemy maritime forces; protect allied sea lines of communication (SLOCs); support the land campaign; and secure favorable leverage for war termination.

In June 1985, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the publication of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. Developed as a subset of the Maritime Strategy, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy outlines the employment of Navy-Marine amphibious forces in support of our global National Military Strategy. Though oriented to address the phased employment of amphibious forces in a global conventional conflict, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy fully recognizes the utility of these forces in the unexpected and more likely crisis scenarios at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

Low-Intensity Conflict: B. H. Liddell Hart, the great British military thinker, expressed the following thoughts on the effectiveness of amphibious forces in low-intensity conflict:

Since Russia has developed nuclear weapons in quantity to match America’s, a nuclear stalemate has developed. In such a situation, local and limited aggression becomes more likely, and amphibious forces become more necessary, both as deterrent and as a counter to aggression—a counter which can be used without being suicidal and a deterrent which is therefore credible.

The role of the Marine Corps in the realm of low-intensity conflicts makes maximum use of the inherent flexibility amphibious forces offer to the National Command Authorities. Congress had this fully in mind when, in passing the 1951 act which dictated the current Marine Corps force structure, it directed that the Marine Corps
would be a “ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.” It is from these roots that the term “force-in-readiness” first appeared, and it is in this arena of rapid and effective crisis suppression that amphibious forces can perform perhaps their greatest service in preventing minor conflicts from growing into major confrontations.

The forward peacetime presence of amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their deployed MAGTFs in the Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian oceans serves as a visible and credible indicator of American capability to react to sudden, unforeseen crises involving U.S. interests. These groups possess the combined ground/air combat power of a Marine amphibious unit (MAU), which can provide a rapidly available military presence, to put out a brushfire incident before it has a chance to spread.

The advantages which these amphibious groups enjoy over forces which must be deployed from the United States—or be permanently based in the region—are obvious. Many Third World governments are understandably reluctant to grant permanent basing rights to U.S. forces because of the destabilization it could cause to the ruling regime. Without regional bases, forces deploying from the United States must deal with long flight times en route, limited lift capacity for support units and their equipment, and refueling and overflight clearances.

Amphibious forces, on the other hand, can be stationed over the horizon at sea, need no basing or overflight clearances, and provide their own sustainment. A MAU can fight its way ashore if required and can be swiftly extracted back to the waiting ships of the ARG. Often, however, the mere presence of the ARG offshore is enough to deter a would-be aggressor from initiating trouble.

A new and innovative development in the crisis response arena has been the procurement and fielding of three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), each carrying equipment and supplies to sustain a MAB for 30 days. Strategically positioned in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, MPSs will add a significant expansion to our response capability when the program reaches completion this year. When married with its airlifted troops and organic aircraft, an MPS-MAB can provide another means of demonstrating American resolve, when employed either preemptively into a friendly port/airhead or as reinforcement for a forward-deployed ARG.

An additional asset worthy of note is the capability of our deployed MAUs to conduct naval/amphibious special operations. Amphibious raids and other special naval missions have always been a part of the Marine Corps repertoire and may well become likely assignments for deployed MAUs in this era of international terrorism and instability. We intend in the near future to include the training for such missions in the
standard pre-deployment workup for all of our MAUs and to have them designated as MAU (Special Operations Capable).

These force projection options from the sea provide a flexible and valuable national asset, in the effort to address and contain potential strife at the low end of the conflict spectrum. The frequency with which we recently have had to face incidents of this type shows that the investment of our defense dollars into amphibious forces is a wise use of scarce resources.

Phase I—Deterrence or the Transition to War: The first phase of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy postulates a growing crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the first sign of deepening tension or possible preparation for a Soviet general attack, U.S. and allied naval forces would surge from their home ports and deploy as far forward as possible. Carrier battle groups and attack submarines would attempt to position themselves for maximum advantage in the event that deterrence failed. The objective of this phase, however, is to assume a deterrent posture so convincing to the Soviets that they would abandon any plans for a general offensive.

Marine forces will be extremely active in this initial phase, and can contribute significantly to the credibility of our deterrent efforts. The very regularity of our amphibious exercises enables us to load our available amphibious ships and deploy them from the United States early in the crisis buildup, without unduly arousing suspicion. This will allow for the massing of amphibious assets in the Atlantic and Pacific to at least MAB size, and will thus give the CinC an in-theater capability for amphibious forcible entry.

While our amphibious forces are sailing to their forward operating areas, MPS squadrons will be repositioning themselves to best support anticipated requirements. The airlifted MAB elements could be joined with their equipment at a preliminary staging location or could be employed as a follow-on element to reinforce the massing amphibious MAGTFs.

Although our Norway land prepositioning program—for a MAB set of equipment and supplies—will not be completed until 1989, the Marine Corps will nonetheless deploy a MAB via amphibious shipping to assist in the defense of Norway. The importance of this region to the defense of the North Atlantic SLOC and its reinforcing flow to Central Europe could dictate the eventual employment of a Marine amphibious force (MAF) to NATO’s Northern Flank.

The deployment of amphibious task forces from the United States, movement of MPSs to crisis areas, and the commitment of a MAB to the defense of Norway will materially assist other Western efforts to dissuade the Soviets from launching a general war. If the
Soviets attack despite these efforts, however, we will be deployed to engage the aggressor far forward and to blunt his assault.

Phase II—Seize the Initiative: Should the Soviets commence a full-scale invasion of Central Europe, the initial NATO strategy will be to counter the attack, to wear down the enemy, and to seize the initiative. Attack submarines will quickly engage Soviet naval forces in the Norwegian and Barents seas, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific Ocean. Carrier battle groups will seek to negate or neutralize Soviet surface and air threats, while allied antisubmarine warfare forces will seek out and destroy the Soviet subsurface force.

The naval battle at sea will be fought to keep forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in the northern region of Europe, the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific, thereby preventing any significant shift of Soviet forces to Central Europe or interdiction of NATO’s reinforcing SLOCs. Allied naval superiority in these maritime theaters, gained through the destruction of Soviet naval forces, will set the stage for a series of counteroffensives aimed to ease the pressure on the land battle in the central region.

Amphibious forces could play many parts in this phase. One likely mission could be the seizure of advanced naval bases. Amphibious raids of MAB size or full-scale MAF amphibious assaults could be conducted for the follow-on introduction of U.S. and allied forces. Although deployments may initially be made by MABs, every effort will be made to combine amphibious, MPS, and follow-on MAGTFs so that employment will be on a MAF scale.

NATO’s Northern Flank will be the scene of tense drama, in which amphibious forces can play a key role. As allied naval forces fight for control of the Norwegian Sea, they will be supported by the air component of MAGTFs ashore. As the Soviet invader is worn down, opportunities will develop for amphibious assaults along the Norwegian coast to his rear, to reclaim any airfields and ports that may have been lost in the war’s initial days.

Other areas that may lend themselves to amphibious operations are the North and Baltic seas, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. Operations in these areas offer possible opportunities to exert pressure on the Soviet Rimland, which might in turn divert Soviet energies from the struggle for the heartland of industrial Europe.

While NATO’s armies are containing the assault in Central Europe, every effort will be made to retain amphibious forces for employment at the decisive point and time when the Soviets have lost their momentum and are therefore most vulnerable. This does not preclude the use of MAGTFs to support a NATO defense which is in extremis on the English Channel coast. As always, Marines will fight where they are needed most. We believe, however, that the employment of amphibious MAGTFs in a sustained land
warfare role compromises their unique capability for flexible maneuver and, therefore, should be avoided.

Phase III—Carry the Fight to the Enemy: Exhausted and contained by a stout NATO defense in the central region, stripped of his naval forces through a bold and decisive allied maritime campaign, and harried by NATO pressure on his flanks, the Soviet invader will now be pounded by a succession of NATO sea, air, and land counteroffensives.

Massed naval task groups will undertake attacks on Soviet forces and their supporting infrastructure in Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland. Naval offensives into the Kola Peninsula and Northwest Pacific regions could attack key Soviet military targets, thus helping to induce a measure of fear, uncertainty, and paralysis into the Soviet warfighting machine.

Amphibious forces will once again play a prominent part in this final phase. Massed amphibious task forces, together with supporting battleship surface action groups, will now undertake landings to retake conquered territory and to seize key objectives in the Soviet rear. Operating as a component of the naval campaign, MAGTFs could land on the North Cape, the eastern Baltic or the Black Sea coasts, in the Kuriles, or on Sakhalin Island—thereby adding a crucial measure of leverage to the successful conduct of the maritime campaign.

The ultimate objective of our Alliance efforts is to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table as quickly as possible, on terms that are favorable to the West. Maritime forces offer the opportunity to avoid a long, costly, and uncertain land effort to push the Soviets back in Central Europe. Naval operations on the exposed Rimland flanks present the option of striking quickly at key Soviet pressure points in a campaign of nautical maneuver. Used in this manner, our naval forces can make the strategic difference.

The Amphibious Team

No matter how pressing the need or sound the strategy may be, the lack of a ready, well-equipped, and professional amphibious force will make all else irrelevant. The profession of arms is a very unforgiving taskmaster. Good intentions count for far less than does superior battlefield performance.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a viable and meaningful concept because of the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team that will put it into execution. Improvements in our amphibious capability in the last six years allow us to be supremely confident about the health of this much-needed and frequently used military capability.
People: The quality of the Marines and sailors in service with the fleet has never been higher. Our ranks are filled with well-educated, physically fit, and spirited young men and women who are proud of the important role they play in the country’s defense. The victors of Iwo Jima, Inchon, and Khe Sanh would be proud to serve with today’s young Americans in the uniform of their country.

Forces: The amphibious assault fleet of today is in its best shape, in recent memory, and it is going to get even better. Six years ago, not a single amphibious ship appeared in the Navy’s five-year defense program. Today, we are well into the production of the LSD-41 and LHD-1 classes of amphibious assault ships and have sound programs for the maintenance and upgrading of the amphibious ships currently serving with the fleet. By the mid-1990s, we will have a total of 76 amphibious ships, which will be capable of lifting the assault echelons of both a MAF and a MAB. The combination of the increase in strategic lift we will realize from both an expanded amphibious fleet and our MPS squadrons will significantly enhance our capability for global response.

Naval surface fire support for the landing force is critically needed in the early hours of an amphibious assault, before our artillery is established ashore. The reactivation of the four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships, along with programmed improvements in the accuracy and lethality of our naval gunfire munitions, will ensure that Marines hitting an enemy-held shoreline will have the accurate and responsive gunfire support they require.

The Navy has made major commitments to improve the readiness and availability of amphibious assault support forces. Construction battalions, cargo-handling groups, and fleet medical support are often overlooked when novices discuss amphibious operations; the professionals know how easily an operation can founder without these naval support elements.

We in the Marine Corps are looking to improve the effectiveness of our MAGTF concept through the establishment of permanent headquarters. Instead of creating MAGTF headquarters by drafting personnel from subordinate units on an “as-needed” basis, we are now assigning Marines to our MAGTF headquarters on a permanent basis, so that the teamwork and experience we gain will not be lost after every series of exercises. Based on the feedback received from several recent exercises, this concept is already proving its worth and will markedly improve our capabilities for effective command and control of amphibious operations in the coming years.

Equipment: If our amphibious forces are to triumph over a tough and determined foe, they must be provided with effective and modern tools of war. Our modernization program is geared to satisfy long-standing warfighting requirements for present and future battlefields.
Improvements in expediting the movement of Marines from the ship to the enemy shore will be realized with the acquisition of the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and the MV-22A “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft. These platforms will allow for a much more rapid closure to the beach, giving the amphibious task force the option of operating from over the horizon, out of the range of many enemy weapon systems.

In addition, because the LCAC rides on a cushion of air, many beaches that were previously unsuitable for assault landings can now be considered. The significant strategic impact of this development is that it considerably widens the range of possible landing sites that an enemy must defend.

We have modernized the assault rifle, artillery, mortars, and the prime movers organic to the MAGTF. In the next several years, we will be introducing a new tank and a series of light armored vehicles which will improve the mobility and firepower of our MAGTFs without making them too heavy to retain their expeditionary character.

The cumulative impact of our modernization initiatives will result in a MAGTF that will be light, mobile, and lethal.

**Doctrine:** Although we have sound joint doctrine for amphibious operations, we are constantly seeking to develop and refine improved operational concepts that will foster the best use of our modern warfighting systems. The formulation of an operational and tactical framework for amphibious operations from over the horizon is a high-priority project, combining the efforts of Navy and Marine Corps planners. We have chosen some of our brightest, most operationally experienced, and talented officers to work on this endeavor. Their initial proposals show considerable promise and will be subjected to operational validation in future amphibious exercises.

Boldness and innovation accurately describe the Marine heritage in putting forth new warfighting concepts. Our development of amphibious doctrine in the 1920s, close-air support for ground troops during World War II, and the use of the helicopter for vertical envelopment in the 1950s are prime examples of this desire to develop new and imaginative solutions to battlefield problems.

So too, today, Marines are working on the refinement of tactics that will increase the effectiveness of the MAGTF ashore. Our schools have become hotbeds for the development of new initiatives, and the volume and quality of the tactical debate in our military journals indicate that the scope, depth, and enthusiasm of this effort runs deeply throughout our Corps. We take pride in the fact that our Marines have taken seriously their responsibility to enhance and advance the amphibious art. They have had, and will continue to have, a positive impact on the combat effectiveness of our MAGTFs.
Training: Nothing hones the fighting edge of our amphibious forces better than realistic and demanding training exercises. An increase in funding to support a high operational tempo has enabled Navy–Marine Corps amphibious forces to conduct dozens of exercises around the world, with frequent participation by our allies and by other services.

Conducted in the cold and snows of Norway and Alaska, the heat and sand of Oman and Somalia, and the jungles of Honduras and the Philippines, these exercises allow for the validation of our operational concepts, tactics, and procedures. Feedback from these exercises shows where our concepts are sound and where they require additional attention.

For the MAGTF ashore, our Combined Arms Exercises at our desert base at Twentynine Palms, California, provides the Marine air-ground team with the most realistic live-fire training short of actual combat. Since their inception in 1975, these exercises have broadened in scope from an initial MAU orientation to the point where we now conduct live-fire training on the MAB level.

Readiness: The payoff we get from having superior people, necessary levels of force capability, modern equipment, sound doctrine, and meaningful training is a Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team that truly is a force-in-readiness. Tasked to respond to a wide range of possible missions, from a show-of-force to a full-scale assault into a hostile beachhead, amphibious forces must be prepared to respond rapidly and effectively when the seemingly hypothetical suddenly becomes reality. The Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team is ready, eager, and able to accept that challenge.

Renaissance and Revolution

A global Soviet menace, Third World instabilities and threats to key U.S. allies or trading partners, and the specter of international terrorism have combined to force a readdressal of our National Military Strategy. Though we tried to pretend during the decade of the 1970s that European security was our only vital overseas interest, we have since relearned that a maritime nation in an ever-shrinking world has vital interests in nearly every region. The protection of our allies and access to key economic resources demand that we command the seas and possess the capability for maritime power projection.

The National Military Strategy recognizes the requirement for a Navy and Marine Corps capable of reacting quickly to a myriad of possible threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Deployments in low-intensity or crisis situations are the most likely happenstance. The Navy–Marine Corps team has been the force of choice in Lebanon in 1958 and 1982, Thailand in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Grenada in
1983. We are thankful that global war with the Soviets is the least probable scenario, but we are prepared to contribute in a meaningful way to the attainment of allied victory should that unhappy conflict be forced upon us.

The importance of an amphibious forcible entry capability and its role in national strategy were eloquently described by Liddell Hart:

> The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious flexibility. In tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy’s power of concentration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ and the resources they possess.

When reviewing the plans for the invasion of Sicily in 1943, General George Marshall is said to have commented that a landing against an organized and highly trained opponent is “probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called upon to face.” The conduct of forcible entry from the sea remains to this day an exacting and complex endeavor, in which our central goal is most often the seizure of an objective whose value is just as clearly evident to the defender as it is to us.

It is only through the dynamic synergism of the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious brotherhood that risks are minimized, obstacles are overcome, and victory is achieved. Those who seek to put Marines on the front in Central Europe or in other sustained inland roles as land force division equivalents not only demonstrate their total lack of appreciation for the effectiveness of our Marine air-ground team; they also convey the most profound misunderstanding of the proper use of maritime power, the depth of our naval heritage, and the pride with which we bear the title of “Soldiers of the Sea.”

Though some military commentators regard World War II to be the high point in the development and conduct of amphibious warfare, we take a very different view. We believe that there is ample evidence to suggest that we have entered a renaissance period in the evolution of amphibious operations, with the broadening of our vistas through the introduction of the LCAC and Osprey yet to come. Indeed, the incremental advances we have experienced in the art of amphibious warfare will soon be giving way to an exciting era—in which the rapid pace of strategic, operational, and tactical improvements will transform the current renaissance into nothing less than an amphibious revolution.
The 600-Ship Navy
JOHN F. LEHMAN, JR.

Clemenceau once declared that war was too important to be left to the generals. But if war is too important to be left to the generals, it is also too important to be left to the civilian experts. In the United States, with our constitutionally mandated civilian control of the armed forces, we forget sometimes that hard-earned military experience must leaven the theories of civilians if our system is to work.

We would do well to keep this in mind as we near our goal of a 600-ship Navy. Media-anointed experts have raised questions about the size, character, and complexity of the Navy: Do we really need so many ships? Are the Navy and Marine Corps effective in helping to deter Soviet aggression—across the full spectrum of violence, from terrorism to nuclear war? Do we have a strategy that guides the planning and training of our forces? Is it the correct strategy? If it is, are we building the right types and numbers of ships to execute it? Finally, can this nation afford to sustain a 600-ship fleet—not only well-equipped but properly manned—for the long term? When defense restrictions become law in the zero-growth 1986 budget, and retrenchment is the theme of the hour, the answers to these questions take on added significance.

Why 600 ships?

To understand how we arrived at the size of our planned fleet of ships, we must begin by discarding the idea that this number has sprung, full blown, from the brow of some would-be Napoleon of the high seas.

Since World War II, maritime force planners have found themselves at the mercy of three enduring elements. First is geography. Water covers three quarters of the world; and the United States is an “island continent” washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Second are the vital interests of the United States, expressed in the web of more than 40 treaty relationships that bind us to mutual defense coalitions around the world. These relationships shape our national security requirements—together with the energy and commercial dependencies that support our economy in peace and in war.
The third element is the Soviet threat. Whatever its original rationale, the Soviet Navy’s postwar expansion has created an offense-oriented blue water force, a major element in the Soviet Union’s global military reach that supports expanding Soviet influence from Nicaragua to Vietnam to Ethiopia. From the Baltic to the Caribbean to the South China Sea, our ships and men pass within yards of Soviet naval forces every day. But familiarity, in this case, is breeding a well-deserved respect.

The Navy’s recently updated Understanding Soviet Naval Developments provides the facts about the Soviet Navy. Every American should be aware, for example, that Soviet nuclear submarines operate continuously off our coasts. “Victor”-class nuclear attack submarines are routinely found lurking near many of our principal naval ports. Soviet surface units are now making regular deployments to the contentious and vulnerable chokepoints of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Worldwide, we find the Soviet Navy astride the vital sea-lanes and navigational chokepoints, through which most of the Western world’s international trade must pass.

This is the new reality. The pattern of Soviet naval deployments has revealed itself in only the last several years. These deployments constitute a post–World War II change in the global military balance of power that has been surpassed only by the advent of thermonuclear weapons. No planner, civilian or military, can ignore the growing dimensions of Soviet maritime power.

Geography, alliances, and the Soviet threat combine to dictate the actual numbers of ships—the “size of the Navy”—required to fulfill our commitments in each of our maritime theaters. Before reviewing in detail the forces we need in each theater, some observations are in order:

- Any view of the global disposition of the U.S. Navy reveals that we often deploy in peacetime very much in the same manner as we would operate in wartime. For purposes of deterrence, crisis management, and diplomacy, we must be present in the areas where we would have to fight if war broke out. Of course, the operational tempo is different—a roughly three-to-one ratio in wartime, as compared with peacetime.

  We also train as we intend to fight. A full-scale general war at sea would rarely find a carrier battle group operating alone. So we train often in multiple carrier battle forces in such exercises as FLEETEX, READEX, and NATO exercises, like Northern Wedding, which we conduct in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.

- Our maritime security depends on significant assistance from allies in executing our missions. Fortunately, we count among our friends all of the world’s great navies, save one. Clearly, in areas such as diesel submarines, frigates, coastal patrol craft, minesweepers, and maritime patrol aircraft, allies of the United States have assets
absolutely essential to us for sea control in war and peace. In some regions, such as the Eastern Atlantic and the waters surrounding the United Kingdom, our allies supply a significant portion of the antisubmarine capability to counter the Soviet threat. In fact, if we could not count on our allies, we would require a U.S. fleet much larger than 600 ships, to deal with the 1,700 ships and submarines that the Soviets can deploy against us. But the world's greatest navies are on our side, and this gives a tremendous advantage to the U.S. Navy and a significant cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer.

- America's increasing commercial and energy interdependence with Asia, and the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet—now the largest of the four Soviet fleets—have negated the so-called "swing strategy" of the Sixties and Seventies, which planned to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet with combatants from the Pacific in time of crisis. Today, the United States has an Asian orientation at least equal to its historic engagement in Europe. Existing treaty relationships in the Pacific have been augmented by growing commercial connections. For example, in 1980, the value of U.S. trade with the Pacific rim nations was roughly equal to trade with the country's Atlantic partners. Four years later, Pacific trade exceeded that with Western Europe by $26 billion.

Similarly, oil dependencies have shifted tremendously in the last five years. This forces America to reconsider the priorities of naval deployments in the Northern Pacific and Caribbean regions. The reorientation of U.S. sources for crude oil—on a hemispheric axis—is a long-term geopolitical reality that has gone largely unnoticed. Western dependency on Middle Eastern oil is still debated at length, for its impact on our military thinking and force planning. But we must also take into account that, in 1985, the United States imported eight times as much oil by sea from the Western Hemisphere as it received from the entire Middle East. Oil from Mexico has increased to almost 25% of our imports, while oil from Saudi Arabia has dropped to only 2.6% of the U.S. import market. We no longer depend primarily on the Middle East and Persian Gulf supply for our vital energy needs. Instead, the locus of our oil trade is in the Western Hemisphere: Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Caribbean area.

With these observations as background, let us review our forces in the main geographic areas: the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf. The numbers used are “notional.” They illustrate force packages constructed for peacetime tasks now assigned to our naval forces. But they are capable of expansion or contraction, should war break out—a flexibility characteristic of naval power.

*The Atlantic:* The large Atlantic theater encompasses the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, the Northern Flank of NATO including the Baltic throat, the South Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. It includes the coasts of South America and the
west coast of Africa, all vital sea-lanes of communications. And it involves the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The U.S. Navy operates in the Atlantic theater with two fleets, the Sixth and the Second. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is the principal fighting force of the NATO Southern Europe Command and provides strike, antiair superiority, antisubmarine, and close air support for the entire Southern Flank of NATO—a principal makeweight in the balance in the Central Front.

In addition, the Sixth Fleet is the principal naval force that supports our friends and allies in the Middle East. The threat there is significant. The Soviets maintain a fleet in the Black Sea and a deployed squadron in the Mediterranean. In wartime, we expect to see also Soviet naval strike aircraft, aircraft carriers, a formidable number of diesel and nuclear submarines, and a full range of strike cruisers, destroyers, and other smaller combatants.

To deal with this threat, as we do in all our planning, we start with a base of allied forces in the areas under consideration. The navies of our allies are good. For example, we count on them to provide about 140 diesel submarines, which are effective for coastal and area defense, for establishing and maintaining barriers, and for certain other useful missions.

In wartime, purely U.S. forces in the Sixth Fleet would have to include three or four carrier battle groups, operating to meet NATO commitments. We would also need to deploy a battleship surface action group and two underway replenishment groups. In peacetime, we average over the year one and one-third carrier battle groups deployed in the Mediterranean.

The Second Fleet is the heart of the Atlantic strike fleet for NATO. It is responsible for naval operations in the North Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, Iceland, the Norwegian Sea, the defense of Norway, and the entire Northern Flank including the North Sea and Baltic throat. It must simultaneously accomplish any naval missions required in the Caribbean, where we now face a very large Soviet and Cuban naval presence; in the South Atlantic, where we have vital sea-lanes; and along the West African sea-lanes, where the Soviets now deploy naval forces continuously.

For the Second Fleet, in wartime, we must plan to have four or five carrier battle groups, one battleship surface action group, and three underway replenishment groups. This is the equivalent firepower of 40 World War II carriers and can deliver accurate strike ordnance on target equal to 800 B-17s every day. In peacetime, we generally run higher than this, because most of our principal training occurs in the Second Fleet’s operating areas.
Today, we have six carrier battle groups cycling in the Second Fleet at one time or another. We have exercises underway with our NATO allies, with our South American and Central American allies, and with other nations, on an ad hoc basis, in every season of the year.

The Pacific: Clearly, our increasing commercial interests and historic security ties in the Pacific impact on our naval planning for the area. If we are to protect our vital interests, we must have forces available to deploy—not only to the Atlantic theaters and the Sixth and the Second fleets—but also to the Pacific simultaneously, to the Seventh and the Third fleets and the Middle East Force of the Central Command. We cannot abandon one theater in order to deal with the other. The great paradox of the 1970s was the reduction of the fleet’s size so that it could only be employed in a swing strategy—just as that strategy was being rendered obsolete by trade, geopolitics, and the growth of the Soviet Navy.

The Seventh Fleet is our forward Western Pacific fleet, which meets our commitments to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand, and in the critical straits of Southeast Asia, as well as the Indian Ocean. In wartime, we would need to deploy five carrier battle groups to the Seventh Fleet, two battleship surface action groups, and four underway replenishment groups. In peacetime, we average over the year the equivalent of one and one-third carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific. That, of course, helps us maintain a peacetime fleetwide operational tempo that provides for at least 50% time in home port for our people and their families.

We do not have a separate fleet in the critical area of Southwest Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, although some have proposed the re-creation of the Fifth Fleet for that purpose. In peacetime, we have the Middle East Force of the Central Command and elements of the Seventh Fleet, normally a carrier battle group.

In wartime, we plan for two of the Seventh Fleet carrier battle groups to meet our commitments in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, East Africa, the Persian Gulf area, and Southeast Asia. Notionally, a Seventh Fleet battleship surface action group and one underway replenishment group would also be assigned to operate in these areas.

The Third Fleet has responsibility for operations off Alaska, the Bering Sea, the Aleutians, the Eastern Pacific, and the Mid-Pacific region. In wartime, there would be considerable overlapping and trading back and forth between the Seventh and Third fleets. This happened in the Pacific during World War II. To cover that vast area, we must assign two carrier battle groups and one underway replenishment group.

These requirements compel us to deploy a 600-ship Navy as outlined in Table 1. In peacetime, we deploy in the same way to the same places we must control in war, but at
one-third the tempo of operations. This allows a bearable peacetime burden of six-month deployment lengths and 50% time in home ports. Looked at either way, we require the same size fleet to meet peacetime deployments as we do to fight a war. Taken together they add up to the following:

- Fifteen carrier battle groups
- Four battleship surface action groups
- One-hundred attack submarines
- An adequate number of ballistic missile submarines
- Lift for the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amphibious brigade

When escort, mine warfare, auxiliary, and replenishment units are considered, about 600 ships emerge from this accounting—a force that can be described as prudent.

**TABLE 1**  
Current Navy Force Requirements

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*Includes forces in overhaul  
**Includes Indian Ocean forces  

Note: CVBG = carrier battle group; BBSAG = battleship surface action group; URG = underway replenishment group.
reflecting geographic realities, alliance commitments and dependencies, and the Soviet fleet that threatens them. Unless Congress reduces our commitments or the Soviet threat weakens, there is no way to reduce the required size of the U.S. fleet and still carry out the missions assigned to the Navy.

Does the Navy have a role in the national strategy?

While the Carter administration questioned whether the Navy could influence a “short war” in Central Europe, such a proposition is indefensible today. The coalition of free nations bound together in NATO must have maritime superiority as a prerequisite for any defense strategy. Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory but the loss of it will certainly assure defeat—and sooner rather than later. The chronicles of warfare from the classical era forward are a consistent testament to the influence of sea power upon history, in which great continental powers do not long prevail against an opponent with mastery of the seas. Today, continental defense in NATO rests on early achievement of maritime superiority. The Soviet Union, as evidenced by its ongoing naval expansion, understands the experience of history far better than our trendier military reformists.

Does the Navy have a strategy? Is it the right one?

Now, consider the charge leveled by some parlor room Pershings that our current naval buildup lacks an underlying strategy.

Not since the days of Theodore Roosevelt have the Navy and Marine Corps exhibited such a strong consensus on the comprehensive strategy which now forms our naval planning. Briefly stated, our strategic objectives are the following:

- To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United States and its allies
- To ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our allies, our forward-deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, and our trading partners
- To be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support combat ashore, should deterrence fail

To achieve these objectives, we need a strategy at once global, forward deployed, and superior to our probable opponents. Global, because our interests, allies, and opponents are global; forward deployed, because to protect those interests and allies, and to deter those opponents, we must be where they are; superior, because if deterrence fails it is better to win than lose.
But do we have the correct strategy? Today’s debates would benefit from a more precise understanding of the role of strategy. Strategy is not a formula for fighting each ship and deploying each tank in the battles that may take place around the world. That is not the function of the military establishment inside the Washington Beltway. Such is the proper function only of the theater commander who is given the responsibility to carry out the defense objectives set by the national command authorities.

Beyond the central concept of global, forward-deployed, and superior naval forces, strategy’s role is to give coherence and direction to the process of allocating money among competing types of ships and aircraft and different accounts for spare parts, missile systems, defense planning, and the training of forces. It provides guidelines to aid us in allocating both resources and shortages.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code charges the Secretary of the Navy with ensuring the highest level of training appropriate to the responsibilities placed upon both the Marine Corps and the Navy. That is what strategy provides to us—a framework within which to train. For example, U.S. naval forces recently conducted a major training exercise, “Ocean Safari 85,” with our NATO allies and the U.S. Coast Guard and Air Force. The “Safari” assembled off the East Coast of the United States and fought its way across the Atlantic, moved north of England and east of Iceland, and ended up in the Norwegian Sea. Approximately 155 ships and 280 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operated for four weeks in this environment, against 19 real Soviet ships and submarines and 96 Soviet aircraft sorties.

That is very effective training, and it is being carried out as part of a coherent training operational plan—linked to the way that the theater commanders intend to fight a war. One will search in vain, however, for a Navy cookbook that tells those on-scene commanders when to move aircraft carriers, or how or where to move attack submarines or Aegis cruisers at any given point after a conflict commences. There should never be any such cookbook and certainly it should never come from Washington. Those who criticize our strategy for being the wrong cookbook or for not having a cookbook do not understand strategy.

Other critics argue that our Navy should be less global, less forward-deployed, or less superior, with the resources saved to be poured into a stronger continental defense. To be less global means to abandon some area of our vital interests. To believe that in the case of the Northern Flank of NATO, for example, a “passive” defense line thrown across the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap will somehow protect our sea-lanes or defer an engagement with Soviet forces demonstrates a lack of understanding of the fundamental mechanics of war at sea and the workings of NATO and the Soviets’ own operational requirements. No coalition of free nations can survive a strategy
which begins by sacrificing its more exposed allies to a dubious military expediency. To suggest that naval support of Norway or Turkey is too dangerous because it must be done close to the Soviet Union is defeatist. To suggest that such a strategy is provocative of the Soviets just indicates the lengths to which some critics will go, in order to portray Soviet intentions as solely defensive.

As for strengthening our continental defenses, we and our allies are also doing just that. To discard maritime superiority in an attempt to match the larger Soviet ground forces, however, would give us neither conventional deterrence on land nor secure access by sea unless the Western democracies are prepared to militarize their societies to an unprecedented, and unwise, degree.

Are we buying the ‘right’ Navy for the strategy?

Because research and development projects span decades, and ships take many years to build, the makeup of our fleet can not change radically with each administration. Instead, the fleet evolves over time with policy and technology. The fleet today reflects the wisdom of the deck plates, the labs, and lessons learned from our exercises. The size and design of our ships and weapons reflect the inputs of sailors in contact with Soviet “Victor” submarines, Kiev-class carriers, and “Bear” aircraft. The wisdom of common sense and the highest available technology are tremendous advantages, brought to the design of today’s Navy and Marine Corps.

Of course, there are many kinds of ships not in the fleet today that could do very well. The British Invincible-class vertical or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) carriers are quite capable antisubmarine warfare ships. It would be nice to have some of them in the U.S. Navy. There are many attractive European frigate designs, and we could make good use of them. There are also diesel submarines in our European alliance navies that fulfill very effective roles.

If the taxpayers of our allies around the world were not buying these vessels, the burden would fall upon us. But happily, they are carrying a considerable share of the cost of naval defense and American taxpayers do not have to fund a Navy greater than about 600 ships.

Perhaps the most debated issue on newspapers’ front pages and television talk shows is whether our aircraft carriers should be large or small. There is no absolute answer to this question, but in my view, the evidence still seems overwhelmingly in favor of the Nimitz (CVN-68)–class carrier of 90,000 tons as the optimum size and design for putting air capability at sea.

Could we gainfully employ more mid-size carriers like our 64,000-ton Midway (CV-41) and Coral Sea (CV-43)? Yes, indeed. They would be very useful. The Navy would like to
have five more of them if we could afford to buy them. At least, we will keep these two smaller carriers steaming in the force for a long time to come.

Similarly, with our nuclear attack submarines, we could buy more of them if we compromised on their capabilities. But our tremendous edge in technology is a permanent potential built into the nature of our culture and our economic system compared with the Soviets. We must build to this advantage, and not trade it away for cheaper, smaller, less capable ships built in greater numbers, which is the forte of a totalitarian, centralized, Gosplan economy.

It would be a great mistake for us to adopt a defense strategy at sea—any more than on land—that attempts to match totalitarian regimes in sheer numbers of cheap reproducible items. Time and again, the high-tech solution has proved to be the wisest investment, and by far the most advantageous one for the United States and its allies. This is true of our missiles, our aircraft, and our ships. We have the world’s finest fighting equipment.

So we are getting the “right” Navy. Although there are plenty of other kinds of ships we would like to have, and we could certainly use the larger Navy long advocated by the Joint Chiefs, we have stayed consistently with the 600-ship fleet because we are prepared to bet that our allies will continue to maintain modern, effective navies and air forces. We are prepared to accept the risk that our nation will make the right decisions to prevent losses of forces early in a conflict, and we think that that is a prudent risk to run in order to have an affordable Navy.

Can we afford the Navy this nation needs?

Numerous studies and surveys, among them a tome by the Congressional Budget Office, suggest that we cannot afford to sustain, or properly man, a 600-ship Navy. Just the reverse is true. Consider the facts. We have now, under construction and fully funded, all of the ships necessary to attain a 600-ship Navy centered on 15 carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups, and 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Our long-term plans in a “zero growth” budget for fiscal year 1986 now reflect reductions in our shipbuilding and aircraft procurement programs. These reductions will be to levels we call the sustaining rate for the 600-ship Navy, an average 20 ships a year in new construction. The actual number will be higher or lower in a given year, depending on the block obsolescence of various types of ships.

The 20-ship average is a sound basis for planning, in part because of improved maintenance and the corresponding increase in longevity. Instead of the average 26 years of life that we realized from our ships in the 1960s and the 1970s, we are now getting 30
years’ service from our ships, because of better maintenance, the absence of a big back-
log of overhauls, and the higher technology that we are putting into our ships.

This “good news” should not blind us to the requirements of the future. A steady 20-
new-ships-a-year average will require 3% budget growth. A future of zero-growth bud-
gets would mean that we will be unable to sustain a 600-ship Navy—or for that matter,
a capable defense. We know from painful experience in the 1970s that the damage done
by no-growth funding is far greater than the mere percentage budget loss would indi-
cate. With zero- or negative-growth budgets, the industrial infrastructure vital to fleet
construction and support shrinks dramatically. The result is a loss in competitive bid-
ing and a return to sole-sourced monopolies. Rates of production must then be cut,
individual unit costs increase dramatically, productivity falls, and, in the final account-
ing, the American taxpayer gets much less “bang for the buck.” Even worse is the
decline in the quality and morale of the people who man the fleet, as we saw in the late
1970s.

Is 3% real growth beyond our means? Throughout the past two decades, many com-
mentators favoring a reduced defense effort have repeatedly predicted that the Ameri-
can people will not support sustained defense growth. That refrain is now put forward
by some, including the Congressional Budget Office, as a fact of life. While it may
express their hopes, it is not supported by history. That view takes as its norm the flat
or even declining figures of the immediate post–Vietnam War period. In fact, except
for those years, post–World War II naval budgets maintained growth commensurate
with our national economy. The middle and late Seventies, by contrast, are now being
seen as an anomaly in U.S. history. It is not apparent, the Congressional Budget Office
notwithstanding, that the American people wish to “restore” that aberrant pattern of
declining numbers of ships, morale, and readiness.

In procurement, we should not assume that Congress will refuse to make the necessary
legislative changes in the way we in the Department of the Navy are permitted to con-
duct our business. Indeed, I suggest that, in the current aura of public concern over
budget deficits and government spending, there would be few more cost-effective and
money-saving moves that Congress could undertake than the removal of excessive reg-
ulations and red tape that characterize the environment in which the Navy operates
today. For example, there repose in the Library of Congress today no less than 1,152
linear feet of statutory and regulatory law governing procurement alone! That is the
real Washington Monument!

Along with over-regulation, we are faced with excessive, layered bureaucracies, and the
accretion of authority without concomitant responsibility into a confusing labyrinth of
congressional oversight committees and federal agencies without end, creating tremendous inefficiencies.

The Congressional Budget Office staffers and others who look at the Navy’s future costs assume that just because this bloated, inefficient congressional-executive system has been in place it will remain in place. I do not accept that. Moreover, we have shown in the Navy a historic reversal of the trend of inevitable cost increases.

Today, for example, the last contract that we signed for a follow-on Aegis cruiser was $900 million. Four years ago, these cruisers cost more than $1.2 billion each, and were projected to reach $1.6 billion by the end of 1985. It did not happen, though, because we brought competition into the program. Both producing yards brought in new efficiencies and instituted strict cost discipline, while we in the Navy applied a new asceticism to our gold-plating lustrs. All of our shipbuilding programs show the same pattern. We have gone from only 24% competition in 1981 to 90% competition in 1985, producing an average of $1 billion in cost underruns for each of the last four years.

Contrary to what the nay-sayers predicted, the costs of Navy aircraft have been going down, not up. This is a sea change, a break with 30 years of uninterrupted cost escalation in naval aircraft procurement. During 1976–1981, growth in aircraft unit prices averaged about 10% in constant fiscal year 1980 dollars. In 1981, we implemented vigorous cost management programs which emphasized competition, no design changes, and firm fixed-price contracts. These efforts have paid off in reduced aircraft prices every year since 1982.

For example, we reached agreement with McDonnell Douglas on a fiscal year 1985 flyaway price of $18.7 million for the F/A-18 strike fighter. In terms of fiscal year 1982 dollars, this is a price 32% below that paid in 1982. Purchases in 1985 represent a savings to the taxpayer of $126 million for that year alone.

So, there is nothing inevitable about escalating costs and overruns in defense procurement. During the last four years we proved that it can be just as consistent to have underruns. And so if we just make prudent assumptions, not even optimistic assumptions, there is no question that we can maintain the size and the current mix of our force through the rest of this century with a 3% growth budget.

Just as significant, we can also maintain the tremendous turn-around in readiness that we have achieved with President Ronald Reagan’s 7% growth budgets. During the past four years, the readiness of our ships and aircraft has increased nearly 40%. Even these statistics do not do justice to the palpable difference in the fleet itself, in morale, in readiness, and in safety—i.e., uncrashed airplanes and unbroken equipment and reduction of tragic accidents.
We know what we have accomplished during the past five years. Furthermore, we know we can maintain this record of success with the size budgets that are currently envisioned by the President.

The German military philosopher Clausewitz once observed that in the balance of power among nations, battle is to deterrence as cash is to credit in the world of commerce. One may live entirely by paper transactions only when there is no doubt about one’s ability to settle accounts with hard currency when challenged.

Similarly, there must be no doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders that the United States and its allies can and will settle accounts, on both land and sea, if challenged. The 600-ship Navy is an essential element in this credibility. We can, and must, afford the naval power that will sustain the defense of this country’s allies and interests around the world.
Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy

On 1 July 1986, Admiral Carlisle Trost succeeded Admiral James Watkins to become the twenty-third Chief of Naval Operations; he would serve in that position until 29 June 1990 and the end of the Cold War. This short, unclassified article was published in the January 1987 issue of the Naval Institute USNI Proceedings,* exactly a year after the unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy had been published, and when Trost had been in office for just six months.

The article was an important public statement about the Maritime Strategy. The article affirmed Trost’s backing of his predecessor’s earlier statement by briefly restating the Maritime Strategy’s fundamental ideas on deterrence, forward defense, and alliance solidarity, as well as its global view and adherence to the fundamental flexibility of the national military strategy. However, it went farther than the earlier statements in discussing the role of antisubmarine warfare.

The first article had its origins in Admiral Trost’s preparations for his 1987 testimony to Congress in support of the Navy’s programs and budget.† At that point, following the high expenditure in the first years of the Reagan administration, Congress was in a mood to cut the defense budget. Through his private discussions with members of Congress and senior staff members, Trost realized that there was a perception that the Maritime Strategy was confined to dealing with the existing threat posed by the Soviet navy’s increasingly capable naval forces. To counter that misperception, Trost explained,

I planned to focus my [congressional] testimony on the broader applications of naval power in support of U.S. national interests. My staff suggested that it would be useful to reiterate the broad sense of the Maritime Strategy to a wider audience by means of a USNI [Proceedings] article.

Obviously, my end goal was to sustain the naval capability which we had and were continuing to build.*

Admiral Trost had had a long association with the development of the Maritime Strategy. As a vice admiral in 1982 and 1983, he had been Director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090), and had personally engaged in and contributed to the development of the first and second iterations of the Maritime Strategy (see documents 1 and 2). In preparing this article, Admiral Trost provided an outline and verbal instructions to Captain Anthony Maness, who was the executive director of the CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K) from September 1986 to July 1988. This article was drafted by officers assigned to the CNO Executive Panel staff, who were simultaneously preparing Trost’s annual posture statements and policy and strategy papers, among their other duties.†

Significantly, this article gave priority to antisubmarine warfare. No other version of the Maritime Strategy, before or after, gave priority to any one warfare task, although carrier strike and amphibious assault were always identified as the culminating tasks. Trost’s highlighting of antisubmarine warfare was significant, given his own submarine service background and the effects of the discovery and breakup of the espionage ring run by Chief Warrant Officer John A. Walker, Jr., and Jerry Whitworth in May 1985. Their espionage had passed vast amounts of information to the Soviet Union on American naval communication, submarine, and surface operations. The United States had realized in the mid-1980s that Soviet submarines seemed to be becoming more aggressive against Western sea lanes of communication.§

As expected, this article also brought further public comment and discussion, appearing as it did in the wake of the public discussion that began in late 1985 and early 1986. At this point, the relations between the Navy and the Marine Corps remained very close. On the world scene, China appeared to be a potential ally against the Soviet Union and an economic partner with the United States. At this juncture, Trost’s article was designed to continue the move forward by adding further to the momentum already in progress. ⚫

Much has been said and written over the years about U.S. Maritime Strategy that has touched off exceptionally vigorous discussions. As a side effect, some of those discussions have left the province of professional strategists—naval officers and civilians—to parade with other defense issues in the shooting gallery of defense criticism. Watching this happen, I am reminded of a comment by Mark Twain in his memoir, Life on the

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† Ibid.
Mississippi: “War talk by men who have been in a war is always interesting; whereas moon talk by a poet who has not been in the moon is likely to be dull.”

In the last several years, there has been a lot of moon talk about the Maritime Strategy; much of it confuses our Maritime Strategy with employment of forces, campaign plans, or the local strategy of battle force or theater commanders. Some of it overlooks plain fact and even plainer common sense.

In this article, I would like to share with you my perspective on the subject.

The Global View: The transcendent fact of modern American history is the emergence of the United States as a world power, with worldwide interests and responsibilities that we ignore only at our peril. The wishful view of a “Fortress America,” secure within its insular shores, ignores reality. Vital alliances, trade, communications, the travel of American citizens, and even our generous spirit and idealistic nature compel us to look overseas.

At the same time, our interests are being contested by a confederation of powers whose highest priority is to replace all free and democratic societies with totalitarian states. The threat to the security of the Free World is global, capable, and growing daily. Much of it is directed from a center of power in the Soviet Union. Some of it is directed to the same general end by fanatics in other countries.

The Soviet Union, a land power, enormous, sprawling, self-contained, operates on interior lines of communications which require virtually no intercourse with other countries. It doesn’t need a large navy to be secure within its borders, but it has one anyway, a fine navy, larger than our own. Although we have always enjoyed a qualitative advantage over the Soviets, in the talents of our people, their training, their winning tradition, and in the superiority of our technology, that advantage is shrinking. The Soviets are getting better fast. They have operated in proximity to our Navy for many years, have watched and learned, and they have improved. And what they haven’t been able to earn for themselves, they have tried—successfully in the case of Walker-Whitworth and others—to steal.

That navy is out on the oceans every day. It does its level best to influence the decisions of any government with maritime interests. It poses a direct threat that it can back up its demands with airplanes overhead, troops on the beaches, or missiles inbound. It doesn’t care about the human element or about the niceties of civilized behavior. It didn’t stop to pick up the boat people of Southeast Asia; it steamed right by them. It doesn’t respect territorial boundaries, a fact to which millions of Swedes can attest, after repeated sightings of Soviet submarines in Swedish home waters.
On the landmasses, the threat is just as significant. In Europe and Asia, the Soviets and their surrogates have stationed the largest armies and air forces in the world. The people are good, the equipment is even better, and you see it everywhere you look, for hundreds of miles. They train every day, and they practice not defensive maneuvers, but attack, the all-out assault.

Elsewhere in the world, in many cases inspired by the Soviets and in most cases equipped by them, are governments of fanatics whose national policy is to destroy what they consider “The Establishment”—the U.S. and our allies. There have always been governments like this (the entrance of Libyan bandits onto the world stage appears to be a cyclical phenomenon), but the difference today is that they have access to technology nearly as good as our own, and they are less inhibited about using it than the people who supply it to them. Like the Soviets, the fanatics move in wherever they perceive a weakness. They use terrorism as an instrument; they use it coldly and deliberately. In many ways these governments are an even more visible threat to us than the Soviets who manipulate and succor them.

Every naval officer understands the reality of the global situation—the reality of a world where the vital interests of the United States extend into every region, the reality of a world where even the smallest and most innocent presence of things American is at considerable risk. The challenge is to get everyone to understand.

In our modern life we are confronted with a spectrum of violence that ranges from the real to the potential, from isolated terrorist bombings and kidnappings, to communist insurrections in friendly countries like the Philippines, to the threat of all-out assaults in Europe or Asia. As Senator Patrick Moynihan said in his book about the United Nations, the world is truly “a dangerous place.”

**National Defense Strategy:** Given the situation, our country needs and has a national strategy—a number of directives signed by the President and a body of thought that supports them—whose purpose is to help guide policymakers, civilian and military, in carrying out the responsibilities of the United States in the world today. Our national strategy has consistently rested on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and allied solidarity. Obviously, our number one responsibility is to deter war. That has been the centerpiece of American policy for more than 40 years. We have been successful in deterring general war because we have been strong. By the same token, we have been more or less successful in deterring limited conflicts depending on how strong and resolute we were perceived to be in the region at the time.

While we deter war, our strategy is to control crises as they come up, and to support our allies. Both objectives require us to maintain a forward presence. For this reason, we do things such as stationing garrison forces in Europe and Korea and deploying naval forces in international waters, where they can be available at a moment’s notice.
In addition, we in the military are charged with considering, on a daily basis, how we would go to war if deterrence were to fail. This is not a case of gazing into the future but one of considering our own interests and those of our allies, the importance of alliance solidarity, the geopolitical situation, the capabilities of the threat, and our resources-in-being to deal with that threat. Among those resources we include our economy, our industrial base, the advantages of our own geography, the utility of any forward positions from which we are operating, and our national resolve. That is strategy: a way of looking at the world situation. It is not a “game plan” with the first 20 plays already charted.

Sea Power in the National Defense: In this world situation, there is a particular need for American sea power. We are not a fortress, but an island nation, dependent upon other countries for vital raw materials. The sea lines of communications are our life’s blood. Water is all continuous. The oceans of the world give us the opportunity to protect our interests through forward-deployed ships—but by the same token, these ships provide the only barriers to threats from overseas. Twice in this century an enemy’s sea power has brought war home to our shores. In 1915, the sinking of the liner Lusitania shook this country out of its reverie. In 1942, Americans could look out to seaward from the Boardwalk in Atlantic City and see the fires of ships burning from German submarine attacks.

To avoid such a debacle in the future, we need to maintain a ready, capable Navy, which can bring to bear against any problem—or against several problems at once—sufficient force to carry out our national strategy of deterrence, crisis control, and support of our allies. We have such a Navy today. It is the finest, readiest instrument that I have seen in my more than 37 years of service. It does the job wherever and whenever the assignment takes it, and then if necessary it steams away to do another job somewhere else. Operating in international waters, it enjoys the unique advantage of being able to signal menace without violating sovereignty, and once the need is past, of being able to sail over the horizon without signalling retreat. For this reason, the Navy has been the force of choice in the overwhelming majority of the 200-plus crises our country has faced since World War II.

But the Navy has not always been so capable. Just a few years ago, our worldwide commitments were more than the Navy could meet. The ships were operated until they fell apart, and they couldn’t be repaired because there weren’t enough spare parts and there wasn’t enough money for overhauls. Even more important than the ships was the personnel situation. Sooner or later a feed pump can be replaced, but the human being to operate it is a perishable commodity. He must be educated in the civilian sector, recruited into the Navy, trained, challenged to excel, coordinated with others, given a
chance to be with his family in between six-month deployments, and then, when his period of enlistment is over, retained as a professional. If he leaves the Navy, years of investment go with him, and his replacement is not someone one can hire off the street. Just five or six years ago, people were leaving the Navy by the thousands, and we had ships that weren’t safe to operate simply because they didn’t have enough trained sailors on board. Our capabilities were contracting. At the same time, the Soviets were carrying out a long-prepared program of expansion.

Now we have turned that situation around, and the difference is well understood beyond our own shores. Credit goes to everyone concerned: to our people on the deck plates, whose performance has stirred so much admiration; to those in support, from whom many resources have been diverted to meet the requirements of the fleet; to the planners, who have gotten the most out of every dollar appropriated; and finally, to the Congress, entrusted with their constitutional responsibility for raising and maintaining a capable Navy.

The Development of the Maritime Strategy: The rebirth of American sea power and the origins of an American Maritime Strategy have been mutually supportive events. It is hard to distinguish between the two, and it is dangerous to think that one exists without the other. As we were developing a ready, capable Navy, structured to meet the threat with all its variety, taking into account such things as overseas commitments, personnel and operational (out of homeport) requirements, called PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO, and the level of risk of having a reduced force structure with limited retention of trained/skilled personnel—as we were creating an appropriate capability, we continued to ask ourselves how this revitalized instrument met the national security objectives.

This was not a new question, and when it was asked in the late 1970s, we weren’t asking it for the first time. Over the years our Maritime Strategy has been very much like the British Constitution—unwritten but thoroughly understood by those who must practice it. Even in the years when we had a so-called written strategy, for example, the Rainbow plans just before World War II, the strategy was fluid and had to be adapted to events. Had there not been a Douglas MacArthur in addition to a Chester Nimitz, there wouldn’t have been a twin-track offensive in the Pacific. And had we not had the ships and airplanes to support the offensive, we would have had to come up with a new set of plans. In those days the strategy recognized what we were capable of doing—both the Navy and the industrial base behind it—and where we needed to go. Strategies always do this. In the late 1970s, as we began to evolve the present Maritime Strategy, capabilities and requirements went hand in hand.
As we developed the 600-ship Navy, a general-purpose force sized to meet both a specific and a general threat, we were reviewing the mission of the Navy in support of our national security objectives. Out of this review came the Maritime Strategy. It was not—and is not—a force-builder, and it was certainly not the origin of the 600-ship Navy. Most of the Maritime Strategy is simple common sense. It is not great literature (although the stacks of criticism about it would do justice to Shakespeare), but it does make good reading if one wants to understand our country’s worldwide commitments and the Navy’s vital contribution to their defense.

The Maritime Strategy represents a consensus of professional opinion and carries the acceptance of both the U.S. Government and the governments of our allies. It represents a consensus because, for the most part, naval officers, experienced and knowledgeable in their profession, wrote and revised it. It has been accepted by the President and the Secretary of Defense and by our allies, whose local security interests depend on integrated, common defense plans with the United States. The Maritime Strategy is an intellectual counterpart to those plans, but is not subordinate to them.

The Essence of the Maritime Strategy: Although it is a brief concept, the Maritime Strategy contains several elements that should be looked at as unexceptionally American.

First, it deals with the forces we have at our disposal today. It is not a “wish list.” Americans play the hand they’ve been dealt. In the Navy, carrying out one’s assignment to the best of one’s ability with the resources at hand is an almost sacred tradition. As we built a more capable Navy, we built the strategy to address it. Subsequent revisions always take into account what forces are available.

Second, it is a forward strategy, forward in the sense of meeting our treaty obligations and other commitments by operating away from our own shores. This is typically American as well, as the history of the 20th century shows us. It reflects an American attitude that the best way to solve a problem is to go right to the heart of it. “The best defense is a good offense,” we say; or as General Nathan Bedford Forrest put it in the Civil War, “I always make it a rule to get there first with the most…. We operate forward because this is where the action is, where our allies are, and where they need us. To this end, we are fortunate because our people and technology give us every confidence that we can operate and win in the forward areas. This was clearly demonstrated during the recent air attack on Libya, in which one of the world’s best air defense systems, alerted both by a high level of diplomatic tension and by rumors of impending attack, was unable to achieve a single hit upon our aircraft from the more than 100 high-quality missiles fired. Aegis anti-air warfare cruisers, the F-14/E-2C combination, and our outstanding submarines, along with many other factors, give us confidence that our forward strategy would be highly effective in the event of hostilities. During
peacetime operations, and in dealing with conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum, of course, a forward presence is equally advantageous.

Third, the strategy is operative worldwide. In any conflict, Europe would be the vital arena: our culture tells us that. But even then we would have responsibilities in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the South Atlantic—anywhere that naval forces can operate in support of our national interests. As Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has pointed out, trans-Pacific communications are currently the most active in the world, and this region is a rival to the Atlantic for our attentions.

Finally, the strategy is flexible, as strategies always must be to be effective. It is not a game plan. Many people who have assailed various aspects of it have confused strategy with employment of forces. The Maritime Strategy discusses a framework of forward operations; anyone who wishes to dispute the correctness of such a framework, assuming that he wishes to challenge a basic tenet of our national outlook, can certainly do so. But to talk about numbers of carrier battle groups or submarines in the context of a particular scenario is misleading. The basis for deterrence is the creation of doubt in the enemy’s mind as to what we would be capable of achieving if he breaks the peace. We have undoubtedly been successful at this. If deterrence fails, what our actions would be at that time is a matter for the commanders involved to determine at that time. Wars are not fought by automatic, preprogrammed responses under the direction of a video game computer. Right now, we can’t say what our exact response would be to a Soviet attack. It would depend on where, when, and how big it was, and who was involved. Even if we knew, we wouldn’t tell. The same message should be understood by any evilly disposed country. Let them worry about what we are capable of doing, and let us not give them any easy assurances ahead of time. The Maritime Strategy reserves the employment of forces to the absolutely indispensable element of the evaluative process.

Antisubmarine Warfare—Mining the Mother Lode: The Maritime Strategy is a part of our overall national strategy to exactly the same extent that sea power is a part of national security. The doctrine of the strategy is a product of the equation that contains our nation’s worldwide interests and responsibilities, the worldwide threat, and the resources at our disposal to meet that threat.

In the same way, the Navy’s missions support national strategy by employing sea power. One mission area of vital importance, in which the challenge of the future is particularly pressing, is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). If we are going to enjoy the advantages of sea power in the 21st century, we must maintain our lead in this area.

The threat is particularly formidable—more than 350 Soviet submarines. When we consider what the Germans were able to achieve in two world wars and what we were
able to achieve in the four years of the Pacific campaign; and when we consider that in each case the number of submarines available at the start of the conflict was from one-fifth to one-tenth the size of today’s Soviet submarine force, we have to respect the potential of the Soviet Navy to disrupt the sea lines of communications linking us to our allies.

Until now, our antisubmarine capabilities have maintained a comfortable lead over Soviet submarine capabilities because of superior individual quality: again, people and technology. Passive acoustic detection has been the “mother lode” of ASW ever since the advent of the nuclear submarine. Today, our sensors are able to detect and track Soviet submarines at ranges much beyond those at which they themselves can be detected; we have much better sea-legs and endurance than the Soviet submarine force; and we think our weapons are the best in the world. But the advantages are decreasing. Soviet submarines are getting quieter and harder to detect. At some point in the future, it can be postulated that they will become as quiet as the ambient sea, and then we will have to turn to other methods of detection. In the meanwhile, we must continue to mine the mother lode wherever that takes us. We must not relax our present strong commitment to the ASW challenge, and we must continue to make good decisions about the kind of ASW forces we want in the future. This will be one of my principal priorities as Chief of Naval Operations, part of my overall goal of retaining the great Navy that we enjoy today.

In the same way, the Maritime Strategy, a good concept already, will become better as we continue to develop our capabilities. The debate over what those capabilities should be is a healthy one, and I welcome it. But those who would use this one concept to prove some separate hypothesis—perhaps a political hypothesis—about the state of America’s defenses, need to look beyond the strategy to the reality of the dangerous world in which we live.
The Maritime Strategy

The original plans to revise the Maritime Strategy on an annual basis did not come to fruition, and several years elapsed after the publication of the 1985 version before a new version appeared. Revisions had been considered in the fall of 1986 and again in the fall of 1987, but in neither instance had come to fruition. By early 1988, the last version of the strategy no longer fully reflected the emerging circumstances with regard to the Soviet navy. In addition, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had left office in April of 1987 and had been succeeded briefly by James Webb, who in February 1988 resigned in protest that the administration would no longer support the six-hundred-ship goal. With further budget declines in the offing, the Navy needed to have a revised strategy that more closely fit the political realities at home and the changing circumstances in the world.

Two versions of the Maritime Strategy appeared in close succession, one in December 1988* and another in February 1989†. Both versions were signed by Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, as Chief of Naval Operations. The two versions are very close in content, but contain some significant changes in wording and small additions. In the following text, the 1989 version has been used as the basic text with annotations that point out the differences from the 1988 version.

In distributing the new document superseding the 1985 strategy, Admiral Trost used his prefatory letter to explain the main differences between the new version and the 1985 version.

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* The Maritime Strategy, revision IV, OPNAV 60 P-1-88, distributed by CNO letter serial 00/8US00502, dated 20 December 1988. This publication was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 7 February 2007.

† The Maritime Strategy, revision IV, OPNAV 60 P-1-89, distributed by CNO letter serial 00/9SS00091, dated 23 February 1989. This publication was approved for declassification by N3/N5 on 7 February 2007.
The Maritime Strategy, as a component of our national military strategy, supports national goals in peace, crisis, and war. In this revision greater emphasis is placed on the Pacific region and low intensity conflict,[*] without[†] subtracting from the validity of the Maritime Strategy as it applies to other regions. Within the Maritime Strategy the basic concepts of forward posture and movement, seizing the initiative and directly pressuring the enemy remain valid. The present updated version has been refined to address more directly:

a. Soviet intentions and capabilities, as well as,

b. The current security environment and major trends which will shape our Navy in the future.‡

In the following paragraph, Trost’s letter stated: “The Maritime Strategy serves as the basis for tactical development and provides the intellectual underpinning for the development of Fleet warfighting plans as well as representing our contribution to joint and allied cooperative planning efforts. Additionally, it is the basis for the development of the Navy POM and testimony on Navy programs and budget.”§ The letter concluded: “Strategy cannot be written in a vacuum, nor can it remain dormant without risk to those who must, of necessity, be its implementors. Your comments and discussion are invited. They should be submitted to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) (Op-06).”**

In the late spring of 1988, the action officer in the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), Commander Richard “Mitch” Brown had completed a new draft and sent it up the chain of command for final approval and release by Admiral Trost. In the routing, Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, reviewed the document and made a number of changes to it before forwarding it to the Chief of Naval Operations on 2 or 3 June 1988. The CNO’s executive assistant, Captain Thomas Paulson, held the document without taking any action on it until Mustin’s replacement, Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson, arrived nearly four months later. At that point, the document was returned to the action officers for its reconsideration. Commander Brown and others in OP-603 removed most of the additions that had been made by Vice Admiral Mustin and added some new items from both the Marine Corps and others. Admiral Trost approved this version and issued it in December 1988.††

The 1988 version only lasted a few days, and its distribution was limited. Upon reviewing it, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, asked Admiral Trost to rescind it and strengthen the sections on contemporary strategic thinking with additional information about revised Marine Corps plans and operations. Acting on this request, Admiral Trost immediately recalled the December 1988 version and requested a newly

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* The 1988 version of the letter used the phrase “low level conflict.”
† The 1988 version had an additional phrase here: “in any way.”
‡ Paragraph 2.
§ Paragraph 3.
** Paragraph 4.
†† Prof. Mitch Brown, e-mail to Peter Swartz, 14 March 2008.
revised version with additional Marine Corps input. In addition, the action officer, Commander Brown, also added some additional themes on the global security environment to the version published on 23 February 1989. These changes were also subsequently reflected in the Navy’s response to the new George H. W. Bush administration’s National Security Review (NSR) 12 of March 1989.*

This final version of the Maritime Strategy made the first mention in any of the Navy’s post–Vietnam War capstone documents of humanitarian assistance operations, drug trafficking threats, and nonstate actions as categories for naval operations. Since that time, all have remained at some level of importance in naval strategic planning.

In addition, the 1988 and 1989 versions of the Maritime Strategy, through both graphics and wording, began to shift emphasis from a mainly Eurocentric focus to a more balanced emphasis on the Pacific as well as the Atlantic theater. While service-directed coupling to national intelligence estimates regarding the Soviet threat kept this version classified, its sections on contemporary strategic thinking, the future global security environment, and defense implications show, on reflection, that it was in reality a transition strategy that showed the need to refocus on post–Cold War issues.†

In the text that follows, the insertions “This section is new” and “End of new section” show the 1989 additions to the 1988 version. ●●

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† Fax message from Mitch Brown to Hattendorf, 25 August 2008.
This is the Maritime Strategy, describing the global contribution of the Navy and the Marine Corps in carrying out U.S. National Security Strategy across the entire spectrum of conflict.* It is a statement of the application of U.S. seapower through a cogent Strategy. It represents the collective judgment of the senior leadership in the Navy and Marine Corps as to how best to employ U.S. naval forces to meet our national objectives in peacetime, crisis, and war. The Maritime Strategy adapts and evolves to accommodate new threats and capabilities.

What is the Maritime Strategy?

- The Maritime Element of a National Security Strategy
  - Based on both U.S. and NATO defense principles:
    - Deterrence
    - Forward Defense
    - Alliance Solidarity
  - A Concept of Employment of Maritime Forces
    - Early, Global Deployment
    - Flexible, Forward Force Posture
    - Initiative on Offense
  - Not a War Plan
  - Framework for Coordinated, Global, Forward Operations
  - Applicable across Full Spectrum of Conflict
  - Exploits Mobility and Flexibility of Maritime Power
  - Global Focus—Applied to all Theaters

The Maritime Strategy is the maritime element of a national security strategy based on deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidarity. It is a concept of employment of maritime forces that can be applied across the full spectrum of conflict. It calls for early global positioning of maritime power both to deter war and to achieve U.S. war aims should deterrence fail. It prescribes aggressive forward operation of naval forces to complicate Soviet planning, best ensure access to Eurasia, help cement alliances, deny the Soviets free access to the open oceans, provide useful offensive options to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and best protect the sea lines of communication.

[1 Paragraph deleted here:]

The Maritime Strategy represents the collective judgment of senior Navy and Marine Corps leaders about how best to employ U.S. naval forces in response to national

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* This introductory passage is substantially expanded over the 1988 version.
guidance, alliance commitments, and joint strategic direction during peace, crisis, and war. The Maritime Strategy adapts and evolves to accommodate new threats and capabilities.

[END OF DELETED PARAGRAPH]

The Maritime Strategy is drawn from both U.S. and alliance strategies. It is a useful counterpoint to Soviet strategy. In particular, it attacks the Soviets’ preferred one-front war strategy, while at the same time remaining flexible enough to deal with Soviet capabilities should they change their own strategy. It is accepted as valid within the NATO alliance itself. The strategy is executable now, in the professional judgment of the theater CINC.

It emphasizes the global capabilities inherent in a strong maritime posture, and in particular, provides the perspective to consider other theaters beyond just the Central Region in Europe.

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**MARITIME STRATEGY**

- **GLOBAL VIEW OF FLEET OPERATIONS**
- **INTEGRATED CONCEPT FOR GLOBAL WAR**
- **CONTEXT FOR WARFARE APPRAISALS/BASIS FOR REQUIREMENTS**
- **FOUNDATION FOR NAVAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT**

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The Maritime Strategy has several purposes. Primarily it provides a global view of fleet operations, for deterrence and crisis control. Should deterrence fail, it shows how fleet operations can be integrated for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. It also provides a context for the day-to-day U.S. fleet operations: routine fleet operations.
deployments, exercises, war games and frequent requirements from the NCA for rapid response in times of international crises. The strategy also acts as a framework for operational requirements which shape the Navy and Marine Corps inputs to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). These in turn drive the priorities of our research and development programs and govern decisions regarding future force structure. As such, the Maritime Strategy is a dynamic concept which both influences and reacts to fleet operations and budgetary issues.

The Maritime Strategy supports our national security goals. It is the nation’s and the Navy’s global architecture for naval force employment.

Principal sources of U.S. national military strategy are National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which are Presidential decisions on national security policy, and our alliances, treaties and agreements.

Several other sources are also illustrated here. The Defense Guidance (DG) is the Secretary of Defense’s biennial direction on strategy and programs. Through the Joint Strategic Planning System, the JCS recommend strategy to the NCA and provide planning guidance to the Unified and Specified Commanders. The concepts of operations and operational plans of the CINCs reflect this strategic guidance.

Coalition defense, represented by alliances and treaties, is an essential part of our strategic thinking. U.S. Maritime Strategy is consistent with the December 1988 Revision to NATO’s Tri-MNC of Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) which was
approved by all 16 NATO member nations. Close relationships and cooperation with allies in every theater are increasingly important to maintaining our overall military capability in this era of constrained defense resources.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

ALLIANCES, TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

The Strategy flows from alliances, treaties and other formal agreements with countries around the world. These alliances and treaties together form a global coalition defense, one of the essential elements of our national military strategy. It is fundamental that by defending our allies, we defend ourselves.

We have seven formal defense treaties with forty-three separate nations, and we have common military interests with a number of other countries. These result in a set of shared global partnerships and interests among the United States and most other countries throughout the free world.

[THIS SECTION IS NEW]

Forward presence of naval forces visibly demonstrates U.S. commitment to honor its alliances and partnership agreements. Conducted on a regular basis, our routine port visits and multinational exercises are integral to this coalition structure.

[END OF NEW SECTION]
Our national strategy is based on joint and combined operations. To succeed against the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact in the event of war, it is essential that U.S. air, land and naval forces operate jointly and in conjunction with our allies. The Maritime Strategy explicitly recognizes this imperative.

In peacetime, the Department of the Navy has strengthened its partnership with the Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the area of joint operations through interservice cooperative initiatives.

To improve interoperability in peacetime, the Department of the Navy pursues multiservice procurement programs in the areas of weapons systems and command and control.

Through foreign military sales and such programs as NATO armaments cooperation, we increase commonality and cooperation with our allies. Similarly, we have greatly increased participation in joint and combined exercises to develop the tactics necessary to operate with our sister services and allies.

[THIS SECTION IS NEW]

The payoff has been evident in recent successful joint operations throughout the world, where naval forces routinely operate in combined, joint task forces, such as in the Persian Gulf today.

The ability of naval forces to operate successfully in a joint and/or combined environment will significantly determine the outcome of future U.S. military involvement in regional conflicts, as well as global war.

[END OF NEW SECTION]
National and NATO commanders are responsible for military operations in support of national and alliance defense objectives in peace and war. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] The strategy provides a conceptual framework for the warfighting CINCs to employ naval forces and execute operations on a global scale, commensurate with NCA direction. [END OF NEW SECTION]

[THIS SECTION (INCLUDING BULLETED LIST) IS NEW]

THREATS TO U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS

- TRADITIONAL CONCERNS—THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
- EMERGING CHALLENGES—LOW AND MID-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Strategy must address the perception of the threats to our security interests. Based on our assessment of the probable future international security environment, there are two distinct categories of threats that must be considered.

“Glasnost”, “perestroika”, and “reasonable sufficiency” notwithstanding, war with the Soviet Union remains the worst-case scenario for which we must plan. Our Strategy and warfighting capabilities will continue to be gauged against the requirements of this unlikely, but possible, occurrence.

At the same time, we must recognize that more probable challenges will face us at lower levels of conflict. Regional conflicts, as well as non-state actions, such as international
terrorism and drug trafficking, will likely require U.S. military response. Capabilities to
deter and defend against a wide range of diverse challenges must be considered in
establishing priorities for the 1990's.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

PEACETIME SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE

The Soviet Union poses the greatest challenge to the security of the United States. Traditionally a strong land power, over the past 20 years the Soviets have built a balanced “blue water” naval force, capable of accomplishing a broad range of wartime and peacetime tasks. Today the Soviet Union possesses the largest navy in the world. And it continues to grow and modernize at a rate that surpasses all reasonable defensive requirements.

As shown above, the Soviet Navy is organized into four fleets which provide wartime defense-in-depth for the sea approaches to the USSR. In peacetime, the Soviet Navy maintains a continuous out-of-area presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic (off West Africa) and the South China Sea. They also deploy to the Caribbean once or twice a year. Their peacetime operational posture and the patrol areas of Soviet missile-firing submarines off the U.S. coasts are notionally represented above.

Soviet out-of-area naval operations support friendly regimes, expand their influence in the Third World (especially in areas of Western sensitivity), balance or eliminate Western presence, and expand foreign involvement.
The Soviet peacetime maritime posture recruits surrogates. Soviet forward maritime presence also enhances the perception of Moscow as an expanding power whose interests must be considered globally. Concurrently, Soviet intelligence and warning (I&W) capabilities are strengthened through an expanded network of intelligence gathering, early warning and support facilities.

Soviet naval forces deployed out-of-area could not by themselves influence the outcome of a general war with the West, and they are not a significant factor in overall Soviet general staff planning. They do, however, have a growing capability to complicate U.S. military planning and to impede, disrupt, or delay Western military operations at the outset of war. Moreover, they constitute a day-to-day presence that has to be considered in every aspect of U.S. defense planning.

Soviet naval forces are complemented by the more than 1700 globally deployed ocean-going Soviet merchant ships. This is the most militarily adaptable merchant fleet in the world. These merchant ships have access to virtually all the major world ports and can perform intelligence collection and a variety of other missions against Western security interests.

**SOVIET WARTIME STRATEGY**

The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strategy is the agreed upon, best estimate by the U.S. intelligence community. According to that estimate, the Soviets believe war with the West would be global in scope. Although they
believe there is the potential for a prolonged conventional phase, they state that nuclear escalation is likely, because they believe NATO would escalate.

Accordingly, the premier elements of the Soviet military are strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet Navy’s contribution to this strategic capability is its powerful ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) force. The main wartime task for the Soviet Navy, therefore, is to deploy this strategic offensive force and to protect it with general purpose forces. The Soviets expect NATO to come after these submarines in a conventional phase, just as they plan early conventional attacks on our nuclear capabilities during the opening phase of conflict. Thus we see no evidence of a “use it or lose it” mentality that means escalation automatically if their SSBNs are attrited!

Other initial tasks for general purpose forces include defending the maritime approaches to the USSR from sea and air strikes—which includes attacking NATO’s nuclear forces—support of ground force operations from seaward flanks, and interdiction of the enemy’s sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The Soviet Navy’s strategic offensive task, however, takes precedence over all other missions.

Soviet wartime operating areas include sea control areas ranging out to 1000 kilometers and sea denial areas to 2000 kilometers from the Soviet homeland. Over the next 15 to 20 years, these areas will probably be extended to 3000 kilometers. The sea denial areas already engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and those of several of our allies, as they extend far out into “blue water.” If secured by the Soviets, the net result would sever our vital sea lines of communication and undercut our ability to reinforce/resupply our allies worldwide.

The Soviet Navy has made great quantitative and qualitative strides in all warfare areas: naval construction programs emphasize modern ships with increased endurance and advanced weapons and electronic systems. The most significant improvement has been in undersea warfare, where submarine quieting and sensor improvements have reduced the acoustic advantage previously enjoyed by western navies. Soviet sea control capability will be enhanced by new cruiser, destroyer, and frigate classes expected to join their fleets between now and the year 2000. They are also building a new class of aircraft carrier which will eventually carry catapult-launched, high performance aircraft. Finally, the introduction of more and better Backfire bombers and Fencer fighter-bombers will increase the complexity of the maritime air battle.

U.S. Maritime Strategy must be sufficiently flexible to counter whatever strategy the growing Soviet capabilities enable them to choose. If we focus solely on intentions, however firmly grounded, and ignore enemy capabilities, the history of war tells us that we would be inviting defeat. Thus, while our strategy is designed to counter the Soviet strategy as we understand it, our force structure—which includes units that may
remain in our inventory for 30 years or more—must be able to deal both with perceived Soviet intentions and Soviet capabilities. Moreover, that same force structure has to be capable of dealing with low intensity conflicts, which are not necessarily a lesser included case of the Soviet problem.

**ATTACKING THE SOVIET STRATEGY**

- EXPLOIT THEIR SENSITIVITIES AND VULNERABILITIES
- INTERRUPT TIMELINES/PRECLUDE THEIR SUCCESSES
- ERODE THEIR DEFENSE/ATTITUTE FORCES

**SOVIET STRENGTHS**
- DEFENSE IN DEPTH
- OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL MENTALITY
- MASS
- PLANNING/TRAINING
- COMBINED ARMS

**SENSITIVITIES**
- CORRELATION OF FORCES
- COMBAT STABILITY
- READINESS
- INTERNAL CONTROL
- MULTIPLE AXES OF ENEMY ATTACK

**VULNERABILITIES**
- GEOGRAPHY
- OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
- SUSTAINABILITY
- TECHNOLOGY
- PERSONNEL QUALITY

**U.S. OBJECTIVE: CAUSE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO REEVALUATE/DESIST**

The Maritime Strategy emphasizes our traditional and enduring strengths—sea power, geography, and American leadership in technology.

The Soviets are a formidable foe. Several of their strengths are listed here. They have a large force designed for combined arms operations. Their preferred tactics feature deception, surprise and massive strikes.

But the Soviets are not invulnerable, and they have weaknesses that can be exploited. We define sensitivities as those things about which the Soviets are especially concerned, and vulnerabilities as the weaknesses that we perceive to be particularly troublesome to the Soviets. Our objective is to exploit Soviet sensitivities and vulnerabilities in ways that promote extended deterrence, even in crisis situations.
This chart shows how maritime forces support U.S. interests across the conflict spectrum.

The U.S. Navy routinely deploys about 100 ships in day-to-day operations around the globe, and the Marine Corps approximately one third of its Fleet Marine Forces outside of CONUS. These forces are at a high level of readiness, as demonstrated in recent naval operations off Libya and in the Persian Gulf. The objectives of this peacetime posture are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, support national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essential to meet the requirements of our overall strategy.

The U.S. Navy peacetime posture is key to conventional deterrence. We see about 20 categories of commitments that require naval force on scene worldwide, 24 hours a day. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] Also an essential element of naval peacetime posture is its contribution to worldwide surveillance and intelligence collection. Forward-based naval collection facilities, aircraft, ships and submarines provide critical coverage in support of our national intelligence collection effort. [END OF NEW SECTION]

Our forward presence is a visible demonstration of U.S. political will that encourages allies and friends, deters and reduces the influence of enemies, influences neutrals, and asserts and reinforces the principles of international law and freedom of the seas.

Low intensity conflict (LIC) is a limited political-military confrontation to achieve political, social, or economic objectives. It usually involves protracted struggles and events ranging from diplomatic and economic pressures through terrorism and
insurgency. Lower level conflict (LLC) includes combat at a level above LIC but short of general war, generally involving regional conflict, normally in the Third World. Neither “low intensity” nor “lower level” translates to either “low tech” or “low violence.”

The general proliferation of high technology weapons world-wide means that the difference between naval forces designed to fight the Soviets and naval forces designed to fight anyone else has narrowed significantly. Moreover, planning to deal with Third World regional and low intensity conflicts underscores one of the most significant geostrategic changes of the past few years—the decrease in American (and Western) access to bases and overflight rights around the world. For example, the U.S. had bases in about 100 countries right after World War II; today we have bases in fewer than 40. And we see more problems on the horizon, with NATO countries and the Philippines raising thorny base negotiation issues. All of this, in turn, will limit the U.S. options to cope with Third World or terrorist threats with military means other than naval forces.

Throughout the conflict spectrum, a bedrock requirement of naval forces is strategic deterrence. As the most survivable element of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, the Navy SSBN force provides that strategic deterrence that forms the backdrop for all other activity in support of our national security interests.

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES

This slide shows the five key areas in which the fleet operates today. Hot spots are highlighted. These same areas are also key in wartime, that is, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps train in peace where they must operate in war. The Soviet Navy, which also
operates in these areas in peacetime, simply cannot sustain long term operations there in war.

Continuing naval presence is maintained in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, the Northeast Atlantic, North Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Those are regions where the U.S. Government has determined it needs forces to protect its interests. Due to political constraints affecting the use of land-based forces, in many areas naval forces are the only forces that can conduct these missions. Roughly one third of the fleet with over 110 thousand sailors and 30 thousand marines are either at sea or forward-based on the average day. Our global commitments and alliance responsibilities result in increased demands for naval forward presence, particularly in developing world areas. The Navy and Marine Corps do not generate these commitments, they execute them.

Another element of the Maritime Strategy in peacetime involves global employment of naval forces in military exercises. Dozens are conducted each year, enabling U.S. naval units to operate with sister services and allied forces to update joint and combined tactics and procedures. This chart depicts only a few of the more important scheduled exercises. These exercises provide the U.S. and its allies the opportunity to evaluate current tactics and doctrine. They strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance interoperability, and improve combat effectiveness. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] In addition, these vigorous demonstrations of the credibility of our naval capability is possibly our greatest deterrent to potential adversaries. [END OF NEW SECTION]
Contingency response is a major role for U.S. naval forces. Due to their flexible force structure and forward posture, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces have been used more frequently in this role than those of any other service. In so many crises in recent years, the first question asked was, “Where are the carriers?” During contingency operations, forward-deployed naval forces fulfill the dual missions of sustaining the U.S. deterrent posture and supporting national policy objectives. They provide flexible military options to the NCA. Naval carrier battle groups and amphibious forces have long served as the primary instruments of national contingency response policy. The unique characteristics of these forces provide leverage to control escalation, often under difficult circumstances. This use affords the NCA unmatched military options to counter any perceived Soviet encroachment aims and similarly, to counter and respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Naval forces are often employed in crisis in conjunction with other U.S. services, and to a lesser extent with allied forces, usually outside the normal alliance framework. The recent setup in the Persian Gulf, in which our NATO allies made major force commitments well beyond the NATO boundaries, is a good example.
This chart shows some of the over 200 crises in which U.S. naval forces have been involved since World War II. The majority of these crises have occurred in the Middle East (including the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf), Western Pacific, and Caribbean/Central American regions. Third World regional and low intensity conflicts are likely to continue. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] The special characteristics of naval forces make them uniquely well-suited to protect U.S. interests in this lower range of the conflict spectrum. [END OF NEW SECTION] Naval contributions to these lower level and low intensity conflicts aim to reduce Soviet influence, discourage terrorism, provide effective counter-strategies to drug trafficking and insurgencies, and promote favorable economic growth conditions in the Third World. Forward, ready and mobile, U.S. naval forces provide a broad range of options for the NCA. These forces, operating without restriction in international waters, are able to demonstrate U.S. and/or alliance commitment and display military power without the political problems of violating territorial sovereignty. The global disposition and characteristics of naval forces in peacetime allow timely response with the right level of force to match whatever requirements our NCA might have.

[THIS SECTION (INCLUDING FIGURES) IS NEW]

Highly versatile, mobile naval forces operating routinely in forward deployment areas can adopt a wide range of military profiles in support of diplomatic initiatives. The
broad spectrum of discriminate force employment options they offer are uniquely suited to match NCA requirements across the lower levels of conflict.

These capabilities extend from providing military presence, forward surveillance operations and demonstrating a show of military force to the evacuation of noncombatant civilians and the conduct of other humanitarian support operations. When required, naval forces can also establish sea-based quarantine or blockade operations or conduct power projection missions ashore through use of naval gunfire, cruise missiles, air strikes, or expeditionary forces.

Capability improvements in naval weaponry and battle force management enable the NCA to direct naval forces to achieve local air superiority, suppress defenses and conduct either coastal raids or deep penetration air and cruise missile attack missions virtually anywhere in the world in support of vital U.S. interests. A particular strength in using maritime forces for such purposes is the ability to rapidly constitute the required forces in a forward area and maintain the perceived threat of direct military action for an extended period of time. This can be done with minimal impact on friendly host nations for support. Most significantly, maritime forces can be withdrawn unilaterally when that serves national policy objectives, without incurring heavy political costs associated with other primarily land-based force options.
Finally, along the conflict spectrum, the strategy articulates the key roles played by Navy and Marine Corps forces in the event of serious confrontation or global war with the Soviet Union. Although deterrence remains the foremost objective, should deterrence fail, maritime forces must be capable and ready to fight successfully and defeat the enemy. Once hostilities have commenced, deterrence of unintentional nuclear use during a conventional conflict remains a prime objective, while seeking early and favorable war termination.

[END OF NEW SECTION]
Conceptually, in a confrontation or war with the Soviets, one can envision events unfolding in three general phases. Phase I can be considered as a period of rising tensions. Operations during Phase I would be conducted for the primary purpose of deterrence. The objective in Phase I is to control escalation of a crisis and to deter the outbreak of hostilities.

If deterrence fails, we believe the Soviets would initiate hostilities, which would signal entry into Phase II. During this phase U.S. and allied maritime forces would seize the initiative. The objective during Phase II is to establish maritime superiority in key ocean areas through the conduct of naval campaigns.

In Phase III, maritime forces would take the fight to the enemy. The objective of Phase III operations is war termination on favorable terms as soon as possible.

There are no timelines associated with the three notional phases: they simply describe the general direction in which the Navy and Marine Corps senior leadership think we should go. We have no timetable; actual wartime decisions and phasing of operations would be determined by warfighting commanders.

**PHASE I**

**SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE**

Phase I deals with reinforcing deterrence and contains options while simultaneously addressing transition-to-war actions.

A period of rapidly rising tensions would be marked by considerable ambiguity. Although indications and warning (I&W) centers would probably send copious
information on global Soviet force movements, there would be disagreement on how to interpret them. Naval forces are ideal for such uncertain conditions—they can rapidly be sent forward in number without crossing any borders, and they can be withdrawn just as fast and as easily.

In this phase we would expect Soviet naval forces to *sortie into their sea control and sea denial areas*. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South China Sea forces, particularly with submarines. We would detect such movements fairly early, and expect about two weeks warning before the Soviets would be fully ready to conduct initial worldwide attacks.

Soviet aviation strike forces would redeploy to dispersal bases, and the Black and Baltic Sea fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact navies would prepare to support joint operations ashore. The Soviet merchant fleet would chop to naval control to provide intelligence, lift, and other functions as directed. The Soviets, in short, would *posture their forces for global war*.

### PHASE I
**DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR**

**GOALS**
- Maintain Alliance Solidarity
- Cease No Vital Area by Default
- Complicate Soviet Strategic Problem

**PRIORITY ACTIONS**
- Position Forward for Sea Control
- Increase Combat Readiness
- Mobilize Reserve Forces
- Enforce Maritime Defense Zones
- Begin Strategic Sealift/Reinforcement
- Expand Forward Logistics Base
- Maximize Tactical Warning/Countermeasures

**EXERT MAXIMUM POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEVERAGE**

During Phase I, we envision one or more crises, a serious confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or an escalation of low intensity conflict involving U.S. or Soviet forces. Deterrence goals are listed on the left, while actions to transition to war are shown on the right. *This phase might very well be the final phase, effective responses might be able to defuse a crisis or prevent a limited war from spreading.*

Tough decisions will have to be made during Phase I. Even a 600 ship navy is not sufficient to accomplish every required wartime task simultaneously, so we will be forced to conduct key operations sequentially. This means that during Phase I, the U.S. must
decide which of our allies will have the greatest need for early support, and position forces accordingly. Some tradeoffs are inevitable.

Timely political decision-making will be crucial. The NCA must act decisively to ensure no vital areas are ceded by default, probably under very ambiguous warning. Without political speed and decisiveness, all possible military and political incentives cannot be brought to bear to control the crisis. Key actions during Phase I will include:

- Early forward movement of naval and air forces.
- Increased combat readiness, mobilized reserve forces.
- Enforcement of U.S. maritime defense zones.
- Requisition of civilian airlift and sealift assets.
- Early reinforcement by ground forces and land-based tactical air.
- Expansion of advanced logistic support, with activation of host nation support agreements.
- Maximum I & W/countersurveillance/countertargeting.
- Conduct of other deterrent options.

**PHASE I**
**DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR**
**FORWARD MOVEMENT OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES**
Alliance solidarity, enhanced by such actions, is also vital to their effectiveness, and will yield the maximum political and military leverage to forestall U.S./Soviet conflict.

In Phase I there would be a global forward movement of Navy and Marine Corps forces, a complex and demanding operation. Some of our SSNs would challenge Soviet sea control and sea denial zones, thereby placing Soviet naval forces, including SSBNs, at risk. Forward deployed battle groups and surge forces from U.S. ports would form into multi-carrier battle forces. Battleship and surface action groups, amphibious task forces, land-based maritime patrol aircraft and special warfare units would intensify surveillance, increase readiness, and execute other deterrent options in support of the balanced fleet. Maritime defense zones would be activated, with the Coast Guard transferred to the Navy, for coastal defense duties and protection of coastal SLOCs and ports. Forces would be positioned by the CINCs in readiness to execute forward mining and mine-countermeasure plans. While forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase their readiness, air-landed elements of Marine expeditionary brigades would begin moving to join pre-positioned equipment [THIS SECTION IS NEW] aboard Maritime Pre-positioning Ships or stored ashore. [END OF NEW SECTION] Sealift would be assembled to start moving components of all Services to carry out the warfighting CINCs’ reinforcement plans.

The surge in maritime deployments would underpin the full range of our deterrent options. Again, the purpose of this global forward movement would be to strengthen deterrence, but if deterrence should fail, forward naval forces can rapidly shift to a warfighting posture.

PHASE I
DEREENNCE/TRANSITION TO WAR
MOVEMENT OF USA/USAF AND ALLIED FORCES
U.S. Army and Air Force units, as well as allied land, sea and air forces, would also begin moving. U.S. reinforcements and their allied counterparts would move by airlift and sealift to join units already forward deployed, in accordance with U.S. and allied war plans. While the primary focus will be on reinforcement of NATO in Europe, planning to support a surge of ground and air forces underpins the forward defense concept in all theaters, commensurate with the potential threat projections.

As shown, an essential pre-condition for this movement is the recall and requisition of U.S. and allied merchant shipping, which is normally dispersed world-wide in commercial trade. Availability of this shipping pool is an absolute requirement for the reinforcement of forward deployed units—approximately 95 percent of reinforcement material must travel by sealift. The time required to assemble these merchant ships in the proper ports of embarkation also drives the need for timely political decision-making.

On a worldwide basis, ASW tracking would intensify and readiness could be increased. The result of all the reinforcements and forward movement, simultaneously converging at strategic locations and providing mutual combined arms support, would create strong, focused leverage to control crises. However, should these deterrent actions prove insufficient, the resultant movements of U.S. and allied forces during this phase would also lead to full preparedness for coalition defense.

GLOBAL MOVEMENT OF MARITIME FORCES

This chart shows some illustrative times involved in moving forces into position, and highlights the importance, as has been emphasized, of timely political decisions. The
Panama and Suez canals are important factors in Phase I operations, because their use substantially reduces closure times. The ability to achieve a strong forward posture anywhere on the globe, by employing both forward-deployed and surge maritime forces, provides unmatched crisis response and escalation dominance capabilities. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] The key to success during Phase I is readiness: readiness of naval forces to move forward quickly on short notice. [END OF NEW SECTION]

PHASE I
DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR
FORWARD LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES

Naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances without support from both mobile and shore-based forward logistics forces. Such support is essential in all three phases of the strategy. The logistical components depicted show the notional requirements needed to support high tempo operations.

Afloat logistics support consists of navy combat logistics forces, supported by strategic (or inter-theater) air and sealift and by intra-theater lift—shuttle shipping and COD/VOD aircraft. These afloat logistics forces, just like naval power projection forces, can, if necessary, operate largely independent of peacetime ports of entry, shore bases, and inland lines of communications such as railroads and highways. As U.S. access to overseas bases continues to diminish, the self-sustainability of naval logistics support for seabasing becomes increasingly important.
Ashore, advanced logistic support bases and forward logistics sites in theater provide reservoirs of critical commodities, staging and transhipment facilities, and repair and maintenance capabilities. Wartime host nation support agreements would be activated worldwide for support such as medical care and repair facilities. A large percentage of the personnel who would operate this forward logistics infrastructure are comprised of naval reserve units. These would be among the first reservists called to active duty by the President.

**PHASE II**

**GLOBAL WAR**

**SOVIETS INITIATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

The war at sea cannot be isolated from the land battle. This chart shows the likely Soviet initial combined arms attack posture in global war. While the primary Soviet thrust would likely be in Central Europe, attacks could also occur elsewhere on the Soviet periphery, such as attempts to seize Northern Norway, Iran, the Turkish Straits, or Northern Italy. The Soviets may also attempt to attack/seize Iceland to deny Western use or extend their own air defense umbrella.

The Pacific Basin is the one region in which major change in the world balance of power will occur in the next 20–30 years. As a result, Soviet planners face in the Pacific a more complex strategic problem than anywhere else in the world. The Soviets must deal with other major powers, namely, the United States, Japan, PRC, and South Korea. The relatively few, widely separated, key Soviet facilities in the Far East are more
vulnerable to attack and less survivable than is the case in European Russia. In the Far East, there exists no buffer zone comparable to Eastern Europe.

Japan and South Korea can contribute to denying the Soviets control of the Sea of Japan and naval egress to the Pacific Basin. This factor, coupled with the prospect of direct attack by very capable U.S. maritime and air forces from additional threat axes, must be factored into Soviet planning. Another uncertainty is the potential threat of nuclear-capable and manpower-intensive Chinese military forces.

In the event of war, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific while simultaneously pressuring the Japanese and South Koreans to deny U.S. use of naval and air facilities. If this were unsuccessful, they would probably attack these facilities, initially by air. Other possible Soviet attacks could be conducted against U.S. facilities in the Philippines and in Alaska (Aleutians). The Soviets would not seek to provoke the Chinese into entering the war against them, but could not afford to discount that factor in determining wartime force reallocation decisions.

**PHASE II**

**SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

**GOALS**

- IMPROVE POSITIONING
- MAINTAIN/BOLSTER NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE
- ASSURE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

**PRIORITY ACTIONS**

- COUNTER FIRST SALVO
- ACHIEVE FORWARD SEA CONTROL
- POSITION FOR POWER PROJECTION
- CONTINUE STRATEGIC SEALIFT REINFORCEMENT

The objective in Phase II is to seize the initiative, with the overall goal of establishing forward maritime superiority.

The strategy’s priority actions then would be to counter all attacks on friendly forces, destroy enemy forces, and to protect vital U.S. and allied sea lines of communications (SLOCs) by establishing sea control as far forward as possible. This is a critical prerequisite to ensuring that forward deployed forces receive required reinforcement and resupply. Throughout this period naval forces would improve their positioning, thereby achieving a forward posture for Phase III.
Phase II would focus on strengthening nuclear deterrence, through efforts aimed at bolstering our flexible response capability, to which dual-capable (nuclear) naval assets make an important contribution. This is interlinked with the mission task of achieving forward sea control in those water areas where forward-positioned naval forces also offer the CINC's potent options for power projection. Achievement of forward sea control using this approach also permits us to continue strategic sealift and reinforcement, which began in Phase I.

Aggressive maritime operations as part of theater naval campaigns in Phase II contribute directly to alliance cohesion by demonstrating U.S. commitment to alliance defense in forward maritime areas, including key waters linking our allies, which might otherwise be effectively ceded to Soviet control.

The same maritime operations will contribute to allied air and land campaigns by complicating Soviet decision making, assuring vital supplies and reinforcements can readily flow to the NATO Central Front and other land campaigns, and by strengthening the ability of alliance forces in key flank areas to mount a sustained defense. The combined effects of forward maritime operations in Phase II would generate strategic leverage by demonstrating to the Soviets that the war could not be confined simply to a preferred single theater of operations.

**PHASE II**

**SEIZE THE INITIATIVE**

**SEA CONTROL AND STRATEGIC SEALIFT**
Sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are critical throughout Phase II. Sealift from CONUS is essential to success. Over 95% of the American reinforcement and resupply dry cargo and 99% of petroleum resupply must go by sea. Additionally, the oil SLOCs would remain important for long-term prosecution of any war, especially by our allies.

Conduct of forward ASW and AAW is axiomatic to successful sea control. Ceding the initiative at sea to the Soviet Union, thereby enabling them to choose the times and places of engagement, would spell disaster for numerically inferior Western forces. Ultimate control of the transatlantic SLOCs, for instance, will be determined in the Norwegian Sea. As USCINCLANT/SACLANT told NATO and the U.S. Congress in 1987, if we fight the next “Battle of the Atlantic” in the Atlantic, we may lose that battle. If we lose the Atlantic—and its SLOCs—we will ultimately lose the land war in Europe.

The destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet is fundamental. A coordinated ASW effort is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons systems, and tactics—all properly the purview of the responsible CINCs. In general, forward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet submarines which could break out to attack U.S. reinforcement and resupply shipping.

Similarly, key goals of the carrier battle forces would be to provide the necessary air umbrella for surface and air ASW forces to form combined arms units with our submarines well forward, and to support the land campaign early. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] Marine Corps land-based aviation will support coordinated fleet defense as necessary. Marine aviation command and control assets can be used to integrate maritime and land-based TACAIR, thus adding depth to the maritime battlefield. [NEW SECTION ENDS HERE] Land-based joint and combined force tactical aircraft could complement these efforts to a degree, but that would depend on the flow of the land battle. Concurrent maritime operations in various theaters would present the Soviet leadership with competing demands for commitment of forces. These demands may disrupt timelines for preplanned use of reserves or alter previously intended theater priorities.

The success of U.S. and allied maritime forces in achieving forward sea control and assuring safe transit for strategic sealift would help maintain alliance cohesion. As an example, early introduction of the air-landed MEB in Norway and carrier air power can make the difference between winning and losing the defensive campaign in North Norway.

Early U.S. and allied maritime successes may also help influence decisions in neutral states, as well as effectively deny the use of global sea lines of communication to the Soviet Union. This latter effort would restrict or forestall many Soviet actions which would otherwise be underwritten by the wide-ranging Soviet merchant marine and fishing fleets that increasingly dominate global shipping and trade patterns.
As a result of attrition, and the improving position of U.S. and allied maritime forces, Soviet options will have been diminished and the combat stability of their forces threatened. Therefore, their willingness to continue the war may be subject to internal reevaluation. U.S. and allied maritime forces would now be in position, to provide sustained power projection according to the directions of the NCA and the CINCs.

A critical objective is to afford the CINCs the means to exploit potent conventional capabilities through the leveraged use of dual-capable CVBGs, BBBGs and SSNs, along with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and special warfare units. These maritime operations would provide critical defensive capabilities to Pacific and NATO flank allies, responsive military options for neutralizing threats from Soviet surrogate or client states, and build on sea control–related efforts to effectively raise the nuclear threshold. Taken as a whole, maritime forces provide the means to begin controlling the pace and timing of military campaigns at the times and places of our choosing.

The objective in Phase III is to carry the fight to the enemy. Priority actions would include keeping the initiative seized during Phase II operations, destroying Soviet forces, and retaining or regaining allied territory. The SLOCs must be kept open for
reinforcement and resupply while maritime forces increase their support of land and air campaigns. Finally, Phase III operations must continue emphasis on raising the nuclear threshold, thereby discouraging the Soviets from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons.

PHASE III
"CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY"

GOALS

- SUSTAIN ALLIANCE COHESION
- AUGMENT CINC MILITARY OPTIONS
- INCREASE STRATEGIC LEVERAGE
- RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY
- RAISE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- KEEP THE INITIATIVE
- DESTROY SOVIET FORCES
- KEEP SLOCs OPEN
- SUSTAIN STRATEGIC SEALIFT
- SUPPORT LAND/AIR CAMPAIGNS

FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION

PHASE III
CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
WAR TERMINATION LEVERAGE

- SOVIET SHORT WAR AIMS FRUSTRATED
- SOVIET THREAT TO U.S./ALLIES REDUCED
- SOVIET CLIENT STATES ISOLATED, ABANDONED
- SOVIETS FACE FULL WESTERN INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

AREAS OF U.S./ALLIED FORWARD SEA CONTROL

ESSENTIAL WESTERN MILITARY/ECONOMIC SLOCs
Operations during Phase III could be employed at key locations along the Eurasian landmass to increase strategic leverage as the long-term correlation of forces gradually tilts to the West.

Maritime contributions to war termination leverage stem from several Phase III results. The first is thwarting Soviet desires for short war: naval power provides a means of fighting a *protracted conventional* war, in which the Soviets are explicitly denied their preferred strategy of a single-theater conflict. The strategy amputates Soviet global reach, thus reducing their threat options against the U.S. and its allies, while simultaneously enforcing the isolation of client states from their Soviet support. In the event of a protracted non-nuclear war, forward sea control, which will enable full access to global markets and materials using secure sea lines of communications, can be the means for victory.

**THE MARITIME STRATEGY IN NUCLEAR WAR**

- **SSBN FORCE:** MOST ENDURING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT
- **POST INF/START:** NAVAL FORCES INCREASINGLY VITAL TO NATO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS
- **KEY VALUE OF NAVY IN THEATER NUCLEAR WAR:** LAND STRIKE OPTIONS (TLAM/N, CV STRIKE BOMBS)
- **SOVIETS UNLIKELY TO INITIATE NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA**
  - DECISION TO USE AT SEA LINKED TO LAND USAGE

Although maritime capability underwrites a *credible conventional* warfighting strategy, the nuclear weapons of the U.S. Navy also play an important role in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. SSBN force is the linchpin of deterrence and stability. Our SSBN force when at sea is the most *survivable* and *cost-effective* leg of the triad and will remain so. Fifty percent of our national on-line strategic nuclear warheads are at sea, with the cost of these warheads comprising only one-fourth of the DOD defense budget allocated for strategic assets. The existence of a *secure* U.S. strategic nuclear strike force capable of threatening key Soviet military, industrial, and leadership targets deters nuclear war, impedes Soviet incentives to continue a nuclear conflict once begun, and provides strong military leverage for war termination. With a START agreement, remaining nuclear forces *must* meet the criteria of cost-effectiveness, survivability, flexibility, mobility, responsiveness and hard target kill capability. The SSBN force satisfies all of these requirements.
The contribution of U.S. maritime forces to NATO’s nuclear deterrent posture will become increasingly vital in a post-INF threat environment. Carrier-based, dual-capable tactical aircraft, ballistic missile submarines and sea-launched cruise missile–capable surface combatants and submarines, which are not included in the INF treaty, remain available for employment in NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” Not tied to garrisons ashore or subject to host government approval to operate from overseas bases, naval forces are highly leveraged for alliance support while remaining free to respond quickly and unilaterally to crises that threaten NATO or U.S. national interests.

The key value of the Navy in theater nuclear war lies in its ability to mount credible nuclear land strikes from the sea—principally through available CV aircraft nuclear striking power and from TOMAHAWK land attack nuclear cruise missiles (TLAM/N). If theater nuclear war is initiated on land, dual-capable naval forces positioned on the Soviet flanks are available forward to strike enemy targets in support of the land battle. Deterrence is therefore strengthened by forward employment of our survivable, flexible theater strike forces because additional uncertainty is forced into Soviet planning—sea-based nuclear weapons can be considered to be the ultimate mobile system.

Soviet writings, exercises and doctrine show that they do not intend to initiate nuclear war at sea unless nuclear war already has been initiated on land. If they chose to do so, our alerted, dispersed and mobile naval theater nuclear warfare forces are extremely difficult to locate and attack. Soviet attempts could widen usage—hence escalation, because our sea based forces could strike new targets deep in the Soviet Union from multiple axes. This prospect of more U.S. nuclear counterattacks ashore is the prospect which concerns them most. Hence, the threat of sea-based nuclear strike operations can favorably influence the land battle as well as provide additional incentive to keep a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union limited.
No strategy can address all of the unknowns that comprise the fog of war. However, we have considered five broad areas of uncertainty.

We assume approximately two weeks of warning time and a transition to global war. Difficult decisions will have to be made in an environment replete with uncertainty and ambiguity. In such a situation, the timeliness and decisiveness of political decisions will be a major concern. Early forward positioning of naval forces can reinforce deterrence and signal firm commitment in the absence of full alliance political consensus.

The unpredictability of the Soviets is another uncertainty. Questions include their reactions to precursor crises, the role their surrogates might play, use of nuclear weapons, and an early flush of their naval forces into the open ocean. National intelligence estimates conclude that the Soviets will adopt an echelon defense strategy while still maintaining some out-of-area forces. The Maritime Strategy shows how one could limit the options available to the Soviets by moving our forces forward early, which would be a powerful disincentive to initially flushing large numbers of their forces into the open ocean.

The Maritime Strategy addresses, predominantly, conventional war with the Soviet Union because it seeks to offer non-nuclear alternatives and avoid escalation to nuclear war. The areas of uncertainty include the question of whether NATO can or will, in fact, sustain a conventional war of long duration; whether Soviet technological advances (e.g., improved submarine quieting) will result in modification or replacement of the bastion concept, and what effects the major change in the balance of power among the Soviets and the U.S., the PRC, Japan, and South Korea will have on the outcome of conflict in the Pacific theater.

How will the war be terminated? The duration of conflict, character of military operations during negotiations, and the transition from fighting to the “new peace” all remain areas of uncertainty. The nature of any post-war environment is inherently uncertain. The assumption is that whatever the outcome of a land campaign in NATO Europe, the United States will endeavor to remain the dominant politico-military force in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

Finally, the world is changing rapidly, with major trends emerging which will alter the future global security environment. An overall smaller U.S. military force structure may be dictated due to fiscal realities. At the same time, the security demands for U.S. forward presence and capability worldwide will increase, despite declining access to overseas bases. Additionally, U.S. involvement in Third World and regional conflicts will likely increase in the future. The Maritime Strategy recognizes these emerging trends and will continue to evolve in this changing world. The flexibility, mobility and versatility of maritime forces will continue to provide multiple options against diverse
CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THINKING

- DOMINATED BY SOVIET CHALLENGE
- CONCENTRATES ON TWO EXTREME SCENARIOS
  - "BOLT FROM BLUE" NUCLEAR ATTACK
  - MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL CENTRAL FRONT ATTACK
- RESULTS: BIPOLAR VIEWS PREDOMINATE
  - OVEREMPHASIS ON CENTRAL FRONT
  - UNDEREMPHASIS ON FLANK AREAS, THIRD WORLD
  - RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
  - DISCOUNTS REALITY OF DIVERSE CONVENTIONAL THREATS

Threats. Forward deployed naval forces, capable of applying discriminate force on a global scale, bolster deterrence and reinforce our various commitments worldwide, thereby enhancing global stability.

U.S. defense planning has centered for many years on a foundation of these three elements: nuclear deterrence, forward deployment of U.S. forces, and alliances with key nations around the globe.

Two general planning scenarios have tended to dominate U.S. notions about the kind of war we should plan to fight—as well as ideas about force structure development. These scenarios focus primarily on:

- A massive, bolt-from-the-blue Soviet nuclear attack against many targets overseas and in the U.S., and
- A massive conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe.

These two scenarios, no matter how they are refined or repackaged, do not adequately take into account a world in which nuclear weapons are becoming relatively less and less a factor in Soviet decision making and in which high technology weaponry is proliferating in a more regionally volatile world. Simply put, the two “worst case” scenarios listed above have led to a disproportionate focus on NATO’s Central Front. They have fostered neglect of NATO’s flanks as well as critical areas outside of NATO. These areas—in particular, the Pacific Basin, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—will loom even larger in the future U.S. security environment.
FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

- SHIFT IN BALANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER
- DECREASED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY U.S. AND SOVIETS
- SPREAD OF HIGH-TECH WEAPONS INTO THE THIRD WORLD
- PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL/NUCLEAR THREAT
- THIRD WORLD REGIONAL AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: INCREASING U.S. INVOLVEMENT
- REDUCED PUBLIC SENSE OF GLOBAL WAR THREAT
- SOVIET NAVAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES TO “CAPTURE” ALLIED AND U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH
- DECLINING U.S. ACCESS TO OVERSEAS BASES AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS
- FISCAL CONSTRAINTS: U.S./NATO IN PARTICULAR

The basic national strategy of forward-deployed forces, backed by strong reserves and maintenance of a credible nuclear threat to protect our allies will remain valid. But, a long range strategy must take into account the realities of changing conditions and threats.

Major trends emerging to alter the future security environment will change some of the fundamental assumptions upon which our national military structure has been developed. These trends include:

- A major shift in balance of economic power, as Asian economic growth rates continue to outpace all others. And we know economic strength underpins military strength.

- As a result of virtual equivalence in nuclear capabilities, a form of nuclear gridlock has evolved which has decreased the credibility of nuclear weapons. All trends indicate, however, that such weapons, along with high tech accurate ordnance and chemical weapons, will spread in the Third World.

- U.S. involvement in the more likely Third World and regional conflict scenarios is likely to grow, resulting in increased diversion of U.S. security efforts and resources.

- A reduced sense of threat, especially in Europe, is likely, where “glasnost” has been most effective in reviving a spirit of detente. A weakening of military commitment and vigilance in the Western alliance could result.
It has become increasingly apparent that Soviet ocean policy and arms control proposals seek to limit the capability and mobility of U.S./NATO maritime forces. These proposals aim at maintaining Soviet military advantages in ground forces while negating NATO's maritime edge and eliminating U.S. forward presence, particularly in the Northern European region.

- Geopolitical realities will increasingly foreclose the overseas basing infrastructure from which U.S. land and air forces operate, and
- Finally, fiscal constraints will beset U.S. and NATO defense budgets, in particular, which will reinforce the imperative for a military force structure that is flexible and capable of performing a variety of missions.

These changes and emergent challenges in the security environment will have enormous impact on basic American military strategy. The changing balance of world power will mean that the Pacific will compete increasingly for U.S. commitments—while at the same time the U.S. must be concerned that there is no erosion of our coupling to NATO. Instability and conflict in the Third World will require greater U.S. involvement—while the declining access to overseas basing could, in general, force greater limits on our range of options for land based force projection. The result is that maritime forces may increasingly be called upon to ensure regional stability and protect U.S. worldwide interests.

**DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS**

- **NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REMAINS A BEDROCK REQUIREMENT**
- **MUST MAINTAIN WORLDWIDE LINKS TO ALLIES**
- **ENHANCED ALLIED SUPPORT/CAPABILITIES ESSENTIAL**
- **MUST EXPAND HORIZONS OF NATO AND PACIFIC ALLIES**
- **FLEXIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIRED**

The emerging security environment and U.S. strategic objectives have profound implications for U.S. defense planning. U.S. strategic objectives will continue to encompass the following:

- Deter war, and should deterrence fail, fight as far forward as possible.
- Foster robust alliances to preserve Western political identity and institutions, maintain international stability, and prevent hostile domination of vital areas.
• Maintain maritime superiority in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic Basin and ensure the continued economic health of that region is protected.

• Ensure global stability, especially in cases where Third World conflicts affect Western interests.

Key defense implications are as follows:

It remains essential that deterrence of a U.S. (NATO)/Soviet (Warsaw Pact) conflict remains intact. Indeed, as we pursue the nuclear reductions intended by the INF treaty and START negotiations (50 percent reduction in ICBMs/SLBMs), the importance of survivable nuclear capability increases to help offset conventional force imbalances and to foreclose the possibility of nuclear blackmail by the Soviets or anyone else.

**MARITIME COMPONENT OF U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

This imperative must be met in the face of declining access to overseas bases and over-flight rights. The U.S. must maintain secure links to allies worldwide in order to deal with the defense realities of increasing economic interdependency (particularly in the Pacific) and to reinforce/resupply smaller sized U.S. ground and air forces overseas when required. Enhanced allied support and capabilities will be essential to ensure coalition capabilities are not diminished, particularly in an era of increasing fiscal constraints. The U.S. must persuade our NATO and Pacific allies to confront changes in the global security environment from a unified alliance perspective. The fact is that events outside the geopolitical “boundaries” of NATO (e.g., in Southwest Asia and the Pacific Basin) can have direct and dramatic impact on the alliance.

Finally, these defense implications should emphasize the requirement for a U.S. force structure that is more mobile, flexible and interoperable. The capability for the worldwide employment of joint forces, often on very short notice in the face of ambiguous
warning, is a firmly established requirement. It has been reconfirmed by each of the United States’ most recent uses of military force [THIS SECTION IS NEW] and must not be allowed to atrophy. [END OF NEW SECTION]

The world environment will continue to undergo change—global military and economic power shifts will be increasingly affected by economic and social factors, particularly those emanating from the Third World. The strategic concepts embodied within the Maritime Strategy will remain valid for U.S. National Security Strategy within this complex global arena. Maritime forces are uniquely suited to provide the flexible options needed by U.S. security interests.

In peacetime, crisis, and war, the Maritime Strategy provides a design for deterrence. It describes the Navy’s view of how best to deploy the maritime forces that we have, using their unique abilities to confront potential aggressors with a broad range of options for military action at the conventional level. At the same time, the strategy recognizes the continuing requirement to assure flexible response across the conflict spectrum, including deployment of survivable, enduring nuclear forces at sea. The flexible strategic design to employ forces across a broad scope in geography, time, and intensity, inherently complicates the Soviet strategic problem. Maritime forces offer a means to preserve U.S. linkage with strong NATO defenses as we simultaneously contend with the demands of diverse national commitments throughout the world.
Maritime Strategy for the 1990s

This article appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings on 1 May 1990, just two months before Admiral Carlisle Trost retired as Chief of Naval Operations. This was the last important official public statement about the Maritime Strategy, and it reflected both the recent revisions to the classified versions of the strategy (see document 7) and the first reactions to the changes in the world order.

At the time, the Soviet Union was pushing the United States for agreements on naval arms control, but American officials had varying reactions to this. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in the new administration of President George Bush still saw the Soviets as the enemy, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, saw them no longer as the major threat they had been. By this time, it was clear that Congress would not fund the plans for the six-hundred-ship navy. At the same time, the Marine Corps had turned away from the world-war scenario, and the Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., seeking more autonomy and equality for the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, had moved the Marine Corps to thinking about third-world contingencies rather than general war.

Admiral Trost had this article prepared for his signature as a reaction to growing public pressure for a “peace dividend” that some thought should be found in cutting the Navy’s existing force structure. Significantly, this article was written after Admiral Trost had become the first U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to visit and to lecture in the Soviet Union, in October 1989. In this May 1990 article Trost was attempting to reach those who neither fully understood nor appreciated the U.S. Navy’s continuing roles and missions as an instrument for international stability and crisis control, even when the Soviet threat was declining, the Berlin Wall was down, and the Warsaw Pact was beginning to collapse. As Trost explained, “I was determined to maintain our posture at a level which would permit us to meet our continuing mission responsibilities.”


As with his previous Naval Institute Proceedings article in 1987, Admiral Trost provided an outline and verbal instructions to the CNO Executive Panel staff (OP-00K), then headed by Captain Michael McDevitt, who served as its director from September 1988 to February 1990, and Captain James R. Stark, who was director from February 1990 to May 1992.* This article was drafted at the CNO Executive Panel by staff officers who, among other duties, had also prepared Trost’s annual posture statements and policy and strategy papers.† By the time this article appeared, the available unclassified literature on the Maritime Strategy was already quite widespread.

We have all seen the images in the news media in recent months. They remind us that the world is a constantly changing place. The U.S. Navy must change with it but guard against changing too quickly.

Each week Eastern Europe seems to experience changes that just a year ago would have been only distant hopes for the future: the democratization of previously totalitarian regimes, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the new openness in international communications, the emergence of independent political parties, and the new tack in Soviet foreign and domestic policy. In addition, an emerging spirit of cooperation between East and West offers the greatest opportunity to move beyond the Cold War since it began.

We have witnessed a declining perception of the Soviet threat, both at home and among our allies, adding to the already strong desire to reduce the defense budget. We cannot, however, afford to react precipitously to the euphoria that these events inspire. We cannot forget that the United States faces a very real threat from regional conflicts, international terrorism, narcotics, and a variety of other challenges that fall outside the scope of the U.S.-Soviet balance.

Clearly, the nature of our political and military environment is changing, and we need to examine closely how we will proceed as the United States moves into the 1990s. From a naval perspective, one of the most important aspects of this examination is the degree to which the Maritime Strategy will remain valid as a key component of our national military strategy in a security environment shaped by continuing changes overseas.

Although the Maritime Strategy has become a major topic of public discussion only in the past few years, its origins predate the Cold War. While most notably associated with a strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, the Maritime Strategy is designed to support the entire spectrum of actions needed to represent U.S. global interests as a maritime nation and a world superpower.

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* E-mail messages from Rear Admiral McDevitt and Rear Admiral Stark to Hattendorf and Swartz, dated August 2008.
† Trost, letter to Hattendorf.
Accelerating Events, Enduring Principles: The Maritime Strategy is a concept of operations rather than a war plan. It is based upon three broad principles governing the global employment of naval forces.

The first of these is deterrence. We want to convince any potential adversary that an attack on the United States or our allies would result in unacceptable consequences for the aggressor. This requires a strategic nuclear force, the capability to defend ourselves in a global conventional war, and a crisis-response capability to deal with lower levels of conflict that are localized or regional in nature.

Second is the principle of forward defense. It enhances deterrence by ensuring that naval forces are in a position to respond to crises quickly, and it maximizes our response options should deterrence fail. Many of our allies and trading partners are located on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. If the United States is to participate effectively in the mutual defense of our own interests and those of our allies, it is imperative that we have forces deployed in the regions where those interests lie.

Third, the strategy rests firmly upon a network of alliances. Since World War II, the United States has established agreements with more than 40 countries—in Europe and in the Pacific—to provide mutual security. By defending our allies we defend ourselves. Each individual nation benefits from the combined strength of all the alliance partners.

Keeping a Watchful Eye . . . : Arguing for a strong defense in the face of the destruction of the Berlin Wall can seem like shouting into a strong wind. Yet the thawing of the Cold War has been accompanied by other more sobering and tragic events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre; the murder of Marine Lieutenant Colonel William R. Higgins; the drug war; attempts to overthrow democratic governments and the democratic process in the Philippines, Panama, Colombia, and El Salvador; and continued attacks by terrorists around the world. As we plan for the future, we need to consider all aspects of the global political and economic environment.

Despite all the changes we see around us, certain facts endure. The United States is essentially an island nation. It is the leader of a global maritime coalition for an array of allies, trading partners, and political interests across the oceans. Global economic interdependence is a fact of life. The majority of our trade routes, our economic and political lifelines, are oceanic. Over 70% of our total trade by value and 99.7% of our overseas export and import tonnage move by sea. Our economic well-being has been made possible by and depends upon political stability.

Maintaining our maritime alliances will be increasingly important as power and influence become more diffuse globally. In the 1990s, the two superpowers will remain the first among equals, but they will not be as dominant as they have been. Political and
economic power will be more broadly distributed in the world, and existing alliance systems will become more political than military in their orientation.

Low-intensity conflicts must be considered; they can involve protracted struggles or sharp outbreaks of violence. They run the gamut from terrorism to regional wars with limited objectives. As we saw in the Persian Gulf and are seeing today with drug interdiction efforts, regional conflicts affect our vital interests and those of our friends and allies. We must be prepared to act in support of U.S. interests throughout the world if we are to protect our citizens and economic prosperity.

The most worrisome aspect of the increasing diffusion of global political and military power is the accompanying spread of high-technology weaponry. The availability of the most modern weapons and the growth of indigenous arms industries add a new dimension to the security calculations of these regional powers, and our own as well. Today, 41 Third World nations collectively possess more than 250 attack submarines, 102 have antiship cruise missiles, 41 have a sophisticated naval mining capability, and 40 are arms producers.

The threat to U.S. and allied maritime interests is not exclusively naval. A number of Third World nations that are potentially hostile to western interests are well situated to pose a land-based maritime threat. Survival in such an environment requires advanced electronics and weapon systems and does not allow the luxury of “low-mix” platforms. The “hi-tech,” advanced military capability of the world’s nations is underscored by the British experience in the South Atlantic and our own in the Persian Gulf.

The spread of arms technology becomes even more sobering in view of the development of nuclear and chemical weapons by emerging regional powers. By the year 2000, at least 15 nations will be producing, or will have acquired ballistic missile technology, and at least six are actively developing nuclear weapons. Fourteen now possess chemical weapons or the capability to produce them, and 11 more are suspected of developing the capacity. As the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War shows, some of these nations are willing to employ such capabilities despite international condemnation.

With or without superpower involvement, low-intensity conflicts will be increasingly violent and involve high technology. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons worldwide means that the types of naval forces designed to prevail in the most technically sophisticated and modern threat environment, exemplified by Soviet capabilities, are increasingly the same types of naval forces required to fight anyone else. The main difference is in the number of ships and aircraft that must be brought to bear, rather than their individual combat capability.
Planning for regional and low-intensity conflicts highlights a broadening of the national strategic focus in the past few years. The decrease in American access to bases and overflight rights around the world has further underscored the versatility and capabilities of our naval forces. At the end of World War II, the United States had bases in about 100 countries; today we have bases in fewer than 40. Moreover, more reductions are on the horizon in both Europe and the Pacific. As U.S. access to overseas bases diminishes, naval forces and their afloat logistic support become increasingly important. They can demonstrate military power without raising sensitive political issues of territorial sovereignty, a natural outgrowth of dependence upon overseas base and overflight rights.

...And Our Powder Dry: From a military perspective, we must consider a potential enemy’s capabilities as well as his intentions. This is especially true for naval force planning. We must respond to crisis and wartime tasking to a large extent with the ships on hand. The time required to build a modern warship (as much as seven years for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) and our highly consolidated national shipbuilding industry would effectively preclude new-construction ships from joining the fight in any future war. Simply put, future wars will be “come-as-you-are” affairs for naval forces.

The Soviet Union represents the most severe military threat addressed by the Maritime Strategy. As welcome as the possibilities presented by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s restructuring and openness might be, prudence and history dictate that we continue to gauge our strategy and war-fighting capabilities against this least likely, but ultimately most potent threat.

The Soviet Union today possesses an impressive ocean-going navy that continues to modernize. The most significant Soviet naval improvements have been in undersea warfare. Soviet submarine quieting and sensor improvements have dramatically reduced our ability to localize and track their submarines. The tactical edge in antisubmarine warfare that we have enjoyed for the past three decades continues to erode, and our first priority is to find the most effective means to counter the submarine threat to our sea lines of communication.

The Soviets are also improving in other areas. Their sea control capability is being enhanced by the development of better integrated air defenses, supported by new cruiser, destroyer, and frigate classes that will join their fleet between now and the year 2000. They are also building a new class of aircraft carrier which will carry high-performance fixed-wing jet aircraft in both fighter and attack configurations. Finally, the addition to the Soviet naval inventory of land-based Blackjack and improved Backfire bombers, Fencer fighter-bombers, and Mainstay AWACS (airborne warning and
control system) aircraft is expanding their ability to threaten our key sea lines of communication in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Thus, despite Soviet pronouncements of naval force cutbacks, Soviet naval capabilities are improving. Under the guise of arms reductions, they are scrapping old units that have limited military utility. Having addressed the problem of block obsolescence, the Soviet Navy will emerge as a smaller, but thoroughly updated and modern force, more sustainable and extremely difficult to defeat.

While we applaud the direction of recent political developments within the Soviet Union, and find encouraging the Soviets’ pronouncements of a defensive national strategy, intentions are influenced by both world and domestic events and can change very quickly. We need to see where Soviet internal political developments lead, assure ourselves that openness and democratization are permanent features of Soviet international behavior, and carefully assess both Soviet military capabilities and political intentions before making any major course changes in our own maritime programs.

We must remember, as we have learned so many times in the past, that political intentions can change overnight, while naval force structure, once relinquished, takes much longer to rebuild.

Aspects of Deterrence: The Maritime Strategy articulates in broad terms how American naval forces are able to support national policy across this entire spectrum. While supporting nuclear deterrence, the strategy also provides a structured framework for the day-to-day peacetime business of the Navy and Marine Corps—routine fleet deployments, exercises, and frequent response to regional and international crises. It integrates balanced fleet operations with our sister services and allies in peacetime to achieve deterrence of conventional conflicts and, if deterrence fails, to fight a conventional war in a global context.

Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear deterrence is the keystone on which the rest of our conventional strategy depends. Soviet doctrine leads us to expect that nuclear weapons would be used at sea only in conjunction with their use in a land war. Nevertheless, other nations also are capable of using nuclear weapons at sea, and current trends suggest that such threats will continue to proliferate. Declaratory U.S. doctrine states that enemy initiation of nuclear war at sea will not limit a U.S. response to the use of nuclear weapons at sea, but may include their use against appropriate land targets. Therefore, we expect naval forces to retain their critical role in both strategic and tactical nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future.

The U.S. force of ballistic missile submarines is and will remain the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. As such, it is a significant factor in strategic stability. Fifty percent
of our national on-line strategic nuclear warheads are at sea, at one fourth the cost of the total strategic force.

As we move with the Soviet Union to reduce our strategic nuclear arsenals, remaining nuclear forces must be cost-effective, survivable, flexible, responsive, and have hard-target kill capability. The fleet ballistic missile force satisfies all of these requirements.

Similarly, U.S. naval forces also contribute to deterrence of theater nuclear warfare through their ability to mount credible nuclear land strikes from the sea. We have dispersed strike assets that were previously concentrated only in manned aircraft on board carriers. Today, submarines and surface combatants armed with nuclear-capable long-range cruise missiles are also available to support the strategy of flexible response.

Guarding the Peace: The objectives of the peacetime posture of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, support national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essential to deal with any crisis. These global commitments and alliance responsibilities require a substantial degree of forward naval presence to protect our interests in troubled areas. Roughly one third of the fleet, with over 110,000 sailors and 30,000 Marines, is either at sea or forward deployed on an average day. Because these forces have the necessary combat capability and are at a high level of readiness, we can influence events throughout the world—as demonstrated in naval operations in the 1980s off Libya, Lebanon, and in the Persian Gulf.

Pressure to reduce defense spending has been a fixture in our budget debates for some time; however, in the past it has been counterbalanced by the Soviet threat. A decreasing Soviet threat would add impetus to budgetary pressures to reduce the size of our military forces. Smaller naval forces will of necessity affect our deployment posture. Consequently, responding to the reduced Soviet threat, naval forces could be deployed within key overseas theaters to provide a nearly continuous flexible forward presence. Although military response times may be less prompt and involve an increased degree of risk, we believe this is acceptable in a worldwide environment of reduced superpower tensions.

Additional factors, such as expansion of the naval services’ role in drug interdiction or a decrease in force levels to meet fiscal constraints, will require further adjustment of our traditional forward-deployed global presence in order to maintain personnel stability and fleet readiness.

In the late 1970s, as we concentrated forces in response to events in Iran, the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) spent 247 days of a 252-day deployment at sea. This was an extreme case of what was happening throughout the
fleet. We did not have an adequate force to support our needs. Long at-sea periods followed by short turn-around times resulted in equipment breakdowns, personnel turmoil, and a loss of experienced enlisted personnel at the end of their obligated service. By the late 1970s we had a middle management shortfall of 22,000 petty officers, and overall fleet readiness was only half of what it is today.

In order to avoid a repetition of that experience, we have established personnel and operational requirements that define employment limits. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy, recognizing that this policy ultimately preserves our personnel and warfighting readiness, strongly support these guidelines. The turn-around ratios for forward-deployed units guard our most precious asset, our highly skilled and trained naval personnel, but they also affect our ability to meet national peacetime naval commitments.

**Being There—the Value of Presence:** Just as the forward presence of U.S. naval forces has contributed to the deterrence of conflict with the Soviet Union, it has also enabled us to promote regional stability throughout the world. This is especially apparent in the Pacific. Apart from the primarily land oriented military stalemate on the Korean peninsula, the Pacific is essentially a naval and air theater. Since the Vietnam war, U.S. military presence there has been represented most visibly by forward deployed naval forces. Carrier and battleship battle groups, along with forward-deployed Marines, have come to represent the commitment and resolve of the United States to preserve regional stability and freedom of the seas for all nations.

This role is distinct from the requirement to counter any potentially hostile naval power in the Pacific. While Asian nations are concerned with the Soviets because of geographical proximity, they are also concerned with purely regional issues. Local objectives—unrelated to East-West issues—could disrupt the regional stability so necessary for the expansion of free markets and the growth of democracies. The countries of the region accord substantial credit to the United States for having maintained a potent and visible presence and thus fostering the Pacific basin stability needed for economic prosperity. The U.S. Seventh Fleet has played a crucial role in maintaining the peace and security of the Western Pacific.

**Crisis Response Roles and Capabilities:** Despite the documented deterrent value of forward naval presence, crises do occur. As demonstrated so many times in the last 40 years, forward-deployed naval forces are particularly well suited for limiting the expansion of a crisis and facilitating a return to normalcy. They can move into position rapidly and in strength without violating any borders or raising national sensitivities over territorial sovereignty. If the situation warrants, our Navy and Marine forces, in concert with those of our allies and friends, can apply appropriate force to protect our
common interests. Once the crisis is resolved, naval forces can be withdrawn unilaterally without giving the appearance of retreat.

Naval forces have proven to be the military force of choice for Presidents in more than 50 crises in the last decade, and in nearly 200 instances since World War II. This represents more than 80% of the crises which the United States has faced during this period. In order to ensure that naval forces will be available to provide appropriate options for crisis response, we have operated our fleets around key “deployment hubs” where the majority of these crises have occurred: the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Caribbean.

There is no indication that crisis response requirements in these crucial areas will diminish in the future. In fact, the move toward increasing politico-military multipolarity and the expanding counter-narcotics effort may well increase naval taskings. Overseas regional powers, terrorists, and drug smugglers would be bolstered rather than deterred were we to withdraw naval forces from forward positions and to operate closer to home ports in the United States. Being present in the immediate region enables naval forces to provide a timely response at the outset of future crises.

Consequently, only by maintaining a balanced fleet that is forward deployed and combat ready can we fulfill the role of providing regional stability while preserving U.S. economic and foreign policy interests.

Combat Readiness...: When a crisis confronts the nation, the first question often asked by policymakers is, “What naval forces are available and how fast can they be on station?” This requires that we maintain our forces in a high state of readiness, positioned as close to the scene of action as possible. Readiness is the key factor in this equation. Sending units that are poorly trained, undermanned, or equipped with inadequately maintained, obsolete equipment is an invitation to disaster. Our forces must not only be there, they must also be capable of conducting successful combat operations.

In order to maintain high levels of readiness and combat capability, we actively participate in a host of joint and combined exercises. In fiscal year 1989, for example, U.S. naval forces participated in more than 300 major and minor exercises, of which 113 were joint exercises with other services and 121 were combined exercises with our allies and friendly navies. These strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance inter-operability with our allies and sister services, and improve combat effectiveness.

...And Capabilities: While we have had naval forces in the Persian Gulf continuously since 1948, our recent operations there in response to the Iran-Iraq War served as a pointed illustration of naval capabilities in crises. Whether tracking air contacts over the Gulf, escorting U.S.-flag tankers, sweeping mines, or engaging in military strikes,
Navy and Marine Corps units have given the United States a flexible and responsive instrument of national policy.

Operations in the Persian Gulf before and after the 1987 decision to escort re-flagged tankers were oriented around our forward-deployed naval forces, but significant interservice cooperation and interoperability were hallmarks of the entire effort. Fleet Marine Forces were represented by a special Marine air-ground task force embarked aboard an air-capable amphibious ship. Army helicopters and Air Force AWACS, reconnaissance, and tanker aircraft contributed significantly to the success of the entire operation.

International cooperation was also extensive. We worked well in coordinated operations with a number of our western allies. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands all had military forces operating in the Persian Gulf. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization duties of the deployed allied units were performed by other allies. Examples of this maritime cooperation included the deployment of West German frigates to the Mediterranean and Norwegian minehunters to the North Sea.

This demonstration of how naval forces operate in distant locations, in support of air and ground forces and in conjunction with allies, is a clear example of the flexibility that the regional application of our global Maritime Strategy provides in times of crisis and contingency response.

The Worst Conventional Case—Global War: Since the end of 1945, the United States and its allies, despite numerous crises and regional conflicts, have been able to prevent a major war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This very success has sometimes been used as an argument for reducing military forces and avoiding the necessity to “think the unthinkable.” Nevertheless, the reality is that for the past four decades it has been our strong military capabilities, the cohesion of our alliances, and our strength of will that have preserved a world free from the horror of global war. We must continue to maintain sufficient combat-ready forces to prevail in a major conflict.

The degree to which we are able to do this is, in fact, the real measure of our future deterrent capability.

The changes occurring today in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have lowered superpower tension and hold the promise of achieving significant reductions in the forces facing each other in Europe. These developments require a careful reassessment of our defense planning in such areas as warning time, mobilization capability, reinforcement requirements, available base structures, and overall opposing force levels. Yet, in looking at the nature of any potential or future major war, several elements will remain constant.
First and foremost, the Soviet Union, with or without its other Warsaw Pact allies, is the only single power with the ability to threaten the continued existence of the United States. Whatever the eventual level of Soviet military and naval forces, and however greatly the superpowers reduce their conventional and strategic nuclear forces in the immediate future, the Soviet Union will almost certainly remain our most dangerous potential adversary.

Second, the basic principles that have guided our naval war-fighting strategy through the Eighties will remain valid during the Nineties. This means reliance upon deterrence, forward defense, and global coalition warfare. In the event of regional or global conflict, U.S. and allied fortunes would continue to depend on our ability to control the seas. Maritime forces would be relied upon to support and resupply our allies and deployed forces as far forward as possible. In any conflict, we would seek leverage to achieve early favorable conflict resolution, while taking every measure to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold unless such a step were forced upon us.

*Maritime Superiority:* While naval forces alone cannot win a war against a predominantly continental power, maritime superiority makes two contributions that are necessary for victory by a maritime nation.

The first is that maritime superiority, and the unimpeded use of the seas which it guarantees, provides a means of fighting a protracted conventional war overseas. Most crucially, the sea-lanes must be kept open for the reinforcement and resupply of forward-deployed U.S. and allied ground and air forces. Successful forward sea control can best secure sea lines of communications, and thereby ensure full access to global industries and resources in order to fuel the wartime economies of the maritime coalition.

Second, maritime superiority enables us to deny an opponent the option of a single-theater strategy in a global war. It would make no sense to allow an opponent to attack us at a point of his choosing without moving to threaten him in areas where he may be more vulnerable. Naval forces allow us to enforce the enemy’s isolation and expand our own strategic options. It is hard to imagine warships passing peacefully in the night while we are engaged in a shooting war ashore.

This does not imply that the Navy and Marine Corps would proceed simultaneously with forward maritime campaigns throughout the world’s oceans. We do not have sufficient forces to do that today, and we are unlikely to have them any time in the foreseeable future. Instead, we would concentrate our forces in sequential maritime campaigns in order to exploit our own mobility and the vulnerabilities of any would-be enemy, while, in conjunction with our allies, keeping any adversary engaged wherever he may be.
The ability to move into forward areas is a necessity if we are to protect our allies, prevent enemy interdiction of our sea lines of communication, destroy his navy, and force him into a defensive posture. In addition, the ability of naval power projection forces to threaten large areas of an enemy’s homeland, whether or not they are ever actually employed against it, ensures that he must tie down large numbers of forces in response. This limits his options to mass forces in support of main offensive and defensive operations.

Naval operations in support of this forward strategy will require significant contributions from our allies and the other U.S. military services, particularly the Air Force. Naval forces have operated in three traditional dimensions—air, surface, and undersea—and increasingly in space, which provides important new warfighting advantages. The use of space will become more significant to the United States as other countries enter this realm as users and potential competitors, and interservice cooperation will be particularly important in this area. We will also rely heavily upon our allies in a host of areas.

Just what does this mean for the actual wartime employment of our naval forces? In the most basic terms, we must attempt to position our forces forward early—prior to any hostilities, if possible. Forward positioning, combined with other measures, may extend deterrence and forestall the outbreak of war. If deterrence fails, we must quickly gain unfettered use of the seas once hostilities are initiated against us, in order to support the land war and as a precursor to possible strike operations ashore.

The forward movement of our forces in the early stages of a crisis serves two purposes. First, it adds to deterrence by signaling national political resolve, showing support for local allies, and demonstrating readiness. Second, it gets our forces into position so they are not caught in port during the critical early stages of a war, reduces our transit times, severely complicates an enemy’s targeting problem, and ensures that we can immediately begin to affect the course of the war.

If deterrence fails, we must establish sea control as far forward and as early as possible. Control of the narrow seas through which an enemy must transit in order to reach the open ocean is a strategic necessity, a force multiplier that exploits geography to our advantage. At sea, the best defense remains a good offense. Taking the fight to the enemy as far from our own shores as possible is a basic tenet of the Maritime Strategy. We want any adversary to react to our initiatives, rather than the other way around.

Although often portrayed as separate from sea control, power projection and the initial campaign to gain control of the seas are actually complementary and closely linked. Air strikes, forcible entry amphibious operations, and the destruction of the enemy fleet and naval air arm are essential elements of the initial sea control campaign.
Once the threat to our naval forces has been brought down to an acceptable level, U.S. and allied naval forces can step up the pace of their campaign against targets ashore. Carrier battle groups will support the land battle, augmented by Marine Corps expeditionary aviation operating from forward land bases. In addition, Marine aviation command and control assets can be used to integrate sea- and land-based tactical air power, adding depth ashore to the maritime operating area in both the sea control and power projection missions. Air Force and allied tactical aircraft may also be available to complement these efforts.

The coalition warfare goal of these forward operations is the support of our exposed allies. An additional important advantage is their role in disrupting enemy time lines for the preplanned commitment of reserves. This diminishes his ability to concentrate on a single theater of operations, and complicates his calculation of allied intentions and force balance.

 Strikes against the enemy’s homeland remain an option open to the President and allied decision-makers. The far-reaching political and military ramifications of such a decision are obvious. Our potential to place an enemy’s homeland at risk in a conventional conflict, and our publicly stated willingness to consider this option, are intended to reap significant strategic benefits. Regardless of whether we would ever decide to employ such a capability, the enemy would be forced to allocate scarce resources to protect its own exposed flanks. Most importantly, such a capability adds markedly to deterrence.

**Conclusion:** This discussion began by asking whether the Maritime Strategy would remain valid during the coming decade in light of the momentous changes we see occurring today. Without question, developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are encouraging and may drastically alter the politico-military environment that we have known since 1945. On the other hand, trends toward a more multipolar, fractious, and turbulent political environment elsewhere in the world mean that we will continue to face difficult challenges. Additionally, all this must be viewed against the background of a tightened fiscal climate and severe budgetary strictures.

Our examination of the Maritime Strategy has established several salient points. First, the strategy is flexible. Rather than laying out a set course of action, it is a general frame of reference to guide our decisions in an uncertain future. Second, the strategy rests upon a solid bedrock of sound facts and principles that will remain valid even as our political and economic surroundings change. Geography and geopolitics still determine our maritime character, deterrence and crisis management remain critical national security imperatives, and our global ties and alliances still require that we support our friends in distant regions. Finally, the military principles that have guided our
strategy in the past retain fundamental validity. We will continue to rely on deterrence, flexible forward deployments, and close cooperation with our allies as part of a global coalition.

Maritime Strategy has helped to provide the security and stability we have enjoyed these last 40 years, and has brought us to the beginning of a new era. As I look at this next decade, I am convinced that the Maritime Strategy and the balanced forces we have built to execute it provide a solid foundation for the future. Maritime superiority has made the “strategic difference.” The Navy and Marine Corps of the 1990s continue on watch, standing ready to protect the values and interests of the United States, our allies, and friends into the next century.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>antiair artillery</td>
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<td>AAW</td>
<td>antiair warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABFC</td>
<td>Advanced Base Functional Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADGE</td>
<td>Air Defense Ground Environments</td>
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<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>afloat element [of MEF/MAB]</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEW</td>
<td>air early warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>intelligence collector (auxiliary) [Soviet]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States [alliance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>amphibious ready group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAT</td>
<td>antisatellite system</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCM</td>
<td>antiship cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>antiship missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASUW</td>
<td>antisuface warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>antisubmarine warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATSS</td>
<td>auxiliary training submarine</td>
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<td>AVCAL</td>
<td>aviation consolidated allowance list</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>battleship</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBBG</td>
<td>battleship battle group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBSAG</td>
<td>battleship surface action group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>biological warfare</td>
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C

C3  command, control, and communications

CASREP  Casualty Report

CAST  Canadian Air-Sea Transportable [Brigade]

CENTMED  central Mediterranean Sea

CGN  guided-missile cruiser (nuclear powered)

CINC [CinC]  commander in chief

CINCEUR  Commander in Chief, Europe

CINCLANT  Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

CINCLANTFLT  Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

CINCPAC  Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

CINCPACFLT  Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

CINCUSNAVEUR  Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe

CNO  Chief of Naval Operations

CNOR  command not operationally ready

COD  carrier onboard delivery

COMIDEASTFOR  Commander, Middle East Force

COMSEVENTHFLT  Commander, Seventh Fleet

COMSIXTHFLT  Commander, Sixth Fleet

CONMAROPS  concept of maritime operations

CONUS  continental United States

COR  command operationally ready

CTOL  conventional takeoff and landing

CV  aircraft carrier

CVA  attack aircraft carrier

CVAN  aircraft carrier (nuclear powered)

CVBF  carrier battle force
CVBG  carrier battle group
CVV  aircraft carrier (vertical takeoff)
CW  chemical warfare

D
DAS  direct air support
DD  destroyer
DE  destroyer escort
DG  defense guidance
DLG  guided-missile frigate [destroyer leader]
DLGN  guided-missile frigate [destroyer leader] (nuclear powered)
DON  Department of the Navy
DPQ  Defense Planning Questionnaire [NATO]

E
EASTLANT  Eastern Atlantic [NATO]
EASTMED  eastern Mediterranean Sea
EMPSKD  employment schedule

F
FBM  Fleet Ballistic Missile [program]
FER  Fleet Employment Planning Operational Data Report
FLEETEX  fleet exercise
FLEXOPS  flexible operations
FLTCINC  fleet commander in chief
FMS  foreign military sales
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany
FY  fiscal year
FYDP  Five Year Defense Program

G
GLCM  ground-launched cruise missile
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<tr>
<th>H</th>
<th>HUMINT</th>
<th>human intelligence</th>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I&amp;W</td>
<td>indications and warning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td></td>
<td>INDRON</td>
<td>Indian Ocean squadron [Soviet]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>initial operational capability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>JSPD</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>LAMPS</td>
<td>Light Airborne Multipurpose System</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LANT</td>
<td>Atlantic [Ocean]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>[U.S.] Atlantic Command</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LCAC</td>
<td>landing craft (air cushion)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>assault ship</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>assault ship/dock landing ship</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>low-intensity conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LLC</td>
<td>lower-level conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>landing platform dock</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>landing ship dock</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>MAB</td>
<td>Marine amphibious brigade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Marine amphibious force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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</table>
MAU  Marine amphibious unit
MC    Military Committee [NATO]
MCM   mine countermeasures
MDZ   maritime defense zone
MEB   Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF   Marine expeditionary force
MEU   Marine expeditionary unit
MIDEASTFORCE Middle East Force
MIW   mine warfare
MK    mark
MLSF  Mobile Logistics Support Force
MNC   major NATO contingency [or commander]
MOA   memorandum of agreement
MOVREP Movement Report
MPA   maritime patrol aviation
MPF   Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPN   Military Procurement (Navy) [account]
MPS   Maritime Prepositioning Ship [or Squadron]
MSC   Military Sealift Command
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFORSTAT Naval Force Status [report]
NCA   national command authorities
NCAPS naval control and protection of shipping
NCCS  Navy Command and Control System
NCS   naval control of shipping
NIE   national intelligence estimate
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>nautical mile</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORLANT</td>
<td>northern Atlantic Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>naval protection of shipping</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>Naval Reserve Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>national security decision directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSOF</td>
<td>Naval Status of Forces [database]</td>
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<td>NTPF</td>
<td>Near-Term Prepositioning Force</td>
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<td>naval warfare publication</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance [account]</td>
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<td>OOB</td>
<td>order of battle</td>
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<td>OPAREA</td>
<td>operating area</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<td>OPFLT</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operations plan</td>
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<td>OPNAV</td>
<td>Navy Staff</td>
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<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operational tempo</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
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<td>OTH-T</td>
<td>over-the-horizon targeting</td>
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<td>overhaul</td>
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<td>[U.S.] Pacific Command</td>
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<td>PERSTEMPO</td>
<td>personnel tempo</td>
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<td>PG</td>
<td>patrol gunboat</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGH</td>
<td>patrol gunboat (hydrofoil)</td>
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<td>PGM</td>
<td>patrol gunboat (missile)</td>
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<td>PHM</td>
<td>patrol hydrofoil (missile)</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objectives Memorandum; preparation for overseas movement</td>
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<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming and Budgeting System</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>R &amp; D</td>
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<td>READEX</td>
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<td>RE/RE</td>
<td>Resupply/reinforce</td>
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<td>RFS</td>
<td>Ready for sea</td>
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<td>Refresher training</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
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<td>Regular overhaul</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>Surface action group</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
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<td>Ship Construction, Navy [account]</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
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<td>SIMA</td>
<td>Shore intermediate maintenance activity</td>
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<td>SLBM</td>
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<td>SLEP</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Soviet Naval Aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOA</td>
<td>Speed of advance</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOJ</td>
<td>Sea of Japan</td>
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<td>SOLANT</td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOSS</td>
<td>Soviet Ocean Surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOSUS</td>
<td>Sound Surveillance System</td>
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<td>SPECWAR</td>
<td>special warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
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<td>ballistic-missile submarine (nuclear powered)</td>
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<td>SSGN</td>
<td>nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>attack submarine (nuclear powered)</td>
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<td>START</td>
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<td>SUBROC</td>
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<td>TACAIR</td>
<td>tactical aviation</td>
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<td>crane ship [MSC]</td>
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<td>TAD</td>
<td>temporary additional duty</td>
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<td>oiler [MSC]</td>
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<td>transport [MSC]</td>
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<td>theater antiship missile</td>
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<td>T-ATF</td>
<td>fleet tug [MSC]</td>
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<td>TFS</td>
<td>tactical fighter squadron</td>
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<td>TLAM-C</td>
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<td>TLAM-N</td>
<td>theater land-attack missile (nuclear)</td>
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<td>TYCOM</td>
<td>type commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>ULMS</td>
<td>Underwater Long Range Missile System</td>
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<td>Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea</td>
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<td>URG</td>
<td>underway replenishment group</td>
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<td>U.S. Naval Reserve</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VISTA</td>
<td>Volunteers in Service to America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOD</td>
<td>vertical onboard delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSS</td>
<td>VSTOL support ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSTOL [V/STOL]</td>
<td>vertical/short takeoff and landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTMED</td>
<td>Western Mediterranean Sea</td>
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