Somalia...From the Sea

Gary J. Ohls

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Somalia . . . From the Sea

Gary J. Ohls
The Naval War College complex on Coasters Harbor Island, in a photograph taken about 2000, looking roughly northeast. In the center foreground is Luce Hall, with Pringle Hall to its left and Mahan Hall hidden behind it; behind them, to the left, are Spruance, Conolly, and Hewitt halls. In the center, partly obscured by Conolly Hall, is McCarty Little Hall. On the extreme right in the foreground is Founders Hall, in which the College was established. In recent years the College has expanded into parts of several buildings of the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, on the northern part of the island. In the middle distance are facilities of Naval Station Newport (the decommissioned aircraft carriers ex-Forrestal and ex-Saratoga are visible at Pier 1) and, beyond that, of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. In the far distance can be seen parts of the towns of Portsmouth and Tiverton, Rhode Island.

Photograph © 2008 by Onne van der Wal Photography, Inc.
Somalia... From the Sea

Gary J. Ohls

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At the end of the decades-long Cold War, the United States displayed its military capability in a positive manner by responding to a severe humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The goal of providing assistance amid starvation and chaos appealed to the better natures of the American people and their leaders. Highly influenced by media coverage of starvation and privation, most Americans happily embraced a series of operations conducted by their government to alleviate the suffering that appeared pervasive throughout that African nation. Regrettably, the best of intentions could not prevent a continuing drift toward disorder, and the American relief effort devolved into conflict and bloodshed. Although the operations were not entirely without success, the violence and casualties incurred during these actions left a bitter impression that influenced American foreign policy and military thinking for some time thereafter. In *Somalia . . . From the Sea*, Professor Gary J. Ohls has written an account of those experiences and their subsequent impact on the policies of the United States. Despite the fact that American incursions into Somalia entailed the joint effort of all U.S. services, naval expeditionary forces provided the preponderance of force during much of the involvement. Professor Ohls illustrates this, while analyzing the operational and strategic aspects of these events.

Professor Ohls undertook this research and writing project in naval operational history while serving as a faculty member in the Maritime History Department of the Naval War College between August 2007 and December 2008. The tradition of studying both recent and long-past historical events was firmly established at the foundation of the Naval War College in 1884 with the contributions of the College’s founder, Stephen B. Luce, and his immediate successor, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Historical research and analysis has continued as a recognized element of the academic life of the institution for the past 125 years. Nowhere is there a more logical requirement for a corpus of relevant source material and for an academic research department devoted to new research on naval history. Building on a tradition of publishing timely analyses, the Naval War College initiated the book-length series of works known as the Newport Papers. In his study of American involvement in Somalia during the immediate post–Cold War period, Professor Ohls has participated in the Newport Papers tradition by making an original contribution to naval operational history that provides insight
and understanding that can inform future decisions and actions in the uncertain world that lies ahead.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF, D.PHIL.
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Chairman, Maritime History Department
Introduction

From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous incursions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the actions had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of American involvement ranged from benign to aggressive—from purely humanitarian to clearly combative. *Somalia . . . From the Sea* is an account that attempts to explain and analyze these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational concepts developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War. During this period, the sea services sought to redefine their roles in a rapidly changing defense environment, as well as the new world order of President George H. W. Bush and the assertive multilateralism of President William J. Clinton. In the minds of many leaders, these were times of both relief and uncertainty. The world had gotten through the Cold War without a nuclear exchange or a major conventional confrontation between the world’s great superpowers, and that was a good thing. But the lack of clarity about this new world order created angst in the minds of many military leaders.

Political leaders and many American citizens saw this as a time of great opportunity. It would be possible to reduce defense costs and reallocate those expenditures to everything from social programs to tax reductions. Even the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war to reestablish Kuwaiti independence did not dampen the enthusiasm of the times, since most leaders viewed Saddam Hussein and his aggression as an anomaly in the new world order. Yet for many military and naval officers and a few political leaders there remained uncertainty in the defense environment, uncertainty that they could ignore only at great risk. Within that context numerous operational and strategic concept papers were developed and published. But despite the thought and professionalism invested in this material, the impact of these concepts on the armed forces of the United States proved inconsistent and tentative.

The first chapter of this study (“Operational and Strategic Context”) identifies the most significant of these new ideas and attempts to analyze their impact on the
thinking and operations of the sea services during this period. In contrasting the new concepts with the major warfighting theories of the Cold War era—such as the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s—it becomes clear how the situation had changed and how that shift influenced the operational nature of the Navy and Marine Corps. Although this chapter addresses a number of papers from the period, such as “The Way Ahead” and The Navy Policy Book, the focus is on three closely related concept documents that typify this period: . . . From the Sea, Forward . . . From the Sea, and Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Not only did these have a great impact during the 1990s, but they remain important influences in the operational and strategic environments today.

Among the more interesting aspects of these concepts is the concurrent nature of their development and implementation. Thinkers in Washington and other centers of study developed these ideas and innovative thoughts at the same time that operators in the field conducted the actions that gave them definition. We will find this interaction between concept development and operational implementation throughout as we attempt to understand American involvement in Somalia within the operational and strategic concepts of that period.

The initial military action in Somalia—Operation EASTERN EXIT—occurred from 5 to 7 January 1991 and involved naval forces committed to DESERT SHIELD. EASTERN EXIT amounted to a noncombatant evacuation operation sent to rescue Americans and citizens of other nations from the war-torn and crime-infested city of Mogadishu. It was a humanitarian operation in that it rescued people and saved lives. More accurately, however, it was an armed incursion, conducted without the permission of the local government and authorized to accomplish its mission by force of arms if necessary. The chapter on EASTERN EXIT and its effects makes it clear how aptly the operation fits into the concepts of . . . From the Sea. It also demonstrates how the larger operations of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—involving some of the same forces that executed EASTERN EXIT—contributed to both evacuation at Mogadishu and development of the operational and strategic concepts of the period.

The chapter that addresses Operation PROVIDE RELIEF deals with the overarching concepts of this study somewhat less perfectly than is the case elsewhere in this work. PROVIDE RELIEF amounted to a relatively small air-delivery operation commanded by a Marine officer and operating through a joint staff. Its primary mission involved flying emergency food aid from Mombasa, Kenya, into remote sites of Somalia ravished by severe famine. Yet this episode is very important to our study, because it constituted America’s entry into Somalia as a humanitarian force. Unlike EASTERN EXIT, PROVIDE RELIEF implied an American commitment to Somalia and served as a precursor for the much larger and more complex involvements that followed. Familiarity with PROVIDE
RELIEF is fundamental to comprehending the American commitments to Somalia, all of them closely intertwined with . . . From the Sea and other concepts from that period. It is not possible to appreciate America’s involvement in Somalia without a clear understanding of PROVIDE RELIEF.

In addition to the air-delivery element of PROVIDE RELIEF, a small but important naval expeditionary action also occurred. The insertion of a group of Pakistani United Nations peacekeepers into Mogadishu promised to be a tricky proposition, because of the instability within that city and the negative view of the UN held by the leader of a major faction and subclan within the city. U.S. naval expeditionary forces in the form of an amphibious ready group facilitated that operation, ensuring its safe accomplishment. The PROVIDE RELIEF chapter also describes the events that created such chaotic conditions within Somalia and led to the enormous humanitarian relief response from many nations of the world. This background provides insight into the operational environment American forces faced while deployed to that part of the world. It also addresses Somali clan relationships, the political factions at play within that environment, and the leaders who contributed to the chaotic and confused society of Somalia in the 1990s. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to appreciate the factors that affected American thinking and actions before and during our larger involvements on the Horn of Africa.

Operation RESTORE HOPE exemplifies the application of . . . From the Sea and the use of naval expeditionary forces in a complex and disordered environment. The first of two chapters on RESTORE HOPE (“Operation RESTORE HOPE: Prelude and Lodgment”) addresses the growth of the crisis, the U.S. decision-making process for responding to the situation, the planning and organization of the operation, and the initial incursion into Somalia for humanitarian relief. The second (“Operation RESTORE HOPE: Operations and Transition”) deals with the problems of overcoming the friction and resistance (whether subtle or overt) that resulted from an effort to change the status quo within the Somali nation. It addresses political and diplomatic efforts, organizational activities, stabilization operations, and in some cases combat actions. Finally, this chapter deals with the problems of transferring control of the Somalia mission from a U.S. operation to one under UN leadership, during Operation CONTINUE HOPE.

CONTINUE HOPE is also addressed in two chapters, beginning with “Operation CONTINUE HOPE: Operations and Conflict.” This chapter completes the transition process from RESTORE HOPE and describes the political, social, and military environment that existed within Somalia from May to October 1993. It explains how the humanitarian relief operation morphed into a full-blown combat situation, with the CONTINUE HOPE/United Nations Operations in Somalia [UNOSOM] II force becoming embroiled in Somalia’s internecine fighting in the streets of Mogadishu. The chapter describes and
analyzes the pattern of this change, the factors contributing to its development, and its impact on the mission and subsequent operations. It includes the factors leading up to the Battle of Mogadishu (also called the "Black Hawk Down" incident), the impact of that encounter, and a brief description of the fighting.

The second chapter on this subject ("Operation CONTINUE HOPE: Reinforcement and Withdrawal") discusses the impact of the Battle of Mogadishu on American and coalition commitment to Somalia and other humanitarian activities. The shock effect of unexpected American casualties, coupled with the desecration of the body of a U.S. soldier in the streets, caused a revulsion among Americans and had a great impact on this undertaking as well as future deployments. We assess the subsequent decision to reinforce American troops while limiting use of the units arriving in Somalia as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. The schizophrenic nature of this period, wherein the U.S. president proclaimed that America would remain involved while announcing a withdrawal date only six months in the future, will also be addressed. The role of Army and naval forces during this period and the complex yet efficient withdrawal of U.S. forces during March 1994 is discussed and analyzed.

One year after the amphibious withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, the United Nations conducted a similar evacuation, known as Operation UNITED SHIELD, under the command of a U.S. naval expeditionary force. Although an efficient tactical and operational action, this undertaking exposed the failure of policy and strategy for saving Somalia from chaos and anarchy. A study of this operation is followed by a chapter entitled "Operational and Strategic Observations," which concludes the narrative and analytic elements of this work. Various appendices follow, including a chronology of events, a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and other relevant information, as well as a complete bibliography. The reader is encouraged to review all the appendices before beginning the text, as this will greatly enhance understanding of the unique aspects of this historic set of events.

Research for this study was conducted primarily in original sources. The most important element comprised original interviews by the author of many high-level leaders involved in the decision-making, planning, or execution phases of these actions. A second important resource involved the Operational Archives at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., and the Marine Corps archives in Quantico, Virginia. In addition to numerous chronologies, histories, messages, and other such material, these archives contain various interviews conducted at the time of the events under study. Memoirs in the forms of books and journal articles also contributed to this research and proved particularly valuable when used in conjunction with personal interviews.
Of course, secondary sources by competent researchers, writers, analysts, and academics were also used.

Three aspects of this study make it unique among the literature of America's incursions into Somalia. The most basic of these is the effort to address all the military actions of the period—from EASTERN EXIT through UNITED SHIELD. Many excellent accounts have covered one or several aspects of the Somalia experience, but no major study has addressed the entire series of American actions or attempted to describe and analyze their interrelated nature. The events most extensively covered in the existing literature are the December 1992 landing in Mogadishu to initiate RESTORE HOPE and the Battle of Mogadishu during CONTINUE HOPE. These events are, of course, addressed in this study, but as elements of the larger commitment rather than as isolated episodes.

A second unique element of this study is its inclusion of the U.S. Navy's contribution to America's Somalia involvement. The naval contribution has generally been left out of accounts, whereas other aspects—Army, Marine Corps, humanitarian, diplomatic, political, and United Nations—have been thoroughly covered. This work is not a naval history of U.S. involvement in Somalia; it is not possible to segment the roles of services in any way that would permit a meaningful account. But it does include the naval role as an integral part of the larger activity and characterizes the value of naval forces in an expeditionary environment.

The third unique aspect of this study is its intention to connect the Somalia incursions and the operational and strategic concepts of the time. This element of the subject is particularly fascinating, since the two activities, operations and concept development, occurred simultaneously and interactively. Through this analysis we not only understand the activity of the early 1990s but gain a broad insight as to how concepts are influenced by action. By including the conceptual aspect of naval thinking throughout this study, we also understand how policy and strategy interact with operations and tactics—at least within an expeditionary environment.

Note
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Me and Somalia against the world,
Me and my clan against Somalia,
Me and my family against my clan,
Me and my brother against my family,
Me against my brother.

Somali proverb
Operational and Strategic Context

Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spent considerable time and energy attempting to define their roles in the new security environment created by the end of the Cold War. The decline of Soviet power, marked by large cutbacks in military spending and a withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, left the United States without a peer competitor—politically, diplomatically, or militarily—on the world scene. The aftermath of this climactic event created pressure in the U.S. Congress for a "peace dividend," in the form of deep reductions in the defense budget. By 1990, President George H. W. Bush recognized the security environment had changed but also felt that it remained somewhat uncertain. The Soviet Union, America's Cold War adversary, was less hostile, but it had not yet imploded (as it soon would) into numerous successor states, and it continued to possess residual military strength, especially large quantities of nuclear weapons.

The president and his advisers wanted to avoid a haphazard disarmament—such as occurred after most wars in American history—and therefore chose to limit defense reductions to 25 percent over a five-year period. They also called for a revised security strategy that reflected new realities in the post–Cold War world. This would permit restructuring America's armed forces to fit new requirements and avoid simple across-the-board reductions that would leave the United States with a hollow version of its Cold War military force. This reassessment of national security resulted from thoughtful and professional analysis, and offered substantial force reductions, but many leaders believed it did not go far enough. In the political environment of 1990, opponents of the administration viewed the decision to reduce no more than 25 percent as inadequate and essentially a victory for supporters of the Pentagon.

During the defense buildup of the 1980s, naval leaders advocated constructing a six-hundred-ship force. They never fully attained that goal, but to defense planners at the time it seemed reasonable, because the Soviet Union possessed a strong and growing navy with deployment patterns that threatened American interests. Additionally,
simple geography and numerous treaty obligations (more than forty treaties that required naval involvement) underscored in the minds of most analysts the ongoing importance of a large naval force. But under the reduced-threat scenario of the 1990s, strategic thinking focused on addressing regional contingencies rather than worldwide warfare against the Soviet Union. In response to that focus, defense leaders developed a “Base Force” concept designed to provide a minimal yet stable defense capability that could adequately protect the nation's interests in the post–Cold War era. The notion of a 25 percent reduction in U.S. military forces, in a manner closely tied to the revised security strategy, resulted from the Base Force planning process. For the Navy, matching the Base Force structure to the new security strategy presaged a reduction from 526 to 450 ships, with associated cuts in manpower and budget. The Marine Corps also faced a decrease from its Cold War force level of 197,000 to 170,600; planners had initially considered a force as low as 150,000 Marines.

Faced with new geopolitical realities and reduced combat capabilities, defense officials and naval analysts of the early 1990s created a series of strategic concepts that redefined the mission of the sea services. The catchword of the period became “expeditionary,” and for the Navy this implied a shift from a strategy of large-scale power projection, antisubmarine warfare, and sea control based on the Soviet threat toward concepts focused on the world’s littorals. This contrasted with the last important Cold War strategy document—known as the “Maritime Strategy”—which had embodied the Navy’s role and mission of that era. Published by the U.S. Naval Institute in January 1986 as a special supplement of its Proceedings magazine, the unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy consisted of four white papers. The 1986 Maritime Strategy resulted from a substantial effort conducted by numerous strategic thinkers over a fairly long period. In fact, the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy constituted a comprehensive policy, one that addressed more than just the Soviet threat. Even so, it did not fit the security environment of the 1990s. The development of a new strategy as the basis for reductions and restructuring was fundamental to the Base Force model. Over the next several years, as ideas and concepts churned through the Department of Defense, the Navy and Marine Corps issued a series of strategic and operational papers that defined the new security environment and with it the roles and missions of the sea services. The Navy Department issued the most relevant of these documents during the first half of the 1990s. Yet even as naval thinkers codified in their policy papers the concepts of littoral-focused expeditionary warfare and sea-based forward presence, the Navy and Marine Corps team were embodying those concepts in numerous incursions in Somalia, on the Horn of Africa.

In April 1991, the Naval Institute Proceedings and the Marine Corps Gazette simultaneously published an article entitled “The Way Ahead.” Like the “Maritime Strategy”
before it, “The Way Ahead” bore the names of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. But this time the three leaders endorsed a single document rather than issuing separate papers, as they had for the 1986 Maritime Strategy. “The Way Ahead” clearly signaled the move away from the Maritime Strategy’s focus on global warfighting and deterrence and toward a new strategy based on multiple regional contingencies where American interests were threatened. Naval thinkers had recognized the need for a new vision as early as 1989, when they first noticed a weakening in Soviet resolve and the prospect of an end to the Cold War. Realizing that a new strategic environment would require new strategic thinking, the drafters of “The Way Ahead” emphasized the need for the Navy to focus on operations ashore rather than a hostile navy at sea. This implied, in addition to forward presence, involvement in humanitarian assistance, nation building, peacekeeping, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response.

“The Way Ahead” constituted the first major effort by leaders within the Navy Department to convey this policy shift to members of the sea services. It also communicated the uncertainty about the future threat environment, particularly the possibility of a resurgent Soviet navy. The ideas expressed in “The Way Ahead” proved prescient, but its ultimate value lay in the awareness it generated among professionals within the Department of the Navy. Most naval officers realized their operating environment had changed, but few could grasp what that meant for themselves or their service. “The Way Ahead” did not answer all their questions, but it did provide insight and augured changes in deployment patterns, task force composition, and mission focus. Though thoughtful and well articulated, “The Way Ahead” never served as a lodestar for planning or operations, because larger events distracted from its message. But it constituted the first important effort to communicate a radically new direction in strategic thinking; assimilating a message of that significance requires some time.

Perhaps the most important paper to address post–Cold War security concerns was the September 1992 publication entitled . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century. This concept document clearly stated a new direction for the naval services and defined a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps. Unlike “The Way Ahead,” the . . . From the Sea document became widely influential within the naval services and throughout the Department of Defense. Just four months prior to the publication of . . . From the Sea, the Navy had issued a document entitled The Navy Policy Book. Although it alluded to the Navy and Marine Corps team on various occasions, The Navy Policy Book was essentially an internal document intended for parochial use within that service. But . . . From the Sea expressed the expeditionary nature of the post–Cold War mission for both the Navy and Marine Corps while capturing the strategic temper of the time. It also reiterated the uncertainty within the operational
environment, first addressed in “The Way Ahead.” But if uncertainty existed at the operational and strategic levels in the minds of some, . . . From the Sea clarified the direction for the sea services at that time and for the near-term future. It unequivocally directed the Navy and Marine Corps team to provide the nation with “Naval Expeditionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Operations—Operating Forward from the Sea—Ta
toled for National Needs.” Its strategic message emphasized the shift “away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations from the sea.” The word “from” was the key term in this new naval concept statement, elevating the role of the U.S. Marine Corps within the larger naval mission of the time. An important assumption underlying . . . From the Sea held that no peer threat—such as a resurgent Russia or China—would threaten U.S. dominance for the next twenty years. Opinion differed on the long-range threat, but an important concept (expressed in the “Manthorpe Curve,” named for Captain William Manthorpe of the naval intelligence community)—suggested that the aggregate threat during that twenty-year window (roughly 1990–2010) would be comparatively low.

. . . From the Sea and the subsequent documents that built on its concepts (Forward . . . From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea) provided insight and direction to the sea services, with an impact not realized since the publication of the 1986 Maritime Strategy. Among other things, . . . From the Sea emphasized the importance of unobtrusive forward presence—as opposed to the forward-defense concept of the Cold War—and the flexibility of sea-based forces. That meant that naval expeditionary forces not only come from and return to the sea, they are also sustained from the sea. Sea-based expeditionary forces can project either power or assistance ashore yet do not encroach upon the sovereignty of nations while at sea. Once ashore, naval expeditionary forces present a relatively small “footprint,” because they are supported by sea, thereby reducing exposure, vulnerability, and host-nation resentment. By concentrating on the littoral regions of the world and recognizing the importance of power projection and maneuver from the sea, . . . From the Sea reinforced the importance of the Navy and Marine Corps team as, collectively, an integrated element of sea power. If . . . From the Sea constituted a new direction in strategy and structure in contrast to the Cold War focus, in many ways it validated the historical and traditional role of the sea services. As early as 1776, with the capture of New Providence in the Bahamas, and in the 1805 conquest of Derna, Tripoli, the Navy and Marine Corps team conducted joint expeditionary missions of crucial importance to the nation. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there occurred numerous expeditionary operations in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific Basin by U.S. naval forces. The subjugation of California during 1846–47 resulted primarily from a series of amphibious landings along the Pacific coastline spearheaded by the Navy and Marine Corps team. Such prominent Army
officers as Stephen W. Kearny and John C. Frémont served primarily under Navy commanders (Commodores John D. Sloat and Robert F. Stockton) as adjuncts to the naval campaign that ultimately defeated the local Californios.  

Even during the Cold War, when both services had larger roles, oriented to the Soviet threat, they retained contingency missions, as exemplified by the 1958 landing in Lebanon and the 1965 incursion into the Dominican Republic. Throughout American history, the Navy and Marine Corps worked as a team, establishing a model for joint operations in an expeditionary environment.

By the time...From the Sea and subsequent documents relating to it appeared, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 had made the concept of “jointness” an object of high devotion among many leaders within the Defense Department. Technically, the Navy and Marine Corps team constitutes a joint force, and its expeditionary incursions qualify as joint operations. But in reality the Navy and Marine Corps team is something else—in fact, something much better—and for obvious reasons. The two services have roots in a close and integrated tradition built over two centuries of operating together, making them essentially two integral elements of a single naval force. This connection goes far beyond simply working together in planning and operations. It includes such key elements as combined staffs, common doctrine, frequent exercises and operations, and a sense of shared experiences, all of which contribute to a common institutional culture in the field of expeditionary warfare. The fact that both services reside within the Department of the Navy is also important, but even that does not adequately explain the symbiotic nature of their relationship. That is more correctly found in the history and traditions of the two branches. As Lieutenant Commander Terry O’Brien stated in a 1993 Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis paper, “[...] From the Sea has not discovered a new form of warfare—it has rediscovered the capabilities of the Navy/Marine Corps team.”

Although disagreement and discord often exist between the Navy and Marine Corps on important issues, their disputes are typically of the productive type that results in better policy, doctrine, plans, and operations through the interchange and vetting of ideas and concepts. Ultimately, this process contributes to improved war preparation and to success in combat. Perhaps the most notable example of this process involved the World War II relationship between two giants of that era, Richmond Kelly Turner and Holland M. Smith. Of course, the Second World War in no way parallels the expeditionary environment of the 1990s. But the effectiveness of the amphibious forces of the Fifth Fleet illustrates the practice that made the Navy and Marine Corps team of that period exceptional—well beyond the level conceived even in joint operational doctrine. As a rear admiral during the Central Pacific campaign of 1943–45, Turner served as commander of the Navy’s amphibious forces, while Smith, holding the rank of major general, commanded the Marines. Both men were highly intelligent, strong willed,
and totally dedicated to the honor and success of their services. They often clashed; some of their confrontations became legendary throughout the Pacific. Yet each valued the role of the other’s branch, and the disagreements always focused on how best to accomplish their mission. The result was often compromise, but only after all competing options received due consideration, under the strongest possible sponsorship. As Smith characterized their relationship after the war, “Kelly Turner and I were to be team mates in all my operations. He commanded Fifth Amphibious Force while I commanded the expeditionary troops that went along with the Navy and our partnership, though stormy, spelled hell in big red letters to the Japanese.”

It might be difficult to determine which of these two powerhouses won more arguments. But the true winners were clearly the United States and the U.S. naval service.

In light of this traditional relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps, it is only natural that the concepts of . . . From the Sea were quickly amalgamated by the two services. In 1994, two years after its publication, a refinement and expansion of its ideas appeared, under the appropriate title Forward . . . From the Sea.” Like most strategic concepts issued by the Navy Department during this period, Forward . . . From the Sea bore the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.” If . . . From the Sea enhanced the role of the Marine Corps in the expeditionary environment of 1992, Forward . . . From the Sea tended to restore the Navy to its senior status by addressing its broader mission—beyond the purview of littoral warfare. Although this concept paper maintained continuity with . . . From the Sea, it also upheld the importance of the Navy’s role in fighting and winning America’s wars at all levels while emphasizing the need to “be engaged in forward areas, with the objective of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.”

Forward . . . From the Sea underscored the point that forward-deployed naval forces provide the linkage between peacetime operations and the initial responses to a crisis or major regional contingency. Additionally, it places the aircraft carrier battle group on equal standing with the amphibious ready group as the “building blocks” of forward-deployed presence.” Forward . . . From the Sea argues the importance of joint and combined operations while specifically affirming the traditional relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps.” Its drafters summarize the document’s main thrust in this way: “Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National Security Strategy: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence.” Of these five, only two—power projection and forward presence—are directly associated with the expeditionary warfare concepts of . . . From the Sea. This caused some concern within the Marine Corps that perhaps the Navy was seeking a return to a blue-water focus at the expense of expeditionary warfare as conceived in . . . From the Sea.”
Forward...From the Sea makes numerous references to...From the Sea and is clearly intended to augment, not replace, the latter’s precepts. By including such traditional naval missions as sea control, warfighting, and deterrence (coupled with the forward-presence and power-projection missions of...From the Sea) this strategy supported Navy efforts to resist further force reductions and budget cuts. In short, the more roles and missions the Navy claimed, the more ships it would need to support them.

In January 1996, the Marine Corps issued a document that augmented...From the Sea, outlining the concept of “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” or as it became known, simply OMFTS. Published after the last American incursion into Somalia, the ideas and concepts of OMFTS were greatly influenced by those operations on the Horn of Africa, as well as by other actions occurring in the early 1990s.

Although many officers within the Navy and Marine Corps contributed to the development of these various concepts after the end of the Cold War, one of the earliest inputs to OMFTS emerged from the experiences of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., during DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and the evacuation of the American embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia (Operation EASTERN EXIT). In a 1991 memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jenkins emphasized that future operations, either combat or humanitarian, should involve very rapid, long-range insertions along the coastline at points where gaps in coastal defenses would permit the avoidance of enemy strength. This would be accomplished primarily by the use of Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles loaded with Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and helicopters or V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. The key elements of Jenkins’s concept were high speed, maneuverability, and long range (perhaps from amphibious ships at sea as far as fifty miles over the horizon). He suggested it be named “Maneuver from the Sea,” or perhaps “Maneuver War from the Sea.” Five years later, the OMFTS concept paper would include all of Jenkins’s ideas.

In many ways, the OMFTS concept paper constitutes an intellectual exercise as much as a policy statement. Its clearly stated purpose is to begin a process of “proposal, debate, and experimentation” while providing near-term vision for naval forces operating in the expeditionary environment. Among other things, OMFTS addresses two major
changes in the operational environment—worsening chaos in much of the world’s littorals and the enhanced combat capability of American forces—and suggests that these factors will greatly influence where, against whom, and how U.S. forces fight in future operations. Implied is the question of whether or not conventional military capability (even enhanced capability) is suitable for the challenges in areas likely to require intervention by America’s expeditionary forces. Conceived as an adjunct document that builds on...From the Sea and Forward...From the Sea, OMFTS is essentially an operational concept, intended to create “forces capable of winning decisive victories in littoral areas.” The essence of OMFTS is a “marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare based on sea-borne maneuver, sea-based sustainability, and rapid execution.” Despite the cerebral nature of the concept paper and the fact that it addresses new dynamics in the expeditionary environment, the OMFTS terminology and the tactical ideas behind it had been in play within the Department of the Navy even before the issuance of...From the Sea.

Historically, amphibious operations—especially large-scale landings—required a buildup ashore after establishing the initial beachhead. Perhaps the most important distinction between OMFTS and traditional amphibious warfare lies in the avoidance of that operational phase. By inserting a landing element directly against enemy centers of gravity, the OMFTS model offers a sea-based version of “maneuver warfare” (then a prominent concept among land-warfare thinkers and planners), one executed by naval expeditionary forces. As stated in the OMFTS document, “Landing forces will move directly from the ship to their objectives, whether those objectives are located on the shoreline or far inland.” Elimination of the traditional need to establish a lodgment ashore is made possible by greater use of sea-based logistics, improved long-range fire support from naval ships (including precision-guided air munitions), and more efficient use of fuel and supplies ashore.

By using the sea as maneuver space, ship-based expeditionary forces can create multiple avenues of approach—to an extent that land maneuver warfare cannot match—and project power from over the horizon or even farther away. By striking rapidly at critical objectives using modern Navy and Marine Corps transport systems (LHA, LHD, V-22, LCAC, AAAV, LAV, etc.), amphibious forces create an intensively rapid operational tempo, thereby acting “inside” the enemy’s decision-making process—that is, posing challenges more rapidly than it can respond. With possession and use of the initiative, an inherent advantage of sea services in expeditionary warfare, landing forces can attack objectives at times and locations of their choosing, thereby pitting friendly strength against enemy weakness. These concepts, based on...From the Sea and OMFTS, apply equally to wartime situations and operations other than war.
Although written for an expeditionary environment, the concepts expressed in
. . . *From the Sea* and OMFTS have application across the entire spectrum of conflict. In
fact, they were not radically new thoughts; the prominent status they achieved during
the 1990s resulted from an evolutionary process at various levels of warfare.\(^6^2\) For
instance, the 1950 landing at Inchon, Korea, and the subsequent capture of Seoul is a
classic example of OMFTS within a conventional war setting.\(^6^3\) Often thought of as a
World War II–style amphibious landing, the Inchon operation actually had several
interesting differences. The maneuver started in southern California and progressed
through Japan and the Pusan Perimeter, gaining in force at each stage, and then on to
the landing at Inchon and the key objectives inland, principally Kimpo Airfield and the
capital city, Seoul.\(^6^4\) By passing through the Inchon site and immediately capturing the
inland objectives, the landing force cut off all support to the North Korean army
around the Pusan Perimeter, resulting in its destruction. The selection of Inchon as a
landing site was in itself an astute application of maneuver warfare, in that the enemy,
thinking an amphibious incursion impossible at Inchon, had left it lightly defended.
The concept of attacking with American strength against North Korean weakness and
moving directly inland to key objectives resulted in an operational victory with strate-
gic implications.\(^6^5\) Had American forces struck a more “logical” place, such as Kunsan
or Posun-Myong, as some planners urged, and then established a supply buildup
ashore before attacking centers of gravity, the best they could have hoped for would
have been a hard fight and in the end little more than tactical success.\(^6^6\)

The Somalia incursions of the 1990s demonstrate an entirely different application of
the concepts associated with . . . *From the Sea* and OMFTS. In those various operations,
we see these expeditionary principles at work in the post–Cold War environment, for
which they were crafted. The examples of Korea and Somalia illustrate the wide variety
of missions that naval expeditionary forces can execute using these concepts. The
Inchon landing occurred in a conventional war, as a purely combat operation, whereas
the Somalia incursions fit in the category of “military operations other than war”
(MOOTW), though some fighting did take place. Expeditionary forces must always be
ready to fight once ashore, but that was not the primary intent in most of the incursions
in Somalia during the 1990s. This study explores the various Somalia operations
in the context of . . . *From the Sea* and OMFTS, using those frameworks to explain and
analyze operational and strategic implications. It also demonstrates how the Somalia
experience contributed to the subsequent development of concepts, doctrine, and
equipment.\(^6^7\) That culminated in the publication of the concept document entitled
*Ship-to-Objective Maneuver* and the introduction of improved assault craft that can
support the rapid maneuver from ships directly to objectives ashore uninterrupted by
topography or hydrography.\(^6^8\)
The operational and strategic concepts relating to expeditionary warfare discussed in this chapter, particularly ... From the Sea and OMFTS, are the cornerstones for explaining and evaluating the Somalia incursions of the 1990s. The initial action discussed in this study involved an emergency evacuation of the American embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, which occurred in January 1991—before the publication of any of these documents. Known as EASTERN EXIT, this operation illustrates the inherent efficacy of the Navy and Marine Corps team prior to the creation of the concept papers issued in the aftermath of the Cold War. The evacuation at Mogadishu occurred because of a collapse in social and political order throughout Somalia. This disastrous situation also led to subsequent American involvement for the purpose—at least initially—of providing humanitarian relief, which is one of the missions envisioned by MOOTW. From April 1992, when UN Security Council Resolution 751 created the organization known as United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), until March 1995, when American forces evacuated all UN personnel from Mogadishu, the United States conducted numerous actions to assist the people of that nation. These actions embodied and exemplified the expeditionary concepts of that time, particularly those of ... From the Sea and OMFTS. The EASTERN EXIT operation, coupled with experiences in the Persian Gulf region during DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM, solidified the concepts later codified by the Navy in the naval doctrine publication Naval Warfare and by the Marine Corps in Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The ability to create theory and publish concepts while simultaneously conducting traditional and innovative operations was a distinctive characteristic of the expeditionary environment during the first half of the 1990s.

Notes


20. Ibid., pp. 12–13, 86.

21. The term *expeditionary* is subject to various interpretations, but for purposes of this paper it “implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly. . . . Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unobtrusive forward presence which may be intensified or withdrawn as required on short notice.” See . . . *From the Sea*, p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 1.

23. Ibid., pp. 2–7.


34. The term joint “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.” Jointness is a slightly pejorative reference to an obsessive dedication to the concept of some officers within the military services. See U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 12 April 2001, as amended through 14 September 2007).


40. The signatories include John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; Adm. J. M. Boorda, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.


43. Ibid., p. 2.

44. Ibid., p. 4.

45. Ibid., p. 8.

46. Ibid., p. 10.


48. Ibid., p. 149.


50. Forward . . . From the Sea, pp. 1, 6.


60. Operating inside the enemy’s decision-making process is another way of saying that one makes decisions faster—and acts faster on those decisions—than one’s opponent. This has the obvious benefit of constantly placing the enemy in a reactive mode. Military leaders often use the “OODA Loop” model (also called the “Boyd Cycle”), a time-competitive version of the observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA) process. See U.S. Navy Dept., Tactics, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 30 July 1997), pp. 69–71; Terry C. Pierce, “. . . From the Sea: Not a CVN Gator,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1993), pp. 74–75; and Anderson, “Implementing OMFTS,” pp. 57, 60.


62. MCDP 1-0, p. 2-16.


64. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from the Sea, p. 7.


66. Ibid., p. 346.


69. NDP 1, p. 22.


71. Jenkins interview.
During December 1990, the eyes of the world and the attention of its leaders focused on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. For months, the United States had been building a strong naval and military presence throughout the region in response to Saddam Hussein's 2 August 1990 attack and occupation of Kuwait. Under the leadership of Vice Admirals Henry H. Mauz, Jr., and Stanley R. Arthur, NAVCENT (that is, the naval component of U.S. Central Command) created a force in excess of a hundred ships, the largest American fleet assembled since World War II. The buildup had begun under Admiral Mauz and continued with Arthur, who assumed command of NAVCENT just six weeks before the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Despite that cutoff date, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso II, did not consider war to liberate Kuwait as imminent and chose to carry out the already-planned change of command at NAVCENT on 1 December 1990. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command, considered Arthur one of the most aggressive admirals he knew and interposed no objection. Additionally, Arthur had considerable experience within this operational area, having created the post of NAVCENT back in 1983.

When Arthur took command in December 1990, Rear Admiral John B. “Bat” LaPlante commanded its amphibious element, which would ultimately consist of thirty-one ships, loaded with two Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) and one special operations-capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU [SOC])—roughly seventeen thousand Marines. LaPlante's Marine counterpart, Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., commanded both the 4th MEB and—as senior Marine officer afloat—the overall Marine landing force, which ultimately included 5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC). In the language of doctrine, LaPlante served as Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Jenkins as Commander, Landing Force (CLF). (The Marine element afloat under Jenkins's command should not be confused with the I Marine Expeditionary Force—I MEF, pronounced “One MEF”—ashore under Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer; the two had different missions and reporting structures.) The primary role, shared by
LaPlante as Commander, Task Force (CTF) 156, and Jenkins as CTF 158, involved preparing for an amphibious assault against Iraqi positions on the Kuwaiti coastline in the upcoming Operation DESERT STORM. This required planning and operational rehearsals, the capstone event being a major landing exercise in Oman during late January 1991, designated SEA SOLDIER IV. This rehearsal was to include the entire force under LaPlante and Jenkins; it would constitute the largest amphibious landing since Exercise STEEL PIKE in October 1964.

The threatened landing was intended primarily as a deception, but Schwarzkopf often impressed on Arthur the importance of convincing Iraqi commanders that an amphibious landing would be part of any future war for Kuwait. Also, LaPlante and Jenkins needed to prepare for an actual assault landing should the course of war so dictate. With proper training, including large-scale rehearsals, the amphibious force would be capable of both deception and combat. The importance of this exercise, coupled with firm arrangements coordinated through Omani and U.S. State Department representatives, caused both Arthur and LaPlante to consider the scheduled dates for SEA SOLDIER IV as fixed and definite. They also believed that the entire amphibious force had to participate in the landing, in order to achieve NAVCENT training objectives. The diversion of ships or Marines for any cause—no matter how important—would disrupt their planning and degrade combat readiness. This issue was to influence the thinking of Arthur and LaPlante when conditions within Somalia necessitated an American rescue mission in the days just preceding DESERT STORM.

As events eventually played out, the amphibious force under LaPlante and Jenkins did not conduct an amphibious landing during DESERT STORM. But as a deception operation, theirs was the most successful since the Second World War. The major reasons for its success include the degree to which the Navy and Marine Corps prepared for the landing, especially the SEA SOLDIER IV rehearsal. Leaders at Central Command also provided American news media opportunities to observe and report the amphibious preparations. The film footage taken during the visits of the press to the fleet showed up on television newscasts throughout the period leading up to the DESERT STORM ground attack. Only the highest levels of command knew that the amphibious landing was actually a ruse; even Jenkins—the senior Marine officer afloat—was not informed, although he had suspected the truth for various reasons, including the constant press coverage. The deception tied down five, sometimes six, divisions (depending on the time frame) along the coast of Kuwait and drew an Iraqi reaction every time LaPlante and Jenkins made a move in the Persian Gulf. The key commanders believed that the hard training by the amphibious force during Operation DESERT SHIELD—capped by SEA SOLDIER IV—provided the credibility that fooled Iraqi leaders.
Amphibious Squadron 6 (PhibRon 6), commanded by Captain Alan B. Moser, had been among the first naval forces to sail to the Arabian Sea after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Moser’s squadron consisted of five ships loaded with some 2,100 Marines from units of Jenkins’s 4th MEB. By January 1991 they had been at sea over four months, conducting training and preparing for the looming battle with Iraq. Prior to deploying for DESERT SHIELD, Moser’s squadron had spent only a few weeks in port at Norfolk, Virginia, following a routine Mediterranean deployment. PhibRon 6 was typical of the Navy and Marine forces that deployed for DESERT SHIELD in that its elements responded to the crisis on very short notice and in various stages of training. But during their time at sea, the sailors and Marines of the entire amphibious task force conducted a series of training exercises, including IMMINENT THUNDER and SEA SOLDIER I–III, and achieved a high level of preparedness. Nevertheless, they urgently needed to participate in SEA SOLDIER IV to ensure their ability to conduct a large-scale landing if required. SEA SOLDIER IV was particularly critical because Jenkins’s landing force consisted of three distinct elements (4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU [SOC]) that did not have a common higher headquarters. It amounted to a command roughly the size of a small Marine expeditionary force but without a MEF headquarters to structure and direct it. Therefore, when LaPlante and Moser received the warning order to prepare for an amphibious evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, their immediate concern involved the new operation’s impact on this critical exercise and subsequent combat landings should such action become necessary during the impending war with Iraq.

On 1 January 1991, as LaPlante increased the tempo of war preparation, NAVCENT received an alert message indicating that internal clan warfare in Somalia might endanger American citizens and so require a military response. This did not surprise Arthur, who had been monitoring message traffic from Somalia and had noticed in it an increasing sense of urgency. The following day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in Mogadishu requested military assistance to evacuate Americans from the embassy due to the chaotic violence occurring throughout the city. The Pentagon immediately directed Central Command to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to rescue American citizens from Somalia. Arthur tasked LaPlante with planning the NEO and proposing a contingency task force to execute the mission. LaPlante summoned Moser to a meeting on his flagship, USS Nassau (LHA 4), then in port at Dubai. Having limited knowledge of conditions on the ground in Mogadishu, the two commanders envisioned a force capable of performing missions across the entire range of amphibious operations, including both surface and air actions. (Only later in the planning process did it become obvious that a surface evacuation across the beach would not be practicable.) In addition to identifying the necessary amphibious ships and
Marines for the mission, they proposed two destroyers, which could provide fire and electronic-warfare support should either become necessary.24

Despite the irregular nature of the fighting in Mogadishu, amphibious commanders had serious concerns that sophisticated weapons systems might be present, particularly within the government faction. During much of the 1970s, Somalia had been a Cold War ally of the Soviet Union and had received both modern weapons and advisers.25 That relationship soured and the Soviets eventually withdrew their support, but American commanders needed to consider the possibility that Cold War weapons—especially surface-to-air missiles and electronic-warfare equipment—remained in Somali hands and could threaten the rescue mission.26 LaPlante therefore recommended a seven-ship response force—four amphibious ships, two destroyers, and one oiler—to conduct the operation, under Moser’s command.27

Concurrent with LaPlante’s planning, Jenkins considered issues relating to the landing force that would conduct the operation on the ground. He tasked Colonel James J. Doyle, Jr., the commander of Brigade Service Support Group 4, then located on the amphibious dock transport USS Trenton (LPD 14), to command the mission to Mogadishu. Jenkins instructed Doyle to create a special-purpose command element—designated 4th MEB, Detachment 1—aboard the amphibious assault ship (and helicopter carrier) USS Guam (LPH 9) to plan the operation and exercise command and control during its execution. Doyle relocated from Trenton to Guam, taking several key members of his own staff, which he integrated with officers from various headquarters
elements to create an experienced, professional, and eager group.\textsuperscript{29} Equally important, Guam’s commanding officer, Captain Charles R. Saffell, Jr., and the Marine commander of troops aboard Guam, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, along with their staffs, began planning for the operation even before the arrivals of Doyle and Moser. When the two commanders reached Guam with their skeleton staffs, they found work already advanced. The staff planning and subsequent execution thus amounted to a collaborative effort among Navy and Marine officers who knew their jobs, knew their doctrines and procedures, and in many cases knew each other personally.\textsuperscript{29}

Arthur recognized the importance of rescuing Americans in Somalia, but he did not want to send a seven-ship task force to do the job. He viewed the action as strictly an extraction, to get people out of and away from Mogadishu. There would be no ongoing operation ashore in Somalia or afloat within the Indian Ocean. At least, Arthur hoped to limit the mission to that role, because he needed all his ships for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—as well as the critical SEA SOLDIER IV workup. Once he sent ships out of the operational area, Arthur and his commanders knew, getting them back could be a problem. For example, the evacuees coming out of Mogadishu would require transfer to a safe haven. Could he bring them back to Oman, or would he have to send his ships to Mombasa, Kenya, or the island of Diego Garcia, even farther from the main scene of action? Additionally, commanders throughout the fleet remembered the 1990 evacuation of Americans in Liberia, Operation SHARP EDGE, which had lasted five months and ultimately involved four ships and some 2,100 Marines. Not wanting to degrade combat readiness in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf any more than absolutely necessary, Arthur decided a two-ship amphibious task force with the right mix of helicopters and Marines could accomplish the mission in Somalia.\textsuperscript{30} Guam and Trenton, at anchor near Masirah, Oman, not only had the necessary configuration but also were located nearest of any possible candidates to the Horn of Africa.\textsuperscript{31} LaPlante assigned these two ships to conduct the operation and sent Commodore Moser—whom he held in high esteem and hated to lose—to command the amphibious task force.\textsuperscript{32}

The need for this rescue mission to Somalia had resulted from the breakdown of governmental control and the subsequent breaking out of social strife occurring throughout that nation, especially in the capital city of Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{33} By 1989, twenty years of dictatorial rule under President Mohamed Siad Barre had produced three substantial clan-based rebel factions: the Somali National Movement (SNM), active in northern Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), primarily in the south; and the United Somali Congress (USC), focused in Mogadishu and central Somalia.\textsuperscript{34} Over the next two years, political turmoil became increasingly fierce, spawning clan warfare and rampant criminal activity. As Siad Barre lost grip on power in Somalia, the rebel elements further broke down into subclan conflict, increasing the level of bloodshed and
undercutting efforts at unification. In early December 1990, conditions had so deteriorated that Ambassador Bishop evacuated nonessential embassy personnel and called on all American citizens to leave the country. He even sent his wife and daughter out of Somalia, to underscore the seriousness of the situation and encourage others to depart. Most foreign missions in Mogadishu took similar actions as the fighting increased and social disintegration worsened. Although not specifically targeted by any Somali faction, the U.S. embassy and its staff were often victimized by gunfire and random acts of violence.

After meeting with the Somali president and prime minister in the closing days of December, Bishop concluded that the government had neither a plan nor the ability to control the growing crisis. As carnage and lawlessness spread, the need to evacuate remaining Americans increased, while the embassy’s own ability to do so decreased. The situation constituted the kind of “chaos in the littorals” that the OMFTS concept paper would later characterize as a war of “all against all.” In response, Bishop moved Americans into relatively secure areas in and around the embassy, while Italian officials made a fruitless effort to arrange a cease-fire among warring factions. With the failure of this effort, the American ambassador realized that his options were narrowing, and on 2 January he requested military assistance to evacuate the embassy. By the following day, Bishop had perceived that conditions were so bad that only a helicopter-borne evacuation had any chance of rescuing the remaining Americans from Mogadishu.

In response to the Pentagon’s execution order for EASTERN EXIT, officers at Central Command deployed two C-130 and one AC-130 aircraft to Kenya and ordered Guam and Trenton to set sail toward Mogadishu. In reality, Central Command had already initiated these actions in anticipation of orders from the National Command Authority (referring, at the time, to the president and secretary of defense). After meeting with LaPlante aboard Nassau, as described above, Moser took five members of his squadron staff and four officers from Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 to Masirah in a P-3 Orion and then helicoptered aboard Guam. Doyle had already arrived, and the two commanders collocated their operations center in the ship’s Supporting Arms Control Center. Although this arrangement appears somewhat ad hoc, the creation of special-purpose organizations for various expeditionary actions is normal for Marine and Navy officers of the amphibious service. The officers assembling on Guam to plan and execute this rescue mission had considerable experience in this type of operation, and many had worked together before. The planning began immediately upon receipt of the warning.
order and continued after the two ships departed Masirah just before midnight on 2 January 1991.  

With the amphibious force in motion, officers at Central Command and NAVCENT continued to consider alternate methods for conducting the evacuation. In fact, various possibilities had been under consideration at all levels of command from the beginning of the crisis, and it had not yet become clear that only one option remained viable. Initially, the preferred course of action involved sending aircraft carrying security detachments into the Mogadishu airport and then flying American evacuees out of the country. Several other foreign missions had done exactly that during the last few days of December. But this required a “permissive” environment, and leaders at Central Command came to realize from Bishop’s messages that such conditions no longer existed. The embassy could not even communicate with the Mogadishu airport to obtain permission for landing evacuation aircraft; the telephone lines were all down. More significantly, the airport was nearly two miles from the embassy, and Bishop did not believe Americans could any longer move safely on the city streets. Central Command also considered the use of special operation forces, going so far as to direct that six MH-53 Pave Low helicopters with tanker support be prepared to conduct the evacuation. This option never progressed beyond the initial concept, because the Pave Low aircraft were preparing for the imminent launching of DESERT STORM. Additionally, the special operations forces were heavily committed along the Iraqi border and in the western desert, looking for Scud missiles. It now became apparent that only an amphibious evacuation by ship-based helicopters offered a prospect for success regardless of the situation on the ground. 

By 4 January, conditions had deteriorated so much further that Bishop requested two Platoons of paratroopers be dropped to protect Americans until the amphibious task force could arrive. Colonel Doyle and other commanders considered it a bad idea, because the space available for a landing zone was so small that the paratroopers might be scattered outside the embassy. Such an operation would also increase the number of people requiring evacuation. More important, by the time Bishop made his request, events had outpaced the rationale: Moser’s task force was nearing a position to launch its helicopters, sooner than Bishop had expected, and the rescue team would likely arrive before paratroops could be delivered. In any case, and fortunately for all concerned, Schwarzkopf refused to authorize the paratroop drop. 

Masirah, Oman, where Guam and Trenton were when they originally received orders to sail, is in the northern Arabian Sea, approximately 1,500 miles from Mogadishu. Guam had a top speed of twenty-four knots, whereas Trenton could manage about eighteen knots maximum. There was no requirement to keep the ships together, and initially
Guam steamed at near maximum speed, outpacing Trenton. Saffell, in Guam, received orders to slow to a more fuel-efficient speed, with which he complied. But as the gravity of the situation in Mogadishu became clear, the ship resumed its initial speed. Neither Moser nor Saffell was concerned over fuel usage, because they had plenty on board and could replenish in Mombasa if necessary. In any case, it had become essential that the ships close the distance to Somalia as fast as possible, and that trumped fuel economy.

Planning and conducting operations had become second nature to Moser, Doyle, their staffs, the officers of the ships, and the embarked Marines. In addition to considerable practice, existing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and training in rapid planning techniques greatly facilitated their efforts and ensured the prompt issuance of well-conceived orders. When to launch the rescue force remained under discussion, but Bishop’s anxious messages forced the issue into the forefront. While Moser and Doyle prepared for the evacuation in Mogadishu, LaPlante and Jenkins—exhibiting high confidence in their subordinates—monitored events from Nassau and continued preparation for Sea Soldier IV, scheduled to begin in Oman on 19 January 1991.

In the early morning hours of 5 January, two Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters lifted a small amphibious force from Guam’s deck and headed for Mogadishu, 466 miles to the southwest. In hindsight, it was clearer than ever that only the helicopter-borne amphibious option offered any hope for saving the Americans in time. The CH-53Es, because they were designed to conduct in-flight refueling, had a long-range insertion capability. They remain the only U.S. heavy-lift helicopters that can fly into an uncertain environment from such a distance.

Assigned to Trenton, these two helicopters cross-decked to Guam to load the evacuation
force and then launch for Mogadishu. The Super Stallions carried a sixty-man force consisting of forty-seven Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (an element of Jenkins’s 4th MEB), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel McAleer; four Marines from Doyle’s headquarters elements; and a nine-man Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team, under Commander Stephen R. Louma, USN. McAleer’s 1st Battalion had been the helicopter-borne assault element of Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2), composed primarily of the 2nd Marine Regiment. Accordingly, McAleer’s Marines had become very proficient in helicopter operations from the many exercises and rehearsals they had conducted at sea. Additionally, their predeployment training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, had included noncombatant-evacuation exercises.

Doyle ordered McAleer to accompany his Marines on their mission to Mogadishu, while he himself remained at sea, where communications were better and he could keep close contact with Moser. In addition to assigning McAleer to command the Marines and SEALs, Doyle appointed Lieutenant Colonel Willard D. Oates as overall commander of the forward element. Oates would be the senior officer on the ground in Mogadishu, working primarily with the ambassador after arriving at the embassy. Major William N. Saunders would serve as the logistician for the mission, specifically supervising the evacuation control center (ECC), which would process evacuees and prepare them for departure.

Sending two lieutenant colonels, one Navy commander (Louma accompanied the SEAL team), and a major in addition to the normal complement of officers and noncommissioned officers seems top-heavy. But Doyle considered this “an unconventional operation with potentially extraordinary consequences” and wanted a “few guys with gray hair” in the landing zone. Loss of American life in the embassy at Mogadishu would distract the nation as it approached the critical point of warfare in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Doyle clearly remembered the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and how it had constrained American action for 444 days. Either scenario could unhinge DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM planning, resulting in unthinkable consequences.

Essentially, Doyle organized the NEO team in a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) structure, as illustrated in figure 1. In Doyle’s organizational plan, Oates functioned as the senior officer ashore, although McAleer held the same rank and commanded most of the Marines. Fortunately, command issues never became a problem, despite the large number of high-ranking officers ashore, because Oates and McAleer tended to be of one mind. Additionally, Bishop clearly understood his role in the operation and remained firmly in control of events throughout. The ambassador had been involved in the evacuation at Monrovia, Liberia (SHARP EDGE), a few months earlier, and EASTERN EXIT clearly benefited from his experience.
While evaluating alternate courses of action, Moser and Doyle considered launching the helicopters directly from their initial positions in the northern Arabian Sea, some 1,500 miles from the target area. They again considered launching when the ships reached a point 890 miles away, but ultimately, as noted above, they launched from a distance of 466 nautical miles. In addition to Bishop's distressed calls for help, a number of issues contributed to this decision: in-flight refueling requirements, the availability of tanker support, the arrival time over Mogadishu, and the availability of AC-130 gunships to provide cover.

Anticipating the issue of in-flight refueling, Arthur had earlier contacted Air Force representatives at Central Command and learned that they could not provide tanker support, due to other commitments. He then contacted Major General Royal N. Moore, commanding general of 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and arranged for Marine Corps KC-130 tankers to refuel the Super Stallions. This proved challenging enough, as the 466-nautical-mile flight meant two refuelings, over open water at night, by pilots who had not recently practiced the procedure. The first refueling would ensure that the helicopters could arrive at Mogadishu, and it would occur at a point that would allow the helicopters to return to Guam should the refueling prove unsuccessful. The second refueling provided sufficient fuel for locating the embassy and guaranteeing that the outbound flight could clear the Somali coastline. Yet another refueling would be required during the flight back to Guam.
Aerial refueling proved difficult during the transit from Guam to the objective, for a variety of reasons. A lack of night-vision capability in the KC-130 tankers (one pilot in each of the CH-53Es wore night-vision goggles) made it difficult for the tanker crews to see the helicopters once they reached the rendezvous point. It had been over a year since the helicopter pilots had practiced refueling, not having anticipated any such requirement during DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM. They had even taken the refueling probes off their aircraft, making it necessary to reinstall them prior to takeoff. Fortunately, Captain Saffell, himself an aviator, was acutely attuned to the problems and risks of nighttime refueling over an open ocean. He delayed the helicopter launch until he saw the KC-130s on radar, then tracked both the tankers and Sea Stallions to ensure a proper rendezvous. One helicopter experienced a fuel leak while refueling; the crew chief repaired it in flight, but not before the Marines and SEALs received a good dousing of gas. It appears that the air crew had not only removed the probes but failed to service the equipment. The second refueling, just fifty-three nautical miles from Mogadishu, went somewhat more smoothly; the third refueling, during the flight back to Guam, would prove successful, though problematic.

Navigation also caused problems during the flight to Mogadishu; the Omega navigation system on the CH-53Es could not always acquire the three land-based signals needed to fix a position. The part of the Indian Ocean in which the task force operated had “dead spaces,” resulting in inconsistent readings. As a result, the pilots relied on dead reckoning (based on prefight calculations), pathfinding support from the KC-130 refuelers, and positive control from the ships while within radar range. When the Omega systems could obtain position fixes, the pilots used those reading as backups. Launching beyond 466 miles would multiply the problems faced by the pilots in conducting this long-range insertion and extraction, due to refueling requirements and navigational complications. Conversely, waiting for a closer departure point would very likely have proven disastrous for the embassy personnel, as local conditions continued to worsen. In retrospect, it seems that Moser, Doyle, and the planners of EASTERN EXIT aboard Guam calculated the launch point just about right.

After receiving the last refueling and a final fix on their position from the KC-130s, the helicopter pilots began their approach into the city. If navigating across part of the Indian Ocean had been difficult, locating the embassy proved equally vexing. The initial information available during the planning phase regarding the location and configuration of the compound had proved to be out of date and inaccurate. A Marine warrant officer who accompanied Doyle from Trenton had served on the Marine security guard detachment in Somalia several years earlier, and he pointed out to the planners that the embassy had moved inland from the position indicated on their maps and
planning documents. Updated coordinates and an aerial photograph were received later in the planning process and proved helpful in identifying the new embassy location. They also eliminated any residual consideration of landing over the beach with surface forces, because the Marines would likely have had to fight their way across Mogadishu, and at that point American leaders wanted to avoid becoming involved in Somalia’s civil war. Despite the updated information, the embassy compound proved difficult to identity from the air, particularly at low altitude in the early morning light. The pilots spent nearly twenty minutes flying over Mogadishu and eventually made a second approach from the sea before finally identifying their objective.

As the Super Stallions arrived over the American embassy at approximately 0620 (that is, 6:20 in the morning) on 5 January, the compound was receiving a large volume of gunfire, and some 150 Somalis with ladders had gathered at one of the embassy walls. Flying low into the cantonment area, the helicopters scattered the assembled miscreants and landed within the embassy grounds. The Marines disembarked and established a perimeter to defend the compound and protect subsequent evacuations. The SEAL team assumed responsibility for protecting the ambassador and reinforced the Marine Security Guard detachment (Marines permanently stationed at the embassy, as opposed to those arriving in helicopters) protecting the chancery building.

The two helicopters remained on the ground for approximately one hour; an Air Force AC-130 gunship loitered overhead to gather intelligence and offer fire support if required. The Super Stallions departed for their return flight to Guam—now some 350 miles away—with sixty-one evacuees, including all nonofficial Americans in the compound; the ambassadors of Nigeria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; and the Omani chargé d’affaires. The original plan called for the CH-53Es to return to Guam and bring a second echelon of Marines into the embassy. Oates believed he needed another forty-four Marines to ensure security and process the evacuees efficiently and effectively. But when the two CH-53E helicopters departed with the evacuees, it would be a one-way trip. After another difficult refueling en route, the Sea Stallions landed on the deck of Guam just under eight hours after leaving the ship. They would not return to Mogadishu with reinforcements but rather fly to Trenton, where their roles in the mission ended.

Despite the original plan for a second wave and Oates’s request for forty-four more Marines, Doyle did not perceive a direct threat against the evacuation force in Mogadishu and so, in coordination with Moser, chose not to dispatch additional Marines. Sending in more troops implied a longer operation and increased the number of people needing evacuation from the embassy. It was a risky call, but events once again bore out Doyle’s judgment. Even had Doyle wanted to insert the additional
Marines, he would not have been able to do so with the CH-53Es; their crews were exhausted from the wearing flight in and out of Mogadishu and incapable of another demanding mission without rest. Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters stationed aboard _Guam_ would carry out subsequent evacuations, once they came within range of the embassy.  

Meanwhile, Marines and embassy employees in Mogadishu prepared for subsequent evacuations, although the shortage of staff to operate the ECC severely hindered the process. Security remained marginal, despite arrival of the Navy and Marine Corps team. There had not been enough Marines on the helicopters to process evacuees efficiently and to provide adequate security as well. It was this that had motivated Oates to request the forty-four additional Marines. He did not want to weaken perimeter security by using McAleer’s Marines in the ECC, but eventually he felt it necessary to do so. The final decision not to send more troops into Mogadishu forced Bishop, Oates, and the other hard-pressed Americans to complete their tasks with the personnel on hand. Doyle, for his part, realized that Oates’s job was difficult, but absent a concerted effort to storm the embassy, he felt that another high-risk insertion flight could not be justified.

After the departure of the Super Stallions, conditions worsened throughout Mogadishu, and consular representatives from numerous nations continued to seek refuge at and evacuation through the American embassy. Bishop at first required foreign nationals to make their own way to the embassy, but when the Soviet ambassador declared that he and his remaining staff would require assistance, he agreed to escort them with permanent embassy security personnel. To augment this force he contracted for Somali policemen, under a Major Sayed, who agreed to support the effort for a fee. The ambassador used a similar approach to escorting members of the British mission into the American embassy. On one occasion, a team of Marines, SEALs, and embassy security personnel ventured into Mogadishu in hardened vehicles to rescue twenty-two people from the Office of Military Cooperation and return them safely to the embassy grounds. The twenty-two included Colonel David Stanley, the chief of the office, along with the ambassador from Kenya and members of his family and staff.

The understaffed ECC established by Saunders on the embassy grounds worked hard to identify and process evacuees under difficult circumstances. Since augmentation of the evacuation force had been denied, Oates utilized not only some of McAleer’s Marines but members of the embassy staff to provide administrative help (checking identities, screening potential evacuees, creating manifests, etc.) as best they could. Although ultimately successful, the preparation of evacuees for movement out of Mogadishu fell far short of ideal, causing problems at the departure site and aboard the ships—particularly
in identifying and accounting for authorized evacuees. As the Marines within the embassy struggled with their problems, the officers and crews of Guam and Trenton began addressing the needs of evacuees. This included establishing a medical triage station, arranging berthing for both genders, addressing care for children, protecting individual property, accounting for evacuees by nationality and status, and providing food and clothing, while at the same time supporting operations ashore.

As night approached on 5 January, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters—flying in four waves of five aircraft each—commenced evacuation operation off the deck of Guam, now approximately thirty miles out to sea. To minimize the risk of hostile fire, all evacuation flights conducted by the Sea Knight helicopters occurred at night, with the embassy compound darkened. The Marine pilots and infantrymen used night-vision devices for visibility during the operation. Even with such equipment, flight operations at night in an uncertain environment can be very dangerous, but the Marines believed they had better control of these complications than they would have over the hostile elements freely operating during daylight. The evacuation started smoothly until Major Sayed, who had earlier assisted in the transportation of foreign consular personnel into the American embassy, suddenly returned with two trucks full of soldiers. Carrying a radio and hand grenade, Sayed demanded that the evacuation cease immediately—his government had not approved the flights. Bishop and Oates refused to halt the operations, and the ambassador ultimately persuaded the Somali officer not to interfere. Bishop accomplished this by means of skillful negotiation, several thousand dollars, and the keys to an embassy automobile of Sayed’s choice. In the process Bishop managed to take possession of the major’s radio, to prevent him from calling antiaircraft fire on the departing helicopters.

This incident with Major Sayed created some confusion in the last evacuation waves, because Bishop insisted on remaining within the compound so as to be available to handle such problems until the end of the evacuation. He and his security team had been scheduled to depart in the third wave; his decision to remain to the end meant that only four helicopters on the third wave departed as planned, leaving the fifth behind, not yet full. Having an extra helicopter on the final wave created confusion, causing inaccuracies in the serial manifests and the helicopter loading plan. That confusion in turn resulted in a small communications team’s nearly missing the last flight out of Mogadishu. (The crew chief on one of the Sea Knights spotted the Marines and placed them aboard his aircraft.) Ultimately, all personnel approved or designated for evacuation, including the entire NEO force, departed safely and arrived on board Guam or Trenton. As the last helicopter departed, a large mob entered the embassy grounds, looting and destroying everything in sight. Well before sunrise on 6 January 1991, the last Sea Knight set down on the deck of Guam, and Ambassador Bishop
declared the evacuation complete. The final evacuation flight had occurred without
the support of the AC-130, because it had detected radar of the type associated with a
Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missile site tracking it and had to move off station. The
presence of SA-2 missiles confirmed the commanders’ concerns about the existence of
sophisticated weapons in Somalia. The SA-2 posed a definite threat to the AC-130 aircraft, but Doyle had not been concerned for the CH-46 helicopters, because he believed
they would fly too low to be tracked by its radars.

The amphibious evacuation in Mogadishu ultimately extracted 281 people, including
sixty-one Americans, thirty-nine Soviet citizens, seventeen British, twenty-six Germans, and various numbers from twenty-eight other nations. There were twelve
heads of diplomatic missions—eight ambassadors and four chargés. Unfortunately,
Bishop determined that none of the many Somali “foreign service nationals” within the
embassy compound could be evacuated, although they remained loyal. Bishop did not
even have enough cash to pay all wages due to them. Though they faced an uncertain
future, the Somalis accepted their fate, remained on their jobs to the end, and never
attempted to rush the helicopters or create serious problems for the evacuation
effort.

The influx of civilians on Guam and Trenton severely taxed the ships’ resources and
ability to support them, of course. But, as Saffell put it, the response of the sailors and
Marines was “awesome”; they gladly gave up berthing space and personal items to ease
the plight of the evacuees. Guam’s medical staff treated one evacuee with an abdomi-
nal gunshot wound and another with a knife wound. Also, the Sudanese ambassa-
dor’s wife gave birth to a baby boy onboard Guam. (In keeping with an old Navy
tradition, the newborn lad’s name was engraved on the inside of the ship’s bell.)

On 11 January, Trenton and Guam off-loaded their passengers in Muscat, Oman, with-
out fanfare and resumed their duties in support of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
Bishop had wanted the evacuees transported to Mombasa, but Schwarzkopf ordered
the ships back into the area of impending conflict in the Gulf of Oman. Omani offi-
cials were at first reluctant to accept the refugees, but stellar work by the American
ambassador in Oman persuaded them to do so. Before taking leave of the sailors and
Marines, Ambassador Bishop praised their competence and professionalism, conclud-
ing his remarks by declaring, “Few of us would have been alive today if we had been
outside your reach. It was only due to your efforts that we made it.”

In many ways, EASTERN EXIT provides a textbook example of how to conduct an
amphibious evacuation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred Gray,
referred to it as a “very complex and somewhat dangerous mission.” Gray would have
known about complex and dangerous NEOs, since he had played a prominent role in
the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975. Although Gray also called the mission “flawless,” in fact many problems arose throughout the action. But the professionalism of Marines and sailors overcame those obstacles with solutions sufficient to ensure success. The operation demonstrated that the amphibious capability of the United States could respond to nearly any exigency virtually anywhere in the world, even when distracted by larger and more important missions. Navy and Marine Corps leaders considered EASTERN EXIT a demonstration of the excellence of the sea services and an example of the value of amphibious capability within the expeditionary environment. The operation also demonstrated that modern amphibious actions depend as much on aviation assets—particularly helicopters—as on traditional surface landing vehicles. This is not surprising, considering the U.S. Marine Corps pioneered the military use of helicopters for a variety of applications, including vertical assault, during the Korean War.

As part of the complete revision of Marine Corps doctrine that occurred during the second half of the 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant from 1995 to 1999, used EASTERN EXIT as a case study for understanding and implementing expeditionary concepts in the emerging new world order. More important, EASTERN EXIT made clear that the professional Navy and Marine Corps team that had matured over several hundred years continued to provide American political and diplomatic leaders with a range of military options unknown anywhere else in the world or at any other time in history. The commitment to EASTERN EXIT had no impact on the subsequent war with Iraq; after off-loading the evacuees in Oman, the entire task force returned to normal duty and participated fully in SEA SOLDIER IV, the important final workup for DESERT STORM. As subsequent events showed, Schwarzkopf’s air and ground war proved sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces—with a little help from the amphibious feint of LaPlante and Jenkins. The ability to move seamlessly from DESERT SHIELD to EASTERN EXIT to SEA SOLDIER IV and on to DESERT STORM clearly illustrates the capabilities needed to implement the operational and strategic concepts espoused in... From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

EASTERN EXIT received little press coverage, due to the larger events of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, but many within the Department of Defense appreciated its significance. The Marine Corps, as noted, included it as a case study in subsequent doctrinal publications, and the Navy mentioned it in Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. Captain Moser assisted in the lessons-learned process by preparing an instructional seminar that became part of the curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College, in Norfolk, Virginia. Lieutenant Colonel McAleer also created a briefing, which he presented to the Landing Force Training commands at the amphibious bases in Little Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California. Notably, he briefed the material to
Captain Braden J. Phillips, Colonel Michael W. Hagee, and the 11th MEU (SOC) staff during their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. As commanders of Amphibious Squadron 1 and 11th MEU (SOC), respectively, Phillips and Hagee were to lead the next Navy and Marine Corps team to implement the precepts of... From the Sea. In August 1992, the United States returned to Somalia to assist in humanitarian relief during operation PROVIDE RELIEF—a precursor to RESTORE HOPE. That September, the PhibRon 1 and 11th MEU (SOC) team deployed to the Indian Ocean and returned to the Horn of Africa as the United States attempted to help a nation in crisis.128

In Somalia, after the American evacuation of its embassy in Mogadishu, conditions continued to deteriorate. To some extent, the large quantities of weapons and ammunition previously supplied by the Soviet Union and later by the United States fueled the fighting. As rebel factions gained ground in the fighting with Siad Barre, they often captured armories and munitions supply centers with which to arm their forces and allies.129 By late January 1991—about two weeks after the evacuation and just as General Schwarzkopf began the air operations phase of DESERT STORM—forces under Mohamed Farah Aideed drove Siad Barre from Mogadishu and, in May 1992, into exile in Kenya and Nigeria. Although many factors contributed to the defeat of Siad Barre and the collapse of his rule, Aideed had been largely responsible for the final victory. He not only drove Siad Barre out of Somalia but also defeated his three subsequent efforts to regain control. Aideed believed that this victory earned him the right to lead the nation, but other warlords disagreed. The clans could not unite to form a new government; warfare continued, and chaotic conditions persisted. The extreme violence made food distribution difficult, creating critical shortages in many parts of Somalia. This fostered an impression of widespread starvation, causing the United Nations to request international intervention to alleviate suffering and restore order. It was for this reason that, a year and a half after EASTERN EXIT, American naval expeditionary forces would return to Somalia and once again apply the concepts of... From the Sea.130

Notes


3. The amphibious force ultimately consisted of Amphibious Group (PhibGru) 2 (thirteen ships), PhibGru 3 (thirteen ships), PhibRon 5 (five ships), 4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU (SOC), totaling thirty-one ships and some seventeen thousand Marines afloat. Jenkins interview; Vice Adm. John B. LaPlante, USN (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 3 October 2007; Pokrant, Desert Shield at Sea, pp. 78–86, 164–68, 238.


5. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, p. 254.


7. Arthur interview.

8. Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword, pp. 149–50; Pokrant, Desert Shield at Sea, pp. 100, 238.

9. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls.

10. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls.

11. Saffell interview.

12. Jenkins interview.

13. Arthur interview; Jenkins interview; LaPlante to Ohls.


15. Col. Robert P. McAleer, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Newport, Rhode Island, 28 November 2007; Jenkins interview; Saffell interview.


17. LaPlante to Ohls.

18. Jenkins interview; LaPlante to Ohls.

19. LaPlante to Ohls.


23. Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 11.

24. Moser interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 12.


28. Doyle interview; Jenkins interview; Moser interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 13, 15.

29. Saffell interview.


31. Arthur interview; LaPlante to Ohls; Moser interview; Saffell interview.

32. LaPlante to Ohls; Commander, Amphibious Squadron 6, Command History for 1991.


42. Doyle interview; Saffell interview.

43. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 84; Moser interview; Doyle interview.


46. When considering incursions into areas not controlled by friendly forces, the U.S. military categorizes the threat environment as permissive, uncertain, or hostile, as a means of determining the degree of force necessary to accomplish its mission. JP 1-02, p. 390.


49. Jenkins interview.

50. Saffell interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 3, 5, 11–12.

51. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 29; Saffell interview.

52. Doyle interview.


54. Jenkins interview.

55. Moser interview; Saffell interview.


58. For air and sea navigation, the U.S. military services measure distance in nautical miles, which are slightly longer than statute miles (1 nautical mile = 1.150779 statute miles). One nautical mile is equal to one minute of arc on the earth’s surface, or 1,852 meters. Mileage referred to in this Newport Paper and in all U.S. operations since 1954 utilize nautical miles. See JP 1-02, p. 363, and Siegel, Eastern Exit, p. 22.


63. In Marine Corps tradition, “Marines” in conjunction with a unit designation refers to a regiment. For example, the “2nd Marines” means the same as “2nd Marine Regiment.” A regimental landing team, a reinforced regiment, takes the numerical designator of the base regiment. Therefore, if 2nd Marines is reinforced and designated a regimental landing team, it becomes RLT-2.

64. Jenkins interview; McAleer interview.

65. McAleer interview.

66. Oates was a member of the 4th MEB, G-3 section, who had been assigned to Guam due to space limitations on board Nassau. Any such MEB staff officer located on Guam was available to assist Doyle in both the planning
and actual operations associated with Eastern Exit: Jenkins interview.


68. Doyle to Ohls; McAleer interview.


72. Moser interview; Saffell interview.

73. Arthur interview.

74. Siegel, *Eastern Exit*, p. 22 note 44.

75. The captains of both ships involved in the NEO—Saffell of Guam and Capt. James A. Curtis of Trenton—were naval aviators, which proved very helpful throughout the operation. Doyle to Ohls.

77. Saffell interview.

78. Ibid.


94. Jenkins interview.

95. Siegel, *Eastern Exit*, p. 32.

96. Ibid., pp. 30, 32.

97. Doyle interview; McAleer interview.

98. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 30; McAleer interview.


100. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 26; McAleer interview.


102. Saffell interview.


106. McAleer interview.


108. McAleer interview.


112. Bishop, “Escape from Mogadishu,” p. 30; McAleer interview.

113. Saffell interview.


115. Saffell interview.


120. Brown, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, p. 80; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 41–47; McAleer interview.


124. McAleer interview; Saffell interview.

125. NDP 1, p. 11; and MCDP 3, pp. 35, 111–15.

126. Moser to Ohls.

127. In 1994, these two commands changed from Landing Force Training Commands to Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups as a result of the shift in focus in . . . From the Sea.


Operation PROVIDE RELIEF

The final phase of the war against Siad Barre occurred throughout the south and central parts of Somalia from January 1991 through May 1992. The combat in Mogadishu had reached its height in December 1990 and January 1991, creating the anarchy that led to EASTERN EXIT. On 27 January 1991, rebel factions drove Siad Barre and his forces out of the capital, but the former dictator carried on the battle in the southern parts of Somalia. The fighting resulted in widespread devastation of the countryside—made worse by Siad Barre’s scorched-earth policy—particularly the area bounded by Kismayo, Bardera, and Baidoa, which came to be known as the “Triangle of Death.” The destruction of crops, livestock, and essential infrastructure—especially wells, canals, water pumps, pipes, the telephone system, and other public utilities—coupled with an ongoing drought, laid the groundwork for the famine that spread throughout the region.¹

This massive destruction was accompanied by looting, rape, and massacres, resulting in the abandonment of the Somali agricultural heartland. Hundreds of thousands fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, and the major cities of Kismayo, Baidoa, and Mogadishu, to find conditions there only slightly better.² In fact, the drought and famine were nearly as bad in northeast Kenya, prompting the U.S. ambassador, Smith Hempstone, to describe that area—to which many Somali refugees had flocked—as “a slice of hell.”³ Hempstone also noted that not only had refugees flocked across the border but also guns and bands of armed Somali men who ambushed truck convoys, robbed traders, and rustled livestock.⁴

The social and economic collapse that accompanied the rebellion against Siad Barre had resulted in part from his own brutal suppression measures. Yet his downfall complicated rather than solved the growing humanitarian crisis, by confusing the issue of political leadership within Somalia. Even before the dictator’s final defeat and exile, clan-based factions that had battled against the regime began to fight an internecine war for supremacy in the regions and cities of southern and central Somalia.
Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed—both important United Somali Congress leaders who opposed Siad Barre—built strong militias during the civil war and contested for national power and control of Mogadishu during and after Siad Barre’s fall from power. Ironically, both of these warlords belonged to the Hawiye clan, as well as to the USC. Yet beginning in 1991 Aideed’s Habr Gidr subclan and Ali Mahdi’s Abgal subclan clashed violently in a battle for primacy, increasing and perpetuating the agony of their nation. As Aideed and Ali Mahdi battled for control of Mogadishu, Omar Jess of the Ogaden subclan fought Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan)—who commanded the remnant of Siad Barre’s army—near Kismayo, Bardera, and the Kenyan border, an area already ravaged by Morgan during 1989 and 1990. Vicious fighting in Kismayo and Bardera further devastated the region, threatening hundreds of thousands of people with starvation.

After Siad Barre’s expulsion from Somalia, a faction consisting of 144 moderate political leaders known as the “Manifesto Group” proclaimed Ali Mahdi—one of its members—as the nation’s interim president. The Manifesto Group had issued a proclamation (or manifesto) calling for a new provisional government and national reconciliation in 1990, when Siad Barre was still in control of Mogadishu. This courageous action resulted in the arrest of most members, but it gained credibility for the group. Yet despite its standing among Somalia leaders, the effort of the Manifesto Group to establish Ali Mahdi as president did not receive general acceptance. A reconciliation conference was accordingly convened by the government of Djibouti in July 1991. It confirmed Ali Mahdi as interim president for a period of two years.

This support of Ali Mahdi infuriated Aideed, who had not attended the reconciliation conference and refused to recognize its dubious selection, believing himself more deserving of the office. He had made a greater contribution to the demise of Siad Barre, commanded stronger forces, and controlled more key locations in Mogadishu than had Ali Mahdi. The Somali National Movement, consisting primarily of the Isaaq clan in northwest Somalia, also refused to accept the decisions of the Djibouti conference. The SNM had declared independence in May 1991 as the “Republic of Somaliland” and had no desire to rejoin a nation ruled by either Ali Mahdi or Aideed. The civil war against Siad Barre’s rule had actually begun with the Isaaq clan and its SNM faction during 1988, in the area that included the major cities of Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao—known as “British Somaliland” prior to independence in 1960. Siad Barre had brutally suppressed that phase of the rebellion, killing five thousand, displacing five hundred thousand refugees, and causing massive destruction before the violence shifted to central and southern regions of the country. The self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland had been relatively free of violence since Siad Barre moved the bulk of his army out of the area to deal with Aideed and Ali Mahdi. But things remained in turmoil in central...
and southern Somalia, and several efforts at international mediation by a variety of nations and organizations during 1991 proved ineffective. The conflict over control of Somalia continued, and the chaos in the streets showed little sign of abating.\textsuperscript{15}

Sporadic fighting between the factions occurred throughout 1991, with open combat beginning in November of that year.\textsuperscript{16} Meantime, gangs of armed youths controlled by neither Aideed nor Ali Mahdi roamed the streets of Mogadishu inflicting violence at will.\textsuperscript{17} Unfortunately, atrocities by these young criminals—including rape, theft, and murder—were not limited to Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{18} In February 1992, Aideed and Ali Mahdi agreed to a vague cease-fire in Mogadishu while each continued to seek recognition as the legitimate leader of Somalia.\textsuperscript{19} The cease-fire resulted from a series of negotiations in New York under the auspices of the UN and involving envoys from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), along with representatives of the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions.\textsuperscript{20} Special UN envoy James O. C. Jonah worked with the two factions the following month to create a more substantial cease-fire agreement, which the warlords signed on 3 March 1992.\textsuperscript{21} By this time, Mogadishu had already suffered enormous destruction from artillery fire and other ravages of war.

The cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdi proved tenuous at best, and it did not end violence, looting, or extortion by freelancing thugs who had emerged from the political and social breakdown of Somali society. These chaotic conditions in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia made it difficult for humanitarian relief organizations to provide services where they were needed most. The willingness of Aideed and Ali Mahdi to restrict the access to relief workers when it served their interests also frustrated efforts to provide aid. In the descent into anarchy, food became a weapon as well as the only basis for a remnant economy.\textsuperscript{22} Widespread shortages in central and southern Somalia—including Mogadishu—during 1991 and 1992 resulted from severely reduced agricultural production, breakdown of the distribution system, and insufficient deliveries from the humanitarian relief community. Additionally, the early coordination effort by UN officials had been so bureaucratic and ineffective that disorder tended to increase as problems compounded.\textsuperscript{23} During the summer of 1992, the relief organizations delivered less than a third of the food necessary to feed the needy, according to the head of the World Food Program in Somalia.\textsuperscript{24} All this, combined with distribution problems created by factional conflict and general lawlessness, clearly meant that a major humanitarian disaster was taking shape.\textsuperscript{25}

The United Nations took a major step to address the Somali crisis on 24 April 1992 with the passage of Security Council Resolution 751, which established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Among other things, Resolution 751 called...
upon the international community to implement a ninety-day surge effort to increase humanitarian assistance, authorized the assignment of fifty unarmed observers to monitor the precarious cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and sanctioned the future deployment of five hundred peacekeepers to Somalia if conditions warranted. The fifty observers, with their chief military observer, Brigadier General Intiaz Shaheen of Pakistan, would not be in place in Mogadishu until 23 July 1992 due to resistance from Aideed, which proved difficult to break down.

Resolution 751 also authorized creation of a special UN representative in Somalia, a post to which Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali assigned Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun. Sahnoun’s energetic and sensitive labor was to bring him into contact with every major figure—both domestic and foreign—having an interest in the Somali crisis. But his credible efforts to create stability and reconciliation did not stem the growing humanitarian crisis; food and medical supplies remained in short supply.

By the summer of 1992, approximately three hundred thousand Somalis had died from hunger or diseases related to malnutrition. Additionally, the crisis had displaced over six hundred thousand people, creating refugee camps in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.

In an effort to gain control over this problem, Boutros-Ghali proposed an emergency airlift, which the Security Council supported by passing Resolution 767 on 27 July 1992. This UN action called for the urgent delivery of food and medical supplies to the most critical areas, particularly in the Triangle of Death. It also provided the vehicle for America’s return to Somalia; President George H. W. Bush responded by authorizing Joint Task Force/Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. Intended to transport supplies into stricken areas of northern Kenya and rural Somalia, PROVIDE RELIEF was a relatively small operation, having no combat component. Since it was purely humanitarian in nature—designed principally to help Somalis and Kenyans in need—American leaders assumed a permissive environment. The only caveat to that presumption involved the insertion of the five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers authorized under Security Council Resolution 751, an insertion that the United States agreed to facilitate.

Although UN Resolution 767 supplied the mechanism for commencing PROVIDE RELIEF, it was media coverage of the humanitarian crisis that provided the trigger that caused President Bush to take action. A cable from Ambassador Hempstone in Kenya describing hellish conditions in northeast Kenya also influenced the thinking of the president and other American leaders. After making its rounds within the administration, Hempstone’s cable was published in the Washington Post, further contributing to the public awareness of the crisis. On 14 August 1992, the president announced that the United States would begin emergency relief flights using Mombasa, Kenya, as a
base of operations. Bush also assigned Andrew Natsios of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as Special Coordinator for Somali Relief and directed that an additional 145,000 tons of American food aid be provided.

After the passage of UN Resolution 767, the international media descended on Somalia in even greater numbers than before. Their coverage of starving children, displaced people in refugee camps, and the devastation wrought by war and widespread criminal activity shocked the world and provoked its conscience. Powerful media images viewed daily on television and in newsprint during the summer of 1992 stirred overwhelming American support for the humanitarian relief efforts of President Bush. The power of the media to bring issues to public attention and force policy decisions upon the government became particularly noticeable during the Somalia crisis. It appeared to many that the traditional “power of the press” had reached a new height; observers began to refer to this growing influence as the “CNN effect.”

On 15 August 1992, the National Command Authority issued an alert order to Central Command (now under the leadership of General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, who had replaced General Schwarzkopf a year earlier), followed the next day by an order to execute Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. Flying supplies into remote areas of Somalia had the dual advantage of avoiding impassable roads and bandits who attacked and looted convoys, while bringing food directly to some of the areas most severely stricken by the famine. Within two weeks, C-130 flights had delivered emergency supplies to Wajir, Kenya, near the Somali border, and Belet Uen (also spelled Belet Weyne or Beledweyne) within Somalia proper. The airlift into Wajir provided food intended for Somali refugees who had crossed the border as well as for numerous Kenyan victims of drought and refugee pressure. The 29 August 1992 flights into Belet Uen—the first PROVIDE RELIEF flights going into Somalia—consisted of four C-130s and delivered thirty-four tons of food supplies to an area not accessible by ground transportation due to road conditions and bandit activity. This flight set the pattern of PROVIDE RELIEF staff
working closely with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local clan elders to ensure security at landing sites and an orderly distribution of supplies. The joint task force (JTF) commander, Brigadier General Frank Libutti, USMC, accompanied the initial flight into Belet Uen and met with local leaders and Somali children while workers unloaded the cargo of beans, rice, and cooking oil from the C-130 aircraft.

Frank Libutti had been with Central Command only a few weeks—and a brigadier general only slightly longer—when notified that he would command PROVIDE RELIEF. He had been in the process of mastering his new duties at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, when abruptly assigned to lead a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the East African country of Kenya. Libutti’s primary duties at Central Command involved serving as inspector general and—far more important—conducting bilateral planning for contingency operations with various countries throughout the region. This task was highly classified, because many representatives of these nations did not want it known that they were involved in such a relationship with the United States. His mission to Africa was to assess the situation relative to humanitarian support efforts in Kenya and Somalia and then make recommendations to Central Command for possible American action. Libutti selected a team of thirty-four personnel from across the directorates at Central Command and headed for Kenya on a C-141 airplane, riding in seats rigged for paratroopers. The assessment team had been in Kenya only a few hours when informed of the creation of JTF Provide Relief, with Libutti as commanding officer.

The original mission upon departing Tampa—to assess the situation and make recommendation—had been somewhat vague, owing to the very short timeline everyone was working under. The creation of JTF Provide Relief expanded the task to include planning and operations. In other words, the assignment now required action as well as observation and analysis. To get the operation up and running, Libutti needed to identify appropriate airfields and establish a system for delivery. This involved coordinating with the government of Kenya, through the embassy, for permission to fly U.S. aircraft into...
northern Kenya and stricken areas within Somalia. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF would also need to cooperate with NGOs already working in those remote areas—particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—in order to make an efficient and substantive contribution. The relief effort in Somalia involved numerous people and many organizations with similar goals; all were operating under the umbrella of UN authority, but that did not necessarily guarantee collegial relationships.

Upon arriving in Kenya, Libutti established his headquarters and base of operations in an aviation facility at one end of the Mombasa airport. This hangar and its contiguous ramp space represented one of several facilities the United States rented in Kenya for just such contingencies. While his staff worked to organize and prepare this site to support operations, General Libutti traveled to Nairobi for discussions with the American ambassador and his staff. Libutti, like most Marine officers, considered himself an operator, not a politician or diplomat. But his first independent assignment as a general officer revealed that life is not so simple for those who wear the stars. Of course, he knew that his team would have to work with the embassy in Kenya, various government officials, and NGOs operating in famine-stricken regions of Somalia. Libutti assumed, however, the State Department would obtain the necessary authority from Kenyan officials to initiate PROVIDE RELIEF, leaving him free to focus on operations. After a few days in Kenya, the new JTF commander would learn otherwise. The visibility of American military personnel and aircraft in Kenya would make the media aware of his activity, and that would spark the interest of political leaders at the highest level. This spelled trouble, because the press hype—coupled with very short notice about the operation—upset the Kenyan president, Daniel Moi. Some of his advisers, whether misinformed or intentionally misrepresenting the facts, had aggravated concern by questioning U.S. intentions. In either case, this created a problem for the viability of PROVIDE RELIEF.

Daniel Toroitich arap Moi had become president of Kenya on 22 August 1978, upon the death of Jomo Kenyatta, a national hero and the first president of postcolonial Kenya. Although handpicked by Kenyatta as his successor, President Moi had never enjoyed the following of his predecessor and constantly struggled to maintain public support for his administration. While in Nairobi for his meeting with Ambassador Hempstone, Libutti learned that President Moi wanted to talk with them regarding the operation. The two American leaders rounded up some key staffers and proceeded to the Presidential Palace, where Moi expressed considerable dissatisfaction over PROVIDE RELIEF. The polemic newspaper headlines coupled with comments of his advisers had piqued his attention. Not only did this crisis agitate the president, but it was also likely affect his public image, with national elections only four months away.
In what appeared to Libutti as a combination of national pride and political theatre, President Moi expressed outrage that the United States would consider operating in Kenyan airspace without better coordination. Moi complained that he had not received adequate notice or sufficient information about the mission. Hempstone suspected the outrage stemmed from suggestions of certain anti-American advisers that the flights offended Kenyan sovereignty and were intended to undercut the president’s public standing. After a contentious discussion, in which both Hempstone and Libutti reassured the president of the veracity of American declared intentions, President Moi agreed to permit food flights into northern Kenya and Somalia. In a follow-on press conference, Hempstone and Libutti allowed the Kenyan officials to take credit for saving the operation, while making sure that everyone of importance went on record supporting PROVIDE RELIEF. Over the course of the next several days, Hempstone worked to mollify Kenyan officials, further ensuring that Libutti’s aircraft would fly their missions as intended.

While establishing his operational base at the Mombasa airport, Libutti noticed parked across the airfield a C-130 airplane that he believed to be involved in relief operations. He approached the pilot and learned that the plane flew food supplies to various locations inside Somalia for the World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Libutti decided to join a subsequent flight into Baidoa for an orientation and some personal reconnaissance. The pilot flew his plane into the remote airfield there, where the general met with NGO representatives on the ground. The NGO workers received the cargo of food and delivered it to the local village, where they had established feeding kitchens. Libutti also noticed the presence of media representatives, several of whom showed an interest in him. When a reporter from the BBC asked why a senior U.S. Marine officer would accompany humanitarian flights into the interior of Somalia, Libutti replied that he was simply there to provide support as part of the UN relief operations. Libutti decided to take advantage of the friendship exhibited by the C-130 pilot and instructed key members of his staff to accompany future flights so they could evaluate airfields for possible U.S. operations, assessing their runways and soil composition. At that point, the PROVIDE RELIEF command consisted of Libutti, the small staff from Central Command, a few U.S. Air Force air control personnel, and two C-141s.

In addition to resolving political issues in Kenya, establishing his base of operations at the airport, and gathering information on possible airfields, Libutti wanted to be sure that ongoing problems within Somalia would not endanger his mission or his people. An important way to accomplish this involved building rapport with the NGOs operating in the areas he would support. The relationship between military forces and NGOs can be very difficult, and Libutti considered his initial contacts somewhat frosty. It is
not possible to generalize about working with NGOs, because there are so many of
them, all with different charters and purposes. Although well intended and right-
minded, many NGOs compete for donations or missions, and this tends to make them
very independent and somewhat self-focused. NGOs also operate within a very differ-
ent organizational culture than does the U.S. military, and bridging the gap can be a
challenge for both sides. But Libutti and his staff made the effort to do so, and in his
view, the NGO personnel “became good friends and good supporters over time.”
Ambassador Hempstone helped this process by facilitating a meeting between Libutti
and the ICRC early in the planning process. This experience helped convince the gen-
eral to work through that organization, because of its structure and communications
system, which operated in both Somalia and Kenya. It also had four established air-
fields in remote parts of Somalia, which supported roughly five hundred feeding sta-
tions within the areas served by the landing sites. Working with the ICRC required the
PROVIDE RELIEF operation to accommodate itself to some basic expectations, such as
placing red crosses on their airplanes and restricting arms from relief flights. Libutti
had no problem with marking his aircraft with the red cross, as long as it did not
obscure other symbols; the question of weapons was more problematic, one that he
needed to consider. The arrival of disaster assistance response teams (DARTs)
proved helpful in facilitating relations between NGOs and the military, as well as in
clarifying aid requirements and security conditions at airfields where Libutti’s air-
craft would land.
Recognizing the need to open communications with key forces inside Somalia, Libutti
established contact with Osman Ato, Aideed’s second in command and the financier of
his operations. Libutti first met Osman Ato in Kenya and subsequently visited him
during trips into Mogadishu. They established a relationship that led to meetings with
Aideed and key members of his staff. Although plans did not initially call for PROVIDE
RELIEF flights to deliver supplies into Mogadishu itself, Libutti saw that good relation-
ships with the Aideed faction—which controlled the Mogadishu airport and port facil-
ities—would be necessary to ensure future access to the city. His contacts proved
particularly valuable some weeks later when the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team
facilitated insertion of the five-hundred-man Pakistani peacekeeping battalion into
Somalia. They were also to help during the large-scale U.S. military commitment in
December 1992 under the rubric of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, the fac-
tion leaders were important in supplying guards and security teams for NGOs and
other agencies operating within Somalia; also, immediate access to the top leaders
could be helpful in controlling certain situations.
Once the PROVIDE RELIEF team had completed the survey of airfields, contacted key people within the NGO community, coordinated with government officials, and connected with Somali factions, a standard routine developed that assured maximum efficiency in the delivery of humanitarian aid.  

It was clear from the beginning that C-141 aircraft could not operate in the rugged terrain and makeshift landing fields in the remote parts of Somalia. Libutti replaced them with the more rugged C-130s, which served as workhorses throughout the operation. Libutti would have fourteen of these airplanes available at the height of the relief activity during PROVIDE RELIEF. The C-130s came primarily from the 403rd Wing of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, based at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, and the 324th Airlift Wing from Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, although German and Canadian partners provided a few aircraft at various times. The C-130s operated off the tarmac at Mombasa airport near the PROVIDE RELIEF cargo staging areas and Libutti’s headquarters. At this point, the PROVIDE RELIEF staff—though still relatively small—had been somewhat enhanced to support the additional aircraft and expanded mission. During the period of greatest activity, the total number of people supporting PROVIDE RELIEF grew to about six hundred, including both military and civilian.

The operational routine that developed for PROVIDE RELIEF started with food aid shipments arriving at the port of Mombasa from all over the world. Contractors would transport the supplies to Libutti’s operational facility at Mombasa airport, where working parties palletized the bags of food. During the evening hours, the cargo would be loaded in the C-130s for the next day’s flights. At 0330 (3:30 AM), pilot briefings were conducted; the aircraft departed between 0500 and 0700 for their designated landing sites. If the designated airfield was secure when the aircraft arrived, NGO representatives on the ground would lay out a simple white sheet or flag, and the pilot would land. If the airfield was not secure, the pilot had instructions to divert to another site or return to Mombasa. Fortunately, that did not prove necessary during PROVIDE RELIEF, due in part to superb advance communications. DART staffers supporting the operation coordinated with the NGOs inside Somalia on a daily basis to guarantee security at the landing sites. They also verified the NGOs’ ability to off-load the supplies in a timely manner, thereby reducing the exposure of aircraft and personnel on the ground.
The rules of engagement (ROE) prohibited landing under unsafe conditions, but aircraft on the ground for extended periods were bound to attract attention. The NGOs’ use of local Somalis for both labor and security at the remote airfields and villages ensured the efficacy of this process. This in turn allowed the people executing PROVIDE RELIEF to focus on flying aircraft and delivering supplies.

Once PROVIDE RELIEF reached a normal operating rhythm, its pilots flew at a rather high operational tempo. This level of activity attracted considerable attention in both East Africa and Washington. At one point in the process, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, visited the operation and accompanied Libutti on a flight into Oddur, Somalia. Jeremiah received a tour of the local village, where he observed conditions and relief operations under way. He and Libutti also met with local elders and clansmen to discuss humanitarian activity and the relief operations.

Although PROVIDE RELIEF did not have a combat mission and had to conform to certain peacetime standards, Somalia remained a dangerous place. The good relationship that developed between Libutti’s staff and NGO representatives, coupled with the work of the DARTs, helped minimize the risk of delivering supplies to remote airfields. But avoidance strategies can be uncertain, and they assume the cooperation of all indigenous parties. As a prudent commander, Libutti did not intend to rely solely on good intentions or polite relationships with his NGO counterparts for the protection of people and aircraft. In order to hedge against nasty surprises, he designated one of his C-130s as a security plane and configured it to deal with unforeseen threats. He loaded the aircraft with armed soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group, the major element of his ground security force. The airplane would circle landing sites while deliveries were under way and respond to acts of violence on the ground. If a threat developed or an airplane took fire while unloading, the pilot would take off and fly out of harm’s way if possible. If not, he could call for the security aircraft, which would land and take necessary action to rescue the people at the airfield and fly them to safety. Fortunately, conditions never required employment of this security provision during Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. Two of Libutti’s C-130s received small-arms fire, but no injuries resulted, damage to the aircraft was slight, and the incidents did not endanger the
operation. Libutti’s security element proved valuable beyond the protection it provided to operations. While accompanying the relief flights, the soldiers also collected intelligence on airfields, assessed the degree of danger within various regions, and obtained other basic information that would be of use in case of future ground involvement. As America’s commitment became larger and ground operations came to predominate, the intelligence value of these flights was to prove vitally important.  

The leaders of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF established procedures and relationships that seemed appropriate for their mission while addressing the particular and uncertain situations they found on the ground. They attempted to conform to standards acceptable to the humanitarian relief community with whom they had to interface. This meant that the military aircraft and crews did not carry weapons and landed only in relatively secure areas. Of course, Libutti wisely allowed for the uncertainty of conditions, by creating the separate security plane to protect his unarmed crews while on the ground. At the remote airfields, as we have seen, NGOs were responsible for unloading, transporting, and warehousing the food for use in the feeding centers where victims of famine gathered. They hired local Somalis to perform this work, usually paying them with a combination of money and food.  

Despite the two incidents of small-arms fire, Operation PROVIDE RELIEF went more or less as intended and made an important contribution to limiting the extent of the crisis. It served areas that aid organizations could not reliably reach by road, and its cargoes did not suffer the looting, pilfering, and outright thievery that created problems in other parts of Somalia, especially in the coastal cities.  

American pilots flew over 1,400 missions and delivered seventeen thousand tons of food through 4 December 1992, when Operation RESTORE HOPE brought a larger mission and higher level of American involvement to Somalia. Yet despite the success of PROVIDE RELIEF, which operated at full capacity between August and December 1992, the food deliveries amounted to no more than 10 percent of the minimum needed to stabilize the Somali crisis. Additionally, the mission, with its benign nature, did
nothing to address the larger problems of security and distribution. Ongoing threats
against staging areas, truck convoys, and feeding stations remained an issue in many
parts of Somalia that did not enjoy a secure port like Mombasa or relatively secure air-
fields like those used by PROVIDE RELIEF. Despite saving many lives and exhibiting
the noblest aspect of the American character, PROVIDE RELIEF could not solve the larger
problems of Somalia with the limited mission and assets it commanded.

Militias of the contesting factions, local gangs and bandits, and other criminal elements
at large in Mogadishu and the countryside—especially along the coastline—hampered
humanitarian relief efforts throughout the crisis. Among other things, these thugs
would often intimidate relief workers, sometimes people who had hired them for pro-
tection. Additionally, the fighting and violence often prevented unloading food sup-
plies, particularly at the port of Mogadishu. Some aid officials believed that as little as
20 percent of the food arriving in Somalia actually reached the needy. Although dis-
puted by many analysts, that figure influenced the thinking of American leaders and
became an important factor in the decision to undertake Operation RESTORE HOPE.

In mid-September 1992, American leaders were not yet contemplating a major deploy-
ment such as RESTORE HOPE but remained focused on the five hundred peacekeepers
authorized under UN Resolution 751. That Pakistani battalion would find itself in the
unenviable position of a small force in the middle of a big problem. It was also lightly
armed and had both a vague mission and a restrictive set of rules of engagement,
imposed by the UN. Brigadier General Shaheen, who commanded the peacekeeping
force, considered the ROE far too restrictive under the circumstances, fearing they
could endanger his peacekeepers and prevent them from accomplishing their mission.
Nonetheless, UN officials expected it to be a positive influence and a security force to
protect food shipments at the port and airport.

Peacekeeping is a somewhat amorphous concept, loosely justified under Chapter VI of
the UN Charter. Although not specifically mentioned in the charter, the idea of peace-
keeping developed over time to include both military-observer missions and larger sta-
bility operations. Though they are military in nature, the UN implements
peacekeeping operations in a nonthreatening manner, with the consent of all dispu-
tants. They apply principles of impartiality, mediation, and persuasion for maintaining
peace and restoring normalcy. In other words, the UN introduces peacekeepers as a
presence intended to calm a situation, not to assert authority. Peacekeeping is funda-
mentally different from “peace enforcement”—authorized under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter—which allows the use of coercive power, either economic or military.

This thinking leads to the (usually naive) presumption that peacekeepers will be viewed
favorably—that is, be valued as helpful neutrals—when introduced into violent
disputes. But in Somalia, Mohamed Farah Aideed had a decidedly negative view of UN involvement and accepted peacekeepers only under considerable pressure from Ambassador Sahnoun. This placed the Pakistanis in a precarious situation, since their primary positions at the airport and the port of Mogadishu were in areas controlled by Aideed. Additionally, numerous crosscurrents existed within the factions, clans, and subclans in Mogadishu, making effective control of people and events somewhat uncertain. Should conflict develop between the peacekeepers and Aideed’s faction, the lightly armed Pakistanis would face adversaries with heavy guns, artillery, plenty of ammunition, and serious attitude problems.

Aideed had reasons for objecting to the deployment of peacekeepers, of course. Possessing the stronger force in Mogadishu, he rightly believed that any restraining factor tended to favor his weaker enemy, Ali Mahdi. Beyond that, Aideed held deep suspicions about UN intentions, because an airplane with UN markings had delivered arms to Ali Mahdi’s faction in northern Mogadishu. Although this incident had actually involved a contractor’s failure to repaint his aircraft after completing a UN contract and not UN support for Ali Mahdi, it reinforced his tendency to distrust and resist UN involvement in Mogadishu. Making things even worse, UN headquarters announced that it would send another three thousand peacekeepers to Somalia just as Sahnoun had convinced Aideed to accept the five hundred under discussion. The news incensed Aideed and humiliated Sahnoun, since neither had known of this decision, learning of it from a BBC radio broadcast. Nonetheless, under pressure from Sahnoun, Aideed reluctantly decided to accept the initial five hundred peacekeepers, and the United States agreed to fly them from Pakistan to Mogadishu in Air Force planes and use the Navy and Marine Corps team to facilitate their entry into Somalia.

American naval expeditionary forces within the Indian Ocean during September 1992 consisted of PhibRon 1, under Captain Braden Phillips, with 11th MEU (SOC) embarked. Colonel Michael W. Hagee, a future Commandant of the Marine Corps, commanded the Marines of 11th MEU (SOC). These commanders and their officers had known of the instability on the Horn of Africa as they conducted their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton and off the California coastline. Noncombatant evacuation operations—such as Captain Moser and Colonel Doyle had conducted at Mogadishu during EASTERN EXIT—constituted an important element of their training package. In this particular case, the Navy and Marine Corps team had the added advantage of a firsthand orientation on EASTERN EXIT from Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer. McAleer’s briefing dovetailed nicely with the NEO training and provided the leaders of the amphibious force significant insight into conditions in Somalia. Both Phillips and Hagee believed their units benefited from that direct connection, especially since Somalia would be within their area of responsibility upon deployment.
In many ways, the amphibious force under Phillips and Hagee exemplified the highly capable and well integrated Navy and Marine Corps team that had been emerging since 1776 at New Providence in the Bahamas. The two commanders cooperated closely during their workup for deployment, with Phillips participating in much of the training that makes a MEU “special operations capable.” Phillips’s PhibRon 1 and Hagee’s 11th MEU (SOC) completed their training and set sail in June 1992 as a four-ship amphibious readiness group (ARG), with Tarawa its flagship. The Tarawa ARG conducted amphibious exercises in Hawaii, Okinawa, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia before steaming eastward toward Singapore in early September. While en route east, it received orders to proceed at best speed to Mogadishu and facilitate the introduction of Pakistani peacekeepers into Somalia. Central Command planners had originally considered using the ARG’s ships to transport the peacekeepers from Pakistan to Somalia, but they ultimately decided against it due to space limitations and cultural issues. Instead, as noted, the Air Force would fly them into Mogadishu with the Navy and Marine Corps team orchestrating a safe insertion.

En route to Somalia, Phillips and Hagee received notice to fly to Nairobi for a meeting with the Central Command representative (General Libutti) and other key officials to discuss the upcoming operation. The two commanders, along with several key staff members, made a five-hundred-mile CH-53E helicopter flight from Tarawa to Mombasa, where they boarded a C-130 for the trip to Nairobi. The subsequent conference occurred in the home of Ambassador Hempstone under Libutti’s overall direction. In addition to the principals, this meeting included Mohamed Sahnoun; Brigadier General Shaheen; Raymond S. Marchand, of Conoco Somalia, Ltd. (who lived in Mogadishu and understood its issues); John Fox, a U.S. embassy political officer and evacuee from Mogadishu during EASTERN EXIT; and several other key staff officers.

The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate the safe arrival of the Pakistani peacekeepers into Mogadishu and guarantee their security until properly established. The group discussed the current situation on the ground in Mogadishu, staging areas for the arriving troops and their supplies and equipment, bivouac areas, and other such administrative and logistical issues. It further addressed the need for a safe and controlled environment in which the large Air Force planes could land and disembark the peacekeepers. This constituted the most serious of the problems, and it was made more vexing by the uncertainty of the situation. The group also agreed that the U.S. role in the operation should remain as inconspicuous as possible, although its members balanced that against the deterrent value of having an American naval expeditionary force offshore. Once Phillips and Hagee returned to their ship, assessed the overall situation in Mogadishu, conducted a reconnaissance of the Mogadishu airport, and completed their planning, they would be able to formalize the Air Force flight schedules.
Following the Nairobi conference, the Tarawa ARG steamed to Mogadishu, where it went into “MODLOC” about ten miles offshore. Throughout the operation, the ships remained in that general vicinity—sometimes within view of the land and sometimes over the horizon—exerting a calming effect on events ashore, in the opinion of Hagee. The leaders of the various Somali factions knew that the ships contained Marines and that the ARG possessed a power-projection capability. The implied threat from such a force proved sufficient to control the situation. By this time, the Tarawa ARG had been at sea for some time, and Phillips had logistical concerns. While attending the Nairobi conference, he had coordinated with Hempstone and Libutti to secure a source for supplies and to receive mail. Throughout the Mogadishu operation, Phillips shuttled two of his ships—Fort Fisher and Ogden—between Mogadishu and Mombasa on a daily basis to conduct the needed logistical tasks. This approach worked quite well, in Phillips’s opinion, because it supported the mission while providing some activity for the ships other than hovering on station throughout the operation.

The plan for inserting the peacekeepers involved sending a Marine force into the Mogadishu airport, accompanied by an Air Force combat control team, which would conduct terminal guidance for the Air Force planes flying the missions. The Marines provided security for the control team and the arriving C-141 aircraft with the peacekeepers. The Marines also protected the Pakistanis until they were in position to assume their own security. The Air Force combat control team consisted of six airmen, whom Hagee characterized as “big and squared away making a strong military appearance.” These Air Force teams are components of the special operations community, and they are trained to conduct such missions in covert and nonpermissive environments when necessary. Libutti visited Mogadishu prior to the beginning of the operation, coordinating with the Pakistani commander and the Aideed faction, which controlled the area surrounding the airport. Using his relationship with Osman Ato, the general obtained a commitment from Aideed not to interfere with the insertions by attempting to shoot down the aircraft or attacking them on the ground. Once Libutti accomplished this, he notified Central Command to execute the insertion plan.

Libutti’s efforts to eliminate the threat from the Aideed faction reduced the risk but of course could not guarantee perfect security. Phillips and Hagee felt it appropriate to go ashore themselves prior the actual operation to conduct a reconnaissance and assess the situation in and around the airport. After determining that the airfield could handle C-141 aircraft and that the situation was not prohibitively threatening, the two commanders took a tour of Mogadishu. Raymond Marchand, the Conoco executive whom Phillips and Hagee had met at the Nairobi conference, joined them at the airport and provided what Phillips considered an eye-opening experience. They traveled in several vehicles, known as “technicals,” mounting .50-caliber machine guns and
manned by local Somalis working for Conoco. Their drive about the city included a visit to the evacuated American embassy, which had been stripped of everything of value and left an utter shambles.

The Continental Oil Company (Conoco) in Somalia had acquired concessions and begun exploring for oil in the northwest part of the country (the Republic of Somali-land) in 1986. Marchand considered the prospect of finding oil in that region modestly promising, foreseeing yields perhaps amounting to three hundred thousand barrels per day once developed. Conoco had also established a large operational headquarters in Mogadishu well before the spread of anarchy in the city. This complex constituted the most secure location available to American officials after evacuation of the embassy in January 1991. As president and general manager of Conoco Somalia, Ltd., Marchand proved to be an invaluable—though entirely unofficial—asset to American diplomatic and military efforts throughout the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Marchand possessed substantial knowledge and understanding of the political, military, and social conditions within Mogadishu and throughout the country. He also had key contacts with the most powerful leaders of various factions, connections that he readily made available to American authorities. He employed well-armed and well-paid guards who provided reliable service to his company and its activities throughout the years of instability. The Conoco headquarters in Mogadishu served as a focal point from which many Americans could operate and where they could reside during the period in which no American consular services existed.

One peculiar factor that affected the Mogadishu operation involved the use of khat among Somali people. Ironically, this recreational drug proved to be the only commodity that retained a viable market in Somalia’s general economic collapse and famine. Khat is a stimulant that Somalis chew in leaf form—as tobacco is chewed in some parts of America—and that secretes concentrations of amphetamine. It is a very social product, but after a full day of chewing khat, individuals become cranked up and irrational. This often results in reckless and aggressive behavior, particularly in younger men. In an environment where every male over seven or eight years of age seems to have a gun with plenty of ammunition, this can create dangerous situations. Although the Marines of 11th MEU (SOC) did not operate under the highly restrictive ROE that constrained the Pakistani peacekeepers, neither were they in Mogadishu to conduct combat operations. Consequently, Phillips and Hagee decided to have their activities performed at the airport in the morning hours and to return all personnel to the ships by about 1300 (1:00 PM) each day. This would minimize the opportunity for violent encounters. That pattern proved very effective during the insertion operation. Only Hagee remained ashore...
overnight, staying at the Conoco compound and keeping in tune with activities in the city.\textsuperscript{117}

Throughout the operation, Phillips and Hagee kept the Marines and ships busy preparing for contingencies in case of problems ashore. Should American forces at the airport come under attack, they had a plan prepared and rehearsed with which to respond. If an antiair threat developed that precluded helicopters from flying, Schenectady, with tracked vehicles on board, could put Marines ashore over the beach to prosecute any action that might be appropriate. In fact, Phillips inserted SEALs onto the beach to be available should any action on the ground become necessary. Because of these precautions, the entire amphibious force—not just the Marines and airmen operating at the airfield—participated in the mission in very real ways.\textsuperscript{118}

The Marines and sailors of the Tarawa ARG remained busy and took their responsibilities quite seriously, but they received a large morale boost when visited by actress Audrey Hepburn, as goodwill ambassador of the United Nations Children’s Fund.\textsuperscript{119} Hagee had met her in Mogadishu, where a UNICEF group had come to meet with American leaders. He and Phillips arranged for her to have lunch on the flagship, meet with some of the Marines and sailors, and talk a little about her mission. Within three hours, the troops had collected over four thousand dollars in donations for the UNICEF cause.\textsuperscript{120} This received considerable press coverage that placed the Navy and Marine Corps team in a very good light. Hepburn had been a UNICEF goodwill ambassador since 1988 and visited many humanitarian disaster areas, but nothing had prepared her for the experience of Somalia. She commented, “I walked into a nightmare. I have seen famine in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, but I have seen nothing like this—so much worse than I could have possibly have imagined.” Perhaps, after her dreadful experience ashore, her visit with the Marines and sailors provided as much of a morale boost for her as she did for the troops. Four months later Audrey Hepburn died from an incurable cancer, diagnosed after she returned home from the Somalia trip.\textsuperscript{121}
The operation now fell into a standard routine. For the first six days, until all the peacekeepers were in place, helicopters would fly the Marines and Air Force controllers into the airport every morning to support their arrival. The controllers would bring in the Air Force planes while Marines protected the landings, off-loading, and defensive preparations. After completing the objectives for the day, helicopters returned the U.S. team to its ships. The Marines also escorted some peacekeepers to the port area, where they intended to establish a post for protecting relief aid that arrived by ship. (After the departure of the Tarawa ARG, the situation in Mogadishu did not permit the Pakistanis to remain at the port, and they ultimately found themselves ensconced at, and limited to, the Mogadishu airport.)

After inserting the peacekeepers, the Tarawa ARG moved off station. But before departing the Indian Ocean, Phillips and Hagee conducted a debriefing—primarily through message traffic—with leaders of an incoming naval expeditionary force, consisting of PhibRon 3, commanded by Captain John W. Peterson, and 15th MEU (SOC), under Colonel Gregory S. Newbold. That Navy and Marine Corps team would lead the American forces ashore for Operation RESTORE HOPE three months later.

After negotiating for deployment of the five hundred peacekeepers, Ambassador Sahnoun became embroiled in a conflict with the UN bureaucracy and felt compelled to resign his post. This proved a serious loss to the peace process and humanitarian relief effort, as Sahnoun had demonstrated great skill and effectiveness in the vexing effort to save Somalia from total chaos and anarchy. When he left, relations between the UN and Somali factional leaders—particularly Aideed and Ali Mahdi—deteriorated to the point that a solution to the problems seemed even farther out of reach. Sahnoun’s replacement, Ismat Kittani, also a veteran diplomat, could not replicate the trust and cooperation that Sahnoun had nurtured among the Somali factions despite his similar understanding of the problem. His approach to dealing with the issues and the leaders of the most powerful factions proved overly structured, relatively ineffective in an environment that valued close personal interaction. It is not clear, of course, whether the agreements Sahnoun had carefully crafted among the diverse Somali factions could have brought an ultimate solution to the conflict and famine. But it is clear that his departure marked an end to any hope for a near-term political or humanitarian solution.

In November 1992, Brigadier General Paul L. Fratarangelo, USMC, replaced Libutti as commander of JTF Provide Relief. Shortly after his return to Central Command headquarters, Libutti received a call from the Pentagon indicating that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, wanted him in Washington to brief the Joint Staff on PROVIDE RELIEF and offer his impressions on Somalia and Kenya. A large-scale humanitarian incursion into Somalia was under consideration at the time, and in Washington Powell asked Libutti for his views on that as well. In his opinion,
Libutti told Powell and the Joint Staff, this would likely lead to assuming responsibility for nation building, which could be a ten-to-fifteen-year proposition. After a subsequent session with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Libutti returned to Tampa. A few days later, Libutti was ordered back to Mombasa to meet and work with the new American special envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley. About a week later, the United States would begin landing Marines in Somalia to implement Operation RESTORE HOPE.

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF constituted a very important element of America’s Somalia incursions of the 1990s. The participants gained a fundamental understanding of the humanitarian crisis, social breakdown, and the military situation, with all its nuances and intricacies. This information was to prove invaluable for the leaders of Operation RESTORE HOPE, which absorbed PROVIDE RELIEF once the larger commitment got under way. Both Libutti and Hagee returned to Somalia during the early stages of the RESTORE HOPE to assist the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, and Ambassador Oakley in addressing the problems they faced and the duties they performed.

RESTORE HOPE proved to be an operation that would embody... From the Sea far more than did PROVIDE RELIEF. Even so, thinkers within the sea services could draw valuable insight from the accomplishments of PROVIDE RELIEF for the strategic and operational concepts then in development. The skillful and casualty-free insertion of Pakistani peacekeepers into Mogadishu clearly demonstrated the flexibility of forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces operating from ships at sea. The deterrent value of naval power projection contributed greatly to that success by deterring hostile actions by militias and gangs ashore. The use of Air Force planes and controllers to fly peacekeepers into Mogadishu demonstrated the concept of shaping naval forces to support joint operations. The very creation of PROVIDE RELIEF illustrated the strategic notion of conducting joint operations tailored for national needs as described in... From the Sea. Libutti’s operation—including the relief flights out of Mombasa and the insertion of peacekeepers into Mogadishu—reported directly to the commander in chief of Central Command, who in turn operated under the direction of the National Command Authority. This permitted efficient command and control over operationally agile forces maneuvering from the sea in response to strategic and policy objectives from the highest level.


7. Ibid., p. 23.

8. Ibid., p. 35.


10. Ibid., pp. 9–10; Abul Fazal Md Sanaullah, United Nations’ Operation in Somalia: The Possibility of Success with a Different Approach or Application (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), p. 43.


37. The National Command Authority (NCA), which comprises the president and the secretary of defense or their authorized alternates, exercises authority over the armed forces operationally through the combatant commanders, in this case, that of the U.S. Central Command. See U.S. Defense Dept., *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFAF)*, Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 10 July 2001), pp. ix, 14, 17.


45. Hoar interview.

46. Ibid.; Libutti interview.


48. Libutti interview.


52. Ibid., pp. 219–21; Libutti interview; Sommer, *Hope Restored?* p. 23.

53. Libutti interview.

54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
57. Libutti interview.
59. The landing sites that the ICRC and subsequently PROVIDE RELIEF used within Somalia included Bardera, Baidoa, Oddur, and Belet Uen. See Hempstone, *Rogue Ambassador*, p. 221; and Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, p. 25.
60. Hempstone, *Rogue Ambassador*, pp. 221–24; Libutti interview.
61. DARTs are elements within the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) that deploy to areas requiring disaster or humanitarian relief, such as Kenya and Somalia during PROVIDE RELIEF. See Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention*, pp. 55, 112–13; Sommer, *Hope Restored?*, pp. 23–24.
62. Osman Ato, whose real name was Osman Hassan Ali, was a major figure in financing and supplying Aideed’s forces. Some observers believed he was deeply involved in the khat trade between Kenya and Somalia, but he always denied such connections. See Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu*, pp. 3–5, 73–74.
63. Libutti interview.
64. Hempstone, *Rogue Ambassador*, p. 222.
65. Libutti interview.
66. Ibid.
68. Libutti interview; Poole, *Effort to Save Somalia*, p. 11; Sommer, *Hope Restored?* p. 23.
70. Libutti interview.
72. Libutti interview.
75. Hoar interview; Libutti interview.
84. Sommer, *Hope Restored?* p. 16.
85. Analysts agree that much food aid was pilfered and diverted, but many think that 80 percent shrinkage is far too high a number. See Bryden, “Somalia,” p. 148; U.S. Defense Dept., *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*, pp. VI-1 to VI-2; Sommer, *Hope Restored?* pp. 28–29.
87. Hagee interview; *Central Command in Somalia*, p. 19.
89. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
97. The ships constituting the ARG included USS *Tarawa* (LHA 1), USS *Ogden* (LPD 5), USS *Fort Fisher* (LSD 40), and USS *Schenectady* (LST 1185). See Phillips interview.
98. Ibid.

116. Phillips interview.

117. Hagee interview.

118. Phillips interview.


120. Hagee interview; Phillips interview; Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu*, p. 41.


123. As we will see, 15th MEU (SOC) was not actually a complete MEU, because of inadequate amphibious shipping to carry all its Marines and equipment. Although commonly referred to as 15th MEU (SOC), it was officially a “special-purpose Marine air-ground task force,” or SPMAGTF. Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold, USMC (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 2 June 2008.


127. Sommer, *Hope Restored?* p. 27.

128. MCNEWS 46-92.


130. Libutti interview.


132. . . . *From the Sea*.

133. During the 1990s, commander in chief was the title given joint commanders of geographical and force commands. In the early years of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the secretary of defense changed it to unified combatant commander.

Operation RESTORE HOPE
Prelude and Lodgment

Throughout November 1992, the Bush administration pondered the question of leading a large-scale humanitarian intervention into Somalia. General Libutti’s trip to Washington contributed to that process, particularly the assessment under way within the Department of Defense. President Bush and his key advisers also received inputs from intelligence sources, UN officials, members of Congress, U.S.- and internationally based NGOs, and various African specialists. On 21 November, the interagency Deputies Committee of the National Security Council, headed by retired admiral Jonathan T. Howe, approved a concept paper—based on planning conducted at Central Command—that offered three options for augmenting the humanitarian response in Somalia. These options comprised increased American support for existing and enhanced UN peacekeeping operations, a new coalition organized by the United States but without American troops, and a major multinational venture led by U.S. ground forces. On 26 November, after intense deliberations within the administration and at the UN, President Bush offered to send American troops into Somalia.

Although influenced by discussions with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell, and Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and input from the Deputies Committee, President Bush’s decision appears to have been very personal, based on his compassion for starving Somalis. Many top leaders within the U.S. government also felt deep-rooted anguish over the human suffering, while remaining ambivalent about the idea of a major U.S. military commitment in Somalia. But the shortcomings of UNOSOM—including the successful but insufficient PROVIDE RELIEF—had become increasingly apparent to all observers as the year wore on. Although food shortages had abated somewhat by November 1992, conditions remained horrific for many Somalis in the worst-stricken areas. Additionally, the humanitarian tragedy continued to receive substantial attention in the press, with an ongoing impact on the administration and American people.
Most American leaders and many key UN officials recognized that hundreds of thousands of Somalis still faced the prospect of starvation despite some improvement in food supplies. Many came to believe that only a strong U.S.-led coalition under Chapter VII of the UN Charter offered hope for mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe. President Bush concurred and favored the heavy application of U.S. ground forces, from among the options provided in the Deputies Committee paper. Initially the administration considered sending a division-sized component but this increased to a three-brigade approach under pressure from General Hoar at Central Command. Originally, Hoar wanted the United States to provide command and control, airlift, and communications for a UN force but no ground troops. When overruled, he developed the three-brigade concept, including a brigade of Marines, a brigade of American soldiers, and an international brigade (the nucleus for which was already in Somalia). The prevailing theory of massive and overwhelming application of U.S. military force—derived from the Weinberger and Powell doctrines—undoubtedly influenced thinking in this regard. Developed and published during the 1980s as an outgrowth of the Vietnam War, these so-called doctrines were somewhat inconsistent with the new concepts of expeditionary warfare in the post–Cold War environment. Yet the remarkable success of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM kept them alive in the minds of many military and political leaders.

After deciding on this course of action, President Bush contacted thirteen heads of state and solicited their participation, believing that a major military commitment in Somalia required international forces to legitimize the UN mandate. All but Great Britain agreed to send troops or provide other support functions. Once the operation actually began, under American leadership, as many as forty-four nations offered to contribute to the effort; of these, twenty-one had provided forces at some level by the end of January 1993. On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council responded to President Bush's offer by unanimously passing Resolution 794, endorsing the offer of a member state (the United States) to lead an international force to protect humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Among other things, Resolution 794 authorized, under Chapter VII, “the Secretary General and all member states to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation in Somalia.”

The ensuing operation—generally known as Operation RESTORE HOPE—set a precedent for UN action. The Security Council had authorized Chapter VII military operations by member states on four previous occasions, but those interventions had resulted from external actions against sovereign nations. In Somalia, the situation involved an internal conflict and focused on humanitarian relief rather than combat operations. At this point, the president’s concept of a “New World Order” meshed...
nicely with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace,” which envisioned a liberal use of Chapter VII peace-enforcement operations. Both leaders believed that the end of the Cold War had created opportunities for a more assertive UN involvement in dealing with problems of the world. Moreover, the use of U.S. naval expeditionary forces to execute this mission to Somalia—jointly supported by major elements from the Army and Air Force—served to demonstrate the efficacy of the concepts then evolving within the American sea services. Indeed, the entire set of U.S. incursions into Somalia during the 1990s tends to exemplify these expeditionary precepts.

Not everyone believed that the drift toward a major American deployment to Somalia during November and December 1992 was a good idea. Those who supported the commitment had the recent examples of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to illustrate the capabilities of an American-led coalition effort. Of course, the crisis in Somalia differed from the Iraqi conflict in many ways, yet the model seemed applicable in the minds of some leaders. Those who held reservations about the undertaking, however, did not believe the short-term commitment President Bush had in mind would provide much more than temporary relief. In the minds of dissenters, only a substantial involvement in Somali affairs over a long period could address the underlying causes of famine and anarchy, and that could be costly in American blood and treasure. Some humanitarian-relief experts—particularly Frederick C. Cuny, the founder of Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corporation and a consultant to USAID in Somalia—believed that numerous, relatively small-scale incursions at various places along the Somali coastline and directly to points inland would be preferable to a large-scale effort operating out of a primary base at Mogadishu. Cuny proposed a series of security zones established by naval expeditionary forces and Army airborne units where relief agencies and Somalis could freely interact. This concept would utilize small ports, over-the-beach deliveries, and helicopter insertions to disburse emergency deliveries throughout the stricken areas. With the elimination of major supply depots and overland delivery routes, opportunity for factions and clans to influence the process would also diminish. This would have the effect of lessening the importance of major warlords, who used control of the food supply to enhance their power. But such an approach differed from current thinking within the Department of Defense, and it received little consideration. In retrospect, it remains unclear whether Cuny’s approach would have been more successful than the course of action actually undertaken.

One of the more thoughtful contrarian viewpoints came from Ambassador Smith Hempstone, whose earlier dispatches from Kenya had aroused so much awareness of the humanitarian crisis. In a message to Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Hempstone expressed his “jaundiced view of apparent
U.S. government plans to send large numbers of American troops into Somalia under a UN fig leaf.” The ambassador acknowledged that the humanitarian issues were compelling but expressed grave concern at the haste with which the government appeared to “embrace the Somali tarbaby.” Hempstone allowed that the United States could effect a landing and take control of Mogadishu with few if any casualties, but he expressed concern for the longer term, when Somalis would likely revert to guerrilla tactics. In Hempstone’s words, “If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.” He acknowledged that American involvement would save tens of thousands of Somalis from starvation in 1993 but was convinced that they would all probably starve to death in 1994 anyway, unless the United States was prepared to remain in the country.

Hempstone believed that it would take at least five years to “get Somalia not on its feet but just on its knees.” American involvement would move from providing food to guarding and distributing food supplies, hunting guerrillas, establishing a judicial system, forming a police force, creating an army, encouraging the formation of political parties, and conducting free and fair multiparty elections. “This putative operation is not a map exercise in Tampa,” he cautioned. “It is not a PR exercise. Real lives (American and Somali) are going to be lost. Billions of the American taxpayers’ dollars are going to be spent. To what end?” Hempstone concluded his dispatch, “We ought to have learned by now that these situations are easier to get into than out of. No good deed goes unpunished. Somalia is an African and Islamic country. If international intervention is contemplated, let it be led by African and Islamic countries. Take the advice of the people on the ground. Inshalla. Think once, twice and three times before you embrace the Somali tarbaby.”

On 4 December 1992, President Bush addressed the nation on the situation in Somalia. He described and praised U.S. contributions during PROVIDE RELIEF but also portrayed the continuing anarchy and famine. He pointed out that “in many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing; food convoys have been hijacked; aid workers assaulted; ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them from docking. There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy prevails.” The president then announced a commitment of U.S. forces—under overall command of General Hoar at Central Command—to ensure the delivery of emergency relief aid to the starving people of Somalia. He identified the major forces to be used: the naval expeditionary force then deployed off the coast of Somalia (the Tripoli ARG); major elements of I MEF, in California; units of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, in New York; various ancillary support units from other services; and unspecified elements from “about a dozen countries.” Planners estimated the total number would amount to twenty-eight thousand Americans and about ten thousand personnel from coalition nations. Although the actual numbers fluctuated
during the deployment, at its peak Operation RESTORE HOPE would count nearly twenty-eight thousand U.S. troops and as many as eleven thousand from over twenty countries dispersed throughout central and southern Somalia. At this point, the president’s actions had strong support from the American public, Congress, and even President-elect William J. Clinton.

The American and coalition forces operating in Somalia during RESTORE HOPE used a variety of names and designators. Initially created by General Hoar on 27 November 1992 as Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, the command progressed to become Combined Task Force (CTF) Somalia as coalition forces joined the organization within Somalia. Shortly thereafter it officially became Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, served as commander of the task force throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE. The UN special representative to Somalia, Ismat Kittani—who replaced Mohamed Sahnoun in October 1992—objected to the exclusive use of U.S. force designators. It was this that produced the change to UNITAF, reflecting a UN role, limited as it was. The United States had agreed to place the operation under the UN Security Council with the understanding there would be no interference with U.S. command and control over the entire force. Since American leaders intended to transfer responsibility for operations in Somalia back to UN authority upon breaking the famine, they believed it prudent to make that desired name change. Throughout these evolutions, most of the media—within the United States and internationally—continued to refer to the undertaking as “RESTORE HOPE.” In short, “UNITAF” became the command designator, while RESTORE HOPE served as the operational name. In General Johnston’s words, “Restore Hope was the message we were trying to send.”

Although intended as a mission of mercy, RESTORE HOPE had authority for first use of deadly force to ensure the success of its mission and the protection of its personnel. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations, which use a minimal number of troops and place strict limitation on the application of military power, RESTORE HOPE would operate in concert with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force and under rules of engagement that allowed expeditious use of weapons when necessary. Nonetheless, Americans going ashore for RESTORE HOPE—like those in EASTERN EXIT and PROVIDE RELIEF—did not view combat operations as their primary purpose. In fact, Johnston stated before leaving for Mogadishu that the mission would be strictly humanitarian and would use force only to protect troops and food convoys. To the consternation of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, this declaration appeared to narrow the intentionally broad Security Council Resolution 794. It also seemed to moderate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, at least as far as the use of firepower was concerned. Yet this policy of self-restraint in the use of weapons was consistent with the humanitarian purpose of the mission.
Obviously, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force had a limited application in the amorphous world of relief operations. One area where the concept played an important role involved the development of a clearly defined and specific mission statement, coupled with a definite exit strategy. In this case, that meant a rapid transfer of responsibility to the UN once UNITAF had broken the famine. 39 Within this context, U.S. leaders planned on a short-term, limited mission that focused on distributing food and saving lives. 40 UN leaders, however—particularly Boutros-Ghali—wanted a long-term U.S. commitment, including an assertive role in restoring political and social stability. Boutros-Ghali’s expectations included the disarmament of clans, militias, and gangs by the American-led force, as well as an active attempt at nation building. 41 But American commanders would go no farther than to require the factions to keep crew-served weapons and technicals within cantonment areas and to confiscate weapons found within prohibited areas or directly threatening to UNITAF members. 42 This policy—occasionally enforced with combat action—did remove some of the most powerful weapons from the environment and contribute to a more stable situation during RESTORE HOPE. 43

General Hoar wanted full authority to act forcefully under Chapter VII when necessary but did not want orders that required him to conduct a general disarmament. Since rifles and assault weapons were pervasive throughout the operational area, full disarmament would be possible only by means of door-to-door and person-by-person searches, creating constant confrontations with both organized and unorganized bands of fighters. That would far exceed the mission conceived by American commanders and lead to numerous casualties. 44 Besides, Hoar pointed out, “We were having a very bad time disarming warlords in Los Angeles and New York and it was less likely we could do it in Mogadishu.” 45 Hoar did support and enforce a selective disarmament should it be necessary in order to accomplish the mission or protect UNITAF forces. The cantonment of heavy weapons and enforcement of that policy by inspections, along with weapons sweeps when the security situation demanded, fit within his criteria, whereas general disarmament did not. 46

American leaders understood the Secretary-General’s perspective regarding disarmament and the need to deal with deep-rooted problems within Somalia. They also recognized that the solution to Somalia’s problems required a long-term commitment that would address humanitarian relief, economic recovery, and political stability. But that, they felt, should occur through a follow-on effort under UN leadership and not as part of the RESTORE HOPE mission. 47 RESTORE HOPE would focus on creating a secure environment for delivery of relief supplies, thereby breaking the grip of famine in the country. To accomplish this, UNITAF would secure major air and seaports, control certain key installations, protect major food distribution points, and ensure free passage for
delivery of relief supplies. Beyond that, UNITAF would transfer operations to UN-controlled forces, under a command that later became UNOSOM II. In other words, UNITAF would solve the short-term crisis, and UNOSOM II would address long-term problems. American leaders hoped to effect this transfer of responsibility by March 1993 (there had even been some early talk of 20 January—inauguration day); in the event, it did not happen until May.

As it became clear in late November 1992 that President Bush was moving toward a commitment in Somalia, Central Command created JTF Somalia under command of General Johnston, who also commanded I MEF, headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California. I MEF would provide the core headquarters and a substantial portion of the forces committed to JTF Somalia and its successor commands (CTF Somalia and UNITAF). As the JTF commander, Johnston reported to General Hoar, who served directly under the secretary of defense and thus the NCA. Concurrent with the president’s decision-making process and the planning at Central Command, the State Department established a U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) in Mogadishu to coordinate among various American and UN entities and indigenous political factions within Somalia.

The president selected Robert A. Oakley—who had earlier served as ambassador to Somalia and knew key military and political leaders—to head the USLO, with the rank of ambassador. Oakley’s résumé included duty in Vietnam and Lebanon as well as service with the United States Institute of Peace, where he had chaired studies on peacekeeping and the Somalia crisis. In his role as special representative to Somalia, Oakley would work closely with Johnston and other key officials to achieve U.S. objectives during RESTORE HOPE. Oakley arrived in Mogadishu on 7 December and immediately set out to persuade the major political and military leaders to cooperate with the American-led forces soon to arrive in Mogadishu.

General Johnston had known by late November that I MEF would probably lead the U.S. mission to Somalia once the president made a firm commitment. This would be a logical choice, since the headquarters and major subordinate elements had conducted
exercises for this type of operation in the recent past. Additionally, I MEF was structured, trained, equipped, and manned for expeditionary operations, as its name implies. In a discussion with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Johnston learned that Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni was available to support the operation as a member of the I MEF staff. Mundy had first coordinated with General Hoar, who immediately blessed the idea of bringing General Zinni into the operation. Hoar served with Zinni in Vietnam and had a very high regard for his professionalism.

Johnston considered Zinni the “number one warfighter in the Marine Corps” and the prospect of his services as the J-3 (operations) officer for Operation RESTORE HOPE an “absolutely priceless offer that I would not refuse.” Johnston saw Zinni as not only a Marine officer of solid reputation but also one who had recent experience in humanitarian operations. Zinni had participated in CTF PROVIDE COMFORT at the end of DESERT STORM, serving as chief of staff under Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili—a future chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That operation had protected, sheltered, and fed some five hundred thousand Kurds in the rugged terrain along the Iraqi-Turkish border after a failed rebellion against Saddam Hussein. PROVIDE COMFORT had saved thousands of lives and created conditions that eventually allowed the Kurds to return to their homes. The primary work of CTF PROVIDE COMFORT occurred during the spring and summer of 1991 but continued through 1997 and ultimately evolved into Operation NORTHERN WATCH, which remained in effect until 2003.

After returning to the United States in May 1992, Zinni served as deputy commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Quantico, Virginia. Knowing in November 1992 that a decision on Somalia was imminent and I MEF the likely candidate to lead the operation, Zinni suggested that his experience could contribute to the effort. This suited his immediate superior, Lieutenant General Charles C. Krulak—a future Commandant of the Marine Corps—who wanted to make MCCDC more relevant and valuable to the operating forces of the Marine Corps. He believed that offering Zinni’s services for the Somalia operation would be a move in that direction. After discussions with Commandant Mundy and General Johnston, Zinni joined the I MEF staff in early December, just days before it deployed to Somalia. General Mundy had intended for Zinni to serve as chief of staff, but Johnston wanted him as director of operations (J-3). Although J-3 was technically a lower-level position, the arrangement proved satisfactory to Zinni, who held Johnston in very high esteem and “would rather do operations than anything else.”
Planning is the key to success in all operations, despite the fact that no plan is ever executed as written. But without a plan, there is no basis for action, there are no troops for maneuvering, no weapons for fighting, no equipment for working, no logistics for sustainment, and no means for communicating. Even if all this is available, without a plan they will not be in the right configuration, at the right places at the right times, and could not move when and where needed. Planning—as every officer in the U.S. services knows—is both continuous and concurrent. Although deliberate planning is the primary model, the Somalia operation required crisis-action planning, as do so many operations that naval expeditionary forces conduct. In fact, Johnston—one of the most experienced and professional officers in the U.S. military—has stated, “In thirty-five years I cannot think of ever executing a deliberate plan.” He also contends that Marines and sailors are at their best in crisis-action planning. Throughout this process, constant deliberations occur at various levels, providing a flow of information well before decisions become final.

In preparing for the Somalia commitment, leaders conducted discussions in Washington while planning occurred simultaneously at Central Command, I MEF, and lower levels of command. As the president and his advisers made key decisions and created policy guidance for the Somalia operation, Central Command hammered out an operation plan in conjunction with the JTF Somalia/I MEF future-planning cell. Although officially established on 25 November 1992, the future-planning cell for Somalia actually began work as early as 20 November. On 1 December, the NCA issued a warning order for the Somalia incursion, and an execution order followed on 5 December. Central Command issued its operation order the following day.

By the time the warning order from the NCA reached Central Command, General Hoar, for the most part, already knew what it would contain and had an operation order well on the way to completion. In fact, Generals Hoar and Powell, acting under guidance from the secretary of defense, made all high-level military decisions throughout the planning phase. Similarly, no surprises greeted Johnston and the I MEF staff when they received directives from Central Command, because they had contributed to their development. The skills that Navy and Marine Corps officers develop through the rapid planning process during short-notice amphibious operations contributed to this effort, by ensuring the most efficient use of limited time. The operation order that resulted involved a four-phase approach to executing RESTORE HOPE. The first phase entailed gaining control of key objectives in Mogadishu and then rapidly moving into Baledogle and Baidoa; phase II involved occupying relief centers at Belet Uen, Oddur, and Gialalassi; phase III included capturing the port and airfield at Kismayo, securing
Bardera, and establishing control of the land route between Baidoa and Bardera; and phase IV involved the transfer of responsibility from UNITAF to a UN peacekeeping force, which would be known as UNOSOM II.  

Ambassador Oakley proposed that he, or key members of his team, would precede each major move into a new area and prepare local communities for the arrival of UNITAF forces. This included coordination with local leaders and a cross section of the population to explain the impending action and seek cooperation. Oakley’s approach was implemented and proved very effective in gaining acceptance of, and even participation in, the relief activity by residents and refugees in many of the affected areas. In the event, Oakley felt secure when he went into these areas, because of the presence of naval aircraft from carriers offshore. He later stated, “I’d go into these places first. But with aircraft overhead, I didn’t have anything to worry about.”

The operation plan for RESTORE HOPE envisioned a timeline of 90–180 days for achieving the objectives of phases I through III. American leaders hoped to be out of Somalia no later than March 1993, which would occur at about the ninety-day point. Of course, the worst-case scenario envisioned that the plan could take twice that long. (As things turned out, UNITAF accomplished all objectives well ahead of schedule, making it theoretically possible to transfer control before the ninety-day period and meet the goal of a March departure. But other factors were to intervene, and UNITAF would not actually be able to terminate operations and transfer command to UNOSOM II until May.) Additionally, in negotiating a transition, the United States agreed to leave American elements in Somalia to provide a quick-reaction force (QRF) and ongoing logistical support for UN operations. Ultimately, this provision was to embroil the United States in Somalia’s internal conflict.

Despite efficient communications among levels of authority and good cooperation in the planning process during November and December 1992, the entire effort was highly compressed, causing everyone to operate on short timelines. After the president announced his commitment to send forces into Somalia, Johnston, Zinni, and the staff at I MEF had little time to complete the planning that would initiate the flow of personnel and material under the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) necessary to accomplish the mission. The initial lodgment in Somalia would be conducted by the Tripoli ARG, which had been positioned offshore at Mogadishu. Captain John W. Peterson served as commodore of the ARG and Colonel Gregory S. Newbold commanded the embarked Marines. The Tripoli ARG would provide a spearhead for the leading elements of JTF Somalia. The landing needed to be closely coordinated with the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies that followed to ensure a fluid, efficient, and professional operation. It would be unimpressive to Somali
warlords if a lag occurred between the arrival of the amphibious force in Mogadishu and the follow-on echelons. To have the best possible effect, the operation needed to occur rapidly and forcefully. The flexibility of the Navy and Marine Corps team and the competence of the commanders within the ARG made this possible, in the opinion of Johnston.

During October 1992—after completing its predeployment training in California—the Tripoli ARG departed U.S. waters for the Indian Ocean. Regrettably, it fell short of having a full naval expeditionary force on the model of the Navy and Marine Corps team (Tarawa ARG/11th MEU [SOC]) that inserted the Pakistani peacekeepers in September 1992 during Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. The Navy had initially proposed a two-ship naval element for this deployment, rather than the traditional four-ship amphibious task force (ATF). Navy leaders wanted to relieve the pressure on their sailors created by the high operational tempo resulting from the recent DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM operations. Although a worthy goal, this policy severely reduced shipping available to the operating forces and deprived the nation of an adequate forward-deployed, ready-response capability. To Peterson, Newbold, and many other interested parties, this arrangement was unconscionable. Should they be committed to a fight having only the combat strength available from two amphibious ships, it could result in embarrassment to the nation and unnecessary loss of young American lives.

General Johnston fiercely argued against this option, taking his case to Lieutenant General H. C. (Hank) Stackpole III, Commander, Marine Forces Pacific/Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. The two commanders that would take the ARG to sea, Colonel Newbold and Captain Peterson, also protested up their chains of command, with the issue ultimately getting the attention of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations. Because of all this effort, U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters reluctantly acquiesced and agreed to source a three-ship force. A three-ship ATF is able to deploy a full MEU (SOC) if among the vessels is one of the larger and more capable LHA or LHD amphibious assault ships. Unfortunately, none of these “big decks” were available, due to turn-around times and long-range scheduling issues. Peterson and Newbold would have to make due with the older and less capable LPH. When an LPH served as the centerpiece of an ARG, it required three additional amphibious ships to load a full MEU.

Although restoring one ship to Peterson’s squadron constituted somewhat of a moral victory for the operating forces, Peterson and Newbold would deploy to the Indian Ocean with an ARG that would still be one ship under strength. This reduction in lift capacity caused the Marines to have shortages in transportation, engineering equipment, aviation assets, logistics, and manpower. A traditional MEU would deploy with 2,000–2,200 Marines and sailors, whereas Newbold would have only 1,850. Although
trained to full MEU (SOC) standards, the shortage of Marines and equipment obviously meant that Newbold did not have full MEU (SOC) mission capability.\textsuperscript{88} Even though the ARG could deploy and execute some missions, the shortage of men and equipment strained the capacity of Newbold’s headquarters, logistics, communications, and combat power. This limited his ability to mitigate unintended events and left the MEU with no reserve capability.\textsuperscript{89}

In an awkward and inadequate effort to compensate, the Navy assigned a ship from Maritime Prepositioned Ships Squadron Three (MPSRon 3) operating out of the Mariana Islands to join Peterson in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{90} That ship—USNS 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011)—contained valuable operational equipment and supplies that would be available to the Marines, but required a benign, deepwater port facility for off-loading.\textsuperscript{91} It also required a fly-in naval support echelon to conduct the offload once in port.\textsuperscript{92} The contents of Lummus would therefore not be available during the early stages of an operation. Additionally, Lummus had not been available to participate in the predeployment workups off California and could not operate tactically with the amphibious ships.\textsuperscript{93} In other words, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ship could not contribute to the initial power projection that is critically important in all amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{94} Of course, the equipment, ammunition, food, water, and spare parts available in large quantities on board Lummus would be of great value once off-loaded later in the campaign.\textsuperscript{95}

Not having a fully structured ATF, Peterson properly designated his squadron as an amphibious task unit (ATU) in a “3 + 1” configuration, with USS Tripoli serving as the flagship.\textsuperscript{96} Marine Corps authorities designated Newbold’s unit an SPMAGTF, thereby emphasizing its reduced capability.\textsuperscript{97} If Newbold’s unit had been able to deploy at full strength in personnel and equipment, it would have been designated 15th MEU (SOC). As a result, many pundits have referred to it as 15th MEU in their writings. But this gives an inaccurate impression of the capability of that unit and wrongly implies an acceptance of deploying suboptimal naval expeditionary forces. The suggestion by some senior officers that the reduced ATU/SPMAGTF could call for additional assets should a crisis occur during the deployment seemed the epitome of naiveté to Newbold. In his words, “Crisis don’t wait for adequate forces—you meet the crisis with what you have.”\textsuperscript{98} Yet in October 1992, this understrength, underequipped, and undermanned amphibious force with its odd mix of ships constituted the leading edge of American power in the region and at the time that America needed them for Operation RESTORE HOPE.\textsuperscript{99} Generals Hoar and Johnston would have to depend on this force to take and prepare the ground in Mogadishu—a very uncertain environment—for arrival of American and coalition units that would constitute UNITAF.
Despite having reduced capability, the Navy and Marine Corps team proved equal to the mission in Somalia because it met very little resistance during landing operations. Additionally, in keeping with the amphibious culture of the U.S. sea services, the Phillips and Hagee team on the Tarawa ARG maintained close communications with Peterson and Newbold before they arrived on station. This provided some orientation regarding the city of Mogadishu and a frame of reference for operations in and around its airport. Equally important, Peterson, Newbold, and their blended staffs had developed a strong, efficient, and professional relationship, which helped overcome deficiencies inherent in their suboptimized force. Nonetheless, Newbold considered his forces spread “very, very thin” at certain locations during the early period of the Mogadishu operation.

Operation RESTORE HOPE began in Somalia on 9 December 1992. Navy SEALs and Marine reconnaissance units from the Tripoli ARG landed in the early morning hours, followed shortly thereafter by the full strength of Newbold’s SPMAGTF. Newbold’s tactical operation plan specified four objectives his Marines would quickly capture: the main airport, the port facilities, coastal sites suitable for landing beaches, and the U.S. embassy, which had been abandoned since the evacuation in January 1991. The operation also called for the surface landing to occur at GREEN Beach (as planners named the landing site) and then push on inland to capture the embassy. Upon arriving, the Marines found the newest—and at one time the most beautiful—American facility in that part of the world a filthy wreck. Indeed, all of Mogadishu had suffered the ravages of war, reminding many Americans of the images of bombed-out European cities during and immediately after World War II.

The Marines and sailors of the Tripoli ARG had very little information about the situation ashore as they prepared for their landing. Although Peterson and Newbold had included Mogadishu as a notional target during some of their training exercises back in California, they did not anticipate actually operating within Somalia when they departed U.S. waters. In fact, by the time they reached Singapore, Central Command had placed the ARG on alert for a possible humanitarian operation in Bangladesh, not Somalia. But by 24 November, the prospect of an involvement in Bangladesh had diminished, and the two commanders began receiving indication that an operation in Somalia might be in the offing. As they started planning for that prospective mission, Peterson and Newbold realized they had very little updated information on the situation and even less insight into the cultural dynamics of Somalia and its people. The knowledge they received from the Tarawa ARG was helpful, but far from being the detailed and current information needed for mission planning. The officers of the SPMAGTF were desperate for good maps, information on...
the combatants, satellite photos, and other such material regarding the operational environment.\textsuperscript{108} The intelligence material they did receive tended to be outdated, irrelevant, repetitive, and of such a high volume that it was very difficult to sort through.\textsuperscript{109} More significantly, Somalia had been an intelligence vacuum since the EASTERN EXIT evacuation in January 1991. There simply was not much current information available, and as a result, both Peterson and Newbold considered themselves astoundingly ignorant about the environment they were entering.\textsuperscript{110} For this and other reasons, the commanders were amazed when they arrived offshore at Mogadishu in the middle of the night on 2 December 1992 to find the largest city in Somalia completely dark due to lack of electricity.\textsuperscript{111} Equally surprising, the sky over Mogadishu would occasionally light up with the eruption of gunfire and tracer rounds. They later learned that this nightly custom resulted in great part from random acts of violence conducted by youths after daylong bouts of chewing khat.\textsuperscript{112}

For two nights prior to the landing, Peterson sent SEAL teams to reconnoiter the near shore of GREEN Beach, the prospective landing site just south of the city. He also sent teams to assess an alternate landing site, named BLUE Beach north of the harbor, and ordered swimmers into the port area. Peterson needed substantial information to lay out the beach approaches because he considered the charts available for that part of the world abysmal. He tasked the SEALs with providing information relating to currents, tides, coral heads, vertical faces, and other hydrographic aspects of the potential landing sites. During reconnaissance of the port area, Peterson’s swimmers also observed the security procedures for its defense, concluding that the landing force could take the entire port area very quickly.\textsuperscript{113} After the landing occurred, Peterson had the SEAL teams conduct a thorough hydrographic survey of the port and harbor to prepare for the movement of numerous U.S. and coalition ships needed to support Operation RESTORE HOPE.\textsuperscript{114}

The general division of labor regarding reconnaissance for the amphibious force had SEALs conducting surveillance within the water and near shore, and Marine force reconnaissance units surveying shore-based areas. Unfortunately, the ARG could not get permission from Central Command or Washington to insert SEAL or reconnaissance teams until 6 December despite continued requests starting on 2 December when they first arrived offshore.\textsuperscript{115} The SEALs conducted two days of work in the water prior to the landing and joined Marine force reconnaissance units as advance elements of the landing force. The only “boots on the ground” insertions for Marine reconnaissance units prior to D-day involved a team sent into Mogadishu the night before the landing to conduct liaison with the Pakistani battalion.\textsuperscript{116}
The sailors and Marines in the Trioli ARG knew Somalia to be a very violent place. The sight of nightly firefights in Mogadishu reinforced that awareness and created questions among members of the landing force about what might happen during the amphibious operation. In that respect Peterson and Newbold labored in what General Hoar referred to as “that twilight area between peace and war”; they had no way of knowing for sure what would happen upon landing. They were neither politically nor culturally knowledgeable about the current situation, and they had no opportunity to improve their understanding before going ashore. The intelligence obtained by SEAL teams during their reconnaissances provided only physical information about the hydrography, harbors, and beaches. The violence in Mogadishu and uncertainty as to the attitudes of various Somali factions and clans caused many members of the landing force to go ashore expecting a possible shoot-out.

The scheme of maneuver for the amphibious operation involved a simultaneous surface landing over GREEN Beach, a helicopter insertion at the airport, and a Zodiac soft-boat attack to secure the port and harbor. When the landing force went ashore at GREEN Beach, Peterson attempted to watch from the bridge of Tripoli, despite the darkness of early morning. At H-hour he observed what appeared to be a massive firefight from the landing beach. Peterson immediately called sick bay and ordered it “to stand by for casualties,” explaining, “We have a giant firefight on our hands.” Shortly after giving the alert, Peterson’s chief of staff suggested, “Commodore, I think that might be flashbulbs.” The international press had gotten word of the landing and had awaited the Marines and SEALs at GREEN Beach to capture the event on camera. The situation offered the potential for disaster, since nobody in the landing force had expected such reception ashore and, as noted, even thought it possible that there would be resistance.

For many people, the beach episode amounted to little more than an amusing—though embarrassing—occurrence at the nexus of world events. Some leaders even considered the incident a good way to advertise America power and demonstrate its capability. But to others it represented an act of gross irresponsibility. Peterson and Newbold had welcomed a large number of media representatives on board Tripoli the day before the landing and provided them a detailed briefing on the operation. The media personnel had then been sequestered and not allowed outgoing communications until the operation had taken place. But other members of the press had remained ashore and learned the exact time and location for the beach landing. Apparently, well intended American officials back in Washington—who hoped for some good publicity about the incursion—had alerted the press but failed to inform the Tripoli ARG that they had done so. No one in the landing force or on board the ships had any idea the press would be there. Peterson and Newbold were livid, feeling the incident brought into question the
situational awareness of many high-level leaders in Washington. Did they have any idea what they were getting into in Somalia? Conversely, Peterson and Newbold also felt that the incident demonstrated the quality and discipline of the enlisted personnel and junior officers. Highly professional and trained for combat, they had gone into an uncertain environment and had been surprised by klieg lights and flashbulbs, and yet they had been able to think on their feet, assess the situation, and restrain the impulse to fire. In Peterson’s words, “To this day, I’m amazed that they didn’t blow away a number of the international press.”

The two main factions that American leaders needed to co-opt during RESTORE HOPE were those belonging to Aideed and to Ali Mahdi. Ambassador Oakley and General Libutti—who had returned to Somalia to work with the ambassador just days before the landing operation—conducted several meetings with the warlords to procure their cooperation during the landings and subsequent operations ashore. This cooperation included acceptance of the ongoing aircraft flights and ship traffic that would bring in the follow-on forces and deliver equipment and supplies to support the operation. But numerous other clans, subclans, gangs, and thugs not controlled by Aideed or Ali Mahdi also existed in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. Their existence created enormous uncertainty for leaders unfamiliar with the current political situation and the conflict among major factions within the operational area. Tapping into a knowledgeable resource, Oakley established his USLO headquarters in the Conoco compound, making use of the firm’s local executive, Raymond Marchand, before and during the early phase of the U.S. incursion. As seen above, Marchand and his staff had already provided important service to the United States and now continued to be valuable, providing facilities, assistance with travel into dangerous areas, and help in communicating with local chieftains. Libutti’s prior relationship with key Somali players, such as Osman Ato, also aided in this regard. Libutti helped smooth the way for the initial incursion and continued working with Oakley and his staff for several weeks thereafter. In addition to assisting with security, he helped establish an effective liaison relationship between Oakley’s USLO and the growing military structure, which included Johnston, Zinni, Newbold, and the other high military officials arriving on the scene.

Despite the media fiasco during the landing and a brief and ineffectual resistance at the port, the landing force quickly secured all of the D-day objectives. Newbold was aware of the efforts of Oakley and Libutti to persuade the major warlords not to resist the landing or the subsequent incursion. In fact, Newbold and Libutti had intermittent contact before the 9 December landing. Nevertheless, Newbold was unaware of the results of Libutti’s efforts and so had to be concerned that unaffiliated rogue elements might try to test his forces. Being a prudent commander, Newbold “planned for the
By moving aggressively with speed and determination, he overwhelmed and deterred any potential opposition. Once Newbold—who accompanied the initial landing wave on the beach—had visited all four objectives and determined they were secure, he transferred command ashore; at that point Peterson assumed a supporting role. The SPMAGTF then prepared to hand over control of Mogadishu to incoming forces of the 1st Marine Division, under Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, and then to move on quickly to capture Baledogle and Baidoa in accordance with the operation plan. The early capture of Baledogle proved particularly important, because it provided an additional airfield for the strategic airlift of military personnel, as well as needed “bed-down” space for U.S. tactical aircraft. Wilhelm arrived in Somalia with a relatively small staff on 11 December and assumed duties as the Marine Forces commander under Johnston’s component organizational structure. Newbold and his SPMAGTF would come under Wilhelm’s command for the remainder of their time in Somalia.

During the amphibious landing at Mogadishu and subsequent operations ashore, F-14 Tomcat and A-6 Intruder aircraft from USS Ranger (CV 61) provided air cover for the Marines and coalition forces. These air missions could provide close air support for troops on the ground.

RESTORE HOPE: Initial insertions by surface and air into Mogadishu and rapid push to Baledogle and Baidoa.
should conditions dictate the need. They also reminded all parties in Mogadishu of the immense power available to the task force. Equally important, Ranger provided imaging of the operational area—particularly, beach and city views—from F-14s equipped with Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photo System (TARPS) pods. Ranger furnished this imagery to Tripoli for distribution to Marine commanders in the field.

Prior to the Somalia incursion, the Ranger battle group had operated in the Persian Gulf, where its planes enforced the no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH). During the early days of December, it became clear in the minds of many American leaders—particularly General Hoar at Central Command and Admiral Jeremiah at the Joint Chiefs of Staff—that it made no sense to put twenty-eight thousand American troops ashore in Africa without air cover. After discussions at Central Command headquarters between Hoar and his naval component commander, Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz, the NAVCENT commander ordered the Ranger battle group, commanded by Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, to support Operation RESTORE HOPE. Just prior to the 9 December landing, Hancock arrived on the scene and met with Peterson and Newbold aboard Tripoli. In addition to coordinating support for the operation, he attempted to identify areas where the capabilities of his battle group could complement the plan and assets of Peterson and Newbold.

As a result of this meeting, Hancock placed all his F-14s and A-6s in a standby status loaded with five-hundred-pound laser-guided bombs. All flights supporting the landing or subsequent operations ashore would have airplanes with five-hundred-pound bombs under each wing available to the Marines and coalition forces should the need arise. During the first several days of Operation RESTORE HOPE, Hancock cycled his entire air wing through patrol duty, focusing on recognizing roads, observing force concentrations, and identifying built-up areas, a process that familiarized his aircrews with the layout of the country. Through the energetic use of his carrier assets, Hancock made a significant contribution to the safety and success of the amphibious operation. His support would continue to have an impact as coalition forces began...
arriving at Mogadishu airport and moving to locations throughout central and southern Somalia.\textsuperscript{145}

For Peterson and Newbold, the entire operation—from training in California through establishing command ashore in Somalia—validated the efficacy of existing tactical doctrine, the emerging strategic and operational concepts as articulated in \ldots From the Sea, and two hundred years of naval tradition, notwithstanding an ARG hamstrung by inadequate force allocation. Just as Peterson’s Tripoli ARG and Newbold’s SPMAGTF embodied the tenets of \ldots From the Sea, so too did Hancock’s Ranger battle group exemplify the emerging concept “Forward \ldots From the Sea.” The complementary use of the amphibious ready group in conjunction with the aircraft carrier battle group foreshadowed the formalization of that coequal relationship—coupled with the reaffirmation of the traditional Navy and Marine Corps relationship—expressed two years later in the Department of the Navy concept paper Forward \ldots From the Sea.\textsuperscript{146}

Notes

1. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 35–42; Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), pp. 52, 57; Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention.”

2. The NSC Deputies Committee serves as the senior subcabinet interagency forum for policy issues. It consists of the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Organization of the National Security Council, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2 (Washington, D.C.: White House, 20 January 1993); Adm. Jonathan T. Howe, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 29 August 2008.


8. Some observers refer to the structure as “two division,” thinking of the 1st Marine Division and 10th Mountain Division, which provided the American element of Restore Hope. But these two divisions did not send their entire forces to UNITAF, only elements
amounting to brigade-sized equivalents. Coalition forces already in Somalia, augmented by those that would arrive at a later point, constituted the third brigade, of course. Hoar interview.


18. Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention.”


25. Ibid.

26. The headquarters of U.S. Central Command is located at MacDill Air Force Base, in Tampa, Florida.

27. Hempstone, message O 115112Z December 1992 [emphasis original].


29. The original plan called for sixteen thousand Marines from I MEF, 1,800 from the deployed SPMAGTF in the Indian Ocean, five thousand from the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, and about 5,200 personnel from other services. See Director of Public Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, to General Officers, (MCNEWS 18-93) 30 April 1993, Folder: Somalia, Opn Restore Hope, Articles, November–December 1992, Marine Corps History Division, Reference Branch, Quantico, Virginia [hereafter MCNEWS 18-93].

30. The number of U.S. and international troops reported as participants in UNITAF varies slightly among various reports. See Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 31; Sommer, Hope Restored? pp. 32–33; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 255.

32. "Combined Task Force," or CTF, is often used as if equivalent to "Combined Joint Task Force" (CJTF). This can be confusing, since CJTF also means "Commander, Joint Task Force." In the literature of RESTORE HOPE, it is possible to find both usages; this study uses "CTF" throughout. See JP 1-02, pp. 101, 297, A-27.


45. Hoar interview.


47. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, pp. 36–40.


51. Johnston interview.


53. General Hoar considered Oakley one of the toughest men in the State Department and the trio of Oakley, Johnston, and Zinni a dynamic force. Hoar interview; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, pp. xvii, 49–50; Central Command in Somalia, p. 22.

54. Hoar interview; Oakley, "Somalia," p. 3.


56. Hoar interview.

57. Johnston interview.


62. Johnston interview.

63. “Deliberate” (or contingency) planning is undertaken when the use of military forces can be anticipated and operation plans developed in advance of action. “Crisis action” planning occurs when there is little or no warning and accelerated decision making is required. JOPES (discussed below) provides additional procedures for the time-sensitive development of operation orders necessary for a military response. See U.S. Defense Dept., *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 26 December 2006), p. xi; Johnston interview.

64. Johnston interview.


67. Hoar interview.


73. Oakley interview.

74. Poole, *Effort to Save Somalia*, p. 25.

75. Hoar interview; Zinni interview.


78. Johnston interview.

79. The Tripoli ARG consisted of USS Tripoli (LPH 10), USS Juneau (LPD 10), USS Rushmore (LSD 47), and an MPF ship, USNS 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011). Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Capt. John W. Peterson, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 8 April 2008.

80. Johnston interview.

81. An “amphibious task force” (ATF) or “amphibious task unit” (ATU) refers to the ships themselves. When combined with a Marine unit (usually an MEU but possibly units of other sizes), the total force becomes an “amphibious ready group” (ARG).

83. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

84. Johnston to Ohls.

85. The amphibious assault ship (general purpose), or LHA, and the amphibious assault ship (dock), or LHD, are larger and more capable versions of the amphibious assault ship (helicopter), LPH, which they were designed to replace. The LHA and LHD are so large and capable that they would be considered aircraft carriers (which they resemble) in any other navy in the world. Unlike the older LPH, the LHA and LHD also have a well deck, further enhancing their flexibility and capability. See U.S. Navy Dept., *Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft*, Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-31B (Quantico, Va.: Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 29 August 2001), pp. 3–8.


87. Johnston interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

88. Johnston interview; Newbold-Dawson interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

89. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

90. Peterson to Ohls, 6 June 2008.

91. 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus is one of the sixteen ships of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) that support Marine Corps operations. Most are container and roll-on/roll-off types. Lummus is part of MPSRon 3, which normally supports operations in the western Pacific, from bases in Guam and Saipan. The MSC also has ten ships that support Army operations, known as “Army Prepositioned Stocks 3” (APS 3). These ships are also roll-on/roll-off but are much larger than the MPS ships that support the Marines. See Military Sealift Command, www.msc.navy.mil


93. Peterson interview.

94. Johnston interview.

95. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

96. The “3 + 1” configuration simply means that the ATU had three amphibious ships plus one MPF ship. The ships composing Peterson’s ATU included Tripoli, Juneau, Rushmore, and Lummus. Perkins first interview.

97. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Newbold-Dawson interview; Perkins first interview.

98. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.

99. Peterson interview.

100. Phillips interview; Newbold-Dawson interview.

101. Peterson interview.

102. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Newbold-Dawson interview.


104. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.


106. Peterson interview.

107. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Peterson interview; Newbold-Dawson interview.


109. Capt. John W. Peterson, interview by Dr. John W. Partin aboard USS Tripoli (LPH 10), San Diego Navy Yard, California, 18 June 1993, Folder: Operations Other than War, Operation Restore Hope, box 5, folder 16, Marine Corps Archives.

110. Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” p. 100; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Peterson interview.


113. Peterson interview.

114. Ibid.

115. Peterson-Partin interview.


117. Peterson interview.


120. Peterson interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.
121. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.
122. Ibid.; Peterson interview.
125. Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008; Peterson interview.
128. Libutti interview; Oakley, *Somalia*, p. 3.
130. United States Liaison Office Mogadishu, message 151818Z December 1992 to Secretary of State, in DuPage Project.
131. Oakley interview.
132. Libutti interview; Newbold to Ohls, 2 June 2008.
135. Newbold-Dawson interview.
136. Peterson interview; Peterson-Partin interview; Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope*, p. 33.
137. Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson interview.
138. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), *Command Chronology*, pp. 2–4; Newbold-Dawson interview; *Central Command in Somalia*, p. 24; Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson interview.
141. The Ranger battle group comprised the carrier USS *Ranger* (CV 61), the Aegis cruiser USS *Valley Forge* (CG 50), the destroyer USS *Kinkaid* (DD 965), and the oiler USS *Wabash* (AOR 5). Hancock interview; Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope*, pp. 17, 176.
143. Hancock interview.
144. Ibid.
146. *Forward . . . From the Sea*. 
The quick success of the special-purpose marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF) on 9 December 1992 permitted a synchronized flow of U.S. and coalition forces into the operational area to begin almost immediately. Generals Johnston and Zinni, along with key staff officers, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December and established headquarters in the remains of the American embassy. Their immediate task was to supervise the complex deployment and logistical activity that would determine the efficiency of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Concurrently, they recognized the importance of addressing political and military issues that would also have great effects on their mission.

Johnston, Oakley, and UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani arranged a meeting with Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and their top aides for the following day. Despite some inevitable bickering, the meeting’s participants agreed on a variety of issues, including a strategy to secure the newly organized humanitarian relief sectors established as part of the RESTORE HOPE plan. More important, in Oakley’s view, “the Somalis reached a seven-point agreement on a cease-fire, free movements in the city, removal of ‘technicals’ and militias from the city and to designated locations, and establishing a joint committee on security matters.” Oakley would later believe that the work of this security committee was the key to the low casualties and relative stability that were to mark RESTORE HOPE. All principal leaders participated in the new committee’s meetings, either personally or through highly placed representatives, permitting the development of relationships and the sharing of information. In Oakley’s words, “We decided the top priority was going to be dialog, followed by the threat of force, and very, very rarely, the use of force.”

General Hoar shared Oakley’s view of the importance of information sharing. Although he felt confident in the ability of UNITAF forces to handle any necessary actions, Hoar wanted to avoid “a misunderstanding where we found people shooting at one another because they were unaware of what it was they were trying to do.” When UNITAF later transitioned into UNOSOM II, the
committee ceased to exist, and when it did, communication between the parties virtually ended.\footnote{7}

As Oakley, Johnston, Wilhelm, and Newbold worked to make things happen on the ground in Somalia, U.S. and coalition forces flowed into the Mogadishu airport, and their supporting equipment and supplies arrived at the port. Yet by December 1992, just when UNITAF operations needed these facilities the most, conditions had deteriorated so much in Mogadishu that use of the seaport and airfield had become problematic. For example, no ground-controlled approach (GCA) capability existed at the main airfield. During the early stages of the operation—before the Air Force airfield kit and radars arrived in Somalia—Johnston had to depend on Admiral Hancock’s Ranger battle group to furnish services normally provided by a Joint Force Air Component Commander. Hancock utilized his E-2C Hawkeye aircraft to supply theatre air control in support of the C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy flights, and he placed his Aegis cruiser (USS Valley Forge) close to shore, where it could provide the GCA. The E-2Cs also supported ground convoy operations with airborne communications relay, while simultaneously conducting the air control mission.\footnote{8} Johnston believed that “the value of the carrier was priceless,” both for the aircraft it could put in the sky during operations and for its control of air operations during the early days of RESTORE HOPE.\footnote{9}

A well synchronized and efficient off-loading of the maritime prepositioning ships (and other ships with valuable cargoes) would be critical for supporting and sustaining the operational forces. For this crucial job, Johnston selected a naval officer he held in the highest regard: Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III.\footnote{10} Perkins and his staff of twelve officers also arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December, shortly after General Johnston. In his normal duties, Perkins commanded Amphibious Group 3 (PhibGru 3), located in San Diego, California. PhibGru 3 supported I MEF deployments by assigning and training the ships and sailors that team with West Coast MEU(SOC)s for deployment to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.\footnote{11} All but one of the officers Perkins brought to Somalia were members of his PhibGru 3 staff.\footnote{12} Johnston and Perkins had great respect for each other and developed a strong professional and personal relationship, working out of their respective headquarters at Camp Pendleton and San Diego.\footnote{13} Perkins was a professional naval officer in every sense; Johnston considered him a “real gunfighter” and “as much a Marine as a Marine could be.” (Johnston meant that as a compliment, of course, although he was not sure that Perkins would so take it, being such a dedicated Navy officer.) Johnston admired Perkins’s “can-do attitude” and considered him a true “champion” of RESTORE HOPE.\footnote{14}

In Mogadishu, Perkins would take charge of and operate the port facility, off-load ships, and coordinate issues afloat for Johnston and his command.\footnote{15} Overseeing port
operations would prove a challenge, because Maritime Prepositioned Ships Squadron 2 (MPSRon 2) had set sail with three ships from Diego Garcia for Mogadishu on 7 December.16 USNS 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus—from MPSRon 3, on Guam—had already arrived in the operational area with the Tripoli ARG. It entered the port of Mogadishu on 11 December; Perkins and his team began off-loading it at the earliest opportunity.17

All these ships were part of the U.S. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), thirty-four ships stationed around the world under control of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). The MPF consists of three distinct elements—sixteen ships supporting the Marine Corps, ten larger ships that support the Army, and eight ships that support the Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency. Ultimately, sixteen ships of the MPF fleet delivered cargo for RESTORE HOPE.18 The MPF concept involved Marine Corps and Army units designated to fly into crisis areas, where they would unite with equipment and supplies delivered on the MPF ships.19 Of course, this requires a port, an airfield, and a benign environment. If the port or airfield is under hostile control, the evolution is still possible, but only if preceded by the forced entry of an expeditionary force. The insertion of Newbold’s SPMAGTF into Mogadishu and its subsequent control of the port and airfield is an example of this principle in action. Although the Somalia venture falls in the category of military operations other than war, the concept is applicable across a broad range of military options.20

Perkins needed to off-load the MPF ships in the port of Mogadishu very quickly to forward the equipment and supplies necessary to support the U.S. and coalition elements arriving daily at the Mogadishu and Baledogle airfields. He had not only to synchronize off-loading material with arriving military units but also to coordinate with the many humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) regarding delivery of their own aid supplies.21 Perkins had to accomplish this through a very small and dysfunctional port facility that was too shallow to allow all the arriving vessels to enter.22 Yet within thirty-five days, the admiral had off-loaded thirty-four military and fourteen civilian ships while doubling the historical throughput of the port. This amounted to some 114,000 tons of supplies (39,700 tons of which were relief supplies), 6,668 vehicles, and 5.22
million gallons of fuel. The port of Mogadishu had been virtually inoperable when Perkins arrived on the scene, but by the end of December it was among the busiest in Africa. 23 His off-loading of Lummus at the earliest possible time proved critical to Newbold, who needed much of its equipment—especially the seven amphibious tractors he immediately commandeered—if he were to move as quickly and robustly as his mission required. 24

Logistical support in the earliest days of RESTORE HOPE—before the off-loading of the MPF ships—came in the form of material and equipment that arrived on the Tripoli ARG. As Peterson and Newbold shared their assets with newly arriving forces and Admiral Perkins off-loaded the MPF ships, Brigadier General Marvin T. Hopgood, Jr., commander of 1st Force Service Support Group (Forward)—or 1st FSSG (Fwd.), an element of I MEF—assumed command responsibility for support and sustainment of the task force. 25 By 27 January 1993 the U.S. Army Joint Task Force Support Command, under Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA, had assumed responsibility for supporting UNITAF. This freed up approximately 2,700 Marines from Hopgood’s 1st FSSG (Fwd.) to return to Camp Pendleton. 26 At its height, Solomon’s operation consisted of some 5,200 American personnel supporting a coalition force of over thirty-seven thousand troops located throughout central and southern Somalia. 27 Several thousands of Solomon’s soldiers would remain in Somalia after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. 28 Perkins would continue to oversee port operations in Mogadishu for about six weeks until relieved by the U.S. Army’s 7th Transportation Group, under the command of Colonel Daniel L. Labin, USA. 29

An unfortunate incident early in RESTORE HOPE illustrated the flexibility of naval expeditionary forces. Shortly after the SPMAGTF had secured its objectives on D-day, a company of the French Foreign Legion, about 150 strong, arrived at the Mogadishu airfield, the first coalition unit on scene. 30 Although its participation in RESTORE HOPE had been coordinated at higher levels, Newbold learned of its planned arrival only the day before his own landing. Newbold considered the legionnaires excellent troops and assigned them to positions at the “Kilometer Four” traffic circle, which controlled the roads between the port, airport, and embassy. 31 This checkpoint, under a French lieutenant and jointly manned by legionnaires and U.S. Marines, was there to prevent hostile elements from approaching American and coalition positions. On one occasion, a vehicle full of civilians drew near the checkpoint and, in apparent confusion, failed to respond to commands to halt. French legionnaires and U.S. Marines are both very sensitive to this type of situation, because some ten years earlier both services had suffered large loss of life in Beirut, Lebanon, after failing to act decisively under similar circumstances. 32 The legionnaires and Marines opened fire, killing two Somali nationals and wounding seven. 33 Upon hearing the report, Peterson decided to bring the most
severely wounded casualties on board Tripoli, which had the best medical facilities and surgical teams within the ARG—within the entire area, for that matter. After a series of long surgical procedures, the Somalis treated on Tripoli survived and eventually recovered.34

Although a tragic event, the outcome of the incident served a humanitarian purpose while illustrating the confusion that existed in the early period. It also illustrates the value of sea-based medical facilities and the importance of having them available at the very beginning of an operation. At the time this incident occurred, no U.S. Army or coalition hospitals had yet arrived. The two civilian hospitals in Mogadishu were in a horrible condition and badly overburdened with casualties.35 Without the facilities on board Tripoli and Peterson’s willingness to make use of them, these Somali civilians would undoubtedly have died. Even as late in the operation as 23 December 1992, American lives were to be saved only because of the availability of medical facilities aboard Tripoli. In that instance, four American officials operating independently and covertly east of Bardera struck a mine or improvised explosive device, and Newbold’s Marines rescued them under fire. All had suffered severe wounds, but three survived due to the medical treatment received on board Tripoli.36

Among General Johnston’s first thoughts about RESTORE HOPE were plans for medical support. Having no idea how violent the operation might become, he chose to provide for a worst-case scenario. As task force commander, Johnston believed that “medical care has got to be at the top of the shopping list.”37 Of course, other leaders shared his concerns, including the Surgeon General of the Navy, who, with Johnston’s hearty concurrence, personally selected Captain Michael L. Cowan to serve as surgeon for the operation.38 Should conditions in Somalia become hostile, Johnston and his medical planners did not want to have to fly casualties to an air-transportable clinic in Mombasa.39 He wanted medical care facilities immediately at hand, either ashore or afloat. The JTF planning staff attempted to obtain a Navy hospital ship, but none was available, due to higher-priority missions—although it is difficult to understand what could have been more important at that time.40 Johnston planned to establish an

![Somali being treated by U.S. Navy personnel.](image)
Army field hospital in Mogadishu as early as possible, but that option became problematic. The MSC ship that carried the hospital could not off-load due to the limitations of the port of Mogadishu. Consequently, the hospital did not become available for several weeks.

The inadequate conditions at the port of Mogadishu affected more than just the Army hospital. Two LASH (lighter aboard ship) vessels, the SS Green Valley and SS Green Harbor, could not launch their preloaded lighters (barges) offshore due to sea conditions. The containerships SS Titus and SS Gibson could not enter the port because of their deep drafts. These four vessels had to return to Diego Garcia, where they cross-decked their cargo onto “handysize” ships capable of operating in the port of Mogadishu. The port of Mogadishu had not only shallow water and limited berthing space but insufficient staging room for cargo transfer. This made it especially critical to synchronize the off-loading of material with the arrival of operational units for which it was intended, so as not to clog the “lay-down” space in the port area.

A standard ARG—in fact, even a reduced ARG like Peterson’s—has a superb medical capability, although not normally staffed to support a force as large as UNITAF would become. But it would have been possible to augment quickly the medical element on board Tripoli enough to triple its casualty-handling capacity; this capability is an important but often overlooked dimension of the Navy and Marine Corps team. Fortunately, casualties during RESTORE HOPE were low, and expanding the medical staffs on the amphibious ships proved unnecessary. Yet as with so many aspects of expeditionary warfare, the best solution to the medical issue—at least in the early stages—was to provide that critical function from the sea. Eventually, UNITAF headquarters established several military hospitals in Somalia, but the medical facilities aboard Tripoli were available and used from the very outset, serving American and coalition medical needs.

In addition to the Navy’s contribution to medical support during RESTORE HOPE, the U.S. Army deployed an evacuation company into Somalia from Germany. Led by Major Pauline Knapp, whom Johnston described as a “dynamic commander with a ‘we can do it’ attitude,” the 159th Air Ambulance Company of the 421st Medical Evacuation Battalion used UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters in its rescue and evacuation missions. The Black Hawks represent a strong capability in an area where the Navy and Marine Corps are a little “light”—powerful, fast, long-range medevac helicopters. Major Knapp staged her Black Hawks at various locations in the operational area as the U.S. and coalition troops extended their occupation of Somalia. The rapid-evacuation capability of the Black Hawks, coupled with the presence of the ships of the ARG and later two field hospitals ashore, ensured that casualties could be delivered to a surgeon’s care.
from anywhere in the operational area within an hour. The medical support of U.S. and coalition forces during RESTORE HOPE demonstrated joint and combined operations at their very best.

As capability built up in the Mogadishu area, UNITAF elements branched out into the countryside to occupy key locations and establish secure food-delivery routes. General Zinni created eight humanitarian relief sectors—later increased to nine—during the planning for RESTORE HOPE. These provided a structure for the military occupation of the countryside and the support of humanitarian relief. In a traditional military operation, planners would use such terms as “zones of action” or “tactical areas of responsibility.” But Zinni had learned during PROVIDE COMFORT that it is best to minimize military terminology when working with NGOs and civilians generally. Zinni named the sectors after the major cities within their respective confines, configuring them to address such concerns as clan and political boundaries, military capabilities and span of control, lines of distribution and communications, and security.

Even after the arrival of UNITAF and establishment of its control in the operational environment, UNOSOM did not cease to exist. The Pakistani force under General Shaheen and UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani continued to operate within its designated area at the airport compound under Chapter VI peacekeeping rules. Its original mission of guarding the airfield, port, and convoys had proved unsuccessful, due to the resistance of Aideed and the inherent weakness of the peacekeeping force. Its light armament and restrictive ROE rendered the Pakistani battalion ineffective against the more forceful militia of Aideed. Ironically, American leaders had to attempt to bolster the UN operation while simultaneously eclipsing its function. Introduction of the more robust UNITAF forces into the operational area reduced the relative stature of UN peacekeepers. This resulted in friction and resentment, which exacerbated...
tensions already present from conflicting views over the scope and purpose of RESTORE HOPE. Yet despite this situation, Oakley and Johnston believed it important to work with Kittani and Shaheen, believing that UNOSOM would be the agency for transferring authority back to the UN once RESTORE HOPE terminated.\(^{56}\)

The primary purposes of RESTORE HOPE were breaking the famine and saving lives. UNITAF could make this possible through improved security and control of the environment, but the humanitarian relief community had to accomplish the actual delivery and preparation of food for suffering Somalis. Recognizing the importance of working closely with NGOs and HROs from his experiences in PROVIDE COMFORT, General Zinni directed that a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) be established and made operational upon arrival in Somalia. Underscoring its importance, General Johnston demanded that the leaders of the CMOC “get things going very fast.”\(^{57}\) Marine colonel Kevin M. Kennedy—who had served as General Libutti’s highly effective chief of staff during PROVIDE RELIEF and understood relief operations—would head the UNITAF CMOC.\(^{58}\) Its staff came from soldiers of the Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) and Marine Corps personnel from Zinni’s J-3 organization. The fundamental purpose of the CMOC would be to coordinate UNITAF’s military support for humanitarian operations.\(^{59}\) Among the first things on Kennedy’s agenda was connecting with representatives of the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and its disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) to establish a system for coordinating with the humanitarian relief organizations.\(^{60}\) The principal figures involved in accomplishing this included Bill Garvelink and Kate Farnsworth, who successively headed up the OFDA element in Somalia.\(^{61}\)

The UN headquarters in Somalia operated a similar organization, called the Humanitarian Operations Center, or HOC, designed to coordinate relief and assistance throughout the stricken areas of Somalia. Located at UNOSOM headquarters, the HOC came under Philip Johnston, the UN coordinator of humanitarian operations. Johnston also held the position of president and chief executive officer of the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).\(^{62}\) Zinni and Kennedy agreed to colocate the UNITAF CMOC with Philip Johnston’s HOC at UN headquarters to facilitate communications and coordination with the NGOs and HROs. The CMOC developed into an integral component of the HOC, with Philip Johnston at the head, Kennedy the military deputy, and Garvelink (later Farnsworth) the civilian deputy.\(^{63}\) Despite some tension between UNOSOM and UNITAF, the HOC and CMOC arrangement proved effective, because it focused on the mission and not prerogatives. Additionally, the officers and staff working within the HOC and CMOC made an effort to overcome institutional and cultural differences, which can easily undercut the effectiveness of such organizations.
The HOC/CMOC operation included all interested parties (UN agencies, UNITAF, NGOs, other HROs, ICRC, etc.) and established links to the various CMOCs within each humanitarian relief sector. This arrangement produced invaluable communication, although the level of cooperation and effectiveness varied among the sectors, with Mogadishu proving the most contentious and difficult. Not all NGOs—especially local Somali organizations—felt they had full access to the CMOC or that their knowledge was fully utilized to the benefit of the mission.

Yet even with difficulties and imperfections, the HOC/CMOC concept proved effective in helping the relief community and military forces accomplish their missions during RESTORE HOPE.

Despite American leaders’ laserlike focus on the basic mission to end famine in Somalia, a certain amount of “mission creep” occurred from the very beginning: such activity as engineering services to repair or rebuild roads, bridges, airfields, orphanages, schools, and clinics; the reestablishment of the Somali police force; and assistance in refugee resettlement. Although some of this work was mission critical, UNITAF went beyond simply addressing the essentials. In the words of Brigadier General Hopgood, “If it is good, if it is legal, and if it feels right and doesn’t hurt anybody, do it.” These civic-action projects created goodwill for UNITAF among the population and with certain Somali leaders. The fact that UNITAF tried to avoid favoring any clan or faction tended to reinforce the positive message. Generals Hoar and Johnston recognized the value of goodwill, as is apparent in their self-imposed restraint on weapons use and relatively liberal authorization of improvement projects. Even so, the commanders did not intend to permit Somali factions or gangs to perpetrate violence or threaten UNITAF forces. In the event, several incidents occurred that required military responses to ill-advised actions against American troops.

The first major incident occurred on 12 December, when U.S. helicopters received fire from forces northwest of the American embassy compound. The helicopters returned fire, destroying two technicals and damaging one M113 armored personnel carrier (APC). On 6 January 1993, Somali gunmen from Aideed’s militia fired upon Marine convoys from a weapons cantonment site near the embassy. The Marines established blocking positions to seal off the area, and Colonel Michael W. Hagee—who had returned to Somalia at Johnston’s request—informed Brigadier General Mohamed Kedeye Elmi, a member of Aideed’s staff, that all weapons from those sites would be confiscated the next day. On 7 January, a psychological operations (PSYOPS) team using loudspeakers warned the defenders to surrender. The weapons cantonment area actually consisted of two sites; one complied, but the other responded with gunfire. The Marines attacked the second facility from both air and ground, forcing it to surrender, while taking no casualties. In the words of General Wilhelm, “We unleashed a firestorm on them.” The Marines confiscated all weapons within the cantonment areas,
including a platoon of tanks, fifteen artillery pieces, ten technicals, six towed mortars, and various armored vehicles. The exact number of Somali casualties is unknown, but most of the Somalis involved in the firefight were either killed or captured.

As forces continued to assemble in Somalia, Johnston rapidly moved them into the humanitarian relief sectors where they would undertake the mission of RESTORE HOPE. Of course, the actual work of assigning the forces to geographical locations and placing them within the organizational structure fell to his operations officer, General Zinni. For a period early in the operation, this became so demanding a function that Zinni’s staff took to calling him the “Century 21 Man” (recalling a well known advertising campaign of an American realty firm). The variety of forces from the United States and coalition nations created a very complex grouping that Johnston and Zinni structured into a component-type organization. It was similar to the command structure that General Schwarzkopf had used in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990–91, when Johnston had been Schwarzkopf’s chief of staff. Simply stated, “components” are subordinate organizations assembled around a service or function. In the case of RESTORE HOPE, Zinni integrated most of the coalition forces under one or another of the four service components, primarily the Marine Forces component. Several contributing nations required their forces to report directly to the UNIFAF commander, as illustrated in figure 2.

**FIGURE 2**
**Lieutenant General Johnston’s UNIFAF Component Command Structure**

Source: Allard, Somalia Operations, p. 27; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 31; MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology, secs. 1, 8; Resource Guide, p. 1.
As forces flowed into the operational area, they assumed their roles in the organizational structure and took control of their sectors. For example, even as Newbold’s SPMAGTF moved through Mogadishu and on to Baledogle and Baidoa, it became an element within the Marine component, under command of General Wilhelm. Wilhelm also commanded the 1st Marine Division, which provided the major elements to the Marine Forces component within UNITAF. Brigadier General Lawson William Magruder III served briefly as the Army component commander, followed by the commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, Major General Steven L. Arnold. Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik served as the Air Force component commander. The Naval component had seven different commanders, whoever was senior officer in the theatre at a given time. Appendix C provides more details on the service component commanders during Operation RESTORE HOPE. Figure 2 shows the component structure of Johnston’s UNITAF force.

After establishing ascendancy in Mogadishu, UNITAF forces rapidly moved into the surrounding areas of central and southern Somalia to oversee the sectors and support the humanitarian relief community. From 13 through 31 December Johnston’s coalition had gained control of Baledogle, Baidoa, Kismayo, Bardera, Oddur, Gialalassi, Belet Uen, and Merca. Although there was nothing easy about the planning or execution, the operation had been efficient, effective, and successful. That did not mean the country had become peaceful or that factions always respected their cease-fire agreements. For example, on New Year’s Eve 1992, clan warfare broke out in Mogadishu, resulting in major casualties. Despite the initial success of RESTORE HOPE and the growing prospect for breaking the famine, Somalia remained a very violent place.

President Bush himself arrived in Somalia on 31 December 1992 for a three-day visit to meet with American troops and the Somali people. Ironically, a leader who held a very different view of America’s role in Somalia, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, visited Mogadishu only a few days later. Somalis received President Bush enthusiastically wherever he visited, whereas Boutros-Ghali’s motorcade received stones and rotten fruit. On one occasion, an angry mob even prevented his vehicles from entering the UN
The president’s Somalia visit proved to be an upbeat experience, whereas the Secretary-General’s was a humiliation. Never popular in Somalia, because of a perception that he had collaborated with the Siad Barre regime when he had been the Egyptian deputy foreign minister, Boutros-Ghali’s status, and that of the UN in general, had deteriorated even further after the departure of Mohamed Sahnoun. For a variety of reasons, Somalis viewed the United States and UNITAF as alternatives to the UN at this point and as untarnished by it.

Although President Bush spent much of his time ashore visiting various commands and meeting with troops and Somalis, he spent two nights on board Tripoli and mingled with the sailors and Marines. In the opinion of the commodore of the Tripoli ARG, Captain John Peterson, President Bush inspired everyone he met and was the nicest of any of the dignitaries who spent time on board his ships. In Peterson’s words, “It was like having dinner with your grandfather; he was amazing.” President Bush would leave office on 20 January, less than a month after his Somalia visit, having been defeated in his bid for reelection by William J. Clinton. But that did not seem to matter to the sailors and Marines, who genuinely appreciated his visit and the manner in which he related to them. To the troops, he seemed a far more genuine person than the many senators, congressmen, and news celebrities who frequently visited their environment.

On 20 January 1993 the United States would inaugurate a new president, but UNITAF would still be in the field. Originally, President Bush had hoped to have American forces out of Somalia by inauguration day rather than leave his successor with unfinished business. But serious-minded planners and operators had known that it was never a possibility. Many American officers believed that March 1993 was a reasonable exit date, but even that proved elusive. Although RESTORE HOPE appeared to be successful and working according to plan well before that date, the transition to UNOSOM II proved far more difficult than any American leader had expected. Ultimately, the United States could terminate UNITAF only by agreeing to remain involved in the subsequent UNOSOM II operations and participating in their nation-building efforts.

Among the more volatile areas where UNITAF operated during RESTORE HOPE was Kismayo, a coastal city some 250 miles south of Mogadishu, not far from the Kenyan border. During much of the period of RESTORE HOPE, fighting continued in and
around Kismayo between forces allied to Aideed and an element led by General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan). General Morgan was Siad Barre’s son-in-law and a leader associated with grave atrocities under that regime. General Hoar considered Morgan “one of the most recalcitrant guys in the country.”

A large percentage of the casualties that UNITAF was to suffer during the five months of RESTORE HOPE occurred in the Kismayo area. The total number of casualties for UNITED forces amounted to eight killed and twenty-four wounded (another ten deaths resulted from various accidents during the operation). The Somali casualty count amounted to about two hundred militiamen killed and perhaps a hundred civilian deaths, mostly people caught in cross fire. Virtually all of these casualties occurred in and about Kismayo and Mogadishu, the two toughest cities in Somalia. Of course, these figures do not include casualties that various Somali factions inflicted on each other during this same period.

In the original plan for RESTORE HOPE, planners scheduled the occupation of Kismayo to occur during phase III. But depredations by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess—an ally of Aideed—and his Ogadeni-based Somali Patriotic Movement militia caused Johnston to accelerate that action. Equally important, UNITAF needed the port of Kismayo and its airfield to help handle the heavy inflow of troops and material. Johnston and Zinni had designated elements of the 10th Mountain Division, from Fort Drum, New York, along with a reinforced battalion of Belgian paratroopers to occupy and administer the Kismayo sector. In the interest of efficiency and in response to necessity, planners wanted to fly as many troops as possible directly into the city rather than stage them through Mogadishu. To do so, UNITAF needed control of the airfield and port, along with a somewhat stable military environment. In the broader scope of the RESTORE HOPE mission, UNITAF needed Kismayo and its facilities to support humanitarian activities in southern Somalia.

Kismayo promised to be difficult, because the militia of Omar Jess had taken control of the port and was attempting to charge exorbitant rates for all transactions. As in Mogadishu before the arrival of U.S. forces, commerce and transportation in Kismayo had slowed to a virtual standstill. Additionally, heavy fighting had broken out between Omar Jess and Morgan, further prompting Johnston to take quick action to gain control of Kismayo. To accomplish this, Johnston created a task force—temporarily under General Wilhelm’s Marine component—consisting of the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin; a company of Marines from Battalion Landing Team 2/9 (that is, a landing team formed from 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, an element of Newbold’s SPMAGTF); two ships from Captain Peterson’s Tripoli ARG (USS Juneau and USS Rushmore); and the French destroyer
Since this movement involved an amphibious landing, the task force included not only the company of U.S. Marines but also Major John L. Ledoux, of Newbold’s staff, who served as S-3 (operations) officer for the action. Peterson would act as the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Jacqmin as the Commander, Landing Force (CLF).

As a critical part of the overall RESTORE HOPE “game plan,” the principal leaders had agreed, as noted, that Oakley or his representative would precede military forces in the occupation of various humanitarian relief sectors. He would meet with elders and other leaders as well as individual Somalis to explain UNITAF actions and reduce the potential for confrontation. This had proved effective during the occupation of Baledogle and Baidoa, and it was thought that the situation in Kismayo would likely benefit from this approach. On 17 December, Oakley and his team met with Omar Jess and Morgan to find a basis for future operations in southern Somalia. Oakley did not personally meet with Morgan, because of the general’s association with the Siad Barre regime and his responsibility for the 1988 destruction of Hargeisa, with great loss of civilian lives. Even now, most of Morgan’s Somali National Front forces were remnants of Siad Barre’s old national army. The upshots of Oakley’s effort to pacify the area were the establishment of Kismayo as an open city and separation of the warring parties. Omar Jess’s faction would remain in the city, while Morgan would move his forces away from Kismayo to the north. The political groundwork had
thus been laid for landing UNITAF forces and, ideally, ending the carnage in southern Somalia. This latter aspiration proved overoptimistic.

On 20 December, the Marines and the Belgian paratroopers—on board helicopters and surface amphibious assault craft—landed at PURPLE Beach in Kismayo, with no opposition. Jet aircraft from USS Ranger roared overhead, providing air cover and psychological impact, just as they had done for the Mogadishu landing. The USS Kitty Hawk battle group had relieved the Ranger group on 19 December, and Kitty Hawk’s air wing would take over air support on the second day of the Kismayo operation. (Commanded by Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, the Kitty Hawk team was the very epitome of professionalism, holding nothing back in its support of forces ashore during RESTORE HOPE.) After going ashore at Kismayo, the landing force immediately secured the port and airfield, while the Belgian contingent continued to flow reinforcements ashore. Peterson and Jacqmin met with Omar Jess, who agreed to keep his forces off the street during subsequent operations of the landing force. The following day, Jacqmin released the Marine detachment, which back-loaded onto Juneau and Rushmore, returned to Mogadishu, and resumed its duties with the SPMAGTF. This set the stage for arrival of 10th Mountain Division units, which would augment the Belgian paratroopers and establish Task Force Kismayo under command of Brigadier General Magruder.

By late January 1993, the situation in Kismayo again became critical, threatening UNITAF with the worst level of violence yet experienced. To contain the escalating conflict, Magruder met with Morgan on 23 January and demanded that he consolidate his technicals at Dhoobley (northwest of Kismayo near the Kenyan border), pull back all forces from Beer Xaani (also spelled Bir Hane, thirty-five kilometers west of Kismayo), establish cantonment areas for his infantry, and desist from fighting with other factions. Morgan acknowledged these demands, but the following day he attacked an element of Omar Jess’s militia guarding a weapons cantonment at Beer Xaani. Magruder again ordered Morgan to withdraw, and when he failed to respond, Task Force Kismayo engaged his militia. Attacking with Belgian paratroopers and U.S. Army helicopters, UNITAF destroyed six technicals, four howitzers, an armored vehicle, and a rocket launcher. Magruder now demanded yet again that Morgan remove all technicals from the Kismayo area and withdraw from Beer Xaani, and this time he complied.

A second major incident occurred on 22 February, when Morgan infiltrated troops into Kismayo for another attack on his adversary. Omar Jess and his militia fled north toward Jilib but in the process had looted a warehouse they had been guarding and fired random shots at Belgian soldiers. Johnston and Oakley issued an ultimatum, ordering both forces out of the lower Jubba Valley (in the Kismayo vicinity) and into
designated areas. Johnston also ordered a quick-reaction force (QRF) into the city to show strength and to conduct weapons-control operations. Although both factions complied with Johnston’s ultimatum, misinformation about events filtered into Mogadishu, sparking demonstrations and several firefight. These were inspired by Aideed and his followers, who wrongly concluded that UNITAF had favored Morgan, the enemy of Aideed’s ally. Additionally, efforts by UNITAF to empower leaders at various localities in Somalia and encourage them to take responsibility for their communities had offended and angered Aideed. They tended to undercut the system he had installed during the civil war and to infringe upon his power base. Aideed therefore was already of a mind to oppose UNITAF, although only up to a point.

The Mogadishu flare-up ran its course for several days, after which conditions returned to normal (by Somali standards) and remained so through the end of RESTORE HOPE. By March 1993, UNITAF leaders felt able to resume their planning for transition to UNOSOM II. Kismayo experienced an additional clash between Omar Jess and Morgan during March, which frustrated UNITAF commanders and again resulted in dispatching a QRF to the town. But this crisis passed and ultimately did not appear to endanger the transition process. Yet this incident caused UN officials to believe that Kismayo—and by extension all of Somalia—was far from stable.

Despite the sporadic problems in Kismayo and Mogadishu, by 4 February 1993 American leaders in Somalia believed that UNITAF had completed its humanitarian mission. At that point, they began planning for transition to UN control and the redeployment of U.S. forces. UNITAF leaders wanted a degree of stability during the handoff to UNOSOM II, but that had never been the criterion for transition in the minds of most American officials. For them, breaking the famine and saving lives constituted mission success for Operation RESTORE HOPE; nation building would occur in the follow-on phase, under UN cognizance. This was the view not only of American leaders in Somalia and at Central Command but of the top levels of the U.S. government. As President Bush stated in a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali the day after the Security Council passed Resolution 794, “I want to emphasize that the mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving people and allow transfer of these security functions to the UN peacekeeping force.”

Despite the president’s unequivocal message, American officials in both Washington and Somalia felt it necessary to reaffirm constantly the limited nature of RESTORE HOPE and to resist efforts by UN officials to expand and extend the mission. Boutros-Ghali and key UN officials did not want the transition to occur before midsummer. Neither did they want to accept responsibility on the ground without a major
American military commitment to the follow-on effort. They were reluctant because, among other reasons, it was clear that many coalition forces would not remain in Somalia under UNOSOM II if the United States did not participate.\textsuperscript{135} UN officials also wanted UNITAF to accomplish a greater degree of disarmament and establish wider geographical control before turning over responsibility.\textsuperscript{136} Essentially, Boutros-Ghali expected UNITAF to accomplish tasks that most American leaders considered the work of UNOSOM II. If United Nations officials could persuade UNITAF to accomplish these goals during RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II would be able to function under Chapter VI peacekeeping rules rather than as a Chapter VII peace-enforcement operation. UNITAF would have a better chance than the UN to succeed at peace enforcement, in the opinion of UN leaders, because only the United States had the military strength and organizational structure to accomplish the difficult tasks that rebuilding the Somali state required. The reticence of UN leaders became clear as early as January 1993, when they failed to meet their commitment to General Johnston and the State Department to send a “technical team” to UNITAF headquarters to plan the transition.\textsuperscript{137} This seeming indifference did not surprise General Zinni, who believed that UN leaders considered the Somali predicament a “poison apple and were very reluctant to take control.”\textsuperscript{138} Because of ongoing resistance by the UN, the transition dragged out three months beyond the point at which Johnston believed UNITAF had accomplished its mission.\textsuperscript{139}

As the February and March incidents in Kismayo and Mogadishu subsided, a peace conference occurred in Addis Ababa that once again appeared to achieve reconciliation between Aideed and Ali Mahdi.\textsuperscript{140} There had actually been a series of sessions in the Ethiopian capital throughout RESTORE HOPE, culminating in accords reached in Addis Ababa on 27 March 1993. Fifteen of the most powerful Somali warlords and faction leaders signed this agreement, causing many observers to believe that it had a good chance to resolve the crisis.\textsuperscript{141} The participants named it the “Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia,” implying an ongoing process rather than a final agreement.\textsuperscript{142} On 26 March 1993—as the Addis Ababa conference moved toward its conclusion—the UN Security Council passed Resolution 814, which officially established UNOSOM II under Chapter VII authority and provided for transition from UNITAF control.\textsuperscript{143} Among other things, Resolution 814 called for a secure environment and the rehabilitation of Somalia’s political institutions and economy.\textsuperscript{144} It also demanded “that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken . . . at Addis Ababa, and in particular with the agreement of implementing the ceasefire and on modalities of disarmament.”\textsuperscript{145} This language clearly tied the mission of UNOSOM II to the Addis Ababa accords.
The Addis Ababa conference seemed so hopeful to observers because in it the most important warlords and faction leaders had committed themselves to reconciliation, reconstruction, development, the establishment of an impartial police force, and peace in Somalia. Interestingly, the agreement also invited “the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Representative in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council, to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this agreement.”

Considering Aideed’s distaste for the UN and its Secretary-General, it is somewhat surprising that he agreed to this provision. Ironically, the United States, which generally endeavored to reduce its direct involvement and presence in Somalia, had pressed at UN headquarters for this larger mission. To some extent, this resulted from the new foreign-policy concept of assertive multilateralism articulated by the new administration of President William J. Clinton. Clinton’s ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, reflected this thinking in stating that the Resolution 814 amounted to “an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.”

The two key UN officials who would oversee the implementation of Resolution 814 and the Addis Ababa agreement were the UN special representative, Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, USN (Ret.), and the UNOSOM II force commander, Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, both recently appointed by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The United States appointed Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, USA, to serve as Bir’s deputy and senior American commander in Somalia during UNOSOM II. By 20 March, all three officials had arrived in Mogadishu, completing the high-level command structure for the new entity. General Johnston approved on 14 March the UNITAF transition plan, intended to facilitate the assumption of command by the new leadership team. He also provided General Bir office space at UNITAF headquarters and made similar arrangements for supporting staff sections as UNOSOM II personnel arrived for duty. Yet despite this preparation, the transition from UNITAF would be anything but efficient, and the command relations under UNOSOM II anything but clear.

Admiral Howe became the UN special representative in Somalia when Ismat Kittani—who had always considered his role as interim—departed from that position in March 1993. In an obvious attempt to ensure continued American involvement in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali asked the United States to recommend a replacement. When the United States suggested Howe, Boutros-Ghali quickly agreed. Howe offered impressive credentials for the job, having attained the rank of full admiral in the U.S. Navy and served as deputy national security adviser under President Bush. In his latter role, Howe had been the president’s focal point on issues relating to Somalia and had played a major role in planning and decision making for RESTORE HOPE during November 1992. Many key members of the Bush administration considered Howe a highly skilled manager.
who could apply those qualities to improve UN operations in Somalia. Others viewed him as a Washington insider whose primary influence came from his considerable time on staffs within the departments of Defense and State. In either case, Howe was well connected with both the outgoing Bush administration and the new Clinton team.

Just before Howe arrived in Somalia to assume his duties, Robert Oakley returned to the United States, considering his role in RESTORE HOPE complete. Oakley intended his leaving to signal a change in leadership and responsibility in Somalia. The function of the UN special representative (the position that Kittani now tendered to Howe) in relation to that of the U.S. special envoy (which Oakley now relinquished) had been ambiguous and subtle during RESTORE HOPE. Oakley's close relationship with Johnston and Zinni—coupled with Kittani and Boutros-Ghali's lack of credibility among many important Somali leaders—had thrown the U.S. envoy into a leading role during UNITAF. Now that Oakley had left Somalia, most observers assumed that Howe would restore the UN special representative to a more dominant position for the duration of UNOSOM II. Oakley's replacement, Robert Gosende, did not attract the same attention or assert the same influence as his predecessor. Of course, the circumstances had changed, and the United States wanted a more prominent role for the UN during UNOSOM II. The appointment of General Bir—a Turkish officer with broad NATO experience—as the military commander for UNOSOM II further underscored the expectation of UN preeminence.

Yet despite these important changes, the operation in Somalia retained an American flavor. Howe might be the UN special representative, but he was still an American, with access to the highest levels of his government. Moreover, Bir’s deputy commander, General Montgomery, had a separate reporting structure—through General Hoar at Central Command—for the use of U.S. forces during UNOSOM II. This left the decision to use American forces, the most capable in Somalia, clearly in the hands of American authorities. Also, notwithstanding the prominence of Americans in the new organization, the changeover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II remained bogged down throughout March and April, causing a high level of frustration and angst for the U.S. commanders of UNITAF.

The provisions of Security Council Resolution 814 and the Addis Ababa accords chiefly prescribed Howe’s responsibilities as UN special representative in Somalia. Howe did not believe the UN had adequate preparation or sufficient resources to assume the mission. He tried to convince Johnston and Zinni to extend UNITAF through June and to expand its operation into the northern parts of Somalia—just as Boutros-Ghali had wanted. Unable to convert either officer to his viewpoint, Howe attempted to use his high-level connections in Washington, but this time to no avail. Johnston and Zinni’s
exit strategy from Somalia had the support of General Hoar at Central Command and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Hoar and Johnston argued that the action requested by UN leaders would constitute a new mission, requiring additional resources and further presidential approval. Despite considerable lobbying, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and Admiral Howe could not persuade the White House to override the position of the military. In the view of most American leaders, RESTORE HOPE had been a success, UNITAF had served its purpose, and the time had come for the UN to assume the responsibility for rebuilding Somalia.

The problems associated with transition stemmed from differences in perception of the RESTORE HOPE mission that had dogged relations between the United States and UN all along. Not only did Americans see RESTORE HOPE as a short-term and limited operation, but they also believed that the handoff to UNOSOM II should be rapid and efficient. UN leaders—acting in accordance with the views of the Secretary-General—feared that UNITAF units would “withdraw hastily, before the reestablishment of a truly secure environment in which the transition to traditional peace-keeping envisaged by UN Security Council Resolution 794 could proceed successfully.”

In the opinion of Boutros-Ghali, the outburst of violence in Kismayo during February and March 1993, coupled with sporadic violence in Mogadishu, clearly demonstrated that the relative stability resulting from RESTORE HOPE was precarious at best. He also concluded that a return to simple peacekeeping as originally intended would not be possible, that UNOSOM II required Chapter VII enforcement powers to have any hope of success. When Resolution 814 passed, it not only authorized Chapter VII actions by UNOSOM II forces but also threatened individual accountability, including prosecution of individuals responsible for “breaches of international humanitarian law.” In short, it intended to put teeth (at least on paper) into the enforcement authority of UNOSOM II. Interestingly, this constituted the first Chapter VII operation organized and commanded directly by the United Nations itself. In previous cases, the UN had only mandated actions, whereas member states actually executed the missions. In promoting this concept, the United States found itself in the curious position of promoting a larger UN commitment to Somalia—through the action of its ambassador to the UN—while simultaneously reducing American support and commitment to the undertaking. As Madeleine Albright later stated, “This was an ambitious mandate, requiring the UN to do more than the United States had accomplished but with fewer and far less potent forces.”

Despite American action to terminate RESTORE HOPE, disband UNITAF, and withdraw the bulk of its forces from Somalia, the Secretary-General continued to press for at least two major milestones before transferring operations to UNOSOM II. The first
involved a greater level of disarmament, including the total disarming of irregular
gangs and the confiscation of the heavy weapons (artillery, large-caliber machine guns,
assault weapons like rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifles, and anything
mounted on technicals, etc.) from the organized factions. This demand was nothing
new, of course, but rather a refinement on the Secretary-General’s ongoing effort to
have U.S. forces achieve general disarmament in Somalia. The second condition
required an expansion of the UN mandate throughout Somalia. UNITAF had focused
its efforts only where the famine actually existed, in the central and southern sections
of the country. That constituted only about 40 percent of Somalia; the northern parts
of the nation were relatively stable, and people there were not dying of starvation. From the American point of view, expanding operations into the northern areas had
nothing to do with the original purpose of RESTORE HOPE. These two conditions of the
Secretary-General were highly unrealistic, because the United States had no intention
of undertaking a large-scale disarmament effort or of sending additional forces to
occupy areas where no humanitarian crisis existed. Nevertheless, it became obvious
to American leaders that they would need to make some concession if the UN was to
assume responsibility under UNOSOM II.

The United Nations intended to assemble a force of about twenty-eight thousand
troops to conduct operations. Some of these would be coalition troops already in
Somalia serving in UNITAF. As part of the American accommodation with the UN,
American officials agreed to leave about 4,200 soldiers in Somalia for duty with
UNOSOM II. This included a quick-reaction force and a logistical support element,
both to be provided by the U.S. Army. The QRF consisted of a reinforced infantry
battalion from 10th Mountain Division and an aviation task force of six Cobra attack
helicopters, eight scout helicopters, and fifteen Black Hawk helicopters, along with a
support battalion, all under a brigade-level headquarters—a total of about 1,100 sol-
diers. The logistics package would consist of some 3,100 U.S. troops from the Joint
Task Force Support Command, which had assumed responsibility for general logistics
support of UNITAF in late January. These forces constituted a price the United States
paid to extricate itself from its large commitment in Somalia.

Nevertheless, many American leaders remained nervous about turning these forces over
to UN authority. That would be very different from the RESTORE HOPE model, where the
United States had operated under UN authority but maintained command and control
over coalition forces. To mitigate this concern, American officials placed all U.S. forces
under General Montgomery, who would exercise command within two reporting chains.
One of Montgomery’s superiors would be General Bir (the UNOSOM II military com-
mander, under Jonathan Howe) for issues relating to the UN. The other would be Gen-
eral Hoar at Central Command for operations involving U.S. forces. This awkward
command structure would become even more convoluted as the UNOSOM II mission progressed and as conflict with Somali factions became more prevalent. 181

Just as the command designator changed from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993, so too did the U.S. operational name change, from RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE HOPE. 182 Yet unlike the RESTORE HOPE name, “CONTINUE HOPE” did not catch on with the media or American public. Instead, “UNOSOM II” became the label commonly associated with that segment of the Somalia incursions. Whatever the name, the UN command element finally took control of operations in Somalia on 4 May 1993”—too soon from Howe’s point of view, not soon enough in the minds of Johnston and Zinni. 183 Johnston had actually been redeploying forces back to the United States as early as February 1993. Throughout March and April, elements of the U.S. contingent had “retrograded” units and heavy equipment out of Somalia. 184 By the time transfer of responsibility actually occurred, only the two elements designated to support UNOSOM II (the QRF and logistics team) remained within Somalia. 185 Also during this period, Johnston began transferring responsibility for the nine humanitarian relief sectors to coalition forces designated to control them during UNOSOM II. 186 Yet all this was not to contain the American involvement in Somalia. The number of Americans committed to UNOSOM II would increase substantially in the future, and the scope of their involvement would expand. Ultimately, the warnings of Smith Hempstone proved correct: “These situations are easier to get into than out of.” 187

By the end of April, only those units identified as part of UNOSOM II remained in Somalia. 188 The impact of this drawdown had been somewhat mitigated by the arrival of the USS Wasp ARG, commanded by Captain Kenneth Pyle, and the 24th MEU (SOC), under Colonel Matthew E. Broderick. 189 They collectively represented for UNITAF (and UNOSOM II) commanders a naval expeditionary force that could act as an operational reserve during the redeployment and transition process. In fact, the MEU proved to be of far greater service, providing forces ashore during the remainder of RESTORE HOPE and sporadically under CONTINUE HOPE. When the ARG arrived in Mogadishu on 23 March, Commodore Pyle assumed duties as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Somalia. Pyle, Broderick, and key members of their staffs coordinated with the UNITAF leadership to prepare for operations. Meanwhile, AV-8B Harrier aircraft flew missions over Mogadishu, to demonstrate the strength of the ARG, and conducted reconnaissance flights throughout the Kismayo sector. 190 General Johnston immediately sent the ARG down to Kismayo, where, he believed, it could help control the potentially explosive situation. 191 Before departing, Broderick assigned a detachment of Marines to remain in Mogadishu and help patrol the city streets. 192 On 26 March, the 24th MEU (SOC) went ashore on PURPLE Beach at Kismayo to assist the Belgian and U.S. Army forces operating within the city and throughout southern Somalia. During its time in the
Kismayo area, elements of 24th MEU (SOC) conducted night and day patrols, weapons-interdiction operations, and roadblock and strongpoint duty; they also escorted relief convoys and undertook civic-action programs.

On 27 March, a reinforced company of 24th MEU (SOC)—designated Task Force RESOLVE—conducted a mechanized march to Dhoobley. Intended primarily as a show of force and demonstration of the MEU’s reach, the 180-mile trip (one way) enjoyed an escort of helicopters to provide airborne radio relay and fire support if needed. After entering Dhoobley unopposed, the convoy returned to Kismayo on 28 March, having made a statement about the capability and resolve of the 24th MEU (SOC). It also allowed the Marines to become familiar with the general area and gain experience operating in southern Somalia. A similar mechanized force—designated Task Force HAMMER—marched to Jilib in the north on 6 and 7 April, accomplishing much the same result.

Broderick’s energetic use of his MEU included helicopter raids on the villages of Goobyen, Hoosingow, and Afmadow, primarily to search for unauthorized weapons and provide humanitarian assistance when possible. Afmadow, for example, was a node in the gunrunning routes in southern Somalia often used by warlords to move weapons out of cantonment areas in violation of UNITAF policy. The Marines conducted a textbook operation at Afmadow and met no open resistance, but they found no weapons and felt a certain silent hostility during their initial sweep of the village. (Broderick learned later that the Somalis had removed the weapons the night before and returned them after the Marines departed.) A second raid at Afmadow later in the deployment proved equally unproductive.

In addition to executing rapid raids inland, the Marines of 24th MEU, accompanied by SEAL teams, conducted riverine operations along the Jubba River. Although intended to observe traffic on the river and interdict weapons movement, these patrols made no direct contact. Yet the continuous presence of the Marines within the operational area, coupled with their establishment of strongpoints at key locations, helped control the flow of illicit arms while monitoring the movement of Somali men of fighting age. In addition to the normal possibility of violent conflict with Somali factions, the Marines and sailors on the Jubba River had crocodiles and hippopotamuses to deal with, threats not addressed in standard amphibious training. These operations helped suppress activity by various troublemakers in the Kismayo sector. They also had the effect of separating the two warring forces (those of Omar Jess and Morgan), thereby reducing their ability to engage each other or disrupt the transition process.

Like Colonel Newbold before him, Broderick believed it important to impress local warlords with the MEU’s speed, mobility, and operating tempo. Also like his
predecessor, Broderick recognized the importance of maintaining a positive image with the local Somalis and the outside world, to the extent possible. He therefore balanced the display of military power with gestures of goodwill. These involved the MEU’s medical and logistical capabilities as well as civic-action projects undertaken by individual Marines and sailors.204

Broderick’s engineers conducted numerous improvement projects, and his medical and dental personnel frequently established clinics to assist local Somalis.205 Even during the raid on Afmadow, Broderick ordered a team of doctors and corpsmen to accompany the Marine force and offer medical care to the villagers. This took the edge off the raids and searches and earned the goodwill of many Somalis.206 These humanitarian efforts by 24th MEU (SOC) sought to improve the lives and circumstances of the Somali people and to encourage cooperation.207

By late April, the mission of 24th MEU (SOC) had ended (for the time being). Marines, sailors, and equipment from various parts of Somalia back-loaded onto Commodore Pyle’s ships and departed for the Persian Gulf.208 They would return to Somalia in June 1993 and again during early 1994 in support of UNOSOM II, but their departure in April signaled the termination of the American operations under UNITAF.209

Broderick and Pyle believed they had made a difference in Kismayo. In addition to stabilizing the situation through patrolling, manning checkpoints, conducting riverine operations, and other actions, the 24th MEU (SOC) had worked very hard at helping the Somali people. Through a variety of actions such as escorting food deliveries, operating health clinics, and dealing with Somalis directly, personally, and respectfully, Broderick and Pyle felt they had won the hearts and minds of the people in Kismayo by the time they departed.210

One experience that won the hearts and minds of the Marines and sailors on board the Wasp ARG was a visit from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. During his visit Wasp returned to Mogadishu, where Powell visited after a day of meetings ashore. Like other ships of the fleet, Wasp had many VIP visitors, but the Powell visit was a highlight, not the ordeal that most were. Like President Bush during his earlier visit to Tripoli, Powell proved a motivational presence. He mingled with the Marines and sailors, offered to have their pictures taken with him, and showed a
genuine interest in every person on board. The morning after his arrival, Broderick
learned, was Powell’s birthday, so he orchestrated a birthday party, including a
cake, on the ship’s flight deck. Powell’s visit was a special event, one that the
Marines and sailors would remember as one of the high points of the deployment
of the Wasp ARG.\footnote{211}

Observers and analysts generally acknowledge that it succeeded in breaking the famine
by ensuring delivery of food and supplies to needy Somalis—its primary mission.\footnote{212}
Although estimates vary, there is little doubt that RESTORE HOPE, coupled with the
contribution of PROVIDE RELIEF, saved many thousand Somali lives.\footnote{213} The fact that this
occurred with only minor fighting should not suggest that it was easy. In addition to
the incidents in Mogadishu and Kismayo between Somali fighters and UNITAF forces,
sporadic sniping occurred throughout the operation, causing casualties and several
deaths. Numerous confrontations also resulted when UNITAF elements disarmed
Somalis caught in violation of arms agreements or during weapon sweeps considered
necessary for mission security. Fortunately, most of these cases did not result in severe
violence.\footnote{214} The cooperation of major warlords in the cantonment of technicals and
heavy weapons helped remove these armaments from the streets and reduced the
potential for violence.\footnote{215}

Conditions would be very different for UNOSOM II during Operation CONTINUE
HOPE, with its more ambitious missions. At the time of transition, UNOSOM II con-
sisted of about seventeen thousand troops from twenty-one nations, making it more a
combined, and less a joint, organization than UNITAF. At its peak strength in Novem-
ber 1993, UNOSOM II would number just under thirty thousand soldiers from twenty-
ine nations.\footnote{216} CONTINUE HOPE never had the expeditionary flavor of RESTORE HOPE,
as it tended to operate out of fixed bases and built semipermanent structures for its
units. Regrettably, it also proved less successful. Many critics suggest that the incom-
plete work of UNITAF preordained failure for UNOSOM II, whereas others have
blamed the second operation itself.\footnote{217} In either case, CONTINUE HOPE would have a
very different outcome than RESTORE HOPE.

The expeditionary nature of RESTORE HOPE and the degree to which it relied on sea-
based forces in many ways exemplify the precepts of . . . From the Sea. The tendency to
focus both the amphibious ready group and the carrier battle group on power projec-
tion ashore illustrates the growing importance of the littoral mission, as opposed to the
blue-water operations of the Cold War era.\footnote{218} The skillful air-control measures of the
carrier battle group in the early stages of the operation, the medical support capability
of the amphibious ready group, and the joint nature of the mission further embodied
the precepts of... From the Sea. The mobility of the ARG and MEU (SOC) along the long Somali coastline, particularly between Mogadishu and Kismayo, demonstrates to a considerable extent the “marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare based on sea-borne maneuver, sea-based sustainability, and rapid execution,” as would be codified several years later in the Marine Corps concept paper Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

Notes

5. Oakley interview.
6. Hoar interview.
8. Hancock interview.
10. Ibid.
11. Perkins first interview.
13. Perkins first interview.
19. In addition to Lumnus, Bonnyman, Phillips, and Anderson, the MPF ships that supported RESTORE HOPE were MV American Cormorant, MV Sheldmond, MV Eagle, MV Strong Virginian, SS Sea Pearl, SS Gopher State, SS Green Harbor, SS Green Valley, SS American Osprey, USNS Pollux, USNS Algol, and USNS Capella. See Military Sealift Command, www.msc.navy.mil.
21. At the initial meeting of the Joint Committee on Security, the members agreed to discontinue using the term “nongovernmental organization” and include NGOs within the more general category of “humanitarian
relief organizations” (HROs). The broader designation includes NGOs, UN humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). HRO became normal usage, as reflected in the literature of Operation RESTORE HOPE. See Zvjic and McGrady, Operation Restore Hope, p. 41; Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” p. 99, 116 note.

22. The U.S. Army is supported by the MPF program through use of ships designated “Army Prepositioned Stocks-3” (APS-3), large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off vessels. Yet at the time of RESTORE HOPE, the Army still relied to a considerable extent on large containerships contracted by MSC for its sustainment packages. See Military Sealift Command, www.msc.navy.mil; Johnston interview; Perkins first and second interviews; Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 45–49.


25. Hopgood-Dawson interview.

26. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp. 18–19.


28. MCNEWS 18-93.


30. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology, sec. 3, p. 2.

31. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 59; Newbold-Dawson interview.


34. Peterson interview.

35. Zinni interview.


37. Johnston interview.


40. The U.S. Navy has two large-capacity hospital ships, operated by Military Sealift Command: USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) in Baltimore and USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) in San Diego. They remain in layup with minimal crews until needed for an operation. When ordered to active service, the ships are able to “staff up” and depart for their mission within five days. See Military Sealift Command, www.msc.navy.mil.


42. Perkins second interview.


44. The “handysize” ships (generally, dry bulk carriers able to enter small ports and unload without crane assistance) were under contract to MSC from the Crowley Corporations for just such exigencies. Perkins second interview; Resource Guide, p. 123.

45. Perkins second interview.


47. Davis et al., Army Medical Support, p. 77; Peterson interview; MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology, pp. 46–47; Zinni interview.

48. Johnston interview; Johnston to Ohls; Davis et al., Army Medical Support, p. 54; Resource Guide, pp. 35, 110.

49. Johnston interview; Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson interview.


52. Zinni interview.


60. Disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) are elements of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which operates under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID—see its website, www.usaid.gov); Kennedy, “Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope,” p. 101.


69. Hopgood-Dawson interview.


71. The helicopters included two AH-1W Super Cobras and one UH-1N Huey. The M113 APC used by the hostile Somalis was a U.S. Army system provided earlier to the Siad Barre government. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), *Command Chronology*, sec. 3, pp. 2–3; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 48; Mróczkowski, *Restoring Hope*, p. 39.


73. Colonel Hagee filled a special role as Johnston’s principal liaison officer with Ambassador Oakley. He was billeted in the ambassador’s compound and attended all meetings with the warlords and other key Somali officials. In this role he reported to Johnston but had direct contact with Zinni in the commander’s absence. Johnston to Ohls; Johnston interview; MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), *Command Chronology*, sec. 2, p. 9.


75. MCNEWS 18-93.


79. JP 1-02, p. 110.

81. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), *Command Chronology*, sec. 1, p. 1; sec. 2, pp. 1–5.
83. Ibid., pp. 10–12.
84. *Central Command in Somalia*, app. 9, p. 10.
91. Peterson interview.
93. Peterson interview.
95. Zinni interview.
97. Hoar interview.
105. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), *Command Chronology*, p. 4.
106. Ibid., pp. 4–5; Peterson interview.
121. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 82.


128. MCNEWS 18-93; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, p. 97; Oakley, “Envoy’s Perspective,” p. 51.


135. Hoar interview.


137. Ibid., pp. 106–107.

138. Zinni interview.


144. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 111.


151. Accounts differ slightly on the actual day on which these officers arrived in Somalia to take up their assignments. The author chose these dates as most credible. In any case, all were in place by 20 March 1993; Howe PBS Frontline interview.

152. Central Command in Somalia, p. 36.


155. Hoar interview.

156. Howe interview.


159. General Montgomery commanded U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORPOSOM) under Central Command’s commander in chief, General Hoar, throughout the period of CONTINUE HOPE. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 8; Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 143–46; Howe PBS Frontline interview.

160. Zinni interview.

161. Howe PBS Frontline interview.

162. Howe interview.

163. Zinni interview.


167. Ibid., pp. 39, 41–42.


170. Oakley interview.

171. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 142–43.


173. Ibid., pp. 41–42.

174. Zinni interview.


176. The exact number of U.S. troops committed to UNOSOM II varies among accounts. The author has used the numbers from the most credible source: U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 9, 26, 35.


178. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 142–43.

179. Zinni interview.


181. Oakley interview; Zinni interview.

182. Zinni interview.

183. Johnston interview; Howe interview; Zinni interview.

184. Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson interview.


186. These assignments included France occupying Oddur, Canada accepting Belet Uen, Italy taking Gialalassi, Morocco working Baledogle, Australia in Baidoa, Belgium at Kismayo, Botswana in Bardera, and Pakistan in Mogadishu and Merca. See Central Command in Somalia, pp. 34, 36; Wilhelm-Curitan/Dawson interview.


189. The ships constituting the Wasp ARG were USS Wasp (LHD 1), USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS Barnstable County (LST 1197), and USS El Paso (LKA 117). See Campaigning in Southern Somalia: Actions of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from 17 March to 25 April 1993: Campaign Analysis by Michael R. Richards, Conference Group One, undated, Folder: OOTW, Opn Restore Hope, box e, folder 32, Naval Historical Center, pp. 4–7; David Bowne Wood, A Sense of Values: American Marines in an Uncertain World (Kansas City, Mo.: Andrews and McMeel, 1994), pp. 18, 38; Capt. Kenneth Pyle, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 28 August 2008.

190. Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), Command Chronology, 1 January to 30 June 1993, 17 September 1993 [hereafter 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology]; Commanding Officer, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (REIN), Command Chronology, 1 January to 30 June 1993, 7 July 1993 [hereafter HMM-263, Command Chronology]; both Folder: Command Chronology, Marine Corps Archives.


195. HMM-263, Command Chronology; Broderick interview.

196. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology, pp. 7–9; Campaigning in Southern Somalia, pp. 8–9.
198. Ibid., pp. 122–45.
199. HMM-263, Command Chronology.
200. Broderick interview.
201. Ibid.; Pyle interview.
203. MCNEWS 18-93; Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope, pp. 97–98.
204. Newbold initiated Project HAND CLASP in Baidoa during December 1992 and Operation RENAISSANCE in parts of Mogadishu during January 1993. This link between security and civic action proved effective and stimulated a greater commitment to direct assistance in Somali needs by UNITAF forces. See Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” pp. 75–76.
205. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology, p. 9.
206. Broderick interview; Wood, Sense of Values, pp. 124, 141–43.
207. Campaigning in Southern Somalia; Broderick interview.
210. Broderick interview; Pyle interview.
211. Broderick interview; Pyle interview.
214. MFS/IMEF (Fwd.), Command Chronology, p. 10; Newbold-Dawson interview.
218. . . . From the Sea.
Operation CONTINUE HOPE
Operations and Conflict

Operation CONTINUE HOPE officially began on 4 May 1993, when Lieutenant General Cevik Bir took command of UNOSOM II military operations in Somalia. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery served as Bir’s deputy as well as Commander, U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM). During the transition process, UNITAF leaders had considered UNOSOM II slow to assume command of the Somalia mission. But from the perspective of Generals Bir and Montgomery, the handoff had been hasty and had not met their needs or adequately prepared them. At the time of the change of command, UNOSOM II had an immature communications capability, insufficient infrastructure to operate its headquarters, and less than 30 percent of its staff in place. This resulted, in part, from the slowness of the United Nations in passing Security Council Resolution 814, delaying funding and formal authority for assigning the headquarters staff. When the resolution passed on 26 March 1993, it officially established UNOSOM II through 31 October 1993, with an annualized budget of $1.5 billion. It officially established the 4 May transition date and authorized Bir and Montgomery to allocate funds and prepare for the transition. The changeover occurred on schedule but not in the “seamless” manner that leaders of UNITAF and UNOSOM II intended. The political and military controversy between the United States and UN regarding prerequisite conditions for transferring control created friction that affected personnel from both when they came together in Mogadishu.

At the beginning of UNOSOM II, Bir commanded about seventeen thousand soldiers from twenty-one nations, including just over four thousand U.S. troops. His degree of authority varied widely. With regard to American forces, the Logistics Support Command—now under command of Brigadier General Norman Williams—would be part of the UNOSOM II organization, but the QRF remained outside that structure, reporting through Montgomery, in his capacity as USFORSOM commander, to General Hoar at Central Command. In U.S. military terminology, operational control of the QRF remained with Central Command (General Hoar), whereas tactical control came under
USFORSOM (General Montgomery). In other words, Montgomery could use the QRF on his own authority for emergencies, but for operations in support of the UNOSOM II mission he needed consent from General Hoar. In addition to the American troops stationed within Somalia, Central Command maintained in the Indian Ocean a naval expeditionary force (an amphibious ready group with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit), which would be available to Montgomery should the need arise. Of course, the ARG would also be available for other missions and might not always be on Somalia station when required. The UNOSOM II command relations—like those within USFORSOM—were also somewhat complicated, and they became even more so in late August 1993 with the arrival of Task Force RANGER, under Major General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army.

Command and control over the coalition forces—which would eventually grow to nearly thirty thousand troops from twenty-nine nations—proved problematic throughout Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Not all forces arrived on schedule, and those that did often came without weapons or equipment, useless until their shipments arrived, sometimes substantially later. Additionally, many coalition commanders operated under limitations imposed by their national governments or required home approval before executing UNOSOM II orders. When confronted with conflicts between UN missions and national agendas, field commanders would always follow directions from their home governments, creating disruption in planning and danger during combat. These infringements upon unity of command made many of the troops essentially unusable, reducing the ability of UNOSOM II leaders to prevent or respond to provocations. This situation was very worrisome, because Generals Bir and Montgomery felt certain that Aideed would challenge the UN and its commitment to the UNOSOM II operation.

In the weeks immediately after taking control in Somalia, UNOSOM II forces continued to support humanitarian relief missions while conducting shows of force within Mogadishu and elsewhere. This consisted of increased patrolling and expanded checkpoint activity intended to maintain a visible presence and give the appearance of a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Additionally, UNOSOM II leaders planned to continue the inspection of weapons cantonment sites (also called “authorized weapons storage sites,” or AWSSs) using the inventories created and provided by UNITAF. Of course, Mogadishu remained the greatest area of concern, because Aideed and his militia controlled a large portion of the city. In contrast, Ali Mahdi and his USC faction (which controlled the northern part of Mogadishu) continued to cooperate with UN efforts within Somalia.
Because of the strength and ambition of Aideed, Montgomery considered Mogadishu the center of gravity for the entire Somalia mission. He believed that actions there would determine the success or failure of Operation CONTINUE HOPE, whatever progress was achieved in other parts of Somalia. Predictably, the first severe crisis for UNOSOM II occurred in Mogadishu, on 5 June 1993, with a murderous ambush linked to the inspection of weapons storage sites. It was a shocking and distressing incident, but there had been forewarnings of greater confrontation with Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) throughout the month since UNITAF’s departure.

On 6 May, only days after UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, Kismayo had again erupted, when Omar Jess attempted to recapture the city. Belgian forces had thwarted his effort, and Montgomery dispatched a portion of the QRF to help stabilize the area. Meanwhile, Aideed began broadcasting virulent attacks against the United Nations over Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio Somalia, or Radio Aideed), which he had taken over after the fall of the Somali government in 1991.

“Radio wars” had been going on in Mogadishu since the arrival of UNITAF in December 1992. Aideed claimed that Radio Mogadishu constituted the official, state broadcasting system, but he had often used it for blatant propaganda purposes, promoting his own claim to national leadership and supporting the interests of his political faction. Much of his cant had consisted of highly inflammatory rhetoric against the UN and its activities. For their part, UNITAF leaders had created a Somali-language newspaper and radio station in Mogadishu, both named Rajo (sometimes spelled Raja, meaning “hope” in Somali), as parts of its public-information and psychological operations activity. In response to provocative transmissions, UNITAF would broadcast rebuttals, matching their intensity to that of the invective coming from Radio Mogadishu. This gave Generals Johnston and Zinni bargaining power with Aideed, causing him to keep his messages more moderate. That approach had proved somewhat effective during the period of Operation RESTORE HOPE.

But now, after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, Generals Bir and Montgomery had a much smaller psychological operations element, with virtually no radio broadcast capacity. Having no way to moderate Radio Mogadishu, they and Admiral Howe considered the possibility of closing it down. Doing so would create problems, including concerns over free speech and protection of the radio’s archives, both of which Montgomery considered important to the Somali people. Many people questioned the wisdom of closing down a radio station while trying to promote democracy and freedom in Somalia. UNOSOM II leaders would have preferred that Radio Mogadishu moderate its broadcasts but did not believe Aideed would do so. In late May, eleven leaders from factions not allied with Aideed urged UNOSOM II officials to...
take over the radio station and operate it as a national asset, providing access to all political groups. Aideed had made this difficult by declaring the premises of Radio Mogadishu part of one of his weapons cantonment areas, collocated with the station, known as AWSS-5. Many UNOSOM II officials and Somali leaders suspected that Aideed did this simply to ensure his exclusive use of the facility. When Aideed and other SNA leaders learned that UNOSOM II was considering shutting down the station, they had reasoned that a takeover would likely occur in conjunction with an inspection of AWSS-5.

In late May, UNOSOM II commanders began planning for inspections of the AWSSs within Mogadishu, in accordance with prior agreements between the UN and Somali warlords. According to UNITAF records, Ali Mahdi had two storage sites within Mogadishu, and Aideed operated five. Montgomery intended to conduct a simultaneous inspection of them all, to preserve the impression of evenhandedness. In addition to the fact that Resolution 814 specified disarmament as an objective for UNOSOM II, Bir and Montgomery wanted to ensure that heavy weapons remained in storage and did not show up on the street. This was of particular concern because evidence suggested that the factions had begun removing heavy weapons from their cantonment sites. UN leaders also wanted to establish a baseline accounting of weapons within the city, validate the accuracy of their inventory lists, and be certain that the warlords used these sites for the cantonment of weapons only.

The Italian contingent of UNOSOM II had responsibility for the section of Mogadishu under the control of Ali Mahdi, the Pakistani element for the area under Aideed. During the final stages of planning for the AWSS inspection, leaders of the Italian brigade notified General Montgomery that they had disestablished the two Ali Mahdi cantonments back in March. The Italian commanders had made this decision on their own and failed to notify either UNITAF or UNOSOM II leaders. Despite this complication, Generals Bir and Montgomery decided to go ahead with the inspections at the five Aideed cantonment sites. When UNOSOM II officials delivered the notification of inspection on 4 June, the evening before the scheduled inspections, the SNA minister of internal affairs became irritated and declared, “This will start the war tomorrow.”

Based on subsequent events, this seems a significant warning, but SNA officials—including Aideed himself and the minister of internal affairs—often made extreme statements that they did not act upon. In Ambassador Oakley’s view, this reaction resulted from lack of dialogue between UNOSOM II and the Somali factions. During RESTORE HOPE, Oakley or another high-level leader would make an appointment with Aideed personally and well in advance, with the result that the inspection process during UNITAF occurred without problems.
The next morning, 5 June 1993, Pakistani units arrived at Aideed’s cantonment sites at 0700 in company strength and conducted the inspections as planned. Contrary to some accounts, the Pakistani leadership had prepared very well for this operation. Photo imagery received from overflights of the cantonment sites the afternoon of 4 June showed newly installed weapons covering avenues into some of the facilities. The Pakistani commanders had received this information, along with copies of the photographs, and had planned accordingly. Additionally, Montgomery had ensured that all the units of the Pakistani brigade had M113 armored personnel carriers, for use in this and other operations. The Pakistani teams came prepared to conduct the inspections by force if necessary, but they experienced no resistance from the militia guarding the cantonments.

Only one incident occurred during the inspection process. A crowd of protesters confronted the soldiers at the Radio Mogadishu site (AWSS-5), resulting in some warning shots from the Pakistanis and rock throwing by the Somalis. According to the UN inquiry published a year later, a Pakistani soldier also shot a Somali man who attempted to snatch his rifle during the demonstration. The disturbance at AWSS-5 constituted the first occasion during the UNOSOM II deployment where Somali agitators mingled with women and children, using them as human shields to screen themselves. The fact that a U.S. technical team accompanied the Pakistani component may have created suspicion among Aideed’s followers regarding the real purpose of the inspection. (The team was intended to evaluate the problem of taking the radio station off the air, but not to actually do so on this occasion.) In the minds of SNA leaders, this inspection was nothing more than a cover for intelligence gathering about the broadcasting station and its equipment, information that could be helpful in a future effort to silence Radio Mogadishu. Some may even have expected an attempt to seize and deactivate the station during the inspection.

By about 1030 that morning, the Pakistanis had completed inspections of all five sites and had begun returning to their base and headquarters, at a soccer stadium. They had confiscated no weapons, and Radio Mogadishu remained open and functioning. In preparing for the inspection, the Pakistani brigade had organized itself into four teams. Before the movement back to their base camp, two teams joined at one of the sites (AWSS-3, where a radio retransmission site was also located), thereby creating three separate processions marching back to the stadium, from different directions. So far, only the demonstration at AWSS-5 had marred the morning action. But that period of relative accord would draw to a quick and violent end.

On the return march from the cantonment sites, the Pakistani element formed of two inspection teams joined together tripped an ambush of automatic-weapons fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). This occurred on 21 October Road near a facility...
named the “cigarette factory,” west of the soccer stadium. A nearly simultaneous attack
opened against a Pakistani detachment providing security at a south Mogadishu feed-
ing station, armed Somali fighters again mingling with women and children. This
mixed crowd of women, children, and armed men overwhelmed the Pakistani soldiers
and in some cases “literally took them apart by hand.”

Somali fighters also struck at several Pakistani checkpoints and ambushed reinforce-
ments dispatched to the embattled units. The attacks had all the earmarks of a well-
planned and coordinated operation designed to inflict maximum casualties and so
challenge UN operations in Somalia. In addition, demonstrations and shootings
erupted throughout Mogadishu. Montgomery dispatched helicopters and elements of
the QRF to relieve the Pakistani troops where possible. But by the end of the day,
UNOSOM II had suffered twenty-four Pakistani soldiers killed and another fifty-six
wounded. Six Pakistani soldiers had been captured, one of whom died in captivity,
while five were returned to UNOSOM II two days after the battle. Additionally, three
American soldiers and one Italian soldier received wounds on that day.

Bir and Montgomery had expected Aideed and his followers to challenge UNOSOM II
at some point, but this attack was a stunning event. It not only crossed a major
threshold of violence against UNOSOM II but threatened to undercut the efficacy of
UN peace operations throughout the world. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and UN
officials in New York feared the broader implication of this action. They believed that
failure to respond adequately would be a signal to miscreants in other conflict areas—
where some ninety thousand peacekeepers were at risk—that they could attack UN
forces with impunity. It was also a challenge to the new policies of “assertive multi-
lateralism” and “engagement and enlargement” of the Clinton administration. This
early Clinton strategy envisioned a post–Cold War expansion in democracy, market econ-
omies, and multilateral cooperation. Administration officials believed that Somalia,
though not strategically important to the United States, offered a test of this concept.

Whether planned, instigated, or spontaneous, the Somali actions of 5 June in
Mogadishu were very cunning in that they occurred after—not before or during—the
inspections. The Pakistani and UNOSOM II planners had prepared for possible resis-
tance at the cantonment sites but had not considered the possibility of an attack after
the fact. Neither had they expected attacks at separate and unrelated locations, such as
the feeding centers, UN strongpoints, or routes of reinforcement. In short, they did
not consider themselves involved in a war. Among the most shocking incidents of these
assaults was the mutilation of Pakistani soldiers overwhelmed by mob action. In the
words of General Montgomery, “That was a real initiation into the kind of brutality
we faced.”
All of these attacks on 5 June occurred within the area controlled by the Aideed faction, leaving little doubt as to SNA complicity. Aideed and his leaders had either orchestrated the events or at the very least created the conditions that spawned them. Later in the CONTINUE HOPE incursion, the extent of Aideed’s personal involvement in ordering these attacks became a matter of some debate. In fact, the entire question of whether the violence had been spontaneous or planned and orchestrated became the subject of considerable disagreement. Nevertheless, few of the American and UN personnel in Mogadishu at the time had any doubt regarding Aideed’s culpability. The inventories taken during the inspection of the cantonment sites revealed that Aideed’s faction had removed numerous heavy weapons, including all technicals, from the AWSSs. This further demonstrated to the satisfaction of UNOSOM II leaders in Mogadishu and UN officials in New York that the SNA no longer intended to cooperate with Resolution 814 or the Addis Ababa accords.

The 5 June 1993 attacks on the Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu caused international revulsion, particularly among nations providing troops to UNOSOM II. They were, after all, in Somalia for humanitarian purposes, to help the Somali people and nation in a time of difficulty. The UN Security Council, prompted by the delegate from Pakistan and strongly supported by the United States, responded the next day by passing Resolution 837. Among other things, it condemned the attack and called on the Secretary-General “to take all measures necessary against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks.” Although early drafts of Resolution 837 named both Aideed and his faction as being responsible for the 5 June attacks, the final version mentioned only the SNA. Nonetheless, broadcasts over Radio Mogadishu praising the assaults of 5 June, coupled with the reappearance in south Mogadishu of heavy weapons, some of which Somalis had used in the attacks of 5 June, convinced UN officials that they needed to take action against both Aideed and his SNA faction. The UN resolution was pushed through the Security Council over the weekend, with virtually no input from U.S. military leaders or State Department specialists.

Critics of the UNOSOM II operation often argue that Resolution 837 amounted to a declaration of war on Aideed and the SNA. They say the resolution and the action it spawned amounted to taking sides in the internal Somali conflict and unnecessarily making an enemy of Aideed. They also suggest that in trying to pick the winners and losers in Somalia, UN leaders forced Aideed’s hand. Some critics go so far as to suggest that the 5 June inspection of the AWSSs did in fact amount, as Somalis had suspected, to a cover for confiscating Aideed’s weapons and closing down his radio station. The clear implication of this line of criticism is that UNOSOM II leadership and not the intransigence of Aideed caused the violence of 5 June 1993, the subsequent
fighting, the ultimate failure of UNOSOM II, and the eventual evacuation of Somalia. We shall explore these ideas, along with contrary viewpoints, later in this study, but one thing is certain: Resolution 837 called for action against the perpetrators of the 5 June attacks, and UNOSOM II leaders in Somalia felt compelled to act accordingly.\textsuperscript{77} What followed amounted to “a virtual war situation between UNOSOM II and the SNA, as the two sides attacked each other over a period of four months.”\textsuperscript{78} This is a clear example of a tactical incident having strategic implications. This one essentially ended all efforts at nation building in Somalia and greatly reduced support for humanitarian operations.\textsuperscript{79}

In addition to condemning the 5 June attacks and directing UNOSOM II to arrest the responsible individuals, Resolution 837 called on UN forces to disarm factions in Mogadishu and neutralize Radio Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{80} During 12–14 June 1993, UNOSOM II leaders initiated action under the mandate of Resolutions 814 and 837—both of which called for disarmament of Somali factions—by attacking weapons and munitions storage areas within Mogadishu. This included both authorized AWSSs and clandestine weapons sites, garages for the maintenance and storage of technicals, the cigarette factory, and Radio Mogadishu and its retransmission site.\textsuperscript{81} These attacks involved AC-130 Spectre aircraft (temporarily assigned to USFORSOM on 9 June) in conjunction with Montgomery’s QRF and other UNOSOM II forces.\textsuperscript{82} On 17 June, UNOSOM II again took the initiative, attacking Aideed’s Mogadishu enclave with AC-130 gunships and following up with a cordon-and-search operation. The QRF played a lead role, supported by French, Italian, Moroccan, and Pakistani elements of the UNOSOM II force.\textsuperscript{83} Also on 17 June, Admiral Howe “called for the arrest and detention of General Mohamed Aideed.”\textsuperscript{84} Howe was supported in his action by the American envoy in Somalia, Robert Gosende, who had become a strong advocate of removing Aideed after the 5 June attacks on the Pakistani troops.\textsuperscript{85}

The decision to declare Aideed a wanted man came after careful consideration of the issues and the possible impact on the situation in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{86} The most critical factor in Howe’s thinking was the finding of a panel of UN jurists who had reviewed the evidence of the 5 June attacks and found “powerful circumstantial evidence . . . buttressed by the testimony of a credible witness,” that the attacks had been well planned, well executed, and well coordinated.\textsuperscript{87} The panel also confirmed the complicity of Aideed and determined that adequate grounds existed for his arrest and prosecution.\textsuperscript{88} Howe further discussed the matter with Kofi Annan (at the time Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping), Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and other Somalia specialists at the UN before deciding to arrest Aideed.\textsuperscript{89}

The final element influencing Howe’s decision was a 13 June demonstration at the Kilometer Four strongpoint in south Mogadishu. During this protest, Pakistani troops
manning that position received fire from gunmen in the crowd and from snipers in nearby buildings. Between eight and twenty Somalis suffered wounds in an exchange of gunfire during that incident, depending on the source. Based on intelligence that Howe considered solid, it appeared that Aideed’s followers had fired into their own protesters to inflate casualties and create the impression of UNOSOM II brutality. Howe believed that “if this man would kill his own people in order to accomplish his goals, he really ought to come off the streets, he ought to be detained. He needed to go through the legal process.” Several weeks later, UN officials authorized a $25,000 reward for information leading to Aideed’s arrest. According to feedback Howe received from military leaders, UNOSOM II’s warrant for Aideed’s arrest had no credibility on the street without a reward; offering rewards for information on terrorists had become normal throughout the world even at this early date. There followed various reports that Aideed had in turn placed a reward on Howe for a million dollars, and on other UNOSOM II leaders for as much as $250,000. When told that the SNA had put a million-dollar price on his head in response to the $25,000 reward for Aideed, Howe quipped, “Well, all I can tell you is that we can pay the $25,000.”

Over the next several weeks, UNOSOM II executed a series of attacks against SNA facilities and weapons sites. The QRF led most of these actions, with the participation of some coalition units. Concurrently, Aideed’s forces conducted mortar and RPG attacks against UNOSOM II positions at the port, airport, embassy, and other facilities, as well as ambushes and sniper fire at targets of opportunity. On 12 July, the QRF launched a controversial attack on a major SNA command-and-control center and meeting place known as “Abdi House.” Officers of the QRF had planned and scheduled the raid based on information that important militia leaders would confer there that day. After attacking with helicopters firing TOW antitank missiles and 20 mm guns, a U.S. air assault company swept the facility. After a firefight within the compound, it cleared the objective area and departed the scene. U.S. forces suffered no casualties, but afterward irate Somalis attacked and killed four international news reporters who came to survey the site.

Although highly successful as a tactical operation and damaging to Aideed’s operation, the unilateral nature of the attack on Abdi House created problems within the UNOSOM II alliance. Most of the previous attacks had been combined operations, and they had been preceded by warnings, permitting civilians and noncombatants (combatants as well, for that matter) to flee the scene. The attack on Abdi House had included no such warning, causing some coalition members to consider it unduly provocative. Additionally, some observers contended that the supposed meeting of militia leaders had been in fact a convocation of various clan and faction leaders who gathered to discuss “a less belligerent approach to United Nations and the possibility of
Mohammed Aideed leaving the country for a while.” One particularly well informed news reporter has suggested that there were actually two separate meetings—the Aideed military conference and a meeting of Somali elders—in near proximity; U.S. intelligence had known only about the militia planning session, and the attack had inadvertently encompassed both groups. All these complications (the consternation of UNOSOM II partners over the attack and the murder of the reporters), coupled with the unifying effect this attack may have had within Somali factions, tended to nullify any tactical advantages gained from this operation.

On 23 June, the USS Wasp ARG and 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somali waters to shore up U.S. military capability and support UNOSOM II operations. A normal rotation of command had occurred in the Persian Gulf, with Captain Charles Vian replacing Kenneth Pyle as commodore of the Wasp ARG. Upon arrival of Wasp off Mogadishu, Colonel Broderick conferred with General Montgomery to discuss future operations. During the meeting, fresh intelligence arrived on the location of Aideed, and the two leaders agreed to prepare a direct-action mission by 24th MEU (SOC) to capture the SNA leader. Broderick quickly tailored his maritime special-purpose force, consisting of elements from the MEU (SOC) and naval special warfare forces, and launched the mission from the deck of Wasp. The raid was based on current intelligence regarding Aideed’s whereabouts, and it was flawlessly executed, but Aideed was not at the target site.

After this operation, Broderick again mixed military action with humanitarian activity, sending his medical team ashore at Merca (near Mogadishu) and other locations to set up medical and dental clinics. Throughout the day, as Marines fanned out to clear the surrounding areas and provide secure environments, Navy doctors and corpsmen treated Somali patients, often as many as thirty per hour. Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC) also escorted grain convoys, conducted riot-control training for coalition forces, and augmented the aviation and explosive-ordnance-disposal elements of the QRF. It even undertook helpful civic-action projects in faraway Bossasso before departing Somali waters—one of the few operations undertaken in northern Somalia during the various incursions of the 1990s.

After the 12 July attack on Abdi House, the conflict between UNOSOM II and Aideed continued at varying levels of intensity through the end of August. Four American military policemen died on 9 August when their vehicle was destroyed by a command-detonated mine. This followed an attack on an American contractor (Brown & Root) vehicle that had wounded two Americans. Largely, these attacks resulted from attempts of SNA forces to regain the initiative they had lost when the QRF began offensive operations following the 5 June ambush. It became clear that Aideed and his leadership
had decided to target Americans to the maximum extent possible (although not limiting their attacks to U.S. personnel). Fully schooled on the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the retreat from Lebanon after the October 1983 Beirut bombing, they had correctly identified the center of gravity for UNOSOM II as being the American media and political leadership. Inflict enough U.S. casualties, SNA leaders reasoned, and the media will create pressure on American politicians for withdrawal. Once American involvement was ended, Aideed’s forces could marginalize the UN mission to Somalia and eventually compel it to depart. In Ambassador Oakley’s words, “The United States became public enemy number one for all the Somalis who supported Aideed.”

During July and August, Montgomery organized and trained the QRF for “snatch operations,” to capture Aideed and his most important lieutenants. That effort, along with attacks against SNA operation centers and facilities, had the effect of driving him deeper into hiding in the backstreets and underground of Mogadishu. Montgomery had a very high regard for his QRF, but it was essentially light infantry of the 10th Mountain Division, not trained or equipped for this type of operation. He believed that UNOSOM II needed special-operations troops with the configuration, training, and capability designed for such missions. Additionally, Montgomery believed he needed to augment UNOSOM II with heavy forces to protect his troops and better support humanitarian operations as the conflict with Aideed intensified. Accordingly, Montgomery requested a mechanized task force and an air cavalry troop. As we shall see, the issue of sending heavy forces onto Somalia would have a long and tortured life.

Montgomery did not need to request special operations units, because Admiral Howe was already making repeated appeals for them through his contacts in Washington, and had been since as early as 8 June. Montgomery now supported these requests, of course, thereby giving them more weight with American decision makers. However, neither General Powell in Washington or General Hoar in Tampa had any enthusiasm for sending those forces into Somalia. Hoar was particularly skeptical about the likelihood of capturing Aideed, considering the prospect for success no better than one in four. Both Hoar and Powell ultimately acquiesced to the request for special operations forces, because the commanders on the scene considered them necessary to accomplish the mission. But even more to the point, President Clinton and his national security adviser, Tony Lake, decided on 22 August, after an attack that wounded six Americans, that it was time to bring Aideed to justice and ordered the deployment. This led to the arrival of Task Force RANGER late in August 1993.

Task Force RANGER consisted of a specially structured (task organized) team of various special operations units amounting to some 450 soldiers. Commanded by Major General William F. Garrison, USA (who also commanded the Joint Special Operations
Command in Fort Bragg, North Carolina), Task Force RANGER possessed capability that UNOSOM II leaders believed would ensure the capture of Aideed. Despite the task force’s name, U.S. Army Rangers made up only about a third of the unit, essentially one company. The other major elements included a squadron from Delta Force and a detachment of the U.S. Army’s special operations aviation unit from Task Force 160.  

“The unit’s mission was to capture Aideed and six of his top aides” and bring to justice those considered responsible for the 5 June ambush of the Pakistani soldiers.

As mentioned earlier, the arrival of these special operation units further complicated the already complex command relationships between UNOSOM II forces. Although Task Force RANGER operated within Somalia in support of CONTINUE HOPE’s objectives, General Garrison served under the operational and tactical control of Central Command. In short, Task Force RANGER remained a strategic asset, under the authority of General Hoar. Despite this anomalous situation, General Hoar made it clear that he expected Garrison to coordinate his actions with Montgomery and keep Montgomery well informed of plans. In fact, Garrison established an excellent relationship with Montgomery, and the two commanders worked very well together. Yet this did not constitute unity of command, and that fact would prove problematic when a well planned and well executed operation turned bad.

In mid-September, Montgomery again requested heavy reinforcements for USFORSOM, including an armor platoon of four M-1 tanks, a mechanized company with fourteen M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and an artillery battery of six 105mm howitzers. As commander of U.S. forces and deputy commander of UNOSOM II operations, Montgomery believed he needed these units to enhance force protection, given the increased incidents of mine warfare, sniping, mortar attacks, and ambushes continuously experienced since 5 June. Admiral Howe agreed, believing these forces were needed to permit movement within Mogadishu and for continued support of humanitarian operations. Generals Hoar and Powell endorsed Montgomery’s request (minus the artillery), but Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rejected it, out of concern over congressional and public criticism. This decision, like the unity-of-command issue, would come back to haunt military and civilian leaders within the Department of Defense.

For the most part, the problems that forced UNOSOM II into the role of a combatant in Somali factional warfare had been limited to Mogadishu—specifically, the areas of the city controlled by Aideed and his SNA faction. The rest of Somalia actually experienced improvement throughout the summer of 1993. The famine had been broken by February, and in many areas calm and stability had begun to return. The resumption of business activity and the reopening of schools demonstrated that progress was
Throughout the crisis, the search for Aideed became the focus of UN operations, attracting the attention of military leaders and the international press. After a short period of settling in and rehearsals, Task Force RANGER launched a succession of operations intended to capture and detain Aideed and his top aides. The first major action involved an attack against the Lig Ligato House on 30 August. The Lig Ligato House had supposedly replaced the Abdi House as a command-and-control node and SNA meeting place. Unfortunately for Task Force RANGER and USFORSOM, this assault proved somewhat of an embarrassment, because the U.S. team captured eight employees of the UN Development Program, whom they immediately released. (Perhaps the UNDP employees should have been the ones embarrassed, since they were in a location frequented by Aideed, and from which UN leadership had instructed them to depart. The presence of substantial amounts of cash and contraband material also raised questions regarding their activities.)

During September, there followed a series of textbook operations that captured a number of SNA leaders. Notwithstanding the skill and professionalism demonstrated in these raids, getting current intelligence on Aideed and his most important lieutenants proved very difficult. This shortcoming resulted in the occasional detention of innocent people, causing criticism from various individuals—mostly in the media—with no understanding of the difficulty of such missions. Regrettably, they also drew caustic criticism from Secretary Aspin, who should have appreciated the problems.

But an operation on 21 September that succeeded in arresting Aideed’s most important lieutenant, Osman Ato, somewhat offset that negative commentary. The apprehension occurred near the Digfer Hospital in downtown Mogadishu, and it also netted three of Osman Ato’s bodyguards. Osman Ato, of course, had been an important point of contact for American leaders during PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, before the fissure between UNOSOM II and the SNA developed during CONTINUE HOPE. He was sent into captivity on an island off Kismayo, but General Hoar would arrange for his early release.

Several other important considerations flowed from the 21 September action. First, Aideed—who already had gone into hiding—went even farther underground, making it more difficult to obtain information on his whereabouts or movements. Additionally, whenever the special operations helicopters, known as “Little Birds” (an armed
variant of the Army’s OH-6A Cayuse), lifted off from the airfield, SNA leaders assumed
that they were on a snatch mission. If Aideed happened to be in a vulnerable location,
he simply took a walk and submerged himself in the friendly masses of Mogadishu. 145
By this point Aideed had become more important to Somalis as a symbol of resistance
than as the leader of his faction and subclan. The failed efforts to capture Aideed
tended to enhance his stature and to unify him and the SNA with all but his most
implacable enemies. 146 This played into Aideed’s hands as he skillfully manipulated the
information front. 147 Among other clever ploys, he cast the UN and United States in the
role of neocolonialists attempting to establish a new trusteeship in Somalia. In so
doing, he defined himself as defender of the nation. 148

A second important point emerging from the 21 September raid was the considerable
firepower encountered by the helicopters of Task Force RANGER. For the first time a
high volume of RPG rounds was received from the SNA militia. It required the Rangers
and Delta Force soldiers to return fire, inflicting an unknown but substantial number
of casualties. Previous raids by Task Force RANGER had been so fast and efficient that
neither side received high casualties; 149 the experience of 21 September suggested that
operations could become more dangerous. Aideed’s fighters had obviously adjusted to
American tactics, and this boded ill for the future. 150 Four days later, on 25 September, a
Black Hawk helicopter belonging to Montgomery’s QRF became the victim of an RPG
round, killing three American crewmen. 151

In the early afternoon of 3 October, leaders of Task Force RANGER learned from a Somali
informant of a meeting near the Olympic Hotel, in the heart of Aideed-controlled
Mogadishu. According to this intelligence, the gathering would include two of Aideed’s
top lieutenants, Abdi Hassan Awali and Omar Salad Elmi. 152 The Delta team leaders
quickly developed a plan and dispatched a snatch team, which captured twenty-four
individuals, including the two Aideed advisers. 153 The task force called for a prestaged
truck convoy to evacuate the detainees, which arrived on the scene at about 1600.
Twenty minutes later a Black Hawk helicopter piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Clifton
Wolcott, which provided fire support from onboard snipers, was struck by a rocket-
propelled grenade and crashed into the Mogadishu street, killing two and injuring five
U.S. soldiers. 154 This precipitated the best-known action of the Somalia incursions—the
“Black Hawk Down” incident, or the “Battle of Mogadishu.” 155

As Rangers and Delta operators moved to protect their comrades in the downed heli-
copter, a second Black Hawk, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, also
took an RPG round and crash-landed some distance to the south. A rescue column
consisting of Task Force RANGER personnel, followed by a company of the QRF under
command of Lieutenant Colonel William C. David, attempted to break through to the
Durant crash. But just past the Kilometer Four traffic circle the relief element tripped an ambush that forced it back to the airport. A special operations helicopter inserted two Delta Force non-commissioned officers near the Durant crash site, where they attempted to hold off a growing throng of armed Somali fighters. After a heroic stand, the small party of defenders was overrun by the mob, killing all except Durant, who suffered serious injuries. When a rescue party finally reached the Durant crash site some hours after midnight, neither Durant nor the American bodies remained. Durant had become a prisoner of the SNA, and irate Somalis had desecrated the bodies of his five comrades.

After the failure of the first relief effort to break through at the Kilometer Four circle, Montgomery had organized a composite force of U.S. troops, Pakistani tanks, and Malaysian armored personnel carriers; it took some time to organize and prepare for action. Clearly, if Montgomery had possessed the armored task force he had requested, a powerful reaction force could have been launched much sooner. Once Montgomery put together his “pickup” rescue team, it fought its way to the two crash sites in the early morning hours of 4 October. The soldiers of Task Force RANGER had been fighting in downtown Mogadishu for over fourteen hours when the relief column arrived. During the day, they received small reinforcements by helicopter, along with a resupply of ammunition. The nearly one hundred soldiers of Task Force RANGER who had formed around the Wolcott crash site fought off all attempts to overrun their position. Unlike at the Durant crash site, the rescue team arrived in time to relieve the Wolcott defenders, evacuate the wounded, and recover the dead.

The fierce battle of 3–4 October 1993 constituted the bloodiest urban fighting for U.S. forces since the Vietnam War. The American and coalition forces suffered eighteen Americans killed and eighty-four wounded, two Malaysians killed and seven wounded, and two Pakistanis wounded. Estimates of Somali casualties vary widely, but the U.S. Army after-action report puts the number at three to five hundred killed and over seven hundred wounded. The Somali figure would have been even greater (and...
American casualties would have been lighter) had not Special Operations Command unthinkingly removed the AC-130 Spectre gunships from Somalia in early August. Grotesque pictures of an angry mob dragging a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu appeared in the United States late on 4 October. It was a sudden shock to the American people and their political leadership. The United States had gone into Somalia to end the famine and save lives. How had that resulted in bloody urban combat and the dragging of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu? Additionally, a public exhibition of severely injured Chief Warrant Officer Durant, the only survivor of the fighting at his crash site, also became a dominant news item, further distressing and angering the American public.

The Battle of Mogadishu and the earlier failures to capture Aideed had vindicated General Hoar’s doubts about the efficacy of this approach, much to his distress. His regret, of course, was the loss of U.S. troops, whom he characterized as “superb soldiers[,] . . . nobody's any better than these guys.” He also believed the decision process had been weakened by the presence of people in high positions who did not understand the realities of combat operations. Additionally, he felt that options with greater promise than the capture and trial of Aideed had existed during the summer and fall of 1993. The most hopeful of them had been an offer by the president of Ethiopia to host a meeting of all aggrieved parties to resolve outstanding issues and end the violence. Leaders in the UN and United States, however, had found no attraction in that prospect at the time. Hoar also finds fault in himself, for permitting the snatch operations to continue after the first several failures. He never believed that the operation had much chance of success in the first place, and he saw virtually none after the element of surprise had been lost: “I feel that I was culpable by not ending that goddamn thing.” Of course, that would have been difficult, since orders for the operation came from the White House.

Notes
2. Zinni interview.
3. Montgomery interview.
4. The army after-action report states that only 22 percent of the UNOSOM II staff was in place during the transition, whereas General Montgomery (and other sources) remembered the number at about 30 percent. Ibid.; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 75, 81.
8. Montgomery interview.
9. The number of soldiers reported as part of UNOSOM II at the time of transition varies from sixteen thousand to eighteen thousand, depending on the account (sometimes it varies within the same account). U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 26, 63, 75, 77, 80; United Nations and Somalia, pp. 49–50.

10. Montgomery interview.


12. Montgomery interview.


14. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology.


17. Howe interview.


21. Howe interview.


23. The United Somali Congress (USC) in Mogadishu divided into two political factions after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The faction under Aideed and his Habs Gidr subclan allied with the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which included the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of Omar Jess and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) located in Baidoa. Therefore, Aideed’s faction became known as the USC/SNA and Omar Jess’s as the SPM/SNA. Eventually, many observers and analysts dropped the “USC” from the Aideed faction and the “SPM” from the Omar Jess faction, referring to them as simply “the SNA.” After the break, Ali Mahdi’s Abgal-based faction became known as the USC/SSA, and then simply the SSA (Somali Salvation Alliance). In the interest of consistency, this study will refer hereafter to the Aideed and Omar Jess factions as the SNA and Ali Mahdi’s faction as the SSA. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, pp. 65–67; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, pp. 10–11; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 69.


30. Montgomery interview.


34. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 117.


36. Ibid., p. 87.


38. This evidence included information from both human intelligence sources and aircraft overflights. U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 86; Howe PBS Frontline interview.

40. Ibid., pp. 86–87.
41. Ibid., p. 87; Montgomery interview.
42. Neither Aideed nor any of his principal aides were available to receive the inspection notification on 4 June. Osman Ato later claimed that had UNOSOM II officials delivered the notice to a member of the Cease-Fire Committee the violent incident of 5 June 1993 would not have happened. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 398; U.S. Army Dept., *Somalia After Action Report*, p. 88.
44. Oakley interview.
47. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 376.
48. Ibid.
50. A subsequent UN inquiry determined that the U.S. technical team had been included for the purpose of surveying the radio facility and transmission equipment. That inquiry did not find any intent to close down the radio during the inspection of 5 June, and General Montgomery emphatically denies any intent to do so on that occasion. He does acknowledge that UNOSOM II leaders had the issue under consideration and may have felt forced to do so. Montgomery interview; UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 375.
53. Montgomery interview.
55. Clarke PBS *Frontline* interview.
56. Howe PBS *Frontline* interview; Montgomery interview.
58. Montgomery interview.
63. Montgomery interview.
66. Oakley PBS *Frontline* interview.
68. At every AWSS, the actual weapons and munitions present differed from the inventory lists. In most cases, inspectors could not find heavy weapons listed on the inventories. In other cases, inspectors discovered weapons

69. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 143; United Nations and Somalia, p. 50.


73. Oakley interview.


75. Zinni interview.


79. Oakley interview.

80. Security Council Resolution 837; Montgomery interview.

81. During the AC-130 gunship attack on Radio Mogadishu, Montgomery was careful not to destroy the archives. By this time he knew where they were located, and he took precautions to protect them while disabling the station. Montgomery interview; “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 837,” pp. 276–77.


87. Professor Tom Farer Report, pp. 296–300.


89. Poole, Effort to Save Somalia, p. 45; Howe interview; Howe PBS Frontline interview.

90. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, pp. 378, 399–400; Professor Tom Farer Report, pp. 296–300.

91. Not all accounts of the 13 June incident at Kilometer Four agree that SNA gunmen fired into the crowd. John Drysdale, an adviser to Special Representative Jonathan Howe at the time of this incident, argues emphatically against this claim in his Whatever Happened to Somalia? (see page 198); UN Commission of Inquiry Report, pp. 378, 399.


93. Howe PBS Frontline interview.


95. Howe interview.


103. Accounts of the number of Somali casualties reported from the attack on the Abdi House vary widely. UNOSOM II estimated twenty Somali dead, the ICRC suggests fifty-four dead and 161 wounded, whereas SNA officials claim seventy-three killed. UN Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 379; Sommers, Hope Restored? p. 41.

104. Broderick interview; Pyle interview.

105. 24th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology, pp. 12, 28.


108. Broderick interview.


116. Oakley interview.


118. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

119. Ibid., p. 134; Montgomery PBS Frontline interview.


121. Lawrence E. Casper, Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 31; Howe PBS Frontline interview.

122. Oakley interview.


124. Howe PBS Frontline interview; Montgomery interview.


127. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 32.


129. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 32.


131. Montgomery interview; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 35.


133. Howe PBS Frontline interview.


135. Howe interview.


140. Sloyan, “Hunting Down Aideed.”

141. Ibid.


143. Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 37; Hoar interview.


145. Hoar interview.


150. In a meeting with General Zinni some weeks later, Aideed stated that he and his officers had observed Task Force RANGER operating out of the Mogadishu airfield and had realized that its helicopters were the key vulnerability. Therefore, when SNA leaders conducted important meetings, Aideed placed his fighters on the rooftops of surrounding buildings armed with machine guns and RPG launchers. By concentrating a high volume fire on the helicopters they hoped to bring one down, with the expectation that the American assault force would rally to protect its crew. This would allow his militia and armed sympathizers to fix the U.S. soldiers in place, swarm to the site, and concentrate their firepower against the now stationary defenders in the streets of Mogadishu. Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, interview by PBS Frontline, “Ambush in Mogadishu” series, 29 September 1998, available at www.pbs.org.


152. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, pp. 28–29; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 32.

153. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, p. 29.


155. The most thorough account of this action is Mark Bowden’s 1999 Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. A popular movie of the same name provided an exciting (even riveting) dramatization of the event. But like all “historical” movies produced by Hollywood, it also played fast and loose with the facts. Lawrence Casper’s 2001 book Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti provides another excellent account of this incident, including a broad perspective on the involvement of the QRF, Pakistani troops, and Malaysian forces. Bowden, Black Hawk Down; Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 31–110; Montgomery interview.


157. The two soldiers who voluntarily went to the rescue of Durant and his crew, Master Sgt. Gary I. Gordon and Sgt. 1st Class Randall D. Shugart, did so knowing they were likely going to their deaths. Their spirited defense held off the Somali throng long enough for an SNA leader to control the situation, thereby saving Durant’s life when the mob swarmed over the crash site. The militia leader knew the value of holding an American prisoner, whereas the crowd was primarily after blood. For their actions at the Durant crash site, both Gordon and Shugart posthumously received Medals of Honor. Bolger, Savage Peace, pp. 323–24; Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 40–41; U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 11.


159. Hoar interview.

160. Casper, Falcon Brigade, pp. 46–87; Montgomery PBS Frontline interview.
163. Ibid., pp. 13, 139.
166. Oakley interview.
167. Apple, “Clinton Sending Reinforcements after Heavy Losses in Somalia”; Hirsch and
168. Hoar interview.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
In some ways, the Battle of Mogadishu was a replay of the 1968 Vietnam Tet offensive, in microcosm. American leaders had not prepared the public for this level of violence, and as a result the vivid press images created revulsion within the population and among members of Congress. Just as Tet 1968 weakened American commitment in Vietnam by shattering the will of irresolute political leaders, so too would the Battle of Mogadishu result in American withdrawal from Somalia. In both cases, elected officials had committed the armed forces of the United States to a role that Americans did not fully understand. When press coverage of an unexpected and violent battle revealed the deception (intentional in the case of Vietnam, probably unintended in Somalia), the revelation impaired the war effort. Ironically, the same media clout that had originally stimulated U.S. intervention in Somalia by exhibiting images of suffering now undercut that effort with the images of the desecration of an American soldier. Of course, the Vietnam analogy goes only so far. The size, impact, and results of the two failures are not comparable. Yet it is interesting to note that if both Tet 1968 and Mogadishu 1993 constituted public-relations defeats, they also represented military victories. But they were victories that American leaders at the time chose not to exploit.

It is understandable that Americans did not have a clear appreciation of their country’s role in Somalia at the time of the Battle of Mogadishu. Many thought American involvement had ended with the return of U.S. troops at the conclusion of Operation RESTORE HOPE. In a highly publicized event at the White House on 5 May 1993, President Clinton greeted General Johnston and a representative group from the UNITAF force with a laudatory speech declaring, among other things, “I say to you General [Johnston], and to all whom you brought with you: Welcome home, and thank you for a job very, very well done.” This seemed like a “mission accomplished” ceremony, although people who followed the Somalia situation in detail knew that the United States had a continuing commitment to the UN effort. But for most Americans—who do not follow foreign affairs closely—this welcome home on the White House lawn...
sent a message that the Somalia incursion was now finished. Certainly, the achievements of RESTORE HOPE justified the recognition that President Clinton conferred. Yet due in part to good press coverage of the White House event, there remained only a vague awareness among most Americans that nearly four thousand U.S. soldiers continued to serve in Somalia, and there was even less clarity about their role. After the Battle of Mogadishu, this ambiguity and the anger it engendered strengthened the hand of political leaders who wanted the United States out of Somalia and free of the UN commitment. It also gave rise to a new term in the American lexicon—“mission creep.”

“Mission creep” is a somewhat amorphous concept that is now widely used by politicians, military leaders, and pundits alike. It suggests the drifting of a military mission into something of higher responsibility and of greater cost in terms of blood and treasure than originally intended. The initial incursions of PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE had operated well within the mandate of Security Council Resolution 794 and the intentions of American leaders. Any expansion of U.S. activity during UNITAF operations—such as engineering support to local communities, reestablishment of a police force, civic-action projects, and refugee resettlement assistance—had been humanitarian in nature and did not cross a threshold that would lead to major combat situations. Although some may consider even this a form of mission creep, it never committed the United States to higher levels of responsibility in Somalia. Some critics even suggest the UNITAF operation constituted “mission shrink,” by virtue of its failing to disarm all Somali factions in accordance with the Resolution 794 mandate and the expectations of many leaders. This study has already addressed the debate on disarmament in some detail, but it is important to note that many observers believe the failure of UNITAF to disarm the major warring factions in Somalia contributed to the problems experienced later during UNOSOM II. Nevertheless, had UNITAF attempted a complete disarmament as these critics suggest it should have, the accompanying violence would surely have constituted severe mission creep.

The transition from RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE HOPE clearly signaled a greater involvement in Somali affairs through the process of nation building, as expressed in Resolution 814, substantially drafted by representatives of the United States. The foreign policy initiatives of the new Clinton administration—“assertive multilateralism” and “enlargement and engagement”—greatly influenced the language of Resolution 814. Unfortunately, the individuals who committed the United States to nation building in Somalia did not coordinate with the established national security organizations, thereby preventing leaders who questioned its wisdom from voicing their objections. The UN decision to take the step toward violent conflict with Aideed’s SNA after the 5 June attacks on the Pakistani forces found expression in Resolution 837, again supported by representatives of the U.S. government. In fact, with passage of Resolution 837 the UN
mission overtly changed from humanitarian operations to a form of violent conflict between UNOSOM II and Aideed’s SNA. This was a very deliberate decision, taken by the UN Security Council and supported—even instigated—by representatives of the U.S. government. In General Zinni’s view, declaring Aideed an outlaw and placing a reward on his head moved the mission from peacekeeping or peacemaking to a form of counterinsurgency warfare. This change in the Somalia mission did not result from a mindless drift but from specific actions knowingly undertaken by high-level leaders in New York and Washington, as well as in Mogadishu.

On 7 October 1993, three days after the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton addressed the nation on Somalia. In it he praised the success of RESTORE HOPE and lamented the fact that “the people who caused so much of the problem in the beginning started attacking American, Pakistani, and other troops who were there just to keep the peace.” He also professed that the United States would finish the job in Somalia, but he allowed less than six months for that purpose: “All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.” Many leaders in the administration and Congress wanted an immediate withdrawal, but a consensus of the National Security Council and other key leaders convinced President Clinton that such action would be unconscionable. In the interim, the president stated, he would increase U.S. strength by ordering more ground troops and armor into Somalia, along with an aircraft carrier and two amphibious ready groups, carrying some 3,600 Marines. The basic purpose of these forces included protecting American troops, continuing the humanitarian relief, and creating conditions wherein the Somali people could solve their problems among themselves. To facilitate this process and achieve its rather nebulous objective for the Somali people, the president asked Ambassador Robert Oakley to return once again to Somalia. To Aideed, hunkered down in the recesses of Mogadishu, all this must have sounded a lot like victory.

After President Clinton had made the decision to withdraw from Somalia, he had tasked General Hoar and Ambassador Albright with informing Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali prior to its public release. It was a message the Secretary-General did not want to hear and did not take graciously. Ambassador Oakley returned to Mogadishu on 9 October, two days after the president’s speech, accompanied by General Zinni and a new U.S. policy for dealing with Aideed and the Somalia problem. Ironically, this new American policy provided sufficient military power to accomplish the original goals of Operation CONTINUE HOPE yet restricted the ability of Generals Bir and Montgomery to use that power. A departure date having been announced, America’s military posture in Somalia now became primarily defensive in nature. In Oakley’s words, “Clinton personally ordered the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Dave Jeremiah, and General Hoar to stop any further action by U.S.
forces against Aideed, the SNA, or other Somalis except in self-defense.”

President Clinton’s policy shift constituted the third major strategy for U.S. military
involvement in Somalia. The first—under President Bush, Ambassador Oakley, and
General Johnston—had focused on breaking the famine while minimizing conflict with
Somali warlords. Although this strategy involved cooperation with Aideed and other
faction leaders, it was backed up by hardball diplomacy and a powerful military force
under UNITAF, consisting primarily of U.S. Marines and soldiers of the 10th Mountain
Division. The second strategy—under President Clinton, Ambassador Albright,
Anthony Lake, General Montgomery, and UN officials Admiral Howe and General
Bir—consisted of nation building through auspices of the United Nations. It consti-
tuted a classic mismatch between strategy and resources, wherein the UN attempted to
accomplish larger and more intrusive objectives than under the earlier policy, with sub-
stantially less military power and diplomatic support. During this phase, communica-
tions between the UNOSOM II force and the Aideed faction broke down, allowing the
factor of surprise to enter into the equation within Mogadishu. That resulted in misun-
derstandings between the SNA and UN, contributing to the subsequent conflict
between Aideed and UNOSOM II. The third strategy followed President Clinton’s
policy speech of 7 October and the consequent reduction in military activity. In this
phase, the United States essentially moved into an exit strategy designed to extract the
United States from UNOSOM II and Somalia after a decent interval. Although U.S.
military and diplomatic power temporarily returned to Somalia during October 1993,
it primarily became a force to protect American personnel until the withdrawal date of
31 March 1994. Only during the first phase of America’s involvement in Somalia—
RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF—was there an appropriate match between strategy and
resources. In the second and third phases substantial mismatches existed, although only
in the second phase did this create problems.

Aideed reacted to President Clinton’s speech of 7 October and the changing political
environment in Washington and Somalia by declaring a unilateral cease-fire in
Mogadishu. Officially, the UN and United States did not acknowledge Aideed’s cease-
fire, but the change in American policy, coupled with the absence of offensive military
activity by UNOSOM II forces, served as an unofficial recognition and acceptance of
the gesture. For Aideed, this provided a needed respite. His militia and supporters
had suffered grievous losses in the Battle of Mogadishu. In General Zinni’s opinion,
“the battle that day really took its toll... [A]t that stage in the game they were really
down and worried.” But Aideed no longer needed to fight against U.S. and UN forces.
He had only to wait until 31 March 1994, and the situation would turn decidedly in
his favor.”
Admiral Howe, as the Secretary-General’s special representative in Somalia, also believed that the Battle of Mogadishu had severely damaged Aideed and the SNA. But in his view, there was now an opportunity to destroy the power of Aideed, whom he considered the major impediment to progress in Somalia. Howe considered the Somalis good people, who had achieved a level of stability everywhere in their country except where Aideed ruled. Even Omar Jess and General Morgan had made an accommodation in southern Somalia, and Kismayo was no longer the flash point for violence that it had been in the past. With substantial U.S. ground and naval forces flowing into the operational area, Howe believed UNOSOM II could now eliminate the power of Aideed and place Somalia on the road to full recovery. Unfortunately for Howe and his concept of victory, President Clinton’s restrictions ensured that the powerful American forces building up in Somalia would primarily operate in a defensive mode. They did conduct extensive planning and rehearsals, along with several complex operations. But these were more in the nature of exercises and shows of force. The days of taking the fight to Aideed and the SNA had ended with the Battle of Mogadishu.

Upon their arrival in Mogadishu, Oakley and Zinni (who returned to Somalia at Oakley’s request) met with Howe, Bir, and Montgomery to gain an understanding of their position on the issues and explain the new American policy for Somalia. Of course, U.S. objectives would drive UN action in the future, just as they had in the past. After discussions with UN and American leaders, Oakley and Zinni met with representatives of the SNA and eventually with Aideed himself. (They also met with Ali Mahdi representatives, although UNOSOM II had not been at war with his SSA faction.) The first order of business involved release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. During meetings with Aideed’s representatives, Oakley and Zinni persuaded them (and indirectly Aideed himself) to release Durant, along with a Nigerian soldier, Umar Shantali, whom the SNA had captured in a bloody shoot-out some weeks earlier. Obtaining these releases had been problematic and very challenging. In Oakley’s words, “Aideed’s decision to release the prisoners without quid pro quo was exceedingly difficult. Thousands of casualties in south Mogadishu in the summer and fall had been among his followers and kinsmen, and feelings were running very high.”

Oakley’s credibility and his skill at hardball diplomacy overcame opposition to Durant’s release. Oakley did not actually negotiate for Durant’s release or promise any U.S. action in return. He simply demanded the release as a gesture of good will, while suggesting dire consequences if refused. But when Oakley returned to the United States, he contacted General Hoar and mentioned that Osman Ato was quite ill in his captivity (on, as noted, an island off Kismayo) and that he thought it might be a nice gesture to release him. Hoar accommodated, telling Oakley, “I’m going to release him, Bob, but please don’t tell anybody.” Certainly, Oakley did not offer Aideed any quid
pro quo for the release of Durant, but it is probably fair to say that one goodwill
gesture deserved another.

Although the release of Durant was important to Oakley’s mission, his broader pur-
pose involved restarting the peace process in Somalia and returning conditions to polit-
cical and diplomatic tracks. Whereas Howe hoped to finish off Aideed militarily, Oakley intended to re-create the more conciliatory relations of RESTORE HOPE. This was consistent with President Clinton’s intent “to make it possible for the Somali peo-
ple, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve
their problems and survive when we leave.” Oakley’s effort had a positive effect on
calming the situation in Somalia, and his credibility with Aideed and SNA leaders gave
him considerable influence. But Clinton’s lofty goals had no real hope for success once he
announced the withdrawal date of 31 March 1994. Zinni came to believe that the Clinton
administration had given up on accomplishing anything beneficial in Somalia and there-
after simply used Oakley to place the best possible face on the American withdrawal.

On 16 November, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 885, which in effect
suspended arrest actions against Aideed and set the stage for release of SNA prisoners,
including Mohamed Awali and Omar Salad Elmi, “snatched” by the Delta Force in
October. Resolution 885 essentially nullified the provisions of Resolution 837. It also
authorized “the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry . . . to investigate armed
attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them.” The results of
that investigation, entitled Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to
Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel, was pub-
lished 1 June 1994. Among other things, the investigation found, “the mandate given to
UNOSOM II, at least as it was interpreted, was too pretentious in relation to the instru-
ments and to the will to implement it.” In other words, there existed a mismatch
between strategy and resources, and an insufficiency of will.

U.S. forces began flowing into Somalia almost immediately after President Clinton’s 7
October address to the nation. The first element included a battalion-sized reinforce-
ment from the 10th Mountain Division, along with AC-130 Spectre gunships. General
Hoar had assigned AC-130s to support Montgomery after the 5 June attacks on the
Pakistani troops, but as noted, Special Operations Command had reassigned them to
other missions during August. As part of the force protection plan in the wake of the
Battle of Mogadishu, Hoar had the Spectres returned to the Horn of Africa. Based out
of Mombasa, Kenya, these AC-130s would patrol the skies over Mogadishu as “airborne
guardians” to the American and UNOSOM II forces below. Howe believed these
gunships represented an ideal weapon, if used in conjunction with other American
forces, for defeating Aideed’s militia and eliminating him as a force in Mogadishu. But
he would not get the opportunity to utilize these or any other U.S. weapons for that purpose. At this point, American leaders intended the AC-130 Spectres, like the other U.S. forces arriving on the scene, for troop protection and as a show of force.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition to the infantry battalion from Fort Drum and the AC-130 aircraft, General Montgomery received heavy ground forces to support and protect USFORSO. These included the immediate ready company of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), with a platoon of M1 Abrams tanks attached. That force moved to Mogadishu by strategic airlift (C-5 Galaxy aircraft) from Fort Stewart, Georgia, within days of Clinton’s speech.\textsuperscript{57} The immediate ready company constituted the lead element of a larger organization known as Task Force 1-64 (1st Battalion of the 64th Armor), which arrived in Mogadishu by strategic sealift during mid-November.\textsuperscript{58} Once fully established in Somalia, Task Force 1-64 consisted of five armored and mechanized company teams, a 155 mm self-propelled artillery battery, an engineer battalion, and various support elements, totaling well over a thousand soldiers.\textsuperscript{59} Task Force 1-64 was a very powerful detachment, far stronger than the mechanized and armor forces Montgomery had requested during August and September. Although intended as an instrument of force protection and deterrence, the increased American military power also enhanced the bargaining position of Oakley and other American leaders on various issues of particular interest to the United States, such as the release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant.\textsuperscript{60}

To organize the forces arriving in Somalia and provide a vehicle for command and control of the growing U.S. Army component, Central Command activated on 14 October 1993 a new headquarters, named “Joint Task Force Somalia” (JTF Somalia), under Major General Carl F. Ernst, USA. The new JTF Somalia commander integrated the forces arriving from the United States with the existing units of the 10th Mountain Division constituting the QRF, essentially taking control of U.S. operational units within Somalia.\textsuperscript{61} Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the organizational structure of U.S. forces before and after the arrival of JTF Somalia. The primary mission of JTF Somalia involved “U.S. force protection and
FIGURE 3
UNOSOM II/USFORSOM Command Structure prior to October 1993

U.S. National Command Authority (NCA)

UN Security Council and Secretary-General

UNOSOM II
Admiral Howe

Commander, UN Forces General Bir
Deputy Commander General Montgomery

Coalition Forces
Coalition Forces
Coalition Forces
Etc...

UNOSOM II
Logistics Support

U.S. Forces Somalia General Montgomery

Coordination

Quick- Reaction Force

FIGURE 4
USFORSOM–JTF Somalia Command Structure after October 1993

U.S. National Command General Hoar

UN Security Council and Secretary-General

Commander, UN Forces General Bir
Deputy Commander General Montgomery

Coalition Forces
Coalition Forces
Coalition Forces
Etc...

UNOSOM II
Logistics Support

U.S. Forces Somalia General Montgomery

Coordination

Quick- Reaction Force

FIGURE 3
UNOSOM II/USFORSOM Command Structure prior to October 1993


FIGURE 4
USFORSOM–JTF Somalia Command Structure after October 1993

preparation for redeployment. The chain of command flowed from General Hoar at Central Command through General Montgomery as commander of all U.S. forces in Somalia, and on to General Ernst as commander of JTF Somalia. But Montgomery had only tactical control of JTF Somalia, whereas operational control of Ernst’s force remained with General Hoar at Central Command, causing some confusion about command relations. This basic structure would remain in place until mid-January 1994, at which time General Hoar combined USFORSOM with JTF Somalia under Montgomery’s command. Although Ernst departed Somalia at that point, his staff remained in place to serve Montgomery in his command of U.S. forces.

In building a staff to support the new joint headquarters, General Ernst drew from a variety of sources. About half of its members came from the headquarters of 10th Mountain Division, the remainder consisting of individual augmentees from all services. Among the more prominent officers were Brigadier General Peter Pace, who served as deputy commander for JTF Somalia, and Colonel Emil R. “Buck” Bedard, who became the J-3 (operations) officer. Assigning these key positions to Marine officers underscored the joint nature of the JTF Somalia staff. It also allowed Ernst to draw upon the experience that Pace and Bedard had acquired while serving with UNITAF during RESTORE HOPE. Both officers would remain in Somalia under Montgomery after the departure of Ernst in January 1994. On 17 October, in the midst of all this activity, Task Force RANGER quietly departed Somalia with all its equipment on board U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft.

Regrettably, with the establishment of JTF Somalia a certain amount of tension developed over command relations. Montgomery and Ernst had somewhat different views of the U.S. tasking, and lines of authority were even less clear than they had been. Although both held the rank of major general (Ernst was actually a promotable brigadier general, “frocked” to the two-star level for this assignment), Montgomery remained the senior American commander in Somalia. But both Ernst and JTF Somalia were under the operational command of Central Command. Additionally, Ernst tended to embrace the Oakley and Zinni criticism of UNOSOM II, thereby creating resentment in Montgomery, who believed that the mission and circumstances had changed significantly since the days of RESTORE HOPE. Having been in the middle of a very difficult and bloody situation in Mogadishu for a several months, Montgomery did not appreciate criticism from individuals who had not been there during that time. Ernst felt he received a cold reception from Montgomery, who wanted most of the JTF Somalia forces (especially engineers and infantry) placed under USFORSOM for construction and security duty. Ernst refused to do so and insisted on keeping all his forces integral to JTF Somalia. Since JTF Somalia was under the operational control of Central Command, only General Hoar could order Ernst to reassign his troops.
Another area of contention between the two commanders involved the clearing of the 21 October Road. Named for a significant victory of the Somali civil war, the road had been the site of numerous incidents between the SNA and UN during UNOSOM II, and it held great symbolic value. Montgomery built a bypass road to avoid the strain and conflict associated with that main corridor and to permit movement in support of humanitarian and UNOSOM II operations. But Ernst believed he had direction to open the old road and keep it clear of roadblocks and factional control. Additionally, he considered the bypass road longer and more time consuming for moving supplies or reinforcements into the hinterland or outlying posts. Montgomery viewed the bypass as an appropriate solution to a sticky problem, one that was consistent with his guidance from Central Command. After Oakley and Zinni visited JTF Somalia during their October trip to Mogadishu, Ernst developed a joint and combined plan to retake the 21 October Road using Pakistani forces with an armored overwatch from elements of the 64th Armor. The armor and other U.S. forces would be prepositioned where they could take over the mission if the Pakistani force ran into trouble. Montgomery suspected that Oakley and Zinni’s visit to JTF Somalia reinforced Ernst’s intent to reopen the 21 October Road by force if necessary. The fact that he did not know about the operational plan until Ernst presented it to him did not please the USFORSOM commander.

Ernst and his staff worked diligently to put together a detailed and comprehensive plan for clearing the 21 October Road and then rehearsed it extensively in live-fire and maneuver exercises. But Montgomery did not intend to approve the plan, believing that UNOSOM II no longer needed the 21 October Road and abhorring the idea of sending Pakistani troops back up that road after the casualties they had suffered on 5 June 1993. Additionally, UN opposition from Generals Bir and Montgomery (in his role as deputy UN commander), coupled with verbal direction coming out of the White House to avoid offensive actions and American casualties, eliminated any prospect of this action, or any other risky operation, being carried out except in self-defense.

Montgomery had originally been scheduled for rotation back to the United States during October 1993. Had that occurred, Ernst would have become the senior U.S. commander in Somalia. But when the president decided to withdraw the United States from UNOSOM II, officials in Washington chose to keep Montgomery in place to redeploy American forces. This undoubtedly disappointed Ernst, as did the restrictions placed on use of JTF Somalia. Ernst did conduct several major humanitarian operations during November and December, which also served to exercise his force, along with the MEU(SOC)’s from offshore ARGs, but he undertook no offensive military actions. Additionally, JTF Somalia escorted convoys, conducted some patrols, and secured the U.S. cantonment areas and other fixed sites. Ernst believed he and his staff
had accomplished all the planning necessary for the existing missions, including the amphibious withdrawal scheduled for 31 March 1994. They had created a four-phase campaign plan: phase I (Tactical Offense and Operational Defense), phase II (Tactical Defense and Operational Offense), phase III (Tactical and Operational Defense), and phase IV (Withdrawal). In the event, JTF Somalia went to phase III much earlier than expected due to the risk-adverse policy of the White House. The JTF staff had also developed a complex execution matrix that addressed every contingency the JTF would likely have to deal with while in Somalia. Although Ernst would like to have remained in Somalia as JTF commander, even he agreed that it made sense to keep Montgomery in place, given his experience and relationship with the UN, which would become more important as U.S. forces drew down. On 17 January 1994, General Hoar combined the two commands (USFORSOM and JTF Somalia) under Montgomery, at which time Ernst returned to the United States. Thereafter, Montgomery removed himself from his role as the deputy commander of UNOSOM II under General Bir and focused exclusively on his duties as commander of U.S. forces. During February and March, elements of USFORSOM/JTF Somalia began the redeployment of its units to the United States through strategic airlift in preparation for the tactical amphibious withdrawal of its last remaining units.

As part of the flow of ground troops into Somalia during October and November, powerful naval forces sailed into its coastal waters, arriving only days after the president’s 7 October speech. The USS New Orleans ARG, with Captain Brian F. Boyce as commodore, arrived on 10 October bearing 13th MEU (SOC), commanded by Colonel Larry D. Outlaw. The New Orleans ARG and 13th MEU (SOC) remained in Somalia waters until mid-February conducting a variety of operations ashore under the direction of Ernst and Montgomery. About the same time, Rear Admiral Joseph J. Dantone, Jr., brought major elements of the USS Abraham Lincoln battle group to Somalia from the Arabian Gulf, where they had been supporting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH by enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. The USS Guadalcanal ARG, under Commodore Guy E. Myslivy, with 22nd MEU (SOC), commanded by Colonel Jan C. Huly, arrived on the scene about the same time as Abraham Lincoln and New Orleans. Collectively, these naval forces constituted a formidable presence to support USFORSOM and JTF Somalia ashore. Ernst and Dantone established a tone of cooperation very early in the deployment, developing a gentlemen’s agreement to work as a team and to keep each other well informed of their plans and issues. When the America group relieved Abraham Lincoln, Rear Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski continued the relationship established by his predecessor. Both naval commanders viewed their role in Somalia waters as providing support to Ernst and JTF Somalia.
Having two MEUs in the operational area with a subtle and sensitive mission to perform, Marine Corps leaders decided to assign a senior officer to oversee composite operations, at least during the initial stages of the deployment. Brigadier General Richard F. Vercauteren—who also commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Hawaii—was a logical choice, because of his extensive experience on the African continent and particularly in Somalia. In previous assignments, before the chaos of the 1990s had set in, he had traveled the length and breadth of the country. Vercauteren collected an ad hoc staff from various sources and joined Admiral Dantone on board Abraham Lincoln, from where he helped coordinate Marine activities ashore and afloat. One of Vercauteren's immediate problems involved the organization of the Marine forces then assembling off the coast of Mogadishu. At that time, the Marine Corps had decided to phase out Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) such as General Jenkins had commanded during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. For this reason, and because ARGs and MEUs would rotate in and out of Somalia station at irregular times, Vercauteren decided not to restructure the two Marine expeditionary units into a MEB configuration. They would continue to function as separate organizations; Vercauteren would closely coordinate and integrate their activities under the rubric "Marine Forces Somalia."

Rear Admiral James Perkins—who commanded Amphibious Group 3 in San Diego—returned to Somalia in mid-October to coordinate the naval elements of the amphibious force, in a role similar to that Vercauteren played for the Marines. Perkins, of course, had provided critical service during RESTORE HOPE, and he would contribute in an equally important, if different, role during this phase of the incursion. Despite the fact that the two ARG/MEUs—New Orleans with 13th MEU (SOC) and Guadalcanal—with 22nd MEU (SOC)—remained separate entities, Perkins performed the function of commander, amphibious task force, while Vercauteren served as commander, landing force, although these roles were somewhat ad hoc in nature. Captain John Peterson—who had been commodore of the Tripoli ARG during the initial insertion of Colonel Newbold’s special-purpose Marine air-ground task force in December 1992—accompanied Perkins as his chief of staff. Vercauteren would depart after about six weeks, returning in March to assist during the final evacuation of U.S. forces from Somalia. Perkins and Peterson remained on station and facilitated the final evacuation of American forces during March 1994. During the closing months of American involvement in Somalia, a close personal and professional relationship developed between Montgomery and Perkins, contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations.

An interesting aspect of the naval expeditionary forces deployed off Somalia during this period was the integration of the carrier battle group with the amphibious ready
groups. This resulted from the exploration of new concepts characteristic of America’s sea services of the 1990s. Admiral Dantone and his *Abraham Lincoln* battle group had teamed with the *New Orleans* ARG and 13th MEU (SOC) during pre-deployment training off the California coast prior to departing for the Indian Ocean. Their innovative approach had combined a carrier battle group with an amphibious ready group as a means to enhance combat power and power projection. For example, at San Clemente Island, off the California coast, *Abraham Lincoln* and the *New Orleans* ARG conducted a series of complex exercises. Use of this concept of naval power in the Somalia situation clearly constituted an application of ... *From the Sea*, in that it focused naval expeditionary forces, coupled with naval aviation assets, toward the littorals while they acted in concert with joint forces (Army and Air Force) ashore. It also anticipated the publication one year later of *Forward ... From the Sea*, which emphasized tailoring naval expeditionary forces around fleet operational forces, using a building-block approach.

The USS *America* battle group under Rear Admiral Cebrowski had undertaken a similar integration effort with the USS *Guadalcanal* ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) prior to their deployment into the Mediterranean. Essentially a form of adaptive force packaging, this approach proposed to do more with smaller naval forces in the resource-scarce aftermath of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. But once the *Guadalcanal* ARG reported into the Sixth Fleet, the amphibious element tended to revert to a traditional ARG/MEU configuration. *America* would participate in Somalia operations as a replacement for *Abraham Lincoln*, conducting a direct handoff later in the deployment. Its earlier training with the *Guadalcanal* ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) proved a valuable asset during subsequent operations on the littoral of Somalia, because its officers had gained a keen understanding of the ARG/MEU capability.

During their time on station, Colonel Huly and 22nd MEU (SOC) assumed the QRF mission for a period, sent security forces ashore, and flew helicopter missions over Mogadishu as part of the show of force then under way. After two weeks on station, the *Guadalcanal* ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) departed Somalia waters to participate in
Operation BRIGHT STAR in Egypt. Despite the intense focus on Somalia, General Hoar and other American leaders believed that BRIGHT STAR played an important role in maintaining American influence and cooperation in that part of the world. Egypt had supported the United States during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and American leaders believed that participation in BRIGHT STAR would help bond that relationship and serve as an indicator of America’s good relations with Arab countries. Additionally, events had calmed down in Somalia to a point that one ARG/MEU off the coast of Mogadishu, coupled with the other ground and naval forces arriving in Somalia, could provide adequate security for American and UN personnel.

Several weeks after the departure of the Guadalcanal ARG/MEU, Cebrowski brought the America battle group into Somalia waters to replace Abraham Lincoln. The two battle group commanders and their staffs conducted a face-to-face turnover, in the interest of maintaining close and continuous support of JTF Somalia during this critical time. Having worked with 22nd MEU (SOC) and conducted its own workups similar to those of Abraham Lincoln and 13th MEU (SOC), the America group’s assumption of responsibility proved seamless with respect to naval operations off the shore of Somalia. The America battle group and New Orleans ARG with 13th MEU (SOC) could function together very effectively in subsequent operations because all elements had trained to perform that mission. In other words, Cebrowski and the America battle group understood MEU operations and could work well with amphibious forces. Additionally, the two carrier battle groups represented a strong show of force, using both their ships and aircraft. The ships could get very near to the shoreline, due to the steepness of the coast and the deep water close in, making them highly visible ashore. Also, of course, they put numerous high-performance jets overhead at fairly low altitudes, reminding all parties of the power available to support U.S. forces and interests.
From the end of October until mid-February 1994, the New Orleans ARG and 13th MEU (SOC) provided the only amphibious force in the Somalia area of operations. During that period, elements of 13th MEU (SOC) conducted various actions in support of JTF Somalia, as a quick-reaction force and as a reinforcing element for operations ashore. Additionally, 13th MEU (SOC) augmented the intelligence and surveillance capability of Ernst, using its sophisticated collection equipment. Outlaw also placed the aviation assets of the Marine expeditionary unit, primarily a variety of helicopters, in the service of the forces ashore. Snipers from both the MEU and SEAL units assisted in the protection of facilities and individuals ashore, keeping hostile elements at a proper distance, while operating within the rules of engagement.

Like the previous ARG/MEU's that had visited Somalia littorals since American involvement, 13th MEU (SOC) conducted frequent humanitarian assistance missions and frequently operated medical and dental clinics for needy Somalis ashore. Like Colonel Newbold's SPMAGTF and Broderick's 24th MEU (SOC), Marines and Navy medical personnel of 13th MEU (SOC) provided extensive, desperately needed health care services during excursions ashore, often for several days at a time. In some cases, such as Operation SHOW CARE and Operation MORE CARE, they operated in conjunction with Army and coalition elements. In other cases, they operated more independently, although always under JTF Somalia command when ashore.

On 2 February 1994, 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somalia waters to relieve 13th MEU (SOC). Colonel Broderick still commanded 24th MEU (SOC), which had now deployed on board the USS Inchon amphibious ready group, with Captain Steven Reis serving as commodore. When relieved by the Inchon ARG, the New Orleans group proceeded to Singapore, where it conducted a face-to-face turnover with the Peleliu ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) and cross-decked some special equipment for use in Somalia by 11th MEU (SOC). Captain Warren Ide, Jr., was the commodore of the Peleliu ARG, and Colonel William C. McMullen III commanded 11th MEU (SOC). The Peleliu ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) proceeded to Somalia, where they joined the Inchon ARG and 24th MEU (SOC) for duty in the last critical weeks of Operation CONTINUE HOPE.

Ide and McMullen had known they would deploy to Somalia as they conducted their MEU (SOC) workup training in California during the latter half of 1993. In addition to the standard and special training objectives required for the deployment of a MEU (SOC), the two commanders concentrated much of their training on raids and long-range noncombatant evacuation operations. Many American leaders feared that the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia would precipitate another social and political collapse. Should that occur, large numbers of American and third-nation citizens would be at
risk and require evacuation. By focusing on raids and long-range evacuation training—similar to what Moser and Doyle executed during EASTERN EXIT—the Peleliu ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) could save many lives if Somalia fell back into chaos. Upon arriving in Somalia waters, 11th MEU (SOC) assumed primary responsibility as an evacuation force in readiness, as well as a reserve force to support Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC) ashore. Broderick’s troops would provide security during the withdrawal of USFORSOM/JTF Somalia units, while McMullen, primarily at sea, would support those operations and maintain a ready-response capability for any emergencies ashore during or after the withdrawal.

Once 11th MEU (SOC) arrived on the scene in Somalia, McMullen and his staff needed to develop a set of plans appropriate for the local circumstances. During this planning process they identified some 2,300–2,600 people, primarily in central and southern Somalia, who would require evacuation. They established four collection sites (Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Bardera), where the evacuees would assemble. In addition to his organic assets, the Marine Corps provided McMullen with a detachment of four C-130 Hercules airplanes based in Mombasa to assist in evacuation operations. After developing operational plans, 11th MEU (SOC) conducted a series of rehearsals that included flights to the assembly areas and reviews of extraction sites and routes.

On 14 March, Peleliu received orders to steam south and conduct search and rescue operations in response to the loss of an AC-130 Spectre aircraft off the coast of Malindi, Kenya, killing over half of the fourteen-man crew. McMullen sent a CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter ahead with key personnel and equipment; it arrived shortly after the crash. The aircraft had gone down in about fifteen feet of water in Malindi Lagoon. McMullen’s divers removed all the ordnance and critical equipment prior to the arrival of the Air Force recovery team. They also recovered all the bodies except one, who had been last seen by his fellow crew members in a parachute over water. Search and rescue efforts by a variety of organizations over a two-week period could not find that missing airman.

As things turned out in Somalia, McMullen did not need to conduct an emergency evacuation in Somalia after the U.S. pullout. Although some firefights occurred among the various factions, the situation in Somalia did not unravel as many expected it to. But 11th MEU (SOC) remained a ready force offshore, “spring-loaded” and ready for immediate launching. Moreover, the training and skills obtained in preparing for these Somalia evacuations did not go to waste. They proved of great service to the United States a few weeks later, when it became necessary to evacuate American citizens from another chaotic situation, in Rwanda.
The actual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia occurred over more than two months.\footnote{144} The buildup of JTF Somalia occurred primarily in October and November, and by January 1994 Central Command had consolidated the force under Montgomery’s command. One of the major milestones of the withdrawal occurred in January, when logistical support to UNOSOM II was farmed out to a contractor (Brown & Root), after having been under U.S. Army cognizance throughout the Somalia incursions.\footnote{142} In February, the gradual redeployment of units back to the United States had begun.\footnote{143} Most of Montgomery’s soldiers and much of their equipment actually flew out of Mogadishu airport on U.S. Air Force C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy aircraft or on contracted 747s and DC-10 planes prior to the amphibious withdrawal that occurred in late March 1994.\footnote{144} But flying large airplanes out of Mogadishu airport loaded with American troops and equipment created considerable risks; for one to be shot down would have been a disaster.\footnote{145}

It is unlikely that SNA fighters using RPGs would have attacked American aircraft in flight; that weapon is inadequate for such a task beyond about eight hundred yards, and the security zone around the runways exceeded that distance. Besides, Aideed wanted foreign forces out of his country and would certainly avoid interference with their departure.\footnote{146} But in Somalia it was always possible that some rogue element would acquire shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles capable of bringing down a slow-flying American plane at low altitude. To avoid this nightmare scenario, Montgomery assigned helicopter gunships and observers to control the areas around the airfield and to escort the U.S. aircraft as they made their approaches and departures from Mogadishu.\footnote{147} Montgomery’s efforts proved adequate since no real threat to flight operations developed during the redeployment period.

The final step in the U.S. withdrawal, including removal of most heavy combat power, occurred by means of a classical amphibious withdrawal named Operation QUICK DRAW.\footnote{148} Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC) served as the primary instrument to accomplish that mission, with substantial support from all amphibious forces afloat. The *Inchon* ARG with 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somalia on 2 February 1994. Broderick’s force immediately went ashore and came under control of General Montgomery.\footnote{149} On 4 March, 24th MEU (SOC) conducted a relief in place with Montgomery’s Army security forces, thereby permitting the subsequent redeployment of all U.S. Army forces. Broderick’s force provided a secure perimeter for the loading of Army forces on two contract ships for transportation to Mombasa, from where they would return to the United States. The ships, provided by Military Sealift Command, included the Greek motor vessel *Mediterranean Sky* and the SS *Empire State*, of U.S. registry.\footnote{150} (Empire State is the school training ship for the State University of New York Maritime College,
at Fort Schuyler, New York, and is part of the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force.)

Essentially, 24th MEU (SOC) established a perimeter ashore that encompassed the port area, the airfield, and other contiguous areas necessary to protect American and coalition forces. Montgomery placed his Army units (ground, air, armor, and logistical) under Broderick’s command, so that he could use them as assets for defense, if necessary, and control their egress from land onto their ships. This also permitted Montgomery to relieve his brigade headquarters earlier so it could fly to its home station and oversee the transition of their forces back into the United States. The 24th MEU (SOC), supported by 11th MEU (SOC) and other naval forces afloat, maintained control over the secured areas while the U.S. forces loaded on ships and departed Somalia. Despite the presence of Admiral Perkins and General Vercauteren in the operational area, amphibious forces off Somalia served under General Montgomery’s command once ashore. The process of relieving Army units of their security responsibilities and preparing for their withdrawal occurred over several weeks, but the actual amphibious withdrawal took only one day—25 March 1994.

During the loading of Army units and equipment, Montgomery and Broderick loaded their tanks and heavy weapons last, so they would remain available for use should the need arise. Once the Army units were loaded on their ships and Montgomery had departed for Peleliu, Broderick’s Marines boarded their amphibious assault vehicles and returned to their ships. During the withdrawal of the Marines, a picket line of AH-1 Cobra gunships from 11th and 24th MEU(SOC)s hovered at the perimeter, facing outboard and ready to engage any element attempting to interfere. Once the last amphibious vehicle splashed into the water, Broderick got aboard Vercauteren’s UH-1 Huey helicopter and the two men returned to their ships. The United States was once again free from foreign entanglements. It had been a clean, smooth, and textbook-quality amphibious withdrawal, but it would not be the last one the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps would undertake from the shores of Somalia.

Notes


6. Montgomery interview.

7. Ibid.

8. Hoar interview.

9. Oakley interview.

10. UNSC Resolution 794, under which UNITAF operated, did not actually call for disarmament of the warring factions, but many leaders in the UN and United States interpreted its reference to using “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment as requiring such action. Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II, did specifically call for disarming the warring parties. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 32, 43; Security Council Resolution 794; Security Council Resolution 814; Sommer, Hope Restored?, pp. 34–35; Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 143.


14. The U.S. representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright, and the national security adviser, Anthony Lake, provided the impetus that moved the United States to support UN nation building during the early days of the Clinton administration. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.


16. Montgomery interview; Howe PBS Frontline interview; Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 142–46.

17. Zinni PBS Frontline interview.

18. Montgomery interview; Oakley interview.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.; Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

22. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Somalia.”


24. Hoar interview.

25. Zinni had been a brigadier general at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope but received promotion to major general prior to returning to Somalia in October 1993. He would, of course, eventually obtain the rank of full (four-star) general. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, p. 270.

26. Montgomery interview.

27. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, p. 128.

28. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

29. Albright, with Woodward, Madam Secretary, pp. 142–43; Oakley interview.

30. Hoar interview.

31. Oakley interview.


35. Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 327.

36. Generals Bir and Montgomery, along with a number of top military leaders in Somalia, also believed that the 3 October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu created an unparalleled opportunity to defeat Aideed. Not only had he suffered grievous losses, but the outcome had weakened his position within the Habr Gidr subclan and its SNA political faction. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” pp. 168–69.

37. Howe interview.


39. Howe interview.
40. Oakley interview; Howe interview; Katz interview.
42. Oakley interview.
43. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, p. 130; Montgomery interview.
46. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.
47. Hoar interview.
48. Oakley interview.
50. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Somalia.”
53. For the entire text of the investigation complete with annexes, see *United Nations and Somalia*, document 88, pp. 368–416.
57. The companies of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) are equipped with M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles, which are a substantially improved and more capable version of the M113 armored personnel carrier. Casper, *Falcon Brigade*, p. 93; U.S. Army Dept., *Somalia After Action Report*, p. 142.
61. Ernst interviews; Montgomery interview.
65. Ernst interviews.
68. Ernst interviews.
71. Ernst interviews.
72. Montgomery interview.
74. Ernst interviews.
75. The 21 October Road was not actually closed to all traffic, not even all military traffic, all the time. But when UNOSOM II convoys, some humanitarian convoys, and some traffic by factions opposed to the SNA attempted to transit, they were often denied passage. The idea that all factions and all UNOSOM II traffic should have unimpeded use of this and other major corridors was behind the persistent concern of many U.S. and UN leaders. Ibid.
77. Montgomery interview.
78. Ernst interviews.
79. Montgomery interview.
80. Ernst interviews; Montgomery interview.
81. Ernst interviews; Montgomery interview.
82. Montgomery interview.
83. Ernst interviews; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 191.
84. Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 191; Oakley interview.
85. Hoar interview; Montgomery interview.


89. Ernst interviews; Oakley interview.

90. Ernst interviews.


92. Montgomery interview.


95. The ships that made up the New Orleans ARG were USS New Orleans (LPH 11), flagship; USS Denver (LPH 9); USS Comstock (LSD 45); and USS Cayuga (LST 1186). Col. Larry D. Outlaw, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 27 August 2008.

96. The Lincoln battle group consisted of USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), USS Princeton (CG 59), USS Ingraham (FFG 61), USS Fox (CG 33), USS Willamette (AO 180), USS Mount Hood (AE 29), USS White Plains (APS 4), and USS Pasadena (SSN 752). Commanding Officer, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), Command History for Calendar Year 1993 [hereafter Lincoln Command History, 1993], Naval Warfare Division, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives Branch, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. [hereafter Naval Warfare Division, NHC].

97. The Guadalcanal ARG included USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7), USS Ashland (LSD 48), and USS Shreveport (LPD 12). Commanding Officer, USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7), 1993 Command History Submission [hereafter Guadalcanal Command History], Naval Warfare Division, NHC; Lt. Gen. Jan C. Huly, USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 4 September 2008; Outlaw interview.

98. Katz interview.

99. Ernst interviews.

100. Dantone interview; Ernst interviews.


102. Dantone interview; Vercauteren interview.

103. Vercauteren interview.

104. Perkins first interview.

105. Outlaw interview.

106. Peterson interview.

107. Vercauteren to Ohls.

108. Peterson interview; Vercauteren interview.

109. Montgomery interview; Perkins first interview.

110. Outlaw interview.

111. Dantone interview.

112. Lincoln Command History, 1993; Outlaw interview.

113. . . . From the Sea, pp. 87–99.


115. Guadalcanal Command History.

116. Huly interview.

117. Dantone interview.

118. Huly interview.


120. Huly interview.

121. Outlaw interview.

122. Capt. Leroy T. Bortmes, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 19 September 2008; Dantone interview.

123. Guadalcanal Command History; Huly interview.

124. Outlaw interview.

125. Dantone interview.

126. Outlaw interview.
When the United States announced its intention to withdraw from Somalia in October 1993, a number of other nations also decided to pull out their forces as well. As a result, UNOSOM II lost some of its most capable and best-equipped contingents. The UN could not replace all the units lost and had to consider how to function under substantially altered circumstances. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali continued to believe that the strategy laid out for UNOSOM II under Resolution 814 and its supporting documents was the correct approach to the problems of Somalia. This strategy embraced the options of coercive disarmament and military reprisals for attacks on UN forces by clan-based factions. But he also realized that the approach was no longer possible, because it had become “evident that Member States were not prepared to commit the troops needed to replace those being withdrawn by the United States and several European and other countries.”

Boutros-Ghali reluctantly proposed a more limited mission for UNOSOM II, which the Security Council passed as Resolution 897 on 4 February 1994. This resolution reduced the size of the UN contingent and curtailed its powers of enforcement, returning UNOSOM II to a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI authority, as had been the case during UNOSOM (I). In short, soldiers could now use their weapons only in self-defense, when directly threatened. There would be no more attacks against Somali factions for preemption or reprisal purposes, and no more discussion of forcible disarmament. Additionally, all UN measures to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their country and achieving reconciliation would depend strictly on cooperation.

Numerous changes in UN leadership accompanied this transition. On 12 January 1994, Lieutenant General Aboo Samah Aboo Bakar of Malaysia succeeded Lieutenant General Cevik Bir of Turkey as the UNOSOM II force commander. By all accounts, General Bir had served the UN very well; he had been a highly competent and effective general officer, respected by his peers and associates. The U.S. commander, General Thomas Montgomery, had developed a close relationship with Bir, for whom he had been—
along with other American officers serving on Bir’s staff—a rock of support during the UN mission. Yet the Turkish contingent to UNOSOM II was only a company-sized unit, and this somewhat undercut Bir’s effectiveness. When he wanted to carry out serious combat operations, he often had trouble convincing coalition members to support them, since many believed the small force from his own nation could not carry its fair share of the burden. This factor, coupled with the independent-mindedness of the various international partners, had made Bir’s job very challenging, despite strong support and cooperation from the U.S. contingent.

On 8 March 1994, Admiral Jonathan Howe stepped down as the Secretary-General’s special representative in Somalia. His deputy, Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, became the acting special representative until 1 July, when James Victor Gbeh of Ghana assumed the post. Howe’s service to UNOSOM II received high praise from Boutros-Ghali and formal recognition in Security Council Resolution 897. Yet Howe had been subjected to considerable criticism within the United States for the UN decision to pursue Aideed after the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers. In fact, Howe had become the person most directly identified with the “get Aideed” strategy and the decision to go to war against the SNA. These critics had conveniently forgotten the role that key members of the Clinton administration played in creating and sustaining that strategy. In seeking to find fault, it is always easier to focus on one individual than a complex process or a group of people with varying degrees of culpability. In any case, Admiral Howe—who had had a highly successful career in the U.S. Navy, and as deputy national security adviser—said of his year in Somalia, “I’ve never had a harder job.”

No immediate descent into chaos occurred in Somalia after the U.S. withdrawal, but as many feared, violence increased. There was fighting between clan-based factions (those of Aideed and Ali Mahdi), and there were renewed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel. From May through July 1994, five Nepalese, two Malaysian, and ten Indian soldiers died in attacks and ambushes from various Somali groups. This deterioration in the security situation had a negative impact on humanitarian activity. Once again convoys came under attack, food started stacking up in the port of Mogadishu, and relief organizations began closing down operations. Nonetheless, Somali factions continued to hold peace conferences and sign reconciliation agreements; there were meetings at Addis Ababa, Cairo, Nairobi, Bardera, and even Dhoobley. Peace conferences between Somali leaders were very common but unproductive in the 1990s, before, during, and after the American incursions.

Even Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suspected, referring to the participation of faction leaders in these reconciliation conferences, that “there remained grave misgivings about the seriousness of their commitment.” Yet the Secretary-General found positive
elements within the Somalia situation and remained hopeful about a peaceful accom-
modation. Boutros-Ghali and Howe always tended to emphasize the political and eco-
nomic stability achieved outside Mogadishu when evaluating progress in Somalia. They
believed that improved agricultural productivity, rebounding markets, and the reopen-
ing of numerous schools indicated what dedicated efforts could achieve.\(^7\) This is a
point often overlooked by analysts, pundits, and historians, and it is absolutely correct.
The international commitment and the efforts of local Somalis had accomplished
much. Only in areas where Aideed had control or exercised strong influence did orga-
nized violence and strife consistently prevail.\(^14\)

One development that Boutros-Ghali and others viewed as hopeful was an effort of the
imam of Hirab to bring about reconciliation within the important Hawiye clan. Since
Aideed’s Habr Gidr element and Ali Mahdi’s Abgal group were subclans within it, this
effort promised to go a long way toward restoring stability to Somalia.\(^19\) But the imam’s
initiative ultimately proved ineffective, and its failure exposed the illusoriness of the
conviction—held by many American and UN officials—that religious and clan elders
possessed great authority within Somali society. That may have been true in certain
parts of Somalia, where traditional forms of leadership remained strong, but not in
areas controlled by the major warlords.\(^20\) The faction leaders and their armed militias
wielded the real power in those zones during the period of American involvement. In
fact, this seemingly positive move by the imam of Hirab had an effect opposite to what
UN leaders expected: some clans and subclans feared that any agreement resulting
from it would lead to a new UN-supported coalition, which would operate to their
detriment.\(^21\)

Still believing that hope existed for peace in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali recommended in an
August report to the Security Council that the UN continue its efforts there a little lon-
ger.\(^22\) But when by October there had been no progress and the political stalemate
showed no signs of abating, even Boutros-Ghali began to question the efficacy of the
UNOSOM II mission, recognizing that “a viable and acceptable peace could only come
from the Somalis themselves.”\(^23\) Beginning to perceive the UN mission as futile, the
Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council a final extension of the
UNOSOM II mandate, to expire no later than 31 March 1995. In the interim he pro-
posed a gradual and sequential reduction of UN presence, culminating in a final tacti-
cal withdrawal, supported by member states capable of ensuring security and success.\(^24\)
On 4 November 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 954, which embodied
Boutros-Ghali’s recommendation and extended the UNOSOM II mandate for a final
time. It also requested member states to provide military assistance in conducting the evacuation.\(^25\)
The withdrawal of UN personnel and materiel occurred incrementally, starting in early February 1995. Most troops departed on contract flights, typically on 747 and L1011 jumbo jets. In some ways, the evacuation process mirrored the American departure of a year earlier. The important difference, of course, was that it involved the tactical extraction of the final UN forces; this time there would be no friendly UN troops remaining behind. Since Somali leaders could not control all factions and gangs, the final phase of the evolution posed a much higher risk than the Americans had faced. By the end of February only a rear guard of about 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers, with their weapons and equipment (much of it on loan from the United States), remained of the UNOSOM II force. On 28 February a combined task force—named CTF UNITED SHIELD, and under U.S. leadership—conducted an amphibious landing at Mogadishu and established a protected enclave for the removal of remaining UN forces. Once CTF UNITED SHIELD had established its secure perimeter, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi troops passed through its lines, entered the protected area, and loaded on ships for departure. By 3 March, Operation UNITED SHIELD had completed all its objectives and the last American Marines had returned to their ships. The evacuation force consisted of elements from seven nations, but like much of the UN involvement in Somalia, it had been primarily an American show. The operation proved efficient, effective, and professional, but it nonetheless represented a failure by the UN to create peace and stability within Somalia.

Yet despite shortcomings and failures, the various incursions of the 1990s were not the abject disasters that many have portrayed—in fact, quite the contrary. The famine had been broken, and many thousands of people (hundreds of thousands, by some estimates) survived who would otherwise have perished. Additionally, the ineffectiveness of military action (particularly during CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II) resulted more from confusion about the mission and tenuous commitments by political leaders than from military incompetence. It did not help, of course, that CONTINUE HOPE occurred during the transition between the Bush and Clinton administrations.

As top leaders within the UN and United States began considering the withdrawal of UN personnel from Somalia during the summer of 1994, several points became obvious. First, a military force could not accomplish this evacuation operation exclusively with aviation or a combination of air and commercial shipping. There would be no way to protect the last departing echelons from surface-to-air missiles, in the case of aircraft, or from RPGs, mortars, artillery, or even small-arms fire, in the case of commercial ships. Even if the major warlords agreed not to interfere, there remained numerous, well-armed elements outside their control willing (even pleased) to strike a
parting blow against UN forces. The only way to accomplish this evacuation was from the sea, using a classical amphibious withdrawal. Any other option left open the possibility of disaster during the final extraction.

Another point of concern involved the ambivalent attitude of many American leaders. There existed no enthusiasm for returning to Somalia, particularly since the mission might involve a withdrawal under fire. More American casualties were the last thing political and military leaders wanted, especially in a failed state having no strategic value to the United States. Yet in the final analysis, the Clinton administration felt responsible for the safety of the international forces remaining in Somalia and recognized that only the United States could ensure a successful extraction. In the opinion of Rear Admiral Lee F. Gunn, who attended a number of meetings with key advisers of the Clinton administration, pressure from General Zinni helped sway opinion in favor of the operation.

The I Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF), headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California, was a logical choice to conduct the evacuation of Somalia. In addition to the reasons that had made 1 MEF the appropriate force to lead Operation RESTORE HOPE back in 1992–93, several other factors now contributed to that decision. For one thing, persistent reports of surface-to-air missiles within Somalia virtually dictated an amphibious withdrawal. An amphibious power-projection capability makes it possible to establish a secure area to protect all extractions (air and sea). After all elements have departed, the landing force systematically collapses its defenses and, if necessary, fights its way off the beach in amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), with the support of tactical airpower and naval gunfire. AAVs can even continue fighting after entering the water. Another advantage in using 1 MEF to lead Operation UNITED SHIELD was that many of its officers and Marines had served in Somalia and understood the situation on the ground. Not the least of these individuals was the newly assigned 1 MEF commander, Anthony C. Zinni, now wearing the three stars of a lieutenant general. Not only was 1 MEF the correct organization to execute Operation UNITED SHIELD, but Zinni was the ideal general officer to command it.

This study has already addressed Zinni’s experience in humanitarian operations—particularly in Somalia and Kurdistan. But Zinni also had broad experience beyond operations other than war, including two combat tours in Vietnam. An additional area of Zinni’s interest and expertise (and more directly relevant to the mission at hand) involved the Marine Corps stock in trade, amphibious operations. Throughout his career Zinni had served in numerous deployments at sea with Fleet Marine Force units. In the process he had become fascinated with the complexity and challenge of amphibious warfare. Additionally, he had taught amphibious warfare at the Command
and Staff College, further building his knowledge and understanding of amphibious operations." For UNITED SHIELD, the alignment of commander, organization, and mission could not have been better.

As Zinni and his staff began to analyze the UNITED SHIELD mission and the forces available for its execution, one thing became immediately apparent—that this operation fit Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine exactly. Zinni had always been the antithesis of a doctrine-driven officer. Yet he was willing to use any appropriate means to get the job done, and he believed that I MEF should “run this [operation] right by the book.” The circumstances not only fit the time-tested amphibious doctrine developed over several hundred years but lent themselves to the new operational and strategic concepts expressed in . . . From the Sea and other papers and studies of the 1990s. Zinni also leveraged the strong relationship that existed between the Navy and Marine Corps organizations within U.S. Pacific Command (which provided the forces used in Central Command operations), by making the commander of Amphibious Group 3, Rear Admiral Gunn, his deputy task force commander as well as the naval component commander. By so combining their staffs Zinni and Gunn gained synergism while solving the problem of finding adequate working space for command and control of the operation. Under the leadership of Zinni and Gunn, the focus of sea-based naval expeditionary forces on littoral power projection was as complete as it could have been.

Another positive aspect of Operation UNITED SHIELD involved that rarest of luxuries in expeditionary warfare and amphibious operations—adequate time for planning. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued the UNITED SHIELD warning order in August 1994, for execution prior to the end of March 1995. This provided roughly six months to plan, rehearse, critique, and execute. Yet having so much preparation time did not keep the operation from being difficult, especially since it involved coalition forces and an uncertain situation ashore. UNITED SHIELD would be the largest amphibious withdrawal under hostile conditions since the 1st Marine Division and several ancillary U.S. and coalition forces withdrew from North Korea at Hungnam in December 1950. During August and September the Joint Staff and Central Command considered various high-level options for the Somalia evacuation; on 25 September 1994 the secretary of defense approved a general course of action. Central Command eventually assigned UNITED SHIELD, in a preliminary planning order, a basic mission “to deploy to the area of operation, provide planning support and conduct military operation in support of the UNOSOM II withdrawal and retrograde of U.S. Government equipment.” Finally, CJCS issued an alert order directing execution planning. The I MEF staff’s work intensified.
The plan that resulted involved a five-phase operation: Phase I (Pre-Deployment), Phase II (Deployment), Phase III (Support to UNOSOM), Phase IV (Execution), and Phase V (Redeployment). The key officers associated with the UNITED SHIELD planning process were Army colonel John C. Latimer of Central Command and the I MEF/CTF Marine staff officers Colonel John W. Moffett (chief of staff), Colonel Harry W. “Bucky” Peterson III (director of operations), and Lieutenant Colonel William R. Norton III (director of plans). Admiral Gunn also played an important role in the preparation for UNITED SHIELD, but he and other key leaders experienced a significant distraction shortly after they began planning.

During early October 1994, Saddam Hussein again moved Iraqi forces toward Kuwait, with the lead elements reaching to within fifteen miles from the border. This mobilization and deployment, coupled with other defense preparations and bellicose rhetoric, captured the attention of commanders and planners at Central Command and I MEF. Under the name of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, Central Command dispatched numerous forces of all services, including the forward-deployed Tripoli ARG and elements of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) from Diego Garcia to Saudi Arabia. Gunn and other naval and Marine officers flew to Oman, where they joined the MPF squadron and then moved on to Saudi Arabia to begin an off-load in preparation for the fly-in combat elements. In many ways, VIGILANT WARRIOR constituted a quicker and more efficient replay of the DESERT SHIELD deployment of 1990. The impressive American response caused the Iraqis to back off, allowing the focus to return to UNITED SHIELD.

As planning intensified at I MEF, Zinni feared that his staff could become excessively attached to its plan, after the hard work and creativity put into it. He therefore requested that a team from Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, review the detailed plan, including its “branches and sequels.” Among other things, the team conducted war games on the plan to ensure its efficacy and offered recommendations that contributed to the success of the operation. From the final detailed plan, the I MEF/CTF staff created a “playbook,” a simplified version of all the contingencies. Copies of this playbook remained with key staff officers as a quick source of information and insight as the operation played out. The UN also created a military planning cell—which included officers from both Central Command and I MEF—to conduct parallel planning during the months leading up to the operation. This cell provided a critical function—to “translate the UN political and diplomatic goals into language understandable by military forces.”

One of the key decisions made by General James Henry Binford Peay III—who replaced General Hoar as commander in chief of Central Command in August 1994—
involved the high-level command relations for **UNITED SHIELD**. Normally, a JTF or CTF commander would report directly to the commander in chief of Central Command. But Peay believed he could provide better support if the CTF commander reported to the Central Command naval component (NAVCENT) commander, Vice Admiral John Scott Redd.\(^64\) Peay’s rationale was that his headquarters in Tampa would be five thousand miles from the scene of action; NAVCENT headquarters, located in Bahrain, would be much closer and more responsive.\(^65\) Additionally, **UNITED SHIELD** had a distinctly maritime flavor, utilizing as it did a preponderance of naval expeditionary forces. Placing it under naval oversight was a logical decision, one that tailored the command structure to fit the mission.\(^66\) This decision caused some controversy because of its unusual nature and because both Redd and Zinni held three-star rank, leading some to wonder who would actually run the combined task force, Redd or Zinni.\(^67\) Nevertheless, Zinni considered it a good idea and had no objections to operating under Redd and NAVCENT headquarters. In fact, he considered it an advantage to have both Redd and Lee Gunn, his deputy CTF commander, available to look after Navy and sea-oriented issues, allowing him to focus more on actions ashore. In the final analysis, the arrangement worked effectively, because both commanders understood their roles and focused on accomplishing the mission.\(^68\)

Another unique element of the **UNITED SHIELD** operation was the use of nonlethal weapons.\(^69\) American leaders were keenly aware that Somali fighters often mingled with unarmed women and children. The SNA had frequently used this technique during **CONTINUE HOPE**. In the 5 June 1993 attack on UN troops it had led to the brutal deaths of several Pakistani soldiers; reluctant to shoot into the mixed mob at a Mogadishu feeding center, the Pakistanis allowed hostile individuals to get close enough to assail them. American troops going ashore during **UNITED SHIELD** had no desire to use deadly force against unarmed civilians if avoidable. A nonlethal option—in addition to conventional combat capability—offered flexibility. The ability to handle mobs without immediately crossing the threshold to deadly force was not only more humane but also broadened the range of tactical situations in which the Marines could engage. This clearly enhanced the ability of the landing force to maintain the initiative and control events on the ground.\(^70\)

The program to arm an element of the Marine landing force with nonlethal weapons came into focus during December 1994, when General Zinni requested the assistance of Colonel Gary W. Anderson of the Marine Corps Combat Development Center in developing such a capability for **UNITED SHIELD**. Anderson and a team from the I MEF staff undertook an intensive effort to identify appropriate weapons, equipment, and training options. Anderson also led the effort to get fast-track approval from the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department for use of these new and exotic systems.
The I MEF team also met with officials of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, authorities at key national laboratories, and representatives of several commercial vendors of nonlethal systems.  

Law enforcement departments and prison guards throughout the United States had been developing and using nonlethal weapons for many years, but the U.S. military had never before used them in foreign lands. Yet within a matter of weeks, the I MEF staff built such a capability, procured the necessary weapons and equipment, and deployed a mobile training team to the Indian Ocean to work with components of 13th MEU (SOC), which would use this technology in the upcoming operation. The MEU commander designated one infantry company to serve as the operation’s primary nonlethal-reaction force. This special unit proved effective while ashore, primarily as a deterrent against mob action by clans, factions, and freelancing thugs. The Marines did not actually fire any of the nonlethal weapons during operations ashore, but they did use a substance known as “sticky foam,” along with four-pronged caltrops for purposes of area denial.

Once the press learned of it, I MEF’s intent to take nonlethal weapons into Somalia became a media event of the first order. It also became somewhat controversial, some observers supporting the concept and others expressing alarm. The primary objection seemed to be that the United States would be placing Marines in harm’s way while at the same time disarming them. The idea that nonlethal weapons simply provided an additional capability on the force continuum did not register with many analysts. But the Marines involved in the operation had no problem understanding the concept and its value. Beyond the controversy, media coverage had the effect of informing hostile elements within Somalia of the new weapons and tactics they might confront. Yet this proved more of an advantage than disadvantage, since it demonstrated to Somali warlords that some of their favorite tactics—unleashing mobs and mixing armed fighters with unarmed women and children—might no longer be available to them. Additionally, media images of Marines in black bullet-resistant vests, plastic face masks, riot shields, and riot batons, carrying exotic weapons and conducting precision maneuvers, made them appear like some latter-day Spartan phalanx, ready and eager to meet any threat.
The fact that there were no mob incidents during the UNITED SHIELD incursion demonstrates the deterrent value of this concept, and the publicity actually helped achieve that goal.\textsuperscript{79} The psychological operations team that supported UNITED SHIELD specifically exploited the publicity about nonlethal weapons, in an attempt to influence the actions of Somalis.\textsuperscript{79} Of course, assessments of the success of nonlethal weapons in UNITED SHIELD should take into account also the facts that Somali leaders did not have time to develop countermeasures before the landing, and that the Marines always had a lethal option available should nonlethal tactics fail.\textsuperscript{80}

UNITED SHIELD was predominantly an American operation, but it also involved forces from six other nations. Figure 5 demonstrates how UNITED SHIELD integrated the coalition forces and lays out the organizational structure for the operation. Next to the United States, Italy provided the largest contingent, a five-ship task force and the San Marco Battalion of Marines. The San Marco Battalion accounted for about 350 troops of the 2,675 total in the Italian contingent.\textsuperscript{81} Rear Admiral Elio Bolongaro was the senior Italian officer with UNITED SHIELD and acted as Zinni’s Deputy Commander for Coalition Forces.\textsuperscript{82} The operation plan for UNITED SHIELD integrated the San Marco Battalion into the landing force, which would establish the secure enclave for the amphibious withdrawal.\textsuperscript{83} This proved very effective, due to the combined amphibious training of U.S. Marines with the San Marco Battalion and amphibious shipping of both countries over a number of years.\textsuperscript{84} In addition to the Italian force, France supplied three ships to the operation, Pakistan three, Malaysia two, and the United Kingdom one.\textsuperscript{85} The total number of vessels participating in UNITED SHIELD would ultimately reach twenty-three, once all logistical and fire-support ships arrived on station.\textsuperscript{86} The Pakistani and Bangladeshi forces that had remained in Somalia as the rear guard for UNOSOM II constituted the final elements of the CTF UNITED SHIELD coalition. These two units performed their duty in Mogadishu to the very last, having provided courageous service throughout their time in Somalia. This is particularly true of
the Pakistani troops, who were the first to go into Somalia during UNOSOM (I), were among the last to leave under UNOSOM II, and had suffered the greatest number of casualties. 87

Regrettably, the ships that the UN contracted to evacuate the Bangladeshi and Pakistani troops from Mogadishu proved poorly maintained, inadequately supplied, and generally unworthy of these fine troops. When the final ship (MV Vergina) arrived to transport the last Pakistani element, the ship’s master damaged his vessel while approaching the pier. 88 There was a strong suspicion that he had been drunk. Admiral Gunn feared Vergina was no longer seaworthy, and to make matters worse, it had no capability to repair the damage. Gunn dispatched a U.S. Navy hull technician team from Essex, which rapidly repaired the damage and permitted the vessel to get under way. Generally disgusted with the lack of professionalism on board Vergina, Gunn assigned the vessel a command-qualified Navy commander and several officers, with orders to take charge if necessary, regardless of what its owners might think. 89

The core element of CTF UNITED SHIELD consisted of the Essex ARG and 13th MEU (SOC), which had deployed to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean area during October 1994. Captain Gary W. Stubbs served as commodore of the ARG, and Colonel John C. Garrett commanded 13th MEU (SOC). Before departing California, Garrett had realized that his MEU would likely have a mission in Somalia sometime during its deployment. He had a good turnover with his predecessor as 13th MEU (SOC) commander, Colonel Larry Outlaw, including a general orientation to the Somalia situation. He also had an intelligence officer who had served in Somalia under General Johnston during RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, when Garrett had a question about Somalia his staff could not answer, he contacted Colonel Broderick and tapped into his wealth of experience. As helpful as this all was, Garrett’s mission would be different from those of the past and many of his problems unique.

Garrett’s 13th MEU (SOC) would be augmented by an SPMAGTF organized around an infantry company and heavily reinforced by a platoon of thirteen AAVs and a section of six Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles (LAVs). The SPMAGTF came from elements of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa and deployed on USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3), based in Sasebo, Japan. Belleau Wood also served as flagship for the CTF UNITED SHIELD command element, which flew from California to Singapore to board the ship. Colonel Carl C. Herdering commanded the SPMAGTF, and Captain John W. Townes III was commanding officer of Belleau Wood. Most of the elements that constituted UNITED SHIELD—both American and coalition—assembled during February off the coast of Kenya, where they conducted a series of exercises and rehearsals addressing interoperability issues, integration of forces, and synchronization of air support.

The aviation support for UNITED SHIELD was substantial, with assets stationed on board amphibious ships and at joint support bases in Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya. In addition to a normal complement of helicopters, 13th MEU (SOC) had six AV-8B Harriers based on Essex to support the mission. Before the landing, the Harriers cross-decked to Belleau Wood, from where they conducted flight operations during UNITED SHIELD. This allowed more space on Essex for helicopter operations, thereby increasing the responsiveness of the aerial quick-reaction force and facilitating other helicopter-borne activity. The SPMAGTF included a composite air squadron of four AH-1W Cobra gunships, four UH-1U Hueys, and four CH-53E Super Stallions, all on Belleau Wood. The support base in Mombasa supported four Marine Corps KC-130 aircraft, additional CH-53E helicopters, and P-3 Reef Point reconnaissance aircraft provided by the Navy, along with Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships. The base in Nairobi supported Air Force KC-135 tankers and additional Reef Point airplanes.
In the weeks leading up to the actual withdrawal, Zinni and key members of his staff conducted a series of meetings to ensure its success. In addition to final planning sessions at Central Command in Tampa and with NAVCENT in Bahrain, Zinni visited Kenya and Pakistan to coordinate with top defense officials and ensure their full cooperation. He also wanted to reach an understanding with each coalition government regarding the tasking of its forces while under his command. Most important of these trips involved several visits to Mogadishu, where Zinni and key State Department representatives met with the Secretary-General’s special representative, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, and the new UNOSOM II commander, General Aboo. They also met with Aideed, who agreed not to interfere with the operation. Somewhat ominously, however, Aideed pointed out that he did not control all the militias or gangs operating near the airfield and indicated that some would likely fight the landing force. Zinni and his team also talked with other major leaders in Mogadishu, including members of Ali Mahdi’s SSA, to ensure they understood UNITED SHIELD’s mission and to elicit their support.

In Admiral Gunn’s words, Zinni “was very frank and direct with them, as only General Zinni can be.”

During the final weeks before the amphibious withdrawal, two incidents occurred in Somalia that could have distracted attention. The first was the “kidnapping” of a popular Italian journalist, Carmen La Sorella, and the murder of her cameraman, Mirko Hrovatin. As is often the case, the journalists had ventured outside of protected areas, and their Range Rover had come under attack. Essentially, the vehicle was caught up in a firefight between two Somali factions. La Sorella ran from the car to a place of relative safety, but Hrovatin died in the exchange of gunfire. Before leaving her car, however, La Sorella phoned her station in Italy, which prompted the Italian government to take action to rescue her. Inevitably, Admiral Bolongaro received a call from Rome directing him to “go get her.” This situation introduced a conflict between national interests and the task force mission, because leaders of UNITED SHIELD wanted to avoid overt aggressive actions that might suggest a return to the tactics of UNOSOM II. Such conflict between national interests and task force missions had been a serious problem in previous Somalia operations but had been refreshingly absent during UNITED SHIELD. Fortunately, operatives ashore confirmed that La Sorella was in a safe location and not in immediate danger. Meanwhile, the CTF operations officer, Colonel Bucky Peterson, and other American and Italian officers of UNITED SHIELD worked out an arrangement (a sort of tactical cover) that gave the appearance of action that satisfied the Italian government in Rome without seeming unduly aggressive to militia leaders in Mogadishu. The next day a combined special operations team went ashore and effected the “rescue.”

The second incident involved the prospect of a noncombatant evacuation operation in Burundi—in the middle of Africa, between Tanzania and the Congo—where
conditions were again deteriorating and the U.S. embassy was under threat. During the planning for UNITED SHIELD, Zinni’s staff had developed a sequel for just such a contingency.110 When this possibility arose, between 16 and 24 February, the CTF staff prepared a detailed plan relatively quickly and with minimal impact on their main activity. Colonel Peterson later believed that the Burundi tasking distracted the CTF staff for twenty-four to thirty-six hours.111 Had it been necessary to execute the noncombatant evacuation in Burundi, however, the impact on UNITED SHIELD could have been very great, particularly if it had conflicted with the planned landing dates in Somalia. The timing for UNITED SHIELD resulted from conditions of the moon and tides, the weather forecasts, and the hydrographic situation, such as the strength and direction of ocean currents. Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi and the location of the prospective evacuation, is over six hundred miles inland, and the demands of such an operation on UNITED SHIELD assets would have been substantial.112 Additionally, this NEO would have occurred within the geographical purview (as then aligned) of European Command, not Central Command. Such operations at the seam of responsibility can be particularly difficult, due to conflicting priorities and perspectives of the respective commanders in chief, as Colonel McMullen and his 11th MEU (SOC) had learned one year earlier.113 Certainly, the UNITED SHIELD team believed that it could carry out both missions if the situation demanded.114 Yet the diversion of forces, equipment, and leadership attention would likely have degraded the Somalia operation and perhaps encouraged greater resistance ashore. In the event, the evacuation from Bujumbura did not occur, but had conditions in Burundi so dictated, only the forces of CTF UNITED SHIELD would have been available for its execution.115

The execution phase of UNITED SHIELD began at 1000 on 26 February 1995, with the establishment of a small command element ashore, collocated with the UNOSOM II headquarters. This forward command element actually “fell in” on a liaison team under Colonel Latimer, which had provided critical coordination with UNOSOM II elements ashore.116 The following day, Zinni came ashore and assumed command of the UNOSOM II force (that is, the Pakistani
and Bangladeshi rear guard) from General Aboo. During the darkness of the early morning hours of 28 February, the UNITED SHIELD landing force—consisting of Battalion Landing Team 3/1, the SPMAGTF, and the San Marco Battalion—conducted a landing under leadership of the 13th MEU (SOC) commander, Colonel Garrett. By early light, the entire landing force had got ashore and had established a continuous perimeter running from GREEN Beach (the key location for beach operations), in the south and on the left flank of the landing force, to New Port, farther north on the right. Engineers had previously prepared berms to enhance the defensive positions the landing force would occupy. Additionally, Zinni had already inserted Army psychological warfare units and special operations teams.

The landing force immediately enveloped the Bangladeshi battalion in its positions at New Port, permitting it to begin evacuation. But “retrograding” the Pakistani brigade would be somewhat more difficult, since it was outside the lines of the landing force, in key positions at the airport. The center of gravity during the early stages of the operation was the port area, since all UNOSOM II troops and some of the UNITED SHIELD landing force would depart from that point. After all elements had departed the port area, the center of gravity would shift to GREEN Beach, where the last element of the landing force would conduct a tactical withdrawal.

At about 0830 on 28 February, General Aboo and his staff departed Mogadishu, and the Bangladeshi battalion began loading on contract ships. At about midnight, the Pakistani brigade began a sequential withdrawal from the airport and a passage of lines through the landing force. This movement put it within the secure enclave, where it could prepare for departure from New Port. Night movements, passages of lines, and interoperability among multinational forces generally, are difficult enough when done singly under normal conditions. To do all three in combination requires great skill and professionalism, which the forces of UNITED SHIELD...
demonstrated ashore at Mogadishu. In this case the passage of lines included the movement of tanks and armored personnel carriers, which added a certain element of danger and complexity during hours of darkness.\textsuperscript{124} By about 0630 on 1 March, the passage of lines was complete and the Pakistani troops had begun preparing their equipment for loading and departure. Simultaneously, the San Marco Battalion prepared for withdrawal across GREEN Beach later that night.\textsuperscript{125}

During the early hours of darkness on 2 March, the landing force initiated a systematic contraction of its defensive line and a tactical amphibious withdrawal from GREEN Beach. Throughout the evolution Marines exchanged gunfire with various Somali gangs that chose to contest the activity. On several occasions it became intense, but the vastly superior firepower of the Marines discouraged any determined effort against their positions.\textsuperscript{126} Additionally, Zinni had Cobra gunships, Harriers, and AC-130 Spectre aircraft overhead, ready to engage targets should the situation require. Sniper teams also proved effective in controlling the actions of rogue militias and often discouraged threatening moves before they got started.\textsuperscript{127} The final amphibious vehicles departed GREEN Beach at about 0100 on 3 March, and among their passengers were the CTF commander, General Zinni, and his chief of staff, Colonel John Moffett. By 0505 the amphibious ships had recovered all forces and vehicles. In the words of the 13th MEU (SOC) commander, John Garrett, “I think it was probably the closest to a perfect operation that I’ve ever been on.”\textsuperscript{128} Admiral Gunn stated, “I rate the UNITED SHIELD piece as one hundred percent effective.”\textsuperscript{129} Many others had similar comments, but the best news after the reembarkation of all UNITED SHIELD forces was the report that no American, coalition, or UNOSOM II lives had been lost during this complex and difficult operation.\textsuperscript{130}

The story of UNITED SHIELD had not yet played out, however, when the final vehicle departed GREEN Beach in the darkness of 3 March. During the trip back to Belleau Wood, the amphibious tractor carrying Zinni and Moffett lost power when its engine overheated. This undoubtedly resulted from the vehicle’s heavy load and the strong current off the Somalia coast that it was fighting.\textsuperscript{131} The bilge pumps were still working, and a companion tractor passed a towrope, so everything seemed under control. Now, however, the towing vehicle, under an incredibly heavy load, “flamed out” too. Both amphibious tractors had now lost communications with the ships and other landing craft, and the tide and strong current were pushing the tractors back toward the beach. Moffett—observing the Belleau Wood getting smaller and technicals, lined up on the beach with their headlights on, getting bigger—realized the seriousness of the situation. Several times before drifting too far from Belleau Wood he heard a voice call out from the ship, “Who’s got the Godfather?” He shouted back, “I’ve got the Godfather!” but no one could hear his reply.\textsuperscript{132}
Although Zinni could figure out the situation for himself, Moffett had the tractor commander, Corporal Deskins, brief him on the situation. After a long litany of all that had gone wrong (the tractor had lost power and was drifting toward the beach, the tow vehicle was in the same situation, they were unable to raise anyone on the radio, there was no response to their flares, and hostile Somalis waited on the beach), the corporal assured his CTF commander that everything was under control: “Our machine guns work better on the beach.” At last, they spotted a safety boat—a utility landing craft—and Moffett fired the tractor’s last flare, which attracted the attention of the LCU’s crew. Eventually two boats arrived, came alongside each of the AAVs, and used the power of their engines to arrest their drift toward the shore while taking off the crewmen and passengers. Upon arriving within the well deck of Belleau Wood and climbing out of the tractor into knee-deep water, Zinni observed waiting officers and journalists looking down from the deck above. Zinni looked to Moffett and said, “You’re going to make me wade up to those cameras, aren’t you?” Moffett smiled and replied, “Just like MacArthur.”

The landing force had been in Somalia only about seventy-two hours, and during that time it had operated strictly from sea bases, with no buildup ashore. The UNITED SHIELD force had come from the sea, been sustained from the sea, and returned to the sea. Colonel Peterson had departed Somalia from New Port for USS Dubsuque and then cross-decked back to Belleau Wood on an air-cushion landing craft. During that final leg, he had one final look at Mogadishu from the sea. In the rush to withdraw, his team had forgotten to turn off the generator that powered an operational site it had used while ashore, and a light was still burning. It was the only thing visible in an ancient city of a million people. That sight saddened Peterson. He reflected, “We left them with nothing except for that one light bulb in the old UN compound.”

Notes
1. The governments of Belgium, France, and Sweden also announced their intention to withdraw from Somalia in October 1993. Italy, Germany, Turkey, and Norway subsequently announced the withdrawal of their forces by the end of March 1994. United Nations and Somalia, pp. 61–62, 333, 350.
2. Ibid., pp. 64, 352.
3. Ibid., p. 65.
6. Montgomery interview.
7. Hoar interview.

12. Howe interview.


27. Like many statistics regarding troop count during the Somalia incursion, the actual number of Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers requiring evacuation by UNITED SHIELD varies among accounts. The UN estimates the number at 2,500, whereas other sources suggest as high as 4,500. The former appears the most consistent and authoritative figure. See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Vice Adm. Lee E. Gunn, USN (Ret.), interview by the author, Alexandria, Virginia, 11 October 2007; *United Nations and Somalia*, p. 76; Donatella Lorch, “Marines Cover U.N.'s Pullout from Somalia,” *New York Times*, 28 February 1995.


33. Howe interview.

34. Zinni interview.


36. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

37. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.
38. Howe interview.
40. Gunn interview.
41. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.
42. Zinni interview.
44. Ibid., pp. 23–111.
46. Zinni interview.
48. Just as Zinni was ready to conduct *United Shield* by using existing doctrine at the macro level, so was he willing to avoid slavish adherence to it at the detailed level when it did not fit the requirements. It often occurs during joint and combined operations that service-specific doctrine is found too restrictive and therefore becomes nonfunctional. Zinni accordingly instructed his subordinates of all services to “leave their rice bowls at home.” Peterson interview; Zinni interview.
49. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.
50. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.
51. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Zinni interview.
52. Because of the unpredictability of various warlords, coupled with the fact that they did not control all violent elements within Somalia, planners for *United Shield* needed to consider the worst-case scenario: an amphibious withdrawal under fire. This decision proved not only wise but also prescient. See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.
53. After the massive Chinese attack at the Chosin Reservoir in late November 1950, the 1st Marine Division fought its way through the vastly superior enemy force in one of the most famous and dramatic breakout operations in the history of warfare. After fighting their way to Hungnam and the sea, U.S. forces conducted an equally famous and highly efficient amphibious withdrawal in the face of their enemy. Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, pp. 493–95; Gunn interview; Zinni interview.
54. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.
55. Ibid.
56. Col. John C. Latimer of the Central Command J-5 planning directorate had created three courses of action for the UN withdrawal from Somalia. This prompted planners and commanders at all levels (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Command, and I MEF) to begin thinking about the issue and led to concurrent planning and decision making. Peterson interview; CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.
57. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.
58. Col. John W. Moffett, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, SAIC, San Diego, California, 14 March 2008; Peterson interview.
60. During the planning for *United Shield*, Zinni and his staff developed “branches” (changes to the existing plan) and “sequels” (new plans) in order to be able to respond immediately and appropriately to any possible event. Representatives from the Marine Corps War College critiqued and wargamed these branches and sequels, along with the basic plan, which I MEF then included in a *United Shield* “playbook” especially created for the operation. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Zinni interview.
61. Zinni interview.
62. Peterson interview.
63. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.
64. The role of naval expeditionary forces within Central Command had become so large and important that the United States created the Fifth Fleet under NAVCENT on 1 July 1995. Although this occurred four months after *United Shield*, it had been in the works for several years. The first fleet created by the United States since World War II, it was actually a reestablishment of the World War II fleet commanded by Adm. Raymond Spruance. Further emphasizing the importance of naval forces in the Central Command area of responsibility, the NAVCENT commander billet had been elevated from
rear admiral to vice admiral under Redd’s predecessor, Vice Adm. John Scott Redd, USN (Ret.), telephone interview by the author, 24 September 2008.

65. Redd interview; Zinni interview.


69. During this time, the terms “nonlethal,” “less than lethal,” and “less lethal” were used somewhat interchangeably in the military context. Several self-proclaimed experts in the Pentagon insisted that “nonlethal” weapons could conceivably cause death even though not designed or intended for that purpose; therefore, a certain constituency developed around “less lethal” and “less than lethal” for such weapons used in combat. Not all military personnel, especially those operating in the field, accepted this terminology. In the literature of this period, especially that relating to UNITED SHIELD, three terms are used. Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, United Shield: Less Lethal Report, 2 June 1995 [hereafter CG I MEF Less Lethal Report] (copy in possession of the author).


72. CG I MEF Less Lethal Report.


74. The forward-deployed 13th MEU (SOC) on board the Essex ARG constituted the main landing force of UNITED SHIELD. The nonlethal systems acquired and deployed for the operation included: 40 mm systems using five types of rounds, 12-gauge systems with three types of rounds, oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) devices, caltrops, stinger grenades, “flash bangs,” sticky foam, and aqueous foam. Other items—such as lasers that temporarily blind, and sonic crowd-control devices—had been considered but not selected for use due to lack of test results. See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.


78. The 13th MEU (SOC) commander had to warn Somali mobs several times not to advance on his positions, but they always stopped after being warned off. Garrett interview; Moffett interview.

79. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

80. Zinni and Ohls, “No Premium on Killing.”

81. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, Information for Secretarial Correspondence Related to Operation United Shield, 7 April 1995 (copy in possession of the author).

82. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

83. Garrett interview.

84. Gunn interview; Zinni interview.

85. The Italian ships were Garibaldi, Libecio, San Marco, San Giorgio, and Stromoli; the French ships were Commandant Bory, D’Estienne D’Orves, and Champlain; the Pakistani ships were Tughriil, Shamsheer, and Nasr; the Malaysian ships were Sri Indra Sakti and Mahawangsa; and the United Kingdom sent Exeter. The number of troops provided (including naval personnel) totaled 902 from Bangladesh, 323 from France, 2,675 from Italy, 413 from Malaysia, 3,321 from Pakistan, 282 from the United Kingdom, and 8,569 from the United States. Of the 8,569 American personnel, 7,597 served within the naval forces component of the CTF, the various ships and the entire landing force. See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

86. In addition to the amphibious ships of the Essex ARG (see note 90), the coalition ships,
and Belleau Wood, the U.S. contributed USS Lake Erie (CG 70), the fleet oiler USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193), the fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194), the ammunition ship USNS Kiska (T-AE 35), and the combat stores ship USNS Spica (T-ARS 59). See CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Gunn interview; Zinni interview; “Last Call: Marines Close Out Final Chapter in Somalia,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1995), p. 7.

87. The Pakistani force suffered thirty-three deaths out of a total of 135 killed in the UN operations of the 1990s. Press, “Retreat from Somalia.”

88. Apparently Vergina collided with an ocean-going tug while approaching the pier. In addition to damage from the collision, the ship berthed wrong side to, complicating the loading of the Pakistanis and their equipment. Gunn interview; Moffett interview; Peterson interview.


92. Garrett interview.

93. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

94. Ibid.; Gunn interview; Peterson interview.


96. Although extensive and complex, the rehearsals off Kenya did not include the actual landing of troops ashore, due to the lack of suitable beaches. Despite turn-away landing exercises, United Shield leaders considered the operation plan fully tested and rehearsed. Peterson interview.

97. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

98. The aviation assets of a deployed MEU (SOC) typically include transport helicopters (four CH-53Es and twelve CH-46Es), utility helicopters (four UH-1Ns), and attack helicopters (four AH-1Ws), along with a detachment of vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (V/STOL) fixed-wing attack aircraft (six AV-8Bs). MCDP 3.


100. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.


102. The State Department representatives who accompanied Zinni on his last visit to Mogadishu included the head of the African bureau, Ambassador David Shinn, and the U.S. special envoy to Somalia, Ambassador David H. Simpson. According to Zinni, Simpson took a provocative line with Aideed, creating some anxiety as to how it might influence Aideed’s behavior. In the end, the incident does not appear to have affected the operation. Admiral Redd also attended several of the meetings in Mogadishu, often playing the role of “tough cop,” though not in a provocative manner. Redd interview; Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, *Battle Ready*, pp. 291–93.

103. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal.

104. Gunn interview.

105. Rear Adm. Pio Bracco, Italian Navy (Ret.), correspondence to Gary J. Ohls, 4 December 2008; Gunn interview; Moffett interview.

Although UNITED SHIELD was conducted primarily by naval expeditionary forces, the U.S. Army and Air Force also provided invaluable support, mostly through Special Operations Command. The Army provided psychological operations and special operations teams; the Air Force contingent operated the JSBs in Kenya and provided special-operations control teams in Somalia in support of both UNOSOM II forces (Pakistani and Bangladesh) and the UNITED SHIELD landing force. CTF United Shield Report on Somalia Withdrawal; Cushman, “Out of Somalia,” pp. 129–30; Peterson interview.

Marines and sailors often referred affectionately to Zinni as “the Godfather,” though usually when out of earshot. Moffett interview.
Operational and Strategic Observations

What can we hope to learn from the American experience in Somalia during the 1990s? Is Colonel Peterson’s dour assessment correct, that “we left them with nothing except for that one light bulb in the old UN compound”? Many individuals involved in UNITED SHIELD and the earlier operations would undoubtedly agree. It has become commonplace to refer to our Somalia involvement as a failure; some even call it a disaster. But not all agree, and even in 1995 many leaders saw value in the incursions and held hope for improvement in Somalia. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali tried to remain optimistic about the future, assuring the world that the UN would not abandon Somalia. But despite the Secretary-General’s earnest intention, it is difficult to square his assertions with the amphibious withdrawal of March 1995. In the final assessment, the UN goal of establishing a peaceful society, a stable economy, and legitimate elected government failed. The UN departed with little more than the hope that Somalis would solve their problems on their own. Yet the incursions into Somalia had saved many lives, and the famine had been broken. Additionally, the large-scale civil war had ended, although clan-based fighting continued, on a reduced level.

Regrettably, the Somali people thereafter did no better at nation building or peacemaking than had the UN and its coalition. Although the country did not immediately return to chaos, neither did it achieve stability. In the absence of progress, conditions trended downward toward more violence and despair. Nearly fourteen years after UNITED SHIELD, conditions in Somalia have returned to anarchy: rampant fighting, widespread criminal activity, and another famine looming on the horizon. Although conditions now resemble those of 1992, the political and military landscape within Somalia has changed, notably with the death of Aideed during factional fighting in 1996 and diminished power of Ali Mahdi. From the perspective of Western nations, the situation has actually become much worse. The rise of a movement known as Islamic Courts—a Taliban-like group with links to al Qaeda—has gained considerable following in southern and central Somalia.
Although American leaders knew of radical Islamic groups within Somalia during the 1990s, they did not figure prominently in U.S. operations. But the issue took on an entirely different significance after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington. The Islamic Courts came close to taking control of the entire country in 2006, and they actually controlled Mogadishu and much of south and central Somalia for nearly six months. Only the intervention of U.S.-backed Ethiopian forces prevented them from defeating the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the UN and United States recognized as the legitimate government of the country. After suffering a series of military defeats, the Islamic Courts reverted to guerrilla warfare, achieving some success, including the capture of Kismayo in August 2008. If the Islamic Courts should gain control of Somalia, they will likely take it into the orbit of the international Islamic terrorist network. Somalia—which had little or no strategic value to the United States during the incursions of the 1990s—would then become a strategic problem comparable to that posed by Afghanistan in 2001.

Predictably, the United States is widely blamed, both locally and internationally, for most of the problems of Somalia, including failure of the UN mission of the 1990s, the current calamity within the country, and the rise of the Islamic Courts. The logic goes something like this. The UN mission to Somalia failed because of a lack of sufficient American support, especially during UNOSOM II. The current calamity exists due to lack of American attention and support after the withdrawal of UN forces. The rise of Islamic terrorist groups resulted from the ineffectiveness of the American interventions of the 1990s. The Islamic Courts movement remains popular in Somalia primarily because of American support for the Ethiopian invasion and occupation of parts of the country.

Whatever truth there may be in these assertions, they hardly explain the chaos that has visited Somalia over the past two decades. However inadequate the UN and American efforts of the 1990s (and there is a wide range of opinions), ultimate responsibility for the anarchy in Somalia must rest with its own leaders. The dictatorial rule of Siad Barre created the conditions for civil war and the subsequent instability of his nation. The self-interest of the clan-based faction leaders—who brought about Siad Barre’s demise—encouraged and sustained the chaos, from which they expected to benefit. The most powerful leaders within Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre put their quests for power and wealth ahead of any genuine concern for the Somali nation and people. Even so, the problems of Somalia continue to reach out to the United States, and they are likely to do so into the future.

What further should we say for the U.S. involvement in Somalia? Simply stated, the United States went into Somalia in 1992 to break the famine and save Somali lives.
PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE accomplished those results. Beyond that, pressure from the UN and American internationalists to take on a broader mission, ambiguously known as nation building, resulted in a confused U.S. policy. Very few Americans—and none with real power—wanted an extended commitment to Somalia during the dying days of the George H. W. Bush administration. But that changed with the arrival of a new presidential administration in January 1993. Initially, President Bush’s concept of a “New World Order” meshed nicely with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” in addressing the crisis in Somalia. But the Bush administration did not see either as committing the United States to a complex nation-building mission using American troops. Ironically, the price of getting out of Somalia (ending Operation RESTORE HOPE and returning General Johnston’s large force to the United States) was an agreement to remain in Somalia, albeit with fewer U.S. troops. The applicability of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine for committing troops—with its corollary of using overwhelming force—was completely lost sight of in the transition. This resulted in an operational overreach, whereby UNOSOM II received a broad mandate without adequate means for its execution. Additionally, UNOSOM II (unlike UNITAF) did not have a finite set of objectives to undertake or a specific time frame in which to achieve them. After the departure of UNITAF, the mission to Somalia became confused in part because the presidential transition in Washington coincided with the mission transition in Mogadishu.

With the arrival of the administration of President Clinton, the doctrines of “assertive multilateralism” and “engagement and enlargement”—primarily sponsored by Madeleine Albright and Anthony Lake—seemed to fit exactly the situation within Somalia. This occurred as the UN was pressing the United States to remain involved as a major player within the UNOSOM II coalition. The facts that the UN leader for UNOSOM II (Admiral Jonathan Howe) was actually an American and that the American military commander (Major General Thomas Montgomery) was also the deputy UN commander further confused the situation. It is true, as many have pointed out, that only American officers commanded U.S. troops during the Somalia incursions. Nevertheless, the operations they executed were part of a UN strategy, driven from both New York and Mogadishu and with enthusiastic support from the new administration in Washington. The crosscurrents resulting from the UN and American relationship allowed conditions in Somalia to slide from one crisis to another, drawing in U.S. forces through a process described, somewhat derisively, as mission creep.

Concerned with the drift toward conflict during the middle of 1993, certain members of the Clinton administration—including the president himself—began to reconsider the situation and ponder a change of policy. Many key military leaders had already come to doubt the efficacy of the mission, and some had opposed it from the
beginning. With the Battle of Mogadishu and desecration of the bodies of American soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, the American people became shocked and enraged. This event—like Tet 1968 in Vietnam—became a defining moment; it resulted in a curtailment of the U.S. commitment to Somalia and its people. In short, it revealed the lack of American will for this mission and brought to light the confused manner in which leaders had created and executed the policy.

As Chester Crocker has declared, “The Somalia ‘failure’ was less a failure of either humanitarian intervention or muscular peacekeeping than a failure to apply them steadily and wisely. The failure was of another order: strategic confusion followed by collapse of political will when the confusion led to combat casualties.” There had been enough political will for RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF, because that operation had been well coordinated, remained “on mission,” and proved successful. But support for CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II lacked these prerequisites and quickly dissolved once the casualties began to mount.

President Clinton further confused the issue by announcing that the United States would not abandon the mission to Somalia but also that it would pull out all forces within six months. The president represented this declaration as an effort to see the mission through, but Somali and UN leaders recognized it for what it was—a face-saving way to withdraw from what was by then perceived as a failed policy. In fairness to the decision makers, they believed this six-month deadline would provide time for UNOSOM II to build up strength from other UN members. They were also under pressure from several congressional leaders for an immediate withdrawal. The six-month commitment was probably the best that could have been achieved under the circumstances, and only if casualties remained low. In the meantime, the U.S. military would build up large and powerful forces in Somalia for defensive purposes and as a show of force. This new and more capable American force—known as JTF Somalia—would not undertake offensive action, as the smaller and less powerful American element had done from June through October 1993. But its presence in Somalia provided a diplomatic tool, one that was skillfully utilized by Ambassador Oakley and others during the final months of the American incursion. It proved effective in part because Aideed—the UN’s number-one villain in Somalia—did not want or need any more shoot-outs with U.S. forces.

At that point in Somalia, the higher-level policy to reconstruct the nation had not yet failed. The tactical effort to capture Aideed had failed, and Americans had been shocked to lose eighteen soldiers in a Mogadishu firefight. But even the results of the Battle of Mogadishu were somewhat murky. In a strict military sense, one could consider it a tactical victory for U.S. forces—the American task force captured the SNA lieutenants it had set out to get, and it had certainly inflicted far greater casualties than it received. But it became a political and public relations defeat for the United States,
because of the shock factor.26 Even so, the overall Somalia operation had been more successful than not at this point, despite the disastrous “get Aideed” operation and the shock of the Battle of Mogadishu. Many leaders remained hopeful that progress was still possible. Certainly Generals Montgomery and Ernst believed that the conditions existed, and that they had the capability, to make an impact as JTF Somalia began to build up. Admiral Howe too believed the time was ripe for real progress. But much of that optimism evaporated with the decision of the Clinton administration to suspend offensive operations, avoid additional casualties, and withdraw from UNOSOM II.27

The United States certainly made a mistake in Somalia by supporting the so-called war on Aideed and his SNA, as many have pointed out. That caused the UN and the United States to lose any claim to neutrality and to be marked as participants in the internal conflict.28 To some extent, this situation resulted from a lack of communications between UNOSOM II and the Somali factional leaders, particularly Aideed.29 But the more fundamental mistake involved expanding the initial UN mandate without providing the military means to ensure its success.30 This failure substantially resulted from lack of a thorough and open debate within the United States over the mandate, mission, force levels, and budget for the Somalia effort.31 Had such deliberation occurred, American leaders would have either scaled back the mission or provided adequate resources.32 But in its absence, top American leaders simply acquiesced to the UN’s vague concept of nation building and hoped for the best. In the opinion of Chester Crocker, “Support for an initially popular undertaking collapsed amid confusion about American purposes. Was this a humanitarian mission, a manhunt for a wily warlord, or a nation-building program?”33

In the opinion of Walter Clarke, the Somalia incursion was a failure but not a military failure. He has stated, “In my view Somalia was not a military failure, it was a well-run military operation, but which had no political focus. It was a failed political military operation.”34 Clarke’s point is very Clausewitzian and one with which few people would argue. If nothing else, the Somalia incursions demonstrate that the primacy of politics should apply to humanitarian and peace operations as much as to regular warfare.35 But it is not enough that political leaders provide policy and strategic direction; they must also ensure that the direction is sufficient to the task. Equally important, the political objectives must be in harmony with the operational level of action as much as with the strategic.36 Otherwise, no degree of military competence can ensure success, as we learned to our regret in Vietnam. Operational excellence is rarely sufficient to make up for inadequate strategy or policy. As Alberto Coll has argued, “In the Somalia intervention, good intentions were mixed with miscalculation in roughly equal proportions to produce an outcome that was as full of ambiguities and failures as it was of undeniable achievement.”37
Perhaps the greatest miscalculation involved the failure of American and UN leaders to keep an appropriate balance and relationship among policy, strategy, operations, and tactics. It is through the application of operational art and the definition of clear objectives that these elements are properly harmonized. But that is possible only if there is clear and consistent direction from the policy and strategic levels. The lack of such guidance, coupled with a failure to clearly define objectives during CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II, resulted in that operational drift that typified military actions during the May–October 1993 period. This contrasted with the focused effort of Aideed and the SNA, who attacked America’s center of gravity—that is, its unwillingness to suffer high casualties where no vital national interests existed.

The Somalia experience caused the Clinton administration to recognize the need for a more orderly process for making decisions and commitments to peace operations. On 3 May 1994, the White House issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which purported to ensure a more collaborative approach and “to impose discipline on both the UN and the United States to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.” PDD 25 also signaled a change from the initial Clinton policy of assertive multilateralism to a much more cautious approach for committing U.S. forces to humanitarian and peace operations. The provisions of PDD 25, against the background of the Somalia experience, inhibited American involvement in humanitarian operations for some time, as exhibited by the reluctance of President Clinton to intervene in the Rwanda genocide. Interestingly, the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi occurred at the very time the Clinton administration was developing and issuing PDD 25. Many observers contend that the “ghosts of Somalia” (as described by Walter Clarke) also influenced the manner in which the United States involved itself in the Balkans and in Haiti during the latter half of the 1990s. When the United States did eventually intervene in those areas, the preparation and subsequent operations clearly benefited from the experience in Somalia.

The U.S. military in Somalia generally receives better marks than does the political side. Of course, it is difficult to separate political decision from military execution. What is the point of a well executed military operation if accomplished as part of a flawed policy? For example, the 12 July 1993 attack on Abdi House was clearly a well executed operation, but it ended any prospect of a peaceful accommodation with Aideed and the SNA. It also had a negative impact on many U.S. allies and weakened the UN coalition in Somalia. Tactical and operational excellence are necessary but not sufficient for success, and they produce effectiveness only when complementary elements of a sound strategic plan. The fact that tactical or operational events often influence strategic thinking further underscores the need to synchronize all levels of political and military activity. The attack on Abdi House is an example of failure to do so, and the 3–4 October
1993 Battle of Mogadishu is another. These tactical events undercut much of the support that existed for the larger policy and its strategic mission. Americans had resolutely committed themselves to the humanitarian objectives in Somalia, but support for combat action was very thin and consequently susceptible to shock, such as occurred during the Battle of Mogadishu. As previously mentioned, the experience in Somalia made the United States shy of humanitarian and peace operations for some time. Yet in a broader sense, support remained for international involvement among most Americans, so long as they perceived a need, had a clear understanding of what the mission would entail, and felt adequately informed of the strategy for success. As Walter Clarke stated in 1997, “If the U.S. role is properly articulated by national leaders, the public is willing to pay the price of global leadership. The U.S. Public intuitively appreciated that the ability to project power for humanitarian purposes over long distances is the singular mark of a world power.”

American leaders had the issue of world leadership in mind before, during, and after the Somalia incursions. As the Cold War morphed into the new world order, leaving the United States as the world’s only superpower, most observers expected America to assume greater responsibility in international affairs. The U.S. sea services, which played a leading role in the Somalia incursions, had ensured their place in the new global environment through the energetic production of operational and strategic concept papers, along with new doctrine where appropriate. The number of documents issued during the decade of the 1990s, including . . . From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea, certainly illustrates that point. Such concept papers—combined with service and joint doctrine, and adjusted to fit new conditions—proved very important in providing military professionals frameworks for thinking about, discussing, and adjusting to changed environments. This framework played an important role in the effectiveness of naval expeditionary forces during the Somalia incursions. It also helped to minimize the effects of policy mistakes and strategic discontinuities. Yet at the more fundamental level, it was the esprit de corps of the Navy and Marine Corps team (developed between the two services over two centuries, and not always happily) that underlay its success during the Somalia involvement, despite a lack of cogent strategic guidance.

Traditional Navy–Marine Corps relationships developed primarily for use in conventional warfare, but they translated well to the expeditionary environment of the post–Cold War era. The new challenges of the 1990s required only fine-tuning, as provided in . . . From the Sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and other documents from that era. Of course, this had been true throughout American history. The ability to
adjust directives, doctrine, and concepts to deal with new and unexpected contingencies is the hallmark of American naval expeditionary forces. The manner in which Navy and Marine Corps commanders exercised the operational art during the Somalia involvement clearly demonstrated the efficacy of this system.

Making things work effectively was no easier for Esek Hopkins and Samuel Nicholas at New Providence in the Bahamas during 1776 than it was for Anthony Zinni and Lee Gunn in Somalia during 1995. But the logic of naval expeditionary forces, the competence and professionalism of leaders, and the commitment of sailors and Marines were the essential ingredients that have ensured effectiveness in differing eras, under differing conditions, and in the face of differing requirements and expectations. Doctrine written over many years from the hard experience of battle, and concept papers written by creative minds that recognize new strategic and operational realities, is good and necessary. But the expeditionary culture, coupled with strong traditions forged by the Navy and Marine Corps team over many years and through many experiences, provided a capable force, able to operate in a variety of conditions, no matter how ineffectively political leaders utilized it. One of the high points of the Somalia incursions is that those experiences tended to revalidate the efficacy of the Navy and Marine Corps team and the related doctrine and concepts it had spawned. But however important concept papers and doctrine may be, it is the expeditionary mind-set, combined with a confident spirit of proficiency in uncertain circumstances, that undergirds martial strength. These Somalia operations are vivid illustrations of Napoleon’s maxim that ‘in war, the morale is to the physical as three to one.’

Notes

6. The Islamic Courts grew out of local efforts to establish order in parts of Somalia where none had existed. The movement spawned a militia initially known as the Union of Islamic Courts, and then the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). Its more radical element hijacked the movement during 2006 with the election of Hassan Dahir Aweys (recognized as a terrorist by both the UN and the United States) as chairman of the CIC Consultative Council and with the increased influence from the radical al-Shabaab component. James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Remarks to the Baltimore Council Relating to Foreign Affairs in Somalia, 7 March 2007, available at www.proquest.com.


10. In December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1725, authorizing a peacekeeping force (mostly from the African Union) to deploy to Somalia under the command of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Whether or not these troops will be more successful than previous efforts is uncertain. The length of time Ethiopian forces will remain in Somalia is also open to question, although most observers believe they will depart as soon as possible. John R. Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (New York: Threshold, 2007), p. 366.

11. Axe, Cries in the Dark.

12. Ibid.

13. Oakley interview.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


20. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.

21. Chester A. Crocker has served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace, and Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” p. 5.


23. Oakley interview.


25. Hoar interview.


27. Oakley interview.


29. Hoar interview; Zinni interview.

30. Oakley interview.

31. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.


33. Ibid., p. 7.

34. Walter Clarke served as Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Somalia, during 1993 and as adjunct professor of peace operations at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping Institute. Clarke PBS Frontline interview.


44. Clarke PBS *Frontline* interview.


46. Oakley interview.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.


53. Zinni interview.

54. Ibid.

Appendix A: The Weinberger Doctrine

Six tests governing the commitment of forces to combat:

1. Our vital interests must be at stake.
2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the United States and our allies that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.
3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secure.
4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives.
5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people.
6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort.

Note: This “doctrine” has been published numerous places, including Caspar W. Weinberger’s book cited here.

Appendix B: The Powell Doctrine

Questions to be answered affirmatively before applying military action:

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

Note: The Powell doctrine is based principally on the “Weinberger doctrine,” created by former secretary of defense (1981–87) Caspar W. Weinberger. General Colin L. Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993, endorsed and advocated Weinberger’s set of principles so strongly that many observers began calling it the “Weinberger-Powell doctrine”; some even started referring to the general’s interpretation as the “Powell doctrine.” Powell also emphasized the use of overwhelming force once American troops are committed to an action and that constitutes the essence of his corollary to the “Weinberger doctrine.”

Appendix C: UNITAF Component Commanders

Air Force Component

- Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 29 March 1993 to 4 May 1993

Army Component

- Brigadier General William Magruder III, USA, 9–22 December 1992
- Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22 December 1992 to 16 March 1993
- Brigadier General Greg L. Gile, USA, 16 March 1993 to 4 May 1993

Marine Corps Component

- Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, 9 December 1992 to 23 March 1993
- Colonel Jack W. Klimp, USMC, 23 March 1993 to 9 April 1993
- Colonel Emil R. Bedard, USMC, 9–23 April 1993
- Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, USMC, 23 April 1993 to 4 May 1993

Navy Component

- Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19–23 December 1992
- Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19–28 December 1992
- Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III, USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 1993
- Captain John W. Peterson, USN, 15 January 1993 to 1 February 1993
- Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February 1993 to 5 March 1993
- Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, 5–23 March 1993
- Captain Kenneth Pyle, USN, 23 March 1993 to 4 May 1993

Appendix D: UN Security Council Resolutions

UNSC Resolution 733 (23 January 1992)

Calls for total arms embargo.
Calls for cease-fire and reconciliation.
Calls for increased humanitarian aid to Somalia.
Establishes special aid coordinator (David Bassiouni).
Worked from Nairobi and (in March) Mogadishu.
Success for resolution questionable due to looting, extortion, lack of support.

UNSC Resolution 746 (17 March 1992)

Deplores human suffering and failure to implement cease-fire.
Urges Somali factions to abide with cease-fire agreement.
Urges Somali factions to cooperate with humanitarian efforts.
Urgently dispatches team to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Calls for a conference of reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

UNSC Resolution 751 (24 April 1992)

Dispatches fifty unarmed UN observers to monitor Aideed–Ali Mahdi cease-fire.
Allows future deployment of five hundred peacekeepers.
Boutros-Ghali assigns Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun to fact-finding mission.
Authorizes appointment of special representative in Somalia (Mohamed Sahnoun).

UNSC Resolution 767 (27 July 1992)

Endorses emergency airlift of food and medical supplies to “Triangle of Death.”
President Bush responds with emergency airlift called Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.
Establishes four UNOSOM operational zones in Somalia.
UNSC Resolution 775 (28 August 1992)
UNSC alarmed by continued sporadic outbreaks of hostilities and loss of life.
UNSC deeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering.
UNSC gravely concerned at the deterioration of humanitarian situation.
Authorizes the increase in strength of UNOSOM to 3,500 (including 550 Pakistanis).
Allows for 750 U.S. soldiers in each UNOSOM operational zone.

UNSC Resolution 794 (3 December 1992)
Establishes UNITAF (Unified Task Force).
The United States establishes Operation RESTORE HOPE.
calls for use of all means to create a secure environment for delivery of aid.
Authorizes Chapter VII (enforcement) operations to create secure environment.

UNSC Resolution 814 (26 March 1993)
Establishes expanded UNOSOM (i.e., UNOSOM II).
Directs a prompt, smooth, and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.
calls for effective program of disarming Somali parties, movements, and factions.
calls for rehabilitation of political institutions and economy of Somalia.
provides for establishment of impartial national police force.
Authorizes enforcement of Addis Ababa peace accords, including cease-fire.
Authorizes Chapter VII (enforcement) operations to create secure environment.

UNSC Resolution 837 (6 June 1993)
Issued in response to the killing of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers in ambush.
Directs UNOSOM to take all necessary steps to bring perpetrators to justice.

UNSC Resolution 885 (16 November 1993)
Authorizes establishment of Commission of Inquiry.
Investigates 5 June 1993 attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers.
Suspends arrest actions against implicated individuals.
Addresses individuals already detained under UNSC Resolution 837.
UNSC Resolution 897 (4 September 1994)
Reduces size of UNOSOM II force.
Revises mandate without enforcement powers.

UNSC Resolution 946 (30 September 1994)
Extends UNOSOM II mandate to 31 October 1994.
Requests intensified preparations for possible withdrawal.

UNSC Resolution 954 (4 November 1994)
Extends UNOSOM II mandate for final period until 31 March 1995.
Requests member states to provide military assistance for withdrawal.
Appendix E: Seven-Point Agreement (reached among principal leaders in Mogadishu on 11 December 1992)

1. Immediate and total cessation of hostilities and restoration of unity of the U.S.C.
2. Immediate and total cessation of all negative propaganda.
3. To break the artificial lines in the capital city of Mogadishu.
4. All the forces and their technicals should report to their respective designated locations outside the city within the next 48 hours, and be controlled by the joint committee.
5. The already established reconciliation committee of the U.S.C. should convene their meetings within the next 24 hours.
6. We call upon all Somalis throughout the country to seriously engage on cessation of all hostilities and join with us for peace and unity of Somalia.
7. We express our deep appreciation to the international community for its efforts to assist Somalia and appeal to it to extend and expand its assistance including not only humanitarian relief aid but also reconstruction and rehabilitation as well as a national reconciliation conference.

Appendix F: Somali Clans and Political Factions

Clans are the equivalent of tribes in most other societies, with their own codes and cultures. Somalis typically divide each clan into five or more smaller clans, which are further divided into subclans.

Principal Clans and Subclans Involved in the Somali Civil War

Hawiye clan
- Abgal subclan—Ali Mahdi Mohamed
- Habr Gidr subclan—Mohamed Farah Aideed

Darod clan
- Marehan subclan—Mohamed Siad Barre
- Majerteen subclan—Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan)
- Ogaden subclan—Ahmed Omar Jess

Isaaq clan

Dir clan—northwestern element
Dir clan—southern element

Rahanwein clan

Major Clan-Based Political and Military Organizations Active in the Somali Civil War

Somali Democratic Association (SDA)
Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Mohamed Farah Aideed’s branch of the USC)
Somali National Front (SNF)
Somali National Movement (SNM)
Somali Patriotic Front (SPF)
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) (Ali Mahdi Mohamed’s branch of the USC)
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
Somali Salvation Front (SSF)
Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
United Somali Congress (USC)
Appendix G: Participating Nations

EASTERN EXIT

*Amphibious NEO from U.S. embassy in Mogadishu*

United States only.

PROVIDE RELIEF

*U.S. support operations during UNOSOM I*

Primarily United States; small participation by Canada, France, and Germany.

RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF

*About thirty-seven thousand personnel from twenty-two coalition nations*

Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe.

CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II

*About thirty thousand personnel from twenty-nine coalition nations*

Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe.

UNITED SHIELD

*About 16,500 personnel from seven coalition nations*

Bangladesh, France, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States.
Appendix H: General Zinni’s Considerations for Humanitarian and Peace Operations

One of the United States military’s most experienced leaders in the field of MOOTW, General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), has developed the following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations:

• Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a single experience.

• Each operation has two key aspects: (1) the degree of complexity of the operation, and (2) the degree of consent of the involved parties and the international community for the operation.

• The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.

• Start planning as early as possible, including everyone in the planning process.

• Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.

• Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determining the centers of gravity, end state, commander’s intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated duration of the operation.

• Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid mission creep and allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision, made by the political leadership in consultation with the military commander, responding to a changing situation.

• Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows subordinate commanders to make appropriate adjustments to meet their individual situation or rapidly changing conditions.

• Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish coordination mechanisms that include political, military, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the interested parties.

• Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decisionmakers are. We must know how the involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own culture.

• Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.

• Don’t lose the initiative and momentum.
• Don’t make unnecessary enemies. If you do, don’t treat them gently. Avoid mindsets or use words that might come back to haunt you.

• Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams between organizations and involved parties.

• Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.

• Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.

• Personalities often are more important than processes. You need the right people in the right places.

• Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who you invite to participate, use as a go-between, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influence in the process.

• Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the image, humanitarian or as firm but well-intentioned agent of change, ensure your troops are aware of it so they can conduct themselves accordingly.

• Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and psychological operations are coordinated, accurate, and consistent.

• Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and military interoperability are crucial to success. The interests, cultures, capabilities, and motivations of all the parties may not be uniform, but they cannot be allowed to work against each other.

• Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness and understanding of their roles. The commander and the staff need to develop and apply new skills, such as negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively and appropriately, and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.

Appendix I: Major Events Chronology

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Somalia gains independence from Italy and Great Britain; forms Somali Republic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Military coup by Mohamed Siad Barre, who establishes Supreme Revolutionary Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Revolution begins in earnest against Siad Barre, brutally resisted. Army and air force bombard Hargeisa and Burao, creating three hundred thousand refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Hawiye clan forms the United Somali Congress (USC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Manifesto Group in Mogadishu calls for Siad Barre’s resignation and national reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Somali civil war flares up; Mogadishu in chaos, social and political collapse. U.S. Navy and Marines evacuate U.S. embassy under fire, in Operation EASTERN EXIT. Siad Barre suffers defeat and flees from Mogadishu and then from Somalia. Clan-based factions begin struggle for control of Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>(May) Last effort to recapture Mogadishu by Siad Barre’s militia is defeated. (August) President H. W. Bush orders airlift of supplies into Somalia, in Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. (December) Naval expeditionary force lands in Mogadishu (Operation RESTORE HOPE). U.S. forces under UNITAF build up in Somalia to protect humanitarian relief operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>(May) Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II begins operations in relief of UNITAF. (June) Pakistani troops under UNOSOM II are ambushed, twenty-four killed. UN and United States respond with operations to capture Aideed and minimize his SNA faction. (3–4 October) Battle of Mogadishu (“Black Hawk Down” incident) occurs. President Clinton announces U.S. intent to evacuate Somalia no later than 31 March 1994. U.S. builds up forces under JTF SOMALIA, primarily for defensive purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>U.S. forces under JTF SOMALIA complete buildup, then prepare to redeploy. Last U.S. elements depart Somalia, in a tactical amphibious withdrawal. U.S. naval expeditionary forces conduct withdrawal (Operation QUICK DRAW).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>UN announces intention to withdraw all forces and personnel from Somalia. U.S. naval expeditionary forces conduct amphibious evacuation of UN troops and personnel. (28 February–3 March 1995) Last of UNOSOM II forces conduct tactical withdrawal, under Operation UNITED SHIELD.</td>
</tr>
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### Appendix J: Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>字母</th>
<th>缩写</th>
<th>含义</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>AAAV</td>
<td>Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle [now Expeditionary Assault Vehicle]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>AAV</td>
<td>amphibious assault vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>AFOE</td>
<td>assault follow-on echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Army Prepositioned Stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>amphibious readiness group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>amphibious task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>ATU</td>
<td>amphibious task unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>AWSS</td>
<td>authorized weapons storage site [cantonment areas]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CATF</td>
<td>Commander, Amphibious Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CEF</td>
<td>Command Element Forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>[U.S.] Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Council of Islamic Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CISE</td>
<td>CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Task Force; Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>Commander, Landing Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOT</td>
<td>civil-military operations team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPF</td>
<td>Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civilian Reserve Air Fleet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSE</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Element</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>combined task force; Commander, Task Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>carrier battle group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>evacuation control center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team [Marine Corps]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIE</td>
<td>fly-in echelon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FIST</td>
<td>Fleet Imagery Support Terminal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSS</td>
<td>fast sealift ship</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSSG</td>
<td>Force Service Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>ground-controlled approach</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>ground combat element</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAST</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance survey team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRO</td>
<td>humanitarian relief organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRS</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Sector</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operations Planning and Execution System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>Joint Psychological Operations Task Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSB</td>
<td>Joint Support Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASH</td>
<td>lighter aboard ship</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAV</td>
<td>Light Armored Vehicle</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LCAC</td>
<td>Landing Craft, Air Cushion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (general purpose, multipurpose)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (dock)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKA</td>
<td>attack cargo ship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>amphibious transport dock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPH</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (helicopter)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>Logistics Support Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>landing ship dock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>landing ship tank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARAD</td>
<td>Maritime Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARFOR</td>
<td>Marine Corps forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCCDC</td>
<td>Marine Corps Combat Development Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCDP</td>
<td>Marine Corps doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>mine countermeasures</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MEB  Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF  Marine expeditionary force
MEU  Marine expeditionary unit
MEU (SOC)  Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MFA  Marine Forces Afloat
MOOTW  military operations other than war
MPF  Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS  maritime prepositioning ship
MPSRon  Maritime Prepositioned Ships squadron
MSC  Military Sealift Command
MTMC  Military Traffic Management Command
MV  motor vessel
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT  [U.S.] Naval Forces, Central Command
NCA  National Command Authority
NDRF  National Defense Reserve Fleet
NEO  noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO  nongovernmental organization
NSC  National Security Council
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OFDA  Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance [element of USAID]
OIC  Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OMFTS  Operational Maneuver from the Sea
OPP  offload preparation party
PhibGru  amphibious group
PhibRon  amphibious squadron
POTF  Psychological Operations Task Force
PSYOPS  psychological operations
PVO  private voluntary organization
QRF  quick-reaction force
RLT  Regimental Landing Team
ROE  rule(s) of engagement
ROWPU  reverse osmosis water purification unit
RPG  rocket-propelled grenade
RRF  Ready Reserve Force
SACB  Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SAIC  Science Applications International Corporation
SDA  Somali Democratic Alliance
SDM  Somali Democratic Movement
SEAL  Sea-Air-Land [Navy special operations]
SLRP  Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SNA  Somali National Alliance
SNDU  Somali National Democratic Union
SNF  Somali National Front
SNM  Somali National Movement
SNU  Somali National Union
SPF  Somali Patriotic Front
SPM  Somali Patriotic Movement
SPMAGTF  special-purpose Marine air-ground task force
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary-General [United Nations]
SSA  Somali Salvation Alliance
SSDF
Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF
Somali Salvation Front
SSNM
Southern Somali National Movement
STOM
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
T
T-AK
cargo ship [MSC operated]
TALCE
tanker airlift control element
TARPS
Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photo System
TFG
Transitional Federal Government
TOW
Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided [M-220 anti-tank missile]
TPFDD
time-phased force deployment data
U
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF
Unified Task Force [UN authorized, US led]
UNLSC
UN Logistics Support Command
UNOSOM
United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR
United Nations Protection Force
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
USA
U.S. Army
USAID
U.S. Agency for International Development
USC
United Somali Congress
USF
United Somali Front
USFOR
United States Forces in Somalia
USLO
U.S. Liaison Office
USMC
U.S. Marine Corps
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USP</td>
<td>United Somali Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL</td>
<td>vertical/short takeoff and landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme [UN Agency]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization [UN Agency]</td>
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</table>
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