Realizing the Navy’s Operational Level C2 Concept: MOC Standardization

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For Issue #5, July 2015
Last Updated: Wednesday July 08, 2015 12:54

In early 2005, the Secretary of Defense issued a memo titled “Policy Implementation to Improve Formation and Sustainment of Joint Task Force Headquarters” to accelerate the military’s ability to command and control an integrated force. This required service components to establish and refine the ability to conduct, coordinate, and integrate operations both vertically and horizontally across a range of military operations. While for decades the Navy had improved its C2 construct at the tactical level through the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept, there was still no standardized approach to C2 in the maritime domain that would seamlessly employ forces in a joint environment across AOR’s to effectively establish working relationships with other Service components or functional commands. In 2007, ADM Gary Roughead published our Enabling Concept for Maritime Command and Control at the operational level with the objective of building an effective, agile, networked, and scalable Maritime Operations Center (MOC) that employs common doctrine, standardized processes and common C4I systems able to operate not only between maritime AORs, but in a diverse joint, interagency and multinational environment.

In 2008, MOCs initially diversified and tailored their capabilities to meet their associated Combatant Commander (CCDR) mission requirements. By 2013, MOCs had come full circle, with Fleet Commanders looking for guidance as to what the MOC was built to do, what the mission limits of the maritime operational HQ should be, and how the MOCs were to be programmatically resourced. From a programmatic standpoint, the eight different MOC footprints were simply unsustainable, and the expected warfighting responsibilities of the Fleet HQ were unclear.

In October, 2012, ADM Bill Gortney directed a Readiness Kill Chain (RKC) analysis of the operational level (OL) headquarters (HQ) as a weapon system. His intent was to examine the Navy HQ, particularly at the fleet HQ, as a warfighting capability. In his guidance to U.S. Fleet Forces and subordinates, he described RKC as, “the end-to-end process for ensuring tight coordination across Fleets, SYSCOMs, and TYCOMs, and other partners throughout the readiness production battle space.” There were two immediate challenges when applying the RKC construct to the OL HQ, particularly the supporting MOC organization: (1) OL HQ do not train through FRTP phases, which is a critical phase of the means applied in ways to achieve readiness ends, and (2) there is no type commander (TYCOM) to manage procurement and acquisition for the MOCs. The most immediate barriers to readiness were the lack of defined standard MOC requirements, the lack of MOC governance, and a missing process to ensure alignment to a MOC standard (MOC certification). In short, there was no common definition for MOC-supported missions, functions, tasks, or procedures, and no way to resource or enforce a standard. The overarching guidance for MOCs was limited to doctrine (NWP 3-32, NTTP 3-32.1, and NWP 5-01), which are not authoritative and do not represent requirements policy. In the
absence of Navy guidance and policy, procurement strategies, or acquisition processes, and
without a common end, the fleet HQs were left to follow combatant commander guidance
alone. The “as is” analysis determined the MOCs supported eight individual fleet
commanders that were loosely organized around Navy doctrine, but were not positioned to
be interoperable, as directed by the CNO during the MOCs inception (CNO’s Guidance,
2009). The proposed solution to these barriers centered around promulgating a MOC
standard requirements document that includes MOC missions, functions, tasks (MF&T), and
procedures; the manning, training, and materiel resources to support MF&T and
procedures; a governance structure to drive MOC guidance; and a certification process to
ensure fleet-wide alignment.

The work to define a MOC standard is the result of over 18 months of “MOC
Standardization OPT” coordination between MOC stakeholders, to include US Fleet Forces
(USFF) N1, N2, N3, N6, N7, and N8; Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF) N3 and N7;
Commander, Third Fleet (C3F) N3 and N7; Tactical Training Group, Pacific
(TACTRAGRPAC); Tactical Training Group, Atlantic (TACTRAGRULANT); Commander, Tenth
Fleet (C10F) N3 and N7; Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC); Naval War
College’s (NWC) College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL); and OPNAV
N2/N6. As the product was developed, it was further staffed with trusted agents and MOC
process drivers at each fleet HQ, to include MOC directors, “N-heads”, functional directors,
branch heads, center and cell leads, and MOC training officers. The focus of the standard
was two-fold: (1) to define the standard fleet HQ missions, fleet HQ functions, as well as
OL mission-essential tasks (METs) and implied functional tasks the MOC supports, and (2)
to determine the manning, training, and equipment (MT&E) necessary for the MOCs to
support standard missions, functions, and tasks (MF&T) adequately.

**Standard fleet HQ Missions and Functions**

Service component commanders are assigned operational missions by their combatant
commanders, both in relatively stable conditions (theater security cooperation and shaping
operations) as well as contingency operations (military-led warfighting contingencies,
humanitarian support, or other limited non-military-led support). Likewise, each service is
required to support Title 10 and force provider missions. The Navy has designated fleet
commanders to fulfill each of these missions with the fleet HQ personnel assigned. Although fleet HQ have always managed the work required to prepare and provide the maritime force to combatant commanders, they may not always have been designated to employ that force in an operational manner (depending on theater). Over the past ten years, the Navy has developed the organizational construct to prepare and provide the force, as well as employ the force, by task organizing the HQ into a maritime HQ (MHQ) construct and a MOC construct. In short, the fleet HQ functions to prepare, provide, and employ the force using the MHQ and MOC task organizations. Each of these organizations also do something that all HQ elements do: support their commander’s decision-making process, and set the conditions to allow their subordinate commanders to succeed by synchronizing, planning, and coordinating operations between them and other joint, multinational, and inter-organizational commands and agencies. Although these are separate task organizations, each organization is supported largely by the same group of HQ personnel.

Though each fleet HQ defined their missions and functions uniquely, based on theater perspective, they all identify with the common construct described above. The MOC Standardization OPT determined that, although every fleet commander prepares and provides the force to accomplish Title 10 and force provider missions very differently (and to greater or lesser extent), the MOC tasks and processes to support the commander’s employment of the force are relatively common. ADM Gortney provided further guidance to focus on the warfighting aspect of the fleet HQ: The MOC. Using this approved operational mission and function standard for the fleet HQ, the MOC Standardization OPT was able to determine the essential tasks critical to each fleet commanders’ success, and the organizational-level MOC supporting tasks to address the missions associated with employing the force.

METs and MOC Supporting Tasks

As every operational planner knows, essential tasks are identified as those that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. As such, METs are most directly related to the commander’s ability to accomplish an objective, and are of high enough importance that inability to achieve the task typically spells mission failure. Therefore, since the elements of the commander’s decision-making process are monitor, assess, plan, direct, and communicate, these must be essential to effectively provide guidance and intent to the force. Likewise, since the CNO and Navy doctrine dictate that the force is built, prepared and provided to support combatant commanders by employing core capabilities (deterrence, maritime security, sustained forward presence, sea control, power projection), and has historically provided maritime forces for non-DoD led operations (non-combat support), the fleet commander must set conditions for the employment of these capabilities. If any of these tasks are not accomplished, the fleet commander risks mission failure based on the tenets of sound decision-making, mission command, and maritime strategy.

Each of these essential tasks cannot be achieved without an underlying set of supporting tasks. In and of themselves, they do not define mission success or failure. Collectively, they contribute to the accomplishment of their associated MET. The MOC Standardization OPT used Navy and joint doctrine, observed MOC effective practices over the past seven years of operations, and established TTP to develop not only the supporting functional and cross-functional organizational tasks to support the fleet commander’s METs, but also the extensive procedures that define each supporting task. In total, the OPT defined 177 supporting tasks, and over 2,000 procedures that the MOC conducts during routine operations, contingency operations, or both to support the fleet commander’s METs and missions. These supporting tasks were identified through mission analysis based on real-world operational missions assigned to fleet commanders, compared to existing UJTL tasks, and chosen based on ADM Gortney’s guidance to define 80% commonality between MOCs. Although these tasks were specifically targeted to support the commander in a maritime operational role (NCC, JFMCC, or CFMCC), they also set a useful baseline of competencies and processes that are closely related to tasks that would support the commander in a JTF role. The translation necessary to support this joint role would require a higher perspective: one of setting conditions for functional components versus subordinate maritime forces (CTFs / tactical maritime TF HQ).
MOC Resource Requirements: Manning, Training, and Equipping (MT&E)

Fleet HQ missions and functions, fleet HQ operational METs, and MOC supporting tasks were briefed to and approved by fleet leadership, to include all numbered fleet commanders, COMPACFLT, and COMUSFLTFORCOM, and represented the basis for determining the required resources to support the standard MOC. This was a necessary "next step", to identify what doctrine could not: a Navy resource requirement for a MOC MT&E to support the approved MF&T. Although the standard MOC MF&T will eventually form the basis for all DOTMLPF "ways" in the MOC’s RKC, such as MOC facilities, the initial guidance from ADM Gortney was to solve the manning, training, and equipment support equation, based on the number of gaps identified in the RKC analysis. Specifically, he required MOCs to be standardized in capability and capacity.

MOC manning was the looming challenge. The initial assumption by the OPT was MOC standard “capacity” was related to a number, an assumption that was reasonably refuted by observing the MOCs in practice. It was necessary to follow the manpower practice of equating work and time to a “man-hour” in order to determine the requirement. Although all MOCs exhibit variables in work-load, based on the amount of time and people dedicated to the 2000+ procedures the OPT identified, there was one consistent factor: the designated MOC process drivers, or leads for each procedure. The result of associating a common process driver position title to each of the 2000+ procedures was a list of the 94 most critical positions to driving the MOC work: the Core MOC Positions. No position was developed before they could be associated with the responsibility to lead a procedure. In other words, the OPT did not develop a list of common people and “fit” them to the task and procedure; rather, the OPT identified procedures, and worked from the bottom up to determine the position that drives each process. The personnel who support the Core MOC Positions were not identified because of the many variables associated with each fleet. The work of identifying MOC Support personnel was left to the Command Manpower Analysis Team (CMAT), who routinely conduct Shore Manpower Requirements Determinations (SMRD) for each Navy shore command. Based on interviews with Core MOC Position personnel in each MOC, the CMAT can determine the unique MOC Support positions required to fulfill each task and procedure. This will ultimately account for the manning differences from fleet to fleet. However, there is still MOC Standardization OPT work to be done to determine if there is some commonality between large footprints of MOC Support personnel, particularly watch floor personnel, intelligence analyst teams, and IT support. This work will be informed by the initial MOC Certifications to be conducted between FY15 and FY17.

MOC equipping was another challenge, but was approached in the same manner. No system, application, or network was identified as a MOC standard in a vacuum. Each of the 177 supporting tasks was examined to determine the minimum essential "equipment" necessary to plan, synchronize, coordinate, collaborate, staff, and distribute operational information to convey commander’s intent, set conditions for subordinates’ success, and coordinate with peer commands and stakeholders, as well as HHQ. With the help of Navy Information Dominance Forces (NAVIDFOR) and the existing MOC Materiel Working Group, a MOC standard materiel core baseline and mission build (CB/MB) was developed to fulfill the requirements identified in these tasks. As with Core MOC Positions, the loss of each system, application, or network identified in the CB/MB has tangible impact on the ability to conduct the 177 supporting tasks, based on the materiel associations the OPT made.

Finally, training the MOC has been done fairly effectively through the MOC Training Continuum for the past four years. However, there were three substantial barriers identified during the RKC analysis that had to be addressed: (1) the severe cut-back in joint training events (primarily CCDR exercises) that fulfilled "tier III / component" training objectives, (2) the loss of senior mentors to support fleet commanders during exercise events, and (3) the lack of sustainable MOC-to-CTF exercise capability (Navy tier III to tier IV) to link OL to TL processes in a training environment. Although the loss of senior mentors may be mitigated over time, this barrier proved to be a policy decision above the OPT’s ability to address solutions. However, the first and third barriers could be addressed with an organic Navy OL exercise capability, in order to resource and provide OL-to-TL exercise events that could make both the tier III (MOC) and tier IV (CTF) HQ elements a primary training audience. The Fleet Synthetic Training-Operational (FST-O) capability was a POM 17.
submission to address this barrier, and it has received limited execution year funding support to build a core framework and support MOC Certifications. It also heavily leverages the tactical Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE) capability to gain cost efficiencies and align OL and TL HQ training in a common exercise construct.

**MOC Certification**

ADM Gortney and ADM Harris made their intent clear to reinstitute a certification process to monitor both MOC adherence to the standard, and provide a feedback mechanism to identify resource shortfalls. They wanted to ensure MOC standardization through a disciplined certification process, using common metrics to measure capacity and capability. “Certification” is an emotionally charged word with a great deal of baggage. The intent was to use these certification events in the true sense of the word, as defined by Webster’s; “to say officially that something or someone has met certain standards or requirements.” In this case, the Navy overall is held to a standard to deliver manning, training, and equipping to support the fleet MOC if the MOC can demonstrate that it meets certain MF&T standards. The Navy leadership intent was clear – to not only ensure MOCs are supporting CCDRs as the Navy intends, but to also identify shortfalls that must be addressed in BSO and POM funding priorities. In November 2015, USFF will be the first MOC certified based on the current proposed schedule.

**MOC Governance**

One of the overarching themes in the analysis of RKC barriers is the lack of a “MOC TYCOM” to provide oversight, prioritize, coordinate, and decide on MOC resourcing issues. Most notably, the lack of a TYCOM makes governance of MOC systems and personnel difficult, particularly providing and balancing these resources to ensure fleet commanders can meet their mission requirements. Much of the current MOC infrastructure has been built through three- and four-star direct dialogue, ad-hoc installation and assignment, and extensive leveraging through the respective CCDR. The CNO’s intent for interoperable MOCs was hampered by the lack of a detailed standard for resource sponsors that supported the MOC requirements. To address this barrier, the DNS assigned responsibility for governing the MOCs to Commander, US Fleet Forces (CUSFF) and Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF) jointly. To facilitate joint governance, CUSFF and CPF co-chair a Fleet MOC Standardization Council (FMSC) decision process with all fleet commanders and USFF and CPF Directors of Maritime Operations as supported members, and NWC, NWDC, and NAVIFFOR involved as supporting commanders. The flag-level Executive Steering Committee (ESC) is supported by an O6-level Executive Working Group (EWG) and action-officer level working groups to define resource and standardization gaps in manning, training, equipping, and requirements. The working groups are informed by the certification process for each individual MOC’s requirements, but may also coordinate each fleet commander’s concerns directly through MOC representatives within each group. The working groups also propose DOTMLPF solutions and timelines to address these barriers to readiness. In this process, CUSFF and CPF make decisions within their own budget submission office (BSO) authorities to resource shortfalls, approve changes to the standard, and collaborate with OPNAV for long-term / POM solutions, as necessary. By intent, the FMSC process is designed to provide the level of governance any TYCOM would provide, leveraging cross-MOC representation to ensure individual MOC concerns are addressed, while also considering impact to the whole enterprise.

**Return on Investment**

In time, MOC requirements will rise to the visibility and priority level that Navy leadership intended, based on a new, tangible standard. The standard has been embraced by fleet commanders and MOC process drivers alike as “a good start,” a point from which to adjust based on the CNO’s intent, joint requirements, emerging warfighting capabilities, and the advancing threat. If the MOC standard is to maintain relevance, it must maintain pace with the changing operational environment, as well as the way the Navy intends to integrate vertically and horizontally from the operational to the tactical level and across the joint force. The true test of relevance for the MOC standard will be the level of commitment that fleet commanders and their staffs dedicate to the process of aggregating Navy operational
and tactical readiness, improving OL to TL alignment, and providing CCDRs with a cohesive maritime warfighting force from the operational level down.

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1 USFF Commander’s Vision and Guidance, October 2012
2 NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, December 2013, pg. 2-8.

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