Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry

Mark Shulman

Lyle J. Goldstein

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examples of the writer's art will be pleasantly surprised, for thought-provoking and fascinating assertions abound. For example, Whaley believes that some societies are more deceptive than others, "but only during any given slice of time." Deception is also, according to Whaley, a mind game that can be learned, although certain types of people, including magicians and practical jokers, may find the game easier to master.

Despite taking the reader on a rather fast-paced ride over centuries of deception efforts, Whaley makes several points with care. The first is that deception operations are not guaranteed success. Two failures cited are the Bay of Pigs invasion, for which Whaley holds CIA veteran Richard Bissell responsible, and the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission, with Jody Powell coming in for censure. The second point is that deception operations are not important in and of themselves; they are only as important as the degree to which they support the commander's operational plan and allow the attainment of desired objectives. As we face a future in which deception operations can be expected to flourish, Whaley's cautionary note is well worth remembering.

RICHARD J. NORTON


Numerous Western observers—expert and otherwise—have opined about the implications of the rise of China. A small number address the implications for hundreds of millions of people who have moved from subsistence living into the middle classes. A few more address the consequences for the world's economy, environment, or rule of law. But most focus on an emerging rivalry with the United States and the possibility it will lead to superpower conflict. Of these, Naval War College professor Lyle Goldstein is virtually alone in mapping out specific plans to avoid friction, de-escalate tensions, and cultivate peaceful coexistence; the others offer "realist" solutions designed to isolate, deter, or defeat China.

Dr. Goldstein—the founding director of the College's China Maritime Studies Institute, and fluent in Mandarin—brings the right tools to the task of analyzing the United States–China rivalry and setting a course toward peaceful coexistence. A political scientist with strong appreciation for the influence of history on strategy, he has read widely in Chinese and English to understand how academics and leaders in each country view their nation's experience, interests, and destiny. By sorting out these perspectives, Goldstein works like a mediator to chart the narrow and winding pathways to trust and cooperation. He dedicates nine chapters to distinct issues that divide the United States and China, categorized by region (for instance, Japan or the South China Sea) or by sector (the economy or the environment). After describing the overall picture, each chapter examines interpretations in the West and then in China, offering particularly valuable insights into the perspectives of Chinese military and strategic thought leaders.

Having toured the strategic horizon and explained the relevant attitudes and interests, the author then lays out "cooperation spirals"—plans whereby...
each side can take concrete, sequential steps to reduce the threat they are perceived to pose and to increase opportunities for cooperation. These plans generally start out small, then grow in ambition. Many focus on measures that reduce the appearance of an aggressive U.S. militarized posture—for example, standing down AFRICOM or reducing the number of troops stationed on Okinawa. In recognition of the fact that the United States can afford some rebalancing, subsequent steps include expanding China’s military commitments—for instance, to a joint antipiracy force for Aden or a trip-wire force based in North Korea. Meeting China halfway is not just a slogan. Goldstein understands that the Chinese (indeed, much of the world) view America’s history as one of nearly continuous aggression, and they need to see retrenchment before they will trust the United States not to threaten their regime.

Written in 2014 and published in 2015, the book is still highly topical and informative about Chinese-U.S. relations, and the concept of cooperation spirals remains appealing. Readers will note, however, that we live in interesting times. The Philippines’ position has undergone two dramatic shifts, first in prevailing in the South China Sea arbitration and then with the election of Rodrigo Duterte and the subsequent warming toward China. Likewise, the new U.S. president, Donald Trump, canceled the Trans-Pacific Partnership, announced a withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, and is taking a much more aggressive attitude toward Iran—each of which moots one of Goldstein’s cooperation spirals. Finally, China’s trillion-dollar commitment to the Belt and Road project likewise signals a shift in ambition and interests. So, while Goldstein’s insights and his concept for reconciliation remain powerful, policy makers today will need a new set of plans.

This remains an important book for anyone seeking to understand U.S.-Chinese relations, particularly those seeking peaceful solutions so as to avoid the so-called Thucydides trap.

MARK R. SHULMAN


Admiral James Stavridis’s maritime opus, Sea Power, is a tour de force that ranges across the global commons of the world’s vast sea-lanes and both near-littoral and distant shores. With four decades of distinguished maritime service in the U.S. Navy, the admiral (now retired) is uniquely qualified to evaluate current geopolitical maritime realities. Stavridis brings that strategic perspective to his historical contextualization of how and why oceans have impacted seafaring and landlocked civilizations and nation-states differentially.

Stavridis is a prolific author, having first been published, early in his naval officer career, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. As someone who has embodied that institution’s motto to “dare to write, think, and speak to advance the understanding of sea power,” he now fittingly serves as chair of the institute. As he does in that role, in Sea Power Stavridis continues to lead and shape the intellectual conversation surrounding sea power and the sea services.