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## Hunters and Killers, Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943

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Prussia created by Frederick the Great and his father Frederick William II” (p. 16) undermine the author’s credibility. Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also known as the Aulic Council” (p. 24); they were very different entities.

Maps are an issue as well. The maps in this book would have been considered archaic fifty years ago; today they are abominable and practically illegible—a magnifying glass might be of some assistance. Any operational study depends on good maps to help the reader understand the course of the campaigns, but this reviewer gave up on trying to use this book’s maps.

It is difficult to state where this book fits in the massive literature on the Napoleonic Wars. This study can be seen as an extension of Robert M. Epstein’s 1994 work *Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War*. Kuehn does accomplish his stated goal of describing the Napoleonic “campaigns, armies, and leaders using the lens of operational art” (p. 10). However, the descriptions of the campaigns are not detailed enough for any but a Napoleonic Wars expert to grasp the points that Kuehn is trying to make. He admits that some will object to his use of twentieth-century military theory to explain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century events (p. xi). Kuehn does have moments of brilliance, especially in the chapters on the evolution of the operational art and the naval duel, as well as the short paragraphs he employs to summarize his chapters, but in the end an analysis based on outdated scholarship provides a weak foundation that jeopardizes the stability of the entire structure.

MICHAEL V. LEGGIERE



*Hunters and Killers*, by Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman. Vol. 2, *Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 272 pages. \$49.95.

*Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943* is the second volume in a comprehensive history of the impact of the submarine on maritime warfare. Engaging their significant expertise in the history of naval warfare and military technology research and development, authors Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman chronicle the development and employment of the submarine as a weapon of war at sea and the resulting response by navies to counter the effectiveness of the submarine through antisubmarine warfare (ASW). This book examines submarine and antisubmarine technology, tactics, and doctrine chronologically, commencing with World War II submarine operations in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminating with twenty-first-century ASW concepts and contemporary issues.

This history captures the asymmetry between the submarine and antisubmarine warfare as these two forms of maritime warfare competed for tactical and operational superiority. The book discusses contributions the science and technology community made to ASW, as well as the actions of operational and tactical innovators. The scientists and innovators collectively developed ASW capabilities that reignited further competition between the submarine and the ASW operator. The book’s chronological approach studies the pace and trajectory of evolutionary and revolutionary changes in submarine operations and antisubmarine warfare by explaining the tactical and operational

challenges facing submarines and ASW forces. The authors then describe and assess the subsequent reactions of navies to mitigate or eliminate each advantage. The book stimulates the reader to assess retrospectively the inflection points at which the hunters became the hunted.

Of particular value is the authors' examination of antisubmarine warfare across the broad spectrum of ASW methods, technology, doctrine, and tactics. *Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943* includes study of the contributions to antisubmarine warfare made by ships, submarines, and aircraft, but also the maturing science and technologies that enabled other forms of ASW. For example, the book explains the development and employment of acoustic systems by describing the development and use of active and passive shipborne, air, and fixed sonar systems. In addition, the authors examine the impact on ASW of nonacoustic methods, illuminating the important contributions made by espionage, cryptographic systems and communication intercepts, electromagnetic effects, infrared and laser systems, and subsurface wake detection.

In the first four chapters of *Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943*, the authors evaluate submarine warfare and antisubmarine warfare during World War II in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Numerous engagements are detailed describing the tactical contributions of World War II ASW ships, aircraft, and submarines to U.S. and Allied efforts to wrest the advantage away from the Axis submarine force. The book captures the multidomain approach to the period's ASW operations. Not surprisingly in a study of antisubmarine warfare after World War II, five chapters of the book identify and analyze

Cold War influences on submarine operations and antisubmarine warfare. This history captures the nature and intensity of the U.S.-USSR Cold War ASW competition. That competition is placed in the context of national military strategies, technological developments, operational doctrines, and tactics. These chapters reflect on submarine and antisubmarine warfare during a long period of not-quite-war, but definitely not peace, in the security environment.

*Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943* is a holistic study of antisubmarine warfare that provides an opportunity to think critically about history's most impactful developments in submarine warfare and ASW operations. Readers might expect the authors to engage their expert knowledge of ASW history to assess which events or developments in anti-submarine warfare were most impactful in the competitive and dynamic relationship between the submarine and ASW forces, but the authors allow readers to develop their own assessments and judge the short-term and enduring significance of ASW technological and tactical initiatives and developments over the history of antisubmarine warfare.

*Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943* will be of great interest to readers with tactical and technical ASW experience. For an ASW expert, the book offers the opportunity to reflect on previously obtained knowledge and experience and holistically reflect on antisubmarine warfare and submarine operations across the broad spectrum of ASW concepts. For the ASW novice, this book provides historical perspective on and context for decades of ASW developments. An appealing feature of this book is that the authors eliminate the incredibly detailed technical parameters that can

dominate any discussion or assessment of ASW operations. For the reader seeking that type of detail, the book's extensive footnotes and bibliography are valuable sources for research on several types of technical information, tactics, and historical events.

*Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943* stimulates the reader to think critically about the trends and inflection points in the lethal relationship between the submarine and ASW operations.

SEAN SULLIVAN



*Honor before Glory: The Epic World War II Story of the Japanese-American GIs Who Rescued the Lost Battalion*, by Scott McGaugh. Boston: Da Capo, 2016. 304 pages. \$25.99.

What is as stirring as a tale of a “lost battalion”? The story elements are simple. A hard-fighting group of American soldiers gets out in front of advancing troops and eventually is surrounded by the enemy. A prolonged fight ensues as the battalion fights for its life, while other U.S. and allied forces mount repeated attempts to find and then rescue the lost battalion.

Perhaps the most famous of all U.S. lost battalions was a force of slightly more than 550 men, primarily from the 308th Battalion of the 77th Division, during the Meuse-Argonne offensive of October 1918. Low on food, water, and other supplies, the battalion withstood repeated German attacks for six days. When finally “rescued,” the battalion had only 194 men. On relief of the 308th, the battalion's commander, a bespectacled major from Wisconsin named Charles Whittlesey, was promoted

immediately and soon after received the Congressional Medal of Honor.

In World War II, the title of “the lost battalion” was worn by the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment of the Army's 36th Infantry Division. The 141st was a Texas National Guard outfit and, like the 308th twenty-six years earlier, it had its brush with fame during a wet and cold October in France. On October 23, 1944, the 141st was ordered to advance into the Vosges Mountains. Members of the 141st were assured that a “strong force” would follow them. The terrain was steep and heavily forested, with but a single logging road. The Germans, with their usual tenacity and competent generalship, conducted a tenacious defense over ground they knew well.

The battalion made good progress on the 23rd, advancing four miles along the logging road, and the advance continued the next day; the battalion reached its objective after covering six more miles. Shortly afterward the Germans conducted a heavy artillery bombardment. An effort was made to reinforce the battalion with light tanks and artillery, but it failed owing to the dense forest. By dusk, the 1st Battalion was surrounded—cut off from resupply, medical aid, and reinforcements. If not relieved, destruction by or surrender to the Germans appeared inevitable.

Major General John Dahlquist, commanding the 36th Division, set about organizing a relief. He chose the 442nd Regimental Combat Team to serve as his primary assault force. Although the 442nd troops had just been taken off the line for some well-deserved rest and resupply, their reputation as highly competent assault troops was a major factor in Dahlquist's decision.