The Ashgate Research Companion to Military Ethics

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The editors and twenty-nine other contributors have produced an impressive collection of essays on military ethics, not “ethics and the military.” Thus, one will find nothing about false reporting, fraternization, abusive command climates, limitations on gifts, gays in the military, women in combat, contractor oversight, civil-military relations, hazing, rape, drug or alcohol abuse, suicide by service members, marital violence, postretirement employment restrictions, interservice rivalries, or headquarters politics (careerism).

The first of four parts addresses why a nation morally may use force. Pacifism of any variety is not considered; the Christian-based ideas of just war serve as the fundamental approach. Chapter 1 explains jus ad bellum (the state’s right to go to war) as seen by the approach’s classic founders from antiquity through Aquinas (Gregory M. Reichberg). Chapter 2 looks at very recent bases for the use of force (jus ad vim), including the “responsibility to protect” weakening the Westphalian idea of sovereign inviolability (Daniel R. Brunstetter). Chapters 3 and 4 examine current international law (Davis Brown) and the military’s role in decisions to use force (Martin L. Cook). The part’s final four chapters focus on “special problems” in resorting to force: preemption (Mary Manjikian), asymmetric warfare and terrorism (Keith Pavlischek), intervention in “failed states” and genocides (Luke Glanville), and weapons of mass destruction (Darrell Cole).

Half the book’s pages are devoted to part 2’s “Right Conduct in the Use of Military Force” (jus in bello). Chapters 9–12 discuss the ground of limitations on violence: from the just war tradition (J. Daryl Charles), from a Kantian perspective (Brian Orend), from several contemporary doctrines of human rights (Robert E. Williams, Jr.), and from international humanitarian law (Howard M. Hensel). Chapters 13 (Amos N. Guiora) and 14 (Pauletta Otis) address terrorism; chapters 15–18 explore the problems arising from targeting dual-use facilities (Paul Robinson), employing autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (James L. Cook), pursuing “targeted killing” of specific individuals (Laurie R. Blank), and conducting cyber warfare (George R. Lucas, Jr.). Chapters 19–21 explain recent academic debates about the moral equality of combatants (Henrik Syse), how to classify and treat prisoners and detainees (John Sawicki), and what—if anything—remains forbidden even to those with just cause whose enemies are fighting without restraint (David Whetham). Chapter 22 studies military ethics in peacekeeping operations (Bard Maeland); chapter 23 reviews the immense problems associated with justifying and enforcing noncombatant immunity (James Turner Johnson); and chapter 24 discusses the enigmatic topic of “proportionality” in contemporary armed conflict (Paul Gilbert).

Part 3 offers reflections on the recently developed topic of postconflict justice, jus post bellum. Chapters 25–28 consider who must take control at war’s end (Eric D. Patterson), how to fight with a future peace in mind (Timothy J. Demy), war crimes trials (Carla L. Reyes), and eventual reconciliation as an ethical military goal (Nigel Biggar).
Part 4 is a valuable addendum giving academic, primarily historical, reviews of military ethics in the Islamic (John Kelsay), Chinese (Ping-cheung Lo), and Indian (Torkel Brekke) traditions. The editors provide summary introductions to all four parts, and they asked the authors to begin each chapter with an abstract and to close with a conclusion section preceding a list of references. All three features are helpful.

Aptly titled a "research companion," this is a cutting-edge effort by many leading students of military ethics. I learned major things from every author; and while I especially admire certain chapters, other experts are likely to applaud different contributions most, depending on their own backgrounds. However, all the chapters are aimed at advanced scholars or the highest level of decision makers.

Finally, two critical remarks underscore scholarly responsibilities. The word guerrilla is spelled with a single r more than a score of times—even quoted materials repeatedly are mangled—in an otherwise laudable chapter by the volume's expert on unconventional warfare. Second, an author asserts that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was merely a matter of erroneous U.S. Navy reporting. While the Navy now judges that the night "battle" of 4 August 1964 never took place, no one doubts that the 2 August day engagement of USS Maddox (DD 731) and three North Vietnamese P-4 torpedo boats happened. (There were eyewitnesses and photographs; a Vietnamese 12.7 mm machine-gun round lodged in Maddox's superstructure; and in 1984 General Vo Nguyen Giap told former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara the attack was deliberate.) The lesson for all of us is that, in professional ethics, theories are interesting but facts matter, usually decisively.

THOMAS GRASSEY


Innovative, provocative, and compelling, Aaron Rapport's Waging War, Planning Peace offers a distinct perspective on U.S. failures in postwar stability and reconstruction operations since 1941. The disconnect between waging war and planning peace is the subject of this intriguing study that applies theories of national security policy to four historical case studies. A lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, Rapport examines how the ambitious state-building aims of U.S. presidents and senior advisers were consistently undermined by meager planning.

Rapport invokes "construal level theory" to explain postconflict reconstruction failures following World War II and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, arguing that the Roosevelt and Bush administrations projected confidence and visionary objectives for peace after the war without providing the necessary organizational support. In turn, failures following the Korean and Vietnam Wars are attributed to administrations that did not articulate end-state agendas and instead concentrated on immediate operational and military gains. The flaw common to the actors in all four historical studies is that kinetic aspects of the war were prioritized at the expense of postwar planning.