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Logistics in the Falklands War

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one-hundred-year life cycle for global hegemons, Liu names the champions: Portugal in the sixteenth century, Holland in the seventeenth century, Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and America in the twentieth century. Maybe China had a fleeting world championship title in the fifteenth century—not through colonial conquest, but through tributary recognition of the center of world power. Liu’s argument is that China is back—to claim the champion’s title in the twenty-first century.

The rest of the book elaborates how China can become the world champion by drawing on lessons from former and current champions, especially the United States. For instance, Liu notes that American strategy included an internal strengthening phase of isolationism under President Washington, a century of regional consolidation under the Monroe Doctrine, and world power generation under FDR’s globalism. He also likes America’s “cheap rise”: in other words, coming late to both world wars, but concluding those wars with the victor’s share of the spoils. Comparing China to America, Liu notes that China underwent domestic consolidation under Mao and Deng, and has its eye on being king of Asia, with the ultimate goal of being king of the world.

The first champion’s goal, toward achievement of which China is well on the way, is to become the wealthiest nation—because all world champions have been the wealthiest nation. All world champions have also been the strongest military power—hence the focus on martial spirit. In terms of strategy, Liu prefers Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, pointing out that China will seek to win without fighting. In what may seem like a non sequitur to Americans and many others, Liu continually repeats the theme that “the first nonhegemonic champion nation in history will appear, and that nation is China.” However, he also refers on multiple occasions to China as king, and the difference between kingly thinking and hegemonic thinking is ironically opaque. Liu refers to the United States as “one country, two systems,” meaning democracy at home and hegemony abroad. Since Liu prefers to see China exercise democracy abroad and hegemony at home, we could also refer to China as “one country, two systems,” but with practices inverted from those of the United States of his characterization.

For those who like the sporting analogy, the book is an entertaining read and an enticement to place one’s bets on the grand sporting event of world politics. On a more sober note, Liu’s world view rings more true to current Chinese policies than to those of five years ago. President Xi Jinping gave his “China Dream” speech in November 2012, apparently somewhat influenced by Liu Mingfu’s book of the same title published two years earlier. Thus, the recent translation is food for thought that should be chewed on by a wider Western audience now that it is available.

GRANT RHODE


Major General Kenneth Privratsky, USA (Ret.), highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics in this book about the Falklands War of 1982. Logistics in the
Falklands War is the result of years of research, begun when Privratsky was at the Army’s Command and General Staff College in the mid-1980s and continued while a fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Most of all, the author wants the reader to “appreciate the extent of the efforts behind the victory” rather than simply present a logistical view of lessons learned.

The book begins by examining British and Argentine claims on the Falkland Islands before walking through the sequence of Argentina’s invasion threat and subsequent invasion; Britain’s mobilization and deployment; combat operations; and the aftermath of the conflict. He highlights the key role of industry during the rapid mobilization. Commercial ships were quickly modified for the war. For example, the cruise ship Uganda was converted to a hospital ship in only sixty-five hours once it reached the shipyard. This included modifying its interior spaces for a clinic, surgical facilities, and labs; installing a helicopter deck; adding equipment to produce fresh water; and applying Red Cross markings. In total, fifty-four ships were taken up from trade, outnumbering the number of warships involved. Privratsky aptly describes the outload as rushed and gives readers a sense of being on the docks during the unchoreographed flurry of activity. Many converted commercial ships were designed only for pier-side off-loading; however, once in theater, supplies and equipment had to be transferred to vessels capable of shallow-water operations. Off-loading difficulties and concerns over Argentine air strikes sent Queen Elizabeth 2 home with “seventy percent of 5 Brigade’s 81 mm mortar and 105 mm gun ammunition . . . buried in lower decks.”

Privratsky argues convincingly that logistics was the center of gravity of the campaign. The movement of ammunition, supplies, and equipment—whether by shallow water–capable ships, helicopters, or backpacks—dictated the pace of the ground war. The author’s thorough research, including interviews, leads to a comprehensive description of the combat operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day, 21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982, at Port Stanley, the capital on the east shore of East Falkland. The British, with their firm resolve and their jointly trained and professional military forces, tirelessly got the right supplies to the right place. His vivid description of the harsh conditions on the Falkland Islands reinforces the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics. Nevertheless, although that integration was successful, “[b]y the time the Argentines surrendered in Stanley, some [British] artillery batteries were on their last rounds.”

In many ways, Britain embarked on a “come as you are, bring what you can” affair to reclaim the Falkland Islands from Argentina. The remote islands’ formidable terrain and inhospitable climate—along with the hostile Argentine military forces—exacerbated the difficulty of moving supplies and equipment, which directly impeded combat operations. As Privratsky writes, “Wars sometimes occur at times and in places least expected.” And a lack of bullets, beans, and fuel can cause unplanned pauses to a campaign plan or, worse yet, leave troops alone and exposed.

Privratsky firmly believes that effective combat operations are enabled by integrating combat and logistics units and
conducting realistic training. Privratsky’s insights could also apply to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off-loading equipment, or occurred in a remote location without prepositioned stores. Military operational planners and military history enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library.

CYNTHIA K. SEXTON


The Japanese invasion of Korea, known in the West as the Imjin War, has been largely overlooked by Western scholars. While Stephen Hawley’s *The Imjin War* and Kenneth Swopes’s *A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail* are excellent works, those wishing for a more thorough treatment of some of the issues leading to a deterioration of relations between Korea and Japan. Economic issues, including trade disputes, predominated in this section, and set the stage for a review of the war itself, which is the subject of the next part of the book, simply entitled “War.”

The nine chapters that compose the section on the Imjin War present the reader with a wealth of information previously unavailable to an English-language audience. These chapters rely almost exclusively on either primary-source material in Japanese and Korean or secondary sources from scholars in Korea, Japan, and China who have provided their own accounts and interpretations of this conflict. Each of the belligerents gets a thorough review, covering political, military, cultural, and social forces that shaped the six-year-long tragedy that has come to be known as the Imjin War. From a military perspective, readers will find plenty of groundbreaking information on the naval aspects of this war, which featured the largest maritime expedition in history up to that time. The valiant resistance put up by the Korean navy against the invading Japanese is worth a separate book in itself.

The third and final part of this book should not be overlooked. Examining the “impact and memory” of the Imjin War, these five final chapters provide the reader with a review of the ways in which this conflict helped shape attitudes among China, Korea, and Japan over the ensuing centuries. Whether through literature, art, or fashion, this conflict left a lasting impact that Western audiences would have had a difficult time discerning prior to the publication of this book.

There is a comprehensive glossary and index at the end of the book; however, the term “glossary” is a bit misleading,