In reflecting on the arc of US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan, three key issues related to the law of armed conflict stand out: one substantive, one procedural and one policy. The substantive matter—what are the minimum baseline treatment standards required as a matter of international law?—has clarified significantly during the course of operations there, largely as a result of the US Supreme Court’s holding in \textit{Hamdan v. Rumsfeld}. The procedural matter—what adjudicative processes does international law require for determining who may be detained?—eludes consensus and has become more controversial the longer the Afghan conflict has continued. And the policy matter—in waging counterinsurgency warfare, how do foreign military forces transition military detention operations to effective civilian institutions?—has emerged as a critical strategic priority for which the law of armed conflict provides little instructive guidance.

President Barack Obama’s determination to close Guantanamo while expanding US military commitments in Afghanistan will draw new public attention to these questions. After briefly explaining the basis of US and coalition detention operations, this article addresses each of these issues in turn. Viewing them together,
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it concludes with some general observations about the convergence of law and strategy.

US and Coalition Detention Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom

In late 2001, the United States launched operations in Afghanistan, and almost immediately began capturing and holding suspected enemy fighters. The US legal authority for detention operations in Afghanistan began from the propositions that

[t]he United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters. There is no question that under the law of armed conflict, the United States has the authority to detain persons who have engaged in unlawful belligerence until the cessation of hostilities. Like other wars, when they start we do not know when they will end. Still, we may detain combatants until the end of the war.2

Although many US allies participated in military operations, US forces took the lead in conducting detention operations in Afghanistan,3 eventually consolidating theater detention operations at Bagram air force base facilities.

As explained by a commander of US detention forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), “[d]uring the execution of this campaign, the U.S. Armed Forces and allied forces have captured or procured the surrender of thousands of individuals believed to be members or supporters of either al Qaeda or the Taliban.”4 Detentions were intended to

[p]revent] them from returning to the battlefield and engaging in further armed attacks against innocent civilians and U.S. and coalition forces. Detention also serves as a deterrent against future attacks by denying the enemy the fighters needed to conduct war. Interrogations during detention enable the United States to gather important intelligence to prevent future attacks.5

Nearly eight years after the initial invasion, US detention operations go on, and the US military is modernizing its facilities in the expectation of their further continuation.6

In some respects US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan are a valuable case study for examining contemporary application of the law of armed conflict. Aside from the thousands of individual detentions, the “data” include publicly released and declassified documents of internal US government legal and policy decision-making, as well as litigation that has pushed the US government to clarify its legal positions and has produced judicial interpretations of the law of armed conflict.
In other respects, however, it is difficult to examine the law of armed conflict in the Afghanistan setting because of some peculiar aspects of detention operations there. First, most US allies participating in coalition operations in Afghanistan have done so not as part of anti-Taliban and anti-al Qaeda combat operations (Operation Enduring Freedom) but as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The latter, which assists the Afghan government in maintaining security in certain parts of the country, is authorized by a series of Chapter VII UN Security Council resolutions that authorize participating contingents to “take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.” Participating military forces therefore derive authority to detain certain captured militants from this UN Security Council mandate independent of the law of armed conflict. Second, US allies participating in both OEF and ISAF have almost entirely “opted out” of detention operations. In 2005, NATO adopted guidelines, which the European partners follow, calling for transferring detainees to the Afghan government within ninety-six hours of capture. As explained further below, this has meant that US detentions form the only significant body of State practice in Afghanistan to measure against or help interpret the law of armed conflict related to detention.

**Detention Treatment Standards**

In the early phases of military operations in Afghanistan, but especially after the Abu Ghraib crisis in Iraq, followed by exposure of detainee abuses in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, the most intense public controversy focused on the issue of treatment standards. Much of this debate centered on the appropriate classification of captured Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, because most protagonists in this debate believed that the appropriate treatment baseline turned in part on captured individuals’ legal statuses.

Shortly before conventional combat operations began, US military commanders in charge of Afghanistan operations issued an order instructing that the Geneva Conventions were to be applied to all captured individuals. Belligerents would be screened according to standard doctrine to determine whether or not they were entitled to prisoner of war status. This was consistent with existing military regulations and recent US military practice.

On February 7, 2002, however, the President determined that Taliban and al Qaeda detainees were “unlawful combatants,” and therefore protected by neither the custodial standards of the Third Geneva Convention applicable to prisoners of war nor Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Prisoner of war protections did not cover al Qaeda detainees because al Qaeda was not a “High Contracting Party” to the Conventions, and they did not cover Taliban because those
forces failed the tests of Article 4 of the Third Convention, which stipulates requirements for legitimate military forces. Common Article 3 did not apply, by its own terms, because this was believed to be an international armed conflict, whereas Common Article 3 rules apply in conflicts “not of an international character.”

The President further directed in his February 2002 instructions, however, that “[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.” While ostensibly protective, this directive also opened holes in the law of armed conflict’s barriers. First, it applied by its terms only to armed forces, hinting that intelligence services might not be similarly constrained. Second, by emphasizing humane treatment as a matter of policy, it suggested that humane treatment was not required as a matter of law. And, third, it suggested that the Geneva Conventions’ principles could validly be compromised in pursuit of security requirements.

Well known is the storm of criticism that erupted over the initial US government position that the Geneva Conventions—and, presumably, customary law of armed conflict—provided no legal guarantee of minimum treatment standards for enemy combatants captured in OEF. Many critics have attributed detainee abuses in Afghanistan to these foundational legal decisions. Critics of the US position consistently rejected the notion that unlawful combatants fall into a “legal gap” in protection. They asserted a range of alternatives, including that captured fighters (at least Taliban) were entitled to prisoner of war status; that all captured fighters are entitled at least to minimum protections of Common Article 3, Article 75 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, and the customary law of armed conflict; and/or that any detainees are protected by international human rights law, including prohibitions on “cruel, inhuman and degrading” treatment.

In June 2006 the US Supreme Court resolved much of this debate, at least as a matter of international law incorporated into US law. It held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a petition brought by a Yemeni detained during OEF and transferred to Guantanamo, that Common Article 3 affords minimal protections to individuals captured within the territory of a signatory but engaged in a conflict not between two nations. This would include not only civil wars (as Common Article 3 is more traditionally understood) but also conflicts with transnational actors like al Qaeda. Soon after, on July 7, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that “all DoD personnel adhere to [Common Article 3 standards] and that each department component “review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures . . . to ensure that they comply with [them].”

Hamdan’s holding that Common Article 3’s minimum treatment standards apply to enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan significantly narrowed the
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Scope of controversy over international legal constraints on US detention operations. Common Article 3 demands that detainees “in all circumstances be treated humanely,” and it prohibits, among other things, “cruel treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.” Although vague, these provisions contain basic care and custody requirements that match closely the basic treatment standards of human rights law that some critics argued applied. While not matching the enhanced protections afforded prisoners of war, this holding nevertheless answered the criticism of those critics who argued that the Geneva Conventions contain no “gaps” in their coverage of individuals detained in armed conflict. Perhaps most important, this holding clarified that these minimum treatment standards apply as a matter of treaty law of armed conflict, not merely policy.

**Detention Adjudicatory Process**

The *Hamdan* holding helped clarify the minimal treatment standards applicable to OEF detention operations in Afghanistan, but the sparse terms of Common Article 3 do little to clarify the separate issue of what minimum procedural requirements govern decisions to detain or continue to detain individuals in Afghanistan. Procedural mechanisms for reviewing detention decisions in Afghanistan have received remarkably little public scrutiny compared with those at Guantanamo, even though in many respects—at least as initially characterized by the US government—the detainees in both are similarly situated. Thus far the war in Afghanistan does more to highlight the difficult issue of procedural safeguards in the law of armed conflict than it does to answer it.

In the early phases of OEF operations in Afghanistan, much of the legal debate about procedural detention issues focused on Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, the Prisoner of War Convention. It provides that “[w]hen any doubt arises as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,” qualify as prisoners of war, “such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” Then, as now, however, little State practice or detailed authoritative commentary existed interpreting these terms. US military regulations previously called for a three-officer panel that would take testimony from reasonably available witnesses, including the detainee, and make judgments. And US military forces were preparing to conduct such tribunals for individuals captured in Afghanistan until they were directed otherwise, eventually by the President’s February 7, 2002 legal determinations which rendered any captured Taliban
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and al Qaida fighters “unlawful combatants” as a matter of law; hence there was not “any doubt” as to their status for Article 5 tribunals to adjudicate.24

Many critics contested this claim, arguing that Article 5 requires case-by-case determinations; that group designations of this sort are impermissible.25 Others have argued that this provision means that when there is doubt whether a captured individual is even an enemy fighter or not, he is entitled to a hearing before a tribunal; therefore, the argument goes, suspected al Qaida and Taliban combatants in US custody should have been entitled upon capture to such review.26 Article 5’s language begins with the notion that a subject detainee has “committed a belligerent act,” suggesting that the drafters intended to mandate minimum procedures for resolving factual doubt as to a subject’s type of combatant or belligerent act, not the prior question whether he is or is not a combatant. But in practice any process to adjudicate an individual’s type of combatancy, and hence the Geneva protections to which he is entitled, would likely uncover some cases of mistaken identity or otherwise erroneous detentions.27

Regardless of its precise meaning, it is quite clear that Article 5 was drafted with very different circumstances in mind from those of the Afghanistan conflict. In particular, it was intended for a conflict pitting professional armies and of limited duration.28 A relatively simple front-end adjudicatory review was sufficient in such conflicts because sorting combatants from noncombatants (for detention purposes) was relatively easy and conflicts would likely end within a few months or years, whereupon any remaining captives would be released. Afghanistan, by contrast, involves a set of conflicts already lasting almost eight years and likely to continue many more, and an enemy force (especially al Qaida forces, but also residual Taliban) that routinely obscures its identity among civilian populations.29

In contexts such as this, the more important issue than appropriate front-end status screening is to what form of review (and perhaps adversarial process) are detainees entitled to contest the factual basis of their detention, given the relatively high probability and cost of errors. Three main positions have emerged, though there are many sub-positions within each.

The US government has generally taken the position that the law of armed conflict is the exclusive body of international law dictating procedural constraints on detention of captured fighters in Afghanistan. This position assumes the continued existence of armed conflict (in the US view, it remains an international armed conflict, though Hamdan at least adds new questions to this view), and that the law of armed conflict operates as lex specialis, displacing otherwise applicable legal norms.30 Beyond consistently arguing against the reach of judicial habeas corpus protections to Afghanistan,31 however, the US government has not articulated any clear procedural mandates imposed by the law of armed conflict for sorting out
who is or is not a combatant. Instead it has sought to maintain flexibility, adopting procedural protections as a matter of policy.

Some human rights organizations have argued that, especially since the establishment of the new Afghan government following the 2002 Loya Jirga, international human rights law, not the law of armed conflict, governs procedural protections, along with Afghan domestic law.\textsuperscript{32} This view generally assumes that the war in Afghanistan evolved at that time from an international armed conflict to an internal armed conflict and that the law of armed conflict provides no independent authorization for detention in the latter category. Holders of this view look to, among other sources, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states:

No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. . . . Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.\textsuperscript{33}

Under the strictest form of this view, any long-term detention of suspected Taliban or al Qaida fighters in Afghanistan requires criminal trial with universally recognized due process safeguards—a standard that leaves US practice in Afghanistan falling far short.\textsuperscript{34}

A third view holds that neither the law of armed conflict nor human rights treaty law provides sufficiently clear or comprehensive procedural safeguards to persons detained for security reasons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed a set of principles and safeguards that it argues should govern security detention in all circumstances, i.e., both in armed conflicts and outside of them. The guidelines are based on law of armed conflict and human rights treaty rules, as well as on non-binding standards and best practice, and are to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. According to the ICRC guidelines, detainees are entitled—among other things—to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and to have an independent and impartial body decide on continued detention or release.\textsuperscript{35} The ICRC considers that Afghanistan is a situation of non-international armed conflict; it would argue that detainees in US or other international-force hands should enjoy far more robust procedural rights than currently afforded and that detainees in Afghan custody should be granted judicial review.\textsuperscript{36}

Experience in Afghanistan offers intuitive support for the third approach, but it does little to resolve the difficult issue of exactly which international human rights law provisions should apply. The fact that the nature of fighting there—
against an enemy that deliberately obscures its identity and moves in and out of local communities—creates a high likelihood of some erroneous, long-term detentions supports the call for thorough screening procedures. But combat conditions, resource constraints and the weak state of Afghan justice would complicate efforts to establish formal judicial mechanisms by either coalition or the Afghan governments.

Meanwhile, the US Supreme Court recently held in Boumediene v. Bush that enemy combatants at Guantanamo are entitled to constitutional habeas corpus rights. The issue of Boumediene’s reach beyond Guantanamo, especially to Afghanistan, will be litigated for some time, and that case turned on interpretation and application of US domestic law. In any event, the Supreme Court did not clarify exactly what procedural structures and protections apply even in habeas cases for Guantanamo detainees, and the Court seemed to have Afghanistan in mind when it cautiously suggested that practical considerations and exigencies of foreign combat zones might limit the reach of constitutional habeas rights to enemy combatant detainees held outside Guantanamo.

Legal requirements aside, US forces have gradually instituted more formalized procedural mechanisms for adjudicating detention decisions as time has gone on. The little detail on review processes in Afghanistan shared openly by the US government appears mostly in court filings in habeas corpus actions brought by Bagram detainees. These public documents explain that by 2006 all individuals brought to theater detention facilities for long-term confinement have their cases reviewed by a five-officer panel, sitting as an Enemy Combatant Review Board, usually within seventy-five days of capture and thereafter every six months. The review board may recommend by a majority vote to the commanding general or his designee whether the individual should continue to be detained. Although the US government maintains that the Fourth Geneva Convention is inapplicable as a matter of law to Afghanistan detainees because that Convention applies to civilians, not combatants, the processes US forces eventually put in place roughly track the requirements of Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular processes and periodic review (at least every six months) for security internees.

So far, the Afghanistan case has produced little legal consensus on minimum procedural requirements in part because the spectrum of views spans differing judgments on such basic questions as what type of conflict exists (international versus internal), what body of law applies (law of armed conflict versus human rights law versus domestic Afghan law, or some combination) and what specific minimum requirements those bodies of law impose (mandatory provisions versus a sliding scale depending on practicability). Meanwhile, US forces have adopted increasingly robust processes for adjudicating cases, suggesting at least some—
though still far from complete—convergence between the aspirations of restrictive legal views and the pragmatic and ethical inclinations of those charged with waging the conflict.

**Transitioning Detention Operations to Local Civilian Institutions**

A final issue to consider is the transition from a military detention to a civilian justice system in Afghanistan. Unlike the substantive and procedural issues discussed above, this is not a law of armed conflict issue in a strict sense (except for Geneva Convention rules governing repatriation). But it is entwined with the other legal issues, and the strategic necessity of resolving it effectively may impact the future development of the law of armed conflict.

The law of armed conflict is generally designed to minimize unnecessary suffering in wartime and to facilitate a return to peace and public order. In the context of conventional warfare, the law of armed conflict’s detention authorities and rules generally serve well these goals: until order is restored through victory or settlement of the conflict they allow—with sparse procedural requirements compared to peacetime justice systems—the incapacitation of captured individuals presumed (or assessed) likely to fight again if released and they protect those individuals from mistreatment. For the most part, the rules align with the law’s policy objectives, including the strategic necessities of detention during combat.

US detention operations have taken place in Afghanistan amid a more complex strategic environment. Operations have evolved to include a major counterinsurgency component against Taliban and al Qaeda forces conducting guerrilla-style and terrorist operations aimed to undermine the new Afghan government. Of course, the role and rules of detention in counterinsurgency conflicts are not new problems or unique problems. One aspect that distinguishes the Afghanistan case, however, is the weakness or nascent condition of State institutions, including law and order systems, which needed to be almost completely reconstituted after coalition and Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001. Indeed, the collapse or weakness of governance in many parts of the country and the inability of the State to provide basic State services like policing and criminal justice create an environment hospitable to insurgent forces. Moreover, the Afghan government lacks effective institutions of governance, including a police and justice sector capable of maintaining order. This is not just a counterinsurgency campaign to save a mature government; it is a counterinsurgency campaign while building a new government in a region long accustomed to internal strife and warlordism.

Amid this setting, a 2004 Pentagon inspection and assessment of US detention operations in Afghanistan concluded that “US detainee operations can only be
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normalized by the emergence of an Afghan justice and corrections system that can assume the responsibility for the long-term detention of low level enemy combatants currently held by the US."44 The report continued:

The value of continuing to keep low-level enemy combatants in custody is simply to keep individuals that represent a proven threat to coalition forces off the battlefield. This is a function that can and should be undertaken by the Afghan government... Despite efforts to improve the process, the press of a growing detainee population without an Afghan solution or continued transfer to [Guantanamo] will continue to create the potential for bad choices to be made at several points in that process.45

In 2005 the governments of the United States and Afghanistan reached diplomatic agreements to “allow for the gradual transfer of Afghan detainees to the exclusive custody and control of the Afghan Government.”46 But this gradual transition has been slowed since then by the shakiness of Afghan security institutions and inability to install domestic legal authorities and processes capable of handling or prosecuting captured militants.47

These factors raise several policy questions onto which the law of armed conflict no longer maps so neatly: Does the long-term reliance on foreign military detention strengthen versus deplete or build versus undermine public confidence in domestic civilian justice institutions? As coalition forces turn over more and more security and governance functions to Afghan authorities, how should responsibility for detaining militants, including those already in custody, be transferred? Many features of this conflict are unique to Afghanistan, but these basic problems resemble those faced in Iraq and could likely recur in other areas where governance collapses, such as Somalia.

One lesson that the US military appears to have drawn in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, is the strategic imperative of high substantive and procedural standards of detainee treatment, especially when seeking to bolster rule-of-law institutions.48 The new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual emphasizes this principle, not only for legal and ethical reasons, but also for military effectiveness.49 After noting, for example, that the “nature of [counterinsurgency] operations sometimes makes it difficult to separate potential detainees from innocent bystanders, since insurgents lack distinctive uniforms and deliberately mingle with the local populace,”50 the manual goes on to warn that “treating a civilian like an insurgent is a sure recipe for failure.”51 It continues:

[Counterinsurgency] operations strive to restore order, the rule of law, and civil procedures to the authority of the [host nation] government... Multinational and U.S. forces brought in to support this objective must remember that the populace will
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scrutinize their actions. People will watch to see if Soldiers and Marines stay consistent with this avowed purpose. Inconsistent actions furnish insurgents with valuable issues for manipulation and propaganda.\(^2\)

Although the law of armed conflict has little to say directly on the issue of transferring detention responsibilities from military to civilian systems, the substantive and procedural legal issues described earlier affect this transition process insofar as adherence to their standards helps lay a foundation of support and legitimacy upon which local rule of law can be built.

**Conclusion**

The operational and strategic significance of detention standards imply several conclusions about the future development and refinement of the law of armed conflict, returning the discussion to the legal controversies discussed earlier. As to substantive treatment standards, the strategic rationale is likely to reinforce strongly the idea of universally applicable minimum requirements, despite initial efforts by the Bush administration to reserve greater flexibility. As to procedural requirements, in thinking about the future trajectory of the law of armed conflict (or the application of human rights law in armed conflict), the more that rule-of-law promotion features as a strategic objective, the more robust procedural protections for detainees will align with military necessity, rather than collide with it.

**Notes**

3. As well as transferring several hundred detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, though I do not discuss those legal issues here.
5. Id.
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14. See President's Memo, supra note 11.

15. Id.


20. Supra note 12.

21. Some of the sparse State practice on this issue, for example, US practice during the Vietnam War and procedures employed by Canadian and British militaries, is described in Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1079, 1090–92 (2008).


23. See Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation 190-8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy
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27. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US military conducted about twelve hundred such hearings for captured Iraqi individuals thought to be pro-Saddam fighters, and found about nine hundred of them to be displaced civilians, who were promptly released. See Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress 578 (2002).

28. COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter JCRC COMMENTARY].


30. See John B. Bellinger, US State Department Legal Advisor, Remarks to the Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drlrlsl68557.htm; Bellinger, supra note 17.


34. See, e.g., US Detentions in Afghanistan: An Aide-Mémoire for Continued Action (Amnesty International), June 7, 2005, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/093/2005/en/dom-AMR510932005en.pdf ("When [the] armed conflict ended [in 2002], those who were captured by the USA during hostilities... were required to be released, unless charged with criminal offences. Civilians detained in that conflict... too were required, when that conflict ended, to be released, unless charged with recognized criminal offences.")


37. See Waxman, supra note 29, at 1402–29.

38. How much these efforts would be complicated is the source of significant debate between the US government and human rights organizations.

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40. See id. at 2259–62.
42. See Geneva IV, supra note 12, art. 78.
45. Id.
47. See Human Rights First, supra note 32; Schmitt & Golden, supra note 6.
50. Id., ¶ 7-38.
51. Id., ¶ 7-40.
52. Id., ¶ 8-42.