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of 1990. A significant case was *Boim v. Holy Land Foundation*, in which attorneys working on behalf of the family of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a judgment against Islamic fund-raising organizations, drying up a significant source of material support to Hamas.

Kittrie concludes with a compelling argument for a more creative and innovative integration of lawfare into U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96), the 2015 National Security Strategy identifies security challenges that are decentralized, transcend state borders, involve nonstate actors, and “cannot be neutralized using only deterrence or the United States’ traditional kinetic toolbox.” *Lawfare* underscores why strategists must have a practical understanding of the entire spectrum of factors affecting the strategic operating environment—institutional, cultural, political, economic, social, and legal.

Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic to expect strategists and policy makers to be legal experts as well, so his conclusions include an analysis of the sources of “lawfare power” and recommendations for leveraging the skills of the U.S. legal community. To show how private-sector expertise can inform potential military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes how Special Operations Command Pacific reached out to the University of Pennsylvania’s law school for research on foreign criminal laws that could be used to detain and prosecute foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie’s assessment (p. 32), if the United States properly leverages its extensive legal expertise to support a national lawfare strategy, the “U.S. advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has the potential to be even greater than its advantage in sophisticated lethal weapons.”

*Lawfare* reminds us that lethal force is only one of many factors affecting outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way toward how legal factors can be used to achieve practical effects. Military officers and policy makers who read this book will be rewarded with a better understanding of the legal dynamics that are exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence.

KEVIN ROUSSEAU

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With the Navy’s recent efforts to reinvigorate war gaming, there has been renewed interest in the interwar gaming conducted at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. In the Naval War College Review, Proceedings, and other maritime journals, war-gaming experts and enthusiasts alike have tried to characterize the nature and value of the Navy’s war games played between 1919 and 1941. John Lillard’s *Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II* is the latest contribution to this resurgence. Seeking to provide a comprehensive study of the interwar games conducted at the College, Lillard intends to inform our understanding of the “navy’s transition” during this period. *Playing War* asserts (p. 8) that the Newport games were “transformational” and played a “central role . . . in preparing the navy for war.” For the most part, the author contributes to the history of that era, but does so with a work that would have benefited
from additional editing and more attention to detail in its historiography. This book succeeds with its analysis of how the Newport war games evolved to reflect the emergence of new technologies and operational thinking for the Navy. Lillard organizes his analysis into three phases: early (1919–27); middle (1928–34); and late (1935–41). He focuses on one or two College classes within each of the phases, concentrating on those of significant figures such as Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and Robert Ghormley. The author is at his best when he analyzes the actual games played and describes the relevant insights recorded by the student-players or the gaming faculty, or both. For example, his section on Tactical Game 94 of 1923 describes how that game demonstrated the importance of reconnaissance and detection of the enemy’s forces first. In his chapter on the middle phase, Lillard explains how the games explored the innovations of air and undersea warfare, pointing out that the players learned more about aviation than they did submarines. Lillard concedes that the College games were not innovative in themselves; instead he reinforces the idea that “they were a common playing field, a shared experience” for the men who would fight the next war at sea.

*Playing War* is a useful complement to Edward Miller’s *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991) and Albert Nofi’s *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010). Lillard’s examination of the 1933 Van Auken report is particularly effective at showing the College’s contributions to the evolution of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet problems. Requested by College President Admiral Harris Laning and written by Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, head of the newly created Research Department, the report summarized lessons learned from all the Blue-Orange games played between 1927 and 1933. The author notes that Van Auken’s analysis of the Trans Pacific problem presaged the logistic challenges of the war and the advent of the four hundred destroyer escorts that emerged during the war. As War Plan ORANGE matured in the 1930s, so too did the war gaming, marked by the construction of Pringle Hall and its famously square-tiled gaming floor. Lillard succinctly chronicles Newport’s war-gaming transformation throughout the book’s narrative.

Readers familiar with the scholarship that examines the U.S. Navy between the two world wars will be distracted by Lillard’s efforts to set his thesis apart from the other literature. *Playing War* looks and feels most similar to Michael Vlahos’s *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980). Both of these works are short in length, and have appendices and tables that lay out the war games played by each class. Lillard’s book focuses more directly on the games and the chronology of the College than Vlahos’s monograph does. However, in attempting to separate his research from *The Blue Sword*, Lillard states (p. 10) that Vlahos “did not use wargame records from the Naval War College archives,” which is not true. Making matters more confusing, Lillard continues to refer to Vlahos’s text throughout the book. Later, Lillard asserts (p. 12) that John Hattendorf, coauthor of *Sailors and
Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a former professor of naval history” whose history of the College lacks “critical analysis.” At the time of publication, Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, and is still recognized as the preeminent scholar on the history of the U.S. Navy at Newport. In addition to these two notable errors, Playing War still reads like a dissertation in need of another round of editing. Chapter introductions and descriptions of the students are repeated several times and add little to the analysis presented. With the main body of the book ending at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader with the impression that there is still more to explore about the relationship between the interwar war games and how the U.S. Navy fought during the Second World War. While this imperfect volume has some merit, the definitive history of the Naval War College’s interwar war games remains to be written.

JON SCOTT LOGEL


The twenty-first-century security environment has been characterized by numerous cross-cultural battle spaces, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army initiated the human terrain team (HTT) because it needed to address the impact of the human cultural dimension in the combat operational environment. The HTT’s mission was to conduct research (in the social sciences and anthropology) and to advise military commanders about the unique cultural aspects of the local/regional population. In eleven chapters, McFate and Laurence have compiled an invaluable collection of experiences from the scientists involved. They afford us the opportunity to accompany these scientists on their journeys, as they share their perspectives with the military. We learn the value of embedding social scientists with military units and how important their knowledge and expertise are for military leaders to achieve an understanding of today’s complex, culturally diverse operational environments. In this way, social scientists can help military leaders make more-informed, and therefore better, decisions.

General David Petraeus (Ret.) states in the foreword that the “key terrain in irregular warfare is the human terrain.” He highlights the role social scientists played in shaping the cultural framework of the battle space and how they contributed to military leaders’ knowledge to ensure mission success. General Petraeus posits the notion that the military indeed may require even greater sociocultural knowledge to conduct future military operations.

Today’s military leaders are well trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures; however, the twenty-first-century battle space presents inherent difficulties for military leaders. One of their principal deficiencies is a lack of cross-cultural competence (C3). C3 is the ability to communicate effectively and appropriately with people of other cultures. As the number of multinational coalition military operations...