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## THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY

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**A**s a global response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was taking place, alarm bells were ringing about a similar growing insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Today, the Gulf of Guinea stands as the most dangerous maritime area in terms of the success rate of attacks and violence. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 2018 (in 2011) and 2039 (in 2012) expressing grave concern about the mounting insecurity in the region and its consequences for regional and global security.<sup>1</sup> A United Nations (UN) team was deployed to the region to assess the situation.<sup>2</sup>

The UN resolutions and the report of the assessment team called on regional states and institutions, as well as the international community, to respond, and

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a code of conduct for the repression of piracy was adopted by Gulf of Guinea states in June 2013 at Yaoundé, Cameroon, with wide international support.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region remains a serious threat. Indeed, in the month following the adoption of the code of conduct a Maltese-flagged vessel, *Cotton*, was hijacked off the coast of Gabon, the first attack of its kind along that coast, portending a widening of the piracy threat southward.<sup>4</sup> It is also noteworthy that at the close of 2013 the Gulf of Guinea recorded more incidents of attacks on the high seas than in previous years.<sup>5</sup> This deepening threat has continued into 2014, as Angola and Ghana registered their first significant hijackings (analyzed below). These

developments reinforce the urgency of effective counterpiracy measures. Realistically, however, the success and efficacy of both regional and global response will depend on a sound knowledge of the operational environment, awareness of the actors, and most crucially, understanding of how the situation has evolved.

This article provides a critical analysis of the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea. It sets the background with an overview of piracy statistics and a categorization of the coast according to the degree of risk of attack. This is followed by an examination of the paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy, while the third section analyzes the evolution of the piracy from its pre-2005 low levels into a regional and global threat. The fourth section summarizes Gulf of Guinea piracy and examines future projections. The article concludes with a discussion of the imperatives for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It should be noted first that the geographical scope of the region referred to as the Gulf of Guinea varies depending on the issue or interest at stake. It is defined in this article as comprising the coastal states stretching from Senegal to Angola and as embracing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).<sup>6</sup>

## OVERVIEW AND DISTRIBUTION OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY INCIDENTS

Piracy has historically been a threat to maritime trade and the good order of the world's oceans.<sup>7</sup> To ensure the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), international law imposes an obligation on states to cooperate in the repression of piracy; it also grants universal jurisdiction over piracy, such that pirates may be arrested and prosecuted within the legal system of any state.<sup>8</sup> The requisite international framework is codified in articles 100–105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of 1982.<sup>9</sup>

To be classified as piracy, an act of piracy or depredation must have taken place on the high seas.<sup>10</sup> The “high seas” in this context include contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones. In contrast to piracy, the terms “armed robbery against ships,” “armed robbery at sea,” or simply “armed robbery” denote piratical acts or thefts that take place within a territorial sea, internal waters, or, by extension, archipelagic waters, ports, and anchorages.<sup>11</sup> For practical purposes, however, piracy and armed robbery pose similar threats to the safety and security of global shipping, and the drivers and motivations behind the two crimes are largely the same despite the legal distinction.<sup>12</sup> For this reason “piracy” is used in this article to cover both types of incidents.

### *Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea*

Although the Gulf of Guinea has its own history of sea raids and piratical acts, they did not constitute a major threat until recently.<sup>13</sup> Within the past few years

the region has seen a significant rise in piracy incidents. Table 1 reflects incidents from 2005 to 2013, as compiled from International Maritime Organization (IMO) reports.<sup>14</sup>

The rising threat of piracy is evident. Attacks went from twenty-three in 2005 to sixty in 2007. For reasons that will be covered below, the incidents decreased in 2008 and 2009, but they swelled again between 2010 and 2013; 2012 marked a peak, with sixty-four incidents. The situation is actually worse than the statistics depict, because, it is believed, unlike in other regions, only about half of the incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships' masters and operators for fear of reprisal during their next visit.<sup>15</sup> Even so, since 2009 the Gulf of Guinea has been identified as the new piracy territory, displacing Somalia, especially with regard to violence employed in the attacks.<sup>16</sup>

Piracy constitutes a major threat to SLOC security when incidents are not confined to ports and anchorages but occur also in territorial waters and, more importantly, on the high seas. The Gulf of Guinea manifests all these indicators, and the percentage of successful attacks outside port areas has increased, as shown in table 1. Robberies and attempted robberies in the territorial sea rose from only five in 2005 to thirty-one incidents in 2007. The region recorded a single incident on the high seas in 2005; the number jumped tenfold the following year, and the number of successful attacks on the high seas has since grown. As early as 2006, pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, *Shkotovo*, about sixty nautical miles off Guinea using automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), manifesting their ability to hijack vessels far out to sea and their willingness to employ high levels of violence.<sup>17</sup> Significantly, seventeen out of the twenty-five high-seas attacks in 2012 were successful, and most attacks in 2013 were against moving vessels.

### *Piracy Hot Spots and Enclaves*

Table 1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea region, but two qualifications must be made. First, piracy and robbery incidents have not affected the entire region continually from 2005 to 2012. Second, even where incidents have been recorded, their nature and trends are not monolithic. To allow a nuanced perception of the dynamics of the problem, localities in the Gulf of Guinea can be categorized as "hot spots," "enclaves," or zones of low risk. Piracy hot spots are rated according to risk and danger of attacks, while enclaves—localities where pirates are based and from which they operate—are classified as primary or secondary, depending on the certainty of the presence of piratical groups.

Angola and Cape Verde are areas of low risk; there are hardly any reported incidents of attacks off their coasts, and the trends on the neighboring coasts are also limited—the hijacking of the tanker *Kerala* in February 2014 was the first major incident off Angola. Incidents in and around the Democratic Republic of

*Continued on page 97*

**TABLE 1  
ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY COMMITTED (Y) AND ATTEMPTED (X)**

Description of Events	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013	
	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X
Committed, attempted	1		5	5	9	3	2	4	7	6	6	4	10	9	17	8	13	14
Beyond territorial sea	4	1	8		26	5	17	1	19	4	15	4	15	5	9	6	5	1
In territorial sea	16	1	13		17		23	3	8	2	16	2	19	3	19	5	16	5
In port area	2		7		13		4		17		20		19		29		34	
Steaming/driftng ships	21	2	26	5	52	8	42	8	34	12	37	10	44	17	45	19	34	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23</b>		<b>31</b>		<b>60</b>		<b>50</b>		<b>46</b>		<b>47</b>		<b>61</b>		<b>64</b>		<b>54</b>	

the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal are also limited to theft from ships in ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in territorial seas. Attacks off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have declined substantially since 2009, thus removing these two states from a high-risk ranking.

Recent multiple attacks, in contrast, have made Cote d'Ivoire a piracy hot spot. Sierra Leone is in the same category, because although attacks off that coast are fewer than off Cote d'Ivoire, they are very violent.

Guinea is both a piracy hot spot and the region's secondary piracy enclave. Attacks off its coast since 2009 have been characterized by heavy use of weapons, violence, and sophistication. *Shkotovo* (as noted) and *Maersk Belfast* were attacked in 2006 with automatic rifles and RPGs;<sup>18</sup> *Isola Verde* and *Songa Emerald* were successfully boarded while under way in 2009 and 2010, respectively;<sup>19</sup> more recently, in 2012, armed pirates attacked the Maltese-flagged *Constanza* twenty nautical miles off Guinea, causing major damage to the ship.<sup>20</sup> It is the frequency and similarity of these attacks that suggest the existence of a piracy base in Guinea and its environs.

The coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo are collectively the most dangerous in the region. However, Nigeria stands out as the epicenter of Gulf of Guinea piracy and as the primary piracy enclave. Nigeria alone accounts for 80 percent of reported incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>21</sup>

## THE PARADIGM OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY

What fundamentally drives piracy, especially in its primary enclave? Who are the primary actors responsible? Answers can be traced in the transmutation of an insurgency into a ravaging piracy network.

### *The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta*

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose coalition of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, ostensibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for the region.<sup>22</sup> A Joint Revolutionary Council surfaced in 2006 as an umbrella organization for MEND and other, splinter groups;<sup>23</sup> MEND is the most dominant and cohesive.<sup>24</sup> MEND claims to fight for "community" interests, but intense criminality dominates its practical existence and activities.<sup>25</sup> From its very inception, expatriate workers have been regularly kidnapped by MEND activists for ransom at each *okrika*—area or axis of control of a subunit or splinter group.<sup>26</sup>

The MEND insurgency gained notoriety at the strategic level for attacks on critical installations in the Niger Delta, starting with oil pipelines ashore and later expanding to offshore oil platforms.<sup>27</sup> The federal government of Nigeria responded with the establishment of a joint task force of security agencies to

counter the insurgency. Despite the robustness of the joint task force, MEND continued to be lethal, engaging government forces in gun battles.<sup>28</sup> Three naval personnel were missing and feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008, and three in April 2009.<sup>29</sup>

### *Rising Threat and the Amnesty Pact*

In late 2008, after almost four years of insurgent attacks, the federal government of Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND; a formal amnesty proclamation resulted in June 2009.<sup>30</sup> This rapprochement was influenced by the increasing threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as epitomized by a successful attack on the floating production, storage, and off-loading unit (FPSO) *Bonga* in 2008.<sup>31</sup> The attack had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea, and beyond. The *Bonga* attack marked a peak in a series of threats to energy security in the Gulf of Guinea, and it opened a new chapter in global asymmetric threats.

Indeed, excluding the attack on *Aban VII* off the coast of India in 2006, the Gulf of Guinea has recorded the most attacks against offshore platforms in the world, all of them off the coast of Nigeria.<sup>32</sup> *Bulford Dolphin*, a mobile drilling rig, was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents.<sup>33</sup> In May 2007 *Mystras* was also attacked, and three days later *Trident VIII* was targeted.<sup>34</sup> In addition to the physical damage and personal injuries inflicted by the insurgents, these incidents impacted the operation of the platforms.<sup>35</sup> The attack on *Mystras* was indeed very significant, as it marked the second on an FPSO in two years.

These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, and they culminated in the June 2008 attack on the *Bonga* FPSO—a major hub of the oil giant Royal Dutch Shell—about 120 kilometers offshore.<sup>36</sup> After the incident, Nigeria's oil production dropped to its lowest in twenty-five years and global oil prices soared.<sup>37</sup> The *Bonga* incident heightened global fears that even deep-sea energy installations were not safe from insurgents and terrorists.<sup>38</sup> In a statement MEND affirmed that its grand objective was to disable oil export operations, described the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian military, and warned that MEND's "next visit [would] be different."<sup>39</sup> Soon after, the Nigerian government and MEND group leaders came to the negotiation table and entered into an amnesty pact. The arrangement involved insurgents laying down their weapons in return for monthly allowances and skills training.<sup>40</sup> However, some commentators have charged that insurgent leaders were accommodated in luxurious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential people and that the insurgent leadership was to receive financial payoffs.<sup>41</sup>

The amnesty led to the demobilization of insurgent forces and of the organizational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities starting in late 2008.<sup>42</sup> Interestingly, in that period piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased,

from a high of sixty incidents in 2007 to fifty in 2008, reaching a low of forty-six in 2009 (as shown in table 1).<sup>43</sup> A review of piracy reports by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 shows that there were few piratical incidents in the last and first quarters of 2009 and 2010, respectively.<sup>44</sup> However, the arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty “cake” had not been shared among all actors (and certainly not in amounts satisfactory to all members of the insurgency).<sup>45</sup> Splinter groups announced an intention to resume normal campaigns, and in the remainder of 2010 piracy attacks became prevalent once again.<sup>46</sup> By the close of 2011 the Gulf of Guinea had recorded sixty-one piracy incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009.

### *An Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy, and Security Complex*

It is clear, then, that the creeks of the Niger Delta harbor dangerous pirates who threaten the security of sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea. Elements of MEND that are no longer attacking offshore oil platforms, kidnapping offshore workers for ransom, or extorting money from oil companies have turned to piracy as their principal activity. This insurgency/piracy nexus often exists among different kinds of organized crime.<sup>47</sup> In the Gulf of Guinea, however, piracy is committed with impunity, and insurgents, rather than achieving a symbiotic relationship with pirates, have fully transformed into pirates themselves.

The crime of piracy is itself only part of a broad spectrum of actions and complexities that constitutes the piracy threat. It may, for instance, be argued that dealing with the Niger Delta piracy is a matter of trading off one element of security for another. At any point in time—this was especially so prior to the amnesty process—the Niger Delta insurgency poses a threat to five critical security interests: the national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies, global energy security, regional security and stability, and finally, the safety and security of shipping. These five aspects of security are in many ways interlinked. Insurgent activities impact Nigeria’s economic interests and stability, which are key components of its national security. Insurgent attacks equally threaten the investment interests of oil companies, as well as global energy security, the safety and security of shipping, and regional stability. For Nigeria, safeguarding national security became paramount following such incidents as the *Bonga* attack, making the security of shipping a lesser concern. Oil companies initially secured their investments by succumbing to the extortion demands of insurgent groups.<sup>48</sup> The amnesty arrangement offered assurance, albeit temporary, of Nigerian national security, oil investment security, and by extension, the contribution of Nigeria’s oil to global energy security. But protecting those security interests left regional security and the security of shipping in peril. That peril may be regarded as unintended, or it can be viewed as Nigeria sacrificing one element of security interest



for the other; indeed, as far as the shipping industry was concerned, Nigeria has had “no political will to combat the problem of piracy.”<sup>49</sup>

## EVOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY INTO A REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREAT

The Niger Delta insurgency has evolved over time from the primary piracy enclave into a region-wide security threat, in scope, tactics, and trends. As in many criminal progressions, the exact dates of transitions are difficult to pinpoint but the patterns are discernible. What follows is a summary of the seven phases of the evolution from 2005 through to the hijacking of *Orfeas* in October 2012.

### *Opportunistic Sea Robbery*

The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as “opportunistic sea robbery.” This taxonomy fits piracy incidents up to 2005 but also applies in part as late as 2007. Two-thirds of attacks during this period took place in ports and anchorages, interspersed with a limited number of robberies in the territorial sea. It needs to be emphasized, though, that the description of this phase of piracy as “opportunistic” is not about the capability of the actors but highlights the fact that robberies were conducted as subsidiary activities. The attention of insurgents during this period was on attacking offshore platforms; some ships, however, were hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom.

Piracy reports during this period gave indications of what would become central in the profile of threats to SLOC security—that is, gangs of hijackers using speedboats armed with heavy weapons. The use of speedboats can be contrasted with Somalia piracy, wherein fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal platforms. In 2006, four crew members of *Northern Comrade* were kidnapped for ransom. In May 2007, over forty people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked *Dlb Cheyenne*, engaged the Nigerian military in a shoot-out, and kidnapped the crew; in the same month *Oloibiri* was attacked using explosives and its crew kidnapped for ransom.<sup>50</sup> Thus the tactic of kidnapping and ransoming expatriate oil workers was being employed in conjunction with the hijacking of ships.

### *Widening the Enclave: Prodding and Surges*

By 2009 there were signs of a new characteristic of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Unlike Somalia, where pirates set out to hunt for victim ships, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea undertake surgical attacks, converging at locations of interest.<sup>51</sup> Activities of insurgents during this period expanded beyond the southern and western coasts of Nigeria, westerly swarms targeting vessels off the coast of Benin, and those to the south attacking ships off Cameroon and the neighboring coast. In 2008 about ten armed persons in military clothing boarded the cement carrier *Elbia* off the island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea, identified themselves as

Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship's crew, and after six hours on board disembarked into speedboats. Accounts of piracy incidents off nearby coasts in 2008 described the pirates and robbers as "Nigerian rebels," "Nigerian militants," and "protectors of the Bonny River."<sup>52</sup>

These surges signaled an ability of the insurgents to increase the intensity and extend the scope of their activities, with widening security consequences. This was demonstrated by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a sea-borne attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea in February 2009.<sup>53</sup> The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a subregional maritime security framework by member states of the Economic Community of Central African States in 2009.<sup>54</sup> Despite the challenges confronting the ECCAS maritime framework (including inadequate logistics, funding, and legal framework), it nonetheless weakened the southern wing of the insurgents, resulting in fewer incidents in the southern Gulf of Guinea.

### *Pursuit and Violence*

A further evolution of tactics became manifest in 2009 as the insurgents started hunting vessels to attack, albeit selectively, but often with great violence. Once a high-value target was identified, it was shadowed farther out to sea and at a vulnerable location was attacked violently. In February 2009 grenades were thrown at the oil tanker *Front Chief*, killing a crew member. Seamen on board *Emirates Swam*, *Sevastopolskaya Buhta*, and other vessels also suffered serious injuries during attacks the same year.<sup>55</sup> The high level of violence not only ensured quick outcomes but compensated for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could be kept during ransom negotiations and moved the Gulf of Guinea toward the employment by pirates of violence and killing to subjugate theaters of operations.<sup>56</sup>

### *Full-Scale Insurgent Piracy*

The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy was a post-amnesty phenomenon, following the withdrawal of insurgent elements from the amnesty deal of 2010. Attacks became more prevalent from 2010 through to 2013. They also became more brazen, as indicated by the chasing of and firing on *Elbtank Germany* for over an hour and the shadowing of *Cape Bon* for two days, in February and March 2011, respectively.<sup>57</sup>

In this transformation pirates have developed new measures. A variant of the mother-ship concept has emerged wherein pirates use hijacked fishing vessels to store fuel for extended operations. That is similar to Somali methods, but in the Gulf of Guinea it is primarily a deception measure to get close to oil vessels. Pirates have targeted especially ships loaded with refined oil, which they always siphon into smaller tankers and then sell illegally, both within and outside the region.<sup>58</sup>

### *Regional Threat and Piracy Networks: The Benin Case*

That the threat of piracy had become regional by mid-2011 was made evident by multiple incidents off the coast of Benin. Piracy off the coast of Benin was by no means new, but unlike earlier cases the June–July 2011 attacks amounted to an invasion of Benin’s coastal space. The pirates of the Niger Delta had expanded their enclave to Benin.<sup>59</sup> Two significant trends emerged from the 2011 Benin attacks, the first of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and security of ships. It is usual to assume that ships in port are shielded from violent piracy, and crews normally lower their security posture, expecting at most only minor robberies and minimal violence by actors from within the coastal state. This assumption was crushed when pirates of the Niger Delta actually entered port areas of Benin to hijack vessels. One ship, *Aristofanis*, was sailed to the open sea, where its cargo was discharged.<sup>60</sup>

The second piracy trend that became apparent in the Benin onslaught was the emergence of a growing transnational criminal network in the Gulf of Guinea. This is evident from the hijacking of *Duzgit Venture*.<sup>61</sup> The captain was forced to sail the vessel all the way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to transfer the oil into a barge. When the pirates failed to meet the barge, the captain was forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighten the cargo. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to do so, the pirates disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the captain and another crew member. The pirates were in cahoots with other actors about four thousand kilometers away from the point of hijack, and to meet them they sailed the commandeered ship across the coastal waters of five states.<sup>62</sup> The incident also raises serious question about the capability of Gulf of Guinea states to monitor their maritime domains.

### *Togo in the Claws: Post–Operation PROSPERITY*

The multiple piracy attacks off the coast of Benin had a staggering economic impact on the country, including an estimated port-revenue loss of U.S.\$81 million in 2011.<sup>63</sup> The president of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response to the crisis. At the multilateral level, he requested the support of the international community, through the United Nations secretary-general.<sup>64</sup> Second, he sought the support of his counterpart in Nigeria.<sup>65</sup> In August 2011 the two states launched joint patrols; known as Operation PROSPERITY, they lasted a year and concentrated largely on the coast of Benin. Benin had operational command over the patrols, while tactical command was exercised by Nigeria.<sup>66</sup>

Within months, a UN report indicated that Operation PROSPERITY had led to a reduction in piratical incidents off the coast of Benin.<sup>67</sup> This was corroborated by the military chief of Benin.<sup>68</sup> However, the fundamental question that should have been asked was, What has been the effect of PROSPERITY on the immediate regions of Nigeria and Benin?

Since the launch of Operation PROSPERITY there has been, on the one hand, a steady decrease in piracy off the coast of Benin, but on the other hand, an emergence of incidents off the Togolese coast.<sup>69</sup> Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese coast coincide with periods of few or none reported off Nigeria and Benin. Some have occurred deep inside port areas of Togo, like the earlier attacks in Benin. The IMB has noted that the Togo coast has become a piracy hot spot, with incidents increasing from a single attack in 2008 to fifteen in 2012.<sup>70</sup> This indicates that Operation PROSPERITY had simply pushed pirates and robbers farther to the west. The short coastlines of Benin and Togo have allowed pirates to treat the two coasts tactically as a single theater of operations. This can be inferred from two reported incidents in September 2011.<sup>71</sup> On the 14th, at 4:15 AM, armed robbers attacked *Abu Dhabi Star*, a Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical miles off Lomé, Togo, but aborted the attack upon being noticed by the ship's company. Four hours earlier, at 11:52 PM, two gangs of pirates had hijacked two tankers, *Mattheos I* and *Northern Bell*, that were conducting a ship-to-ship transfer, sixty-two nautical miles off Benin. The pirates succeeded in sailing *Mattheos I* to an unknown location, but the crew of *Northern Bell* regained control of their ship.

Analysis of these two incidents, taking into account time, location, and distance, suggests that the same gang of Niger Delta pirates that lost control of *Northern Bell* off the Benin coast sailed toward Togo, and then paid their predatory visit to *Abu Dhabi Star*. The IMB subsequently confirmed that Nigerian pirates have expanded into Togolese waters.<sup>72</sup>

#### *Cote d'Ivoire under Siege: Nowhere Is Safe*

The hijacking of *Orfeas* in October 2012 marked the seventh phase of the evolution of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into a well-entrenched regional threat. *Orfeas* was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>73</sup> Gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed it over two thousand kilometers to the Niger Delta and stole the oil cargo, releasing the vessel two days later.<sup>74</sup> The hijacking encapsulates most of the tactics already discussed but also brings to the fore the new sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy. Soon after the hijacking, the pirates took the vessel into deeper water, both to make contact with their criminal networks and to put the ship out of reach of rescue. In December 2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil tanker in a Cote d'Ivoire port.<sup>75</sup> These incidents show that attacks in the western Gulf of Guinea have become more brazen.

### EMERGENT PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTION

This seven-phase evolution shows that in the absence of robust responses the pirates are likely to consolidate and expand their activities. Effective counterpiracy

action must take into account the modus operandi of pirates, the piracy profile, and emerging trends. By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile of the Niger Delta pirates had crystallized, as summarized in table 2.

The above profile reflects a primary focus on the Niger Delta. However, Gulf of Guinea piratical activity is now marked by fluidity and increasing complexity. Effective responses should therefore assume the scope of the broader maritime security context, with particular attention on the evolving piracy track and criminal networks. The following trends should be closely watched.

### *Widening of the Niger Delta Factor*

Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counterpiracy efforts have led to a steady decline in successful attacks since 2009, the Gulf of Guinea has seen an escalation.<sup>76</sup> This suggests that pirates in the region are mastering its geography and shipping profile. Distance is not a limiting factor for piratical activities; conversely, long-range attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo. Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure for piracy.

Indeed, in the primary piracy enclave we see two mutually reinforcing developments: consolidation and further widening. It is logical for the Niger Delta pirates to continue to view the coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo as their normal

**TABLE 2**  
**PROFILE OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY AS OF 2012**

Subject	Description/Outcome
<i>Platforms</i>	Speedboats, already used by insurgents. Ideal for piracy because of their speed and maneuverability. Generally faster than victim ships and naval ships.
<i>Grouping</i>	Up to forty pirates in multiple speedboats. Large numbers ideal for overpowering crews.
<i>Weapons</i>	AK-47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades, and knives. Able to stop ships under way with firepower.
<i>Violence</i>	High level of violence and injury to crew. Instills fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks.
<i>Reach/range</i>	Southward: Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550 km). Westward: Nigeria to Cote d'Ivoire (over 2,000 km).
<i>Time</i>	Operate day and night but shifting more to night operations. Surprise achieved through night attack.
<i>Target ships</i>	Oil and product tankers; objective to steal refined oil cargo. Other vessels attacked for money and valuables.
<i>Mother ship</i>	Hijacked fishing vessels occasionally used as resupply basis or as decoy when approaching targeted ships.
<i>Assisting ships</i>	Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo.
<i>Ransom</i>	Increasingly not a prime motivation but still employed as a supplementary activity.
<i>Networks</i>	Stolen oil sold within and outside the region. Timing of attacks suggests prior information about locations of oil tankers.

zone while they venture into new areas. This new dynamic was unleashed in January 2014, with the hijacking of *Kerala* in Angola.<sup>77</sup> The tanker was subsequently sighted under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria, where part of the oil cargo, worth eight million U.S. dollars, was stolen.<sup>78</sup> This incident signified a southerly expansion of piracy attacks. The months of June and July saw three hijackings off Ghana, two of them of oil tankers, signifying a further enlargement of piracy threat, this time westward.<sup>79</sup> These attacks shattered the reputations of Angola and Ghana as having coast waters among the safest in the region. The incidents also demonstrated that oil tankers will continue to be targeted, because the financial rewards for the pirates and their accomplices, as well as for buyers of the stolen oil, are extremely high.<sup>80</sup> However, all other vessels are also susceptible prey.

#### *Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave*

But even the primary piracy enclave can get more complicated. There is a history of attacks by two organized groups in neighboring Cameroon that are completely removed from the Niger Delta insurgency. One, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), is opposed to Nigeria's return of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.<sup>81</sup> The BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and detaining them for ten days before negotiating a ransom payment.<sup>82</sup> The second group, the Africa Marine Commando (AMC), kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010 and extorted a ransom for their release.<sup>83</sup> There have been no other discernible piratical attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from the Cameroon government, including lethal force.<sup>84</sup> However, the groups are far from being dismantled; reports indicate that the AMC was involved in the kidnapping of local officials in 2011.<sup>85</sup>

#### *Concerns in the Secondary Piracy Enclave*

Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone. Incidents in this enclave are fewer than off the Niger Delta but worrisome because of the high level of violence employed. There is also a very close correlation between reported piracy off the coast of Guinea and incidents in neighboring Sierra Leone—a portent of organized criminal activity in the latter area. In March 2007, pirates armed with machine guns boarded *Atropos*, which was under way forty nautical miles off Sierra Leone.<sup>86</sup> In August of the same year, thirty pirates armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom-registered product tanker off Guinea.<sup>87</sup> That December pirates armed with AK-47s and wearing military-like uniforms fired on and boarded a tanker off Sierra Leone.<sup>88</sup> In August 2010, ten pirates armed with AK-47s attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea;<sup>89</sup> more recently, in 2012, a Maltese cargo ship, *Costanza*, was attacked twenty nautical miles off Guinea by pirates, again armed with AK-47s, damaging the ship.<sup>90</sup> These are indications of entrenched piratical activity in this secondary enclave.

### *Threats beyond Piracy*

While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new transnational actors are gaining notoriety in the region. The Nigerian extremist Islamist group Boko Haram, whose activities were previously confined to the northern part of the country, has broadened its operations across Nigeria and neighboring states.<sup>91</sup> In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on the United Nations office in Nigeria, killing eighteen staff and injuring over a hundred others.<sup>92</sup> This attack dramatically changed earlier assessments that had viewed the group's threat as limited.<sup>93</sup> In June 2013, following repeated attacks on major cities and towns, the government of Nigeria officially declared Boko Haram a terrorist group;<sup>94</sup> the Nigerian minister of defense emphatically described it as a franchise of Al Qaeda.<sup>95</sup>

To date, there have been no reports of maritime attacks by Boko Haram. Although a strike on an onshore pipeline in February 2012 by militants "want[ing] to register their presence" raised fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting strategic oil assets, no connection with it has been established.<sup>96</sup> Nevertheless, the possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas installations in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be discounted.<sup>97</sup> Indeed, the high value of these assets, coupled with their vulnerability, makes them attractive targets.<sup>98</sup>

### COUNTERPIRACY IMPERATIVES

This article has established an increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. As attacks spread southward from the secondary enclave in Guinea, a piracy arc reaching to the primary enclave of the Niger Delta will be formed, leading to a very grave situation for the safety of shipping, offshore energy security, and the stability of the region. Effective remedial measures must be adopted by regional states and the international community. In designing these measures lessons from recent multilateral efforts in Somalia would certainly be useful, but cognizance should also be given to the distinctive dynamics of this new theater. On the whole, five thematic areas must be addressed.

#### *Improved Governance*

The governance nexus with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is important. The consequence of a governance deficit goes beyond the spiral of piratical attacks being witnessed. It also finds expression in a myriad of maritime security challenges, including illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing and illegal migration by sea.<sup>99</sup>

The 2006 UN *Niger Delta Human Development Report* provides an incisive description of the conditions of the people of the Niger Delta.<sup>100</sup> The report notes that the region has "dismal health and health service delivery," that the people live in "predominantly . . . poor quality [housing]," and that nearly all school facilities

are in “a state of extreme disrepair.” It reports increasing “disillusionment and frustration,” as well as “deepening . . . deprivation and environmental devastation.”<sup>101</sup> Research suggests that the quantity of oil spilled in the Niger Delta over the last fifty years is more than fifty times the volume spilled in the *Exxon Valdez* accident of 1989—one of the greatest environmental disasters the world has ever witnessed.<sup>102</sup> Such poor environmental management has led to serious pollution and environmental degradation, limiting the opportunity of people to earn a living from either farming or fishing.<sup>103</sup>

Realistically, therefore, bad governance must be said to lie at the heart of the maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Considering the tremendous oil wealth generated by the Niger Delta region, the dismal social picture painted by the UN report is otherwise difficult to comprehend. Resentment would be at its height in such an environment, leading to restiveness, conflict, and crime.<sup>104</sup> In any case, poor governance creates a malignant environment that can be exploited by pirates and transnational criminal networks.<sup>105</sup>

### *Enhanced Capability*

The impunity with which ship hijackings are conducted in the Gulf of Guinea, at times deep inside ports, is symptomatic of weakness in policing, surveillance, and response capabilities.<sup>106</sup> Although security-sector funding is generally inadequate in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation with respect to navies and coast guards is especially problematic. Angola’s allocation of resources for the protection of its maritime estate is typical for Gulf of Guinea states. Angola has an estimated coastline of 1,600 kilometers—the longest in the region. Its gross domestic product is the second highest in the region, much of it derived from offshore resources. Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan navy is only a thousand (compared to a hundred thousand for Angola’s army and six thousand for its air force), and its equipment state is palpably inadequate, in contrast to that of the army.<sup>107</sup> The Nigerian navy is similarly underfunded and limited in capability.<sup>108</sup> Its personnel strength of eight thousand is the largest in the Gulf of Guinea but in sharp contrast to the sixty-two-thousand-strong Nigerian army.<sup>109</sup> Liberia represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea but with respect to how the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with maritime interest. Although Liberia is the second-largest flag state in the world, its diminutive coast guard has only fifty personnel and eight craft, all under ten feet in length.<sup>110</sup>

A quick glance at the other navies and coast guards reveals a similarly worrisome situation.<sup>111</sup> It is evident that the maritime jurisdiction and interest available to Gulf of Guinea states are not commensurate with the exercise of responsibility to ensure the safety and security of their coasts.<sup>112</sup> This capability gap must be addressed.



### *Effective Legal Framework*

An inadequate legal framework too undermines maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two interrelated obligations regarding piracy. States are required, first, to suppress piracy at the national level, and second, to cooperate with other states in that effort at the regional and international levels.<sup>113</sup> To give practical effect to the former, Gulf of Guinea states must enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy.<sup>114</sup> With respect to the second obligation, cooperative instruments and structures should be established that facilitate the sharing of information, at the minimum, and also possibly lead to joint patrols.

However, Liberia and Togo are the only states in the region that have up-to-date piracy legislation.<sup>115</sup> It was only in January 2013 that Nigeria initiated the process of enacting a law to combat piracy and other maritime crimes.<sup>116</sup> A UN assessment mission observed that the definition in the national laws of Benin of the crime of piracy was outdated and inconsistent with the provisions of UNCLOS.<sup>117</sup> In summary, there is a legislative deficit with respect to the crime of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, even were states able to patrol their coasts, they would be unable to prosecute or punish offenders. The likely result would be a “catch and release syndrome,” as was manifested in the early periods of Somali piracy when counterpiracy forces frequently released apprehended pirates because of difficulties in prosecution, thus further entrenching insecurity.<sup>118</sup> The Gulf of Guinea states must therefore create an effective counterpiracy regime, first passing laws against piracy, with accompanying penalties, and second, providing the necessary prosecution and judicial structures.

A related important global instrument is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 (known as the 1988 SUA Convention), and its protocols.<sup>119</sup> The 1988 SUA Convention established a basis for responding to a spectrum of violent crimes at sea, from insurgency to terrorism.<sup>120</sup> These crimes tend to fall outside the scope of piracy as defined by UNCLOS.<sup>121</sup> The 1988 SUA Convention has addressed such gaps, giving Gulf of Guinea states the opportunity to respond effectively to these threats.

Despite the relevance of the SUA regime, ratification and implementation of SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea states have been unsatisfactory. Only Cote d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012.<sup>122</sup> Angola, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria—all of them major oil-producing states with substantial offshore infrastructures—have not ratified the 1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. States that have ratified SUA instruments have generally failed to incorporate them into their domestic legal systems.<sup>123</sup> For example, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria have all ratified the 1988

SUA Convention, but not one has incorporated the convention into its national law.<sup>124</sup> Since 2004 the UN has emphasized the importance of the SUA framework for maritime security.<sup>125</sup> It is therefore imperative that Gulf of Guinea states ratify and implement the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and policy frameworks. They should then develop regional responses, on the SUA framework.

### ***Robust Regional Cooperation***

Maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is increasing; however, it is crucial that initiatives be tailored to meet the needs of the region. Member states of the ECCAS in 2009 adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security, based on a structure that divides the ECCAS grouping into zones to enhance joint patrol, monitoring, and enforcement.<sup>126</sup> This structure is being replicated for the entire Gulf of Guinea as part of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. For instance, ECOWAS member states decided to establish a pilot Zone E, comprising Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and the landlocked state of Niger.<sup>127</sup> However, a number of issues have to be addressed: information sharing, realistic funding, interoperability, and current and future maritime boundary disputes.<sup>128</sup>

### ***Viable International Cooperation***

International maritime security cooperation too has gained traction in the Gulf of Guinea; the United States has achieved a good deal of visibility in this regard. The United States launched its Africa Partnership Station (APS) in 2007 with the deployment of the catamaran HSV-2 *Swift* and the dock landing ship USS *Fort McHenry* (LSD 43) to the Gulf of Guinea, and there has since been a consistent APS presence in the region.<sup>129</sup> While serving as a platform for capacity building and joint exercises, the APS also contributes to the strategic objectives of power projection and cooperative engagement for the United States through the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).<sup>130</sup> Other U.S. government and policy institutions, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., are also engaged in meeting nonmilitary maritime-security needs of the Gulf of Guinea.

The European Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in January 2013.<sup>131</sup> The initiative is designed to improve safety and security off the coasts of seven states.<sup>132</sup> Several other states as well are keenly engaged with the Gulf of Guinea on maritime security, as epitomized by the increasing port visits of foreign navies in the last couple of years.<sup>133</sup> Even the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy, which traditionally has had no presence in the region, visited Cameroon in May 2014 and reportedly undertook antipiracy joint drills with the host country.<sup>134</sup> At the multilateral level, both the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Office

on Drugs and Crime have maritime security capacity-building programs in the Gulf of Guinea. There is also an initiative by the international police community (INTERPOL) focused on the investigation of maritime-security incidents.<sup>135</sup> This will be a useful means of unearthing patterns of maritime crime and criminal networks.

Although international cooperation holds out the prospect of enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a number of challenges have to be addressed, of which two deserve highlighting here. First is the need for coordination of international partnerships. Multiple cooperative initiatives are currently being unpacked in the region that national administrators and regional institutions are required to respond to and then implement. They overcrowd national and regional policy, adversely affecting maritime-security decision making and coordination. External actors, donor agencies, and relevant international organizations should instead engage with Gulf of Guinea states in a harmonized, coordinated way. Second, while maritime security cooperation is arguably a means for nonregional states to pursue wider strategic interests, some have made no allocation of logistical support or funds corresponding to the maritime-security needs of the region. For example, France pledged only U.S.\$1.6 million to support maritime security in 2013, while funding for the CRIMGO project is just €4.5 million.<sup>136</sup> This amounts to a fraction of the annual cost of the Nigerian-Benin joint patrols (Operation PROSPERITY), estimated by the UN at U.S.\$112 million.<sup>137</sup>

Given the socioeconomic realities in the Gulf of Guinea, where many states are at the bottom of the global development index, external partnerships should contribute substantially to the enhancement of capacity and capability.<sup>138</sup> An arrangement similar to the trust fund established under the auspices of the IMO to facilitate counterpiracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is recommended for the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>139</sup> Of course, the prevailing governance nemesis in the region makes such a fund susceptible to corruption and abuse. The framework must therefore have inbuilt mechanisms and checks to ensure the transparent and efficient application of the fund.

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#### NOTES

- The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Ghana Armed Forces or to any other institution with which the author is affiliated.
1. United Nations [hereafter UN] General Assembly, Resolution 2018, "Piracy and Security in Africa," 31 October 2011; idem, Resolution 2039, "Peace Consolidation in West Africa," 29 February 2012.
  2. UN Security Council [hereafter UNSC], *Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, UNSC S/2012/45 (New York: 19 January 2012) [hereafter UNSC, *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*].

3. Summit of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 24–25 June 2013; UN News Center, “Ban Welcomes Anti-piracy Strategy Adopted by Leaders from West, Central Africa,” 29 December 2013, available at [www.un.org/](http://www.un.org/); idem, “At UN-Backed Meeting, African States Seek to Combat Piracy in Gulf of Guinea,” 29 December 2013, available at [www.un.org/](http://www.un.org/).
4. International Maritime Organization [hereafter IMO], *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during July 2013*, MSC.4/Circ.200 (London: 15 August 2013) [hereafter *Piracy and Armed Robbery*: (subtitle) in shortened citations to either the IMO or the International Maritime Bureau publications of this title].
5. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2013*, MSC.4/Circ.208 (London: 1 March 2013 [sic]). The correct date of adoption of *Annual Report 2013* is 1 March 2014.
6. States within the region are Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola.
7. Harry D. Gould, “Cicero’s Ghost: Rethinking the Social Construction of Piracy,” in *Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance*, ed. Michael J. Struett, Jon D. Carlson, and Mark T. Nance (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 23–46; Gerhard W. Mueller and Freda Adler, *Outlaws of the Ocean: The Complete Book of Contemporary Crime on the High Seas* (New York: Hearst Marine Books, 1985); John C. Payne, *Piracy Today: Fighting Villainy on the High Seas* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Sheridan House, 2010).
8. Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, *Law of the Sea* (Manchester, U.K.: Univ. of Manchester Press, 1999), p. 210; Eugene Kontorovich, “Universal Jurisdiction and the Piracy Analogy,” *Harvard International Law Journal* 45, no. 1 (2004), pp. 183–237; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law,” in *Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International Law*, ed. Stephen Macedo (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
9. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereafter UNCLOS], 1833 UNTS 397. The full text of the convention is reprinted in 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
10. *Ibid.*, art. 101.
11. Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, *Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-piracy* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), pp. 37–40; Terence Fokas, “The Barbary Coast Revisited: The Resurgence of International Maritime Piracy,” *University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal* 9 (1997), pp. 427–60.
12. Martin N. Murphy, *Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security*, Adelphi Paper 388 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), pp. 12–35; Maximo Q. Mejia, Jr., “Modern Piracy at Sea: Selected Legal Aspects,” *International Proceedings of Economics Development and Research* 48, no. 21 (2012), pp. 96–100. See also Maximo Q. Mejia, Jr., “Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism, and Acts of Maritime Violence,” *Journal of International Commercial Law* 2, no. 2 (2003), pp. 152–75.
13. Some of these instances of “banditry” or “piracy” were, however, offshoots of contests among coastal kingdoms to control or influence trade and commerce. Ukoha Ukiwo, “From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants’: A Historical Perspective on Anti-state and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta,” *African Affairs* 106, no. 425 (2007), pp. 587–610; John Darnton, “Pirates Plying Nigerian Seas,” *New York Times*, 9 January 1977; P. C. Lloyd, “The Itsekiri in the Nineteenth Century: An Outline Social History,” *Journal of African History* 4, no. 2 (1963), pp. 207–231.
14. The International Maritime Organization, previously known as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, was established in 1948 to regulate shipping and navigation safety. The IMO plays a major role in ensuring the security of international shipping through international agreements and recommended best practices. All the coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea are members of

- the IMO. See *IMO: International Maritime Organization*, www.imo.org.
15. International Maritime Bureau [hereafter IMB], *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2009* (London: January 2010), p. 41.
  16. Peter J. Pham, "Africa's Other Dangerous Waters: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," *World Defence Review* 3 (December 2009); Scott Baldauf, "Pirates Take New Territory: West African Gulf of Guinea," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 January 2010.
  17. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during May 2006*, MSC.4/Circ.87 (London: 20 June 2006).
  18. *Ibid.*
  19. IMB, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2009*; *idem*, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2010* (London: January 2011).
  20. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during August 2012*, MSC.4/Circ.188 (London: 29 October 2012).
  21. IMB, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2008*, p. 26; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment* (Vienna: February 2013).
  22. Nigeria is a federal state; and the Niger Delta region is made up of Delta State, Bayelsa State, Edo State, Ondo State, and Rivers State. The swampy coastal areas and deep seas bordering the Niger Delta constitute one of the world's richest oil and gas regions. John H. Enemugwem, "The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil Region in Africa, 2000–2006," *Africana* (June 2012), pp. 166–81.
  23. The Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) emerged as an umbrella organization for MEND, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, and the Martyrs Brigade. The JRC was used as a platform to claim responsibility for attacks and release public statements. See "Country Briefing: Nigeria—April 2009 to March 2010," *Jane's Terrorism Monitor*, 7 May 2010.
  24. See "Nigeria's MEND: A Different Militant Movement," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 19 March 2009, www.stratfor.com/, and Stephanie Hanson, *MEND: The Niger Delta's Umbrella Militant Group* (New York: U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 22 March 2007), available at www.cfr.org/.
  25. Ilufoye S. Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria," *Journal of Social Science* 20, no. 1 (2009), pp. 31–42.
  26. *Okrika* is a MEND term, meaning area of control. Each *okrika* is regarded as semiautonomous and is controlled by a leader or commander. See "Nigeria's MEND."
  27. For a detailed analysis of these attacks, see Mikhail Kashubsky, "Offshore Petroleum Security: Analysis of Offshore Security Threat, Target Attractiveness, and the International Legal Framework for the Protection and Security of Offshore Petroleum Installations" (PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, 2011), pp. 89–142.
  28. See "Country Briefing: Nigeria—April 2009 to March 2010"; and Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and 'Cake': Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," in *Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies*, ed. Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, Newport Paper 35 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2010), pp. 191–206.
  29. "Nigeria: 3 Naval Men Feared Killed by MEND," *IntelliBrief*, 7 April 2007; "Nine Nigerian Navy Members Killed in Fresh Attack," Agence France-Presse, 10 June 2008; "3 Nigerian Navy Soldiers Killed, 2 Gunboats Captured," *Panapress*, 3 April 2009.
  30. The First Amnesty Proclamation was issued on 25 June 2009. Oscar E. Ubhenin, "The Federal Government's Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta: An Appraisal," *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi* 21, no. 1 (2013), pp. 179–203.
  31. For a detailed analysis of the *Bonga* incident and its effect on global energy and insurance industries, see Mikhail Kashubsky, "Offshore Energy Force Majeure: Nigeria's Local Problem with Global Consequences," *Maritime Studies* (May–June 2008), pp. 20–26.
  32. Kashubsky, "Offshore Petroleum Security," p. 35. *Aban VII* was outside the territorial sea of India when it was boarded; IMB, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against*

- Ships: Annual Report 2006* (London: January 2007), p. 53.
33. *Bulford Dolphin* (Singapore) was attacked on 1 April 2007, sixty-four kilometers off the Nigerian coast. The kidnapped worker was released four days later; IMB, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2007* (London: January 2008), p. 66. It is noted that the IMB report identifies the rig as *Bueford Dolphin*, but the author's research (which included a review of the comparative IMO annual report for 2007, MSC.4/Circ.115 [10 April 2008]) confirms that the correct name is *Bulford Dolphin*.
  34. *Mystras*, an FPSO, was attacked on 3 May 2007, while *Trident VIII*, a mobile offshore drilling rig, was attacked 5 May. In both cases people were kidnapped. IMB, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2007*, p. 67. See also the listing of these incidents in IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2007*, MSC.4/Circ.115 (London: 10 April 2008), pp. 11–12.
  35. S. Bajpai and Jai Gupta, "Securing Oil and Gas Infrastructure," *Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering* 55 (2007), pp. 174–86.
  36. "Bonga Deepwater Project, Niger Delta," *Offshore Technology*, [www.offshore-technology.com/](http://www.offshore-technology.com/). For a detailed analysis of the *Bonga* incident and its effect on global energy and insurance industries, see Kashubsky, "Offshore Energy Force Majeure."
  37. Alexander Kwiatkowski and Julie Ziegler, "Shell Shuts Nigeria's Bonga Oil Field after Attack," *ODAC: The Oil Depletion Analysis Centre*, 19 June 2008, [www.odac-info.org/](http://www.odac-info.org/); Jeff Vail, "Nigeria: The Significance of the Bonga Offshore Oil Platform Attack," *Oil Drum*, 24 June 2008, [www.theoil Drum.com/](http://www.theoil Drum.com/).
  38. On threats to offshore energy, see Mikhail Kashubsky, "Protecting Offshore Oil and Gas Installations: Security Threats and Countervailing Measures," *Journal of Energy Security* (August 2013), available at [www.ensec.org/](http://www.ensec.org/).
  39. See "Observing the Offshore 'Bonga' Attack," *Information Dissemination* (blog), 27 June 2008, [www.informationdissemination.net/](http://www.informationdissemination.net/).
  40. Ordinary members of the insurgency were to receive approximately four hundred dollars a month, an amount exceeding the monthly income of most public-sector workers in Nigeria and the region generally. See *The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone*, Africa Report 195 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 12 December 2012).
  41. Insurgent leaders reportedly lived in the executive suite of Abuja's Hilton Hotel for months, regularly meeting and dining with politicians and other influential people. In 2011, former insurgent leaders Dokubo-Asari and Ekpumopolo allegedly received nine million and 22.9 million U.S. dollars, respectively, from the Nigerian National Petroleum Company as annual payments for offering protection to critical oil infrastructure. See Drew Hinshaw, "Nigeria's Former Oil Bandits Now Collect Government Cash," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 August 2012.
  42. Between 1 April 2009 and 31 March 2010, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre recorded seventy-five successful attacks in Nigeria as a whole, an average of 6.3 per month. In late June, the Nigerian federal government launched the amnesty program with MEND. By August, attacks had decreased; many militants, including some senior commanders, were embracing the amnesty program. "Country Briefing: Nigeria—April 2009 to March 2010."
  43. See also IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2009*, MSC.4/Circ.152 (London: 29 March 2010), pp. 31–33. Only three attacks occurred between April and June 2009, a period coinciding with the commencement of the amnesty arrangement. Between October and November 2009 there were seven recorded attacks; this figure is low compared with the same period the previous year, but it shows that the number of attacks started to rise by the close of the year owing to dissatisfaction and frustration within MEND. Indeed, it has been suggested that around this time younger insurgents began accusing senior commanders of corruption and betrayal.
  44. Citing IMB, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2010*, pp. 97–98.
  45. Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and 'Cake.'"
  46. See "MEND Threatens 'Onslaught' on Nigerian Oil Trade," *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, February 2010, and "MEND Threatens More Violence," *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, October 2010.

47. John T. Picarelli, "The Turbulent Nexus of Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: A Theory of Malevolent International Relations," *Global Crime* 7, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1–24; Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime and Transformation," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 1 (2001), pp. 43–58.
48. Anna Dunin, "The Niger Delta: Where Oil Is a Curse," *Geopolitical Monitor*, 8 August 2011, [www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/). See also Dennis Naku, "MEND Calls for Probe of Amnesty Committee," [allAfrica.com](http://allAfrica.com), 10 June 2011.
49. The director of IMB remarked in 2009 that "unlike Somalia, Nigeria has an effective government and the strongest Navy in the region. What is worrying is that there appears to be no political will to combat the problem of piracy off their waters and coast." IMB, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2009*, p. 41.
50. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during August 2006*, MSC.4/Circ.91 (London: 11 September 2006); IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during May 2007*, MSC.4/Circ.103 (London: 9 July 2007).
51. For Somalia, Roger Middleton, Chatham House Briefing Paper (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, October 2008).
52. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2008*, MSC.4/Circ.133 (London: 19 March 2009), pp. 62–69.
53. *Africa Research Bulletin* 18155, 16 February–15 March 2009.
54. ECCAS, Protocole Relatif à la Stratégie de Sécuritisation des Intérêts Vitaux en Mer des États de la CEEAC du Golfe de Guinée, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 24 October 2009.
55. IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2009*.
56. Alexander O. Exquemelin, *The Buccaneers of America* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993).
57. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during February 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.168 (London: 14 March 2011); IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during March 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.170 (London: 14 April 2011).
58. Patrick Dele Cole, a politician from the oil-rich Niger Delta region, says that 90 percent of the stolen oil is being shipped out of the country illegally; "Stolen Nigeria Oil 'Goes to Balkans and Singapore,'" *Ghana Oil Watch*, 23 October 2012, [ghanaoilwatch.org/](http://ghanaoilwatch.org/). See also Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, "Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat Export of Stolen Oil," *Chatham House*, September 2013, pp. 2–12.
59. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during June 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.173 (London: 11 July 2011), and *Acts Reported during July 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.174 (London: 8 August 2011)
60. IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Acts Reported during June 2011*, and *Acts Reported during July 2011*.
61. IMB, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2011* (London: January 2012).
62. Ibid.
63. UNSC, *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*.
64. Ibid.
65. See "Benin Seeks Nigeria's Help to Fight Sea Pirates," *Next Newspapers*, 12 August 2011.
66. There is hardly any detailed official information from Nigeria and Benin on Operation PROSPERITY. This information is gathered from interaction with naval officers of the two states directly involved and from presentations and briefings on PROSPERITY delivered by officers from Nigeria and Benin at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security in November 2012.
67. UNSC, *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*.
68. "Nigeria-Benin Anti-piracy Patrols 'Successful,'" *DefenceWeb*, 18 October 2011, [www.defenceweb.co.za/](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/).
69. For details of incidents in the months under review see IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during November 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.178 (London: 20 December 2011); *Acts Reported during December 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.179 (London: 10 January 2012); *Acts Reported during January 2012*, MSC.4/Circ.181 (London: 10 February 2012); and *Acts Reported during*

- February 2012, MSC.4/Circ.182 (London: 30 April 2012).
70. IMB, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2012* (London: January 2013), pp. 5, 6, 21.
  71. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during September 2011*, MSC.4/Circ.176 (London: 1 November 2011).
  72. IMB, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2012*, p. 25.
  73. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during October 2012*, MSC.4/Circ.190 (London: 21 January 2013).
  74. Ibid.
  75. The chemical tanker *Madonna 1* (Panama) was attacked on 23 December 2012. The pirates injured the crew, damaged the ship's communication equipment, and stole ship's property and personal belongings. See IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during December 2012*, MSC.4/Circ.192 (London: 24 January 2012).
  76. It is important to distinguish between attempted attacks and successful ones. Although the number of attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the wider Indian Ocean continues to increase, the rate of success has declined tremendously, especially on the East African coast, thanks to the presence of foreign forces. On the declining state of Somali piracy, see Bruce Legge, "Countering Somali Piracy: Success, Failure or Status Quo?," *Combined Maritime Forces*, 27 July 2012, combinedmaritimeforces.com/.
  77. IMO, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts Reported during January 2014*, MSC.4/Circ.206 (London: 7 March 2014).
  78. "Tanker Hijacked off Angola in Jan Returned, minus \$8m Diesel," Reuters, 24 February 2014, www.reuters.com/.
  79. The hijacked vessels in June were MT *Fair Artemis*, a Greek-owned oil tanker flying the Liberian flag, and MV *Mariner 771*, a Ghanaian-registered fishing vessel; *Hai Soon 6*, a Kiribati-flagged oil tanker, was hijacked in July.
  80. Katsouris and Sayne, "Nigeria's Criminal Crude."
  81. The return of the Bakassi Peninsula by Nigeria to Cameroon follows the decision of the International Court of Justice, *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)*, Judgment of 10 October 2002. See generally Hilary V. Lukong, *The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute: Management and Resolution, 1981–2011* (Oxford, U.K.: African Book Collective, 2011).
  82. *Sagitta*, a supply ship (France), was attacked on 31 October 2008 off the Bakassi Peninsula, within the territorial sea of Cameroon. The kidnapped crew members were released on payment of a ransom on 11 November 2008. See IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2009*.
  83. "New Pirates Group Africa Marine Commando Group," *Close Protection World*, 17 March 2010, www.closeprotectionworld.com/.
  84. Chris Rawley, "Africa Marine Commando on the Rise," *Information Dissemination* (blog), 7 April 2011, www.informationdissemination.net/.
  85. See *Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone*, pp. 13–14.
  86. IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2007*.
  87. *Wappen Von Leipzig*, oil tanker; *ibid.*, p. 69.
  88. *Jamal Massry*, tanker, Gambian registry; *ibid.*, p. 74.
  89. IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Annual Report 2010*.
  90. IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Acts Reported during August 2012*. Note also the hijacking of *Marciana*, a Maltese general-cargo ship, in October 2012; IMO, *Piracy and Armed Robbery: Acts Reported during October 2012*.
  91. *Boko Haram* translates to "Western education is bad." The group is an extremist Islamic sect in northern Nigeria that is waging a war against the government, demanding the institutionalization of Islamic rule. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the group is not in the same category as other terrorist groups, as it is not targeting Western interests. See Andrew Walker, *What Is Boko Haram?*



- (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2012), available at [www.usip.org/](http://www.usip.org/).
92. "UN House Bombing: Boko Haram Claims Responsibility," *Vanguard* (Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria), 27 August 2011, available at [nigerianbulletin.com/](http://nigerianbulletin.com/). See also Bashir Adigun, "UN Headquarters Car Bombing in Nigeria Kills 18," Associated Press, 27 August 2011, available at [www.google.com/](http://www.google.com/).
  93. See "Country Briefing: Nigeria—April 2009 to March 2010"; and Gwynne Dyer, "Nigeria and Boko Haram: Islamist Extremists Threaten Democracy and Muslim-Christian Unity in Africa's Largest Country," *Hamilton (Ont.) Spectator*, 29 August 2011, [www.thespec.com/](http://www.thespec.com/).
  94. "Jonathan Officially Declares Boko Haram a Terrorist Organization," *Premium Times* (Abuja, Nigeria), 4 June 2013, [www.premiumtimes.com](http://www.premiumtimes.com).
  95. Hon. Erelu Olusola Obada, "Nigeria's Defence Priorities: Domestic Stability for Regional Security," *Chatham House*, 18 July 2013, p. 4. See also Ola Awoniyi, "Nigeria Defence Chief Says Boko Haram Has Ties to Al-Qaeda," *Agence France-Presse*, 23 February 2012.
  96. "Militants Claim Attack on Eni Oil Pipeline," *BusinessDay*, 5 February 2012, [www.businessdayonline.com/](http://www.businessdayonline.com/).
  97. The AQIM operates in western Africa, largely within Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal; Anneli Botha, *Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism*, ISS Monograph 144 (Pretoria, S. Afr.: Institute for Security Studies, June 2008). See also UNSC, "Peace and Security in Africa," *May 2013 Monthly Forecast*, [www.securitycouncilreport.org/](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/).
  98. Hans Tino Hansen, "Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The 'Four Circles Model' for Maritime Security Threat Assessment," in *Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security*, ed. Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman, and Peter Lehr (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC, 2008); Torbjorn Thedeen, "Setting the Stage: The Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructures," in *Protection of Civilian Infrastructure from Acts of Terrorism*, ed. Konstantin Frollov and Gregory Baecher (New York: Springer, 2006); Amanda East and Bill Bailey, "Australia's Oil Refining Industry: Importance, Threats and Emergency Response," *Security Management* (2008).
  99. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa*, pp. 26–30; Karin Brulliard, "U.S. Outreach on Rough Seas off Western Africa," *Washington Post*, 21 May 2009.
  100. United Nations Development Programme, *Niger Delta Human Development Report* (New York: 2006), pp. 19–34.
  101. *Ibid.*
  102. For a detailed analysis of these environmental impacts and their concomitant effects on the people of the Niger Delta, see Joseph Effiong, "Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: The Paradox of the Black Gold," in *Environment and Social Justice: An International Perspective*, ed. Dorceta E. Taylor (Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group, 2010), pp. 324–49. See also *Nigeria: Petroleum Pollution and Poverty in Niger Delta*, AFR 44/017/2009 (London: Amnesty International, 2009), available at [www.es.amnesty.org/](http://www.es.amnesty.org/).
  103. See Ubhenin, "Federal Government's Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta," p. 182; Sheriff Folarin, "Niger-Delta: Environment, Omani Crises and the State," *Constitution* 7, no. 1 (2007), pp. 37–61; and Effiong, "Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria."
  104. Folarin, "Niger-Delta"; John Vidal, "Niger Delta Oil Spills Clean-Up Will Take 30 Years, Says UN," *Guardian*, 4 August 2011, [www.theguardian.com/](http://www.theguardian.com/).
  105. Sarah N. Katherine, "Piracy in Somalia: Targeting the Source," *Global Security Studies* 2, no. 3 (2011), pp. 22–29; Eric Frecon, "Piracy in the Malacca Straits: Notes from the Field," *International Institute for Asian Studies*, Newsletter 36 (2005).
  106. Generally on the implications of weak naval and policing capability for maritime security, see Martin Murphy, *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World* (London: Hurst, 2010).
  107. "Sub-Saharan Africa," in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2012* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 421–22.
  108. See "Nigerian Navy Is Underfunded, Former Naval Capt. Tells Senate Committee," *I Paid*

- a Bribe Naija*, 4 June 2013, [www.gejites.com/](http://www.gejites.com/), and “Senate Seeks Better Funding for Navy,” *NBF News*, 18 June 2009, [www.nigerianbestforum.com/](http://www.nigerianbestforum.com/).
109. “Sub-Saharan Africa,” pp. 447–48.
  110. *Ibid.*, p. 441. See UN Conference on Trade and Development, *Review of Maritime Transport 2012* (New York and Geneva: 2012), p. 44.
  111. “Sub-Saharan Africa,” pp. 411–62.
  112. On the inadequate funding and capability of African navies and coast guards, see Augustus Vogel, *Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges*, Africa Security Brief 10 (Fort McNair, D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011).
  113. Article 100 of UNCLOS provides: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
  114. See UNCLOS, chap. 4, secs. 4.2.1.2–3; Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists,” *California Law Review* 98 (2010), pp. 243–76; and Diana Chang, “Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates,” *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* (2010), pp. 273–88.
  115. See Penal Code of Liberia, 2008, and Code de la Marine Marchande, Togo, 1971, available at the UN Office of Legal Affairs / Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea legislation and treaties database: *Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation*, [www.un.org/](http://www.un.org/).
  116. See “NIMASA Seeks Legal Backing to Fight Piracy,” *This Day*, 14 February 2013, [www.thisdaylive.com/](http://www.thisdaylive.com/).
  117. See UNSC, *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, p. 5.
  118. For a discussion of the “catch and release” syndrome and the difficulties associated with piracy prosecution in Somalia, see Kontorovich, “Guantánamo on the Sea,” and Elizabeth Andersen, Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, and Patricia Goff, *Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Options in International Law* (Washington, D.C., and Waterloo, Ont.: American Society of International Law and Academic Council on the United Nations System, [2009]), available at [acuns.org/](http://acuns.org/).
  119. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988, Rome, Italy, entry into force 1 March 1992, 156 parties as of 2 December 2010, 1678 UNTS 201 / [1993] ATS 10 / 27 ILM 672 (1988).
  120. Generally on the SUA framework and the suppression of terrorism, see Helmut Tuerk, “Combating Terrorism: The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,” *University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review* 15 (2008), pp. 337–67; John F. Frittelli, “Maritime Security: Overview of Issues,” *United States Congressional Research Service*, 5 December 2003; Jose L. Jesus, “Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects,” *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law* 18 (2003), pp. 363–400; Malvina Halberstam, “Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety,” *American Journal of International Law* 82 (1988), pp. 269–92; and Andrew L. Liput, “An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice,” *Fordham International Law Journal* 9, no. 2 (1985), pp. 328–72.
  121. Kontorovich, “Guantánamo on the Sea”; Douglas Guilfoyle, *Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), pp. 254–59.
  122. “Status of Multilateral Convention and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions: As at June 30 2013,” *IMO: International Maritime Organization*, [www.imo.org/](http://www.imo.org/).
  123. This has been confirmed in Magnus T. Addico (secretary general of the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa), “Maritime Security Threats and Responses in West and Central Africa” (address to the United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, New York, 23–27 June 2008).
  124. For Nigeria, see “NIMASA Seeks Legal Backing to Fight Piracy.” For Benin, see UNSC, *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*. For Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, author interview with national authorities.

125. See UN General Assembly, Resolution 62/215, "Oceans and the Law of the Sea," 14 March 2008, para. 67; UN General Assembly, Resolution 61/222, "Oceans and the Law of the Sea," 16 March 2007, para. 59; and UNSC, Resolution 1540 [on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons], 28 April 2004.
126. See ECCAS, Protocole Relatif. Zone A: Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Zone B: Angola, Republic of the Congo, Gabon; Zone D: Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe.
127. ECOWAS, Final Communique, Forty-Third Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, Nigeria, 17–18 July 2013.
128. See Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, "Fault Lines in Maritime Security: Analysis of Maritime Boundary Uncertainties in the Gulf of Guinea," *African Security Review* 22, no. 3 (2013), pp. 95–110.
129. On APS see "About Africa Partnership Station," *Commander U.S. Naval Forces Africa*, n.d., [www.c6f.navy.mil/](http://www.c6f.navy.mil/), and Kathi A. Sohn, "The Global Fleet Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 45–58.
130. AFRICOM was established in 2007 to focus exclusively on the African continent. See "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa," *White House*, 6 February 2007, [georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/). For an extensive analysis of the background and future of AFRICOM, see David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command*, Letort Papers (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), and Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?," *Military Review* 88, no. 1 (January–February 2008).
131. European Commission, "New EU Initiative to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," press release, Ref IP/13/14, 10 January 2013, Brussels.
132. Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo.
133. Ghana has, for example, hosted visits by navies of the following states since 2011: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
134. "Chinese Naval Fleet Pays Four-Day Goodwill Visit to Cameroon," *People's Daily Online*, 4 June 2014, [english.peopledaily.com.cn/](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/); "Chinese Naval Delegation Visits Cameroon," *DefenceWeb*, 5 June 2014, [www.defenceweb.co.za/](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/).
135. The INTERPOL Maritime Piracy Task Force focuses on three main areas, working closely with the international community: countering maritime piracy, investigating incidents, and tracing the proceeds of crime. "Maritime Piracy," *INTERPOL: 100 Years of International Police Cooperation*, [www.interpol.int/](http://www.interpol.int/).
136. "United Nations Security Council, 6723rd Meeting, Monday, 27 February 2012, 10 a.m., New York," S/PV6723 (Provisional), *Security Council Report*, p. 10, [www.securitycouncilreport.org/](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/).
137. See UNSC, *Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea*, p. 6. The UN assessment team stated that Benin's monthly contribution to the joint operation, U.S.\$466,000, is only 5 percent of the total cost. This means that the monthly total cost is \$9.32 million, of which Nigeria contributes \$8.85 million. This translates into an estimated annual cost of \$112 million.
138. *World Bank Development Indicators 2010* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 2011); *Africa Competitiveness Report 2011* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011).
139. A trust fund has been established to support the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct for Combating Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Japan provided the seed money, after which financial contributions followed from many states, including France, the Republic of Korea, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Norway, and Saudi Arabia. See "Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund," *IMO: International Maritime Organization*, [www.imo.org/](http://www.imo.org/).