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BOOK REVIEWS

WARTIME RELIGION

Jenkins, Philip. *The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade*. New York: HarperOne, 2014. 438pp. \$29.95

The roots of today's sectarian-fueled conflicts lie in the First World War. By igniting "a global religious revolution," the "Great War" redrew the world's religious map both figuratively and literally. Modern Islam, characterized as "assertive, self-confident, and aggressively sectarian," is a direct result, but so too are the spread of charismatic Christianity in Africa, an invigorated Zionism that led to the eventual creation of the modern state of Israel, and even the "efflorescence of esoteric and mystical ideas that we often summarize as New Age." So argues Philip Jenkins. Like other recent authors, Jenkins claims that the Great War in effect "created our reality." This book, however, is noteworthy for placing the war's political, social, and cultural elements, and effects, within an explicitly religious context.

Jenkins, distinguished professor of history and member of the Institute for the Study of Religion at Baylor University, has written an ambitious and highly readable book. Synthesizing military, cultural, and religious history and drawing principally from a vast body of secondary literature,

the book is admirable in its reach even when it exceeds the author's grasp.

By focusing on the religious dimensions and consequences of the war, this book fills a historiographical gap, one in which wartime religion is commonly regarded as "irrelevant . . . window dressing" with "each side cynically appropriat[ing] God to its own narrow nationalist causes." Instead, Jenkins takes seriously the decidedly religious worldview that informed the war's belligerents. While there were national and religious disparities (for example, where Orthodox Russians cast the war in traditional "crusade" language, British rhetoric emphasized a "war for Christian civilization"), a common religious vocabulary of sacrifice, holy war, divine mission/mandate, crusade, and cosmic battle, marked by both apocalyptic fears and millenarian hopes, was widely shared across national and faith-group boundaries.

In Jenkins's view, it was these war-fueled expectations and the ensuing wartime cataclysm that fundamentally shaped the postwar world. A more secularized Europe was a reaction to wartime religious excesses, even as that same "rhetoric of

the holy war and holy nation” coupled with apocalyptic ideas to “metastasize” into “Fascism, Nazism, and racial extermination.” So too was the Russian Revolution a religious civil war, the Bolshevik cause as messianic and millenarian in vision as it was antireligious in doctrine. Anti-imperial and anticolonial movements in Africa and elsewhere were also parts of this postwar “worldwide millenarian upsurge.” Similarly, the war led to a proliferation of “charismatic, fundamentalist, [and] traditionalist forms of faith” within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moreover, the defeat and geographical division of the Ottoman Empire created not only the modern Middle East but also, according to Jenkins, modern Islam. The loss of a geopolitical center and the caliphate resulted in a “postwar search for new sources of authority [that] led to the creation or revival of virtually all the Islamic movements that we know in the modern world.”

Like many of the book’s broadest claims, this last one falls a little short. Still, Jenkins’s book is important and timely. The Great War might not have been a “war of religion” per se, but Jenkins shows how for its participants it was certainly religious. Most of all, Jenkins reminds us, as sectarian fighting continues over national boundaries drawn following that century-old war, of the continued relevance of religion’s global effects.

BRAD CARTER
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Manicom, James. *Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea*. Georgetown Univ. Press, 2014. 280pp. \$54.95

As the world reacts to an increasingly powerful and assertive China, East Asia’s maritime frontiers are emerging as friction points that threaten regional stability. James Manicom’s *Bridging Troubled Waters* presents a timely analytical history of Sino-Japanese relations in the East China Sea and makes important contributions to understanding the prospects for maritime cooperation. The book authoritatively documents new insights regarding this complex state of evolving affairs, one that has included elements of cooperation, compromise, competition, and conflict. It employs a helpful analytical framework from which to argue for optimism, by demonstrating that Chinese and Japanese leaders have historically been able to manage tensions by decoupling material issues from strategic and symbolic differences. Manicom has a PhD from Flinders University in Australia and is an expert in East Asian security, specializing in maritime issues. A research fellowship at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and trips to China and Japan positioned him well to deliver this systematic analysis.

Manicom constructs a unique matrix for evaluating the value of maritime space vis-à-vis national objectives and applies this construct to motivations for cooperation versus conflict. Manicom then uses this framework to interpret case studies from the Sino-Japanese maritime relationship, examining the dispute over islands in the East China Sea, fisheries management, agreements governing research at sea, and cooperative arrangements in the Chunxiao gas field. Building on the insights delivered by these case studies, the book’s final chapter and conclusion focus on the current political dynamics in the Sino-Japanese maritime relationship and

assess the prospects for successful management of tensions through a shared-jurisdiction arrangement that satisfies both countries' territorial objectives.

The book is a densely packed, academic work. The opening chapter, in which Manicom lays his theoretical foundations and analytical framework, will demand particular effort from readers seeking immediate, practical insights. However, this academic investment is well worth the effort. The follow-up analysis is exceptionally insightful for not only academics but also policy makers, strategists, and military professionals. Its tone, however, reflects the fact that the author did most of his research in Japan (only five of the twenty-six interviews were conducted in Beijing), and Manicom seems intermittently challenged to shake a Japanese perspective.

A more significant shortfall is that the book qualifies its strong case for optimism with two significant caveats. First, Manicom notes that past cooperation has only resulted when "material issues have been separated from the more symbolic aspects of [Sino-Japanese] relations" and that the countries have the greatest difficulty finding paths to cooperation over contested symbolic and strategic issues. Second, he qualifies his optimism also by stating that tensions will be sufficiently managed to prevent war only so long as "the leaders of each state can exercise the necessary leadership to manage their respective national pressures." These caveats are of great concern, because leaders in both nations may find it increasingly difficult to manage the growing nationalistic demands of their constituents. Furthermore, because the years of cooperative efforts expertly documented in Manicom's case studies have taken the edge off

many of the material issues, the remaining tension points are predominantly strategic and symbolic in nature. Still, despite these criticisms, the lessons contained in Manicom's insightful analysis will be of great value to those seeking to understand Sino-Japanese tensions and other maritime disputes.

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Westad, Odd Arne. *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750*. New York: Basic Books, 2012. 515pp. \$32

The Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad, in this well-written history of China over the past 250 years, tells the story from a broad global perspective. His approach tracks that of his earlier works on the Cold War, where he placed a binational rivalry into a larger world context. Similarly in this work, he sees the principal driver of China's modern experience as relentless internationalization. However, China is more than just a country. It is, as Lucien Pye once described it, "a civilization-state, pretending to be a nation-state." Imperial in every respect, it pushed out, and the world has pushed back, powerfully, since 1750.

However, the adjective "restless" in the title is an understatement. No country's modern history has been more tumultuous or more violent. Westad describes episodes, including the worst, that occurred in the time of "peace" that the Communist regime was supposed to usher in. The most deadly and destructive of modern China's encounters with the world, Westad astutely notes, was between 1937 and 1945—its war with

Japan. In a campaign breathtaking in its brutality, Japan destroyed China's nascent republic, enabled the victory of the Communists in their civil war with the Nationalists, and destroyed the old imperial order in Asia. Thus, the new China was born into a world of many possibilities. Unhappily, none of the good ones, either domestically or internationally, was realized until 1979, when China's current "rise" can be said to have begun.

Westad's fine account of what has come before brings us to realize that the rise of China will not necessarily have a calming effect on either the Chinese people or on others who live nearby. Since 1750, "internationalization," though not entirely a one-way street, has been mostly that; now, the restless empire, once in a defensive crouch, is moving out smartly in all directions. Perhaps this should be expected of a "civilizational state," except that today's China offers to the world nothing of what it once did—no high culture, no attainments in intellectual and philosophical life, and certainly no models for wise and effective governance. Instead, as Westad helps us see, the current regime is thrashing around, which makes its own future, as well as the futures both of its "near abroad" and of the world at large, hard to predict.

Empires, we have been taught, are supposed to bring peace, but today's Middle Empire ruled from today's Beijing displays many indications that it is bent on becoming a major disturber of the peace. Yet even under a more enlightened outlook, there would be challenges: the Middle Empire borders on three nuclear-weapons states—Russia, India, and Pakistan—and probably also a fourth, North Korea. Even so, from his own well-informed examination of

China's modern experience Westad concludes that prospects for peace remain—not a ringing vote of confidence in the powers that be in Beijing, but neither is it a wholly despairing outlook. After all, Westad is an accomplished historian of the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedom-enhancing outcome of which reminds us that things do not always turn out badly.

CHARLES HORNER
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Twomey, Christopher P. *The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2010. 240pp. \$35

It has been said that "weapons speak to the wise—but in general they need interpreters." *The Military Lens*, written by political scientist Christopher P. Twomey, associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, shows the difficulty of that quote. Twomey makes a strong case that differing military languages and doctrines explain otherwise puzzling examples of deterrence failure and escalation.

The Military Lens is a welcome addition to the literature on deterrence, which too often treats actors as interchangeable "black boxes." Twomey writes in the spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis, explore psychological factors that led to misinterpreting the actions of others. Twomey's work adds the new factor of military doctrine. Every military has its own doctrine, or "theory of victory," its vision of how military resources are to be used to achieve operational success. Twomey's core argument is that strategists look through a doctrinal "lens" when assessing capabilities

and intentions and that this weakens deterrence in two ways: the credibility of others' threats is discounted, because their doctrines are thought to be ineffective, and the others' signals are missed by the use of one's own doctrine as a template for indicators. This attention to misperceptions at the level of operational net assessment is new and of direct relevance to planners and analysts.

Much of the book tests the author's theory against three Korean War-era episodes: China's failure to deter U.S. movement north of the thirty-eighth parallel, American failure to deter China from entering the war, and the less well-known maritime story of how the United States prevented a planned Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Twomey also traces how greatly the United States and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) underestimated each other's land warfare capabilities and as a result issued threats that neither considered credible. The PLA Navy, with officers largely educated abroad, understood that U.S. air supremacy rendered landings impossible. The choice of the 1950 Korean cases was wise, as most variables other than PLA army/navy differences are constant. A notable feature of the case studies is archival research, both in the United States and in China; fresh documentation alone will appeal to Korean War specialists.

Doctrinal difference fits the Korean War, but the radical divergence of the revolutionary PLA and atomic American military makes this a relatively easy case, as Twomey acknowledges. How often do doctrinal differences generally lead to deterrence failures? An additional chapter on two Arab-Israeli cases argues that deterrence failure is correlated with doctrinal divergence. The evidence is suggestive, but the book could be

strengthened by a larger universe of cases that may answer such additional questions as these: Are doctrinal differences more common in ground than naval warfare, for example? Do opponents in long-lasting rivalries (compared to the United States / People's Republic of China in 1950) fare better at assessing the others' capability despite differing doctrines?

The Military Lens offers a warning that clear, credible threats may not be understood as such by others. Since doctrinal misperceptions take place at the military level, the lessons here are particularly relevant to planners, as they develop assessments and deterrent options for civilian leaders. This work also holds implications for professional military education, stating as it does that officers should be encouraged to overcome doctrinal filters, that scholars should study foreign doctrines, and that educational exchanges might reduce misunderstandings (the author himself is involved in U.S.-Chinese dialogues). Perhaps weapons speak a common tongue, but Twomey reminds us that militaries need to be fluent in multiple languages.

DAVID BURBACH
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Kane, Tim. *Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It's Time for a Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 271pp. \$27

This book provides a critical analysis and highlights a dysfunctional U.S. Army officer personnel management system. The author explains why the best and brightest young officers depart early for civilian careers and what can be

done to encourage them to remain on active duty. Kane also outlines why the military's leadership training is so successful and admired by civilian industry.

Tim Kane's background as an Air Force veteran and successful entrepreneur with a PhD in economics gives him the perspective, skill, and insight to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the current system and a blueprint for the future.

Kane conducted an online survey of West Point graduates from six different classes at different stages of their careers. Overall, it was a balanced sample, with approximately 250 respondents, both military and civilian. Based on the results of a first survey, Kane conducted a follow-up to gain additional insight. The results highlight many reasons why young leaders leave the service, and Kane suggests what can be done to curb the exodus.

Kane proposes an alternative to the current All Volunteer Force (AVF)—what he calls the “Total Volunteer Force” (TVF). He posits that there is a “philosophical difference between the current system, which gives people freedom to choose only at the moment of volunteering [the AVF], and a system in which employees are free every day.” Kane's book is unique in that it offers possible alternatives to many of the Army's current personnel policies that young leaders despise. It is relatively easy to criticize bureaucratic policies without offering solutions, but Kane does offer solutions, which the Army has already begun to implement. For example, Kane proposes allowing officers a break in service to enter civilian industry, after which they can return to the military without prejudice—a policy that the Army recently embraced.

One of Kane's major criticisms of the military is that officer promotions, unlike their civilian counterparts, are based more on year seniority than on merit. “It is fair to say that selection to general is highly competitive, but the reality is that longevity is a bigger factor than merit in determining who makes that rank.” The result is that in an effort to make the officer assignment process as fair as possible the system has become outdated and less than optimal for officers and commanders alike. Kane's TVF proposes promotions based on merit and assignments and using a market mechanism—that is, an internal job market, in which officers apply for any open job.

As a retired Army colonel with almost thirty years of active-duty service, many of them as a personnel officer, I was skeptical when I started reading this book. It is difficult to criticize something when you have been a part of the problem. However, I found that Kane has skillfully proposed a series of recommendations that could make a difference. *Bleeding Talent* is a must-read for all on active duty today. Kane's writing style and method of presenting counterarguments make for thought-provoking proposals that merit consideration in today's Army.

THOMAS GIBBONS
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Northrup, David. *How English Became the Global Language*. New York: Palgrave, 2013. 220pp. \$24

In this slim volume David Northrup, a retired Boston College professor of history, gives a clear and concise account of the development of English into the twenty-first century's one truly global

language. First he traces how English became the predominant language in the British Isles, overcoming such rivals as Cornish, Welsh, and Gaelic. Then he looks at how English spread throughout the British colonies that eventually became the United States and Canada. Finally, Northrup analyzes the culminating phase of the globalization of English and its rise to its current status as the lingua franca of the modern world.

To account for this worldwide penetration Northrup points to a number of related developments, especially the way English has become the indispensable medium of international communication in science, business, and higher education. Northrup identifies the meteoric growth of the World Wide Web as the most important factor in spreading English to every corner of the globe.

To his credit, Northrup rejects the easy and fashionable narratives that view the globalization of English as a worldwide cultural disaster and the success of English as one more instance of the West's cultural imperialism. Northrup shows that the spread of English has not necessarily involved the death of other languages. By learning English, in fact, people around the world are generally becoming more bilingual and even trilingual; as Northrup correctly insists, the global diffusion of English is more a matter of "pull" than of "push." To be sure, some governments have mandated the learning of English. However, the "push" of governments has been less successful than the "pull" of people all around the world who simply want to learn the language to make their lives better. Northrup rejects the common view that people are passive with respect to language, that they just sit around waiting to have languages imposed

on them by fiat. Instead, Northrup sees people everywhere taking active roles in their own educations, eagerly embracing English in the hope that it will allow them to trade more freely with the international community, to keep up with the latest developments in science, technology, and popular culture, and to take advantage of the remarkable educational opportunities available in the English-speaking world.

Language is thus a prime example of what the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek calls "spontaneous order." Spontaneous orders are the result of human action but not of human design. That means that many orderly phenomena in human life, such as the famous "invisible hand" of the market, result not from government central planning but from the seemingly chaotic interaction of widely dispersed people pursuing their individual self-interest yet in the process producing a larger public good.

Language is a human institution that no one plans in advance but that grows out of the active usage of millions of individuals. As Northrup shows, attempts by linguistic experts to create a global language "scientifically" have failed completely, most notably in the case of Esperanto. Despite all the efforts to promote it, even official recognition from UNESCO in 1954, Esperanto has basically languished in the realm of faculty lounges and parlor games. Contrary to the conspiracy theories of postcolonialist pundits, no central authority set out to make English the global language that it is today. Some accidents of colonial history were undoubtedly involved in the process, such as the fact that Britain ruled over the populous Indian subcontinent for several centuries. Yet if English had not appealed to millions

of individuals around the globe on its own, the language would never have achieved the preeminence it now enjoys.

Unfortunately, Northrup's book could have profited from better copyediting and proofreading. It has far too many errors of grammar and spelling (on the order of "Isaac Azimov" instead of "Isaac Asimov"). Ironically, in view of its subject, too much of the "research" is straight from the Internet. I did not expect to see so many citations to

Wikipedia in a scholarly publication.

These problems aside, *How English Became the Global Language* offers a good introduction to its subject for the general reader, who will come away from the book with a better grasp of what brought about the globalization of English and what it means for the world's future.

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