Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace

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over sea power, that access and its handmaiden forward presence are the essentials of American defense strategy. The logic underlying this assumption is seductive in its simplicity: the United States needs access to allow it to use force at times and places of its choosing in the service of its national interests. Yet rarely does Tangredi ask whether the assumed national interests are worth the enormous financial, technological (in terms of opportunities forgone), and even human cost of countering A2/AD strategies, given the challenges of geography, the growing capabilities of potential adversaries, and the evolving nature of modern warfare. After all, what specific national objectives are at stake in, for example, the Taiwan Strait scenario that could not be achieved by other means? Moreover, the author gives insufficient attention to the downside of forward presence and, especially, to the potential negative consequences of executing counter-A2/AD strategies. Some downsides can, of course, be intuited from the historical case studies included in chapters 3 and 4. However, to stress this weakness, serious as it is for the state of maritime and naval strategy in general, would be unfair to Sam Tangredi, because it would ask him to write a book that he chose not to write. He chose to explain and analyze antiaccess warfare in both contemporary and historical contexts, and he has done an excellent job of it. I highly recommend that the readers of this journal find room for Anti-Access Warfare on their bookshelves.

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Small Navies is a selection of essays presented at the Small Navies Conference held in October 2012 at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, cosponsored by the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London, and the Centre for Applied Research in Security Innovation, Liverpool Hope University. The first three essays examine existing classifications of what constitutes a small navy. Chapters 4 and 5 reflect on the conditions that inspire innovation within small navies. The remaining eight essays analyze the small navies of several states and discuss their characteristics and employment, the relationships between strategy and naval force structure, and the particular challenges they face. The first theme in the collection is the question of what constitutes a small navy. Several definitions are proposed; the traditional quantitative methods of comparing and measuring navies are discussed, as well as movements beyond such historical measurements of naval power as tonnage, hulls, and capital ships. Eric Grove, Geoffrey Till, and Basil Germond review navy hierarchical classification criteria proposed by analysts during the past three decades. They consider naval warfare principles and common naval functions and missions. Till's essay evaluates the differences and similarities between large and small navies, arguing that “small navies are simply big navies in miniature.” He considers
functions common to all navies, the impact of cooperation among navies of all sizes, and the common pressure placed on navies to align resources with operations and mission execution. Germond's essay compares classification criteria and argues that twenty-first-century navies should be classified by their “order of effect” vice their “order of battle.”

This book as a whole does not propose its own definition generally accepted by the authors. It is instead a thoughtful examination of the conditions in the twenty-first-century security environment that challenge preexisting classifications while broadly observing that the size of a navy is an insufficient basis of classification.

Building a small navy is a national choice. Essays in this work examine the conditions of the strategic environment that cause states to build them, finding that because of the effects of globalization, technology, and economics, navies are valuable to states for a variety of reasons.

Several essays discuss the necessity for small navies to provide perceived or actual returns on national investment in naval force structure. Absent a nationally valued return, small navies face an existential threat, which may explain the observation that many small navies have made the practical decision to build constabulary and coastal-defense forces. Such navies focus on maritime missions that promote national-security and economic interests through operations in territorial seas and exclusive economic zones.

Small Navies is a thoughtful collection of concepts and ideas now present in naval force planning. This book assesses the range of strategic and domestic influences facing states and navies engaged in maritime force-structure decision making. Today, naval ship-building costs are on the rise, potential adversaries have access to technology that complicates the threat to maritime forces, and states struggle to dedicate more than a few percentage points of gross domestic product to defense. These trends portend that a growing number of states will possess the capacity to build only small navies.

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The author delivers a chronological review of how the relationship between the president and senior Army leaders has evolved over the life of the Republic. The book is part history, tracing the evolution of U.S. civil-military relations from an uncertain beginning to a level of increasing professionalism, to the current state, which the author finds excessively partisan. It also belongs on any shelf devoted to government policy, since it presents a convincing argument that Samuel Huntington's concept of operational control is as artificial a construct as the frictionless plane described in most physics textbooks.

Moten is not the first author to suggest this. For example, Mackubin Owens, of the Naval War College, has long held that the U.S. political-military relationship is more akin to a contract that has been periodically renegotiated. However, Moten takes this a step farther by