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A BIT OF A MAVERICK


*The Hundred-Year Marathon* is the culmination of a lifetime’s work on Chinese security policy by Dr. Michael Pillsbury (1945–), an independent China analyst based in Washington, D.C. The book is popular, not academic. That said, it is by and large accurate and must be read and digested.

At the outset, though, two issues must be raised. One is the title. The other is the author. The title suggests, with no evidence, that somehow a secret Masonic cabal has existed in China for a century, having as its purpose the overthrow of the United States as leading world power. Taken literally that would mean planning got under way in 1915, under President Yuan Shikai, continued during Chiang Kai-shek’s watch, and then on through Mao Zedong and beyond—which, bluntly put, is not history at all, but classic tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory. China’s changing international behavior over the last century is indeed difficult to explain, but it is most certainly not the product of some arcane “Protocols for the Replacement of America.”

As for Pillsbury, he is well-trained, hard-working, and independently wealthy. He is the author of original and definitive books about the People’s Liberation Army. He is also a bit of a maverick: a one-man show, rarely part of a team. Long a proponent of pro-China policies, including sale of weapons to Beijing in the 1980s and 1990s, he has, as he tells it, changed his mind as he has learned more. While a “panda hugger” he was well treated and given much “access”—which means access to people whose job is to deceive you, as well as hospitality. In 2006, however, he published an article in the *Wall Street Journal* decisively repudiating his previous views—and felt the back of Beijing’s hand until 2013. Then he was able to return to China, as Beijing sought to shore up support, faced with the South China Sea crisis, to be discussed below (pages 129–30).

Pillsbury is not to be believed without question. He has had numerous run-ins with counterintelligence officials owing to his seemingly uncontrollable proclivity to leak secrets—to this reviewer, for example, in the passenger seat of his vintage Jaguar motorcar. Here, however, we are reviewing neither the sales strategy nor the author of this book, but rather its argument.
The book makes two fundamental contentions. First, Pillsbury states that the Asian region and the United States currently face the problem of an unexpectedly aggressive China. Second, he argues that this unpleasant surprise is no more than the product of decades of official self-delusion about Beijing, even when confronted with mountains of facts that supported opposite conclusions. This reviewer agrees with these two points, albeit with many academic caveats that will be spared. Disagreement arises only when speculation begins about the future.

For roughly forty years, from the Nixon diplomacy of the 1970s to about 2010, the idea that China could pose a threat militarily was considered so mistaken as to be effectively beyond toleration in either academic or governmental circles. The insistent conviction was that “engagement” would transform China into a strong economy, a friend, even an ally, and most likely a democracy as well (page 7). Among the few in Washington not convinced by these arguments was the longtime head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, who did much to support Pillsbury’s work through contract research.

China is of course a new country. The first states having that word as part of their official names were founded in the last century: the Republic of China in 1911; then after the Chinese civil war, the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Before that a myriad of states, some ethnically Chinese, some not, rose and fell on the East Asian plain. To lump them all together as a political “China” to be treated as a historical entity having thousands of years of history is a profound error, as specialists now recognize. Still, the continuity of a distinct culture belonging to the Chinese people must not be underestimated.

If one were to undertake a comprehensive study of the view of force within this cultural tradition, the first consideration would be the extreme pacifism expressed in the classics of Confucianism, created two millennia in the past, and long official orthodoxy. The mainstream of Chinese thought—not a pretense but a conviction—sees superior virtue and civilization as the way to genuine power, as is testified by the vast corpus of classical writings, memorized by scholars for generations and not forgotten today, as well as the volumes of official memorandums on foreign policy, in which opposition to force is regularly the winning argument.

Pillsbury, however, makes no claim to be writing about “China” in general or even broadly about today’s People’s Republic. He says little about Confucianism because others have said much, and focuses instead on the all-but-forbidden tradition of writers on military topics, the bingjia whose heyday was also two millennia ago, but whose influence has continued, like an underground stream, ever since, to emerge today in what Pillsbury calls “the Chinese hawks,” or yingpai.

Seemingly overlooked by official American estimates, these hawks have no truck with engagement, are deeply antiforeign and anti-American, and seek Chinese hegemony to be achieved through deception, strategic dominance, and the use of particularly effective weapons usually called in English, rather awkwardly, “assassins’ maces” (shashoujian). They do not lack influence.

Pillsbury has come to know and understand this group by employing the most elementary but often neglected methods of information gathering:
namely, reading their work and having long conversations with them (he speaks excellent Chinese). The results of years of such research, by Pillsbury and others, effectively upend the conventional wisdom of nearly half a century. The questions that follow are: First, how did we go wrong? And second, what to do now?

To answer the first question, “what went wrong,” requires going back to President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. That China would reenter the international system was long a near certainty in their time. Maoism was beginning to be recognized internally as having been an unmitigated catastrophe, not only for the Chinese people, but also for the military—though many foreigners still idolized the man. The Soviet Union moreover presented China with a threat requiring a counterweight. The only question was how exactly China would return.

Sadly, these two Americans devised an utterly unrealistic plan that set our diplomacy on a course that, unsurprisingly, has brought unexpected and baleful consequences. Nixon and Kissinger seem to have imagined a future in which an intimate Beijing–Washington political axis would supersede the entire then-existing security system in Asia. Such a vision seems the only possible explanation for Nixon’s quite astonishing question to Mao when they met on 21 February 1972: “Is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or is [sic] better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States? The point being—I am talking now in the realm of philosophy—in international relations there are no good choices.”

Put bluntly, Nixon seems already to have decided, long before the meeting, to drop relations with Japan, then our closest ally, in favor of China. (Japan was of course kept in the dark.) But Mao was bored and somnolent as the two leaders spoke. Neither he nor any other Chinese ever took up this offer. How could so unrealistic an American policy plan have come into being? The answer is by wishful thinking and self-deception: in this case, aided by the rigorously selective limitation of sources to those that supported the policy already adopted. Only a tiny secret team knew of the plan. The books they read were uniformly from the strongly pro-Mao school of writing then current (Kissinger, *White House Years* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1979], p. 1051). Other books, many by better scholars, existed but were not consulted. Likewise, the speaker invited to the White House to enlighten the Americans was the erratic Frenchman André Malraux. Others were incomparably more knowledgeable and available—to name but two, the American Foreign Service officer Edward E. Rice and the Berlin professor Jürgen Domes—but they were not even contacted. Thus, information that had been intentionally biased formed the deepest foundation for our policy. But the longed-for axis between Beijing and Washington never came into being. Quite the opposite happened.

Starting in the first decade of this century, with now-retired leaders holding the reins, China openly changed its visible foreign policy to dangerous military adventurism, for reasons no one can explain. The change has not succeeded. Thus the conquest of Scarborough Shoal undertaken in spring 2012, which Beijing no doubt expected to be a military cakewalk against the Filipinos, has turned into a military and diplomatic standoff, drawing in
more players, losing China prestige, and showing no sign of ending (page 203).

It is as yet unclear that continuing irresponsible expansion will be the gravamen of President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. China’s current leader took power in November 2012 months after the Scarborough Shoal standoff began and while he has not repudiated the policy he seems far more intent on domestic reform.

China could even liberalize: recently the down-market and often xenophobic Beijing tabloid Global Times attacked Western “pro-China” scholars for insulting that country by explaining away repression as the only answer to otherwise inevitable chaos. “Western scholars have never imagined that China might have a ‘peaceful democratic transition,’” the tabloid observed (8 March 2015). These astonishing words did not appear by accident: the Global Times is wholly owned by the party’s most authoritative mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. Xi must be aware that even small external distractions will almost certainly derail domestic reform.

As for what the rest of the world should do, obviously it is time to prepare: to rearm and deter seriously. The region, however, is responding so robustly to Chinese aggression that Beijing is alarmed. Japan today is not a mighty power only because it chose to try peace instead. Let no one doubt that if Tokyo deems it necessary, it will emerge again—indeed that is its current direction—which would be perhaps the greatest imaginable setback possible for the Chinese political and economic future. Nearly every other state in Asia too, from India to the Philippines and beyond, is rapidly and effectively preparing military capabilities that could present China with a nightmare scenario in which it is at war with a multiplicity of capable adversaries along a front of more than four thousand miles, from India to Tokyo.

Pillsbury speaks of the risk of prematurely “asking the weight of the emperor’s cauldrons,” or wending (page 196), which sounds exotic. What it means is showing your cards too soon. China has in fact done just this, with the consequences the Chinese sages would have predicted: creating failure as others react in time. My conclusion: we will certainly soon see a highly militarized Asia; we may see some skirmishes or worse (though recall that the Chinese esteem most those victories achieved without fighting; they abhor long-term, attritional war), but we most emphatically will not see Chinese hegemony, either in the region or in the world.

ARTHUR WALDRON


The numbers are staggering. In 2012 the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimated that eight thousand veterans take their own lives every year. Think about that—twenty-two people die every day of whom many, in pain and having lost hope, have carried their war with them for far too long. For some it may have been recent fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq; for others it may have been decades ago in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Regardless, the trauma these people experienced knows no boundaries between deserts and mountains, between marshes and...
oceans. Or as the great First World War poet Wilfred Owen said: “These are men whose minds the Dead have ravished.”

David J. Morris, former Marine infantry officer turned war correspondent, tells us that post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, as it is commonly known, has been called many things throughout history: shell shock, combat exhaustion, the blues, or simply being worn down and played out. It’s a condition that “went unacknowledged for millennia . . . and is now the fourth most common psychiatric disorder in the United States.” Not until 1980, when PTSD was added to the psychiatric manual—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM—did PTSD get more attention.

Morris’s book is not only timely—arriving at the end of two long wars—but it is grand in its ambition and scope. Similarly to Siddhartha Mukherjee’s approach in his Pulitzer Prize–winning book, The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer, Morris covers the history of trauma and war; how trauma affects the mind; the therapies that are often used to fight it; the drugs that are prescribed to numb it; and some alternatives to modern medicine. But what makes it truly a powerful book, beyond a journalist’s endeavor, is that PTSD is personal to Morris. His book is an exploration that begins with basic yet difficult questions: “Why does the world seem so different after I got back from Iraq? Why do I feel so out of place now? What does one do with the knowledge gained from a near death experience?”

In October 2007, in the middle of the surge, Morris was imbedded with the Army’s 1st Infantry Division. While riding in a Humvee in the volatile neighborhood of Saydia in southwestern Baghdad, his patrol was attacked. The Humvee in which Morris was riding was hit by an improvised explosive device. Battered and bent, the vehicle held together and the patrol was able to get back to its forward operating base. Morris escaped serious physical injury, and after a short medical examination he left Iraq and was back in California a week later. The explosion would change his life. It would lead him on a long journey, trying to understand his experience, through literature, research, and writing. It left him with nightmares and anger. It left him sitting in VA centers watching others suffer silently, with shaking legs and blank stares.

Morris tells us, in beautiful, searing language, that “we are born in debt, owing the world a death. This is the shadow that darkens every cradle. Trauma is what happens when you catch a surprise glimpse of that darkness, the coming annihilation not only of the body and the mind but also, seemingly, of the world.” And yet the world is still trying to understand how trauma affects us. Not surprisingly, the science is mixed. Some therapies have empirical evidence showing that they help trauma victims—whether it is combat trauma or one of the other big-T traumas that Morris describes. The big-T traumas are those that are soul crushing—airplane crashes, extended combat, rape, physical assault, and natural disasters. These are the traumas that overwhelm our brains and destroy our sense of time.

The VA’s response to trauma patients, the “gold standard” therapies, focuses on two types: prolonged exposure and cognitive processing therapies. Most have heard of prolonged exposure. It is essentially a reliving of the event, over and over, in which the patient, with help from a therapist, is trying to change
the stimulus to the traumatic event. Yet there is no consensus on what the best treatment for PTSD may be. For as Morris notes, the “gold standard” treatments often do not account for those that leave the program prior to completion. Drugs are just as questionable. Some drugs, like selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors—Prozac and Zoloft—have been around for years, and are the more popular drugs prescribed for PTSD. And like many of the therapies, some patients find that the drugs help them. Then there are drugs like propranolol, originally developed to prevent heart attacks, which now challenge our ethics on how we deal with trauma victims. That is because propranolol, when provided correctly, can inhibit the brain’s ability to etch a traumatic event in your mind if taken within a few hours of the traumatic event. This is a drug that can disrupt the brain’s ability to embrace a memory; it can change our sense of self. Morris rightly raises the concern that messing with our “flight or fight response” can fundamentally alter what we view as dangerous or not.

In the end, we are reminded that as humans we are idiosyncratic creatures—each of us responds to traumatic events in our own way. Therapies that work for some do not necessarily work for others. Just the simple act of listening to our bodies—say, practicing yoga—is a powerful therapy for some PTSD patients. As for Morris himself, he does not discount anything that might work for you, even if that is a moderate amount of alcohol; if it works, then consider it a remedy, or just another way to make it through the day.

The Evil Hours is not simply a book for combat veterans and service members. It is a book that deserves a much wider audience. Trauma and the suffering and pain that follow have been with us since Homer’s time and will be with us for many more years to come. David J. Morris has shed much needed light on this all-too-human and -deadly thing.

CHRISTOPHER NELSON


Pedestrian forms of philosophical innovation often involve the application of old ideas to new cases. It should therefore come as no surprise that the creative bulk of what is published today on the ethics of war achieves its novelty—when it does at all—by applying the just war tradition to hitherto-unexamined aspects of contemporary warfare, for example, drones and unmanned systems, cyber warfare, intelligence and covert operations, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism.

Now, this is a useful thing to do; it has expanded conceptual categories within the literature on the ethics of war (e.g., the jus post bellum and jus in intelligencia). But it falls short of that deeper kind of philosophy that overthrows preconceptions and generates entirely new areas of rational inquiry. This more difficult (but potentially more fruitful) way to innovate in philosophy would call into question the entire edifice of knowledge that, through university schooling or professional military education, everyone takes for granted when discussing the ethics of war.

Charles A. Jones does exactly this in his provocative, original, fun-to-read, and tightly argued book More than Just War:
Narratives of the Just War Tradition and Military Life. Jones is Emeritus Reader in International Relations at the University of Cambridge, and such a conceptual tour de force is exactly what one might expect from a Cambridge don by comparison to many military authors who understandably confine their work to areas of their own tactical expertise. By contrast, Jones offers perhaps one of the most interesting and penetrating theses about the ethics of war since Michael Walzer’s classic Just and Unjust Wars.

Jones shows that the pithy stories that appear in almost every book or article about the just war tradition, tales that narrate the tradition’s cumulative development from venerable origins to postwar resurgence, mask important complexities crucial to understanding its applicability to contemporary warfare. Since the 1960s, the resilience and ubiquity of just war discourse, combined with continual reference to late-classical and medieval theologians in contemporary texts, give the impression that a continued and coherent “tradition” of thought about war existed and continues to develop. Yet, Jones argues, careful examination reveals that just war thinking was largely ignored from the middle of the seventeenth century only to be revived in the middle of the twentieth. What is now spoken of as if it were an unbroken tradition owes its veneer of coherence to resurrection by modern scholarship. Upon close examination, both selectivity and instrumentality characterize its revival. Alongside this historical critique, Jones exposes contemporary just war doctrine for its implicit adherence to a set of assumptions that he argues are objectionable when applied to contemporary warfare. For example, the doctrines of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* assume the vantage point of the state over the individual and have a difficult time dealing with unorthodox forms of modern warfare. Just war doctrine assumes a conception of ethics that is rule oriented and largely ignores character—something actual militaries spend a lot of time cultivating. Finally, the doctrine’s origin is more wedded to religious theology than most secular philosophers (like Michael Walzer) and champions of international law (like Yoram Dinstein) today admit.

Jones brings to light an intriguing dichotomy between the way practitioners and authors closest to war account for its normative dimensions, on the one hand, and the narrowness of just war discourse on the other. An intriguing question gets raised: How did this dichotomy between theory and practice come about? More than Just War answers by offering a different account of how the just war doctrine became what it is today, an artificial “tradition” unable to account for the most interesting normative aspect of modern warfare—the phenomenology experienced by war’s participants themselves. An alternative tradition of military ethics, Jones says, exists alongside the just war doctrine. This tradition, found in both film and literature, fills the experiential gaps that the just war doctrine leaves barren. Any account of military ethics that ignores both traditions will suffer from this neglect.

Perhaps the most intriguing part of Jones’s book offers a penetrating survey of a variety of authors within this latter tradition. Works by William Shakespeare, Sir Walter Scott, James Fenimore Cooper, Stephen Crane, John Buchan, Robert Louis Stevenson, Joseph Conrad, Tim O’Brien, and Kurt Vonnegut are featured. Since many of
these will be familiar to students, *More than Just War* makes for an excellent supplement to the curriculum at military service academies, war colleges, and civilian institutions.

While the book’s strength rests in its ability to unmask the just war tradition critically and outline its alternative, there are several points where the author could have done more to substantiate the philosophical views that undergird the argument’s positive side. For example, Jones leans quite heavily on the American pragmatism of John Dewey without fleshing out the exact connections between Dewey’s epistemology and his own. Nevertheless, since most readers will be nonphilosophers such omissions are the slightest of concerns.

At over one hundred dollars (hardbound), the book’s expense may be prohibitive for many. Routledge is expected to offer a less expensive paperback sometime in 2015. Meanwhile, an affordable digital (Kindle) version is available.

JOSEPH M. HATFIELD

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Nigel Biggar is Regis Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology and Director of the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life at the University of Oxford. This volume collects seven essays on various aspects of the just war tradition. It is very much a book of theological ethics, although in strong dialogue with contemporary philosophical just war thinking and the international legal framework of the law of armed conflict. Although the essays are to some degree independent of each other, they are united by Biggar’s clear and consistent theological perspective.

Anyone familiar with the culture of “mainline” Protestantism and much liberal Roman Catholicism will recognize that these traditions, at least since the Vietnam War, have moved strongly toward positions that are to various degrees close to pacifism. Some are straightforwardly pacifist—a position most closely identified with the American theologian Stanley Hauerwas. Some Roman Catholic organizations such as Pax Christi are on this end of the spectrum as well. Others hold a position generally called “just war pacifism” in that they continue to use the categories of just war, but apply them in such a way that almost no actual conflict could meet them (by, for example, interpreting “last resort” as requiring one to do literally everything conceivable short of war). A position called “just peacemaking” has emerged in many denominations as preferable to just war, stressing anticipatory actions to be taken to prevent war over the necessity of the use of force in some circumstances. Biggar’s first two chapters address these trends directly, arguing against the coherence of the pacifist view and in favor of a meaningful sense in which Christian love can be manifest, even in the midst of military conflict.

The next two chapters take up two central principles of classic Christian just war thinking: double effect (in which a given action is militarily desirable but also has a foreseen, but not intended, “evil” effect such as destruction of civilian lives and property) and proportionality. The principle of double effect has been under considerable criticism from philosophers, who prefer to reduce it to...
utilitarian calculus, and from Christian thinkers who worry that it smacks of hairsplitting casuistry. Biggar strongly defends it, noting that a hallmark of distinctively Christian ethics is its attention to the intentional state of the actor—an emphasis that reaches all the way back to the Sermon on the Mount. Christian ethics has always maintained what the Germans call a Gesinnungsethik—an ethic of intention. Therefore the “foreseen but not intended” requirement of double effect captures that in an essential way.

The proportionality requirement of just war appears on both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello sides of the just war ledger. Biggar’s fourth chapter considers it on the jus ad bellum side and takes up the most challenging of cases to test it: World War I. In the face of widespread belief that World War I was a blunder and certainly not worth its vast toll, Biggar argues that it indeed was worth it. While this reviewer didn’t find the argument completely persuasive, it is closely and carefully argued and provides an excellent presentation of an uncommonly held and therefore provocative view.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with questions of the relationship of international law to the parallel ethical tradition of just war. Against black-letter-law fundamentalism, Biggar strives in these chapters to establish the principle that the ethical tradition is deeper and may on occasion trump the legal. Some contemporary philosophers (most notably David Rodin and Jeff McMahan) critique aspects of just war tradition from the perspective of a modern liberal rights-based perspective. In particular, they attack the traditional division of responsibility in war between the political leaders who make the decision to go to war in the first place (jus ad bellum) and the soldiers who do the actual fighting (who bear no responsibility for the overall justice of the war, but only for the conduct within the war [jus in bello]). They challenge the “moral equality of soldiers,” which holds that soldiers on both sides are not culpable for the killing they do as long as they fight within the bounds of the law of armed conflict. In their account, at least one side in any war must be wrong in fighting it, and therefore the soldiers who prosecute that side are not morally equivalent to their opponents. Biggar rigorously critiques this account, while granting it flows from the ethical framework its advocates are bringing to bear on the issue. But that is itself the problem, as Biggar sees it: the older and deeper traditions of Christian just war, he asserts, provide the resources and show the wisdom of retaining the traditional account.

Biggar also challenges the complete adequacy of the current international system in capturing fully legitimate decisions to use military force in the first place. According to the legal framework of sovereign states, possessed of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, response to aggression is the “gold standard” justification for the use of force. At least since the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and certainly according to a close reading of the Charter of the United Nations, states may use force only when responding to aggression, when assisting another state responding to aggression, or when part of a collective security action authorized by the United Nations. Biggar uses the Kosovo conflict as one that clearly falls outside that normative legal framework and yet, he argues, was absolutely necessary as an ethical matter.

The book concludes with another hard case: the war in Iraq beginning in 2003. Against those who argue the war was justified on manufactured
and dishonest grounds and not worth the cost, Biggar once again provides a clearly argued case that the cost was justified. Whether readers come away persuaded or not, Biggar’s argument will sharpen their thinking.

Biggar’s is very much a theological book, and therefore mostly of interest to readers interested in a strong normative Christian argument. In that context, whether one is persuaded on every detail or not, it is a welcome tonic among the often shallow and sloppy thinking about war and the international system from some Christian circles. Yet there is value in the book even for readers who may not share the full theological view. It certainly brings a historical depth to the discussion that much contemporary philosophical just war thinking does not, detached as it is from the long historical tradition in the West Biggar represents, and attempting to grapple with the ethical problem of war with a comparatively small tool kit.

MARTIN L. COOK


Phillip Pattee, a retired naval officer and professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, examines British efforts before the First World War to craft a global maritime strategy to deal with threats that were expected to arise during a war with Germany. In doing so, he makes a compelling case that British naval thinkers were not completely fixated on the German High Seas Fleet, nor were they unconscious of the critical need to keep the sea-lanes of commerce and communication open for their merchant navy and England’s national economy. Threats included the inevitability of impossibly high insurance rates during times of war, the combat capability of the overseas German East Asia squadron, and the possibility of persistent predations by German raiders. British leaders also understood that, despite the size of the Royal Navy, British assets would initially be stretched thin, as most British capital ships would be kept in home waters to respond to potential action by their German counterparts.

Pattee discusses British efforts to overcome these threats. His review of British involvement in insurance programs designed to keep merchant vessels in trade is fascinating and illuminates what must be one of the least known programs of the First World War. Strategies to deal with the German East Asia squadron, raiders, and shore-based supporting communication systems are better known, but Pattee still does them justice. Taken all together, At War in Distant Waters is a useful addition to a complete account of the First World War.

However, this book could have been much more. For starters, the title is misleading. Although the book chronicles actions taken in colonial waters, the depicted purpose is much more aimed at defending Britain, not its colonies. Nor does Pattee convincingly prove that Great Britain conquered German colonies to provide maritime security. Although some actions, such as the seizing or destruction of German high-frequency radio installations, were designed for this purpose, others, such as the conquest of German Southwest Africa, were not. Britain could have easily conducted limited operations and
denied naval basing and support from the German colonies. A major second African front, although sensible for other reasons, was not needed to protect seaborne trade. Additionally, the book is surprisingly dry, when it definitely did not need to be so. The eradication of German raiders from the world’s oceans is a remarkable story, complete with drama, excitement, and extraordinary personalities. Spee’s one-sided German victory at Coronel and his subsequent defeat at the Falklands were two of the major naval battles of the war, yet are given short shrift by Pattee. The tale of Count Felix von Luckner and his raider Seeadler, although occurring after the raider threat was greatly diminished, would provide a compelling illustration of the challenges in hunting down a gifted and tenacious raider captain. Pattee does relate the story of SMS Königsberg, but in such a brief manner as not to do justice to the very real concerns the cruiser created for the Admiralty, or the sheer magnitude of effort it took to destroy the warship. To compound matters, Pattee claims the destruction of Königsberg was carried out by two mortar-equipped barges. This is an error. To put Königsberg out of commission, the Admiralty dispatched the monitors HMS Mersey and HMS Severn on a long and hazardous journey to the Rufiji delta, where Königsberg was hiding, to sink it. For a book of this nature, this error is surprising. While Pattee does include a description and evaluation of British operations in Mesopotamia—and ties these actions to the strategic importance of oil—the book is strangely silent on the Dardanelles campaign and the U-boat war. Perhaps this is because Pattee does not see the Mediterranean or Atlantic as “colonial” waters, or because neither Gallipoli nor submarines figured sufficiently in prewar planning. Still, each of these challenges either demanded or resulted from evolving British strategies and both would seem worthy of inclusion.

Still, when all is said and done, Pattee has contributed to a deeper understanding of British—and German—maritime strategy in the First World War. By shifting focus away from the North Sea and the clashes between the Grand and High Seas Fleets, he has reminded the reader that British maritime leaders understood global vulnerabilities and planned to deal with them long before the guns of August opened fire.

RICHARD J. NORTON


Centennial commemoration and observance of the First World War have generated many books studying major and minor aspects of what was hoped would be the “war to end all wars,” or as H. G. Wells titled a 1914 book, The War That Will End War. It wasn’t; instead, it was the first act of a century-long tragedy. The present volume provides a significant study of the more than 100,000 German-Jewish and 320,000 Austro-Hungarian Jewish soldiers serving during the war. One in eight was killed. First World War historian Jay Winter is correct when he writes in the volume’s foreword, “we owe a debt to Peter Appelbaum for bringing to light the Jewish element in this tragic story.” The volume is groundbreaking in its scope and depth. The volume consists of eight chapters and four appendices. The first chapter...
provides an overview of Jewish soldiers in the armies of the German states from the Prussian Wars of Liberation beginning in 1813 until the beginning of the First World War. The quest for respected and accepted service was part of the larger Jewish experience of nationalism and participation in German society and met with varied results. Although no Jew ever attended or graduated from the Prussian Military or Naval Academy, there were Jewish officers in the prewar Bavarian army and Austro-Hungarian army. The second chapter looks at mobilization and German-Jewish attitudes at the outbreak of the war. The outbreak of the war furthered German-Jewish patriotism. While there were dissenting, pacifist Jewish voices, they were largely ignored and overcome by Jewish organizations and individuals who published calls to volunteer. German-Jewish society responded at all levels and all ages. As the war progressed the initial zeal was replaced by calls for service based on duty (Pflicht) and honor (Ehre). German Jews entered service with hopes and confidence of no anti-Semitism. They were misguided. The third chapter studies in detail the experiences and opposing views of the war of two officers who served on the western front, Julius Marx and Herbert Sulzbach. This chapter and the fourth chapter, which looks at diaries and memoirs from the front, show the diversity of experiences and perspectives of religious and nonreligious Jews, all fighting with national loyalty, patriotism, and pride. The chapters also provide a good snapshot of ever-present Christian-Jewish sentiments.

With respect to naval matters and the Kriegsmarine, there is little available information on Jewish sailors. By geography and profession, maritime life was not a significant part of the experience of German Jews. However, Jews did serve in the Kriegsmarine aboard surface vessels and U-boats. The fourth chapter provides information on these activities, noting that the 1916 census of Jews in the military (Judenzählung) registered 134 in maritime service. At least thirty were killed, some in the May 1916 battle of Jutland.

Chapter 5 studies the experiences of German Jews who served as physicians, physician assistants, and medical orderlies. It shows that Jewish participation spanned the strata of society and reminds readers of the pain and trauma of those who were wounded and dying. This chapter is enriched by the author’s knowledge and experience from his first career of forty years as a physician, microbiologist, and professor of pathology. The sixth chapter moves to the air and looks at the approximately 250 Jews who served in airships and single-engine aircraft. Several pilots were killed, several became prisoners of war, and others—such as Fritz Beckhardt, who was credited with seventeen recognized kills—garnered fame and glory.

By 1916 there was rising anti-Semitism on the home front and rumors that Jewish service and sacrifice were not comparable to those of non-Jews. The seventh chapter recounts these rumors and perceptions and the solution of the landmark Judenzählung. The final chapter provides an analysis, epilogue, and transition to the interwar years. In an attempt to counteract growing anti-Semitism during the postwar period German-Jewish veterans banded together in 1919 and formed the Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten (Association of Jewish Front Veterans). One of the main activities was the publication of a monthly newspaper and other works.
attempting to neutralize anti-Semitic agitation. All of this effort was shattered by the National Socialists after Kristallnacht (1938) and the anti-Semitism experienced during the First World War culminated in the anti-Semitic tragedies of the Second World War.

The present volume is Appelbaum's second book addressing the Jewish military experience of the era. The earlier work, Loyalty Betrayed: Jewish Chaplains in the German Army during the First World War (2013), received significant attention and acclaim and Loyal Sons is deserving of the same. Appelbaum delves deeply into published and unpublished diaries, letters, and memoirs of those who served. For the first time, widespread personal and archival materials are gathered and analyzed in a single source. The work is meticulously researched, well written, and enjoyable to read. The author has produced a volume that bridges the chasm between studies for academic specialists and works for general readers. It is a welcome addition to the military history bookshelf that is lively, engaging, and thorough. The appendixes and numerous photographs are interesting and enhance the work. Loyal Sons deserves a wide readership and will not disappoint even the most casual reader.

TIMOTHY J. DEMY


Spain was the only nation to take up arms against fascism in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. England, France, and the United States did not act against this impending threat. While the Spanish Civil War began as an internal domestic matter between the newly elected Spanish Republic and reactionary Nationalist forces led by General Franco, the conflict would draw in Germany and Italy in support of Franco, and the Soviet Union in support of the Republic. The conflict pitted forces of Europe's far left and right against each other, eventually overshadowing the Spanish Republic's attempt to maintain power. Against this backdrop, Amanda Vaill follows the lives and fates of three couples. She weaves their lives and fates into the larger fate of Spain as Europe's only stand against fascism collapses under the weight of Franco's forces in early 1939. In doing so, she provides the reader with an overview of the political and military events of the Spanish Civil War, as well as minibiographies of six eyewitnesses to the war in an eminently readable and gripping account of the savage war that ended with the fall of Madrid.

Vaill's characters are presented in pairs. They are couples, romantically and professionally. The first to appear is the chief of the Spanish government's foreign press office in Madrid, Arturo Barea, and his future wife, Ilsa Kulcsar, an Austrian radical who has come to Spain after the war begins. Spain's tragic fate is most explicitly illustrated through Barea's slow descent from moderately prominent government official to ordinary refugee, finally settling in France with Ilsa. His observations on the Spain of his youth contrast with the savagery of the conflict between Republican and Nationalist forces that takes place throughout the book. Following Barea and Kulcsar, Vaill presents the Hungarian-born André Friedmann, who would come to be known as Robert Capa,
one of the greatest war photographers of all time. His relationship with the similarly gifted and prominent photographer Gerda Taro (Gerta Pohorylle) forms much of the central narrative of the book. Finally, American novelists, journalists, and war correspondents Ernest Hemingway and Martha Gellhorn are the third couple, rounding out the book’s six main characters.

*Hotel Florida* is much more than just an account of the Spanish Civil War—or the story of the six main characters during those years. It is as much a story about the nature of truth and reality in wartime as it is a gripping narrative of the seminal conflict of the interwar years in Europe. Vaill’s characters become who they are through their interaction with the war, and they create themselves—and the meaning of their own lives—as much as they create accounts of the war’s events, whether through the written word or the photograph. Their stories and pictures are in many cases used for propaganda purposes, and the characters know this. However, the fine line between truth and propaganda largely disappears, if it is ever distinguishable in the first place. With the exception of Barea and Kulcsar, the characters want to be close to the fighting, to see the troops and the refugees and the destruction caused by the war, so that they can capture its meaning and portray the tragedy to the world, which does not seem to understand the importance of defeating fascism. A host of minor characters appear, many of whom are fighters in the various International Brigades (to include the famous Abraham Lincoln Battalion of American volunteers). These characters might as well have walked right out of a Hemingway novel—tough whiskey drinkers hunting fascists and eating trout and vegetables cooked over a fire. In fact *Hotel Florida* itself reads like a novel, and it is no irony that the book concludes with the first sentence of *For Whom the Bell Tolls* as Hemingway begins to type the first page, transferring his Spanish experience into his greatest literary work.

This book offers something for not only the student of European history, military history, or literature. It is a first-rate account of the political and military events of the Spanish Civil War. It is also a deeply philosophical examination of the relationship among war, truth, and propaganda. It asks hard questions that are immediately relevant today even as the media landscape has changed dramatically; the fundamentals of human nature have remained such that any of the main characters of this book could sympathize with reporters, photographers, and journalists today. I highly recommend this brilliant book to scholars and general readers alike.

JEFFREY M. SHAW


This is a wonderful, wonderful book. It is very much more than even its title and subtitle suggest. And it’s a great read even though it deals with subjects and policy debates about which most of us would rather not think because they’re either upsetting, or too complicated, or both.

The first half of the book is devoted to the image of America that our low (and getting lower all the time) popular culture projects worldwide. When
I embarked on reading it, I was intimidated by how much of our popular culture Martha Bayles proposed to cover in detail by focusing on (seemingly) so many individual products. I felt I already knew how vulgar and vile the movies and television shows we export are. When the author started in on *Sex in the City*, I thought, “Well, better her than me at least: somebody needs to know about this particular offense, but not me.”

Then, I discovered that Bayles very cleverly combined her assessment of how that television program gives a debased view of America with the reactions of interviewees abroad. Every example (and there is a myriad of them in chapters “The American Way of Sex,” “Empire of Special Effects,” “Television by the People, for the People?,” and “From Pop Idol to Vox Populi”) proceeds in this way. While she means us to look at and understand the attraction of and “push back” against American pop culture from place to place abroad, she provides excellent analyses of the indigenous pop culture and non-American influences. This takes one into society and politics as much as culture, religion, taste, and inevitable interesting peculiarities. The outcome is a nearly complete global vision of popular culture that I don’t believe can be found anywhere else. Of course, Bayles means to show the guiding influence of American pop culture.

In dealing with popular culture, Bayles is slyly operating in the way in which she will eventually commend that public (or culture) diplomats proceed. She holds that public diplomacy is made up of four activities: listening, advocacy, culture and exchange, and news reporting. These ought to be discrete from one another but given equal importance. Accordingly, a cultural officer ought to be able to tell foreigners how Americans really regard *Sex in the City* (no one takes the show as real or expressive of his or her attitude toward life); be able to explain how certain things fit (or don’t fit) into the real American ethos (this is the advocacy part); know enough about the local culture to understand the “push back” that should always be sought; and, finally, tell the truth.

In addition to the foregoing, this book does several other things, and all of them excellently. Bayles is well versed in American political thought and history—enough to produce a fine essay on the American ethos that combines the historical, political, and cultural into what is really American. Again, this is an example of what every U.S. public diplomat should know and what those abroad might learn if public diplomacy were properly practiced.

The book is also a thorough history of U.S. public diplomacy, from the first master, Benjamin Franklin, through the shutting down of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1999, to the present. While she believes the abolition of the USIA was a mistake, the book does not advocate its revival. This is because Bayles is clearly more concerned with the content of government-provided information about America since the early 1950s (which is a distressing history) than she is about the institutions.

On top of it all, Bayles treats most related subjects—for example, the experiment in “strategic communications” as a kind of public diplomacy inflicted on the Department of Defense after 9/11 (and terminated by Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011); the history of the tight relationship between Hollywood and Washington that secured
the worldwide domination of American pop culture, while allowing its content to sink lower and lower; the troubled career of U.S. international broadcast; and the Internet and social media.

And yes, she deals also with the problem of U.S. promotion of democracy abroad. To quote from the last sentences of the book: “The premise of this book has been that a significant number, perhaps even a preponderance, of today’s tiny battles are being fought not in the news media but in the mundane realm of popular culture. The wisdom of America is clear and straightforward: political liberty can be sustained only by self-governing individuals and prudently designed institutions. Yet when our fellow human beings look at America through the screen of our entertainment, what they see most darkly is a rejection of tradition, religion, family and every kind of institutional restraint, in favor of unseemly egotism and libertinism. Attracted and repulsed by this image, they might be forgiven for not appreciating the part about self-governance.”

KENNETH D. M. JENSEN


“The only chance we have is to initiate bold moves against the enemy,” national security adviser Henry Kissinger confided in 1971. This was his advice to the administration of President Nixon, which sought to end the Vietnam War by creating “peace with honor.” “Bold moves” would include two new strategies. One was resumed bombing of North Vietnam. The second would be new ground raids into Cambodia and Laos to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail—the network that allowed Hanoi to supply communist forces in the south, and that at its peak even included an oil pipeline from the Chinese border to the environs of Saigon. The raid into Laos, code-named LAM SON 719, is the subject of Robert Sander’s recent book Invasion of Laos, 1971.

Despite the term “invasion” in the book’s title, LAM SON 719 was designed as a cross-border raid on the town of Tchepone. It was here communist military supplies were shifted from trucks to porters, bicycles, and pack animals. The town had received attention from American military planners as early as the Kennedy administration. Sander quotes General Westmoreland explaining to General Abrams in March 1968, “I’d like to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the tickets.” Westmoreland’s plans called for at least four divisions to undertake the assault. For its part, the government of Saigon had been planning an operation into Laos from at least 1965. In reality, as Sander notes, the United States had been conducting CIA and covert air operations in Laos since the 1950s.

President Nixon’s policies of détente and outreach to China meant a reduction of the chance that expanding the war into “neutral” Laos would trigger Soviet or Chinese response.

Congressional restrictions designed to limit the war meant that American involvement in the 1971 operation would be confined to supporting roles in artillery and fire support. Yet, as Sander points out, this was still a bloody battle for the Americans. American casualties ran high, with over two hundred killed and at least 1,100 injured. Sander, who was a pilot during the battle, observes

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/10
that “U.S. Army helicopter crews endured incomparably higher losses during this two-month operation in heavily defended airspace than during any other period of the Vietnam War.”

The overall impact on the Ho Chi Minh Trail was limited but communist forces suffered at least thirteen thousand casualties, and the offensive blunted any North Vietnamese attempts to strike at withdrawing American forces. The withdrawal at the conclusion of the operation was memorialized by journalists who photographed Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers hanging on to the skids of returning American helicopters.

The operation’s overall dismal results were not due to a lack of ARVN bravery, Sander argues, but to poor operational planning and politics. Indeed, the ARVN suffered some 7,500 casualties out of the seventeen thousand soldiers committed to the operation. Rather, the ARVN battle plan for LAM SON 719 “was complex, far too complex for a corps commander and staff that had never conducted corps-sized operations.”

In Washington, the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, remarked that “only a Patton or a MacArthur would have made such a daring move; an Eisenhower or a Bradley would not have attempted it.” Yet, at the start of 1971, South Vietnam had such an officer: General Tri, the daring corps commander who had led the successful Cambodia offensive. General Tri’s bravado extended to his trademark swagger stick and stylish sunglasses. Tragically, General Tri died in a helicopter crash en route to take command of the stalled Laos offensive.

Sander identified the operation’s relative failure as “the unintended consequences of a decision to launch a major military operation involving corps from two nations that did not share a common objective.” While President Nixon “hoped to prevent the North Vietnamese from launching an offensive that could endanger, and even delay, withdrawal of American forces remaining in Vietnam,” South Vietnamese president Thiệu’s ultimate “objective was to give South Vietnam more time to prepare to meet the North Vietnamese without direct U.S. military assistance and without sacrificing his best divisions.”

American frustration during the operation was compounded by President Thiệu’s refusal to commit ARVN reserve forces to the battle. Sander suggests that many of these unused ARVN divisions were less than combat ready. Many were hampered by soldiers who spoke regional dialects and had strong ties to their local areas and could not be deployed far from home without fears of desertion. ARVN readiness was affected by another problem on which Sander does not dwell: “flower soldiers.” By the early 1970s, South Vietnam had as many as a hundred thousand “flower soldiers,” soldiers who paid commanders to continue civilian life as normal. In other instances the names of dead soldiers were kept on the muster rolls so their commanders could collect their salaries.

There are apparent parallels between LAM SON 719 and more recent events. It was revealed in November 2014 that the Iraqi Army had fifty thousand “ghost soldiers” who similarly did not exist. Likewise, where President Thiệu saw ARVN elite units first and foremost as a force to crush potential rivals, in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki had similar views of using military force to suppress Sunni rivals. Thiệu was hesitant...
about committing forces to LAM SON 719, and in 2014, when ISIS seized Fallujah, Maliki allowed the problem to fester. In neither case was suppression of a hostile insurgency put above the objective of maintaining a grip on power—much to the frustration of Washington. As Henry Kissinger would later say of LAM SON 719, it was an “operation [that was] conceived in ambivalence and assailed by skepticism, [and] proceeded in confusion.” Today what was then the town of Tchepone lies abandoned, though the lessons of 1971 remain fresh. Sander’s work will likely remain the definitive record of the Laos campaign until such time as archives in Hanoi are made fully available.

JOSEPH HAMMOND


Robert Haddick proposes a revised U.S. strategy toward China. He argues—agreeing with recent U.S. national security strategies—that continued U.S. forward presence is the only option that supports the American objectives of “an open international economic system; respect for universal values around the world; and a rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation.” He articulates a two-front effort to ensure China rises within the existing international structure: positive reinforcement of good behavior combined with significant defense reforms to allow punishment of bad behavior.

Haddick discusses the nature of China’s military modernization and how it bodes ill for the U.S. ability to punish Chinese transgressions against international order. He believes that current U.S. force posture is inadequate because U.S. air and naval capabilities are vulnerable to Chinese land-, air-, and sea-launched cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. And future U.S. capabilities—the F-35 in particular—have insufficient range to operate from existing bases under the antiaccess umbrella created by these weapons. To counter the tactical and operational challenges these weapons create he advocates the Pentagon develop a new long-range bomber and long-range cruise missiles able to penetrate Chinese airspace and hold critical targets at risk. He also promotes autonomous aerial projectiles based on a 1990s DARPA model to locate and destroy road-mobile missile launchers. He argues convincingly that his acquisition proposals solve the likely tactical and operational problems of a future war with China, but he does not engage with the highly contested literature on the strategic effectiveness of airpower. Without a theory of strategic effectiveness, he fails to make the case that these new capabilities would support his strategy and influence Chinese decision making during crisis or war.

Additional proposals are designed to threaten presumed Chinese fears. These include encouraging America’s regional allies to develop their own antiaccess capabilities on the First Island Chain, improving U.S. Navy blockading capacity, developing irregular warfare capacity among China’s minority populations, and developing antisatellite weaponry.

However, if China continues its policy of “salami slicing,” these weapons and plans will never see battle. By incrementally challenging the existing regional order,
China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving its objectives without risking war. Beijing understands there is a threshold for U.S. military response and will continue to operate below it. An American president would be loath to fire the first shots over the Chinese occupation of an uninhabited island. Haddick therefore argues the United States should develop policies to encourage China to follow the existing international rules in letter and spirit. Unfortunately, he does not detail these policies, leaving his strategy wanting.

Haddick states that strategy is about managing risk. While much of what Haddick proposes seems commonsensical, it is unfinished, and this poses risks. Focusing only on punitive measures against possible Chinese actions runs the risk of ignoring the ways China has played by the rules while furthering a mind-set where every development in the PLA’s modernization is perceived as a threat to U.S. regional interests—regardless of Chinese intentions. This book should be read as part of an ongoing and equally unfinished debate on how to handle a rising China.

IAN T. SUNGSTROM

Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95

The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics is a collection of thirteen essays assembled by Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.)—author of several books, most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat and Military Modeling for Decision Making. Captain Hughes is also an accomplished naval officer, having served as commanding officer of USS Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS Morton (DD 948). Notable authors appearing in On Tactics include Admiral Woodward, RN, who commanded British forces in the Falklands War, and Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel Books series, which is a collection of books containing some of the Naval Institute’s most well-regarded articles from Proceedings—and other sources—on such topics as naval leadership, command, strategy, and cooperation.

On Tactics is well worth the reader’s time, and appropriate for both junior and senior officers. It benefits greatly from Hughes’s insightful commentary and tactful editing, which boils the combined length of the selected essays down to a manageable 190 pages. Although the topic of tactics is broadly applicable to all naval communities, surface warfare officers will probably have the easiest time relating to the selected essays.

Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,” written by Hughes himself. “Missile Chess” describes a game created by Hughes in which players sit down to play a traditional game of chess but with a major twist: the players have a fixed number of “missiles” that they must distribute among their pieces as they see fit. The pieces still move according to the rules of regular chess, but each time they capture an opposing piece they expend one “missile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is depleted a piece can no longer capture. After he walks us through several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear that despite its simplicity, missile chess nicely elucidates some of the most vexing operational challenges with which a modern naval commander must contend.
My only criticism of On Tactics is that some of the selected essays veer into areas that could more aptly be described as “strategy” or “enterprise management.” For example, “Toward a New Identity” chronicles Admiral Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet together long enough to test the tactical doctrines flowing out of the recently founded Naval War College. Although this is a fine essay, it does not provide the reader with any particular insight into tactics. Rather, it provides insight into why new tactics can be difficult to develop. Similarly, “Creating ASW Killing Zones,” although an excellent piece on Cold War antisubmarine warfare operations and strategy, does not provide much in the way of tactical insights on how to defeat the submarine threat.

The great advantage of this book, and indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is that it makes many excellent articles and essays readily available to the reading public—essays that might otherwise have fallen by the wayside. Overall, this volume is an excellent addition to any personal library. The size of the book and length of the articles make it an excellent work for professional development, wardroom discussion, and thought-provoking conversation.

CHARLES H. LEWIS


Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan Wachman was a giant in the China, East Asian studies, and international relations field who remains sorely missed following his untimely death in 2012. In what is widely considered one of his major scholarly contributions, through this pithy, well-researched book—rightly considered a classic—Wachman engages in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis to offer provocative coverage of historical episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s status fundamentally. Some events raise penetrating questions about what might have resulted had they ended differently; other factors inspire critical questions about East Asia’s future. Wachman develops a theme of the strategic salience of “imagined geography” as the best explanation for the significant variation over time in the association of Taiwan as part of Chinese sovereign territory in the minds of the leaders, and even the populace, of mainland China. He does so through close examination of key Chinese documents and terminology as well as careful consideration of their relative authority and reliability.

Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and even possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially consider Taiwan to be part of China in the sense that it is understood officially today. This approach raises compelling questions about state formation and national identity that are critical to the understanding of international relations. Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined geography” is a global phenomenon and hardly peculiar to China. It is important to remember that Taiwan was formally incorporated into Qing administration in 1683, nearly a century before the founding of the United States. One may contrast such historical events as the American acquisition and incorporation of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude that the factors Wachman considers do
not negate mainland China’s sovereignty claim to Taiwan. Rather, it is primarily concerned for the maintenance of Taiwan’s democracy and the freedoms of its citizens that continue to inspire Washington’s involvement long after the Carter administration abrogated the United States–Republic of China Mutual Security Treaty in 1980.

While Wachman clearly documents Taiwan’s strategic salience (real and perceived), other factors may be important as well. An alternative explanation might consider the challenge of Taiwan as a separate polity (e.g., democratic system). The vast majority of the other “lost territories” to which Wachman compares Taiwan have never been separate polities; the few that have been have not persisted for significant periods of time. Hence, political salience may be an appropriate variable. In fact, the challenge of Taiwan as a separate polity has emerged periodically throughout history (e.g., through Dutch occupation, Qing dynasty separatism under Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong, Japanese imperialism, Nationalist rule, and today’s multiparty democracy). China’s imperial rulers initially viewed Taiwan as a remote, politically unorganized hinterland. Subsequently, however, as alternative political systems were imposed or developed on it with identities and objectives potentially at odds with those of Beijing, it periodically assumed heightened importance. This has geographic underpinnings in the sense that physical location rendered Taiwan susceptible to both influence and conquest by foreign maritime powers and later to technological acquisition, trade, and the attainment of per capita gross domestic product at levels that the vast majority of political scientists agree are conducive to the development of a democratic political system.

But the Taiwan question has been, and remains to this day, a fundamentally political one. While Taiwan’s geography has not changed, its political identity has varied tremendously. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. support for Taiwan has arguably hinged on its rapidly liberalized political system, not its geostrategic significance. Taiwan is fundamentally useful in a geostrategic sense primarily for the basing of capabilities to facilitate its own defense. While some U.S. policy makers no doubt see geostrategic benefits to the island’s present status even today, it is difficult to imagine Washington being willing to risk the expenditure of increasing amounts of blood and treasure if and when Taiwan’s democratic system is no longer at stake. Should the day come when a majority of Taiwan’s populace favors formal unification with the mainland—and this popular will is expressed through a transparent democratic process with no external coercion—it is inconceivable that Washington could actively oppose such a transition on geostrategic grounds. There is, however, the disturbing possibility that even if Washington’s policy toward Taipei is not fundamentally geostrategic in motivation, policy advocated by elements of China’s government (particularly the military) may be.

Wachman does acknowledge related complexities and the difficulty of finding conclusive evidence for his geostrategic explanation. However one may view these sensitive issues—which remain hotly contested—Wachman has made a valuable contribution on a critical issue whose complex history and enduring significance are forgotten at the peril of all in the Asia-Pacific. The complexities
Wachman introduces provide important considerations for the continuing debate over Taiwan's future. Those fortunate enough to have known Wachman personally know what a fine friend and colleague he was; all can benefit from his intellectual legacy, of which this book is an important, enduring part.

ANDREW S. ERICKSON

OUR REVIEWERS

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Kenneth D. M. Jensen was the first executive director of the American Committees on Foreign Relations as well as a founding staff member and officer at the United States Institute of Peace. He holds BA and PhD degrees in history (with Russian minors) from the University of Colorado and also did graduate work at the University of Wisconsin and Moscow State University (USSR). His fourteen published books include *The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy: The Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of 1946*; and *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map*. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Present Danger.
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