2015

More than Just War: Narratives of the Just War Tradition and Military Life, by Charles A. Jones

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Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/13
the stimulus to the traumatic event. Yet there is no consensus on what the best treatment for PTSD may be. For as Morris notes, the “gold standard” treatments often do not account for those that leave the program prior to completion.

Drugs are just as questionable. Some drugs, like selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors—Prozac and Zoloft—have been around for years, and are the more popular drugs prescribed for PTSD. And like many of the therapies, some patients find that the drugs help them. Then there are drugs like propranolol, originally developed to prevent heart attacks, which now challenge our ethics on how we deal with trauma victims. That is because propranolol, when provided correctly, can inhibit the brain’s ability to etch a traumatic event in your mind if taken within a few hours of the traumatic event. This is a drug that can disrupt the brain’s ability to embrace a memory; it can change our sense of self. Morris rightly raises the concern that messing with our “flight or fight response” can fundamentally alter what we view as dangerous or not.

In the end, we are reminded that as humans we are idiosyncratic creatures—each of us responds to traumatic events in our own way. Therapies that work for some do not necessarily work for others. Just the simple act of listening to our bodies—say, practicing yoga—is a powerful therapy for some PTSD patients. As for Morris himself, he does not discount anything that might work for you, even if that is a moderate amount of alcohol; if it works, then consider it a remedy, or just another way to make it through the day.

The Evil Hours is not simply a book for combat veterans and service members. It is a book that deserves a much wider audience. Trauma and the suffering and pain that follow have been with us since Homer’s time and will be with us for many more years to come. David J. Morris has shed much needed light on this all-too-human and -deadly thing.

CHRISTOPHER NELSON


Pedestrian forms of philosophical innovation often involve the application of old ideas to new cases. It should therefore come as no surprise that the creative bulk of what is published today on the ethics of war achieves its novelty—when it does at all—by applying the just war tradition to hitherto-unexamined aspects of contemporary warfare, for example, drones and unmanned systems, cyber warfare, intelligence and covert operations, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism.

Now, this is a useful thing to do; it has expanded conceptual categories within the literature on the ethics of war (e.g., the jus post bellum and jus in intelligencia). But it falls short of that deeper kind of philosophy that overthrows preconceptions and generates entirely new areas of rational inquiry. This more difficult (but potentially more fruitful) way to innovate in philosophy would call into question the entire edifice of knowledge that, through university schooling or professional military education, everyone takes for granted when discussing the ethics of war.

Charles A. Jones does exactly this in his provocative, original, fun-to-read, and tightly argued book More than Just War:
Narratives of the Just War Tradition and Military Life. Jones is Emeritus Reader in International Relations at the University of Cambridge, and such a conceptual tour de force is exactly what one might expect from a Cambridge don by comparison to many military authors who understandably confine their work to areas of their own tactical expertise. By contrast, Jones offers perhaps one of the most interesting and penetrating theses about the ethics of war since Michael Walzer’s classic Just and Unjust Wars. Jones shows that the pithy stories that appear in almost every book or article about the just war tradition, tales that narrate the tradition’s cumulative development from venerable origins to postwar resurgence, mask important complexities crucial to understanding its applicability to contemporary warfare. Since the 1960s, the resilience and ubiquity of just war discourse, combined with continual reference to late-classical and medieval theologians in contemporary texts, give the impression that a continued and coherent “tradition” of thought about war existed and continues to develop. Yet, Jones argues, careful examination reveals that just war thinking was largely ignored from the middle of the seventeenth century only to be revived in the middle of the twentieth. What is now spoken of as if it were an unbroken tradition owes its veneer of coherence to resuscitation by modern scholarship. Upon close examination, both selectivity and instrumentality characterize its revival. Alongside this historical critique, Jones exposes contemporary just war doctrine for its implicit adherence to a set of assumptions that he argues are objectionable when applied to contemporary warfare. For example, the doctrines of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* assume the vantage point of the state over the individual and have a difficult time dealing with unorthodox forms of modern warfare. Just war doctrine assumes a conception of ethics that is rule oriented and largely ignores character—something actual militaries spend a lot of time cultivating. Finally, the doctrine’s origin is more wedded to religious theology than most secular philosophers (like Michael Walzer) and champions of international law (like Yoram Dinstein) today admit. Jones brings to light an intriguing dichotomy between the way practitioners and authors closest to war account for its normative dimensions, on the one hand, and the narrowness of just war discourse on the other. An intriguing question gets raised: How did this dichotomy between theory and practice come about? More than Just War answers by offering a different account of how the just war doctrine became what it is today, an artificial “tradition” unable to account for the most interesting normative aspect of modern warfare—the phenomenology experienced by war’s participants themselves. An alternative tradition of military ethics, Jones says, exists alongside the just war doctrine. This tradition, found in both film and literature, fills the experiential gaps that the just war doctrine leaves barren. Any account of military ethics that ignores both traditions will suffer from this neglect. Perhaps the most intriguing part of Jones’s book offers a penetrating survey of a variety of authors within this latter tradition. Works by William Shakespeare, Sir Walter Scott, James Fenimore Cooper, Stephen Crane, John Buchan, Robert Louis Stevenson, Joseph Conrad, Tim O’Brien, and Kurt Vonnegut are featured. Since many of
these will be familiar to students, More than Just War makes for an excellent supplement to the curriculum at military service academies, war colleges, and civilian institutions. While the book's strength rests in its ability to unmask the just war tradition critically and outline its alternative, there are several points where the author could have done more to substantiate the philosophical views that undergird the argument's positive side. For example, Jones leans quite heavily on the American pragmatism of John Dewey without fleshing out the exact connections between Dewey's epistemology and his own. Nevertheless, since most readers will be nonphilosophers such omissions are the slightest of concerns.

At over one hundred dollars (hardbound), the book's expense may be prohibitive for many. Routledge is expected to offer a less expensive paperback sometime in 2015. Meanwhile, an affordable digital (Kindle) version is available.

JOSEPH M. HATFIELD


Nigel Biggar is Regis Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology and Director of the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life at the University of Oxford. This volume collects seven essays on various aspects of the just war tradition. It is very much a book of theological ethics, although in strong dialogue with contemporary philosophical just war thinking and the international legal framework of the law of armed conflict. Although the essays are to some degree independent of each other, they are united by Biggar's clear and consistent theological perspective. Anyone familiar with the culture of "mainline" Protestantism and much liberal Roman Catholicism will recognize that these traditions, at least since the Vietnam War, have moved strongly toward positions that are to various degrees close to pacifism. Some are straightforwardly pacifist—a position most closely identified with the American theologian Stanley Hauerwas. Some Roman Catholic organizations such as Pax Christi are on this end of the spectrum as well. Others hold a position generally called "just war pacifism" in that they continue to use the categories of just war, but apply them in such a way that almost no actual conflict could meet them (by, for example, interpreting "last resort" as requiring one to do literally everything conceivable short of war). A position called "just peacemaking" has emerged in many denominations as preferable to just war, stressing anticipatory actions to be taken to prevent war over the necessity of the use of force in some circumstances. Biggar's first two chapters address these trends directly, arguing against the coherence of the pacifist view and in favor of a meaningful sense in which Christian love can be manifest, even in the midst of military conflict.

The next two chapters take up two central principles of classic Christian just war thinking: double effect (in which a given action is militarily desirable but also has a foreseen, but not intended, "evil" effect such as destruction of civilian lives and property) and proportionality. The principle of double effect has been under considerable criticism from philosophers, who prefer to reduce it to