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The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Another View from Outside

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Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R) appeared in March 2015. It aims to “refresh” the strategy with the same primary title that first appeared back in 2007 and that has to a significant extent guided U.S. maritime policy over the past eight years. Navies both reflect and help shape the international context. They matter. So, when the world’s most powerful navy looks at its strategy and decides on a change, the rest of the world should pay attention, since the change will reveal at least some of America’s strategic preoccupations and help set the agenda, for a few years at least, for diplomats and other navies around the world. Most especially this will of course apply in regions as maritime as the Asia-Pacific. How navies or nations react will depend first on what they think has changed and why, and, second, on who and where they are.

A number of questions immediately arise: What is this new “strategy,” whom is it for, and what’s changed? The first of these is relatively simple to answer. It’s what most people would call a statement of doctrine, something intended to provide guidance for those serving in today’s U.S. Navy, especially its planners. Unlike grand statements of strategy as produced by the likes of Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett, doctrine is evanescent; it is a menu for today and so constantly needs to be assessed and adapted in the light of experience and changing conditions. How navies or nations react will depend first on what they think has changed and why, and, second, on who and where they are.

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circumstances. CS21R identifies some of these changes (such as fiscal constraint and the rise of China) and, rightly, the need for a “refresh”; these things indeed need thinking about.

The second question—Whom is it for?—is more complicated. The fact that CS21R has been issued as a public document shows that it is not just an exercise in raising the level of strategic thought within the Navy, entirely laudable though that aspiration would be. The drafters of CS21R may have wished to target the audience in their three maritime services, but they knew there were other very important domestic audiences too—the rest of the Department of Defense, the administration, Congress, defense literati, the public, to name just a few. Translating CS21R into several languages reflected assumptions that it would also be widely read around the world. All these different audiences, with their diverse interests (and their likely tendency to fasten on those parts of the document that support conclusions they already have!), had to be catered for to some extent. The difficulty is that what is said to appeal to one audience will worry another. Accordingly, balances had to be struck, words chosen with care. That’s because, in essence, CS21R is for nearly everyone, whatever its drafters may have intended.

But one thing that all these diverse audiences have in common is wanting to know the answer to the final question—What’s changed? How different is the “refreshed” version from the original? The answer most of them will come to is “quite a lot.” For a start, it’s much longer, it looks different, and so far, the video isn’t as good. CS21R comprises two opening review sections—of the world and of what the U.S. maritime services need to do. This merges into a complex discussion of their seven missions and five functions (see the figure).

The main focus for discussion in this strategy is the functions rather than the missions. The missions presumably are thought to flow naturally out of the review, conducted in Sections I and II, of the international context and how, broadly, the United States feels it needs to respond. There’s plenty of evidence to be found in those sections for all of these missions, but they’re not much specifically discussed, and neither, really, is how the functions will support them. Instead, the emphasis is on the five functions themselves. It’s these that will therefore command attention. The final section of CS21R shows how the necessary capabilities will be grown.

There is now much less direct emphasis than there was
in 2007 on the role of the U.S. maritime forces in contributing to the defense of the global sea-based trading system. That aspiration is still there of course, being implicit in the continuing accents on working with allies and partners in a “global network of navies” to secure international stability and maritime security and on the continued American determination to safeguard the freedom of navigation on which Washington thinks the system depends. This reduced emphasis on the systemic justification for U.S. seapower doubtless reflects the fact that in the 2007 version of the strategy, it did not go down well in Congress—which ultimately pays the Navy’s bills. There are already signs that CS21R will do better in this respect.5

Instead, readers will find and many will welcome a more muscular emphasis on the defense of U.S. national interests at sea.6 “Defending our Nation,” said the first iteration of the fact sheet that accompanied the strategy, “and winning its wars is the core task of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.”7 On the face of it, there is nothing very remarkable in this. Most of the world’s navies, when push comes to shove, would say the same thing, but many of them would adulterate the message a little by giving greater prominence to the task of preventing wars rather than just winning them. Of course, the strategy’s writers will argue that preventing wars is implicit in the notion of defending national interests and ensuring stability; also conventional “deterrence” is specifically identified, as the second of both the seven missions of the sea services and their five essential supporting functions.

The notion that ensuring stability prevents wars runs like a leitmotiv throughout the glittering but intricate missions/functions structure of CS21R’s Section III but is not specifically articulated and could, given the limited coverage of the nature of the missions, easily be missed by foreign observers less well attuned to American ways of thinking about maritime strategy. There is moreover just one paragraph on conventional deterrence in a section that has twenty-six others. Each function is justified by being shown to support several of the missions identified earlier of the U.S. Navy; in every case “defending the homeland” comes first. This is clearly nation-centric rather than system-centric.

Several additional aspects of the refreshed strategy seem at first glance to point in the same more muscular direction. First “humanitarian assistance and disaster response” (HADR) is now relegated from being one of the six main functions of the U.S. Navy to being a subset of the capacity to project power ashore. This task had been given a new and special prominence in the original 2007 version of the strategy and of course has been practiced extensively over the past eight years, most recently in dealing with Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. No doubt the Navy will continue to perform this function as it always has, but HADR’s conceptual downgrading will nonetheless seem significant to outsiders. This may
particularly apply in the Asia-Pacific, where many of these disasters take place and where the HADR task is now given much conceptual prominence. The increased muscularity of the new version of the strategy comes out in other ways too. Oddly, there seems to be less opportunity to talk of the soft-power advantages of naval diplomacy, an infinitely flexible means of winning friends and influencing people. Again, in some quarters, the first version of the strategy was criticized for not being a “strategy” in the sense that it neither delved into “ends, ways, and means” nor offered much in the way of specific guidance to force planners on future acquisitions. It simply identified the “ends.” If this criticism was just (and by no means had everyone thought it was), then the deficiency has been corrected this time. The concluding Section IV is all about force design and building the future force, with explicit targets for the future fleet (Coast Guard, Navy, and amphibious) clearly identified. It shows how the necessary technological capacities and human skills have to be grown and developed to deliver the capabilities needed for the five functions listed earlier. It’s all very logical, businesslike, and “back to basics.” It identifies what it thinks is necessary. The implication is clear—so now give us the resources!

The same sense of a shift toward war-fighting and hard-power thinking emerges in the appearance of a new major function of maritime power, that of assuring “all domain access,” which now comes first in the list of the U.S. Navy’s maritime functions and therefore inevitably looks as though it is the most important. In the consultation exercise that accompanied the “refresh” process, many objected to the focus on this as the primary (or at least first-mentioned) function of the Navy on the basis that this was not a function but more a precondition for both sea control and maritime power projection ashore. Perhaps the desire to focus on the potentially transformational impact of challenges in the domains of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum meant that assuring access needed to be treated as a function on its own rather than subsumed, with much less fanfare, within those two historic functions of seapower.

Of course, this emphasis on all-domain access makes perfect sense within the Beltway. It has the advantage that by referring to the undoubted, and potentially critical, rise of sea-denial capabilities around the world, it reinforces the importance and the urgency of supporting the Navy’s budget and plans for future acquisitions. This is particularly important for the defense of the research and development budget, given its importance in delivering the kind of capabilities needed to offset the very possibly very grave consequences of significantly greater challenges to assured access in the future. Moreover, it links up nicely with the Joint Operational Access Concept released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2013 and the recasting of the Air-Sea Battle into the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. Elevating all-domain access therefore ticks all
the right Washington boxes, not least that of “jointery” (what Americans might call “jointness”) in general and of bringing the Army on board in particular. It also efficiently deals with the complaints sometimes made of the 2007 version of the Cooperative Strategy—that it didn’t seem quite to fit in with other official formulations of U.S. strategy of the time. Now it clearly does.

If the budget, joint concepts, and mismatched statements were indeed amid the reasons why all-domain access was given such preeminence, then it takes us back to the special and probably unavoidable problem that American strategy makers have—namely, identifying their critical target audience. When it comes to strategy making, Washington, with its plethora of government institutions and thrusting think tanks, still has the aura of imperial Rome. Defense literati within the capital talk to each other, but the rest of the world listens in, or tries to. Two thousand years ago, the barbarians of the outer world could only marvel at the exciting and fast-moving intricacies of imperial policy making while barely comprehending its nuances. The barbarians could easily oversimplify and misunderstand what was really going on. The same applies now. The prospect and the dangers of this will need careful handling.

For this reason, all-domain access could all too easily be seen as a response to the purported antiaccess/area-denial concepts of the Chinese. This would worry, for example, many (but admittedly not all) of America’s allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Here, as remarked earlier, much depends on who they are and where they are. Take, for instance, the Chinese themselves. Their naval expansion, the new strategy pointedly says, “presents both opportunities and challenges.” What will they make of the new strategy now for the first time made officially available to them in Mandarin? Will they see it as a challenge or an invitation to cooperate in defense of a rules-based order? Most likely, they will turn the issue around, seeing this new doctrine as presenting them with both “opportunities” and “challenges.” Soft-liners will go for the opportunities, looking for invitations to cooperate equitably in defense of an acceptable rules-based order; hard-liners will see it as a straight conceptual challenge and a warning.

To an increasing extent, of course, the Chinese have a developing problem with the rise in the hitherto modest sea-denial capabilities of their immediate neighbors and so a professional interest in “all-domain access with Chinese characteristics,” but for the moment their preoccupation is still largely with the security of their near seas. Most of the People’s Liberation Army Navy seems much more likely to see this new stress as something to be circumvented. It, and some local bystanders too, will interpret the emphasis on all-domain access as contributing to a slow, dangerous, and unnecessary American drift into a more adversarial relationship with China and maybe respond accordingly.
How navies react to the stress on all-domain access depends, as has been said earlier, on where and who they are and on their immediate strategic preoccupations. Many of them will modestly stand back from it, focusing instead on the less technologically demanding task of defending their own waters. They will follow the examples of Japan, Vietnam, and other countries in Southeast Asia concentrating on building up their own sea-denial capabilities. If so, the kind of all-domain-access capabilities aspired to in CS21R will tend to be regarded more as ones to be outflanked and offset rather than ones to be contributed to, even if the putative adversary is not in many cases the United States. A few more-capable navies, however, are also interested in developing the capabilities for all-domain access if of a more modest sort. This would mean taking all-domain access as something of an agenda. Most navies will want to do both, as far as their resources allow—securing sufficient access for themselves and denying it to others—just as they always have. Where they wish to strike the balance between these two and their general attitude to this part of CS21R will reflect their unique circumstances.

Such diversity of international reaction reminds us that the effect of strategy lies very much in the eye of the beholder. How effective a strategy is at securing the ends its framers have in mind depends very much on how people perceive and react to it. The stress on all-domain access is a clear risk from this point of view. A bad Chinese reaction to the new strategy could well increase the hesitations in other regional countries about cooperating with the United States, especially if they already have doubts of their own about U.S. intentions or reliability. In this all-too-likely scenario, the stress on all-domain access cuts right across CS21R’s “foundational principle” about the need to cooperate with navies. To avert this, a careful and sensitive international strategic communications campaign will need to follow the appearance of the refreshed strategy.

This brings us to the third but probably most important concern about the creation of all-domain access as what at least looks like the primary function of the U.S. Navy. It seems to have pushed out the opportunity evident in earlier drafts of the refreshed strategy to redefine and reemphasize “forward naval presence” as a means of shaping the strategic environment, winning friends, and influencing people. Of course, this criticism—if that is what it is—is not completely fair since the importance of U.S. forward naval presence is identified as one of two foundational principles in CS21R. \(^{13}\) Section II is in fact entitled “Forward Presence and Partnership” and sits, just as it should in the strategy, after a review of the international context and before addressing the missions and functions of the U.S. Navy that flow from it. Despite this, the forward-presence box has not been fully ticked, because apart from the comparatively short introductory paragraph of Section II, there is no sustained discussion of the advantages of forward naval presence and
absolutely no attempt to identify it as a good thing, not just for the United States, but for the world community generally. Instead, we read a series of regional reviews, starting with the Indo-Asia-Pacific, which identify the proposed force levels needed to deliver the required forward presence region by region, ending up with the Arctic and Antarctic. Several of these regional reviews conclude with a brief paragraph outlining what that resultant forward naval presence is supposed to deliver, but these ideas are nowhere woven together into a kind of sustained defense of the aspiration for a forward naval presence as a whole.

At a time of fiscal constraint when it is becoming harder to balance resources against commitments and when the military-technical, political, and legal challenges to a forward naval presence are clearly growing, this failure to take the bull by the horns and address the issue directly will strike many as unfortunate. It could play into the hands of domestic skeptics inclined to doubt the importance of forward presence, especially if the attempted defense of the capability seems likely to be expensive, fiscally and programmatically. At the same time, the absence of a justification for forward presence runs the risk of further antagonizing neutral or suspicious international opinion apt to think the worst of American intentions, since the determination to maintain a forward naval presence could simply be interpreted as illustrative of aggressive intent.

A few years ago, for instance, Major General Luo Yuan spoke for more than just PLA hard-liners when he said that “the so-called forward presence means that the United States can send its gunboats to every corner of the world. . . This way, the United States can even claim the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea is covered within its security boundary.” He and others pointed out that in the aftermath of the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, were USS George Washington to have sailed into the Yellow Sea, its aircraft would have been capable of reaching Beijing. If to this particular concern is added a general strategic culture deeply affected by the country’s historical exposure to threats from the sea and by the disastrous consequences for China of a failure to deter naval activities of this sort, Chinese sensitivity to the unauthorized presence and activity of foreign navies in “Chinese waters” is understandable. The point is that other countries, not the least India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, share to some extent such hesitations about the unauthorized forward presence of (other) great-power naval forces.

Since a forward U.S. naval presence is not in fact regarded by a sizable chunk of international opinion as a universal good to be welcomed, the failure to discuss and justify it in a doctrinal statement that will be avidly studied around the world seems a lost opportunity. Hitherto, the principle has largely been defended negatively by freedom-of-navigation exercises and repeated recourse to Western interpretations of the law of the sea. To win support, it is not enough to say merely that something is legal; it needs also to be shown to be “right.” The case
for forward presence needs to be made positively. Sadly, the new strategy does not explicitly do that. This failure, together with the emphasis on the function of all-domain access, will reinforce the perception, and not just among the paranoid, that the U.S. Navy is only interested in maintaining a forward naval presence as a precondition for its capacity to threaten countries. This is, of course, part of it, but there is so much more to tell.

Paradoxically the case would be relatively easy to make. Much of the illustrative material used to explain the ideas in CS21R indeed could be rebrigaded into a justification for forward presence. For instance, a forward naval presence, even off unwelcoming shores, provides 24/7 general assurance for all legitimate sea users. It facilitates maritime domain awareness, which is a universal good in that it increases the effectiveness of the international response to all forms of criminal activity at sea that threaten everybody, directly or indirectly. Forward presence also supports rapid and effective responses to natural disasters. In contested areas a forward naval presence can serve as a calming mechanism. More generally, a forward naval presence is part and parcel of naval diplomacy, allowing events to be monitored, relationships developed over time, and stability defended. The bones of a persuasive argument are easily discernible.

At the moment, most countries accept, albeit with a shade of reluctance in some quarters, that, in Kishore Mahbubani’s words,

the real reason why most international waterways remain safe and open—and thereby facilitate the huge explosion of global trade we have seen—is that the American Navy acts as the guarantor of last resort to keep them open. Without the global presence of the US Navy, our world order would be less orderly.17

For this reason too, the notion of a global maritime partnership, outlined in the first version of the strategy, positively extended the concept to the world’s other navies by providing an opportunity for them to join the U.S. Navy “on the beat”; the idea was generally welcomed around the world, since it addressed problems held in common, such as the threat of piracy, drug smuggling, international terrorism, human trafficking, and catastrophic natural disasters. Any of these could directly threaten sea-based trade and other legitimate forms of sea use and indirectly jeopardize the local stability afloat and ashore on which that trade depends. Hence nations participated in a multitude of cooperative multinational naval activities designed to curb these shared problems, to build up local capacities to handle them in the future, and where necessary to engage in security-sector reform. More discussion of this would have helped sustain the general argument for a forward presence and so added to the international appeal of CS21R.

The fact that the strategy has been issued in a number of different languages, including Mandarin, shows that its authors are well aware of the importance of its international appeal, not least because of the expanding need for the Navy
to operate alongside those of its allies and partners. Because so much emphasis remains in the document on the essential role of America’s allies and partners as a means of narrowing the gap between what must be done by the United States alone and what can be, the response of regional countries to this new strategy will be key to its success over the next decade. It is worth repeating the point that the relative absence of discussion on the advantages of naval diplomacy in winning friends and influencing people seems a pity.

The reactions of those different navies and the countries and regions they defend will of course vary, in accordance with their strategic situations. Countries like Japan and the Philippines, wary of China’s rising power, will probably broadly welcome the new emphasis on the all-domain-access function and the apparent reinforcement of the “rebalance” suggested by the special prominence given to the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” region. Both of these indicate the U.S. determination to stay in the western Pacific despite China’s “counter-interventionary” strategies, and that resolve would seem to underline for Japan and the Philippines the U.S. security guarantee.

But even in those two countries there will probably be a small constituency of opinion that will worry that the new muscularity of CS21R will be found provocative in Beijing and so will worsen the atmosphere. It would be surprising if Beijing in general and the People’s Liberation Army Navy in particular did not find aspects of the new strategy provocative, at least in public. China has after all for the first time been identified as a security concern, and all-domain access certainly looks like a response to the antiaccess/area-denial strategies with which the Chinese have been associated.

Countries with currently better relations with China, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, may share these concerns about what some critics will undoubtedly consider the offensive tone of the new strategy; they may also be encouraged in this response by the reduced emphasis apparently given to the general maritime security concerns that tend to be higher in their national defense priorities. Illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, and other forms of criminal activity at sea are actually their most immediate concerns. U.S. support of efforts against crime (especially in the shape of U.S. Coast Guard activity) is of course frequently referenced in the early part of the strategy, but explicit coverage of the role is less than it was in the 2007 strategy, because Section III is about national security rather than the American contribution to the defense of the system. Maritime security is indeed “a promising area for expanded cooperation with our allies and partners,” and so the less-explicit emphasis on it given in the new version of the strategy means there is less to offset its putative muscularity. How other navies respond to the whole package will doubtless reflect how they perceive this shift in its balance.
The same pattern of response will probably be replicated in other parts of the world too. Countries with concerns about an overmighty neighbor, such as Iran or a newly truculent Russia, and in need of reassurance will welcome the American emphasis on maintaining a forward presence for the same reasons as Japan and the Philippines, moderated only by concerns about the relative priority apparently accorded their respective regions when compared with the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Whether it is intended or not, describing American interests in geographic regions sequentially looks like a priority list, and Europeans will note without surprise that they have slipped to position three behind Asia and the Middle East. Africans come next, then neighbors of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. That the region closest to the United States and central to its homeland security comes just fifth in the list suggests that it is not in fact a priority list; nonetheless, that is how it will be seen.

Finally, reactions to the new strategy will also reflect different constituencies within countries as well as their positions in various geographic regions. Professional opinion in the world’s other navies will probably neither be surprised nor in many cases much dismayed at much in this strategy. A great deal of academic and professional attention has been paid to the rise around the world of military-technical constraints on naval maneuver near to land and its portentous implications for the future utility of naval power; there has been a natural and parallel rise in blue-water aspirations and capabilities, not least in the Asia-Pacific. Navies with such aspirations (or that privately assume they might have such aspirations one day) will want to maintain access too. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy’s explicit determination to maintain access and forward presence, and through this the whole gamut of the traditional naval capabilities that flow from sea control, will seem to other navies both natural and right—although in some cases, their professional sympathy for the Navy’s determination to maintain the strategic value of seapower in general may be kept decently private, if only because of the concerns of their political masters. Navies that know they will always be limited in their aspirations to negative sea-denial strategies, in contrast, will naturally be much less sympathetic professionally to the main thrust of the strategy.

The variation and complexity of the international response to CS21R and its importance as a means of winning friends and influencing people suggest that the U.S. maritime services will need to devote significant effort to their strategic communications plan. The problem is that the necessary audiences are varied, and to allay their different and often competing concerns and to build up the required support, the messaging will need to be tailored to particular audiences. This will require considerable skill and effort.

How the U.S. sea services communicate CS21R may generate the same difficulties the Obama administration faced when launching its pivot/rebalance
toward Asia. This occasioned huge, almost unending, debate about what it all meant, with different countries wanting to hear different things and major definitional problems for the administration. While no one would argue against serious reflection on strategic matters as a means of enhancing the quality of thought, there is a pragmatic argument against making its conclusions too public, especially when addressed to multiple audiences. Rather than announce with fanfare such statements of general policy purposes, perhaps one should just get on and do them! After all, what a policy means is usually best clarified by what the policy maker does. But this, in the immediate aftermath of the delivery of one of the world’s most interesting doctrinal statements on twenty-first-century seapower for years, is probably best left to another article and another time.

NOTES


8. In Southeast Asia, for instance, ASEAN and several of its individual members, most notably Singapore, are in the process of establishing new cooperative arrangements to deal with the apparently ever-increasing incidence of disasters in that region.


11. In this list, sea control and power projection are for some reason run together, giving the impression that there are only four functions.


13. The other foundational principle is that naval forces are stronger when we operate jointly and together with allies and partners” (CS21R, page 2). Arguing this and developing the follow-on notion of a “global maritime partnership” were seen as the major thrust of the original strategy. Now it seems to be regarded as a working assumption and, as such, much less discussed.
14. “Indo-Asia-Pacific” is an interesting new term clearly compromising between the old “Asia-Pacific” and the new challenger, the “Indo-Pacific” region, favored by the Indians and the Australians.


