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A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S SEA-POWER THEORY DEVELOPMENT

Zhang Wei [张炜]
Translated by Shazeda Ahmed

The Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) uses primary and secondary Chinese-language sources to produce original scholarly research that enables current and future leaders to understand better the complexities of contemporary China’s maritime rise. The below translation offers non–Chinese readers at least a sense of what can be gained by considering Chinese texts in the original. Zhang Wei’s article, originally published in the journal Frontiers (Xueshu Qianyan) in July 2012, is a historiographical survey of the critical Western and Chinese texts and thinkers who have shaped the concept of sea power in China. It gives insight into the richness of the Chinese discourse about sea power. Of particular note is the fact that as Chinese strategists engage in this discourse, they no longer question the utility of sea power; even the country’s most ardent land-power advocates recognize the strategic and economic importance of the sea. On the contrary, the primary question now concerns the form and character Chinese sea power should take. The CMSI hopes this translated article (in which the endnote citations are original) will inform and strengthen the debate in the West about this critical question.

At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan produced the three volumes of The Influence of Sea Power upon History and, later, Naval Strategy. At one time, sea-power theory was popular in Western countries. In particular, it became an important theory in support of America’s rise. China is a traditionally continental state. The recognition of sea power within academic and political circles has long wavered between contradiction, hesitation, dispute, and even rejection. However, with the deepening of China’s reform and opening up (gaige kaifang), the ocean’s strategic position has risen. It is inevitable that we reexamine, and extract things of value from, this theory that has had such tremendous impact on the rise and fall of great powers.
HISTORY’S CALL: THE RISE OF RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE SEA POWER

After the First and Second Opium Wars, there arose in China a Self-Strengthening Movement centered on the military. At one point China prioritized the establishment of a Beiyang Fleet. In 1885, while stationed in Germany, the Qing diplomat Li Fengbao translated New Ideas on Naval Warfare.* This was the first appearance of the concept of sea power in Chinese translation. In 1890, when Mahan’s first work on sea power was published, it was quickly translated into German, French, Russian, and Japanese, among other languages. Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Japanese emperor valued and adopted this theory, which directly influenced the two countries’ naval development and their respective rises. But in 1900 the Japanese translation of “Theory of the Elements of Seapower” was published in Shanghai’s East Asia Times. This was the first time Chinese readers encountered Mahan’s classic theory of the “six elements” of sea power. It was, of course, associated with China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the navy’s decline. After the revolution of 1911 Sun Yat-sen discussed Chinese sea-power issues many times, but he was helpless in the face of the numerous great powers and China’s waning strength. All he could do was sadly lament the realities of sea power in East Asia.

In the period following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the deep pain felt after a hundred years of imperialist invasion and the new wounds of ideological conflict obstructed the introduction of these Western theories. In 1978, one of China’s most authoritative academic publications, Historical Research, published Feng Chengbai and Li Yuanliang’s “Mahan’s Theory of Strength at Sea.” They argued that this theory “was a blueprint that established maritime forces for the sake of imperialism, seized control of the sea, redivided colonies, and contended for global hegemony... It represented a monopoly of the capitalist classes’ interests and demands. From theoretical and strategic perspectives it demonstrated the position and function that maritime power occupied in the struggle for global hegemony.” The essay also criticized “Russia’s twentieth-century Mahan,” Sergey Gorshkov, the former commander in chief of the Soviet navy, and his propagation of “maritime hegemony.” The authors thought Gorshkov’s ideas followed in the footsteps of the imperialism of the old tsarist regime and the United States and that building an offensive far-seas navy would become “the important force behind the counterrevolutionary global strategy to achieve control of the seas, seize Europe, and dominate the world.” They saw this as an “evil instrument” with which the strong bullied the weak.† The essay represented the Chinese people’s basic understanding of Mahan’s sea-power theory at that time.

In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China launched the era of reform and opening up.

* This is a direct translation from the Chinese. The original German title could not be found.—Trans.
Chinese people began to use the ocean and reach out to the world. They started to acknowledge rationally the relationship between the ocean and the survival and development of the Chinese people. Chinese conceptions of the ocean took flight, and people began to reexamine sea-power theory. The year 1985 was the first time the People’s Liberation Army Navy [PLAN] sent ships overseas and became a genuinely “international military service.” The navy also promoted the strategic idea of “near-seas defense,” which became a new direction for China’s naval development. This led to the post-1990s resurgence of research on sea-power theory.

In 1991 the Ocean Press published the first volumes of the Ocean Consciousness series, which contained Zhang Wei and Xu Hua’s *Sea Power and Prosperity*, the first book on sea power openly published in China. The book uses Karl Marx’s “two types of natural resources” as its theoretical foundation. It begins with an analysis of the early cultures of Eastern and Western states and of their natural geographic environments and then compares Chinese and Western civilizational history. The work contrasts China, representing land-based civilization, with the Mediterranean states, representing maritime civilization. “The former is based on agriculture, and is controlled by natural economic patterns. The latter, however, is based on commerce, and is controlled by the economic patterns of commodities.” Zhang Wei and Xu Hua point out that sea power was rooted in the conflicts of economic interests opened up by trade between maritime states. States that were successful in maritime trade needed to control sea lines of communication and capture desired markets, while simultaneously blocking other countries from controlling or occupying them.

This kind of power was required of states. Power belongs to the realm of politics, and politics is full of violence. Thus, a few merchant ships began to carry soldiers. As ships became more specialized, navies emerged. Therefore, behind the rise and fall of Mediterranean and Atlantic states “was hidden an invisible sword—sea power.” Zhang and Xu state, “For the sake of their own economic and political interests, states use maritime forces (most importantly navies) to control the ocean, and this is called sea power.” Their analysis is based on several centuries’ history of struggle for control of the oceans. Their book forms, by linking the oceans and the state’s political, economic, and military interests, an abstract concept. It does not focus on researching sea power itself but rather studies its use from the perspective of national strategy. It is a work of high-level, state-strategic theory. Dialectically, Mahan’s sea-power theory takes the creation and development of capitalist sea power as its object of inquiry. It is strongly affected by the social class of its author and the age in which it was produced. But it also has a “rational core”—it accurately recognizes and grasps the patterns of capitalist production and development with respect to the use and control of the
From a high-level, national-strategic perspective, sea power exerts a huge effect on a state's rise.²

In 1998, Zhang Shiping's *Chinese Sea Power* was published by the People's Daily Press. Writing with a strong sense of urgency, the author used the past to discuss the present. He thought that in human history the states and peoples that had been and continued to be powerful and prosperous had either once or later possessed sea power. The Chinese people were the first in the world to move toward the sea, yet the phrase "sea power" has always been unfamiliar to them. Zhang Shiping's book declares that sea power is a category of history and that its meaning—especially the development of concepts of the ocean—changes continuously as societies grow. "In the simplest terms, sea power is the freedom to conduct activities in the maritime domain."³ The author emphasizes that to maritime countries or people, possession of sea power is not an objective but a means, an indispensable way of ensuring the survival and sustainable development of the state and nation. The book divides sea power into purely "military" and "comprehensive" sea power. Military sea power refers to one party in a war asserting control of a fixed maritime space for a certain period of time. Comprehensive sea power includes political, economic, and military factors. It denotes a state's freedom to act within a fixed maritime space during a specific period of time. The two are closely intertwined. If a state does not have comprehensive national power, it cannot possess military sea power; likewise, if a state lacks a certain amount of military sea power, it cannot have comprehensive sea power.

Zhang Shiping identifies four factors affecting sea power in the world today: maritime military forces, maritime entities, ocean development, and maritime legal systems.

In 2000, the Sea Tide Press ceremoniously rolled out Wang Shengrong's *Maritime Great Powers and the Struggle for Sea Power*. The book hails America's Mahan as the "founder of 'sea power'" and the former Soviet Union's Gorshkov as having "reconstructed the new concept of 'state sea power.'" It uses John F. Lehman's "revival of Mahan's 'seapower' thought" as a section heading and goes even farther, systematically explaining the classic theories of "sea power" as well as methodically researching and discussing the history of the development of Western sea power.⁴ The book explains Mahanian sea power as follows. Sea power is an important historical factor or process. The economic basis of sea power involves the rights and interests in the sea—that is, economic sea power. The superstructure of sea power is the power to control the ocean—that is, military sea power. The cultivation, growth, and development of sea power rely on six discrete geographical factors: a state's geographic position, the natural territorial contours of the state, the scope of its territory, the size of its population, its national character, and its political traits. Wang believes Gorshkov's "state sea
power” concept is richer than Mahan’s sea-power theory—that “sea power is the sum of the organic composition of developing the world’s oceans and protecting national interests. Fixed national sea power determines the use of the ocean’s military and economic value, and [this form of sea power] is the capacity to achieve the state’s goals.” This work has similarities to Zhang Shiping’s Chinese Sea Power. They both deeply consider contemporary sea power, and both find that China must develop sea power, because “in the twenty-first-century world, people are still ‘dancing with wolves’”; also, “in the future the world’s oceans will still be under the control of strong states that possess sea power.”

In this period translations on sea power were published one after the other: Gorshkov’s Sea Power of the State, Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History and Naval Strategy, a Mahan collection entitled Sea Power Theory, and Lehman’s Command of the Seas, among others. Domestic monographs on sea-power issues also increased, such as Yang Xinhua and Shi Ping’s Chinese Sea Power and Historical Culture, Qin Tian and Huo Xiaoyong’s On the History of Chinese Sea Power, Liu Yijian’s Command of the Seas and Naval Strategy, and Lu Rude’s Ocean–State–Sea Power, as well as the PLAN Command Department’s Modern Chinese Navy and Cheng Guangzhong’s On Geopolitics. All of these objectively explained and assessed Mahan’s sea-power theory.

It can be seen, then, that after reform and opening up, more and more Chinese people became conscious of the ocean and an increasing number of Chinese scholars considered the nation’s sea-power issues. This was the call of history.

THEORETICAL DIALECTICS: THE NATURE OF CHINA’S SEA POWER

In English, haiquan is translated as “sea power.” “Sea power” can be also rendered [in Chinese] as 海上力量 (haishang liliang), 海上实力 (haishang shili), 海上强国 (haishang qiangguo), etc. As a political term and strategic concept, haiquan perhaps comes closest to Mahan’s original meaning. This is because the noun “sea” connotes the ocean; Mahan said that he chose it after much careful thought, deliberately avoiding the popular adjective “maritime” to compel people to pay attention and so make the phrase widely used. Translating “power” as quanli gives a more political cast than the alternative word liliang. It may be that [for the Chinese] “sea power” has become too politicized or has “bad origins.” Thus, even as one set of Chinese people vigorously calls for Chinese sea power, another has misgivings. In the early years of the twenty-first century, China’s peaceful rise is attracting the world’s attention; the modernization of China’s national defense and navy is rapidly proceeding, and the “China threat” theory (especially the “Chinese naval threat” theory) is surfacing again and again in the international
community. As a result, the question whether or not the nation should develop sea power has once again stirred discussion in China.

Since 2003, the “sea-power school,” of which Zhang Wenmu is a representative, has attracted a great deal of attention in Chinese academia. Zhang has published a multitude of dissertations and books on sea power, including *On Chinese Sea Power*, *China’s National Security Interests within the Global Geopolitical System*, *Command of the Seas*, and *The Historical Experiences of the Rise of Major Powers*. He finds the deductive, logical origin of geopolitical theory in resources.

In this context, humanity’s means for controlling geography have evolved from command of land to command of the sea. This is because with the Industrial Revolution, mankind’s methods of survival, production, and earning wealth changed. States’ economic development expanded beyond national boundaries and formed interdependent relationships with global markets and resources.

The most convenient medium that connects the world is the ocean, and the easiest, most direct routes are along sea lines of communication. In the age of capital globalization,* whoever had a large, strong navy and effectively controlled sea lines held an advantageous position in the division of international interests. The reality of history is that trade followed gunboats, not contracts. Any major trading power will also be a sea power. Issues of control of the seas are global issues. What happens in China depends on what happens in the world beyond its borders. Sixty percent of China’s oil resources come from the Middle East, and an enormous amount of trade relies on overseas markets. In today’s world, having laws but not power makes justice unattainable. China must have strong maritime forces. The navy is an important means for the state to expand its sea power. Therefore, to adapt to economic globalization and the context in which China is attempting to rise, as well as to the demands of its national interests and security strategy, China must greatly develop sea power and establish a strong navy—specifically, it should construct a far-seas navy, with an aircraft carrier at its core.7

At the same time, many in China oppose expansion of sea power. Xu Qiyu has pointed out, in “Reflections on the Sea-Power Fallacy,” that people currently have four misunderstandings about sea-power issues. One is that sea power has determined history, that it is in a class of its own, and that this is still the case. A second is that globalization demands that states have more international markets and resources and that having sea power means a country can guarantee security for these things. A third misconception is that major powers must struggle for sea power or they will have no prospects for development. The fourth is that through the development of naval forces a state can enjoy the sea power of a hegemon and that this is the foundation of genuinely equal “friendly relations” with hegemonic

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* A reference to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.—Trans.
countries. Xu believes that sea power has indeed played a deeply significant role in history but that this does not mean that sea power “determines” history. It has functioned within the context of given periods of historical development and has never been in a category of its own. He examines sea power from the perspective of an up-and-coming major power—its strategic choices and geopolitical restrictions, its ability by means of comprehensive national power to support sea-power development, and its risk of conflict with hegemonic states. In light of these considerations, he maintains, China should avoid the “sea-power fallacy.”

In 2005, Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai published “A Few Thoughts on China’s Sea-Power Development Strategy” in Research on International Politics. The essay argued that a state having naval forces alone is incapable of becoming a major sea power; traditional Western concepts of sea power are not adaptable to the current development of China’s sea power. China’s sea power encompasses Chinese capacity for and influence over research on and development, use, and control of the oceans. It is not likely that China can become a major power with sea power, or even a major power that equally values land and sea; rather it can only position itself as a land-based power that has established substantial sea power. In 2007, Ye Zicheng published “China’s Peaceful Development: The Return to and Development of Land Power” in World Economics and Politics. The essay posits that if China does not regard geopolitics from a hegemonic military-strategic perspective, then in the end land power will determine the development of sea, air, space, and information power. China’s peaceful development is primarily that of a land power, in a certain sense the return to land power. China’s peaceful growth has been oriented throughout toward its economic development and has not made obtaining power to control land its primary objective. As a result, China’s peaceful growth has advanced a new concept of land power—one that is focused on land, people, and development, as well as on the Eurasian continent and on comprehensiveness. Ye argues that building up inland areas was the first level of China’s land-power strategy and that today the Eurasian mainland should be the focus. China should establish a foothold in the Eurasian continent to develop strategic partnerships with Europe, Russia, and India. At the same time, good-neighbor diplomacy should be an important element in China’s land-power strategy. Moreover, Ye pointed out that land-power development is beneficial in easing the strategic contradictions with the United States resulting from China’s rise. These two essays can be said to be the representative texts of China’s “land-power school.”

In the land-power-versus-sea-power debate, both sides accept the assumptions of China’s peaceful rise and that China will not pursue global hegemony, but the strategic choices they emphasize are markedly different.

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* That is, that by Xu Qiyu and the one by Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai.—Trans.
The “sea-power school’s” theories certainly do not embrace Mahan’s original meaning. Zhang Wenmu has said that in English “sea power” denotes “maritime power,” not “maritime rights.” Moreover, Chinese sea power is a type of maritime right pertaining to Chinese sovereignty—not maritime power, much less maritime hegemony. In practice, China’s sea power is far from seeking maritime power; it is in the stage of merely protecting maritime rights and interests.\(^{11}\) Zhang also notes that Chinese sea power unifies its objectives and means, to include “maritime rights” that proceed from China’s national sovereignty and the “maritime forces” that would bring about and protect such rights. It should not include the “maritime power” for which Western hegemons generally strive. The characteristics of Chinese sea power [in Zhang Wenmu’s view] are as follows: first, the processes of national unification and achievement of sea power are in lockstep; second, as determined by special geopolitical conditions, Chinese sea power can be described as limited; third, the development of China’s maritime military forces combines the limited nature of China’s long-term strategy with the unlimited nature of its near-term strategy.

The scholar Liu Zhongmin, of the sea-power school, holds that from a geopolitical perspective, China must on the one hand consider how improvements in security on land offer the strategic possibility of concentrating force for the purposes of promoting sea power, while on the other hand it must consider the necessity of developing sea power itself, given the pressures on maritime frontier security. With respect to the relationship between developing sea power and comprehensive national power, China should be calculating not how to decrease the already quite low investment in naval defense but how to increase the contributions of the maritime economy to comprehensive national power. In the relationship between sea-power development and China’s peaceful rise, the former should not conflict with or hinder the latter.\(^{12}\)

The doctrine of the land-power school does not completely reject the idea that China should develop sea power. Ye Zicheng has said that Chinese sea power should be defined as the nation’s capacity and influence with respect to researching, developing, using, and to a certain extent controlling the sea. It should also address in a detailed way the question of how to “walk the road of developing sea power with Chinese characteristics.”\(^{13}\) Ye Zicheng has pointed out that China’s peaceful development is a new type of land-power conception. If, as it is stated previously, China does not view geopolitics from a hegemonic military strategic viewpoint, land power should in the end be determined by sea, air, space, and information power.\(^{14}\) Xu Qiyu too has not completely rejected sea-power development. He has said that sea power is not simply a military question but a grand-strategy issue that concerns national security and development. From a grand-strategy perspective, however exalted sea power becomes,
it is only one means of actualizing grand strategy. In summary, sea power serves strategy—strategy does not serve sea power.\(^5\)

In 2006 the Current Affairs Press published the book *Roadmap for Asian Regional Cooperation*, which mentions the “theory of harmonizing sea power and land power.” This book argues that in the process of economic globalization and regional integration, states should advocate peace and cooperation between maritime and land-based countries, “adopting peaceful methods to manage and use geopolitical relationships between states, promoting enduring peace, security, development and prosperity for individual states, the region, and the world,” thus realizing “harmony of land and sea” and common development.\(^6\)

In the context of today’s continuously growing economic globalization and the rising importance and usefulness of the ocean, and given China’s deepening reform and “opening up,” rapidly increasing foreign trade, and gradual expansion of overseas interests, debate over the question whether or not China should develop sea power has become meaningless. This is obviously not the point being debated by the two camps. The substantive issues are that of the nature of Chinese sea power and the direction of its development, whether or not it should be a significant option in China’s national strategy.

Of these, the most basic question is the nature of Chinese sea power; today it is a given that China should develop sea power as a significant option of national strategy to support the nation’s rise. But China cannot repeat the mistakes of Mahanian sea power.

To begin with, times have changed. Mahan’s sea-power theory is from an age when capitalism led to imperialism and “imperialism was war.” Therefore it possessed characteristics of a time when the state used military force to control the oceans and promote the expansion of global capitalism and the pursuit of monopoly. However, ours are globalized times, in which peaceful development is the mainstream. Even though as the world’s sole superpower the United States still pursues sea-power “fundamentalism,” it too has been forced to change. This is because a high level of economic interdependence makes any country unwilling or unable to use military force frequently. The conditions under which a state’s maritime security rests completely on war and hegemony no longer exist.

Second, the scientific and technological foundations are not the same. Mahan lived in an age of broad-based development in the field of mechanization. Navies, because of their integration of surface, air, and undersea operations, as well as their good endurance, combat radius, and global power-projection capabilities, became the most important services of the age. Although these advantages are still maintained by navies in the information age, they cannot be absolute. New situations emerge as a result of struggles in space and in the electromagnetic realm, as well as over rights to control information and the Internet. The concept
of integrated operations guides decisions of military strategy; the technological foundation on which the supremacy of sea power rested no longer exists.

Third, cultural traditions are not the same. “Power” was at the core of Mahan’s sea-power theory. It possessed characteristics of traditional Western realist theory. To date it still influences the national- and maritime-security policy of the United States: develop maritime forces (the most important being the navy) and attain sea power—control the ocean (the most important [parts] being sea lines of communication)—control global trade—win global hegemony. But the theoretical paradigms of traditional Chinese military studies include the concepts of concord (hehe) and harmony (hexie) and the fundamental aspects of peace and defense. China cannot choose to imitate Mahan’s offensive, hegemonic sea-power model.

Fourth, there are disparities in state character. Mahan’s sea-power theory was born in the United States, so it has been revered by Western capitalist countries and necessarily has the nature and ideological bent of these nations. Today’s China is a socialist power under Chinese Communist Party rule. This fact has determined China’s foreign strategy and foreign policy and established as the preconditions for developing sea power the principles of the “four persists” (sige jianchi). Under the guidance of “the five principles of peaceful coexistence,” the “new security” concept, and the “harmonious world” concept, China will extract the wheat and discard the chaff of sea-power theory.*

China will not repeat the mistakes of Mahanian sea-power theory, but [to ensure that it does not,] the country needs to reflect on the history of its national security strategy, how it conceptualizes the ocean, and the conservative, negative side of traditional military studies. In a certain sense, sea-power theory is an achievement of civilization, and China should draw from some of its rational elements, including the following: its basic patterns (maritime economic activities that are characterized by a commodity economy and influence the development of productivity, as well as a state’s rise); the philosophical methods it reveals (when the ocean ceases to be a barrier and instead brings the world together, a state needs to think about global strategy); and the important reality it exposes (the essential linkage between a state’s maritime security, national economy, and politics, and the navy’s important role among these). Lenin once pointed out, “In the Marxist revolution, the proletariat’s ideology gained historical significance because it did not forsake the most treasured achievements of the capitalist class’s generation. Conversely, it absorbed and altered that which was valuable from

* According to a Deng Xiaoping speech of 30 March 1979, the “four persists” are to persist in supporting “the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and both Marxism and Mao Zedong thought.” For the full speech, see “邓小平：坚持四项基本原则 (1979年3月30)” [Deng Xiaoping: Persist in Supporting Four Basic Principles, 30 March 1979], available at www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/10/20000529/80791.html.—Trans.
over two thousand years of humankind’s ideological and cultural development.”

This is the attitude we too should adopt toward sea-power theory.

HISTORICAL CHOICE: DEVELOP SEA POWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

Sea power is an issue that falls within the purview of national strategy and national-security strategy, but it does not constitute their entirety. Instead, it is the maritime component of national strategy and national-security strategy. The state’s understanding and use of sea power are not a matter simply for the maritime domain. Rather, sea power is a complete policy, a process of specific steps to be implemented. It begins with the land and how the land influences the ocean. Emphasizing the development of sea power is not the same as following the path that Western powers took to maritime hegemony. Likewise, emphasis on a return to land power and a land-centric approach cannot be equated to a capacity for naturally peaceful development. A nation with land power can take the hegemonic path as well. In reality, a state must base its development on land, but it cannot ignore the objective existence of sea power. Thus, people should no longer deliberately separate “land power” and “sea power” but should consider the two in tandem and conduct integrated planning.

Contemporary Chinese sea power is, in practice, a component of the state’s comprehensive national power and strategic capacity. It is a means of actualizing China’s peaceful development strategy and national maritime security. It is concretely realized in national strategic plans for developing, using, managing, and controlling the sea and in the management systems and maritime forces themselves. Sea power can be an element of both “hard power” and “soft power.” China’s sea power should be formed of the following components:

- National maritime strategy. Maritime strategy is comprehensive state planning of maritime matters taking account of such things as the economy, politics, the military, science and technology, law, and culture. It is a product of state power. It is also a fundamental reflection of the state’s concept of the sea and of the government’s level of understanding of the sea. National maritime-development strategy and national maritime-security strategy derive from national maritime strategy. Maritime-development strategy mainly expresses the general plan for the progression of a state’s maritime economy and industry. A state’s maritime-security strategy, however, comprises its comprehensive planning for and guidance of security affairs at sea—the sum total of the state’s maritime-security concepts in the political, diplomatic, military, economic, and scientific domains.

- Governmental ocean-management mechanisms. The state is the subject of sea power, and the government is the material representation of the state’s
power. Therefore, government mechanisms for ocean management should be a formative part of sea power and should mainly include policy mechanisms, legislative and executive institutions, and related cooperative structures.

- National maritime forces. They are the executors and protectors of the state’s maritime strategy and ocean development strategy; they constitute the major support for sea power. These forces include civilian-use marine transport resources (the merchant marine), near- and far-seas fishing fleets, scientific survey vessels, and marine-resource exploration and development assets, among others; military forces at sea (of which the navy is central, but that also include maritime militia reserve fleets); and maritime law-enforcement forces, which include the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), the Coast Guard of the Border Control Department, the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLEC), and Maritime Customs, among others.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, there was a change in China’s peripheral maritime security environment. The security demands of national sea lines of communication and of overseas interests surged. As China’s national power has increased, international society has increasingly demanded that China take on the burdens of a great power. As a result, China’s sea-power development stands at a new historical starting point. Today, CMS and FLEC are taking positive actions to safeguard China’s near-seas maritime security. China’s navy has implemented routine antipiracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia’s maritime space, in accordance with a United Nations resolution. The hospital ship *Peace Ark* has journeyed to third-world countries in Africa and Latin America to provide medical care. Combat vessels have entered the Mediterranean for large-scale evacuation operations from Libya and to provide maritime security. China has launched a training aircraft carrier capable of far-seas operations and sent it on sea trials. The deep-sea submersible *Jiaolong* has dived to depths greater than seven thousand meters.

Today, development of Chinese sea power is not a subjective factor but an important historical choice of China’s national strategy. First of all, in the age of globalization, humanity’s development largely depends on the oceans. China’s rise too greatly relies on the oceans. Sea lines of communication and maritime resources have already become strategic components of sustainable development, components from which the state cannot depart for even a moment. This consideration shapes sea power’s historical influence on the momentous rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This influence is not absolutely decisive, but its relative
decisiveness must be faced squarely. We need to expand the horizons of our security strategy, establish a foothold in the world, and strategically manage [jinglüe] the ocean. Furthermore, we should synchronize the maritime expansion of China's national interests and the process of its rise, demanding a modernized navy that provides maritime security and implements necessary, limited sea control [haiyang kongzhi]. China also requires a navy strong and large enough to fulfill new missions, as well as adapt to the nation's great-power status. Because China faces a global trend toward revolution in military affairs (RMA), it must confront the immutable laws governing the relationship between “spears” and “shields” in contemporary international society.*

Chinese sea power must have Chinese characteristics. The first such characteristic is big-picture, highly centralized strategic planning that aligns with China's national strategy regarding peaceful progress toward a harmonious world and its foreign strategy. Second, sea power should embody the core values of socialism with Chinese characteristics—a socialism that is guided by Marxist tenets, that has as its objectives eliminating exploitation and achieving justice, and that dialectically combines China's national interests and the shared interests of humanity. Third, sea power ought to give priority to the maritime economy, maritime economic forces, and exploration for and use of ocean resources. Fourth, Chinese sea power should emphasize comprehensive security and cooperative security; actively develop security cooperation with littoral states and states along sea lines of communication; and comprehensively deploy economic, political, diplomatic, military, scientific, and cultural means to achieve maritime security. Fifth, Chinese sea power should reflect the national-security strategy of “active defense.” Its basic objective should be to assure national maritime security and national economic interests. Additionally, Chinese sea power should emphasize the limited use of military and paramilitary forces at sea, stressing especially the search for ways to use maritime forces in peacetime, including as instruments of political diplomacy. This will have to be an important component of China's future sea-power theory and a highlight of sea-power theory with Chinese characteristics.

In brief, China's development of an ability to control and manage the ocean is meant not only to protect national interests but also to safeguard world peace. This is the crux of the difference between sea power with Chinese characteristics and sea power in general. Chinese sea power is the application of national maritime forces to developing and using the sea. It is also the process of protecting national rights and interests and ensuring national maritime security. Above all, it is the process of developing strategic management of national maritime affairs, the capability of administering the ocean, and the art of doing so.

* The Chinese characters for "spears" and "shields," when combined, create the word "contradiction." The author's point is that contradictions are inevitable.—Trans.
NOTES

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