
Roger H. Ducey
Stephen A. Emerson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/18

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
adequately account for the complexity of our contemporary moral lives rests on epistemological presuppositions that take the moral speech acts of the present as an epistemic starting point rather than as resulting from historical contingency. Finally, Fisher leaves questions about the adequacy of the just war tradition in accounting for contemporary warfare largely unexamined.

JOSEPH M. HATFIELD


Stephen Emerson has written the definitive work on the war in Mozambique between Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and Renamo ( Mozambican National Resistance) that began in 1977 and ended with the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October of 1992. It would be an impressive effort to capture just the fight between these factions vying for control of Mozambique, then newly independent after 450 years as a Portuguese colony: Emerson goes much further. He describes the complex environment in which this struggle takes place—overshadowed by a larger Cold War and bordering countries like South Africa with its own fight over apartheid, as well as the war against white minority rule next door in Rhodesia. Emerson traces the beginnings of Frelimo and its armed struggle against Portugal. Despite its success in gaining independence from Portugal in 1975 after over a decade of war, Frelimo struggled with postindependence nation building. Formed by opponents of the Marxist-aligned Frelimo, Renamo initially achieved operational effectiveness by obtaining arms, logistics, training, intelligence, and planning support from a Rhodesia seeking to counter Frelimo’s support of Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) forces. Mugabe’s eventual success in establishing an internationally recognized Zimbabwean state cost Renamo its major benefactor. In the 1980s, however, Renamo gained a new partner in its fight against Frelimo from the South African government of P. W. Botha looking to create instability in its “frontline states” as a way to stave off support for the African National Congress. This patronage allowed Renamo to continue its fight against Frelimo—now the ruling party of an independent Mozambique—for another thirteen years.

The conflict’s ebbs and flows affected every part of the country and its inhabitants. Between 800,000 and 1 million Mozambicans were killed in the fighting, and more than 2 million were displaced. The war’s effects included a plundering of natural resources and environmental disasters made worse by drought. An end to the Cold War and South Africa’s apartheid regime—coupled with leadership changes in Frelimo itself and all-around war exhaustion—eventually enabled peace talks and a successful settlement.

The Battle for Mozambique benefits from Emerson’s decade of research. It reflects his access to formerly classified Rhodesian military documents coupled with the firsthand accounts gleaned from hundreds of hours of interviews with both former Frelimo and former Renamo fighters as well as Rhodesian and South African military and civilian personnel. The descriptions of
operations and battles are graphic and bring a reality not seen very often.

A longtime resident of southern Africa, Emerson is a renowned scholar of African affairs, having served as Chair of Security Studies at the U.S. National Defense University’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and as head of the Africa regional studies program at the U.S. Naval War College. His knowledge and experience make The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992 a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the history and challenges of the African continent. ROGER H. DUCEY


Kate Epstein’s book about the relationships between the torpedo and the creation of the military-industrial complex builds on her earlier work about naval tactics, in particular her essay in the April 2013 Journal of Military History about “torpedoes and U.S. Navy battle tactics” before World War I. (See Katherine C. Epstein, “No One Can Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History before World War I,” Journal of Military History 7, no. 2 [April 2013], pp. 491–520.) Here she goes after much bigger “fish”—excuse the pun. Epstein wastes no time in getting to her primary thesis in this fascinating monograph about the development of the torpedo as a weapon system in the United States and Great Britain. She begins boldly: “Thus, in addition to the part they played in the origins of the military-industrial complex, torpedoes were at the nexus of the international arms race, globalization, and industrialization after World War I.” Epstein takes the reader on a journey back in time to relate a story little told and even less known.

The modern self-propelled torpedo, invented and improved in the last half of the nineteenth century by the Englishman Robert Whitehead, was naval warfare’s first “fire and forget” weapon. Like breech-loading rifles and artillery, also products of the nineteenth century, it changed the landscape of war in its environment—the maritime domain. Just as breech-loading rifles increased the lethality and scope of land warfare, so too did the torpedo, but on unimaginable scales in a very short time period. As Epstein notes in her introduction, “Over a fifty-year period the speed of torpedoes had increased by roughly 800 percent, and their range by 5,000 percent. They were the cutting edge of technology.” When combined with other so-called disruptive technologies, like the airplane and the submarine—that is, technologies so unique that they break sociopolitical, commercial, and military paradigms—they had the potential to and, in fact, did throw existing notions of sea power, naval tactics, and even maritime strategy into question. It was no accident that the great maritime strategists—A. T. Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett—emerged during the period of the torpedo's rise to prominence as sailors recast their thinking about naval tactics in the modern age in part because of cutting-edge technology.

Epstein builds on the work of historian William McNeill and his arguments about the emergence of “command technology” in the nineteenth century,