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Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy

Richard J. Norton
Dave Oliver

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failed to match naval strategy to national security requirements. The result was an impressive fleet designed to defeat another major navy rapidly in blue-water action, when a more flexible force capable of securing and defending vital maritime interests might have served Japan better. The force structure and mentality of the IJN led to dramatic success for Japan in the early stages of World War II, but those gains could not be sustained, and Japan’s poorly guarded sea lines of communication became a vulnerability that American submarines exploited to decimate Japan’s merchant marine and undermine the Japanese economy.

As a direct result of this experience, writes Patalano, the founders of the JMSDF sought to ensure that Japan’s new navy would have a broad, maritime focus rather than a narrow naval one, and that new generations of naval leaders would anchor their maritime strategies in Japan’s national policy objectives. These leaders also worked to make the JMSDF immune to the internal rivalries that wracked the IJN in the 1930s by centralizing the JMSDF’s command functions under a single Maritime Staff Office reporting to a single chief of maritime staff firmly under the control of civilian bureaucrats. The JMSDF’s study of the IJN’s failure to secure its sea lines of communication during World War II influenced the prioritization of sea-lane defense during the Cold War. Additionally, interservice rivalries that weakened the efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during World War II were addressed postwar by the consolidation of initial officer training to foster interservice cooperation and camaraderie. Yet the IJN is more than a mere cautionary tale—it’s esprit de corps and traditions live on in the modern JMSDF. Patalano’s outstanding work falters only when the author attempts to explain the JMSDF’s current tactics as a function of its IJN heritage. While the IJN’s influence on the JMSDF is undeniably proven by the book’s analysis, the links between the JMSDF’s identity and its tactics are not clearly traced. It is the reviewers’ experience and assessment that JMSDF tactics are generally either adopted directly from the United States or the product of analytical efforts to maximize the effectiveness of the force’s combat systems vis-à-vis perceived threats. While it is logical that culture and identity elements are strong influences on those analytical processes, Patalano’s argument lacks tangible examples to delineate this connection clearly. The link between JMSDF strategic culture and IJN heritage is clear, but the relationship between the IJN and modern JMSDF tactics is tenuous.

Well articulated, broad in scope, and drawing on sources not previously accessed by Western researchers, Patalano’s work delves into previously unexplored territory essential to making sense of Japanese decision making in the maritime domain. Given rapidly developing events in East Asian waters, Post-war Japan as a Sea Power deserves attention from anyone seeking to understand maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific.

CARLOS ROSENDE AND JOHN BRADFORD

Oliver, Dave. Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 178pp. $27.95

Hyman Rickover almost single-handedly delivered nuclear power to the United
States Navy and, when this was combined with submarine and missile technology, gave the United States the assured second-strike capability that was the bedrock of Cold War deterrence. Rickover also ruled his nuclear navy for decades, setting unrivaled standards for safety and performance while also becoming one of the most controversial military officers of the twentieth century.

Dave Oliver, a retired rear admiral and veteran submariner who joined the Navy in the nuclear navy’s adolescence, had a career that provided him both a unique opportunity to observe Hyman Rickover, and a chance to think deeply about what might be referred to as “the Rickover method.” This book purports to examine that method, with a particular emphasis on Rickover’s leadership style and how he changed naval and submarine culture. Oliver does this by focusing on large themes, such as “planning for success,” and “innovation and change.” He populates each chapter with descriptions of Rickover in action and more than a few personal anecdotes that in some cases simply beggar the imagination. The result is a fast-paced volume that reads much more like a memoir than a scholarly study of leadership or management. From this perspective, Against the Tide is a success. The book also has value as a window into a branch of the Navy that, for reasons good, bad, and inevitable, was insulated, isolated, and opaque to most outside observers.

Readers who approach this work with the hope of learning how to achieve similar results to Admiral Rickover’s will be disappointed. In part this is due to Rickover’s unique story, his consistent refusal to produce any form of comprehensive autobiography or memoir, and the complexity of his career. Rickover is a hard man to understand truly and perhaps impossible to replicate. Oliver points out that Rickover himself occasionally deviated from his own first principles, but fails to explain why that happened. In another case Oliver argues that Rickover was able to anticipate the future far more accurately than almost all his peers, but offers no suggestion about how this gift might be replicated. Here too, questions arise. One of the examples used to demonstrate this prescience involved the admiral pulling an answer for a technical problem from a stack of solutions, written long ago, that he kept in his desk. The scene is dramatic, but leaves the obvious question; if Admiral Rickover, with his ability to anticipate the future, foresaw the problem, why didn’t he fix it beforehand? In another example, toward the end of the book Admiral Oliver offers the observation that “hard work and focus can succeed for anyone.” Yet in earlier chapters he makes a very convincing argument that Rickover’s controversial interviews and ruthless “culling of the herd” of prospective and serving nuclear officers was warranted because some of those men, including one from his own wardroom, no matter how hardworking and focused, lacked what it took to be a successful officer on a nuclear submarine.

Oliver, when all is said and done, openly admires Admiral Rickover. He tries to maintain a balanced approach when it comes to identifying and analyzing Rickover’s blind spots and personal weaknesses but still minimizes some of Rickover’s less commendable attributes—while engaging in occasional hyperbole when it comes to describing the admiral’s detractors. For example, Oliver refers to Admiral Rickover’s “adversaries” as “attacking with the
viciousness and mindlessness of a pack of stray dogs.” The imagery is bold, but the truth is that, as later described by Oliver, some of those adversaries were principled officers with different and often broader portfolios and perspectives whose opposition to Rickover was anything but mindless.

To its credit, this book touches on and invites thought and discussion about more than a few attributes of senior leadership, including personal accountability. Rickover was quick to dismiss subordinates who he felt had failed his program—yet the degree to which he would be willing to sacrifice his own position and power is less clear, particularly when even many of his supporters feel the admiral clung to power too long and eventually became a detriment to the program he had created. Another area involves personal and professional ethics. Oliver seems to make the point that when the stakes are high enough, the ends do justify the means and a successful outcome justifies questionable or even illegal actions. This invites a subsequent discussion involving the deepest questions of what it is to be an officer and member of the profession of arms.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Admiral Oliver’s book is the revelation that the author identifies Admiral Rickover as a manager and not a leader, contrary to what Rickover desired and believed. Today, Admiral Rickover is among the leadership biographic cases senior students study at the Naval War College and the question—Was he a leader or manager?—always comes up. While there are some students who agree with Admiral Oliver, the majority identify Rickover as a leader. However, all are agreed Rickover should be credited for daring greatly, building to last, and being most worthy of continued study.

RICHARD J. NORTON


Chris Dubbs, a Gannon University executive, followed a fascination with his discovery of a First World War German submarine wreck in Lake Michigan. He pursued meticulous research through collections of First World War U-boat accounts and recorded American attitudes on the war and the public fascination with submarines. Throughout the book, he grabs the attention of readers as he skillfully recounts the arrival of the German freighter submarine Deutschland in the United States to reopen trade with Germany, the horrors that U-boats caused during the war, and the end of the war, when the allies claimed U-boats as war prizes. His well-cited account of events in the United States, at sea, and in Europe between 1916 and 1920 entertains readers with riveting images of German submarines and crews, the perils of war at sea, and public reaction and debates on the war. Dubbs offers an informative and historically accurate description of the impact U-boats had on the evolution of warfare and the subsequent employment of submarines as offensive weapons in war. He concludes his book with a note on the entrance of the United States into the Second World War, when Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, ordered U.S. submarines to commence unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan, thereby disregarding the moral outrage.