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## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR

Mann, James. *The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House to Redefine American Power*. New York: Viking, 2012. 416pp. \$26.95

James Mann walks the reader through the key foreign-policy challenges faced by the Barack Obama administration and outlines the evolution that has taken place in the president's approach to these issues.

He traces the post-Vietnam history of the Democratic Party's foreign policy and describes the three different generations that come together in the present administration: the Vietnam War generation, the post-Vietnam War generation, and the Obamians, who are identified by Mann as mostly campaign staffers, plus National Security Council officials Ben Rhodes and Denis McDonough. The third group's foreign-policy experience is limited to the Congress, and its political reference points are September 11th, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The Vietnam War is ancient history to them.

Mann believes this third group most closely reflects President Obama's own worldview. He notes that foreign-policy "veterans were to discover that

Obama relied to an unusual extent on his own informal network, the Obamians he had come to trust in the presidential campaign." In fact, while Defense Secretary Bob Gates, National Security Adviser General Jim Jones, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, and others have moved on, the core of officials that Mann describes as Obamians are largely still in place.

Mann describes "two distinctive aspects of Obama's foreign policy." The first is that Obama is not "squeamish about employing American military power," as the surge in Afghanistan, the war in Libya, and his campaign expression "to track down, capture, or kill" all show. The second is the concern on the part of both the president and the Obamians that America's financial resources no longer allow the United States to exercise its traditional postwar hegemony. Instead, they believe that on entering office they were faced with a "continuing effort to recast the United States' role in the world in a way that fit America's more limited resources." Mann notes the

biggest change for the William Clinton administration alumni was grasping this new reality of declining resources.

The author also chronicles some important missteps made by the Obama administration, arguing that the president's fixation on not repeating what the Obamians viewed as mistakes of the George W. Bush administration led them to downplay democracy early in their tenure. This led, in part, to being overly reticent during Iran's Green Revolution. Mann also describes how their initial approach to China was based on lessons learned during the Clinton administration. Unfortunately, they did not recognize that China had become much more confident during the eight years of the Bush administration, thereby making their approach ineffective.

Mann spends a significant amount of the book dealing with Afghanistan and describing President Obama's increasing disillusionment with the war.

Afghanistan, for candidate Obama, was the good war that had to be won. During the first policy review this remained the main theme, and the president, at least implicitly, endorsed a counterinsurgency strategy. However, when General Stanley McChrystal's appointment as top commander in Afghanistan set in motion another review later that same year, President Obama was "forced to confront the implications of the counterinsurgency strategy: How many troops would be required, and how long would it take?"

President Obama comes into his own, according to Mann, with the 2011 war in Libya. Mann states that while Obama acknowledged the United States has

little strategic interest in Libya, he also recognized that our "only . . . strategic interests on this issue lay in maintaining strong relationships with close allies." Nonetheless, President Obama did not approve the initial plan for a humanitarian intervention, because his advisers admitted it was unlikely to work, but rather pressed for options that would accomplish the mission. The president then personally worked out the division of labor among allied forces, in order to limit U.S. involvement.

Mann, looking back at his book *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (2004), concludes he was right when he described the 2003 invasion of Iraq as "the outer limits of the expansion of American power and ideals." Mann concludes that the Obama administration has been centrist, marking a new era in America's relations with the world, "one in which primacy is not assured."

*The Obamians* follows in the path of such books as Bob Woodward's *Obama's Wars*, in that it uses background interviews to provide a picture of the Obama administration's foreign-policy decision making. While Woodward focuses on the Afghan-surge decision making, Mann looks at the evolution of the Democratic Party's foreign policy since Vietnam and then places the Obama administration within that context. By doing so, James Mann has produced a book of value to both specialists and the general reader, contributing to a better understanding of the Obama administration's foreign-policy decision making.

AMBASSADOR JOHN A. CLOUD, RET.  
*Naval War College*



Cimbala, Stephen J., ed. *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2010. 243pp. \$60

There is no lack of analysis and opinions when it comes to the presidency of George W. Bush, particularly now, during an election year. However, the concise and competent analysis found in this work provides an objective review of that pivotal period in history, one that helps the modern reader draw valuable insights applicable to America's defense acquisition process and to the foreign policy and global strategy of the United States going forward.

Stephen Cimbala, distinguished professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine, has assembled a series of eleven essays by leading academics and analysts of the military-industrial complex, who provide assessments of President Bush's defense policy and strategy. This scholarly but thoroughly readable collection examines preparations for, and the execution of, war and regime change in Iraq, success and stalemate in Afghanistan, and the sobering effects of "transformation" on the Department of Defense. Additional insights into struggles within NATO and its relationship with the United States, the U.S. relationship with Russia, the critical issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and the implications of foreign military sales complete this collection.

The editor sequenced the essays to provide first the context of the times, the political pressures, and the personalities of key members of the administration. These contextual essays are prefaced by an erudite commentary on

defense planning, including the brilliant takeaway that the oxymoron "foreseeable future" deprecates the ability of planners to make reliable resource-allocation decisions. This chapter alone makes the book worthy of a place on the unofficial list of "books to read before reporting to a Pentagon tour." The essays follow with a critical (if sometimes unnecessarily pejorative) look at Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's behavior and his management of the department, along with the successes and failures of "transformation." Afghanistan and Iraq are closely examined in several essays, in which are documented examples of Secretary Rumsfeld's overreaching policies, his broken faith with uniformed leaders, and the systematic abuse of intelligence data used to fabricate the case for invading Iraq.

Subsequent chapters address future-oriented defense strategy and policy topics that were germane during the Bush presidency and continue to have implications now. One essay examines the primary questions facing the NATO alliance, including out-of-area missions and the ongoing debate regarding burden sharing among member states as they transition the institution from a posture of collective defense to one of collective security. This is followed by three essays that address arms-transfer policies and foreign military sales, weapons of mass destruction security, and U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control and missile defense.

This book will appeal to military and political scholars, but it also will be immensely appealing to the novice seeking insight into the national defense decision-making process. The lessons provided in this study are

directly applicable to current and future decision makers in the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill, and in the White House.

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Reveron, Derek S., ed. *Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World*. Georgetown Univ. Press, 2012. 246pp. \$29.95

This new collection of cyberspace policy essays includes the works of fourteen scholars and thinkers who present a panoply of views into how cyberspace can be contemplated as policy, doctrine, and strategy. The essays are not U.S.-centric but include focused views of Russian and Chinese thought on the domain, as ably presented by Nikolas Gvosdev and Nigel Inkster, respectively. Additionally, James Joyner provides an excellent synopsis of American and European Union thinking on cybersecurity and how these differing approaches affect not only national-level policy but also the debates within NATO. These perspectives lend texture to the questions of how cyberpower may be considered and how cyberpolicy may be crafted to be both credible and effective.

A section focuses on the legal aspects of cyberspace operations and the potential pitfalls of policy development. It pays particular attention to the concept of deterrence—an area that baffles policy thinkers and technical mavens equally. Of particular use is David Fidler's chapter, which provides useful terminology and definitions that help the

layperson participate in legal-focused discussions on the cyberspace domain.

Derek Reveron's editing deserves specific and laudatory mention. Rather than merely a collection of articles arranged by topic, he has produced a broad web of writings that shows the interaction of varied scholarly efforts, makes few restatements of the same facts, and brings the volume as a whole to bear on a variety of subtopics.

Steven Bucci's "Joining Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: A Likely Scenario" lays out a useful rubric for understanding the operational environment of cyberspace and employs time-tested "most dangerous/most likely" threat-evaluation analysis. This chapter would be of particular benefit to planners and leaders looking to develop "tabletop" or other training events that would focus leaders on specific threats and the action, reaction, and counteraction options available to them.

Chris Demchak writes about "cybered conflict," which I thought to be a most remarkable approach of how cyberspace should be contemplated in national security, either as a domain or as discrete operations. In it she raises the point that all conflict from now on will have some degree of cyberspace flavor. However, very little will actually be dominated by or within this domain. The key is how best to integrate cyberspace into a coherent strategy, recognizing cyberspace's varied role. Her use of the term "cybered" is not random. It is a useful modifier and connotes "all sorts of systems of people, things, processes, and perceptions that are computer-related but not necessarily purely computerized." More than any

one particular chapter, this contribution opens the policy aperture and offers a useful, broad term with which coherent policy may be developed.

BRETT J. PATRON  
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Haywood, Robert, and Roberta Spivak. *Maritime Piracy*. New York: Routledge, 2012. 184pp. \$125

The resurgence of maritime piracy has generated a renewed interest in the subject across a number of different disciplines, including law, history, and security studies. Robert Haywood and Roberta Spivak's work draws from each of these fields to provide a succinct overview of the issues surrounding both contemporary piracy and counterpiracy operations. The authors, both affiliated with the Oceans beyond Piracy project, focus on how pirates are able to operate in the twenty-first century in the face of all the advances in military technology. Their answer highlights ineffective governance at the local and global levels, as well as outdated institutions and laws meant to deal with piracy. These failings have created gaps in the international system that have allowed piracy to flourish over the past several decades. The authors provide a number of policy recommendations to help quell the threat. One recurring theme is the need for a global reform of the merchant-vessel registry system. Historically, flag states have borne a large share of the responsibility for suppressing piracy. Since the end of World War II, however, open-registry states, also known as "flags of convenience," have undermined this line of defense against piracy.

While this book benefits in many ways from an interdisciplinary approach, some of its historical analysis is simplistic or inaccurate. For example, the second Opium War was not fought principally because Great Britain felt that Chinese officials had violated its flag-state rights during the famous *Arrow* incident, as the authors imply. They also attribute the rise in piracy around Hong Kong in the mid-nineteenth century solely to the fact that the Royal Navy refused to intervene against pirates unless British interests were directly involved. This is a gross oversimplification of the issue. Such slips are perhaps unavoidable in a relatively short text that ranges from Bronze Age maritime history to best-management practices on board contemporary merchant vessels, but the authors may have been overly selective in their historical account to add credibility to their policy recommendations.

That being said, this work is a valuable addition to the growing literature on contemporary maritime piracy. By covering a wide array of different topics, it serves as an excellent starting point for researchers interested in specific aspects of the subject. Furthermore, many of the policy recommendations will be of value to those interested in maritime security in general. Although some readers may disagree with the authors' belief that international organizations like the United Nations can play leading roles in suppressing piracy, these policy recommendations merit consideration because of their originality and ingenuity.

EDWARD LUCAS  
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Rosen, Stephen Peter. *War and Human Nature*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005. 224pp. \$23.95

Stephen Peter Rosen is Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University. In this ambitious volume he attempts to counter the view that economic-rationality models of human behavior adequately explain human decision making. He defines economic rationality as the assumption that people “have a stable, ordered, and consistent set of preferences and that they have a stable way of making choices about how to use scarce resources in a manner that gives them the most utility for a given expenditure of resources.” Rosen attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy of economic rationality to explain or predict human behavior by drawing on a wide range of empirical research.

The book is organized into four major chapters. The first explores brain structure from an evolutionary perspective and in some depth. The central finding here is that for very good evolutionary reasons much of human decision making is performed by the nonconscious portion of the brain. This clearly is a survival mechanism in an environment where danger and challenge must be rapidly assessed and action must be taken much more quickly than a linear and consciously analytical process would allow. The implication of this research for the overall project is a need to contemplate more deeply the limits of conscious and cognitive aspects of decision making—we must think more on the role of economic rationality in human choice.

The second chapter explores the genetic and personality variations among individuals, stressing the degree to which such variables cause individuals to make different choices in the same situation and fact set. The third looks at the various ways different societies organize themselves and explores the degree to which varying forms of social organization cause different types of individuals with different styles of decision making to emerge as leaders. The last major section explores the mechanisms of determining political behavior of states. Rosen argues that in some forms of social organization, the decision-making styles and personality traits of individuals may be dampened by mechanisms of social control, whereas in others they may be amplified.

Along the way, the book looks at the effects of emotion, memory, dominance, testosterone, distress, depression, and varying time horizons, and the decision-making styles of tyrants (as contrasted with leaders in other forms of government). It is, in short, an attempt to synthesize a wide range of information from the biological and psychological disciplines to cause us to think more critically about the role of rationality in political decision making. Because of the work’s broad and synthetic approach, the reader may sometimes be less than thoroughly convinced of the implications of such diverse studies for political decision making. The author acknowledges as much in stressing the book’s tentative and exploratory nature. As a preliminary effort to temper excessively rationalistic narratives, however, Rosen has provided a valuable contribution and corrective to much political theory.

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Catsambis, Alexis, Ben Ford, and Donny L. Hamilton, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Archaeology*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 1,203pp. \$150

*The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Archaeology* is a survey of the current state of the field as seen by fifty-seven scholars from across the globe. The volume is organized into seven parts: an introduction by the eminent American scholar George F. Bass, one of the pioneers of the field; a section on process, with fifteen topical chapters; on ships and shipwrecks, with sixteen chapters; on maritime culture and life ashore, with seven chapters; on matters “beyond the site,” with eight chapters dealing with an eclectic group of topics ranging from maritime history to underwater tourism, international law, heritage site management, and museum issues; a single concluding chapter dealing with future directions; and finally, a section that includes both a glossary of ship terms and an appendix on scientific analyses and dating techniques. Each of the separate chapters includes an extensive and useful selected bibliography, and there is a general index of the entire volume.

Overall, this volume constitutes a major complementary work to James L. Delgado’s *Encyclopedia of Underwater and Maritime Archaeology* (British Museum, 1997, and Yale University Press, 1998), and as such it represents a benchmark by which to measure the growing sophistication of the field over the fourteen years that separate Delgado’s work from this one. As George Bass points out in his introduction, maritime archaeology has

become a worldwide methodological approach, one that has grown from single-site research in the past fifty years. Its future now rests on the synthesis of geographically and chronologically diverse data. At the same time, the volume demonstrates that not all its practitioners have yet transformed the breadth of their understanding in order to achieve this vision fully.

This work suggests a number of important and encouraging signs of maturation within maritime archaeology. First, there is a growing appreciation that the field extends outward from underwater shipwrecks and is linked to a number of areas. These areas range from the concept of maritime cultural landscape, as explained by Christer Westerdahl, to the remains of ships that have survived ashore, as Delgado describes, to archaeological work being done on coastal sites to understand the littoral interaction between life afloat and ashore, to studies of ancient harbors in the Mediterranean, and the archaeology being done in shipyard sites. Second, and even more importantly, there are clear signs of important broad synthesis in topics where underwater archaeology is able to provide information missing from other sources. This welcome trend is evident in the chapters by Mark Polzer on early shipbuilding in the eastern Mediterranean, by Deborah Carlson on the seafarers and shipwrecks of ancient Greece and Rome, by Eric Rieth on Mediterranean ship design in the Middle Ages, by Susan Rose on medieval ships and seafaring, by Fred Hocker on postmedieval ships and seafaring in the West, and by Randall Sasaki on East Asia shipbuilding traditions during the era of Chinese maritime expansion. Curiously, few authors mention at any length the



maritime archaeological contributions to social history that constitute such a feature of terrestrial archaeology.

As this handbook suggests, underwater archaeology is best known for its contributions to understanding ship construction in periods and places for which other sources are either scarce or nonexistent, but at the same time, additional areas are opening up for the field as it expands. The long section with fifteen chapters on the processes of maritime archaeology shows that the field is becoming increasingly complex and changing rapidly as new technological capabilities are brought to bear. This work repeatedly displays the immature aspects of the field, with several authors suggesting that they prefer a closed and private field of inquiry and others noting the relative lack of analytical publication, the numerous investigations that have produced little in the way of written results. Nevertheless, this work provides room for optimism that more and more maritime archaeologists are moving beyond the earlier narrow foci on process, procedure, and intrinsic objects toward wider interpretations. Francisco C. Domingues, in his contribution, touches on this point when he emphasizes the relationships of maritime archaeology to the broader study of maritime history, the study of mankind's interaction with the seas, oceans, and waterways of the world. Indeed, maritime archaeology is one of the many complementary disciplinary approaches by which we can better understand that basic theme in global history. It is a distinct methodological discipline, but its meaning must extend beyond its process and procedures, just as the work of an archival researcher or library

reader extends beyond methodologies and processes. Maritime archaeology is a means to find greater understanding and meaning in traces and remains that can be found in an underwater equivalent of libraries and archives, but to do so its results need to be merged with those from other complementary methodologies and processes. As is clear from this volume, practitioners of maritime archaeology have a way to go, but the reader is left with hope that there is movement toward that end.

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Gerwarth, Robert. *Hitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2011. 393pp. \$35

Reinhard Heydrich, Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, favorite of Heinrich Himmler, and architect of the Nazis' notorious "final solution," stares out of a seventy-year-old photograph looking more movie star than monster. Yet monster he was, in a party of monsters. Any biography of this once-rising star of the Third Reich must ask and attempt to answer the question, How does a person become a monster?

Robert Gerwarth does as well as any scholar in answering this question. He meticulously charts the course of Heydrich's life. Heydrich's childhood was relatively normal. His family held the values of the middle class, perhaps a bit more so than most, since his father ran a music conservatory. Heydrich accepted, along with most of his generation, the military myth of betrayal as an explanation for Germany's defeat in

the First World War. The Depression brought his family the specter of want and uncertainty, as it did to hundreds of thousands of families. He developed a passion for sports, and throughout this period there was never any sign that Heydrich was destined for anything out of the ordinary, but when he joined the German navy as a cadet, as Gerwarth chronicles, Heydrich began to display a fierce ambition and an ability to identify opportunities for advancement and position himself to take advantage of them. Heydrich was clearly on a path for success when he was obliged to appear before a naval court of honor, as a result of a prior love affair that had surfaced after he announced an engagement—a minor scandal made worse by Heydrich's arrogance before the court.

Heydrich was stripped of the uniform that in many ways had defined him, and his potential for historic impact seemed slight. However, leaving the navy he found himself at a unique and eventually rewarding nexus of personal, state, and global changes. Heydrich's fiancée and her family were passionate Nazis, and for Heydrich the party offered a new path to power, position, and a positive self-image. For the rest of his life Heydrich would commit himself to becoming a paragon of National Socialism. He would succeed far better than most.

Getting in at what amounted to the ground floor of the creation of the Schutzstaffel (SS), Heydrich rapidly rose in the organization, becoming a confidant and trusted agent of Heinrich Himmler. Gerwarth argues convincingly that Heydrich was not an ideologue when he joined the movement, but he increasingly acted as an apparently true believer. Among

Heydrich's more interesting, and chilling, attributes was a belief that the times called on true Germans to be hard, even ruthless, in reestablishing their place as the rightful rulers of Europe.

Heydrich was also hardworking, athletic, personally brave, and fairly good-looking. Upon several occasions he disobeyed orders and flew combat missions with the Luftwaffe. He was quick to accept and master new challenges, particularly ones that would enable him to rise within the party structure or gain power. Increasingly, these involved the removal of Jews and other "undesirables" from the Reich. As the regime moved inexorably toward mass murder and genocide as policy, so too did Heydrich. He was responsible for the *Einsatzgruppen*, special task forces that followed the advancing front rounding up intellectuals, professionals, politically suspect individuals, and—always, always—Jews. Impressed with pseudoscience and apparently obsessed with sanguinary percentages, Heydrich divided and subcategorized the inhabitants of Europe on the basis of the Aryan "purity" of their blood. Early ideas, such as transporting European Jews to Madagascar, quickly faded, to be replaced with murder on an industrial scale. By 1941 Heydrich had crafted the so-called final solution. For him the elimination of populations was also the road to increased personal power, advancement, and fame. It was also a personally fulfilling task, for he had come to hate these unarmed and all but helpless enemies of the state.

To the German people Heydrich presented an image of the perfect National Socialist, secure in his roles as loyal servant of the people, good family man,

and warrior standing between loved ones and the war's devastation. At dinner parties he was urbane, charming, and attentive to women. It was not surprising that he had affairs.

A workaholic, he became a master of political infighting, and Gerwarth chronicles how Heydrich continually and successfully employed this skill, which gained him many enemies and opponents, such as Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of German military intelligence. He knew how to hold a grudge and how to take advantage of opportunities for advancement. Still, Gerwarth debunks the modern myth of competition and jealousy between Himmler and his protégé. Gerwarth quite early in the book also disproves allegations that Heydrich's ethnic heritage included Jewish forebears.

Some readers may find Gerwarth a shade too empathetic with his subject, but it is important to note that it is all too easy to paint Heydrich as a monster born or to suggest that somehow the catalyst of National Socialism was required to create him. The author reminds us that the reality is far more terrifying—that the conditions that transformed Heydrich into an architect of evil can all too easily be re-created.

If there is a shortcoming to *Hitler's Hangman*, it is the lack of an in-depth examination of Heydrich's leadership, which leaves a curious gap in our understanding of the man. Still, taken in its entirety, this book has earned a rightful place on the shelves of serious biographies. The lessons it offers are ones that should not be forgotten.

RICHARD NORTON  
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