Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World

Brett J. Patron

This new collection of cyberspace policy essays includes the works of fourteen scholars and thinkers who present a panoply of views into how cyberspace can be contemplated as policy, doctrine, and strategy. The essays are not U.S.-centric but include focused views of Russian and Chinese thought on the domain, as ably presented by Nikolas Gvosdev and Nigel Inkster, respectively. Additionally, James Joyner provides an excellent synopsis of American and European Union thinking on cybersecurity and how these differing approaches affect not only national-level policy but also the debates within NATO. These perspectives lend texture to the questions of how cyberpower may be considered and how cyberpolicy may be crafted to be both credible and effective.

A section focuses on the legal aspects of cyberspace operations and the potential pitfalls of policy development. It pays particular attention to the concept of deterrence—an area that baffles policy thinkers and technical mavens equally. Of particular use is David Fidler’s chapter, which provides useful terminology and definitions that help the layperson participate in legal-focused discussions on the cyberspace domain.

Derek Reveron’s editing deserves specific and laudatory mention. Rather than merely a collection of articles arranged by topic, he has produced a broad web of writings that shows the interaction of varied scholarly efforts, makes few restatements of the same facts, and brings the volume as a whole to bear on a variety of subtopics.

Steven Bucci’s “Joining Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: A Likely Scenario” lays out a useful rubric for understanding the operational environment of cyberspace and employs time-tested “most dangerous/most likely” threat-evaluation analysis. This chapter would be of particular benefit to planners and leaders looking to develop "tabletop" or other training events that would focus leaders on specific threats and the action, reaction, and counteraction options available to them.

Chris Demchak writes about “cybered conflict,” which I thought to be a most remarkable approach of how cyberspace should be contemplated in national security, either as a domain or as discrete operations. In it she raises the point that all conflict from now on will have some degree of cyberspace flavor. However, very little will actually be dominated by or within this domain. The key is how best to integrate cyberspace into a coherent strategy, recognizing cyberspace’s varied role. Her use of the term “cybered” is not random. It is a useful modifier and connotes “all sorts of systems of people, things, processes, and perceptions that are computer-related but not necessarily purely computerized.” More than any
one particular chapter, this contribution opens the policy aperture and offers a useful, broad term with which coherent policy may be developed.

BRETT J. PATRON
Yorktown, Va.


The resurgence of maritime piracy has generated a renewed interest in the subject across a number of different disciplines, including law, history, and security studies. Robert Haywood and Roberta Spivak’s work draws from each of these fields to provide a succinct overview of the issues surrounding both contemporary piracy and counterpiracy operations. The authors, both affiliated with the Oceans beyond Piracy project, focus on how pirates are able to operate in the twenty-first century in the face of all the advances in military technology. Their answer highlights ineffective governance at the local and global levels, as well as outdated institutions and laws meant to deal with piracy. These failings have created gaps in the international system that have allowed piracy to flourish over the past several decades. The authors provide a number of policy recommendations to help quell the threat. One recurring theme is the need for a global reform of the merchant-vessel registry system. Historically, flag states have borne a large share of the responsibility for suppressing piracy. Since the end of World War II, however, open-registry states, also known as “flags of convenience,” have undermined this line of defense against piracy.

While this book benefits in many ways from an interdisciplinary approach, some of its historical analysis is simplistic or inaccurate. For example, the second Opium War was not fought principally because Great Britain felt that Chinese officials had violated its flag-state rights during the famous Arrow incident, as the authors imply. They also attribute the rise in piracy around Hong Kong in the mid-nineteenth century solely to the fact that the Royal Navy refused to intervene against pirates unless British interests were directly involved. This is a gross oversimplification of the issue. Such slips are perhaps unavoidable in a relatively short text that ranges from Bronze Age maritime history to best-management practices on board contemporary merchant vessels, but the authors may have been overly selective in their historical account to add credibility to their policy recommendations.

That being said, this work is a valuable addition to the growing literature on contemporary maritime piracy. By covering a wide array of different topics, it serves as an excellent starting point for researchers interested in specific aspects of the subject. Furthermore, many of the policy recommendations will be of value to those interested in maritime security in general. Although some readers may disagree with the authors’ belief that international organizations like the United Nations can play leading roles in suppressing piracy, these policy recommendations merit consideration because of their originality and ingenuity.

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