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Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern Middle East

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that have occurred in Southeast Asia or off Nigeria) in terms of state failure, and counterpiracy as the maximization by states of their competitive advantage over other states in an international system where material capabilities are changing. For its part, neoliberalism argues that states seek to create norms and shape them through international institutions. These facilitate cooperation and enable states to act through them under international law, albeit for self-interested reasons. Exponents of this theory see United Nations action and UN Security Council resolutions as reflecting the aims and objectives of their sponsoring powers. It also explains why so many developmental initiatives have foundered within Somalia—because they seek to aid the creation of a Western-style liberal democracy rather than political arrangements that may align more closely with Somali political and clan structures.

However, the book under review also collects a number of essays articulating a third approach, called constructivism. That theory departs from state-centric, rationalist approaches to suggest that social processes, including norms other than international ones, as well as issues of identity, inform security interests across a range of players and shape their actions accordingly.

This collection focuses particularly on the topic of global governance, a construct that places particular emphasis on institutions and regimes (in this case security regimes) and implies that international institutions are actors in their own right. In this view, these actors have objectives that are often different from those of their member states and that in turn shape the behavior of those states and of nonstate actors. Interestingly, and rightly, it takes the view that

because piracy occurs in a space outside territorially bounded state authority, maritime depredation asks profound questions about who exactly decides what is right and wrong, and why.

Several contributors make the point that differences between state responses to piracy reveal governance gaps in the interstate system, gaps that pirates have exploited—and states too, a point emphasizing the indissoluble connection between piracy and state action. The role of international law comes under particular scrutiny. Legal discourse has played a crucial role in framing the piracy problem in the modern era, arguably at the expense of political and economic approaches.

In the end, this important and useful book asks everyone with an interest or a role in piracy issues to confront questions that affect all users of the sea, military and civilian. Are we witnessing the end of an old regime, the reactivation of old legal mechanisms, or the development of a global governance regime based on international institutions? Moreover, where will this process end and will notions of universal jurisdiction, and perhaps global citizenship, spread out from their current enclaves and touch us all?

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Anderson, Scott. *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Doubleday, 2013. 592pp. \$28.95

As the subtitle suggests, the First World War, with its unintended consequences, unbridled imperial ambitions, and a

complicated maze of duplicitous dealings among untrusting allies, underlies the making of the modern Middle East. One could easily add martial lunacy to this list of horrors, as this brief but highly relevant treatment of Britain's mismanagement of the Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and Gaza campaigns will attest.

None of this is news, but the topic has garnered a great deal of attention in recent years. Anderson covers the familiar ground well, outlining the political, diplomatic, military, and economic drivers of imperial ambitions as the Western allies plotted the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. In telling this tale Anderson discusses the usual suspects: Mark Sykes, Henry McMahon, King Husayn, Faisal ibn Husayn, Lord Kitchener, and a host of others. More interestingly, however, he ties in as well a number of important players who generally get short shrift. The German diplomats Max von Oppenheim and Curt Prufer are major players in the story. So too is Djemel Pasha, the Turkish governor of Syria. The role of the American William Yale, first as an officer of Standard Oil Company of New York and later as a special agent for the State Department, is also significant, if only for beginning a ninety-five-year tradition of fundamentally misreading the region. Finally, the importance of Aaron Aaronsohn and his Zionist spy ring that supported British operations in Palestine receives its due.

Anderson's T. E. Lawrence is a complicated and enigmatic man who "seemed intent on baffling" historians. Noting his many admirable and not-so-admirable qualities, Anderson neither praises nor condemns but rather tries to understand this hugely talented but ultimately unsuccessful man. Relying heavily but not uncritically on

Lawrence's writings, Anderson attributes his tactical, operational, and essentially political-military successes to brilliance, timing, and sheer luck—the latter largely owing to his managing to avoid the consequences of having infuriated any number of very senior officers. Anderson portrays well the tension caused for Lawrence by the duplicity of British and French diplomacy vis-à-vis the Arab uprising between his loyalty to Britain and his sense of personal honor.

Among the cast of dishonest brokers Anderson paints as the worst Mark Sykes, a brilliant but unprincipled dilettante with no apparent compunction against lying to his own government or to Britain's allies. Working diligently to advance Britain's imperial interests by managing the flow of (and often inventing) information, Sykes accumulated a great deal of responsibility for the postwar mess that was and remains the Middle East. Others contributing to the mess are a whole bevy of senior British and French officials, and also Woodrow Wilson, whose profound ignorance, idealism, and arrogance opened a Pandora's box of ethnic and nationalist desires that still smolder throughout the region. As for the Arabs, often portrayed as victims, they seem here not to have been as gullible as it may appear. Citing Husayn's and Faisal's not-always-aboveboard diplomacy, aided by Lawrence's unauthorized revelation of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, Anderson argues that the Arabs were not exactly "rubes" when it came to power politics.

A journalist by trade, Scott Anderson is a frequent contributor to a variety of periodicals and the author of two novels and several books of nonfiction. His bibliography is extensive, but the paucity in it of Arab and Turkish sources is notable.

In addition, his use of nonstandard notations can render specific citations a little fuzzy. This is a minor issue, however, as Anderson's synthesis is superb, his analysis is sharp, and his writing style is engaging. All in all, this is a very useful contribution to the body of work, one that helps foster a better understanding of the dynamics shaping today's Arab Spring and beyond. Given America's track record in the region, anything that helps broaden our understanding of the Middle East can only be a good thing.

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Boscawen, Hugh. *The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758. Campaigns and Commanders*. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2011. 504pp. \$39.95

The British amphibious operation to capture the French fortress at Louisbourg in Canada during the Seven Years' War was the largest joint operation undertaken by British forces in that period. This major event in naval history has not been overlooked by historians, but no one until Colonel Hugh Boscawen, British Army (Ret.), has been able so effectively to combine the skills of an experienced army officer with those of an insightful modern historian in analyzing this campaign and its commanders.

A direct descendant of the British naval commander at the capture of Louisbourg, Admiral the Honorable Edward Boscawen, Colonel Hugh Boscawen brings his own experience of thirty years of active military service in the Coldstream Guards to bear on the subject, with his knowledge of modern-day campaign planning and execution. Such

credentials might have led an author in the wrong direction, resulting in an anachronistic and hagiographic tale full of modern military jargon. However, in Hugh Boscawen's hands they have led to a model of careful historical scholarship informed by professional military understanding, experience at sea as a yachtsman, and access to family papers. Starting out from the key conceptual point that campaigns and commanders should be seen in the context of the aims, ways, and means of their own day, Boscawen has carefully and judiciously examined the subject. Over many years, he made a thorough study of both the published English- and the published French-language scholarship. Going much farther and deeper, he examined in detail the extensive public and private records in four French and eight British archival depositories, as well as other primary-source materials in Canada, the United States, and private hands.

Colonel Boscawen opens his study with an overview of the strategic situation that the competing powers of Britain and France faced in the period immediately leading up to 1758, and of the contrasting organization of those governments and their leaders. Boscawen goes on to examine the background to the construction of the French fortification at Louisbourg, ranging from the reorganization of the defense of New France following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 to the perception on both sides that Louisbourg had become an important trading point, the key bastion in the defense of the Saint Lawrence River and Quebec, as well as the French fisheries on the Grand Banks. When war broke out again between the two countries in 1755, neither was immediately prepared to react decisively.