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On 8 July 2014, Rear Admiral Walter “Ted” Carter, USN, was relieved as President, Naval War College by Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III, USN, in a traditional ceremony in Spruance Auditorium on the College’s campus in Newport. Although Admiral Carter’s term as President was quite brief, the College has made considerable progress on his watch in expanding and strengthening its educational programs in support of the fleet. Writing together with Professor John Jackson, in “Navy Nexus,” this issue’s lead article, Admiral Carter provides readers of this journal a comprehensive and authoritative overview of the full range of the College’s activities today. At this writing Admiral Carter is due to receive his third star and appointment as Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy. We wish him fair winds and following seas, as we welcome Admiral Howe, who has the distinction of being the first Navy SEAL to serve in his position.

The current administration’s commitment to “rebalance” its overseas military presence in the Asia-Pacific region has had the effect, among other things, of putting a spotlight on the long-standing U.S.-Australian security relationship. Peter J. Dean, in “Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian Defense Policy,” offers a wide-ranging account of the history of Australia’s strategic outlook and relationship with other friendly powers, primarily Britain and the United States. He notes the central paradox of Australian strategic culture—a continentalist mind-set yet a history of distant “expeditionary” commitments in support of alliance partners. He argues that Australia’s recent awakening to the importance of a more robust amphibious capability in its near seas may signal a more fundamental shift on the nation’s part toward a more maritime strategic outlook. Peter Dean is Director of Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.

American policy makers continue to digest the implications of Russia’s recent seizure of Ukrainian Crimea and, at least equally worrisome, China’s increasingly aggressive efforts to assert its sovereignty over disputed islands in the South and East China Seas. In “Consequences,” Nicholas Rostow assesses these developments, together with the looming end of a Western military presence in Afghanistan, as posing a potentially existential threat to the international legal and political order that the United States has played a key part in establishing and sustaining ever since the end of World War II. Professor Rostow is Senior
Director of the Center for Strategic Research at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

In “Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study,” Commander Guy M. Snodgrass, USN, argues that Navy leadership has been slow to grasp and acknowledge an emerging crisis in officer retention at all levels, including postcommand. Basing his work on extensive research and personal interviews over a number of years, Snodgrass makes a compelling case that while no single factor appears to account for the phenomenon, a converging of quality-of-life issues, lack of trust in senior leadership, the “zero defects” mentality, overcentralized decision making, and escalating administrative distractions, among other factors, seems to be responsible for this state of affairs. It should be noted that this article, although in print here for the first time, has had an extensive circulation on the Internet since January 2014; the original version has been revised by the author to take account of the comments received from many readers. Commander Snodgrass also cautions that some of his detailed recommendations for change have since been acted on or are in the process of being addressed by the Navy. His study is an important contribution to the dialogue on military professionalism that is currently taking place both within the Navy and in the joint world.

Finally, under the rubric of naval history, we offer Milan Vego’s “The Allied Landings at Anzio-Nettuno, 22 January–4 March 1944,” a further installment in this prolific author’s ongoing study of major naval operations during World War II. Vego incorporates much new material from archival sources in his account of this closely run—indeed, nearly disastrous—U.S.-British amphibious assault against German forces in central Italy just seventy years ago. Milan Vego is a professor of Joint Military Operations at the Naval War College. His study Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 will be published shortly by the Naval War College Press as Historical Monograph 22.

IF YOU VISIT US

Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. Rear Admiral Howe is a native of Jacksonville, Florida. He was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy.

Howe’s operational assignments have included a full range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint Special Operations communities. He commanded Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service overseas includes multiple deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in Operations EARNEST WILL, PROVIDE PROMISE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

His key joint and staff assignments include current operations officer at Special Operations Command, Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S. Special Operations Command; and Assistant Commanding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command.

Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1995 with a master of arts in national security affairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and from the National War College in 2002 with a master of arts in national security.
IN EARLY JULY 2014, I stood proudly on the stage of Spruance Auditorium and assumed duties as the fifty-fifth President of the Naval War College. As I said at the time, I was incredibly humbled and honored to join the long line of institution leaders going back some thirteen decades to the days of our founding President, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. The baton was passed to me by a leader whom I hold in the highest regard, Vice Admiral Ted Carter. I intend to maintain the momentum he has engendered, and I expect that, certainly in the near term, you will see more emphasis on continuity than on change.

I come to the College with a very personal appreciation for the value of higher education. As a young officer, I arrived at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 1993 pretty sure I “knew it all.” It only took about a half a semester for me to realize that my knowledge of the world was limited to the relatively narrow niche that my engineering-oriented academy education had provided and the mission-focused experience I had gained as a special warfare operator. The broadening impact that my NPS education had on me personally was life changing, as my eyes were opened to the greater world around me. The degree I earned in National Security Affairs (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) symbolized the mastery of the subjects required, but more significantly it signaled my birth as a critical thinker. My equally important second “intellectual awakening” came about a decade later, during my year as a student at the National War College. The experience I had in the classrooms at both institutions was transformational, and I am committed to working to provide the resources and support necessary to keep the Naval War College, as it has always been, at the forefront of Joint Professional Military Education.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) recently directed the intellectual leadership of the Navy, at all ranks and in all locations, to Focus on efforts to rein-vigorate our collective strategic mind-set; to Nurture those individuals and those processes that create innovative ideas; and to Align our thinking to future challenges. After reading the College’s 2014–18 Strategic Plan, it’s clear to me that the College already plays an important role in each of these lines of effort; that said, I also recognize there is always room for refinement and enhancement. The fall trimester of academic year 2014–15 will be a period of discovery for me as I seek to understand, at a fairly granular level, how this great institution executes its primary mission, and explore with faculty and staff those adaptations necessary to operationalize fully the CNO’s guidance. In future “President’s Forum” columns, I will share with you the results of these discussions and our plans for the future.

The College began the fall trimester with two long-time leaders missing from the battle roster. Ambassador (retired) Mary Ann Peters, our outstanding Provost over the past six years, will assume the position of Chief Executive Officer of the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, where she will coordinate President and Mrs. Carter’s goodwill efforts across the globe. The mission of the Center, founded in 1982, is to “wage peace, fight disease, and build hope” worldwide. Mary Ann’s experience as a diplomat and as an educator will serve her well in this challenging new position. While here, she guided the College through some particularly challenging times and significantly advanced the College’s academic, research, operational leadership, and international programs. She will be missed. The second deletion from our roster came with the retirement of Professor Barney Rubel, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, who has retired to his farm in Illinois after forty-three years of active-duty and Naval War College service. A retired naval aviation captain with more than three thousand flight hours in A-7 and F-18 aircraft, he spent a cumulative total of twenty-four years at the College as an active-duty officer and as a civilian researcher and educator. One of the most strategically minded leaders at the Naval War College, Barney leaves behind a great legacy—in the minds of the students and faculty he mentored and in the College’s very culture of operationally focused scholarship. Our efforts to identify reliefs for both of these exceptional leaders are currently under way.

Erin and I are thrilled to be joining the Naval War College team, and we are grateful for the warm welcome we have received. We look forward to getting to know all of you in the months and years ahead.

P. GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
Rear Admiral Walter E. “Ted” Carter, Jr., became the fifty-fourth President of the U.S. Naval War College on 2 July 2013. A native of Burrillville, Rhode Island, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981, was designated a naval flight officer in 1982, and graduated from the Navy Fighter Weapons School, Top Gun, in 1985. He accumulated 6,150 flight hours in F-4, F-14, and F-18 aircraft during his career and safely completed 2,016 carrier arrested landings, the record among all active and retired U.S. Naval Aviation designators. He also flew 125 combat missions in support of joint operations in three different theaters of operation. He was awarded the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Leadership Award and the U.S. Navy League’s John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership. Carter was also appointed an Honorary Master Chief by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy. He was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral and assumed the position of Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy on 23 July 2014.

John E. Jackson is a professor in the Naval War College’s College of Distance Education. He is the program manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program and since November 2009 has taught an elective course entitled “Unmanned Systems and Conflict in the 21st Century.” Retiring as a Navy captain in 1998 after twenty-seven years of service, he holds a bachelor’s degree in speech and communications from the University of New Mexico, a master’s degree in education from Providence College, and a master’s degree in management from Salve Regina University. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College and the Management Development Program at Harvard University. He is a doctoral candidate at Salve Regina University, in Newport.
If it’s important to the Navy, it is on the agenda at the Naval War College!

This is a bold statement, but it is one that can be rather quickly substantiated by even a casual review of what is happening on the busiest educational and research complex in the Navy—the Newport, Rhode Island, campus of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC).

Since 1884, the Naval War College has existed as a place to study conflict and to produce leaders who are critical thinkers. As it celebrates its 130th anniversary, the college continues to refine its educational and research programs to meet the demands of the Navy and the national security community. While some of our more traditional offerings, such as our highly regarded Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs, are fairly well-known, other programs and initiatives are regaining their intended direct linkage to and support to the fleet. The primary purpose of this article is to highlight the ways in which the Naval War College is helping to prepare and shape the Navy of Tomorrow and how it is significantly supporting the Navy of Today without forgetting the lessons of history.

Rear Admiral Walter E. “Ted” Carter, Jr., U.S. Navy, and Professor John E. Jackson

Shortly after the article that follows was drafted, I was notified that I had been nominated for promotion to vice admiral and assignment as Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy. This unexpected set of orders will cause me to depart the Naval War College after only one year as its President. Still, and although much remains to be done to keep the college at the top of its game, the organizational and administrative changes its faculty and staff have accomplished over the past twelve months have refined its educational and research programs in significant ways. The article (which collects and elaborates on material that, in some cases, has already appeared in print, including the “President’s Forums” of the Spring and Summer 2014 issues of the Review) serves as evidence of what dedicated professionals can do when motivated by an unrelenting commitment to excellence.

REAR ADMIRAL W. E. “TED” CARTER, JR., USN
THE NAVY OF TOMORROW: INVESTING IN AMERICA’S INTELLECTUAL ARSENAL

A classic Asian proverb holds, “If you are planning for one year, sow rice; if you are planning for a decade, plant trees; if you are planning for a lifetime, educate people.” The Naval War College is committed to ensuring that America’s future military leaders are prepared to meet the challenges of the next decade and beyond. We want and need to change as the global environment evolves, while reinforcing the successful initiatives and activities that have brought us to the high level of success we currently enjoy. The Naval War College continues to refine and enhance its curriculum to keep abreast of the evolving national security environment and fulfill the needs of future naval leaders and the nation’s joint forces. Moreover, we are expanding our reach to all Navy officer and enlisted ranks, while doing more to serve fleet commanders through tailored special programs. This deliberate method of collegiate rebalancing is an ongoing and faculty-driven process, and while the exact nature of the college of the future is always evolving, I would like to share with you a number of initiatives that show great promise.

For three decades following fundamental curriculum changes—commonly called “the Turner Revolution,” adopted in 1972–74—the college’s Senior Level Course (SLC) and its Intermediate Level Course (ILC) were, by design, very similar in content and pedagogical approach. In 2005, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed NWC to bifurcate its existing graduate-level program into two separate courses, each clearly focused at the level of seniority of the students. Our faculty identified differentiated educational outcomes for each course, and the fleet’s senior leaders reviewed and concurred with the changes. Now, a decade later, we are further enhancing the unique knowledge and skill sets required of each targeted student population. To make these changes more evident, beginning with the 2014–15 academic year the SLC program will be named the Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Course in National Security and Strategic Studies; in it, students will examine the challenges of leadership and the profession of arms at the strategic level. Nimitz Course graduates will earn the degree of Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies, as well as credit for JPME Phase II. The ILC program will be named the Admiral Raymond A. Spruance Course in Maritime Warfare and Strategic Studies, and it will focus on maritime and joint planning and warfighting at the operational level, as well as on leadership at the theater-strategic level. Spruance Course graduates will earn a newly established Master of Arts in Defense and Strategic Studies, and also credit for JPME Phase I. Refined course content, new course names, and conferment of separate degrees will complete the bifurcation begun a decade ago and will
provide the graduates with education, credentials, and attributes required for the Joint Officers of 2020.

While the Strategy and Policy, National Security Affairs, and Joint Military Operations Departments are already known for their rigorous and rewarding courses, a number of other programs have been developed to enrich further the Newport experience.

- The Naval Strategist Program (NSP) is a new initiative for a select group of students who will complete either the Nimitz Course or the Spruance Course and simultaneously a series of three defined elective courses. Beyond broad graduate-level studies in joint military operations, the national security environment, and the interaction of strategy and policy, students will delve into international security, economics, strategy, and the role of sea power in the past and future. The final component of the NSP will be a focused thirteen-week capstone project that will enable students to develop strategic products tailored to specific issues identified by fleet and combatant commanders. Successful graduates will be assigned the subspecialty code 2300-P, identifying them as naval strategists. The pilot offering of the NSP is being conducted during academic year 2013–14, with the ramp-up to a fully staffed program expected in 2015.

- Another indicator of the Naval War College’s advancing reach beyond the officer ranks can be seen in the revitalized program at the Navy Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA). NWC is closely involved in curriculum development and faculty support for this growing program, which operates as an independent but aligned department of the college. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Mike Stevens has announced plans to require all senior chiefs (E-8s) to complete the SEA, doubling its throughput on an annual basis. A “blended” approach, which combines distance-learning courses with a three-week residence period in Newport, will enable over 1,200 students to graduate each year. Once a phase-in period is complete, SEA graduation will be mandatory for selection to master chief petty officer (E-9).

- Greatly enhancing the relevance and value of our resident educational programs is the inclusion of top-quality officers from partner nations around the world. Since the first postwar international officers arrived in 1956, almost 4,500 of them, from 134 different countries, have attended the Naval
War College. Out of that august group, approximately a third have achieved flag rank and over three hundred have gone on to lead their respective navies. On any given day, at least thirty navies or coast guards around the world are commanded by NWC graduates. Friendships begun here in Newport years ago continue to foster understanding and trust that cannot be surged during a crisis. Almost 150 international students will enroll at the college in 2015—by far the largest class ever.

- Our focus on the Navy of Tomorrow can also be seen in many of the war games, conferences, and workshops conducted by the college’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS). The Center’s War Gaming Department conducts high-quality research, analysis, gaming, and education to support the Naval War College mission, prepare future maritime leaders, and help shape key decisions on the future of the Navy. Recent games have included the Title 10 Global Game series, the Proliferation Security Initiative game, the Fleet Arctic Operations game, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Warfighting game. Gaming creates a decision-making environment that fosters education and understanding for military and civilian decision makers in maritime and joint warfare, generates and debates strategic and operational concepts, and provides insights and help to assess operational risk.

- Of course, the limited capacity of our resident educational programs means that many officers will never have opportunities for a year of full-time study in Newport. To address this reality, for a hundred years the Naval War College’s College of Distance Education (CDE) has delivered Professional Military Education (PME) to the fleet. Today, CDE maintains a network of nineteen Additional Instructional Locations (AILs), located primarily in fleet concentration areas, where the Fleet Seminar Program offers faculty-led evening seminars. These seminars are similar in content and methodology to the Spruance Course offered in Newport, and top-performing students, after further study, may earn the Naval War College master’s degree. Other versions of the ILC are taught by a cadre of NWC professors at the Naval Postgraduate School and via web-enabled and CD-ROM-based programs. In addition to the tailored versions of the Spruance Course, CDE also manages the Navy’s online PME program for junior officers and the enlisted force. Over 140,000 Sailors are currently enrolled in four courses accessible on the Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) portal.

**THE NAVY OF TODAY: EDUCATING AND CONNECTING WITH THE FLEET**

A number of NWC programs and initiatives focus on nearer-term outcomes.
• On 1 May 2014, the Naval War College established the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC) as an operating unit here in Newport. This new organizational entity, an expansion and modernization of the former Command Leadership School (CLS), will become the Navy’s primary venue for educating officers and enlisted personnel across all warfare communities, staff corps, and subspecialties in a wide range of leadership and ethical issues. The physical schoolhouse will host educational programs to include “train the trainer” instruction; prospective–commanding officer, prospective–executive officer, and command master chief courses; and a small traveling team to assist in fleet concentration areas. NWC will work closely with the Navy Center for Personal and Professional Development (CPPD) to produce meaningful tools for the fleet and will be responsible for assessing the service’s response to Navy-wide leadership and ethics challenges.

• All of the Naval War College’s programs and many of the NLEC curricula focus on reinforcing the set of Desired Leader Attributes established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, U.S. Army. The Chairman has noted that military leaders must have the ability to understand the environment and the effect of all instruments of national power; to anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty; to recognize change and lead transitions; to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding; to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms; and to think critically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations. In describing the value of PME, General Dempsey has said, “We can’t underinvest in professional military education or we will suffer challenges in the future. You just mortgage your future when you underinvest in professional military education.”

• The college is also playing a key role in implementing the Navy Leader Development Strategy, a comprehensive, career-long continuum for all Sailors, seaman recruit to admiral (E-1 to O-10), that integrates four core elements—experience, education, training, and personal development—to produce fully prepared leaders for our Navy. According to the CNO, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, “The purpose of this strategy is to synchronize the Navy’s leadership and strengthen our naval profession by providing a common framework for leader development—regardless of community—that is comprehensive in scope and enduring.”

• Another initiative relates to how a Naval War College education is documented in a Navy officer’s service record. Typically, officers attending the resident NWC programs receive “not observed” fitness reports. For some officers, a yearlong not-observed report could be perceived as suboptimal. We
recently implemented a change to provide “observed” reports signed by the college’s President for officers who excel in our academic program—those who finish in the top 20 percent of each class. Selection boards will now be able to see that these officers competed with joint service officers in a highly demanding educational program and came out on top!

- In addition to the previously mentioned Naval Strategist Program, students can take a “deep dive” into war gaming through selection as a Halsey, Mahan, or Gravely Scholar. These scholars engage in collaborative student/faculty efforts that use operational analysis supported by free-play war gaming to examine in detail such issues as the medium-intensity access-denial challenge; high-intensity conventional warfare centered on a technologically sophisticated access-denial challenge posed by a “near peer” military competitor; and strategic-level challenges, such as nuclear weapons, deterrence, and escalation control. Analysis is conducted at the classified tactical level and relies on military and civilian student expertise to maintain its relevance to the fleet and appropriate staffs.

- Students participating in the Spruance Course may apply for a competitive appointment to the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS), which educates officers to be operational-level leaders. Its students learn to understand and apply maritime power effectively, to set up and lead Operational Planning Teams (OPTs), and to think creatively and critically in evaluating complex, chaotic security problems, identifying key causes and effects, developing exhaustive alternatives, and implementing effectively the best courses of action. MAWS also teaches effective operational planning for participation on planning teams in multinational, interagency, joint, and maritime environments.

- The work of our Regional Studies Groups (RSGs) sustains professional networks that build partnership, trust, and confidence. Areas of study comprise the Asia-Pacific, Eurasia, the Greater Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the Indian Ocean, and, a recent addition, Arctic regions. The RSGs bring faculty, students, and outside experts together to study issues unique to each region.

- The Stockton Center for the Study of International Law continues a legacy dating back to 1891 of teaching, research, and publication in international law. Frequent research workshops bring together top international academics
and practitioners. In 2014, the Stockton Center conducted sessions on autonomous weapon systems and naval mines. The International Law Studies, the oldest series (founded in 1895) of international-law publications in the country, has now become the first to go entirely electronic, which dramatically enhances its influence on, and timeliness of response to, international crises involving legal issues. The Center’s faculty members regularly publish their research in top international law reviews. They also teach in the college’s core curriculum, as well as abroad. The Center currently has teaching and research memorandums of understanding with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, the NATO School, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and the Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law.

- The college’s Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (C3S) is conceptualizing, promoting, and supporting research in and the teaching of cyber warfare, cyberspace operations, and cyber conflict. As part of its charter, C3S equips NWC graduates with the knowledge and education to employ cyber operations as a battlefield capability, in accordance with the laws of war.

- The China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), established in 2006 to increase among defense professionals knowledge and understanding of the maritime dimensions of China’s rise, consists of faculty from across the college. They conduct research in the areas of energy, global commerce, law of the sea, maritime technologies, merchant marines, naval development, naval diplomacy, and shipbuilding. CMSI operates under the assumption that the U.S.-Chinese maritime relationship will form essential bedrock for maritime security in the twenty-first century. The most recent China Maritime Study, number 11, is *China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities*.

- The Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) hosts annual conferences that focus on the types of conflict the United States and our allies are most likely to face in the future. They bring world-class scholars and special warfare operators together to evaluate and discuss the threats on the horizon.

- The Navy’s Joint and Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC and CFMCC) courses are executive-level PME/JPME for U.S. and international, respectively, flag and general officers. They are designed to prepare these officers for theater-level combat leadership and to inculcate a broad perspective of the operational and strategic levels of war. Offered three to four times each year, CFMCC courses are conducted around the globe within specific fleet commanders’ areas of responsibility; the annual JFMCC course is taught on campus in Newport.
The weeklong Executive Level Operational Level of War Course (ELOC), for the fleet’s senior leadership (O-6 level, i.e., captains and colonels), explores the intricacies of effective participation in the decision-making process and the management of the resources of Maritime Headquarters (MHQs) and Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs).

The five-week Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC) provides Navy chief petty officers and officers with organizational and individual-level education and training in planning, execution, and assessment functions and tasks in a MOC or other operational-level maritime staff. The Naval War College’s Assist and Assess Team (AAT) partners with fleet commanders and their MOC staffs to enhance the Navy’s maritime command, control, and readiness at the operational level of war.

The eleven-week-long Maritime Operational Planners Course (MOPC) is a stand-alone program that develops planners capable of performing in high-tempo, fluid maritime operational environments. MOPC focuses exclusively at the C/JFMCC staff level and is designed to fill the gap in planner capability on the Navy’s Professional Military Education Continuum between graduates of the basic MSOC and of the high-end MAWS. Two “beta tests” of the newly developed course have been completed, with ramp-up to a fully manned course planned for fiscal year 2015.

The Naval War College also hosts each year dozens of major academic events that serve as opportunities to address the key issues facing the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and our allies. The three largest events are these:

- The annual Current Strategy Forum (CSF), hosted by the Secretary of the Navy, brings together a number of prominent civilian and military guests to discuss future U.S. strategy with students and faculty. Distinguished speakers examine various facets of forum themes in a series of addresses and panel discussions, followed by question-and-answer sessions. Attendees also break into informal classroom seminars chaired by faculty moderators, giving guests and students the opportunity to discuss topics of current strategic concern.

- The International Seapower Symposium (ISS), cohosted by the CNO and the President of the Naval War College, usually occurs every other year. Chiefs of allied navies and coast guards from nations around the globe attend to discuss common maritime challenges and generate opportunities to enhance international maritime security cooperation. ISS is unique, the only forum in the world that brings together the heads of so many navies at the same time.
Discussions at ISS have resulted in many successful efforts in such areas as countering piracy and providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. ISS-21 will be held 16–19 September 2014.

- The college’s Professional Military Ethics Program offers a series of lectures, panels, seminars, and discussion groups to further student officers’ understanding and application of ethical leadership. Each year the ethics program is built around a core theme, such as “Enduring Ethical Dilemmas: Rights and Responsibilities of the Professional Military Officer,” and it weaves questions of ethics throughout the core curriculum. The college invites guest speakers from academic institutions, the military, and other professions to discuss contemporary issues relevant to the professional military ethic.

The years between the First and Second World Wars are often referred to as the college’s “Golden Era,” when most of the senior officers who would ultimately lead Allied forces to victory in the Pacific spent time in Newport studying the many potential futures they were likely to face. We now find ourselves in a similar period, having drawn down from a dozen years of complex irregular conflict. We strongly believe that all military officers should now invest in themselves, to improve further their ability to think strategically and contribute to the needs of the joint force of the future. A Naval War College education, in residence or via one of its excellent nonresident programs, should be in every officer’s career plan. The Navy excels in training its Sailors to understand and react to events they are likely to face—in training for the known eventualities. Education, on the other hand, develops critical analysis and cognitive skills to deal with the unexpected and the unknown. This powerful combination of training and education, reinforced by real-world experience, equips us for success in the future.

At the heart of all of these efforts is a superb and talented faculty, dedicated to the task of providing students with the edge they will need to succeed in the future. The faculty is why the Naval War College is known as the “Navy’s Home of Strategic Thought.”

It is our sincere hope that you will allow the Naval War College to change irrevocably the way you look at the world.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE POLICY

Peter J. Dean

Since its European settlement in 1788, Australia has been dependent on great-power protectors for its security. Initially this security was achieved by virtue of Australia's status as a British colony, later as a member of the British Commonwealth. In return for its protection, Australia committed military forces in support of British interests to the Sudan, in the Boer War, and in the First and Second World Wars. Australian support for these actions was premised on two key factors: Australia's membership in the Empire (and with that the identity of its citizens as “independent Australian-Britons”) and the assessment, universal among Australians, that support and protection of the Empire and of British interests were also in their interest.

However, the fall of Singapore in 1942 was a “salutary warning about the dangers of a smaller power [like Australia] becoming too reliant on a great power to protect it.” Accordingly, while Australia's strategic approach in the post-Singapore era involved heavy reliance on the United States, it was not as one-dimensional as its relationship with Great Britain had been. As early as October 1944 the Australian Defence Committee recognized that the nation “should not accept the risk of relying primarily for its defence upon the assistance of a foreign power.” What developed instead was a combination of, on one hand, support for multilateral organizations and a rules-based global
order through a strong liberal, internationalist approach to diplomacy and, on the other, alliances with major Western powers and a credible, capable, and permanent Australian military force for the defense of the home territory.

Following the Second World War, Australia strongly supported the establishment of the United Nations, forged a new security partnership with Great Britain, and, along with New Zealand, formed the ANZUS alliance with the United States. Australian support for the West in the Cold War and the British presence in the Far East led to commitment of troops to Malaya and Malaysia in the 1950s and 1960s, and its emerging relationship with the United States would see it sending forces to Korea and Vietnam. Continued support for U.S. global leadership and Western liberal democratic values into the post–Cold War and post-9/11 eras would lead Australia to commit forces to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a consequence of this “expeditionary strategy,” by which its armed forces have been used principally in support of its major alliance partners rather than in direct defense of Australian territory, Australia’s approach to war fighting has come to be distinguished by the “quality of its expeditionary infantry, who are usually sent overseas as part of a wider coalition and depend on a larger ally for logistical and other support.”

This expeditionary approach to strategy—embracing a major alliance partner while maintaining a degree of defensive self-reliance—has led to tensions in Australian strategic policy. These tensions have been manifest in the need both to develop forces that can be used to support alliance partners in distant operational areas and to maintain capabilities to meet strategic interests and objectives in its immediate region and for the defense of the continent. Amphibious warfare represents an intersection of these needs and therefore a focal point for understanding the tension between them.

This article traces the role of amphibious operations in the evolution of Australian defense policy. It argues that the Australian experience with amphibious operations has been ironic, in that while Australia’s military forces conducted them in both world wars to support its interests and those of its major alliance partners, the potential for managing the nation’s own regional security was not realized. Thus, during the Cold War and immediate post–Cold War years the amphibious capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) were not robust. However, with the end of the Cold War the ADF was forced to reorient its security strategy toward one requiring moderate projection and sustainment of forces to promote regional stability. As the necessary capabilities were being developed in response to the demands of the new era of “Regional Defence,” moreover, major shifts in the strategic environment were under way. The rise of China, the movement of the global strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region, and,
after 2011, the U.S. “pivot,” or “rebalance,” to the region have reshaped Australia’s security future.

As the nation commits itself accordingly to a strategy of both maritime security and regional engagement, what emerges is an end to what has been described as the “tyranny of dissonance” in Australian strategic policy. As a result, amphibious operations are finally coming of age in Australia and will play a more crucial role in the nation’s defense policy for the “Asian Century.”

AUSTRALIA’S ENDURING STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES

Australia’s dependence on its two major alliance partners, Great Britain and the United States, and the dominance of an expeditionary approach in its strategy and use of military force have been a result of Australia’s enduring strategic geography and circumstances. Australia is the sixth-largest country in the world and the only one of the largest six to be surrounded completely by water. With an area of 7,618,493 square kilometers and 59,736 kilometers of coastline, it is not only an island but also a country and a continent. Australia, which has a strongly Western cultural identity, is a classic trade-dependent maritime state. As the then Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, remarked in March 2014,

If Australia was to be described as an organism, a startling characteristic would be that most of its vital organs exist outside its body. Over 50 percent of Australia’s [gross domestic product] has an external basis. Australia’s national interests require that for its prosperity and future stability, it must be able to shape its strategic environment and respond to threats to those vital organs. This is not, for example, merely the protection of Sea Lines of Communications and freedom of navigation, but rather the protection of trade itself.

The combination of its location in Asia and its cultural heritage, deriving largely from its British settlement in 1788, along with its small population, large land mass, and rich natural resources, means that Australians have always sensed acutely a “tyranny of distance” from their major ally and the West, a sense that “gave rise to popular fear[s]—which still linger in the collective consciousness—that the country [is] indefensible.”

It is for this reason that since its settlement Australia has relied for its security on the exercise by a major Anglo-Saxon maritime power of dominance over the Asia-Pacific. From 1788 until 1941 this power was the Royal Navy and from 1942 the U.S. Navy. Throughout its history Australia’s ability to pursue an expeditionary strategy to defend its interests and values has always depended on a stable Asia-Pacific, largely devoid of tension and major strategic competition. Not only that, but when Australia has committed forces to Europe and the Middle East, its “great and powerful friends” have themselves been guaranteeing its maritime security in Asia.
This expeditionary approach to strategy and war fighting has, it has been argued, been at odds with a peacetime Australian strategic policy tending to the defense of geography—that is, continental defense, generally referred to as “Defence of Australia.” This has led to the aforementioned “tyranny of dissonance,” between Australia’s strategic theory and its actual conduct of military operations. Defense of the continent, that is, butts up against Australia’s strong affiliation with Anglo-Saxon culture, democracy, and Western diplomacy and values and its tradition of committing forces in pursuit of interests in such areas as Europe (First and Second World Wars) and the Middle East (the world wars, the Gulf War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).

So binary a distinction between continental defense and expeditionary strategy has left little room for amphibious warfare in Australian defense policy. The former has relied on Australia’s two powerful allies to provide its first line of defense while Australia’s own military forces focused on the “air-sea gap” to the continent’s north. The latter has involved niche, single-service, distant contingencies, sometimes described as “wars of choice,” as part of coalitions with major alliance partners.

**AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND “IMPERIAL DEFENCE”**

Dependence on the British Empire and Imperial Defence (see note 6) in the period after Federation in 1901 meant that Australia’s military forces were little interested in amphibious warfare. Counterintuitively, however, Australia’s first-ever national military action came in the form of a joint expeditionary operation with an amphibious component. In 1914, the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force was created and dispatched to secure German New Guinea. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) provided “means for deployment, force protection, sustainment, command and control, support, and landing parties.” The army provided, at very short notice, a 1,500-strong battalion group for a number of landings in New Guinea to defeat the light-armed indigenous troops under German command. However, although it “demonstrated the usefulness of joint forces in the defence of Australian interests,” this small and brief campaign was soon forgotten in the maelstrom of the Australian Army’s actions at Gallipoli in 1915 and in the Middle East and on the western front between 1916 and 1918.

Australia secured possession of New Guinea at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which concluded the First World War. In the same negotiations the Japanese used their support for the Allied powers during the war and their occupation of Germany’s Pacific colonies in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands to push for their annexation. Their success in effect cemented Japanese “domination of the central and western Pacific,” an outcome that radically altered the strategic position of both Australia and the United States.
acquisition of German New Guinea and its excellent harbor at Rabaul on New Britain and the Japanese annexation of the central Pacific Islands made the two uncomfortably close neighbors in the southwestern Pacific. 

Despite the experience of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force in the South Pacific in 1914 and the requirement to protect and sustain Australia’s newly won colonial possessions during the interwar period, amphibious operations were almost entirely absent from Australian defense planning.\(^\text{20}\) In fact, only one amphibious exercise was undertaken between the world wars. In 1935, Tasmanian militia forces from the 40th Battalion landed at Blackman’s Bay, south of Hobart, from the cruisers HMAS Canberra and HMS Sussex. This sole military exercise, evidence of the paucity of interest in amphibious warfare, was remarkable only “for [its] air of unreality.”\(^\text{21}\)

In the interwar period Australia placed its faith in the Singapore Strategy for its defense against Japanese aggression in the Pacific, despite the clearly understood problems with this one-dimensional naval strategy.\(^\text{22}\) The naval “fortress” at Singapore and the need to contribute to Imperial Defence saw Australia raise a second all-volunteer expeditionary force for service in Europe and the Middle East at the start of the Second World War; the majority of this force was sent overseas in early 1940. The bulk of the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), including the 6th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, plus considerable elements of the RAN and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), would serve in the Middle East until the outbreak of the Pacific War at the end of 1941. The majority would return to Australia and the Pacific soon after, but the 9th Division did not return until the beginning of 1943, and a number of RAN ships and RAAF squadrons were to remain in the Middle East for most of that year.\(^\text{23}\)

**THE PACIFIC WAR**

The fall of Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Australian New Guinea in early 1942 radically changed Australia’s strategic circumstances. For the first and only time in its history, Australia faced a genuine threat of invasion. The loss of the territories to the north was soon followed by the bombing of Darwin and a Japanese air offensive against northern Australia.\(^\text{24}\) The establishment of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under the American general Douglas MacArthur by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff helped to secure Australia;\(^\text{25}\) nevertheless, MacArthur had to spend the majority of 1942 defending the last remaining Allied bastion to Australia’s north, Papua. Notwithstanding this initial defensive stance, it soon became apparent to MacArthur that a maritime strategy, one formed around land-based airpower and amphibious operations and embracing the concept of maneuver, was needed to defeat the Japanese in the region.\(^\text{26}\) MacArthur’s headquarters proposed an offensive based on island hopping, each jump of no more than three
hundred miles (480 kilometers) in order to ensure fighter cover for the SWPA's strike aircraft and heavy bombers. It also proposed the use of combined-arms task forces to undertake these amphibious landings, with heavy naval support under the cover of air umbrellas.\textsuperscript{27}

MacArthur's principal strike weapon, however, was his air force. His strategy rested on air superiority, enabling sea control to allow his amphibious force to leapfrog forward, establishing airfields, ports, and logistical bases to allow the advance to continue and isolating large numbers of Japanese troops on islands and around areas not assaulted.\textsuperscript{28} The problem was that the majority of MacArthur's ground and naval forces from 1942 to early 1944 were Australian, neither equipped nor trained to conduct amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{29} It would take MacArthur and his American and Australian commanders over a year to establish amphibious training schools for the army and navy, as well as to acquire the necessary specialized equipment.\textsuperscript{30}

During 1943–45 the Australian Army with support from its U.S. ally in the SWPA would conduct a number of joint expeditionary operations utilizing amphibious warfare. This would include four division-sized amphibious assaults, one brigade-sized assault, dozens of battalion- or company-sized landings and hundreds of amphibious transportation operations. The most critical of these occurred in New Guinea in 1943 and in Borneo in 1945.\textsuperscript{31} Meanwhile the RAN’s landing ships HMAS Manoora, Kanimbla, and Westralia would form a core part of the U.S. Navy’s VII Amphibious Force throughout the SWPA in 1943–45, as did the landing craft, destroyers, and cruisers from the RAN that supported MacArthur.\textsuperscript{32}

THE COLD WAR

As a result of the Australian experience of joint and combined amphibious expeditionary operations in its immediate region during the Pacific War, the 1946 and 1947 “Appreciation of the Strategical Position” prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended the development of a “mobile RAN Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with their escort[,] . . . [a] Fleet Train[,] . . . Amphibious craft for combined operations[,] . . . [and] Standard [army] formations designed for . . . amphibious operations, but capable of conversion to meet the conditions of jungle warfare.”\textsuperscript{33}

This rather ambitious force structure was not taken up by the government. The threat of the Cold War and the fact that by 1950 Australia again found itself providing niche, single-service contributions to overseas coalitions, this time in Korea, meant that amphibious operations drifted from priority. Australia moved into what was known as the era of “Forward Defence” (1955–72), a period that, along with the overlapping Commonwealth Defence (1901–42 and
1945–69—again, see note 6), would once again see Australia concentrate on securing its interests and supporting Western values and objectives in conjunction with its major alliance partners, far from its shores. The default condition seemed to be that the farther away from Australia’s immediate region its military operations were, the less they had to do with amphibious warfare.

Thus it was for the Australian deployment to Vietnam. Here the Australian services fought singly alongside their American and South Vietnamese counterparts. Amphibious warfare played no role for the Australian commitment, but because of the lack of amphibious transportation and logistics ships and the need for maritime sustainment of the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province, one of the RAN’s two aircraft carriers, HMAS Sydney, was pressed into service to move troops and supplies to South Vietnam. The ship was soon nicknamed the “Vung Tau ferry.”

THE DEFENSE OF AUSTRALIA

At the conclusion of the Vietnam War and with the establishment of the Nixon Doctrine (by which the United States reduced its direct involvement in the defense of allies), Australian strategic policy shifted toward a focus on the “Defence of Australia.” This continental-defense posture was based on a “need for greater self-reliance and the ability to act independently” in the defense of continental Australia and the necessity to “prepare for low level contingencies.” This basic premise was accepted by the conservative Coalition government of Malcolm Fraser and later the Bob Hawke–Paul Keating Labor governments. The resulting emphasis on the Defence of Australia at the “air-sea gap”—Australia’s northern approaches—meant that the army would focus on the protection of the mainland against low-level incursions. Meanwhile, air and maritime forces would deter major-power threats. This defensive “self-reliance” was to be achieved within the alliance (ANZUS) framework.

The new strategy offered little prospect for the development of an Australian amphibious capability. In fact the influential 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence, which had been commissioned by the minister of defense Kim Beazley, noted that the ADF’s amphibious lift capability “is limited” and recommended the gradual running down of what was left. By mid-1986 the few ships and landing craft of the RAN’s “Australian Amphibious Squadron [had been] disbanded.” The review declared that the 5,800-ton heavy landing ship HMAS Tobruk and supply ship HMAS Jervis Bay were between them “sufficient to support any modest deployments of ground forces or their equipment that could not be handled by aircraft or land transport.” The six heavy landing craft (LCHs) were to be used only for “coastal hydrographic work or maintained in the operational reserve.” Finally, “there is no requirement to plan now for their [LCH] replacement, nor
is there any need for additional . . . [ships] of the *Tobruk* class.40 This approach, as a commentator noted, “left the Army, in particular, with little capacity for, or doctrinal interest in, the projection of military power at a distance.”41

The perception that there was little need for force-projection capabilities, given the strategic focus on sea denial in the defense of continental Australia, was soon to reveal its shortcomings with regard to regional interests. In May 1987, in Suva, the capital of the Melanesian island nation of Fiji—about two thousand kilometers north of New Zealand and some three thousand east of Brisbane, in Queensland—Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka and elements of the Royal Fiji Military Forces staged a coup. The Australian government of Prime Minister Bob Hawke asked the ADF whether it could rescue the deposed Fijian prime minister, Timoci Bavadra. The Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, quickly explained the insurmountable obstacles. However, foreseeing a requirement to conduct a protected evacuation of some four thousand Australian nationals, the Operational Deployment Force, based in Townsville, Queensland, was flown by RAAF C-130 Hercules aircraft to Norfolk Island (roughly midway between Australia and Fiji) and embarked in an “ad-hoc fashion” on board the warships *HMAS Parramatta* and *Sydney*, the supply ship *HMAS Success*, and the RAN’s only amphibious ship, *Tobruk.*42

For fifteen days these troops stood offshore between Norfolk and the Fiji island of Viti Levu, then returned to Australia. This period revealed the poor state of joint capability in the ADF—inadequate doctrine, poor communications between services, shortage of amphibious ships and craft, and the absence of operating concepts. As one observer noted, “Operation Morris Dance [as the Fiji operation was designated] provided a sobering demonstration of the limits of Australian military power in the late 1980s. Even if it had wanted to or needed to, Australia simply could not have deployed a land force into the South Pacific safely and effectively if there was any prospect of onshore opposition to such a move.”43

The critical fault was that the Defence of Australia strategy had excluded force-protection capabilities. While single-service expeditionary deployments with allies could be undertaken with the existing force structure designed for the defense of Australia, the lack of force-protection capabilities meant that Australia lacked the capacity to deal with regional security problems.44 This shortcoming had been tolerated despite the fact that it had been long recognized that the expeditionary strategy almost invariably involved “wars of choice,” while deployments in the immediate region were, and would continue to be, “non-discretionary.”45

While Defence of Australia dominated strategic thinking and force-structure priorities from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, some in the ADF acknowledged during the 1980s that given the size of the Australian continent, an amphibious capability could play a significant role.46 However, any action was hamstrung by
a debate within some sections of the Department of Defence over the concept of “non-offensive defence,” put forward in a review, commissioned in May 1989, of civil-military relationships in Australia by a former Deputy Secretary of Defence, Alan Wrigley. His report, *The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s Defence*, released in June 1990, recommended placing the defense of the continent in the hands of largely part-time forces and restricting the regular ADF to overseas deployments in a constabulary role. Wrigley’s views of “non-offensive defence,” it was pointed out, implied that not even a “defensive” amphibious force could be supported, for fear that it might be destabilizing for the region.\(^{47}\) In addition, the Hawke government made it clear that it found the “offensive nature” of an amphibious capability, like that of the RAN’s aircraft carrier capability, which was retired at this time, “inappropriate for Australia’s force structure.”\(^{48}\)

The government rejected Wrigley’s recommendations, although the 1991 *Force Structure Review* did cut the size of the army and transferred a number of its combat capabilities from regular to reserve forces.\(^{49}\) However, arguably, the most significant impediment to the development of amphibious capabilities in the ADF at this time was a lack of institutional interest from the navy and, especially, the army.\(^{50}\) The post–Cold War era would see Australia again making single-service military contributions to distant “wars of choice,” this time in support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq and later in the first Persian Gulf War, 1990–91.\(^{51}\)

As has been noted, the 1980s and 1990s were “a dark period for amphibious and joint operations, which were only kept alive in largely unread doctrine or through heavily orchestrated training exercises.”\(^{52}\) However, concurrently with international deployments, post–Cold War Australian strategic policy was also concerning itself with instability in the immediate region; the period from 1997 to 2001 was in fact the era of “Regional Defence.” The year 1999 saw Australia’s most significant military operation since Vietnam, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a peacekeeping mission undertaken in response to the conflict between East Timorese pro-independence supporters and pro-Indonesian militias (supported by regular Indonesian forces). During INTERFET the “ADF [would] rediscover the importance of joint operations to national security.”\(^{53}\)

**EAST TIMOR AND REGIONAL OPERATIONS**

The realization of the limitations of the ADF’s force-projection capabilities after *MORRIS DANCE* in Fiji, coupled with concern over growing instability in the South Pacific, had led to a revised strategic guidance, in the 1991 *Force Structure Review*, acknowledging a need to “respond to regional requests.”\(^{54}\) In particular, the review noted that “the ADF currently has no single vessel capable of operating
a number of helicopters simultaneously.” This led to a decision to replace the roll-on/roll-off support ship *Jervis Bay* with a dedicated training and helicopter-support ship. However, in 1993 the government balked at the expected $500 million price tag for a purpose-built vessel and decided instead, in 1994, to acquire two surplus U.S. Navy *Newport*-class 8,500-ton tank landing ships, redesignated as “Landing Platforms Amphibious” (LPAs). This was “an important, positive [move in the] use of the sea for [a] military purpose [that] added to the 1987 [Defence of Australia] construct.”

Nevertheless, 1999 found the ADF woefully short on the amphibious capability it needed to undertake INTERFET. The acquisition of the LPAs “could not disguise the years of institutional and doctrinal neglect, cost cutting and lack of single-service interest” in amphibious operations. In any case, the LPAs *Kanimbla* and *Manoora* had not completed refitting and were not yet in service when Australia decided that year to send a stabilization mission to East Timor. This left the RAN with only *Tobruk* (long overdue for maintenance), the recently leased fast catamaran (a new HMAS *Jervis Bay*), and three heavy landing craft. These vessels were supplemented by the RAN’s replenishment and supply ship *Success*, soon reinforced by ships from the Canadian, New Zealand, Singaporean, and U.S. navies, as well as seventeen commercially chartered vessels.

The ADF was exceptionally lucky that it was able to secure the harbor of Dili, the capital, and its one wharf and crane, before it could be damaged by forces opposing East Timorese independence. Loss of this critical node would have severely hampered the ability of the ADF, with its one small amphibious ship, to build decisive force ashore rapidly and then sustain it. Furthermore, these amphibious forces proved especially significant, as INTERFET pushed out from Dili and its immediate surrounds. As has been argued, “coalition maritime capabilities and, above all, amphibious units proved essential to any realistic efforts to make land forces mobile over long distances.” To facilitate these moves, *Tobruk* and the RAN’s heavy landing craft conducted numerous over-the-beach lodgments.

RAN and coalition amphibious forces, then, were critical to the success of INTERFET. Its commander, General Peter Cosgrove, would state the ADF amphibious assets were a “capability of first resort.” While in many respects this is unsurprising, given the archipelagic nature of the region, INTERFET served to highlight not only the potential requirement for amphibious operations but also the ADF’s stark lack of such capability at the time. These deficiencies were particularly noticeable once the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ship USS *Belleau Wood* (LHA 3) started to provide heavy lift with its Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters.

The East Timor experience was ultimately to herald a new era for amphibious warfare in Australian policy and strategy. By 2000 *Manoora* and *Kanimbla*...
were available and in concert with Tobruk formed the first RAN amphibious ready group (ARG) since the end of the Second World War. This increase in RAN capability was matched by a resurgence in the Australian Army’s doctrinal interest in amphibious operations. This new doctrine was established on the back of U.S. concepts such as “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” which had developed after the Cold War as the U.S. Navy transitioned from the conception of a blue-water fleet as envisioned by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan to an idea of maritime strategy that, reminiscent of the theoretician Sir Julian Corbett, focused heavily on force projection, support of forces ashore, and expeditionary operations.\(^\text{66}\)

For the Australian Army, such ideas were developed under the rubric of MOLE (Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment). However, its development in the land forces soon stagnated. Against the background of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in the post–September 11 era, MOLE “has long been overshadowed by [Army doctrine development on] Complex Warfighting and the Hardened and Networked Army scheme, [which] . . . merged into the comprehensive framework of Adaptive Campaigning.”\(^\text{67}\)

In the years after 2001 the ADF undertook its regional-security operations, which relied so heavily on the RAN’s amphibious assets, at the same time that it (in particular, the army) became involved intensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus during the past decade two of the major drivers of Australian defense strategy—far-off expeditionary deployments (Iraq and Afghanistan) and regional operations (East Timor in 2003 and 2006, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands)—have been undertaken concurrently. This has placed enormous strain on the ADF’s resources and has led to two very different sets of experiences and lessons. In some cases, such as the army’s MOLE doctrine, the Middle East experience would overshadow, though not eclipse, thinking and concept development for regional amphibious operations.

The first operational deployment of the ARG was in 2006, when the ADF was again required to intervene in East Timor as the security situation deteriorated. Its three ships were able to land an infantry battalion group within three days, including armored and support vehicles and three Blackhawk helicopters. They did so entirely over the beach, as, unlike in 1999, the Dili harbor facilities were not secured.\(^\text{68}\) This was a considerable achievement for assets that sixteen years earlier had been deemed “inappropriate.”\(^\text{69}\)

In the years after **Morris Dance** the ADF’s amphibious assets had also seen extensive service in Vanuatu (1988), in Somalia (1993), and on Bougainville (1990 and 1994). The ARG also has since played a critical role in the support of the Australian response to the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Aceh region of Indonesia.
In light of the lessons from Somalia, Bougainville, and East Timor, the John Howard government’s white paper Defence 2000 committed the nation to purchasing two new amphibious vessels to replace Tobruk, Manoora, and Kanimbla. This met the third of the paper’s five objectives—“Stabilization of South West Pacific,” which the government deemed a “self-reliant task” (although it expected support from New Zealand). The “main requirements for the RAN force structure that flow[ed] from this objective . . . [were] . . . for a capability to patrol South Pacific waters, and for amphibious lift.”

The 2003 Defence Capability Review noted that “both frigates and amphibious ships have been engaged constantly since September 2001 across a full spectrum of operations. Additionally, the importance to the Government of the ability to safely deploy, lodge and sustain Australian forces offshore has been re-emphasised.” As a result, the government announced that the replacement amphibious ships would be “large vessels” and would be supplemented by an additional sealift ship. By the release of the Defence Capability Plan 2004–2014, the size of these two ships had doubled from that envisaged in 2000. The plan had evolved to a decision to purchase two 27,500-ton, Spanish-designed ships of the LHD (landing helicopter dock) type, the largest vessels that the RAN has ever operated. Each of these ships, when operational (late 2014 and 2016), will be able to deliver ashore in three hours what the RAN’s ARG needed three days for in East Timor in 2006.

THE END OF “DISSONANCE”? 

The irony of Australian expeditionary warfare is that the forces the ADF has consistently deployed to distant theaters generally do not actually conduct joint expeditionary operations. Truly expeditionary, and amphibious, operations have occurred only close to the Australian homeland. The reductive and binary debates, therefore, over Australia’s strategic policy as a choice between an expeditionary strategy and Defence of Australia have been particularly unhelpful in understanding the role that amphibious operations have played in achieving the nation’s strategic objectives.

In particular an “expeditionary strategy” / “Defence of Australia” distinction obscures the requirement for Australia’s military forces to operate in the zone between the continent itself and far-off deployment zones—that is, notably, in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. This region has long been characterized by Australian strategic policy as the nation’s “area of direct military interest” or “primary operating environment.” As the 2009 white paper noted, it is an “expansive strategic geography [that] requires an expeditionary orientation on the part of the ADF at the operational level, underpinned by requisite force projection capabilities.”
As the ADF has transitioned away from high-tempo operations in the Middle East it has started to carry out its own “pivot,” or “rebalance,” toward the Asia-Pacific region. This move is in response not only to the drawdown in Afghanistan but also, and especially, to the shift of global strategic competition and economic power to the Asia-Pacific. As a result, the “tyranny of dissonance” between geography, on one side, and history, values, and political interests, on the other, has begun to recede. Australian trade and investment are now becoming firmly centered on the Asia-Pacific region; Australia’s major alliance partner, the United States, has announced, as noted, a strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific; Australia is now deeply engaged in stability operations in the South Pacific; and Canberra is developing regional defense relations with such fellow democracies and major trading partners as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Japan.

In the process Australia is embracing a maritime strategy in which amphibious and joint expeditionary operations in the Asia-Pacific region will play a significant role. This move was reflected in Defence White Paper 2013, which devotes a section to maritime strategy (paragraphs 3.42–3.47) and refers to amphibious “capability,” “operations,” “training,” or “forces” no fewer than forty-three times. The amphibious-related sections include discussions of “Joint and Enabling Forces” (paragraphs 8.12–8.14), of “Land Forces,” of “Naval Forces,” and of the amphibious capability as the “central plank in our ability to conduct security and stabilisation missions in the [South Pacific] region” (paragraph 6.55); and of “cooperation and engagement activities in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste, including bilateral or multilateral exercises with regional security forces” (paragraph 3.51).

This approach is set to continue under the conservative government of Tony Abbott that was elected in late 2013. In the lead-up to the election, Abbott, then opposition leader, and his shadow defense minister, David Johnston, committed themselves to writing a new white paper on defense, a commitment they reaffirmed once in government. Johnston has suggested the central role that the new LHDs will play. Speaking alongside the American and Japanese ambassadors to Australia and the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., at the Kokoda Foundation annual dinner in Canberra on 31 October 2013, Johnston emphasized their critical importance for regional engagement and deeper relations with Australia’s allies and regional partners. Johnston called this amphibious capability a major new “strategic asset for Australia.”

The development of this “strategic” amphibious capability is a critical part of the continuing close strategic partnership with the United States, a relationship that is taking on a new emphasis and new roles as a result of the American “pivot.” As the 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review noted, more will be asked of Australia and other allies to “undergird the ability of the United States to face
future crises and contingencies” and especially to grow partners’ “capacity . . . [to] play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions.”

Nonetheless, development of this capability presents enormous challenges to Australia and the ADF. As the 2013 white paper notes, “the challenges for training and institutional culture involved in developing the capability to conduct amphibious operations will be significant.” This challenge is manifest in the difficulties the ADF has faced in developing clear strategic guidance, the slow progress of amphibious concepts, and a lack of integration between some of the amphibious plans and projects managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation. Of major concern is the erosion of the ADF’s littoral amphibious capabilities, especially with the retirement of the heavy landing craft and the delays in implementing and funding replacements for these and other brown-water assets as the LHDs come online. As one ADF officer has observed, “You can’t ride a concept to the beach.”

However, this is not a capability or institutional problem of the ADF alone. Rather, in many respects it is reflective of much broader, national, cultural problems. These are barriers to the acceptance of a focus on the Asia-Pacific and in particular of a maritime strategy for Australian defense policy. This issue is a divide less between values, history, and geography than between continental and maritime cultural outlooks: a result of the “peculiar trajectory of Australia’s national culture . . . [which] has impeded a sense of maritime consciousness . . . [—a] situation that is particularly reflected in defence policy.” But as has been noted, this cultural hand brake is not immovable; rather “Australians, while respectful of their continental ethos, must increasingly seek to recast the national cultural narrative towards the seas of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.”

Such an approach, in terms both of national outlook and of the integration of a maritime strategy into the ADF, is of paramount importance, given the focus on the Asia-Pacific region. The changing nature of Australia’s strategic environment is also critical. Although Australia’s “region has been at peace now for almost 40 years” and there is a “low likelihood of war between the major powers[,] . . . miscalculation and misjudgement short of major war are a risk, as they have been throughout history. And in our part of the world there are plenty of territorial and ideological tensions and jockeying for influence by the rising powers.”

Increased strategic competition in this region has important ramifications for strategic policy and will make it much more difficult for any Australian government to participate in expeditionary deployments outside the Asia-Pacific region in the future. In addition, given the low risk of a direct threat to the Australian continent, a regional focus has become of overriding importance to Australia’s strategic interests and objectives. The region to Australia’s north—a vast maritime, littoral, and archipelagic region—presents the ADF with a land-sea-air operating
environment, not an “air-sea gap.” It requires the ADF to be able not just to provide for continental defense or deploy alongside major alliance partners but also to carry out joint maritime operations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific—operations that are critically dependent on a robust amphibious capability.85

With the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the rise of China, and the increasing importance of both the immediate region and the wider Asia-Pacific to Australia’s strategic interests and objectives, the odds are that even more demands will be made on the ADF’s emerging amphibious capability. This is especially true as a modern, versatile amphibious capability could provide much more than the standard, orthodox roles of amphibious assault, raid, withdrawal, and demonstration.

Rather, a joint amphibious expeditionary force will also play key roles in humanitarian assistance, evacuation, and peacekeeping. It will increase the ADF’s ability to assist friendly nations and undertake military diplomacy and combined military exercises, as well as to provide “presence” and undertake preventative diplomacy.86 This joint maritime force could also exert a high level of coercion, especially through deterrence and compellence.87 These are all critical for strategic shaping,88 if utilized properly, they will be key elements of Australia’s policy of engagement and of the ADF’s contribution to managing the peace in the immediate region. These capabilities highlight the prospect that despite its troubled past, Australian amphibious warfare has an enduring role to play in contemporary defense policy and strategy.89

NOTES


2. Defence Committee, minute 335/1944, 18 October 1944, A5799, 206/1944, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory [hereafter ACT; this collection hereafter NAA].


4. Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), p. 5. This is not to overlook the service of either the Australian air force or navy, in particular the latter, in support of Australia’s global interests and military coalitions. The army’s commitments in two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, however, have been numerically more significant than those of the other services.

5. “Amphibious operations” in this article is defined as “a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.” Australian Dept. of Defence, Amphibious Operations, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2 (Canberra, ACT: 29 January 2009). This ADF definition is also the standard NATO definition and is only slightly different from that found in U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: 8 November 2010). While “amphibious operations” is
tactical in orientation, the associated “Expeditionary Operations” concept is highly relevant to Australia’s use of amphibious operations, given Australia’s island/continent status and the character and types of operations in which Australia has used its amphibious capabilities. These include operations in New Guinea in 1914, in the Pacific in 1942–45, and in the South Pacific and East Timor from the 1970s to the present. Sam J. Tangredi has noted that “expeditionary warfare consists of military operations on land that are exclusively or primarily initiated, supported and supplied from the sea. It is largely the responsibility of marines, naval infantry, or army units transported by ship, and is supported by fleet units, naval aviation and other strike assets . . . and—based on situational factors—land-based combat aviation.

“Amphibious warfare is a significant subset of expeditionary warfare, and prior to the 1990s was the preferred American term for naval expeditionary operations. . . . In short, expeditionary warfare is more than amphibious warfare, but amphibious operations remain its keel”; Sam J. Tangredi, “Navies and Expeditionary Warfare,” in The Politics of Maritime Power: A Survey, ed. Andrew Tan (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 80.

6. Since Australia federated in 1901 there have been five broad defense eras, referred to in Australian Army, Manual of Land Warfare, LWD1 (Canberra, ACT: Dept. of Defence, 2001) [hereafter LWD1] as “Imperial [later Commonwealth] Defence” (1901–42 and 1945–69), “Forward Defence” (1955–72), “Defence of Australia” (1973–97), “Regional Defence” (1997–2001), and “Expeditionary Strategy” (2001–12). The first three are widely used in Australian security circles; however, there is some debate over “Regional Defence.” “Expeditionary Strategy,” which has not yet been taken up in common usage, merges Australia’s operations under Regional Defence and activities in the global war on terror, asserting that Australian security interests are not defined by geography alone. The rise of China and the shifting global strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific have seen the emergence of what this author would loosely call an emerging “Indo-Pacific Maritime Strategy” era (from 2009). This most recent change has emerged through the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers (the 2013 white paper introduced the “Indo-Pacific” term); however, its establishment as a strategic-policy era will depend on the direction of a new white paper, due in 2015 and announced by the incoming conservative Coalition government during the federal election in late 2013. In the meantime, there is an ongoing debate about the western extent of the zone identified as the “Indo-Pacific”—most argue for the eastern Indian Ocean. The more familiar “Asia-Pacific” is used in this article, except in formal or implied reference to the white paper.


10. This bilateral defense pact was formalized through the ANZUS alliance, signed in 1951.


12. The notion of “expeditionary” in Australian parlance can be somewhat misleading. Many strategic commentators in Australia use the phrase “expeditionary operations” to describe deployments of Australia’s forces away from its immediate region in support of its allies. This is actually, however, the use of force as part of an expeditionary strategy; examples are the use of Australian forces in Europe (World Wars I and II) and the Middle East (the world wars, Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan). This is opposed to the shared U.S., British, and NATO definition—“the projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific mission.” One reason for this confusion is that the


23. The 8th Division AIF would be lost at Singapore and in the islands north of Australia in early 1942.

24. For the events of 1942 see Dean, *Australia 1942*.


26. See Peter J. Dean, “Army vs Navy: Allied Conduct of the Pacific War” (paper presented at “Armies in a Maritime Strategy,” Chief of Army History Conference, Canberra, ACT,
2 October 2013). MacArthur never actually used “maritime strategy” to describe his approach to operations in the SWPA, but the phrase contains all the fundamental elements.

27. This strategy is articulated in a General Headquarters (GHQ) SWPA report, “Defensive and Offensive Possibilities,” GHQ G-3 Journals & Files Box 566 (no. 1), April 1942–30 May 1943, Record Group 407 98-GHQ1-3.2, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.

28. Ibid.


31. For the former, see Peter J. Dean, ed., Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).


34. For Commonwealth Defence, “A Brief History of Australian Military Strategy,” app. A in LWD1, pp. 79–82. During this period Australian forces operated alongside the British in Southeast Asia in the Malayan Emergency and in Borneo during the Konfrontasi with Indonesia, as well as in Korea and Vietnam. As part of Commonwealth Defence planning during the 1950s and ’60s, it was intended that in the event of a global war against communism Australian forces would deploy to defend the Middle East.

35. Vung Tau was the main port in Phuoc Tuy Province. For details on the maritime sustainment operations see Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955–1972 (Sydney, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1998).


37. While Defence of Australia had been laid out as the major priority for Australia in the early 1970s by the conservative Fraser government, it was not until the mid-1980s under Robert Hawke’s Labor government that the concept was fully integrated into strategy and force structure. See Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, 1986), and Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, The Defence of Australia (Canberra, ACT: 1987).


42. HMAS Tobruk was the first purpose-built major amphibious ship in the navy. The vessel, commissioned in 1981, was designed to carry troops (350–550), vehicles, and stores and to put them ashore without the aid of port facilities.


49. Blaxland, Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, pp. 86–87.


52. Parkin, Capability of First Resort, p. V.

53. Ibid.


55. Ibid.


59. For details on Australia’s commitment to East Timor see Iain Henry, “Playing Second Fiddle on the Road to INTERFET: Australia’s East Timor Policy throughout 1999,” Security Challenges 9, no. 1 (2013), pp. 87–113. Kanimbla and Manoora were former U.S. Navy ships, respectively USS Saginaw (LST 1188) and USS Fairfax County (LST 1193). These ships were found riddled with rust and other problems that delayed their entry into service, pushed refurbishment costs far above expectations (from $70 million to $400 million), and eventually led to their early retirement; Spurling, “1991–2001,” p. 275.


61. The port was secured by troops from the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, flown by C-130 aircraft directly from Townsville to the Dili airport, which had been secured by Australian and New Zealand special forces.

62. Stevens, Strength through Diversity, p. 28.


74. “Operation Astute.”
76. Evans, Tyranny of Dissonance.
77. Australia’s major trading partners are, in descending order, China, the United States, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Thailand, Germany, Malaysia, and the other countries of Southeast Asia.
79. Senator David Johnston, Kokoda Foundation Annual Dinner Speech, 31 October 2013, Canberra, ACT (author’s notes from the speech).
85. See Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013. This document outlined for Australia a maritime strategy with a heavy increase on amphibious operations; however, it removed any reference to an ADF ability to undertake joint expeditionary operations. This is mainly due to the mistaken notion of the term “expeditionary” in Australian strategic debate and the term’s connotation for the Labor government of distant deployments of single-service forces.
87. This last point is really significant only for the ADF within the South Pacific, but the ADF can undertake collaboration around the region, across the Asia-Pacific, and in concert with the United States, while Australia can play its own (limited) role in coercion. The latter can take the form of preventative or reactive deployments. An emphasis on humanitarian assistance / disaster relief, search and rescue, and joint exercises does not mean that war fighting should be overlooked. Australia’s maritime strategy should not be one of peacekeeping.
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This article examines possible consequences of U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russian annexation of Crimea and claims to territory inhabited by ethnic Russian citizens of other countries, and Chinese claims to control large adjacent areas of the Pacific Ocean. Fundamental principles of world public order are at risk or directly challenged in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and the western Pacific. They are not unique locations in this respect, but this article is not a review of all aspects of U.S. diplomacy and policy or of international relations since the end of the Cold War. The purpose here is to examine assumptions, highlight American national interests in these regions, and suggest options for defending or advancing those interests. Events in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and the western Pacific affect U.S. vital interests because, since World War II, the American people have been united in support of the following propositions: first, a repetition of general war among the great powers is to be avoided; second, the United States and other great powers bear responsibility for preventing such a conflict; third, rules of minimum world order support the effort to prevent world war; and fourth, isolationism and indifference to international crises are not appropriate means for achieving the goal.

Whether as a new country or as a mature great power, the United States has participated in international politics and pursued a grand strategy. Since World War II the central theme has been to avoid nuclear war. Deterring and defeating aggression was at the core of U.S. grand strategy as applied from Harry Truman through Ronald Reagan, with some variations along the way, because the disastrous consequences of accepting aggression prior to World War II were vivid for

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There is only one argument for doing something; the rest are arguments for doing nothing... It is a mere theorist's paradox that doing nothing has just as many consequences as doing something. It is obvious that inaction can have no consequences at all.

F. M. Cornford

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Though determined to avoid nuclear war, paradoxically perhaps, administrations in the immediate aftermath of World War II professed a willingness to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, thus hoping to deter aggression. As the Cold War evolved and knowledge and understanding of crisis management in a nuclear age matured, American administrations and Americans more generally thought of nuclear weapons only as a weapon of last resort in the most extreme circumstances of national defense, if usable even then. As the leading great power during most of the postwar period, the United States has viewed its strategy as a responsibility it must shoulder. As a result, Washington has expended blood and treasure to maintain non-nuclear-weapons options and to shore up an international order based above all on three principles set out in the United Nations Charter: the sovereign equality of states, the prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and the inherent right to use force only in individual or collective self-defense or pursuant to UN Security Council authorization. Since World War II the international system has rested on these principles. It has been able to contain unpreventable conflicts, thus creating a regime of minimum order.

Of course, during the Cold War the United States recognized the reality of a divided Europe because successive American administrations and the American people themselves almost intuitively understood that it might require world war to undo it and that such a war likely would involve the widespread use of nuclear weapons. The United States therefore adopted a policy and strategy of containment, preventing Soviet expansion in Europe and communist expansion elsewhere so as to preserve as wide a space as possible for democracy and economic activity. The mix of means by which the United States and its allies implemented containment included robust deterrence and willingness to fight to maintain this regime on a global basis. The cost was high. Ultimately, the effort was successful.

Since the Cold War, the belief that the world now embraces the three principles at the core of the UN Charter has dominated the American approach to international affairs and formed the basis for coalitions responding to crises in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa. Doubt about whether Russia and China, for example, share the American view of the UN Charter has persisted—sometimes in the foreground, sometimes in the background, but never absent. This article examines the consequences of American, Russian, and Chinese actions in this context.

Afghanistan’s significance for Americans primarily flows from the facts that Afghanistan was the command platform from which the 9/11 attacks were launched and is now a source of the opium used to finance terror and, more generally, to fuel the global narcotics trade. Russia and China, in contrast, are great powers
and have been rivals of the United States for most of the past seventy years. The thematic continuity among these three cases concerns the kind of world in which we live and may want to live and the impact on that world of U.S. action. The process of deciding among policy options needs to include analysis of American national interests—important and vital—and the nation’s role in the world. It should be almost unnecessary to say that the requisite analysis and probably action may not be avoided.

U.S. interest in Afghanistan has been transactional, depending on others to bring the country to Washington’s attention. After the Soviet Union invaded in 1979, the United States saw a need to ensure that the Soviet campaign did not move into Pakistan and an opportunity to create a quagmire for Moscow by providing the Afghan resistance with weapons and other assistance. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the job was done. The conventional wisdom sees this limited U.S. view of American responsibilities as at least partly responsible for Afghanistan’s becoming a terrorist base. If we now withdraw all our forces from Afghanistan and again turn our back on the country, will Afghanistan once more become a haven for terrorists and others whose activities pose a direct threat to the United States? What will other countries make of such American behavior? Will they see it the way the U.S. government does, as of no strategic moment? Will they regard this action as significant and somehow affecting their national interests? Will Afghanistan become the place where India, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Russia compete for influence? And what will happen to Afghans, like Afghan women, whose lives improved because of the Western intervention?

And if Russia is in the midst of a campaign to reestablish, by hook or by crook, the old borders of the Soviet Union, does that mean we are back exclusively in the world of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue?10 Certainly President Vladimir Putin’s language suggests that that in fact is the case and that he has no discomfort in following Hitler’s example in 1938 of fabricating complaints by ethnic German citizens of Czechoslovakia to excuse seizure of the Sudetenland region.11 Will the United States acquiesce or even agree that larger powers have the right to control, as contrasted with influence, their smaller or weaker neighbors and that concern for international law and order constitutes a lesser interest? Are we prepared to equate Russian or Chinese aspirations to their own versions of our Monroe Doctrine, even though the original Monroe Doctrine was much narrower than the Russian or Chinese iterations appear to be?12 Will we agree, for example, that Russia has a bigger stake than others do in Ukraine and the former republics of the Soviet Union and that China has title to the South China Sea? If so, should we defer to Russia’s and China’s wishes, especially because Russia and China possess nuclear weapons? And if we do, where does that kind of behavior end? Are the stakes high enough that we, with or without partners, need to enforce
international norms that are part of the bedrock of order? If so, how do we do it? What is the impact on our friendships and alliances, and does that impact matter to us? And, if we do not want to give Russia and China free hands, what are our options?

The international system consists of independent states that have delegated certain powers to multilateral institutions like the United Nations without thereby creating a world government. The system does not manage itself. Left alone, its tendency is to coalesce against the strongest member or members, which is why attempts to achieve hegemony historically have failed. But the historical price of preventing hegemony has been general war, which in a nuclear age is excessive. Medium- and small-sized states watch what the United States does because the United States has been the principal guardian of an international balance of power and order within which they could go about their business without excessive fear. Therefore, the actions of the United States and other great powers matter; they affect, for example, calculations about whether to obtain nuclear weapons. For this reason, the 1968 British-Russian-U.S. guarantee of non-nuclear-weapons states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons was so important to the willingness of states to forswear nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Will governments take from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in Ukraine and takeover of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia the lesson that they need their own nuclear arsenals, in particular because of the failure so far (as of writing, May 2014) to make good on the 1994 pledge (similar to that of 1968) by Britain, Russia, and the United States? Or will they take the lesson that nuclear weapons provide an effective shield if one is contemplating aggression? Or some other lesson? The world has avoided nuclear war since 1945 with a handful of nuclear-weapons states. Despite some theorists’ optimism that nuclear proliferation is stabilizing, no one really knows what the impact of a large number of nuclear-weapons states will be, especially given that proliferation is outside the protocols and systems for preventing the use of nuclear weapons developed through years of intense effort by the United States and the Soviet Union. A mistake in this area will ruin everyone’s day.

All of these questions require analysis if we are to arrive at an answer to the fundamental question of (with a bow to Lenin) what is to be done. In proposing answers, one should be mindful of costs and benefits. Too often in recent years the United States has acted without regard to short-, medium-, and long-term costs and has provoked international reactions as negative as if it sought hegemonic control in the same vein as Napoleon or Hitler. As a result, a number of American officials have found those actions to be excessive in terms of results achieved. The costs have taken political as well as monetary forms, as Putin reminded his Duma audience in a bitter speech on 18 March 2014:
Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle, “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organizations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.

This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the twentieth century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.17

Truth was not the issue: feelings, nationalism, and desire to recover power and territory lost (in Putin’s view) when the Soviet Union disappeared dictated the move on Crimea, to be described in words as far from “aggression” as possible. U.S. policy was to blame for Russia’s predicament, and Ukraine’s actions—real, imagined, or invented—against Ukraine’s ethnic Russian and pro-Russian citizens.

Putin’s criticism of American actions and conceptions was not entirely without merit, although not in terms he would use. Whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, whatever the legalities, the United States did not articulate to itself, much less the world, focused goals. Rather, American and allied policy in Afghanistan and Iraq suffered from diffusion of purpose, sometimes appearing to be without a basis in the international law underlying the initial use of force in self-defense and/or pursuant to UN Security Council authorization.18 The tone and tint of U.S. speeches and diplomacy sometimes were as abrasive as Putin’s own.

AFGHANISTAN

In Afghanistan, the variety of U.S. goals makes forecasting the consequences of ending American involvement at the end of 2014 or 2016 more complicated than it might otherwise be. More issues and variables are in play than would have been the case had the coalition’s mission been simpler.19 The accretion of goals brought an increase in responsibilities. Prioritization became correspondingly difficult. Yet, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently wrote, “foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.”20

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States determined that the perpetrators had trained in and operated from Afghanistan, where their
leaders lived. No other government dissented from this analysis and conclusion. President Bush demanded that Afghanistan turn over Osama bin Laden for trial. Afghanistan prevaricated, which the United States found unacceptable. The United States took military steps in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense against Afghanistan to capture Osama bin Laden and bring an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for such terrorist operations. Again, no government protested.

This U.S. action was consistent with the long-standing view of the international-law right of self-defense that victims have the right to use force against both the attackers and, in certain circumstances, the places whence the attacks emanate, even if not the same. Thus, when Article 51 of the UN Charter affirms the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,” the affirmation includes the right to use force against the perpetrators of a military act from a country about which the country should have known and taken steps to prevent or remedy. When the offending country is unable or unwilling to do so, the victim has a right to use proportional and necessary force to bring the threat or use of force against it to an end. In condemning the terrorist attacks of September 11th as a threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council “recognize[d] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.” This UN language meant that the Security Council recognized the applicability of the right of self-defense in the circumstances of September 11th. The United States intended its military action to contribute to the suppression of terrorism. The international community, including Russia, led by Vladimir Putin in his first term as Russia’s president, agreed.

A state will fight to defend a “vital interest.” The suppression of terrorism has been a vital U.S. interest for decades. To advance this interest, the United States has used force repeatedly, although it has not engaged in protracted armed conflict solely because of terrorism except in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, the 1986 Libya attacks were retaliation for Libyan terrorism in Berlin. The United States attacked Iraq with cruise missiles in 1993 in response to an attempt to assassinate President George H. W. Bush. U.S. military operations in Afghanistan commenced on 7 October 2001, quickly chasing Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leader Mullah Omar into hiding. The fall of the Taliban government provided the context for political change in Kabul. Policy makers then began to add to the narrow military goals in Afghanistan, on the ground that they were necessary if terrorists were not to resume the use of the country as a base of operations. They therefore did not focus exclusively on training an Afghan army so that the national government might hope eventually to obtain something like a monopoly on force and the ability to secure the country against those who would use it as a terrorist base.
Right after the 11 September attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance to support the United States. This action ultimately led to the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), blessed by the UN Security Council, as the international military coalition in support of the Afghan government in its struggle against Taliban and other fighters at odds with the Kabul government. The United States and its partners helped create and protect an interim government and engaged in bringing cultural as well as political and security change to Afghanistan. Nearly a decade after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, UN Security Council resolutions reauthorizing ISAF and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan routinely contained the following language, which spoke to the magnitude and multiplicity of the missions: "Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance, human rights, rule of law and development as well as the cross-cutting issues of counter-narcotics, anti-corruption and accountability are mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges through a comprehensive approach . . ." In October 2001, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, had specifically rejected a “UN trusteeship in Afghanistan.” Yet the efforts needed to achieve these Security Council goals would involve long-term commitments of troops, civilians engaged in reconstruction of a state and society, and money. In this context, a decade is short-term. Afghan history, culture, and character militated against success. While a trustee might have looked forward to the long-term attempt to implement this agenda whatever the obstacles, the odds were stacked against success for a coalition partner of the Afghan government because of, among other things, different views of governance and lack of time.

The NATO mandate, announced at Lisbon in 2010, for wrapping up military operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 emphasized the complexity and importance of the task:

Our [NATO’s] ISAF mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance’s key priority, and we welcome the important progress that has been made. Afghanistan’s security and stability are directly linked with our own security. . . . We are entering a new phase in our mission. The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in some provinces and districts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision. Transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan. Through our enduring partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, we reaffirm our long-term commitment to a better future for the Afghan people.
NATO's Lisbon Declaration reflects two different but not competing realities. First, the United States and its allies wanted to assure the Afghan government and people that the relationship would endure. Officials in Washington and Kabul remembered well that that had not been the case after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Second, the Lisbon Declaration makes clear that the international coalition work of building Afghanistan necessarily would continue beyond the termination of NATO military operations at the end of 2014 and that international assistance equally would have to continue. Unstated is the view that Afghanistan will not be able to secure its future without such assistance.

NATO's declared aspiration for Afghanistan includes far more than a central army capable of controlling the country. It involves no less than the creation of a state of Afghanistan as developed countries understand the concept of “state”: a government with a monopoly on the use of force, capable of delivering fundamental services, including justice, throughout the country consistent with the rule of law. NATO adopted this goal and more in its May 2012 summit, and a month later several dozen countries committed themselves to high development goals at the Tokyo Donors Conference.34

The possibility that political, social, and economic developments in Afghanistan may not meet the NATO timetable has been no secret. In international meetings, Afghan officials have expressed their concerns about the durability of national institutions without ISAF protection and support. Some have even remarked that increased corruption reflected concern to provide for escape to foreign countries in the event the elected Afghan government was not strong enough to survive in a struggle with the Taliban. At the same time, NATO government officials seem to ignore the affirmation that “Afghanistan’s security and stability are directly linked with our own security.” Such language suggests that, above all, NATO and other forces are in Afghanistan to defend their respective national interests. Do they really believe it?

Against this background, what are the foreseeable consequences of a withdrawal of all U.S. and NATO armed forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 or even 2016? First, there will be no international force to continue to train and support the Afghan National Army. Whether that army will be able to perform its mission of maintaining the security and stability of Afghanistan against Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters is a question for professional assessment and for testing in battle. Some recent veterans of American military efforts in Afghanistan are optimistic, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that one should not expect the Afghan National Army, unassisted with materiel or advisers, to hold its own for long against Taliban and Al Qaeda, especially if joined by regional leaders seeking their own advantage vis-à-vis Kabul. Those veterans favor a modest ongoing U.S. military presence coupled with robust support to the Afghan government. If the
conventional wisdom is wrong, the United States and NATO will be able to point with some pride to the hard-won achievement such an outcome would represent.

If, on the other hand, the conventional wisdom is correct, then ongoing conflicts among Afghan regions and warlords (sometimes allied with, and sometimes aligned against, various Taliban factions), incursions by Afghanistan’s neighbors, unbridled poppy cultivation, Al Qaeda terrorist training camps, and Islamist social mores likely again will dominate Afghan life. We can anticipate that external powers—India, Pakistan, Iran, and China (and perhaps a newly reenergized Russia)—will vie for influence with which they could acquire what they think would be a strategic edge in this regional game. Pakistan, India, and Iran may exert influence through proxies, destabilizing a fragile Afghanistan. After withdrawal from Afghanistan, American influence and prestige there will be minimal. U.S. ability to play a constructive role to diminish the chances of nuclear proliferation or conflict and maintain and improve relations with Pakistan, India, and China will be problematic and beset by obstacles. Those countries will pursue their own interests without regard to Washington. Despite the “rebalance” to Asia, the U.S. disappearance from the Afghan scene will have a negative impact on American interests in the rest of Asia, stretching from Singapore to South Korea. Having seen the public alignment in 2010 of U.S. and NATO interests with Afghanistan’s, Asian states may well draw the conclusions, not only that they may not count on the United States in their estimates of future events and threats, but also that, going forward, they should ignore U.S. interests and protestations of interests. For the United States, which has long-standing commitments to friends and allies in Asia and which has fought four wars in Asia since 1941, this outcome would represent a serious challenge to vital interests and ability to fulfill commitments.

Quite apart from having an impact on the American position in Asia, a U.S. and NATO and possibly UN departure from Afghanistan foreseeably will have a most deleterious effect on those who have benefited from the coalition and UN efforts. Among them are a substantial number of women who again have been able to attend schools and participate in the political life of post-9/11 Afghanistan. It would be a human tragedy—and one with strategic implications, given the way Americans, NATO, and the United Nations think of themselves and portray themselves to the world, and given also the challenge to “the West” represented by Russia, among others—if the end of the U.S. and NATO military presence in Afghanistan restored a society that has values so at odds with those the coalition and United Nations brought there.35

Why does this situation matter to the United States? Governments and non-state actors have always paid attention to credibility and reliability—in short, to reputation. They base calculations of risk, cost, and benefit on them. Since World War II, the United States has played a decisive and continuous, if sometimes
controversial, role in the creation and development of an international community. It has done so because of how it understood its own national interests. The United States also has felt a general sense of global responsibility to use its power to avoid or prevent a general conflict that could involve nuclear weapons. The United States has seen this role as necessary to the regime of minimum world order essential to strengthen peace. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 are part of this strategic tradition. Were the United States to wash its hands of Afghanistan, other countries likely would conclude that the United States had formed a narrow role for itself in international affairs, a role inconsistent with its position during and immediately after the Cold War and with the responsibility it bears for helping the world avoid nuclear confrontations.

Ukraine and maritime issues in Asia raise questions about how to understand the U.S. international posture, questions that total withdrawal from Afghanistan would highlight. Would such a withdrawal mean only that the job is finished? Or should it be understood that the U.S. posture really is what, for example, the columnist Charles Krauthammer says it is: a rejection of the American role since 1945 in preventing international “chaos or dominance by the likes of China, Russia and Iran.” If this summary accurately describes U.S. policy, does it mean in those regions the same as it does in Afghanistan, namely, that they have to get along without the United States?

Afghanistan is not about to disappear as a source of issues and problems, no matter what Washington may wish. The narcotics dimension of Afghan reality escaped control by NATO and U.S. forces, and it will be an abiding aspect of Afghanistan in international affairs in the future. The Afghan economy largely depends on supplying opium to, principally, Europe's heroin consumers. Other states necessarily will concern themselves with Afghanistan in light of this industry. Some will try to profit from opium. Some will seek to use it as an insidious weapon against their enemies. Others will seek to limit the corrosive social impact of narcotics. Even more than Afghanistan's potential as a terrorist base, Afghanistan's continuing to produce high-quality opium likely will provide the locus of Afghan interaction with the rest of the world in the twenty-first century, as it was in the latter part of the twentieth century. It justifies treating Afghanistan as a strategically significant place, where law meets reality. For the United States and Europe, therefore, containing the Afghan opium trade will be an ongoing necessity. Opium means that it will not be possible to forget or ignore Afghanistan.

UKRAINE

Despite the history lesson from Henry Kissinger in the Washington Post on 5 March 2014 and his persuasive advocacy of seeking and finding a way, given
geographical and historical realities, to accommodate both Russia’s long, historical connection with Ukraine and Ukraine’s aspirations to chart its own course, the Russian posture on Ukraine puts the post–Cold War international regime under a lens. Indeed, it may presage Cold War II, as Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, has suggested: “This new conflict is unlikely to be as intense as the first Cold War; it may not last nearly as long; and—crucially—it will not be the defining conflict of our times. Yet, it will be for real.”

On 27 February 2014, Russia seized Crimea by force and purported to annex it on 21 March. The seizure took place four days after the Sochi Olympic Games, which Russia had used to show off its modernity, prowess, and class. Now, Russia occupies Crimea, a province of Ukraine, just as it does South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regions of the independent state of Georgia.

Russia’s action has political, strategic, and legal consequences and ideological aspects. Politically, at the least it raises a question about the safety of Russian neighbors that are independent states yet not part of NATO. Are they fair game for Russian coercion or expansionism? Will Russia test NATO by moving against a NATO country with a significant population of ethnic Russians and able to invoke Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance?

Strategically, not much has changed, because Russia already controlled Crimea as a naval base through agreement with the government of Ukraine. Legally, Russia has violated the bedrock international-law prohibition on the use of force, becoming a belligerent occupant in Crimea in the process: “All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes [set forth in Article 1 of the UN Charter] of the United Nations.” Russia is unable to claim that it is acting pursuant to the one exception to this rule, self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Ukraine has not threatened or used force against Russia. Russian nationals are not threatened. The fact that ethnic Russians who are Ukrainian citizens may want to become Russian citizens and take Crimea with them does not enable Russia to meet the test of self-defense, however expansively interpreted to include anticipatory self-defense, as in the case of Israel’s war against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in June 1967.

The ideological aspects of Putin’s ambition ought not to be ignored; the world has too much experience trying to understand ideologues who, ultimately, have had to be taken seriously in their own terms. It bears watching to see whether Putin’s Eurasian Union indeed proves to be the antidemocratic, anti-rule-of-law collectivity observers like Timothy Snyder fear. If so, the likelihood of a new version of ideological struggle, with elements akin to aspects of the Cold War, should not be discounted.
As of this writing, Russia has not invoked the right of self-defense as justification for its actions and has brushed aside other obligations, notably the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 5 December 1994 by the presidents of Russia and the United States and the prime minister of Great Britain. The document is of singular importance, although it is not a “treaty” as defined in either the U.S. Constitution or international law. Yet heads of state and government do not often sign documents of this kind. It recalls—indeed, it refers to—the 1968 declaration at the UN Security Council made by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in connection with the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that they would unite to ensure that the Security Council could take immediate steps to protect any non-nuclear-weapons state from attack or threat of attack with nuclear weapons.

In the 1994 memorandum, the United States, Britain, and Russia committed themselves to, among other things, respect the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, not to use or threaten the use of force, not to engage in economic coercion, and to consult in the event of a question arising about these commitments.

Russia has violated each of these commitments, while saying that the 1994 memorandum is no longer binding, because Ukraine is no longer the same as it was in 1994. This position represents bad faith and poor legal reasoning as well as doubtful strategy: commitments do not change with governments unless explicitly renounced. For example, Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter have not changed because it was the Soviet Union that originally made those commitments. The ongoing character of international obligations is even more important where nuclear weapons are concerned, as any alternative destabilizes the Non-Proliferation and arms-control treaty regimes for the whole world. In addition, as a legal matter, Russia’s actions make Russia a belligerent occupant, whose behavior is governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

The Convention recognizes that a belligerent occupant has rights; it also imposes duties. Above all, occupation does not affect legal status.

History is full of examples of states, including the United States, exploiting their superior strength at the expense of weaker neighbors. The run-up to World War II in Europe is much in people’s minds because Hitler used tactics similar to Putin’s with respect to the Sudetenland. The question for the rest of the world is what to do about it. Some share the view of Britain’s ambassador in Berlin in the 1930s:

What is defeatism? Is it to say that war sooner or later between Great Britain and Germany is inevitable? Or is [it] to say that peace can only be preserved if Germany is allowed to become one of the satisfied angels? I believe the latter, she may never
be satisfied but that is the risk we have got to face. I do not mean, when one talks of satisfying Germany, giving her a free hand, but I do mean basing one's policy towards her on moral grounds and not allowing oneself to be influenced by considerations of the balance of power or even the Versailles Treaty. We cannot win the battle for the rule of right versus might unless and until our moral position is unassailable. I feel this very strongly about the Sudeten question.\textsuperscript{54}

An alternative approach is represented by President Truman's response to the Berlin blockade in 1948 and French president Charles de Gaulle's to crises over Berlin in the late 1950s—a firm affirmation and defense of rights and insistence that the United States and its allies were not to be bullied or successfully threatened with world war.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, President George H. W. Bush and his allies would not let Iraq's 1990 attempt to annex Kuwait—Iraq's so-called Thirteenth Province—stand.\textsuperscript{56} Why did they care? They cared because they understood that the most important foundation of minimum world order after World War II was at stake and that to give in would not buy peace.\textsuperscript{57} The logic today is the same. Putin's Russia has used force to take control of two GeorgIan provinces and now a Ukrainian one. The character of the Ukrainian government and its politicians is irrelevant in this analysis.\textsuperscript{58} As President Obama said on 26 March 2014 Russia is “testing . . . the international order that we have worked for generations to build up.”\textsuperscript{59} The stakes could not be put more starkly, even though the president also said Russia will not “be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further escalation by military force.”\textsuperscript{60} He did say, however, that Russian isolation would deepen and sanctions would expand should Russia stay on its present course.

To impose high cost on Russia would not be difficult, although for some it might be expensive. Economically, Russia depends on the sale of its natural resources, principally oil and gas, and access to international financial markets to fund its budget and meet its payroll. The United States and its friends are in a position, because they control enough of the world oil and gas supply, to drive the prices of these commodities down. They could reduce or bar Russian access to international finance and conduct NATO military maneuvers to reinforce the impression of alliance unity in defense of the treaty area. The United States also could start Russian-language broadcasts to the region providing alternatives to Russian sources of news. Do the United States, its NATO allies, and closest international partners care enough to do so?\textsuperscript{61} They should. A third such Russian territorial gambit will cost far more to undo or block, to say nothing of the costs to law and order in the Far East if Putin's Crimea policy is followed by copycats.

A deeply cynical alternative approach on Russia's part would seek to exploit Ukraine's political and social culture. As in so many former parts of the Soviet Union, including Russia itself, corruption, kleptocracy, and near bankruptcy rather than real democracy, rule of law, and open markets have characterized
Ukraine’s government since 1989. Russia may be content to see the United States and its partners take responsibility for Ukraine’s economic performance, recognizing that for the foreseeable short term the costs, including the cost of Russian oil and gas, will be enormous. This reality does not undermine the world public-order impact of Russian action.

ASIAN MARITIME DISPUTES
The western Pacific washes the shores of Brunei Darussalam, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Each of these countries asserts claims to islands, rocks, and surrounding water, together with the land under the water. These waters see some of the world’s highest volumes of commercial shipping and fishing and hold promise of great mineral wealth in the seabed. In a rational world, these states would submit their competing claims to a court for authoritative decision according to the international law of the sea, codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which all the claimant states are parties. The world is not so rational. It operates according to power as well as law, and perhaps power more than law. The disputes in the western Pacific are political, geopolitical, and economic-political. There is no obligation that the claimants submit to judicial or other third-party dispute resolution, although they are obliged to settle their disputes peacefully. The situation raises profound strategic issues and questions, not unlike those raised by events in Afghanistan and Ukraine.

China, which has the most sweeping claims, including to most of the South China Sea as if it were a Chinese lake, is unwilling to engage in third-party dispute resolution, insists on discussing issues bilaterally, uses the military instrument to intimidate and coerce its neighbors into capitulating to Chinese claims, and seeks to avoid inclusion of the United States in any discussions. The South China Sea is the region’s principal shipping route and source of fish, as well as a potential source of natural resources, such as oil and gas. The United States recently clarified its interest in the region and its position on the various claims and disputes. On 5 February 2014, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel R. Russel testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on all the issues involved in the western Pacific maritime disputes. The statement is of such relevance as to deserve extensive quotation:

I think it is imperative that we be clear about what we mean when the United States says that we take no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the East China and South China Seas. First of all, we do take a strong position with regard to behavior in connection with any claims: we firmly oppose the use of intimidation, coercion or force to assert a territorial claim. Second, we do
take a strong position that maritime claims must accord with customary international law. This means that all maritime claims must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with the international law of the sea. So while we are not siding with one claimant against another, we certainly believe that claims in the South China Sea that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed. In support of these principles and in keeping with the longstanding U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program, the United States continues to oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that belong to all nations.

We are also candid with all the claimants when we have concerns regarding their claims or the ways that they pursue them. Our concerns include continued restrictions on access to Scarborough Reef; pressure on the long-standing Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal; putting hydrocarbon blocks up for bid in an area close to another country’s mainland and far away even from the islands that China is claiming; announcing administrative and even military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea; an unprecedented spike in risky activity by China’s maritime agencies near the Senkaku Islands; the sudden, uncoordinated and unilateral imposition of regulations over contested airspace in the case of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone; and the recent updating of fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea. These actions have raised tensions in the region and concerns about China’s objectives in both the South China and the East China Seas.

There is a growing concern that this pattern of behavior in the South China Sea reflects an incremental effort by China to assert control over the area contained in the so-called nine-dash line, despite the objections of its neighbors and despite the lack of any explanation or apparent basis under international law regarding the scope of the claim itself. China’s lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims has created uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region. It limits the prospect for achieving a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements among the claimants. I want to reinforce the point that under international law, maritime claims in the South China Sea must be derived from land features. Any use of the “nine dash line” by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it in accordance with the international law of the sea.

We support serious and sustained diplomacy between the claimants to address overlapping claims in a peaceful, non-coercive way. This can and should include bilateral as well as multilateral diplomatic dialogue among the claimants. But at the same time we fully support the right of claimants to exercise rights they may have to avail themselves of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms. The Philippines chose to exercise such a right last year with the filing of an arbitration case under the Law of the Sea Convention.
... All claimants—not only China—should clarify their claims in terms of international law, including the law of the sea.

In the meantime, a strong diplomatic and military presence by the United States, including by strengthening and modernizing our alliances and continuing to build robust strategic partnerships, remains essential to maintain regional stability. This includes our efforts to promote best practices and good cooperation on all aspects of maritime security and bolster maritime domain awareness and our capacity building programs in Southeast Asia. The Administration has also consistently made clear our desire to build a strong and cooperative relationship with China to advance peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, just as we consistently have encouraged all countries in the region to pursue positive relations with China. And this includes working with all countries in the region to strengthen regional institutions like ASEAN and the East Asia Summit as venues where countries can engage in clear dialogue with all involved about principles, values and interests at stake, while developing cooperative activities—like the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training initiative we recently launched—to build trust and mechanisms to reduce the chances of incidents.

To conclude, this is an issue of immense importance to the United States, the Asia-Pacific, and the world.65

This full and important statement of U.S. policy contains a number of points worth stressing. First, the American interest in the western Pacific is “of immense importance.”66 Second, the U.S. strategic interest lies in the maintenance and strengthening of traditional alliances and partnerships, freedom of the seas, the international law basis for maritime claims, mechanisms for managing confrontation and crisis, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Third, the United States sees itself as a great Pacific power, with a vital national interest in peace in the region. Inevitably, U.S. allies and friends are asking, can they rely as they have on American security guarantees in an Asia in which China is the most powerful state and is flexing its military muscle? A second question, which is beyond the capacity of any state apart from China to answer, concerns China’s relationship with the world. Is it along the lines Henry Kissinger described in the first part of his book on China, seeking recognition of its centrality in traditional Chinese terms of insisting on external forms of respect rather than domination or even an active leadership role in the global system?67 Or is it more in line with the UN Charter system to which China is committed, not only as a treaty party, but also as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, willing to take on global responsibilities and obligations?68

The South China Sea may provide an opportunity for constructive engagement with China with respect to piracy and other rule-of-law issues. The South China Sea and its environs have a high volume of piracy. While some littoral states, including China, may have citizens who engage in piracy or profit from it,
Beijing probably sees it as a problem to be addressed. It may find solutions that comport with international law more attractive in this area than with regard to title to the sea itself. American diplomacy should explore this subject with China. If China is attracted by a rule-of-law partnership against piracy, there might be a diplomatic foundation on which to build with respect to sovereignty.\(^69\)

**A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES**

U.S., Chinese, and Russian actions and inactions with respect to Afghanistan, Crimea, and the South China Sea have consequences in the short, medium, and long terms. It is imperative to analyze their significance. At least on the surface, they raise questions about the degree both of consensus behind the post–Cold War international order and to which defenders of that order immediately (and will for the foreseeable future) understand that it needs defending, including diplomatically and militarily. Contrary to those who believe that force is irrelevant or useless or unnecessary, successful diplomacy among the great powers has always depended on the understanding that real military capacity and a willingness to use it must back up words.\(^70\)

In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. intervention and then more than a decade of activity across a broad spectrum of governmental and societal functions have profoundly altered the Afghan landscape in the name of a coincidence of American, NATO, and Afghan interests. Withdrawal in these circumstances inevitably will raise questions about that coincidence of interests, unless it is accomplished in such a way as not to jeopardize them. In this context, Afghanistan touches issues of world order.

Similarly, Russia’s seizure of Crimea challenges the norms of international peace and security to which all states supposedly subscribe. Because of Russia’s importance as a great nuclear power, Moscow’s actions have a much greater impact than a lesser power’s would on global order. The same is true in the case of China.

China’s willingness to use its growing power to assert and defend maritime claims having no basis in law challenges all states that depend on seaborne trade. As one such maritime state, the United States inevitably sees its interests challenged. The challenge ought to be manageable, because every state knows where uncontrolled naval competition can lead. How to manage the challenge is the issue, one to be explored diplomatically in a range of capitals, not just Beijing.

The United States, Russia, and China ought to want a shared understanding of fundamental rules of international order. Those rules are set out in the UN Charter, although the Charter did not invent them. Actions implement those rules and give them day-to-day meaning. It behooves the United States and China to discuss how they understand Russia’s actions, how they would like to see the
South and East China Seas operate, and how they would like to see the future of Afghanistan unfold. The stakes are high. One interest the United States and the Soviet Union shared during much of the Cold War was based on agreement that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was dangerous. The taboo of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 remains stronger than many analysts believed it would. But it has weakened since Pakistan, India, and North Korea became nuclear-weapons states and may weaken further if Iran joins that club. This fact should draw the United States, Russia, and China closer together. As long as disagreements about world public order persist, such coming together is unlikely or at least extremely difficult to bring about. A breakdown in minimum public order may make such a dream become reality. A French antiwar question in 1939 was, “Why die for Danzig?” One hears the same question asked in connection with Crimea or Moldova or any of Putin’s other targets or potential targets. World War II was never about Danzig. The crisis Putin has provoked is not about Crimea or Ukraine, any more than the fate of Afghanistan is exclusively about Afghanistan or the crisscrossing claims in the western Pacific concern the rights of fish—the issues involve world public order.

NOTES

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2. Thus, the Syrian civil war, whose significance may not be underestimated, and other convulsions to which the United States has paid attention from time to time are absent from the article.


6. President Truman summed up the theme of his first volume of memoirs as follows: “I believe as I said on January 15, 1953, in my last address to the American people before leaving the White House: ‘We have averted
World War III up to now, and we may have already succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that war from happening as far ahead as man can see,” Harry S. Truman, 

7. Disagreements on interpretation and application do not detract from the centrality of these principles.

8. George Kennan, who conceived the containment policy, thought it would buy time for the weaknesses of the Soviet system to force fundamental change in Russia. See X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (July 1947), pp. 566–82.


13. See notes 46, 48 below.


17. “Crimea Crisis: Russian President Putin’s Speech [of March 18, 2014] Annotated,” *BBC News*, 19 March 2014, available at www.bbc.com/. My Russian-speaking summer research assistant, Daria Slepenkina, class of 2014, University of California–Irvine, finds that the English and Russian versions of President Putin’s speech differ in interesting and important ways. Both appear on the Kremlin website. The English translation uses the phrase “rule of the gun” instead of “the law of the strong” or “the right of strength,” which are closer to the Russian original. Putin’s Russian-language speech uses the passive voice when referring to U.S. actions. The English translation uses the active voice, with statements such as, “They hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya,” whereas the Russian version translates most accurately to, “And then there were the instances in Afghanistan, Iraq, and outright violations of the UN Security Council resolution on Libya.” In another example, the English translation refers to the no-fly zone over Libya and states...
that "they started bombing it, too." The Russian version uses the passive voice: "bombings began there, also." The discrepancies between the versions result in a more hostile, militant tone in English than in Russian. The English translation quoted here is at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889; the Russian text is at http://kremlin.ru/news/20603.


25. See Rostow, "International Law and the 2003 Campaign against Iraq." Without the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it is extremely unlikely that the United States and others would have invaded Iraq in 2003.


28. On 12 September 2001, NATO, for the first time in history, invoked Article 5, the provision of the Atlantic Alliance providing that an attack on a member constitutes an attack on all members. Pursuant to this decision, NATO allies flew AWACS radar aircraft (large, sophisticated surveillance and air-control platforms) over the United States to help secure U.S. airspace; see "Collective Defense," NATO, last updated 14 January 2014, www.nato.int/. ISAF operates in Afghanistan pursuant to an agreement with the Afghan government implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), which authorized the creation of ISAF as contemplated in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, on the future government of Afghanistan; Resolution 1386, UN Doc. S/RES/1386, 20 December 2001. U.S. armed forces not assigned to ISAF operate in Afghanistan pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, set forth in Article 51 of the UN Charter.


30. In informal UN Security Council "consultations" (not an official meeting), attended by the author.

31. A knowledgeable official once said at the National Defense University that the United States had created a government in Kabul that Afghanistan could not afford.

32. In 2010, at meetings on the future of NATO, observers spoke of the future, if any, of NATO as tied to "success" in Afghanistan.


43. Dennis Ross in 2004 summarized the run-up to, and the unfolding of, the Six-Day War as follows: “Nasser [president of Egypt], after being taunted by the Syrians and Jordanians for not doing enough to protect Syria in the face of escalating tensions and military engagements with Israel, demanded that U.N. Secretary-General U Thant pull the UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force, established in 1956 to separate Egypt and Israel] out of the Sinai. U Thant complied. Nasser moved Egyptian forces back into the Sinai. While probably not originally intending to do so, he acted to reimpose the blockade on the Israeli port of Eilat when he declared on May [22] that the Straits of Tiran were mined. In addition, he moved six Egyptian divisions to the Israeli border, threatening to inflict a final defeat on Israel once and for all.

44. For example, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Hitler, Mao.

45. Timothy Snyder states that “any democracy within the Eurasian Union would pose a threat to Putin’s Russia. Putin wants Ukraine in his Eurasian Union, which means that Ukraine must be authoritarian, which means that the Maidan must be crushed.” Snyder, “Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine,” p. 16. See also Michael Rühle, NATO Enlargement and Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas, NDC Research Report (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, 15 May 2014). Moscow’s arms control actions over several years add to concerns over Russia’s regional ambitions. In addition to testing at least one new weapon system in violation of, and another circumventing, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (see above note 9) in 2007, Russia suspended implementation of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, citing among other things the “illegitimate” agreement requiring it to withdraw troops from Georgia and Moldova. One year later came the military conflict with Georgia and the resulting expanded area of Russian occupation. “Russia Should


49. “Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State.”

50. “The End of the Beginning?” Economist, 8 March 2014, p. 23. See also “Russia and the EU Exchange Threats over Ukraine,” Stratfor: Global Intelligence, 12 March 2013, which states, “Russia has threatened to use powerful economic, political and military levers to pressure the fledgling government in Kiev and its European supporters” in order to achieve a “long-term goal of ensuring a neutral Ukraine, which it considers part of its sphere of influence, as a buffer with the European Union.”


52. Ibid., p. 207.


55. Tournoux, La Tragédie du Général, p. 315. (There would be no Munich—in response to Khrushchev’s threat to operate on the “cancer” of Berlin.)


57. See, for example, “Kidnapped by the Kremlin,” Economist, 8 March 2014, p. 11: “giving in to kidnappers is always dangerous: those who fail to take a stand to start with often face graver trials later on.”


60. Obama, “Remarks by the President.”


63. International law is enforced in a multiplicity of ways. Some might be slowing the processing of commercial documents, like bills of lading, or identifying a sudden need to repair canals. Others can involve noncommercial mechanisms causing a state discomfort or otherwise forcing it to comply with legal obligations and raising the cost of noncompliance (which is what the United States presumably is trying to do with respect to Russia’s seizure of Crimea).

64. Concerning the South China Sea as a Chinese lake: “The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea. . . . [Its width] is approximately 550–650 nautical miles (nm), and its length is 1200 nm.” Beckman, “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,” p. 143.

65. Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Maritime Disputes in East Asia, 5 February 2014 (testimony of Daniel Russel), available at www.state.gov/.

66. Ibid.


68. Brahma Chellaney sees China as entirely expansionist since the 1949 founding of the People’s Republic, increasing its territorial extent through “a ‘salami-slice’ strategy— or what Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) last May called a ‘cabbage’ strategy. This involves asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting—one at a time—cabbage-style multiple layers of security around a contested area so as [to] deny access to a rival. The establishment of an expansive air-defense zone in the East China Sea is its latest cabbage-style security layer move”; Brahma Chellaney, “Irredentist China Ups the Ante,” Forbes, 2 December 2013, www.forbes.com/. Robert Kaplan sees—perhaps just because the Caribbean washes American shores and is not too dissimilar to the South China Sea in extent—an analogy between China’s behavior and the dominant position of the United States in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico; see Robert D. Kaplan, “Beijing’s Caribbean Logic,” National Interest, 25 March 2014. But the United States, even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, has never asserted more than its law-of-the-sea rights.


The U.S. Navy has a looming officer-retention problem. More than a decade of prolonged high operational tempo and ever-increasing deployment lengths have fostered a sustained weariness “on the deckplates.” A rapidly improving economy and an erosion of trust in senior leadership, coupled with continued uncertainty about the future, mean the Navy could be facing its most significant officer-retention crisis since the end of the Vietnam War. Although this trend is also likely to impact our enlisted ranks as well, the emphasis in this article is on our officer corps, because of the significant negative impact that plummeting retention of junior-, mid-, and senior-grade officers can have on the enlisted members of their commands.

Unlike previous cycles of low retention, the one before us appears likely to challenge retention at all commissioned levels. Junior-officer retention in 2013 was tough and is forecast to become tougher. That year marked the worst in history for the special warfare community, with record numbers of lieutenant commanders declining to stay for promotion to the next pay grade. The aviation community saw a department-head bonus “take rate” (i.e., acceptances of a pay bonus in return for assuming department-head billets) of 36 percent, well below the 45 percent target needed to ensure community health. This low rate has most recently manifested itself in a shortfall in the number of eligible strike-fighter and electronic-warfare aviators available for consideration by the department-head screening...
The surface warfare community is also seeing an uptick in lieutenants leaving at the first opportunity, driving a historically low retention rate of around 35 percent even lower and indicating that a significant amount of talent in the surface warfare community walks out the door immediately following the first shore “tour” (assignment). This trend in the junior officer ranks is particularly troubling. While officers at or beyond the twenty-year mark have a retirement option, junior officers do not. In many cases they have invested six to ten years of their lives in a career field they are now willing to leave, convinced that the pastures are greener outside naval service.

Our retention of post-command commanders is also falling. A developing trend in naval aviation is representative of a larger problem facing most naval warfare communities. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, seven naval aviation commanders retired immediately following their command tours, a number that nearly doubled to thirteen in 2011, before jumping to twenty in 2012. Additionally, a survey of twenty-five prospective executive officers revealed that no less than 70 percent were already preparing for their next careers—earning transport pilot licenses, preparing résumés for the civilian workforce, or shopping for graduate schools. This trend is not limited to naval aviation. Checks with other community managers show similar disturbing trends, with increasing numbers of promising surface warfare and special warfare officers leaving at the twenty-year mark. These officers are tired of the time they must spend away from home, the high operational tempo, and the perceived erosion of autonomy of O-5s in command billets.3

Unfortunately, the fact that a growing number of quality officers have already left the service or are planning to do so seems to be going undetected by senior leadership. The Budget Control Act and subsequent sequestration, Strategic Choices and Management Review, the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, programmatic battles over the Littoral Combat Ship and Joint Strike Fighter, the rise of Air-Sea Battle, furloughs of civilian government employees, and the increasing number of firings of commanding officers are just a few of the significant issues (and distractors) with which senior leadership has had to contend since 2011. Now, in addition to all these, retention is poised to develop once again into the significant issue that it has historically become during military drawdowns.

My premise is that retention problems tend to be cyclical in nature and therefore largely predictable on the basis of knowable factors. Unfortunately, the ability of senior leadership to address the looming exodus proactively is being constrained by congressional pressure to control spending and by overreliance on “ex post facto” metrics that by their very nature are useful only after several years of falling retention rates. Instead, senior leaders within the Navy should, with the cooperation of the Department of Defense and Congress, take swift action,
with targeted incentives and policy changes, to help retain the best, brightest, and most talented naval officers for continued service and to ensure the “wholeness” of Navy manpower.

THE SITUATION

A four-star admiral speaking at the January 2014 conference of the Surface Navy Association commented that “we don’t have a retention problem,” leading many in the audience to wonder about the quality of his staff’s fact-checking. The reality is, however, that his comments were largely correct—if, that is, you define retention as simply the ability to fill required job billets with “bodies.” This points to one of the biggest problems with Navy manpower management: Our Manning system tends to focus heavily on the quantitative needs of the service at the expense of retaining the right officers—the ones with qualities like sustained performance in fleet operations, advanced education, and preferred skill sets.

Conversely, perhaps the admiral is correct—that is, while larger numbers of officers are leaving at all levels, we may actually be retaining exactly the type of people we need to ensure the future health of the officer corps. Naval service requires skills and resilience significantly different from those associated with many jobs in the private sector, and the officers who elect to stay might be precisely what the Navy needs. Even so, falling retention means lower selectivity—in effect, reducing the available pool of officers from which the Navy must choose its future leaders. The Navy, unlike its private-sector counterparts, cannot hire department heads, commanding officers, or senior officers from outside—we promote only from within. We need, therefore, high retention rates to ensure the health of the service. But lower rates are here, and they are likely to worsen in the next few years.

In fact, officer retention is at a tipping point; events and trends from our past, present, and anticipated near-term future are converging to impact retention negatively. In short order we will begin losing a large number of officers—each with more than a decade of operational wartime experience—and they will be taking their expertise and lessons learned with them. This highlights the critical issue—although qualifications can be replaced, experience cannot. We must act swiftly. We may be constrained in our own options for responding to falling retention rates, but the global demand for the talent for which we are competing is not.

The primary factors leading to the pending departure of officers can be categorized as associated with the past, present, or future. The research sources from which they are derived include news reports, internal Navy documents, studies by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and “Fortune 500” initiatives used to retain the best, brightest, and most talented. The listing that follows also
relies heavily on informal and small-group interviews conducted by the author with more than two hundred naval officers from the surface, submarine, aviation, SEAL (special warfare), and Explosive Ordnance Disposal communities—ranging from the newest ensigns to rear admirals—since July 2011.

**Factors from Our Past Affecting Retention**

**Sustained High Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO).** Between 1987 and 1999, the average length of deployments in the Navy was approximately 180 days. Average deployment length has crept steadily upward since the attacks of 11 September 2001. By the end of fiscal year 2013 carrier strike groups were typically at sea for more than eight months at a time, ballistic-missile-capable surface combatants for eight or nine months, and submarines for six and a half months. Drastic examples of extended OPTEMPO (the proportion of time a unit is away from its home port or base) abound, such as the 2012 and 2013 USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) Carrier Strike Group deployments, which lasted a combined fifteen and a half months, with only a short respite (five and a half months) between, and more recently, the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69) group, which deployed twice for a total of ten and a half months with only a two-month break. According to the *Navy Times*, 2013 marked the fourth-highest year for OPTEMPO since the Navy began tracking this statistic; 2012 was the highest year.

Current OPTEMPO generally reflects a situation similar to that before 1986. Prior to that year ships were at sea for approximately six months before rotating back to the United States for nine-month maintenance and resupply periods. That high operational tempo, in a period without a corresponding crisis (see following section), resulted in rapidly declining reenlistment and officer-retention rates. In response, Admiral James D. Watkins, the twenty-second Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and John Lehman, then Secretary of the Navy, moved to a new schedule that continued the six-month deployment period but kept the carrier strike groups home for twelve to fourteen months, reducing operations and maintenance costs while increasing retention and quality of life for sailors. Of note, the Navy had fourteen aircraft carriers at the time.

As for today, all respondents—junior and senior alike—cite unreliable cruise schedules and consistently long deployments (more than seven months) as factors affecting their decisions regarding continued naval service. In short, sustained high operational tempo is perceived as placing an incredibly large burden on service members and their families and is likely to continue as the battle-force ship count continues to shrink.

**A Conflict We Can Believe In.** Increased patriotism following the attacks on 11 September 2001 resulted in a measurable rise in retention in both officer and enlisted ranks. The retention rates for surface warfare and submarine officers...
completing their minimum service requirement rose from pre-9/11 levels of 27 percent and 32 percent, respectively, to 33 percent and 43 percent. The increase in surface warfare officer retention was short-lived, however, although submarine retention remained elevated until mid-2004. Likewise, retention for naval pilots reaching their minimum service requirement was 31 percent pre-9/11 but rose steadily to 53 percent by mid-2004 before once again dropping off. Officers serving in special operations and special warfare billets also mirror this trend, with retention increasing 200–300 percent following 9/11. Most restricted-line careers (e.g., intelligence and engineering-duty officers) demonstrate varying levels of increased retention immediately following 9/11, and enlisted retention rates also mirror this larger trend, with cohorts having up to ten years’ service showing the most significant increases.9

In general, a belief in the importance of one’s unit’s mission is critically important to those surveyed for this article; it is a significant factor, positively impacting retention. Most respondents cite patriotism, the opportunity to serve their country, esprit de corps, and a desire to be a part of “something larger than themselves” when deciding to join the Navy. Whether these needs are met is important when they decide whether to remain in uniform.

A Global Economy in Distress. The global financial crisis that began in August 2007 and continued into 2008 also played a large role in elevating retention rates across all pay grades, not just those reaching their initial minimum service requirement during that period. A December 2013 Center for Naval Analyses report illustrates a general trend of increasing retention following 2008. Several career paths—notably surface warfare, submarines, special warfare, special operations, and the medical corps—have, however, shown marked corrections back to low retention rates since 2011, as the global economy has stabilized and the national press corps has furthered the perception of improving domestic economic factors. The global economic downturn and stock market crash in 2008, coupled with negative economic signals in the years immediately following, convinced many of those surveyed to remain in uniform rather than brave a difficult civilian hiring environment.

Revocation of Critical-Skills Bonuses for Senior Officers. The revocation of critical-skills bonuses for senior officers (in this case, above the grade of commander, O-5) is a significant driver of our impending officer retention crisis.10 In the absence of service obligations incurred by accepting such bonuses, many will take advantage of their retirement eligibility within a year of their changes of command. Aviation-specific metrics, as previously mentioned, are startling. In 2010, seven commanders retired immediately following completion of command tours, a number that increased to thirteen in 2011 before jumping to twenty in
2012—that is, roughly 15 percent of the officers annually “screened” (formally designated as qualified) for command.

As of February 2014, twenty-two sitting commanding officers had already communicated intentions to leave the naval service immediately following their tours. The Aviation Officer Distribution branch of the Naval Personnel Command also tracks the number of aviation commanding officers who are in a command tour and are not obliged to accept follow-on orders by having accepted a critical-skills bonus: 58.4 percent of current commanding officers are not so held, increasing to 100 percent of commanding officers by 2016. Already nearing the twenty-year mark, many of these commanding officers can “walk” immediately following their command tours. This trend is also appearing in the special warfare community; this year marked a 500 percent increase in the number of post-command commanders retiring at the twenty-year mark.

In a traditional sense, it is understandable why the bonus was withdrawn. As retention remained high following the 2007 worldwide economic crisis, why pay someone to remain who is willing to stay anyway? Unfortunately, this creates a “pay inversion,” in which lower-ranking officers—with far less responsibility—make more than their commanding officers, sending a negative signal regarding the value of the commanding-officer position.

Another problem is that bonuses lag retention problems by several years; adjusting them requires several time-consuming steps. First, the service needs to discern lower-than-average retention, then request bonus reinstatement, which requires high-level policy approval before the bonus can finally be implemented. Requests to reinstate critical-skills bonuses for senior officers have been made in recent years but have been slow to gain traction with Navy civilian leadership, who require metrics demonstrating the need. Unfortunately, metrics lag the problem too, and in any case they track only the quantity of officers staying, not necessarily their quality. As figure 1 indicates, the critical-skills bonus for senior aviators was actually withdrawn when it was needed most—the last year it was offered was fiscal 2011, when a marked increase in post-command retirements was occurring. This bonus, along with the short-term critical-skills bonus for surface warfare commanding officers, was withdrawn three years ago as part of a response to the Budget Control Act of 2011.

**(Factors Presently Affecting Retention**

**Withdrawal from Crisis Operations.** We have noted that a service member’s belief in the mission and a perception of high quality of work significantly and positively affect retention. In support, a 2004 CNA study examining the effect of personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO, a measure of the proportion of time that service members—as opposed to given ships and units—are away from
home port, etc.) on retention noted that reenlistment rates among sailors who deployed longer than eight months in support of DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD did not decrease. The reason? “The morale-boosting effect of participating in national crises offset the hardships.”14

The drawdown of real-world operations in the Middle East and elsewhere has removed one of the most powerful factors keeping quality officers in the Navy. Accordingly, the other factors affecting retention will have outsize effects, since they will not be offset by morale-building participation in national crises. Withdrawing from crisis operations is good for the nation’s overall well-being, but it causes our best and brightest to look for the next challenge to tackle—which may very well be out of uniform and in the civilian sector. Our current increased OPTEMPO in the absence of some single, overarching national crisis is a powerful contributor to decreasing retention.

The Perception of a Rapidly Improving Economy and Retirement of Baby Boomers. Press coverage of the national economy has rapidly changed in tone in recent months, transitioning from the 2012 election cycle (negativity and perceived economic stagnation) to a sharp uptick in corporate and consumer optimism following the 2013 holiday retail season. Recent months have also seen the passage of several large congressional spending bills, a largely uncontested debt-ceiling extension, proclamations of growing American “energy independence,”
shrinking unemployment, stabilization of global markets, and growth in U.S. gross domestic product. These are all signs of an improving economy and of a job market trending positively.

Unfortunately, these signals of an improving national economy come at exactly the same time that senior military leadership is testifying about budget shortfalls. This juxtaposition leads a service member to conclude that while the future looks bright for employment outside the service, the military is likely to continue its present (and painful) process of budgetary contraction and downsizing.

Further impacting the national labor market is the ongoing retirement of millions of “Baby Boomers,” the segment of the population born in the post–World War II period of 1946–64. The first Baby Boomers reached sixty-five years of age in 2011.\textsuperscript{15} The requirement for skilled labor will accelerate as Boomers exit the workforce, creating additional external demand for quality sailors currently serving in uniform. In particular, recruitment efforts by civilian employers are likely to increase to keep pace with the workforce needs of a recovering American economy.

Figure 2 provides another leading (that is, predictive) indicator of the relationship between an improving economy and waning desire to serve in the military. All U.S. service academies experienced significant growth in applications from 2006 to 2013. The Naval Academy recorded the largest number of applicants, growing from 10,747 applicants in 2006 to a record 20,601 in 2012. The following year, however, the number of applicants to Annapolis fell by 14 percent, to 17,819. While inconclusive, being only a singular data point, this sudden drop could reflect the beginning of a return to historical norms for applications and serve as

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\textbf{FIGURE 2}
APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY (2006–2013)

Source: Application numbers derived from U.S. Naval Academy reports on the classes of 2010 through 2017.
an early indicator of decreased interest in military service, for new accessions as well as people currently in uniform.

**Influx of Millennials.** Numerous studies have been conducted on the differences among demographic groups in the workplace, most notably Baby Boomers, “Generation X” (born 1965–80), and “Millennials” (1981–95). One of the most concise is a recently concluded effort jointly conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the University of Southern California, and the London Business School in 2011–12. It collected data from more than forty thousand respondents, including 13,150 PwC employees (9,120 Millennials and 4,030 non-Millennials) at the same points in their careers. Some notable differences between Millennials and their non-Millennial counterparts include the following:16

- Millennial employees are unconvinced that excessive work demands are worth the sacrifices in terms of personal life.
- Millennials say, even more so than their non-Millennial counterparts, that strong cohesive, team-oriented workplace cultures and opportunities for interesting work—including assignments around the world—are important to satisfaction.
- While the same basic drivers of retention exist for both Millennials and non-Millennials, their relative importance varies; in particular, Millennials place a greater emphasis on being supported and appreciated.

Addressing retention, the report notes, “Generational differences do exist among Millennials and non-Millennials, and should be taken into account by organizations that include employees from both groups. For example, Millennials are more likely to leave if their needs for support, appreciation and flexibility are not met, while non-Millennials are more likely to leave if they feel they are not being paid competitively, or due to a perceived lack of development opportunities.”17 This point has alarming implications for senior naval leadership, since the service’s traditional top-down approach and differences in perspectives are likely to hinder cross-generational communication.

Another concern is the Millennials’ perspective on employment, which is more characterized by a “transactional approach” than those of Baby Boomer or Generation X officers. In general, Millennials, the youngest of these, are not emotionally invested in or tied down by between four and eight years of naval service. They are more willing to vote with their feet if they feel their needs are not being met, forcing the service to adapt or suffer a loss of talent as disenfranchised service members leave—reducing, as we have noted, the pool that will produce our future senior leaders.
Millennials also place significant value on post-baccalaureate education, a milestone not readily available in certain operational officer career paths. It is significant that the post-9/11 Montgomery GI Bill, with its generous benefits package, inadvertently provides an incentive and a readymade pathway to leave the naval service to pursue advanced education.

**Risk Aversion and a Shift toward Centralization of Command Authority.** Views on this topic were difficult for respondents to put into words, but it was cited by a vast majority of those dissatisfied with their current naval service. In short, they perceive a withdrawal of decision-making power from operational commanders, a shift from a leadership-centric Navy to a service more focused on risk mitigation and metrics.

Many respondents in the author’s research reported what they see as a continuing service-wide “zero-defect mentality”—that is, in this context, an institutional unwillingness to forgive (perhaps arbitrarily defined) mistakes or failings. This perception is bolstered by a growing number of reliefs for cause of commanding officers, an increasing reliance on quantitative metrics that do not necessarily correspond to actual mission capability, and loss of clear strategic direction to subordinates. Other problems cited include implementation by the surface warfare community of an overbearing examination process for command, loss of esprit de corps owing to excessive uniform standardization, and ever-increasing administrative responsibilities (compounded, ironically, by the Navy’s 2013 “Reduction of Administrative Distractions” initiative).

Another example is a recent movement within the Navy to eradicate behavior that is, by its very nature, ineradicable. U.S. Navy leaders firmly believe in the importance of social issues, but as team members of Task Force RESILIENT, mandated in 2013 by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations “to make recommendations to improve organization, training, resources and metrics,” discovered, there is a substantial opportunity cost in trying to do so. Team members noted, for instance, that most efforts to eradicate suicide had a very discernible price point beyond which there was little or no additional benefit. By extension, there is no dollar amount that can be spent, or amount of training that can be conducted, that will completely eradicate such complex problems as suicide, sexual assault, or reliefs for cause—yet we continue to expend immense resources in this pursuit. Sailors are bombarded with annual online training, general military training, and stand-downs in an effort to combat problems that will never be defeated. The deckplate perception is that these efforts are undertaken not because of their effectiveness but in response to political and public pressure and oversight.

Respondents also note to the author that senior leaders seem too eager to lay accountability at the feet of midlevel leaders without providing the
commensurate authority needed to make changes, and while failing to accept the risks required to back up these subordinates. This tendency has been captured in several surveys and was recently highlighted during the U.S. Naval Institute’s 2014 West Conference, where a panel on retention cited a recent survey finding that surface warfare officers are decrying a decreasing quality of senior leadership. Sailors continue to perceive an overfocus by senior leadership on social issues, at the expense of discussions of war fighting—a point that demoralizes junior and midgrade officers alike.

Britain’s Royal Navy saw a similar shift from leadership-focused to administrative efficiency–focused ship command between 1805 and 1916, and the results were disastrous. Admiral Horatio Nelson’s fleet at Trafalgar used only a handful of signals to prepare for battle, relying on the competence, leadership ability, and personal relationships among the commanding officers to guide the fighting when they engaged the enemy. By the time Admiral John Jellicoe led the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet at the battle of Jutland, command positions were being assigned on the basis of officers’ ability to execute rapidly and flawlessly a myriad of detailed signals promulgated by a central command authority. At Trafalgar the British scored a messy but decisive victory over the Spanish fleet, but could achieve no better than a disappointing tactical draw against the Germans at Jutland.

Ultimately, the reduction of latitude in decision making at the commanding-officer level is perceived as creating a more risk-averse climate than existed in the generations preceding. Several naval warfare community managers cite the erosion of independent decision making in command and the perception of risk aversion as significant reasons for falling junior-officer retention rates.

**Erosion of Trust in Senior Leadership.** “People are our most important asset”—a familiar claim that is routinely brought up by officers in connection with erosion of trust in senior leadership and its impact on retention. The passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and subsequent sequestration has eroded the belief that senior leadership takes care of its service members and civilian shipmates. People may be our most important asset, but the perception is that policies and recent actions are inconsistent with quality of life, quality of work, and readiness.

One has only to study the history of personnel- and operational-tempo instructions issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) since the original introduction of these measures to realize that leadership is not shy about redefining standards when it is unable to meet them. Admiral James Watkins, as CNO, laid out the personnel tempo concept in October 1985 to address the “hollow force” and retention concerns of the years following the Vietnam War. As further codified in 1990, PERSTEMPO was part of a “deliberate process to balance support of national objectives with reasonable operating conditions.
for our naval personnel, and maintain the professionalism associated with going to sea while providing a reasonable home life.”

Three key expectations for the employment of U.S. naval forces were established: maximum deployment length of six months, minimum turnaround ratio of two to one, and a minimum of 50 percent time in home port for a unit over a five-year period. Unfortunately, successive instructions have extended the cruise length to eight months and reduced the turnaround ratio to one to one, as a result of which a unit might enjoy only eight months of time in home port following eight months at sea.

Beyond the redefined operational/personnel-tempo standards, the actions taken by the 2011 Enlisted Retention Board represent what is perhaps the single largest perceived breach of trust. Reaction in the fleet was well publicized when 2,946 midcareer enlisted sailors were discharged to correct the overmanning of thirty-one ratings—followed almost immediately by an announcement indicating a need for more sailors. These seemingly contradictory decisions produced an impression in the fleet of gross mismanagement of manpower. The Navy’s manpower management tool, known at that time as Perform to Serve (PTS), was run through the mud, prompting a substantive change to “PTS 3-2-1” before being superficially rebranded as “Career Navigator” in an effort to address sailor resentment.

Other examples include the forced administrative furloughs of Navy civilians for eleven days (later reduced to six days by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel), comments by senior leaders that “we have to show the pain” by reducing base and installation services, shifts of promotion zones and delays of officer promotions by a year to save money, and recent “attacks” on the military pay, compensation, and pension system.

The perceived erosion of trust in senior leadership is an incredibly powerful contributor to negative trends in retention. The problem is likely exacerbated by the twenty-four-hour news cycle, increased use of social media, near-real-time “fact-checking,” and the dilemma whereby senior leadership is forced to balance strategic communications between making plain to Congress the pain of sequestration and communicating to sailors the value of naval service.

Factors in Our Future Affecting Retention

Reduction in Operational Funding. Unlike our sister services, the Navy is not designed to be a garrison force. Since the War of 1812 it has been tasked with securing America’s interests abroad while providing defense in depth for the continental United States. This need to be “where it matters, when it matters” ensures that the service will continue to prioritize deployments overseas to assist in deterring aggression while assuring allies of America’s commitment. Unfortunately, the recent decrease in resources has not been matched by a corresponding decrease in requirements for overseas presence.
The fear is that recent reductions in operations and maintenance accounts will further reduce funding for steaming days and flight hours. While the Navy's forward-deployed forces have largely escaped the ax, many units homeported in the United States have spent increasingly lengthy periods at sea while other units have little operational time, creating a perception of “haves” and “have-nots.” In short, sailors are expected to work harder and deploy longer but with less training, fewer resources, and no clear purpose justifying the increased demands other than “forward presence.”

The Navy's School of Aviation Safety in Pensacola, Florida, offers five-day safety courses for prospective commanding officers. One course, designed to pass along the results of recent aviation unit-culture workshop surveys, notes that the most consistent survey result is “Based upon our current manning/assets, my unit is overcommitted.” In this case, the survey item is ranked forty-seventh of forty-seven (on a scale of negativity) by all three squadrons sampled, making it by a significant statistical margin the most worrisome negative trend. It is followed closely by “Fatigue due to current operational commitments is degrading performance.” A pre-command O-5 taking the course summed up this factor nicely by saying that in the near term his squadron is likely to experience an “increase in fatigue, an increase in collateral duties, with a corresponding decrease in morale.”

Fear of a Stagnating or Decreasing Quality of Life. Unlike in the retention downturns of the 1970s and 1990s, today's service members are compensated very well. A 2011 report from the Congressional Research Service notes that “in the nearly 10 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, basic pay has increased nominally by nearly 35 percent (figure not adjusted for inflation). This figure does not include other increases in allowances, bonuses, or incentives. The cumulative effect is that most analysts now agree that the average annual cost per service member exceeds $100,000.”

Despite tangible increases to quality of life for service members, in terms of pay and benefits, the previously discussed erosion of trust in senior leadership has officers and enlisted alike nervous about future impacts to the workforce. The current perception is that pay and benefits are likely to stagnate or decrease in the near future, a perception that, once again, negatively impacts retention. A February 2014 announcement by Secretary Hagel regarding military pay and benefits is likely to perpetuate this fear, further fueled by media headlines like “DoD Budget Seeks Cuts in BAH [Basic Allowance for Housing], Commissary, Tricare Benefits” and “Hagel to Recommend Deep Cuts to Military Pay, Benefits.”

Continued Operational Uncertainty and High Operational Tempo. A vast number of officers informally polled for this research respond that continued long deployments and continued uncertainty in cruise schedules have them planning to
leave the naval service within the next two to five years. An attempt to provide the stability and predictability for which sailors are looking—the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP)—was publicly unveiled at the 2014 symposium of the Surface Navy Association. Realigning surface combatants with their associated carrier strike groups will increase predictability—that is, for force planners. Unfortunately, early discussions “on the deckplates” suggest that O-FRP is being received with skepticism. Several issues exist (see figure 3).

First, cruise lengths have been extended to a minimum of eight months—shorter than some recent deployments but still a 33 percent increase over the six-month standard set in 1986 and carried forward until recent years. Second, O-FRP is purported to signal a shift from the “demand-based” response of recent years to global force-management needs to a “supply-based” approach, but the slides and language used during the unveiling tell a different story. Of particular interest here is the “X factor,” a fourteen-month period following an eight-month deployment in which a unit is considered available to be sent back to sea as part of “surge and sustainment” responses to real-world contingencies. If the last ten years are any indication, the Navy can indeed expect to “surge” during these fourteen-month periods. As briefed to the Surface Navy Association, this period will likely result in additional time at sea based on funding levels or national interests—undercutting the promised predictability of a true supply-based system (see figure 3).

Third, representatives from Navy Personnel Command and Chief of Naval Operations staff state that despite O-FRP’s public unveiling, the majority of work to implement the new deployment cycle remains to be completed. In the meantime, a new breach-of-trust issue may have been created, since nine-month (and possibly longer) cruise lengths are predicted to persist for at least two more years.

The commentator and Democratic strategist James Carville captured national sentiment during the 1992 presidential election when he declared
(slightly varying his guidance for Bill Clinton's presidential-campaign team), “It's the economy, stupid.” For the Navy, the equivalent issue for the near term is likely to be operational tempo, with its unusually long deployments and uncertainty regarding family separations.

**Longest and Largest Commercial Airline Hiring Spree.** The forecast hiring spree in commercial aviation will rapidly begin to impact retention in naval aviation, much as it did during the 1990s. Many commercial pilots were furloughed following 9/11, and hiring has been relatively stagnant for the past five years, creating a pent-up demand. Another challenge is a 1 August 2014 Federal Aviation Administration rule change that biases Air Transport Pilot licenses in favor of military pilots. By the new rule (the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010), pilots with military experience need far fewer hours to qualify than do their nonmilitary counterparts. In fact, the average junior officer reaching the minimum service requirement already has (at the expense of the government) the necessary flight time:

- With military experience, 750 hours
- Without military experience but with a four-year aviation college, a thousand hours
- Without military experience but with a two-year aviation college, 1,250 hours
- Without military experience and with nonstructured education, 1,500 hours.

Additional future retention pressures have their origins in changes in 2007 to the mandatory retirement age for pilots increasing the retirement age for a commercial pilot from sixty to sixty-five and delaying numerous retirements until 2013. Based on this change and overall worldwide demand, a recent estimate claims that fifty thousand pilots or more will be needed through 2024. This prospect compounds the looming challenge for the Navy of retaining the best, brightest, and most talented fixed-wing pilots, who are already affected by the other retention factors previously explored.

**OPPORTUNITIES TO OUTRUN THE STORM**

Recommendations for changes to policy include aligning “Stay Navy” messaging across the leadership; incentivizing officers to remain in service for operational command opportunities; refocusing operational command on operational employment and leadership, not “administrivia”; improving access to and the quality of Navy “enterprise” (i.e., broad functional areas within the Department of the Navy) resources; modifying statutory and administrative selection boards; and emphasizing unit-level morale and esprit de corps.
Enable Commanding Officers to Communicate Better with Sailors. In today’s 24/7 media environment, which bombards sailors with information, it is more important than ever for the “Stay Navy” message to be aligned across all levels; conflicting information risks eroding trust and confidence. This alignment requires senior leadership to determine desired strategic end states, to construct appropriate messages, and to share that message across all levels. There are several ways we can improve our “Stay Navy” message to inform the fleet better and aid retention.

First, expand on existing products. The Navy is a geographically dispersed organization, a fact that makes the timely sharing of information critically important. About weekly, senior leadership receives Chief of Naval Information talking points, helping ensure that admirals and Senior Executive Service members are “on message” regarding forecasted areas of interest. Why not tailor a version for officers in command? The Chief of Naval Information’s current talking points could help deckplate leaders with the “whys” behind current decisions with access to relevant and timely background information. The commanding officer (or officer in charge of smaller units) can further tailor this information to share the importance of their mission with the sailors the officer leads, conveying that our sailors serve with a purpose. This product should include quarterly updates regarding programs that directly impact sailors, including the Career Navigator and 21st Century Sailor programs.

Second, public affairs officers on the staffs of type commanders (with administrative, personnel, training, and maintenance responsibilities for, e.g., surface ships) should provide relevant talking points to commanding officers and officers in charge. These talking points, combined with those from the Chief of Naval Information, will help keep deckplate leaders informed about their communities’ “hot button” topics. One of the worst answers a leader can give to a question on such a topic is “I don’t know”—but it is even worse to make up on the fly a response that does not correspond with the truth.

It is critically important that deckplate leaders be “pushed” this information rather than be required to “pull” it—in particular after it has become necessary. The point is to help leaders at all levels remain informed so that they can speak intelligently and with one voice. Asking leaders—who are already task saturated—to create their own talking points as they go risks perpetuating incorrect or misleading messages.

Third, messaging needs to reflect retention realities and provide facts to sailors now that relative budget stability has returned. The past few years of budget impacts and the messages that went along with them created a belief that the Navy is in a state of chronic decline. Communication with the fleet needs to emphasize once again the “good news” of naval service, especially against the background of
predictive signals of falling retention. It is important that sailors, and the nation, recognize the importance of the Navy’s mission. The Navy’s overseas presence for global stability, including the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, is a perfect vehicle for this message. Leaders should emphasize the tangible benefits of naval service: service to the nation, the incredible quality of the men and women beside whom we serve, and the reality that the public sector has few jobs that can compare with what we do in uniform. While leadership understands all this to be true, these facts are not clearly discussed or understood by officers and enlisted approaching their first minimum-service milestone.

Revocation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense National Security Waiver of 8 October 2001. As we have seen, long deployments, extended time away from home, and uncertainty in cruise schedules are significant negative drivers for retention. The 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided for payment of “high deployment” per diem to service members who exceeded 250 days away from home over a 365-day period. This change was intended to force commanders “to be faced with the dilemma of spending dollars on readiness issues or on high-deployment per diem” for service members; payments were to begin on 5 November 2001. The 2002 NDAA stipulated that these payments were to be made from each service’s operations and maintenance account, deliberately reinforcing the difficulty of the choice. The original 2000 NDAA, however, had included a waiver process that could be invoked when high deployment rates were necessary to the national security interests of the United States. This waiver was exercised by Paul Wolfowitz, then deputy secretary of defense, on 8 October 2001, before any high-deployment per diem payments were made, and it remains in effect today, thirteen years later.

Revocation of this waiver is overdue. The dismantling of Al Qaeda, the withdrawal of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the shift to a steady-state effort in the war on terror have significantly reduced the requirement for a high operational tempo. Ending this waiver will place our sailors’ consistent concern—high operational tempo—front and center, by requiring payments for excessive time away from home port. These payments will emphasize the importance of our sailors’ mission, compensate them for their service beyond congressionally mandated limits, and bring Navy decision making in alignment with current operational realities. The Navy should recommend revocation to the deputy secretary of defense.

Reinstitute Critical-Skills Bonuses for Surface Warfare and Aviation Commanding Officers. One of the most important aspects of Navy culture is the near reverence it accords to operational command: “A vital part of developing our total force strategy and maintaining combat readiness is to provide appropriate incentives to
retain skilled personnel for critical [community] enterprise billets. This statement, from the last surface warfare–community message offering a command bonus, sums up the importance of reinstating a critical-skills bonus for surface warfare and aviation officers serving in operational command. This payment should be reinstituted as a three-year bonus of no less than $15,000 a year, beginning when the officer assumes command. This program would cost $9,600,000 annually—$4,200,000 to fund ninety commanders selected for surface warfare command and $5,400,000 for 130 officers selected for naval aviation command, across three years. The critical-skills bonus for commanding officers is an important lever for inducing quality officers to remain for subsequent tours, while clearly communicating the value the Navy assigns to O-5 command.

First, restoration of the bonus will correct the current pay inversion, previously mentioned, whereby certain department heads under long-term “continuation pay” contracts make more than their commanding officers. Junior personnel look up their chain of command for tangible signals regarding the value of their future service, and they want to see that command is something to which to aspire—hard to prove when department heads make more than their executive and commanding officers.

Second, the bonus, beginning once the officer “fleets up” from executive officer (i.e., second in command), will incentivize remaining in the service for a full tour following command. The current system enables a substantial number of officers to retire shortly following their command tours, at the twenty-year mark. Retention of these officers for follow-on tours will bring them closer to selection for captain (O-6), which in turn increases their incentive to remain for two more tours until retirement as a captain, traditionally after approximately twenty-six years of cumulative service—because the last three years of active duty, on which retired pay is based, would be served at that higher grade.

Third, the bonus—available after seventeen or eighteen years of cumulative service—will provide an additional reason for junior officers and department heads to remain beyond their minimum service requirements. As we have seen, keeping our best, brightest, and most talented in the service for their entire careers ultimately improves the pool of candidates available for major command. Losing this talent and experience reduces the selectivity possible for administrative and statutory boards and potentially the quality of officers available for promotion to flag rank.

Most important, the critical-skills retention bonus for commanders in operational billets should remain in place regardless of fiscal climate or retention statistics. It represents a consistent message to junior and senior personnel alike regarding the importance of operational command. Understandably, all expenses deserve scrutiny during a period of declining budgets, but the Navy does not save
much by eliminating critical-skills bonuses, which represent a small cost that provides a substantial return on investment. Instead, command bonus fluctuations create an adverse impression concerning the value (or lack thereof) of O-5 command. A bonus consistently paid upon screening for command will convey to all officers, Millennials in particular, that this position is valued and to be sought after.

**Move Milestone-Screened Individuals to the Top of the Lineal Number Lists for Their Year Groups.** Individuals should be moved to the top of the lineal number lists for their year groups (that is, establishing relative seniority among officers commissioned the same year) once they are selected for their next major career milestones. Under the current system, officers remain in the same relative lineal ordering with officers who fail to screen for major milestones, a situation exacerbated by the recent shift, another cost-saving measure, to small, monthly promotion zones (seniority groups formally considered for promotion). In the current situation an officer can fail to be selected for the next milestone but still be promoted at the beginning of a fiscal year, while a contemporary who does screen for the same milestone is promoted nearly a year later, in September.

Placing officers who screen for the next major milestone in their career paths—department head, command, major command, etc.—at the top of their lineal lists reinforces the importance of continued performance with accelerated promotion opportunity and the higher pay associated with advancement. Screened officers would retain the same lineal-number positions relative to their screened peers, simply moving up compared to their nonscreened peers.

**Align Unrestricted and Restricted Line Boards.** The recent increase in selectivity—the selection of fewer officers for the next rank—at “statutory” boards (which, governed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, consider active-duty and reserve officers for promotion) has significantly constricted the pool of officers that can be considered by various administrative boards (for selection to next career milestone, such as unit command). The effect is to reduce a warfare community’s ability to select the officers it feels are best suited for continued progression, the statutory board having already eliminated so many prospects, since officers “passed over” for promotion are not eligible for selection to their next career milestone.

This divergence between the statutory and administrative screening boards can be partly resolved by having unrestricted-line officer (i.e., eligible for operational command) statutory boards operate as do those conducted for restricted-line communities. Each restricted-line community is evaluated in its own board, making it much easier to compare “apples to apples.” In contrast, the unrestricted line screens officers of all communities—surface, subsurface, aviation, special warfare, and special operations—simultaneously, a large pool of officers with
disparate backgrounds and from communities with disparate needs, from which a fixed total number are to be selected for the next rank.

Instead, unrestricted-line officers considered for promotion should be evaluated in separate “tanks,” within which apples can be properly compared to apples. Surface warfare officers would compete for their next rank against their peers, as do the officers of each restricted-line community. Board composition would remain the same as it has in recent years, and the overall process would remain unchanged and in accordance with Title 10. Screening the officers of each unrestricted-line community against their community peers would help facilitate the selection of each community’s best and most fully qualified members, to be passed to the subsequent administrative boards. The pool of unrestricted-line officers would simply be subdivided into surface warfare, aviation, submarines, special warfare, and special operations.

**Refocus Efforts to Remove Administrative Distractions for Commands.** Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the CNO, wrote in a 21 May 2013 memo to Admiral John Richardson, the director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, “I have been made aware, from the chain of command and from direct feedback from the fleet, that we are spending too much time performing administrative tasks, or perhaps completing duplicative or competing requirements . . . which keep all of us from being effective—that prevent us from keeping ‘warfighting first.’” This memo instructed Admiral Richardson to stand up a task force dedicated to the reduction of administrative distractions so that sailors and commands could place greater emphasis on war fighting. The effort was then handed to Rear Admiral Herman Shelanski, who later declared, “Our goal is to give back to our warfighters, and includes everyone from the CO [commanding officer] to the deckplate leaders, more time to focus on the things they need to do.”

Unfortunately, little progress appears to have been made regarding the most common distractors, which may simply reflect inability to communicate the Reduction of Administrative Distractions team’s success back to the fleet. The best source of information should be the website Reduction of Administrative Distractions. Accessing the site requires a username and password; a user who decides to sign up for this—yet another—Navy website, however, is greeted by little usable information. Even though an entire cycle of feedback has been completed, there is little on the site to indicate what actions the Navy is taking to reduce administrative burdens. The only collection of ideas available to a sailor is a list of fifteen “top submissions,” which includes some good ideas but not necessarily ones designed to reduce administrative distractions.

The Reduction of Administrative Distractions team is in a position to influence the morale of the fleet, but to do so it needs to redirect its efforts to
fact reducing administrative distractions, not adding more. Look at the annual training requirements for sailors and units. What training could be repeated less often? What could be eliminated altogether? Which instructions are redundant? Focusing on high-level requirements that directly affect units and sailors, and then posting an accessible portal to a website detailing actions being taken, estimated timelines, and current status would communicate the importance of sailor feedback and demonstrate that the Navy is willing to hold itself accountable. Failure to do so risks perpetuating the current fleet perception that the program is largely academic—all hype, little real change.

**Unify Major Personnel Websites and Make Progress Reports Publicly Accessible.** While consistently cited as a way to reduce administrative distractions, the unification of major personnel websites is important enough to warrant its own discussion here. Today’s sailors, particularly Millennials, have been surrounded by technology for most of their lives. They tend to be computer savvy and seem to have an innate understanding of electronic social media. The sorry state of most Navy websites, therefore, suggests to them a service in disrepair. In an era when even the smallest of civilian start-ups present impressive digital faces to the world, why does the U.S. Navy seem to struggle in this arena, posting websites that appear to have been designed in the 1990s?

It will become increasingly important to unify and update enterprise websites and data portals as more Millennial sailors replace departing Baby Boomers and Generation Xers. Decrepit websites, inappropriately coded and notorious for hogging bandwidth, must be replaced by sites with a clean and impressive look, that use bandwidth effectively, and that offer simplified access to the tools sailors use most often. The technology has long existed to enable all sailors to forgo username and password combinations, to be replaced by mandatory common-access-card (CAC) accessibility.

Unifying the most important websites into a single CAC-enabled portal is a relatively easy and inexpensive proposition. Combining websites will provide sailors a single resource, reducing the potential for security breaches. Direct observation quickly shows how insecurely sailors handle their various sixteen-digit, random-character passwords—in notebooks, taped to their desks, in personal cell phones—especially when the passwords change quarterly, with no repeats allowed. Conceptually, the present arcane rules produce a more computationally secure information system, but in actuality the result is less secure.

Providing a single enterprise solution will also allow the Navy to direct precious resources—people, time, and money—to the upkeep of one resource rather than dividing them among the dozens that currently exist. Sailors could be provided card readers the size of a small pack of gum, enabling access to e-mail and
other accounts while traveling or away from their units. Clean, clear, and impressive websites would be hallmarks of a technologically savvy service and would help recruit from America’s most promising young people. Similarly, internal Navy websites with the same quality will boost productivity and aid retention.

**Remove Examination Requirements for Unrestricted-Line Command.** Nothing in recent years has sent such shock waves through the ranks of junior naval officers as a recent directive, OPNAV Instruction 1412.14 of 4 June 2012, regarding qualifications for command. The new set of requirements has measurably reduced the desire to pursue command and has led many junior officers to question the “harassment package” that seems to come with a Navy career. In fact, according to informal feedback from members of the OPNAV staff, a majority of the officers taking the surface warfare officer examination in 2013 failed at least one section. It is also being circulated that a number of post–department head officers who have received “early promote” fitness reports—that is, the officers traditionally destined for command—have declined to take the test, thereby effectively refusing command.

The command qualification examination is part of a service response to the rising number of firings for cause of commanding officers, and while it may be appropriate for that purpose, evidence indicates that it has generated limited return on investment. One surface warfare officer recently noted to the author that completing the 2,500 pages of required reading in preparation for the exam has taken the place of war-fighting training during his current deployment. After completing his preparations, he will have to travel from his forward-deployed ship to the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (successor of the Command Leadership School), in Newport, Rhode Island, to take the exam—a forty-five-hour absence for an examination that, according to recent statistics, will not accurately assess his ability to command in the first place.

The Navy has produced high-quality commanding officers throughout its 239-year history. Officers are screened for command potential throughout their careers, receiving fitness reports at least annually, and they are typically board selected for at least one major career milestone—for example, as a department head—prior to their command screen board. Examinations that “everyone passes” are pro forma and provide little value other than ensuring that students have at least a cursory knowledge of material.

Instead of placing yet another administrative burden on officers, one with an especially severe downside, we should focus on making the system currently in place work. Reporting seniors already assess an officer’s abilities, as well as his or her potential for positions of increased responsibility—and they must continue to do so judiciously. Boards must continue to select objectively the best qualified
officers using a process that is firm, fair, and consistent. Most importantly, senior officers must be willing to acknowledge that the relief of commanding officers is to be expected and is an indicator that the system as a whole is working. Put another way, something is likely very wrong with standards or with our reporting system if no officers selected for command are ever relieved.

The Navy is unique among the services in its desire to account publicly for reliefs for cause of commanding officers. This practice is intended to engender the trust of Congress and the American public, but it works only if leaders are willing to defend the system they represent, rather than passing along the burden to those below them. We cannot hope—while putting “Warfighting First”—to achieve a zero defect rate, but we can hold fully accountable for their actions those who fall short.

**Incentivize Education Opportunities within Career Paths.** The Navy must find a way to provide greater educational opportunities. The CNO’s “Diversity Vision” puts it best, stating the Navy needs sailors “diverse in experience, background and ideas” to reach our full potential as a war-fighting force. Common sense would suggest that officers with advanced education outside their warfare specialties have more propensity for original thought and can leverage their education for the betterment of the service. Excessively standardized career paths do not promote the “outside” thinking needed to support the continued intellectual health of the service.

There are no easy answers here. The Navy needs to reevaluate the relative importance of advanced education and lifelong learning and to shift its culture accordingly. Recently established programs like the Naval Postgraduate School’s executive master’s in business administration or the Naval War College’s non-resident professional military education are examples of opportunities available to officers on shore duty. If advanced education is truly important, we must incentivize its attainment and provide opportunities for officers to pursue it within their career paths, rather than on their own time. Some career paths, however, permit little time for officers to pursue advanced degrees without adverse impact to career progression.

A recent experience at the Aviation Commanding Officer Training Course in Pensacola is indicative of the situation. One class emphasized to the students, prospective executive officers, the importance of their junior officers’ pursuing advanced degrees. However, when the civilian lecturer was asked which was more important, a designated joint (i.e., multiservice) assignment or an advanced degree, the answer was the joint assignment. As the discussion continued it became clear that education actually plays a very small role in improving advancement potential for officers—operational experience, job performance, and timing
are paramount. The instructor ultimately admitted that any job producing a “competitive” fitness report (i.e., comparing the officer’s performance to that of peers) would likely outshine the advanced degree (for which fitness reports are administrative placeholders). Observed, operational excellence has long been the dominant performance trait promoted in the Navy, to an extent unique among the services. It will take massive effort and creativity to fit education into this paradigm, but the benefit would be worth the cost.

Millennials place a particularly high premium on advanced education, especially in-residence degrees from civilian institutions. To aid retention of the most talented of this group, each community should allow an opportunity sometime prior to command for advanced education. Greater availability of post-baccalaureate education will likely improve retention and ultimately increase skill diversity within Navy leadership.

**Rethink Mandatory Annual Training.** We must be judicious in allocating our already constrained resources during this period of declining budgets and high operational tempo. One of the most unpopular training requirements is the variety of annual Navy Knowledge Online certifications—courses on information assurance, antiterrorism, force protection, human trafficking, and other subjects. The burden of this training can be greatly reduced. For example, sailors new to the Navy would need to complete their initial training, but refresher training could occur every three to five years rather than annually. More than a million man-hours could be returned to the Navy.

**Invest More in Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance.** Additional funding in this area could produce outsize returns on investment, for two reasons. First, the state of our facilities has a significant psychological effect on sailors’ perceptions of the fleet and plays a part in their decisions whether to remain in the Navy or seek employment elsewhere. Second, families are especially sensitive to the quality of, and access to, base facilities—and families have a great deal of say in service members’ decisions to stay Navy or not.

**Improve Retention Indicators.** Measuring leading indicators that can provide advance warning of falling retention is a challenge. A recent community-wide survey conducted by the Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology group on behalf of naval aviation is a step in the right direction. It polled 8,265 aviators regarding retention; while some of the questions were unwieldy, the survey could provide insights into retention drivers, enabling senior leadership to make timely changes. Today’s technology makes collecting sailor feedback easier than ever. Best of all, if responses to command-culture workshops and command-climate surveys are any indication, sailors are likely to provide unvarnished feedback regarding their experiences in the Navy and what would or would not induce them to stay.
It will be important to bring commanding officers into the conversation, as they have close connections with the individuals they lead. Senior leadership should solicit them to provide near-real-time anecdotal feedback. This information should be requested informally; otherwise it risks becoming yet another administrative burden to be borne by the unit. But if leading indicators are important for shaping retention efforts, more important is the willingness of senior leaders to take bold, proactive action based on the information they receive.

**Incorporate a Personnel Tempo Counter in the Leave and Earnings Statement.** The year after tracking personnel tempo was mandated by the 2000 NDAA, the U.S. Army added a PERSTEMPO “counter” on soldiers’ leave and earnings statements; the counter was removed following 9/11. The Navy is now tracking personnel tempo, and providing this number on its leave and earnings statements would make perfect sense. Informing sailors of their cumulative time away from home will add credibility to the Navy’s efforts to reduce operational tempo, enable sailors to cross-check their personnel-tempo numbers for accuracy, and possibly debunk “high time” myths, where the PERSTEMPO of an individual sailor is actually lower than he or she perceives it to be.

**Reinstitute Uniform-Wear Diversity for Commands.** Unit esprit de corps is an incredibly powerful tool in retention. As one commanding officer puts it, “Everyone likes to be a part of a winning team.” Unfortunately, the Navy has sharply restricted the latitude that commands once enjoyed, in small but highly valued ways, with respect to uniforms; senior leaders thereby lost credibility, making a change that had no discernible effect other than cosmetic alterations. As one officer put it, “Why make a change to something that is trivial to many but held very dearly by those it affects most?”

Senior leaders should reconsider relaxing regulations concerning uniform wear, such as reinstating command ball caps for surface warfare units and colored tee shirts and shoulder patches with flight suits for naval aviation—to include their wear off base. An 18 February 2014 message from Commander, Naval Air Forces allows the wear of additional shoulder patches off base and colored tee shirts on base. This is a welcome change, one for which many junior officers have fought over the course of several years. Since the Navy Uniform Board is internal to the Navy (it is chaired by the Chief of Naval Personnel), the opportunity exists to push this shift to its logical conclusion—allowing the wear of colored tee shirts off base. This will remove the necessity for a majority of officers to change shirts once they arrive at, and depart from, their squadrons every day.

While the wear of flight suits and use of ball caps seem trivial, they are just specific examples among the many that could be cited for each warfare community. This recommendation should not be perceived as a wish to decrease
professionalism or relax uniform standards. Rather, it is intended to provide commanding officers greater latitude in building a command climate based on excellence and individuality—both traditional hallmarks of successful Navy units.

Recent signs within the U.S. Navy, in light of external factors, indicate that an officer retention problem looms on the horizon. More than a decade of prolonged high operational tempo, ever-increasing deployment lengths, a rapidly improving economy, and erosion of trust in senior leadership, coupled with uncertainty about the future, mean the U.S. Navy could be facing its most severe retention crisis since the end of the Vietnam War.

In fact, officer retention is at a tipping point, at which events from our past, present, and anticipated near-term future are converging. In short order we will begin losing a large number of officers having each more than a decade of operational wartime experience, and they will be taking their expertise and the lessons they have learned with them. While their qualifications can be replicated, their experience cannot. This trend is also likely to impact our enlisted ranks, because of the negative impact that plummeting junior-, mid-, and senior-grade officer retention can have on the enlisted members of their commands.

Lessons from Fortune 500 companies are telling. The most successful organizations realize that you cannot simply wage a bidding war to keep talent—there is always a competitor willing to offer more money. Instead, the most successful companies focus heavily on intangibles, such as work that challenges and stimulates an individual, opportunities to pursue advanced education or personal interests, and “perks” that reflect an individual’s worth to the company. The successful companies invest much time and energy in studies to understand more fully what Millennials need and want, and then they tailor their efforts to promote esprit de corps and personal fulfillment. The recommendations in this article take a similar approach, focusing most heavily on the opportunities under the direct purview of senior leadership—some of which are easily implemented and low cost.

We must act swiftly. We must stop reacting belatedly to trailing indicators, reflecting on the situation after the fact, but instead move proactively on the basis of leading indicators and readily identifiable factors the author has derived from two years’ worth of fleet input and informal officer interviews. More work remains to be done. We must acknowledge our service’s tendency to favor efficiency more than effectiveness and thoughtfully reconsider our approach to organizing, training, and equipping our future force. Our allies, global partners, and our nation deserve no less.

We are competing with a global demand for personnel to retain our best, brightest, and most talented officers—the same pool of officers who will one day
rise to senior leadership. We cannot directly hire into positions of importance, and therefore cannot afford simply to let them walk away.

NOTES

The recommendations made in this article were current as of the final updating of the text in early May 2014. Several of them may have been acted on, and likely corrected, while the journal was in press.


2. SEAL community manager, Navy Personnel Command, interview with author.

3. Informal interviews by the author over a two-year period at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., and the Pentagon. The current retention survey is also bearing this out, though it will not be finalized until fall 2014, when the report and raw data will be released publicly.


10. Officer pay grades in the U.S. Defense Department are designated O-1 (the most junior—in the Navy, an ensign) to O-10 (a four-star flag or general officer, the O-11 grade being reserved for wartime). In the Navy an O-5 is a commander, an O-6 a captain; in the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, they are, respectively, a lieutenant colonel and colonel. For the Navy, see “Rank Insignia of Navy Commissioned and Warrant Officers,” America’s Navy, 12 August 2009, www.navy.mil/.


12. Figure 1 is based on data tabulated in PERS-43, Updated PCC Retirement Accounting, 9 January 2014, reproduced below.

13. A term used frequently by Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the current CNO. In his equation, a service member’s perception of overall quality of service is based on two key metrics: perceived quality of work and of life. “Quality of work” includes skill-set training, belief in the mission, and possession of the right training and tools to perform assigned roles. “Quality of life” includes pay and compensation, benefits from military service, health care, housing, operational tempo, and a myriad of other intangibles that impact a service member. The author contends that a third metric, that of leadership, should also be evaluated for a more holistic evaluation of “quality of service.”


16. PricewaterhouseCoopers, University of Southern California, and London Business
17. Ibid., pp. 11–13.
20. Task force members, informal author interviews, the Pentagon, winter 2013.
22. Many thanks to Cdr. Ryan Stoddard for reminding me of this stellar example.
23. Also see Secretary John Lehman, “Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137/9/1,303 (September 2011).
27. As evidenced by the media response following the Department of Defense’s release of its annual budget on 4 March 2014.
31. Member of the Joint Staff Global Force Management office, informal author interview.

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37. Estimated using numbers of commanders screened for operational command during FY15 surface warfare and FY14 aviation command-screen boards.


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THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO, 22 JANUARY–4 MARCH 1944

Operation SHINGLE

Milan Vego

The Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on 22 January 1944 (Operation SHINGLE) was a major offensive joint/combined operation. Despite Allied superiority in the air and at sea, the Germans were able to bring quickly large forces and to seal the beachhead. Both sides suffered almost equal losses during some four months of fighting. The Allied forces on the beachhead were unable to make a breakout or to capture the critically important Colli Laziali (the Alban Hills) that dominated two main supply routes to the German forces on the Gustav Line until the main Fifth Army advanced close to the beachhead. Only the naval part of the operation was excellently planned and executed. The decision to launch Operation SHINGLE was primarily based on political-strategic, not operational, considerations. Ironically, the Allied political leaders, Winston S. Churchill in particular, and high operational commanders grossly underestimated the Germans’ will to fight and their war-fighting capabilities. Another major reason for the failure of Operation SHINGLE was very poor leadership on the part of the Allied operational commanders. In retrospect, on the basis of the true situation at the time, SHINGLE should not have been planned, let alone executed. It never had a realistic chance of success. It was a vast gamble that ultimately failed.

THE SETTING

In the spring of 1943, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean was highly favorable to the Western Allies. The campaign in North Africa had ended with the surrender of the German-Italian forces in Tunisia on 12 May 1943. At a conference in Washington, D.C., on 12–27 May (TRIDENT) the highest Allied leaders confirmed their decision next to seize Sicily (Operation HUSKY). The Combined
Chiefs of Staff (CCS) directed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been Supreme Commander Allied Forces, the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, to prepare options for continuing the war in southern Europe after capturing Sicily.\textsuperscript{1} Eisenhower’s staff considered three options for the future operations in the Mediterranean theater. One envisaged a seizure of Sardinia and Corsica, followed by a descent on southern France; the main advantage of this option was that it would support the main effort in Normandy. The second option, favored by the British, contemplated a thrust through Italy, to support guerrillas in the Balkans and bring Turkey into the war on the Allied side. The third option was a landing in southern Italy, then an advance northward, using Italy as a logistical base and acquiring airfields for long-range bombing of Germany and the Balkans. It was believed that this option would probably force Italy out of the war, in which case it would remove twenty-one Italian divisions from the Balkans and five from France. The Germans would be forced to take over the defense of the Italian Peninsula and thereby weaken their forces in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{2}

The relative ease of victory on Sicily convinced the British that the Allies should now assume higher risks and invade Italy’s mainland and thereby drive it out of the war. The first step, the British argued, should be the capture of Naples, then Rome. American planners hesitated to embark on such a course of action. They were (and as it turned out, correctly) much concerned that an invasion of the Italian mainland would lead to a long and indecisive peninsular campaign. It would also probably require additional resources. This, in turn, would negatively affect the buildup of the Allied forces for the planned Normandy invasion (Operation OVERLORD).\textsuperscript{3}

On 3 September 1943 the Allies signed in Cassibile, Sicily, a secret armistice with the Italian government. This was not made public until 8 September, when Italy’s surrender was formally announced.\textsuperscript{4} On 3 September, the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina and landed in Reggio di Calabria (Operation BAYTOWN). Six days later, the Allies carried out a large amphibious landing in the Bay of Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE). The invading force, composed of the U.S. Fifth Army, commanded by General Mark W. Clark and comprising the U.S. VI Corps and the British 10 Corps, was transported by some 450 ships.\textsuperscript{5} The majority of the Allied invading force was assembled at bases in North Africa and made a “shore to shore” assault. All the Allied landing craft and smaller escort vessels had to be refueled on the way from the North African ports and hence were staged through two ports on Sicily’s north coast.\textsuperscript{6}

After landing at Salerno the U.S. Fifth Army advanced along the west coast to Naples, while the British Eighth Army moved up the east coast. By the end of September, the Fifth Army had reached the Volturno River. Naples was liberated on 1 October, but its port was virtually destroyed.\textsuperscript{7} The British Eighth Army
seized the Foggia airfield complex intact on 29 September. Despite considerable numerical superiority on the ground, at sea, and in the air, the Allies had suffered over twelve thousand casualties (two thousand killed, seven thousand wounded, 3,500 missing). 8

The stubborn delaying defense of southern Italy by the Tenth Army convinced Adolf Hitler not to abandon Italy. On 4 October, he decided that a stand would be made south of Rome. At that time, the Germans had only eight divisions of the Tenth Army deployed in the southern part of Italy. In northern Italy were nine divisions of Army Group B, of which by the end of October three were to leave for the eastern front and two for southern Italy. Additionally, two divisions would arrive from southern France. 9 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the South (Sued), was directed to conduct a delaying defense as far as the Gaeta–Ortona line. 10 Hence, the Germans hurriedly constructed several successive defense lines across the Italian Peninsula. 11

An important Allied conference was held in Cairo on 22–26 November 1943 (SEXTANT). Churchill, the British prime minister, wanted the Allies to make a more determined effort in Italy. He argued that the Allied forces should reach the Po River by spring 1944, even if that meant weakening or delaying the Normandy invasion. In contrast, the Americans insisted that no new operations in the Mediterranean should adversely affect planned redeployments of the Allied forces to Normandy. The Allies decided at Cairo to cancel a planned landing on the Andaman Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean, releasing forces for other theaters. Admiral Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, South East Asia Command, was directed to send about half his amphibious craft to the Mediterranean and England. 12

At the Allied conference in Tehran on 28 November–1 December 1943 (EUREKA), the main topic was whether to focus on the planned invasion of Normandy or intensify Anglo-American efforts in the Mediterranean. Both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, insisted on an attack across the English Channel, combined with a landing in southern France. Churchill agreed on southern France but insisted on a more determined effort in Italy. For him, it was paramount that the Allies capture the Italian capital, Rome, by mounting a large amphibious landing in the vicinity of Rome. Churchill also advocated intensified efforts to entice Turkey to enter the war against Germany. However, Roosevelt and Stalin were adamant that the focus remain on Normandy. A second conference in Cairo, on 4–6 December, confirmed the decision of the Tehran conference that OVERLORD would be the most important Allied effort in 1944 and nothing was to be done elsewhere to endanger its success. 13

By 1 December, the Allied armies in Italy had reached the Bernhardt Line, defended by the XIV Panzer Corps (in the Tenth Army). This line was a bulge
in front of the more formidable Gustav Line, constructed to protect the approaches to Rome through the Liri Valley. The Gustav Line consisted of a series of interlocking positions extending across the peninsula from just north of the mouth of the Garigliano River on the Tyrrhenian Sea to the mouth of the Sangro River on the Adriatic coast. It centered on the town of Cassino, near which was a 1,700-foot-high peak, on the top of which stood a sixth-century monastery. The Gustav Line, eighty-four miles long and ten miles deep, consisted of deep underground bunkers, labyrinthine tunnels, machine-gun emplacements, antitank ditches, minefields, and concertina wires. Kesselring promised Hitler to hold the Gustav Line for at least six months.

**ALLIED THEATER COMMAND ORGANIZATION**

The Allied command organization in the Mediterranean was highly fragmented. Various Allied headquarters in the Mediterranean theater were separated by long distances. This in turn made operational planning very difficult. Also, planning procedures in the British and the American staffs were considerably different.

On 10 December 1943, the CCS directed consolidation of all Allied major commands in the Mediterranean theater. All British forces in the Middle East were placed under Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) commanded by General Eisenhower, who was appointed at the same time Allied CINC, Mediterranean Theater. A major problem in the new command structure was the lack of a component commander for all the Allied ground forces deployed in the theater. Eisenhower’s deputy was a British general, Harold Alexander, who was also commander of the 15th Army Group, composed of two armies (the U.S. Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army). Directly subordinate to Eisenhower were General George S. Patton, commander of the U.S. Seventh Army (in Sicily); General Alphonse Juin, commander of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC); and General Władysław Anders, commanding the Polish 2nd Corps.

The decision to consider the Normandy landing the highest priority in 1944 led to several major command changes in the Mediterranean. The most important event was the departure of Eisenhower to become Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces for the invasion of northwestern Europe. The CCS did not request Eisenhower to leave the theater until after the capture of Rome, but he transferred his staff to London right away, believing the immediate prospects of taking Rome to be poor. On 8 January 1944, Eisenhower was replaced by a British general, Henry Maitland Wilson (his title later changed to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater). General Bernard Montgomery, who had commanded the Eighth Army, was chosen to lead an army group for the cross-Channel invasion; he was replaced by Lieutenant General Oliver W. H. Leese on 1 January 1944. (These command changes had originally been planned to go into
On 9 March 1944, Alexander became Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; his 15th Army Group became the Allied Forces in Italy on 11 January 1944. Seven days later it was renamed the Allied Central Mediterranean Force and on 9 March 1944 Allied Armies in Italy.

The highest-ranking Allied air commander in the theater was British air chief marshal Arthur W. Tedder, Commander, Mediterranean Air Command (changed to the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, or MAAF, on 10 December 1943). In December 1943, it was announced that Tedder would go to England and become Eisenhower’s deputy. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, of the U.S. Army Air Forces. The principal components of the theater’s Allied air forces were the Middle East Air Command (renamed Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East on 10 December 1943), U.S. Ninth Air Force, and Northwest African Air Forces. The latter in turn consisted of the Northwest African Strategic Air Force (title changed to Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force on 1 January 1944), the Northwest African Coastal Air Force (as of 1 January 1944, Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force), the Northwest African Tactical Air Forces (which became Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force on 1 January 1944), the Northwest African Troop Carrier Command (disbanded on 1 January 1944), the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (renamed Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing on 1 January 1944), and the Northwest African Air Service Command (disbanded on 1 January 1944).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham of the Royal Navy was Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. When in October Admiral Cunningham was appointed First Sea Lord, he was relieved by a British admiral, John H. D. Cunningham. The most senior U.S. Navy officer in the Mediterranean was Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, whose title had changed for each major amphibious landing operation, including AVALANCHE. On 16 September 1943, Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry relieved Richard L. Conolly as Commander, Landing Craft and Base, North African Waters (Comlandcrabnaw). Lowry also replaced Rear Admiral John L. Hall as Commander, VIII Amphibious Force, on 8 November 1943.

**GERMAN THEATER ORGANIZATION**

Field Marshal Kesselring as CINC South had a full command over the forces of all three services deployed in his theater. However, in November, just when the Germans most needed unified command in the Italian theater, Hitler directed a change in command relationships. Naval Command Italy (Deutsches Marinekommando Italien) and 2nd Air Fleet (II Luftflotte) were resubordinated to their respective services and directed thereafter merely to cooperate with Kesselring. As CINC South, Kesselring directly commanded eight divisions, mostly mechanized or panzer (tank). Some of these forces were newly arrived...
from North Africa and had not been brought back to full strength. All German
ground units had been considerably weakened during the long withdrawal from
Salerno. On 16 August 1943, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and his Army Group B were
deployed to the northern part of Italy. Army Group B’s mission was to pacify
northern Italy, crush the insurgents in Istria and Slovenia, protect the lines of
communication and coastal flanks of the theater, and organize the defense of
northern Italy. Army Group B’s thirteen divisions were mostly reorganized or
reactivated units from the eastern front, generally unsuitable, because of a lack
of mobility, for combat in the southern part of Italy. Normally, Kesselring as a
theater commander should have been in control of both army groups. However,
he and Rommel were on the same level, directly subordinate to Hitler.

On 6 November, however, Kesselring was appointed CINC of a newly estab-
lished theater command, Southwest (Suedwest), as well as commander of Army
Group C (formally established on 21 November). Army Group B was dissolved.
Rommel was sent to strengthen the “Atlantic Wall” (Atlantikwall) defenses in
Western Europe against a large-scale invasion. Part of his staff was assigned to
the headquarters of CINC Southwest and the rest to the newly created AOK
(Armeeoberkommando) 14 (a level between an army group and army corps),
known also as the Fourteenth Army. On 21 November 1943, Kesselring formally
took over command of the entire Italian theater.

The Luftwaffe units operating from Italy had been subordinated on 10 June
1940 to the Commanding General of the German Luftwaffe in Italy (Komman-
dierende General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Italien). In 1941, this command
was changed to “General of the German Luftwaffe at the Supreme Command of
the Royal Italian Air Force (ITALUFT).”

German Naval Command Italy controlled surface forces and all other ele-
ments of the Kriegsmarine (navy) present. The exception was that the Chief of
Naval Transport was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command of the Navy.
In February 1943 a special staff was created for the convoying service within the
Italian Naval Ministry. After the fall of Tunisia in May 1943, this staff was merged
with the German Naval Command Italy. In November 1941, the newly created
staff of the Commander, U-Boats, Italy was incorporated into the German Naval
Command Italy, where it remained until March 1943. After the capitulation of
Italy in September 1943, the Germans took over control of coastal defense of
northern Italy. In late spring 1944, the major commands of the German Naval
Command Italy were the 7th Defense Division (headquarters in Nervi); Sea De-
fense Commandant Italian Riviera (La Spezia); and Sea Defense Commandant
Western Adriatic (Venice).
ALLIED AND GERMAN OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The main sources of information for Allied intelligence were ULTRA radio intercepts, human intelligence obtained from agents in German-occupied territory, German prisoners of war, air reconnaissance, and various methods of technical intelligence. However, by far the most important source on German orders of battle, states of supply, and plans and intentions was ULTRA intercepts, decoded at Bletchley Park, northwest of London. ULTRA provided a steady stream of accurate and often timely information on the movements of German forces in Italy. Among other things, it revealed the timing of Kesselring’s withdrawals to a series of temporary defense positions all the way to the Gustav Line. ULTRA analysts read two or sometimes three messages from the Luftwaffe’s liaison officers almost every day. ULTRA also read the situation reports of the Tenth Army, Army Group B, and its successor the Fourteenth Army, as well as messages exchanged among Hitler, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), and Kesselring. Divisional reliefs and withdrawals rarely escaped the attention of the ULTRA analysts. ULTRA also intercepted and decrypted supply reports; hence, Allied planners were fully informed about the current state and shortages of fuel, ammunition, and rations.29

ULTRA messages were generally (but with some exceptions) shared only within Allied headquarters at the army level or higher. Moreover, at the army level ULTRA reports were not known to many American planners. For example, only four persons within Fifth Army headquarters were authorized to read ULTRA intercepts (Clark; the chief of staff, General Alfred Gruenther; the staff intelligence officer, or G-2, Colonel Edwin B. Howard; and the deputy G-2, a Major Riggs).30 The Fifth Army’s operations officer (or G-3, Brigadier General Donald W. Brann) was not authorized to know about ULTRA, but the 15th Army Group’s G-3 (British brigadier general R. B. Mainwaring) was. That put General Clark’s G-3 at a great disadvantage in discussions with General Alexander’s.31

ULTRA decrypts showed in essence how the front line looked to the German side. Very often they revealed what the Germans knew about Allied forces and how they interpreted their own reconnaissance reports. For example, on 10 January 1944, ULTRA revealed that Kesselring had learned on the previous day from a report sent on 3 January by the Abwehr (military intelligence) station chief in Paris that General Maitland Wilson was pushing the preparations of landing operations on both coasts of Italy with all forces available in the Mediterranean. The Germans expected the landings on approximately 15 January.32 In the first three weeks of January 1944 ULTRA revealed that the Germans had repeatedly misinterpreted the movements of Allied naval vessels in the Mediterranean. For example, the Germans were apparently unconcerned about the disappearance
of landing craft from Bizerte and about the presence of the Allied carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, thought to be carrying reinforcements of land-based aircraft.\textsuperscript{33}

Kesselring and his major subordinate commanders apparently had fairly accurate knowledge of the Allied forces along the Gustav Line and in southern Italy. The Germans knew the approximate size and composition of enemy air and naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Their main sources of intelligence were radio intercepts by air reconnaissance and enemy prisoners of war. Their greatest problem was that they did not have information on enemy plans and intentions. Hence, they relied on patterns in Allied actions of the past to make assessments about the future. Specifically, the Germans had only an approximate knowledge of enemy amphibious shipping, enemy preparations for amphibious landings, and possible landing sites. Also, most German air reconnaissance reports pertained to the western and central Mediterranean. Many additionally focused on the sea area between Sicily and North Africa, especially the port of Alexandria.

**ALLIED PLANS**

The idea of an amphibious landing in the German rear originated when in October 1943 it became obvious that the Germans would fight for the entire peninsula rather than quickly withdraw to northern Italy. Allied planners looked for a way to break the stalemate now produced by the poor weather, rough terrain, and stiffening resistance.\textsuperscript{34} The British carried out a successful landing at Termoli, on Italy’s eastern coast, on 2–3 October 1943. This raised hopes that the Allies might replicate that success on the western coast and thereby outflank the Gustav Line.\textsuperscript{35} At a meeting at La Marsa, Tunisia, in late October and early November 1943, Eisenhower and his senior commander discussed how to increase the tempo of the lagging campaign in Italy. General Alexander strongly advocated an amphibious landing behind the German right flank, as a part of the general offensive to seize Rome.\textsuperscript{36} He envisioned landing five divisions, an idea that never got traction, because it was clearly unrealistic. The Allies had neither the troops nor amphibious lift for such a large operation.\textsuperscript{37}

But Eisenhower approved Alexander’s idea for a landing south of the Tiber River once the Fifth Army had reached a point from which it could link up with the landing force within forty-eight hours.\textsuperscript{38} Eisenhower also promised that he would press the CCS to retain enough tank landing ships (LSTs) in the Mediterranean for such a landing. At the Allied conference in Quebec (QUADRANT) on 17–24 August 1943 the decision had been made that sixty-eight of the ninety LSTs in the Mediterranean would be redeployed immediately to other theaters.\textsuperscript{39} However, the British wanted to retain fifty-six British and twelve U.S. LSTs in the theater until 15 December. They also looked for more troops for a divisional
amphibious assault.\textsuperscript{40} The situation with the smaller tank landing craft (LCT) was little better; out of 201 LCTs in the Mediterranean, some 120 were scheduled to sail for Britain and India. The remainder were all lighter types, operating continuously serving as ferries, supplying the Eighth Army in the Adriatic, and working ports on both Italian coasts.\textsuperscript{41}

By 17 November, the 15th Army Group had completed plans for a two-phase offensive in southern Italy. The Eighth Army would attack as soon as 20 November. This would be followed after seven to ten days by an attack by the Fifth Army. If opportune, an amphibious landing would be launched in conjunction with the Fifth Army’s reaching Frosinone (some fifty miles by road northeast of Anzio). Beaches near Anzio were chosen.\textsuperscript{42} Originally, the landing was scheduled for 20 December 1943.\textsuperscript{43}

The main Fifth Army offensive against the Gustav Line started on 1 December. Yet even in ten days of fighting the Fifth Army failed to reach Monte Cassino or Frosinone.\textsuperscript{44} The British Eighth Army, on the Adriatic front, was also bogged down.\textsuperscript{45} Because of the lack of success in breaking through the Gustav Line, Clark proposed on 10 December that the landing at Anzio not be tied to the advance of the main Fifth Army.\textsuperscript{46} The landing force would dig in, he suggested, consolidate the beachhead, and wait for the main Fifth Army. Clark’s proposal required a much larger landing force than previously envisioned. It also placed much greater demands on amphibious lift and logistical support. A major consequence of Clark’s proposed changes was that the landing at Anzio would become essentially an independent major operation. In any case, the original timing of the Anzio landing for 20 December was impossible; it was estimated that the earliest that the Fifth Army would reach Frosinone was 10 January 1944.\textsuperscript{47} This delay would complicate the situation with the amphibious lift. After taking all the LSTs to complete the buildup on Corsica (in preparation for invasion of southern France) there would be only thirty-seven LSTs on hand instead of the forty-two LSTs considered necessary by the Fifth Army’s staff.\textsuperscript{48} Hence, on 18 December Clark recommended to Alexander that he cancel the landing at Anzio. Four days later Alexander did so.\textsuperscript{49} The Fifth Army’s planning staff was reduced, and the 3rd Infantry Division (ID), earmarked for the Anzio landing, recalled its planning personnel to prepare for employment on the main front.\textsuperscript{50}

Planning for the Anzio landing was unexpectedly revived by Churchill in late December. The major command changes in the Mediterranean announced in December 1943 had a significant effect on the Allied strategy in that theater. Until then General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, had essentially made strategic decisions for that theater, through Eisenhower. However, after Eisenhower moved to England, Marshall’s influence in the theater was greatly weakened. The British Chief of Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, de facto assumed
the primary planning responsibility for the Mediterranean. As a result, Churchill now played a greater role in the Mediterranean strategy.\textsuperscript{51}

Political-strategic, not operational, considerations were most important in the final decision for the landing at Anzio.\textsuperscript{52} After the Cairo conference, Churchill was both physically and mentally exhausted. He fell seriously ill (pneumonia) for about a week and then spent several weeks recuperating. Hence, he had ample time to review the results of the Cairo and Tehran discussions and the reasons for his failure to persuade Roosevelt to focus on the eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{53}

Churchill convened and presided over a special conference at Tunis on Christmas Day. There he argued, overly optimistically, that a landing at Anzio would cause the Germans to withdraw forces from central and southern Italy and thereby hasten the liberation of Rome. Eisenhower disagreed but was overruled.\textsuperscript{54} Because of his illness, Churchill’s subordinates were unwilling to challenge strongly views on which he had already made up his mind. The decision to land at Anzio was eventually made by Churchill. Opposing and skeptical views did not receive proper hearings. Clark wrote in his memoirs that Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, the British G-2 of AFHQ and thus Eisenhower’s intelligence officer, was doubtful about the advisability of the Anzio operation. Strong was well aware of the political importance of Rome to Hitler. He also knew that the German divisions in France and Yugoslavia were not busy in the winter months and could be moved to Italy if needed. Churchill disregarded this and believed that the capture of Rome was worth the risk.\textsuperscript{55} Not surprisingly, Alexander deferred to his prime minister. Also, a decision was made to double the original size of the landing force by adding one British division.\textsuperscript{56}

On 26 December, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that the Anzio landing would decide the battle of Rome and probably achieve the destruction of the substantial part of the German army. Churchill also requested Roosevelt’s approval not to move LSTs out of the Mediterranean for a few weeks. Two days later, Roosevelt sent a positive response, agreeing to delay redeployment of fifty-eight LSTs scheduled for Operation OVERLORD.\textsuperscript{57} Roosevelt imposed the condition, however, that OVERLORD remain the paramount operation and proposed landings on Rhodes and in the Aegean be sidetracked.\textsuperscript{58} Another condition was that the Anzio landing not interfere with the air buildup on Corsica for the invasion of southern France (Operation ANVIL, later renamed DRAGOON).\textsuperscript{59}

Churchill’s idea of landing at Anzio complicated the American plan for a supporting drive (a landing in southern France) for the cross-Channel invasion. General Marshall later admitted that the struggle over the size, composition, and timing of ANVIL constituted “a bitter and unremitting fight with the British right up to the launching.”\textsuperscript{60}
Churchill presided at a conference in Marrakech on 7 January attended by Maitland Wilson, Alexander, Walter Bedell Smith (Chief of Staff, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces), and Admiral Andrew Cunningham. There a decision was made to move D-day for the Anzio landing ahead as much as possible to gain time before the required redeployment of the LSTs to England. The aim was to give the LSTs time for two trips to Anzio or, in the event of favorable weather, three. This, in turn, would speed up transport of supplies and follow-up forces. At the second and final day of the conference, most of the talking was done by Alexander and Cunningham.\footnote{Alexander was able to secure retention of twenty-four LSTs until the end of February.} Churchill was very happy with the results of the Marrakech conference, wiring Roosevelt that “unanimous agreement for action as proposed was reached by the responsible officials of both countries and all services.” Churchill left Marrakech on 14 January, having won his argument that the Anzio landing must be carried out.\footnote{THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE}

**THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE**

Anzio was selected as the amphibious objective because of its proximity to Rome and also to the German front line. Anzio is some thirty-five miles southwest of Rome, and it was about sixty-two miles from the front, on the Garigliano River.\footnote{Anzio was a small port enclosed by a six-hundred-yard-long breakwater. Its anchorage could be used for ships with drafts of ten feet and less. It is subject to considerable swell.} North and east of Anzio the coast consists of sandy, gently shelving beaches, with long dunes above the high-water mark. All the beaches are exposed.\footnote{With the exception of the beach just southeastward of the harbor, all were too rocky, were too small, or had gradients too shallow for a landing.} No gradient was better than one foot in sixty; the average was 1 : 90. The gradient on the west beach was 1 : 120.\footnote{The area between Point Torre Astura, not quite ten miles south of Anzio, and the Tiber, about fifty miles north, and extending inland to the round, volcanic mass of the Alban Hills is generally a low plateau, dropping off to the south to the Pontine Marshes and rising sharply in the north to the Alban Hills. The area is cut by several streams and drainage canals. The coastal plain is very swampy in spots, especially in the rainy season.} The larger coastal plain, stretching from Terracina (about thirty miles south of Anzio) to the Tiber consisted of dry, gently rolling, and often wooded countryside, rising slowly to a railway embankment some thirteen miles north of Anzio. It was cultivated with vineyards and small farms.\footnote{The area west of the Albano road is cut by a series of gullies, of which the largest, Moletta and Incastro, run southwest from the Alban Hills toward the sea. Often fifty feet deep, they proved difficult obstacles to armor.}
Southeast of Anzio were the Pontine Marshes—a low, swampy, malarial bogland, chiefly sphagnum moss and peat. As part of a large reclamation and resettlement project undertaken by Mussolini’s Fascist government, the Pontine Marshes had been converted to cultivated fields, carefully drained and irrigated by an extensive series of ditches, canals, and pumping stations. During the rainy season it was impassable for most heavy equipment. In addition, this largely treeless area offered scant cover.

The Padiglione Woods (extending three to five miles north of Nettuno) provided cover where a force might prepare and attack. However, after leaving the forest, a force was vulnerable, its movements easily observable; there was no cover between the woods and the coastal railway. Eastward from the Padiglione Woods the entire right flank of the planned beachhead line was protected by the Mussolini Canal, which drained the northern Pontine Marshes. The main canal was built like an antitank ditch, with steep sides sloping to a shallow, sixteen-foot-wide stream. The combination of the canals and marshes made the right flank of the beachhead a poor avenue for attack.

The 3,100-foot mountain mass of the Alban Hills, about twenty miles inland, controls the southern approaches to Rome, fifteen miles north. East of the Alban Hills is the Velletri Gap. The 5,040-foot Monti Lepini (Lepini Mountains) stretch along the inner edge of the Pontine Marshes southeastward toward Terracina. Both the Alban Hills and Lepini Mountains protected the Tenth Army’s vital supply lines. In operational terms, the Alban Hills were a “decisive point,” because they dominated Highway No. 6 (Via Casilina) and Highway No. 7 (Via Appia).

The road network on the Anzio Plain was well developed, but the roads were of poor quality. The most important road used for supplying German troops on the front line was the narrow and easily defensible Highway No. 7. It runs along the coast and passes around the Aurunci Mountains and then through the Pontine Marshes. Highway No. 6 runs from Rome through the Liri Valley. It could be easily blocked by a defender in a narrow defile known as the Mignano Gap some ten miles southeast of the Liri Valley. The main west coast railway paralleled these highways. Along the network of paved and gravel roads crisscrossing the farmlands were numerous two-story podere (farmhouses) for the recent settlers. The provincial town of Aprilia (whose community center would be called “the Factory” by Allied troops) was modern; the twin towns of Anzio and Nettuno were popular seaside resorts.

In January and February the wind in the Anzio-Nettuno area was mostly from the north and east. Along the coast between the island of Elba and Civitavecchia southerly winds prevail. Gale-force winds lasting two or three days and accompanied by depressions move eastward across the northwestern Mediterranean. Southerly and southwesterly gales bring low clouds, drizzle or continuous rain,
and sometimes snow, until the wind veers to the westward. Southwesterly winds generate heavy seas on the Italian coast.80

THE FINAL PLAN
Operation SHINGLE was now essentially an independent operation, to be executed regardless of whether the main Fifth Army was in striking distance.81 (The modified operation is sometimes referred to as SHINGLE-II.) The landing at Anzio would be a two-division instead of a single-division assault.82

On 2 January, General Alexander issued his Operations Instruction No. 32. The Fifth Army’s mission would be “cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German 14 (Panzer) Corps.” The operation would take place between 20 and 31 January 1944. The U.S. VI Corps, under Major General John P. Lucas, was assigned to carry out the landing. The initial landing force would be composed of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, two armored elements (one U.S., one British), U.S. Army Ranger battalions, one regimental combat team (RCT), the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, the British 1 Division, and two British commandos (units of about four hundred men).83

Lucas asked for a delay to 25 January to allow proper rehearsal. As a compromise, D-day was set for 22 January.84 H-hour was set for 0200, to give the landing forces four hours of darkness. Morning twilight would begin a few minutes before 0600, and the sun would rise at 0731.85 Sunset was at 1711.

The Fifth Army’s headquarters started detailed planning on 31 December. The naval planning staff was headed by Admiral Lowry, commander of the VIII Amphibious Force and commander of Task Force (TF) 81, already formed for the operation. The air plan was prepared by Major General J. K. Cannon, Commander, XII Air Support Command, and his staff.86 It was decided that the British contingent would be transported by a separate but subordinate task force under Rear Admiral Thomas H. Troubridge, Royal Navy. Troubridge and his staff worked at the planning section of the 15th Army Group headquarters in Caserta.87 However, some key commanders were not involved in planning, specifically General Lucas, who was with his staff at Maddaloni (southeast of Caserta), and Captain E. C. L. Turner, in charge of the Rangers, who spent most of the time at Pozzuoli, on the Gulf of Naples.88 Plans for Operation SHINGLE were approved on 12 January, only ten days before D-day.89

Clark’s plan to breach, concurrently, the Gustav Line was based on Operations Instruction No. 12, issued on 16 December 1943 and amended by Operations Instruction No. 13 of 10 January 1944. Clark’s intent was that the main Fifth Army, reinforced with two divisions from the Eighth Army, would attack the German Tenth Army across the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, break through the Gustav Line, and drive up the Liri Valley. This offensive should have sufficient strength
to draw the German reserves. While the enemy was preoccupied defending the Gustav Line, the Allies would land at Anzio-Nettuno (see map 1).  

Clark’s Field Order No. 5, issued on 12 January, pertained specifically to the Anzio landing force, which was meant to “launch attacks in the Anzio area on H-Hour, D-Day,” aimed “(a) to seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio,” and “(b) advance on Colli Laziali.” The word “advance” implied a significant change in the mission. Clark’s order directed Lucas to advance toward the Alban Hills for the linkup with the main Fifth Army seven days after the landing (that is, on D+7). This change of the mission became a major reason for subsequent and continuing controversy.

Although Alexander knew from the ULTRA intercepts that the Germans had a sizable force in the Rome area (I Parachute Corps, with two divisions), he was not sure whether it would be in the proximity of Anzio on D-day. Hence, he emphasized to Clark the importance of securing the beachhead as the first order of business. Afterward, Clark simply focused on that part of the mission assigned to the VI Corps. On 12 January, Brigadier General Brann, the Fifth Army G-3 (Operations), visited Lucas to brief him about the final order by the Fifth Army for the Anzio operation, specifically the vague wording of the mission. Brann

MAP 1
FIFTH ARMY’S OPERATIONAL IDEA, JANUARY 1944
made it clear that Lucas's primary task was to seize and secure a beachhead. Clark expected no more. He did not want to push Lucas on to the Alban Hills at the risk of sacrificing the VI Corps. At the same time, it was understood that Lucas was free to take advantage of an opportunity to capture the Alban Hills. Clark did not think it would be possible for Lucas to reach the hill mass and at the same time hold the beachhead to protect the port and landing beaches. The loss of the port and beaches would completely isolate the VI Corps and would put it at the mercy of the Germans.  

The VI Corps Plan

The mission of the VI Corps in “phase I” of the landing as stated in Clark's outline plan of 12 January was “by first light D-Day to capture and/or reduce enemy gun batteries capable of seriously interfering with the assault on the beaches and to launch assaults on the beaches north and northeast of Anzio and establish a beachhead.” In “phase II,” the mission was simply “attack in the direction of Colli Laziali.”

The VI Corps's scheme of maneuver (or “operational idea”) envisaged a simultaneous landing on the Anzio and Nettuno beaches. The U.S. 3rd ID (under Major General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.) would land three regiments over X-RAY beach, two miles south of Nettuno. In the center, the 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional), as well as the 83rd Chemical Battalion and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, would land over YELLOW Beach adjacent to Anzio Harbor, with the mission of seizing the port and clearing out any coastal-defense batteries there. On the PETER beaches, six miles northwest of Anzio, the 2 Brigade Group of the British 1 Division would land. The 2 Special Service Brigade of 9 and 43 Commando would advance eastward to establish a roadblock on the main road leading from Anzio to Campoleone and Albano. The forces landing at Anzio and at Nettuno would link up to consolidate a beachhead seven miles deep centering on the port of Anzio.

The planners assumed initial heavy German resistance and hence provided a strong floating reserve, the bulk of the British 1 Division, with the 46 Royal Tank Regiment. In addition, the 24th Field Regiment, the 80th Medium Regiment, and the 504th Parachute Infantry would land behind the 3rd ID and assemble in a corps reserve.

The 15th Army Group headquarters prepared a “cover” plan (or operational deception plan) aimed to mislead the enemy about the timing and direction of the Anzio landing. Because it was hardly possible to conceal that an amphibious landing was being prepared at Naples, the Germans had to be convinced that the Allied intent was to land further north on Italy’s western coast near Civitavecchia or even Leghorn, toward the end of January 1944. Originally, a naval feint was planned at Ostia Lido, at the mouth of the Tiber River, on D-day. This site was
changed first to Palo—about fifteen miles north of the Tiber River mouth—and then, at General Clark’s insistence, to Civitavecchia. The reason was that most of the German troops were already deployed north of the Tiber River; a deception at Ostia Lido, if successful, would tend to draw the enemy forces closer to, not farther from, the landing area. Hence, one British antiaircraft cruiser and two destroyers would shell Civitavecchia, some forty miles north of Anzio, at H-hour on D-day. At the same time, a force of six cruisers and destroyers would appear off Terracina, again to distract German attention from Anzio. Civitavecchia would be bombarded again at midnight on D+1 by cruisers and destroyers. In addition, fishing craft were assembled in Corsican harbors, where army engineers made a great show of “secret” activity, assembling dummy supply dumps and constructing imitation landing craft. Information was “leaked out” from Caserta that the Fifth Army would not advance in January but that the British Eighth Army, with fresh troops, would advance up the Italian Adriatic coast.

A radio deception plan included the establishment of a radio station on Corsica purporting to be the advance headquarters of the VI Army Corps. This station would transmit messages building up plausibly in volume up to H-hour at Anzio. The operational deception plan further included wireless broadcasts to resistance forces and agents in Italy using a cipher it was known the Germans could read. The messages notified the recipients that an invasion was imminent at Civitavecchia.

Planning for the logistical support and sustainment for Operation SHINGLE required a great deal of time and effort. Ingenious methods to sustain the landing force ashore had to be found. The possibility of not having clear weather more than two days out of seven dictated that the assault convoy be completely unloaded within forty-eight hours; everything would be combat loaded, ready for quick removal in the sequence in which it would be needed. The available LSTs could carry only seven days of supplies for the troops. Admirals John Cunningham (Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) and Lowry wanted to warn Lucas that he could not rely on support over the beach, because of the probability of bad weather and the urgent need for the LSTs in other operations, and so should plan for disembarkation of the whole force immediately after the landing. However, Alexander and Andrew Cunningham (the First Sea Lord) insisted that continuous maintenance be provided and that more LSTs be assigned.

At a conference in Marrakech on 7 January, an American army colonel, Edward J. O’Neill, Clark’s assistant chief of logistics, suggested embarking loaded trucks on board LSTs at Naples, disembarking them at Anzio-Nettuno, and then driving them directly to supply dumps on the beachhead. The LSTs would then embark empty trucks of the previous echelon and take them back to Naples. A similar procedure had been successfully used by the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the
Southwest Pacific Area. However, this idea was rejected by Churchill, the First Sea Lord, and General Bedell Smith. Their objections were that because of unpredictable winter weather it could be difficult to land the DUKWs carrying loaded trucks. Also two offshore sandbars might block heavy landing craft. In addition, the Royal Navy was concerned that the port facilities at Anzio-Nettuno might be destroyed by the Germans.\textsuperscript{108} As it turned out, the DUKWs (which ultimately were used for other purposes) were able to reach the shore, and the Germans failed to demolish the port facilities.\textsuperscript{109}

Clark eventually accepted the idea of carrying preloaded trucks on LSTs.\textsuperscript{110} This method reduced the unloading time from a full day to a single hour. Without it, maintaining the Allied forces at Anzio would have been impossible.\textsuperscript{111} The trucks would load up to their five-ton capacity at Naples dumps, drive onto the LSTs, and then drive off again directly to the VI Corps dumps. Some 1,500 trucks were assembled expressly for this purpose.\textsuperscript{112}

The assault and follow-up shipping would be mounted from Naples and its satellite ports. Organization of the convoys for the British contingent was the responsibility of the AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon, while the Peninsular Base Section had the same responsibility for the U.S. contingent. Because, as noted, all unloading had to be completed within forty-eight hours and the beaches were poor, the port had to be put into operation quickly, or pontoon causeways would have to be used. Some thirty LCTs and all available DUKWs and both U.S. (LCVPs) and British (LCAs) assault landing craft would be used to unload larger ships. Heavy stores and equipment would be loaded in Algiers, instead of the heavily congested port of Naples, on eight Liberty ships. Four of the Liberty ships would sail with the assault convoy, and four others would follow.\textsuperscript{113}

**Naval Plans**

Naval planning for the original Operation SHINGLE started on 18 November 1943. It was a joint effort of Task Force 81’s planning staff and the headquarters of the Fifth Army at Caserta.\textsuperscript{114} The chief planner, however, was Admiral Lowry. Admiral John Cunningham set up an advance headquarters at Naples.\textsuperscript{115}

The planners selected two main landing sites. One was the 5,600-yard stretch about five miles west of Anzio. The approach was very shallow (a gradient of 1 : 110), and its sand was too soft for vehicles, especially in the exits through the dunes.\textsuperscript{116} This sector was selected for the PETER Force. It was divided into three beaches, designated GREEN, AMBER, and RED, each thirty to sixty yards wide. They were composed of soft sand. In some places five-foot-high banks blocked entrances to the dunes in the rear. The dunes were backed by a belt of trees varying in depth between fifty and four hundred yards. Behind the trees were fields and orchards. A “metalled road” (paved with stone chipping mixed with
tar) ran roughly parallel to, and five hundred to eight hundred yards behind, the beach. The beaches would be difficult to locate at night, any heavy winds would seriously impede operations, and sandbars made it likely that soldiers would have to wade the two hundred or three hundred feet to dry land. A sandbar approximately 150 yards offshore extended almost the entire length of these beaches. LSTs could not reach these beaches and would have to unload over four-hundred-foot causeways. These beaches were suitable for LCVPs, LCAs, DUKWs, and possibly LCTs. The navy recommended to the army that at the PETER beaches neither troops nor equipment be landed from LSTs, LCTs, or infantry landing craft (LCIs).

Another landing site was at Nettuno, four miles east of Anzio. The approach to the Nettuno beaches was also shallow (with gradients of 1 : 80 to 1 : 85). Designated the X-RAY sector, the Nettuno site was divided into three beaches: RED, GREEN, and YELLOW, 2,860 yards long in all. A sandbar extended 150 yards offshore for the entire length of the beach; a minimum six feet of water over the bar could be expected. These beaches were suitable for LCVPs and LCAs, as well as for LCTs and LCIs in some places. Pontoon causeways were required for LSTs. YELLOW Beach was rough sand, 820 yards long, forty yards wide, very shallow (gradient 1 : 130 to 1 : 150), and suitable for the LCVPs, LCAs, DUKWs, and some LCT variants; however, craft drawing three feet or more would ground 150 yards offshore. LCIs, LSTs, and some LCTs could not be beached without a thorough reconnaissance of the spot, which would be conducted during the operation.

TF 81’s Operation Plan No. 147-43, issued on 12 January 1944, stated that the task force’s mission was to “establish 3rd ID (reinforced) Major General Lucian Truscott in positions ashore near Cape D’Anzio in order to attack the rear of the enemy’s right flank.” Clearly, TF 81’s mission was not consonant with that given by Clark to Lucas; it more resembled the mission issued by General Alexander to Clark’s Fifth Army. Plan No. 147-43 also stated that “PETER Force under Rear Admiral Troubridge will operate simultaneously with this force in an area north of line 45° through Capo [D’]Anzio.” The mission of the PETER Force was simply “the landing of the First British division (reinforced).” The plan did not elaborate on what the British contingent’s mission would be ashore. The planners assumed that the enemy would offer strong resistance and that “strong enemy submarine, E-boat and air attacks are to be expected.” They also assumed that mines would be encountered but that the weather would allow landing through surf on the designated beaches.

For gunfire support of the X-RAY Force, TF 81 planners organized four fire-support groups plus a rocket and AA (antiaircraft) support group to deliver “prearranged fires” prior to H-hour. The British Bombarding Squadron would
conduct fires in support of the Peter Force. To achieve surprise, no preliminary bombardment would be conducted except for short, intense rocket barrages at H–10 and H+5 by three specially modified craft known as LCT(R)s. Shore fire-control parties would be provided by the 3rd ID for Red and Green Beaches.

**Air Plans**

TF 81’s plan envisaged comprehensive support by Allied air forces during the sea transit and landing. The Coastal Air Force would provide both day and night fighter cover over the loading areas at the Naples and Salerno loading areas, as well as day and night fighter cover and antiship protection from the swept Ischia Channel to the Ponza Islands. By night, radar patrol aircraft would conduct antiship patrols from the swept Ischia Channel up to the landing beaches. In addition, the Coastal Air Force would ensure both night and day fighter cover over rehearsal areas and convoy routes in the Salerno area. The XII Air Support Command would provide fighter cover over the convoy routes from the Ponza Islands to the assault areas, plus fighter cover over the transport area and the assault beaches.

Planning by air commands for Operation Shingle was completed on 30 December 1943. The effort was divided into three related phases. Phase I (1–14 January) aimed to disrupt enemy communications in northern Italy and deceive the enemy about Allied intentions by supporting the deception plan; Phase II (15–21 January) was the isolation of the landing area by bombing attacks on road and rail communications north of Rome and on the fronts of the Fifth and Eighth Armies. The focus of attacks in this phase would be enemy airfields, aircraft, and communications. In Phase III (22 January to the end of the operation), Allied aircraft would provide cover to convoys and over the beachhead, and close air support to the landing forces.

**Allied Preparations**

Orders for the naval part of the operation were issued on 16 January. All commanders taking part were briefed that day at Naples. Admiral Lowry had directed that all landing craft were to arrive at Naples prior to 15 January for a briefing the next day. Prior to that, five (later ten) LSTs and a group of LCI and LCTs were assembled in the Naples area for training with the British 1 Division and the U.S. 3rd ID.

The Anzio-Nettuno landing required significant redeployment of forces on the Allied front. The 3rd ID was assembled at Pozzuoli on New Year’s Day. The VI Corps turned over its sector of the front to the FEC on 3 January and moved its headquarters to Maddaloni. The most difficult redeployment involved the Eighth Army, which shifted no fewer than three divisions, plus attached units, to
the main Fifth Army front. Between 1 and 5 January, the British 1 Division was moved from Foggia on the Adriatic front to the Salerno area. It was followed by the 2 Special Service Brigade. The British 5 Division was shifted to reinforce the British 10 Corps for an attack across the Garigliano. The New Zealand 2nd ID was moved from Orsogna to Venafro to join the 15th Army Group reserve. To minimize the possibility of enemy detection of these movements, these units were ordered to maintain radio silence. However, they were allowed to move during daylight, because of the absence of the enemy aircraft. The Eighth Army was to make a demonstration along its front so that the Germans would not move forces toward the main Fifth Army. For that purpose, the headquarters of the Canadian Corps and the 4th Indian Division had to be brought forward from reserve.

Despite the short time available, the VI Corps embarked on extensive large-scale landing exercises between 4 and 19 January. The initial focus was on conducting small-unit, then battalion and regimental rehearsals. Infantry battalions rehearsed tactical landings under simulated fire, removing minefields and barbed wire and knocking out pillboxes. Artillery units rehearsed loading and unloading DUKWs. Assault landings were practiced from landing-craft mock-ups on dry land and then, in the battalion and regimental exercises, with craft provided by the navy.

Preparations for the Anzio landing culminated in a corps landing exercise (dubbed WEBFOOT) six miles south of Salerno on 17–19 January. It was not really a full-scale rehearsal, although all the assault units, DUKWs with their weapons, and token support weapons and vehicles took part. The rehearsal went reasonably well for the British contingent. However, the U.S. contingent encountered heavy weather on the night of 17/18 January. Few landing craft arrived at the proper beaches. Some landing craft disembarked so far out that the forces arrived at the beach late. About twenty DUKWs sank. With them were lost a number of 105 mm howitzers. Also, several men drowned. The situation on the U.S. beaches was chaotic. Both Generals Lucas and Truscott insisted on another rehearsal, but Clark rejected the idea for lack of time.

In the meantime, the Allied air forces interdicted German road and rail communications beyond the prospective beachhead. These massive “operational fires” were designed to prevent the movement of enemy troops or supplies and in that way to have a major impact on the course and outcome of Operation SHINGLE. German troops in Italy moved mostly by rail, using three main routes: one on the western coast, one on the eastern, and a third in the middle from Florence to Rome. All of them ran through very mountainous terrain. Allied bombers attacked key marshaling yards and bridges almost constantly. The main targets of tactical bombers were rail yards at Florence, Pisa, Arezzo, and Terni and bridges at Orte, Orvieto, and Cecina, on the central and west-coast routes. Closer to the
Anzio area, light bombers, fighter-bombers, and night intruders attacked enemy motor transport.\(^\text{146}\)

Between 1 and 13 January, Allied bombers systematically struck rail communications in central Italy, with the aim of preventing the supply of German units on the front in southern Italy.\(^\text{147}\) They also conducted massive attacks on German airfields, specifically four fighter airfields near Rome and three airfields at Perugia for reconnaissance aircraft.\(^\text{148}\) On 21 January, Allied bombers attacked German airfields at Montpellier, Salon, and Istres (used by torpedo bombers and glide bombers) in southern France.\(^\text{149}\)

By 19 January, the Allied airmen claimed, ``all communications from northern Italy to Rome were cut.'' In fact, however, this bombing did not do much good for the forces that landed at Anzio-Nettuno. The Germans filled runway craters overnight. Their engineers always kept at least one rail track open. That was all the Germans needed for troop and supply trains, and the civilian population's needs could wait. Nevertheless, the Allied air attacks did ground the reconnaissance aircraft at the Perugia airfields just before the Allied assault convoy sailed.\(^\text{150}\)

Complicating the preparations for the Anzio landing were very unsatisfactory Anglo-American military relations in the Mediterranean theater. The problem was especially apparent in the combined headquarters commands, where American and British officers were ``clannish'' and did not mix freely with their counterparts. The Americans viewed the British as selfish and obstinate. The Fifth Army's headquarters, however, did not seem to have such British-American friction. Clark was the first American army commander to command large formations of Allied troops. On 7 January 1944 Clark had six British divisions, one Moroccan, one New Zealander, one Indian, and one Canadian division in addition to his four American divisions.\(^\text{151}\)

The chain of command above Clark was a breeding ground for difficult Anglo-American relations. Formally, there was a single chain of command running from the CCS through the British or American theater commanders and then to the American, British, and other Allied forces all the way to the division level. However, there was also an informal but very important personal chain of command, which ran along national lines. For example, General Alexander regularly communicated with General Alan Brooke without going through Eisenhower. Clark also often communicated with Eisenhower without notifying Alexander. Eisenhower attempted to ensure that Clark kept Alexander fully informed about these discussions but did not try to stop Clark from communicating directly with him. Both the Americans and British accepted this informal chain of command. It did not become a problem until Alexander and General Ronald Penney, commander of the British 1 Division, began to discuss the performance of General Lucas during the Anzio landing. Penney complained that Lucas did not inspire
confidence in his subordinates and did not know what to do about the situation after the Allies landed ashore. (Penney had been Alexander’s signal officer prior to assuming his command in VI Corps.)

Alexander believed that Clark did not like the British. A probable reason was that Alexander often gave instructions to division-level commanders directly and visited them for discussions. Not surprisingly, Clark did not like Alexander giving instructions to his Fifth Army subordinates. Hence, a certain degree of animosity did develop on Clark’s side. On their part, the British generally regarded Clark as extremely ambitious, vain, temperamental, and sensitive. Clark argues in his memoirs that he encouraged cooperation and understanding to strengthen American ties with their British comrades.

Truscott would write in his own memoirs about a lack of understanding between British and American commanders and staffs. This was especially true in the case of VI Corps and its British divisions. Reportedly, Lucas had little trust in British commanders or their troops and the British commanders returned the favor. The VI Corps staff was not familiar with British organization, staff procedures, or tactical methods. Some staff members failed to appreciate the difference in national characteristics. A tendency on the part of Americans was to be critical of all things British and impatient with methods unfamiliar to them.

GERMAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

The number of German troops in Italy was barely sufficient to hold the southern front and strengthen rear areas. In the case of an enemy landing, reinforcements would have to be sent from adjacent theaters and Germany proper to prevent a collapse of Army Group C. Foreseeing this contingency, the OKW issued orders at the end of December 1943 to the CINC of the West (France and Low Countries), the CINC of the Southeast (Balkans), and the Commander of the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) specifying the units that would be transferred to Italy in the event of a large enemy landing. Kesselring thus was assured that reinforcements would be on the way shortly; until they arrived, he was to employ all available forces to repulse the landing. The Germans believed that although the enemy landing could not be prevented, they could contain and destroy the enemy forces after they landed.

By 20 December 1943 the OKW’s Joint Operations Staff (Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab) had prepared redeployment plans in case of a major enemy landing on the Ligurian coast (MARDER 1) and on the Adriatic coast (MARDER 2). Each of these contingency plans detailed movements of specific units deployed in southern France, southern Germany, and the Balkans to the Italian theater. In addition, Kesselring also prepared five contingency plans in the event of a large enemy landing in his theater. Specifically, these plans pertained to the
following scenarios: landing in the Rome area (Case RICHARD), near Leghorn (Case LUDWIG), in the Genoa area (Case GUSTAV), in the Rimini–Venice area (Case VICTOR), and in Istria (Case IDA) (see map 2). In the months before and at the
turn of 1944, it was clear to Kesselring that the area around Rome from Civitavecchia to Gaeta, and especially Campagna, was highly vulnerable. His chief preoccupation was to create a reserve to counter any large-scale landings. Prearranged code words would bring forces from all parts of the Italian Peninsula to mass at the invasion point.  

Case RICHARD envisaged the movement of forces subordinate to the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies, as well as the SS & Police Command, Italy; the XI Air Corps; and 2nd Air Fleet. Specifically, the Tenth Army would make available one of its panzer divisions or panzer-grenadier (mechanized) divisions in reserve, and one panzer reconnaissance detachment, plus some other smaller units. The Fourteenth Army headquarters would be relocated from northern Italy to the Rome area. It would move combat-ready forces of the 362nd ID, 114th Light (Jaeger) ID, a reinforced regimental group of the 356th ID, and another from the 65th ID. The SS & Police Command would make available the 16th Panzer-Grenadier Division Reichsfuehrer-SS (less one regiment) and the 35th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment. The XI Air Corps would move the 4th Parachute Division, plus some corps troops. The 2nd Air Fleet would make available four heavy AA detachments.

Kesselring’s contingency plans for defense against landings on Italy’s western and eastern coasts contemplated the organization into reaction forces of rear-echelon troops, such as AA units along the coast, replacement units, engineers, and other support units. They would fight as infantry until maneuver units could reach the beachhead. For the Germans, the main lesson of Salerno had been that the landing force had to be thrown back into the sea within twenty-four hours—that is, before the enemy could deploy its artillery and so consolidate the beachhead. Hence, the German reaction units had to be close to the coast, so they could reach the site in one night’s march—being unable to move during daylight hours because of Allied air superiority.

The Germans considered the entire Italian coast to be potentially threatened by enemy landings ranging in size from tactical (in support of enemy forces on the front line) to “strategic” (actually operational) meant to cut off an entire army group. The Germans accordingly organized five coastal-defense sectors, centered on Genoa, Leghorn, Rome, Rimini-Ravenna, and Istria (in the Southeast Theater). Each was fortified and guarded by small units. In October 1943, the Fourteenth Army consolidated the defenses on the Gothic Line (Pisa–Rimini) and between La Spezia on the west coast and Pesaro on the east coast. The Germans also paid attention to the defense of the Voralpen (Alpine foothills) Line, stretching from the Italo-Swiss border to Istria. In the case of a successful enemy landing these lines would offer prepared defensive positions in the rear of the central Italian front.
Army Group C was well aware of the inadequacy of the fortifications and forces close to the coast. Neither OKW nor Army Group C believed it possible to defend Italy’s coast successfully against a large amphibious landing with forces on hand. Nevertheless, the Germans made constant efforts to strengthen threatened sectors. They emplaced additional coastal guns and constructed obstacles; they mined offshore waters and inundated certain coastal areas. But the situation on the Tenth Army’s front limited the extent to which forces could be spared for coastal defense. When an enemy offensive caused a crisis on the front, reinforcements were sent from northern Italy, weakening coastal defenses.  

The situation west of Rome was especially acute. The Germans always considered it possible that the Allies might land in the rear of the Tenth Army in support of their forces on the front. However, the Fourteenth Army was unable to accept additional responsibilities for defenses south of Rome. OKW was unwilling to further weaken defenses in northern Italy, because of uncertainty about whether the enemy intended to land west or south of Rome, in the Gulf of Genoa, or on the Istrian Peninsula. For this reason the Tenth Army was left to secure the coastal sector in the vicinity of Rome. The I Parachute Corps was specifically responsible for it.  

In early January, having received more information pointing to a landing in the Rome area, OKW decided to replace the 3rd Panzer-Grenadier Division with the much stronger 90th Panzer-Grenadier Division, then on the Adriatic coast. A lull in the first two weeks of January 1944 allowed the Germans to reinforce their forces in the Rome area. This regrouping started on 10 January. The 29th and 90th Panzer Divisions of the I Parachute Corps were assigned to the coastal sector, and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division was held as a mobile reserve, between Rome and the southern front.  

**OPPOSING FORCES, 22 JANUARY**  
The Allies had initially a large superiority in forces on the ground, and their strength at sea and in the air was overwhelming for the duration of the Anzio-Nettuno operation. The 15th Army Group, led by General Alexander, was the highest command echelon of the ground forces on the Italian mainland. Alexander himself had intelligence, good looks, and charm—everything came easily to him. An imperturbable coolness made him appear unconcerned even in the most intense moments of crisis. General Alan Brooke would say of Alexander that he never had “the slightest doubt that all would come out right in the end.” Alexander was more persuasive than forceful. His operations were neither daring nor creative. In planning, he always sought the advice of his subordinates.  

The Fifth Army, led by General Clark, was the command most directly involved in Operation SHINGLE. Clark had never commanded a large formation
before he took over the Fifth Army. For most of his career Clark had been a training instructor, assigned to various staff duties. At forty-eight, he was much younger than most generals of his rank; he had been promoted from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant general in just three years. Clark was aggressive, hardworking, and efficient; Eisenhower thought Clark “the best organizer, planner and trainer of troops that I have met.” Before landing at Salerno, because of his youth and inexperience, Clark had shown great deference to his superiors. However, after Salerno, Clark became more self-assured and less deferential. He was cordial with the British, although he became disenchanted with them. In general, Clark tried to hide his sensibilities behind a mask of coldness.

The VI Corps was led by General J. P. Lucas. General Marshall characterized Lucas as having “military stature, prestige, and experience.” He assumed command of VI Corps at Salerno on 20 September 1943, when Clark relieved Major General Ernest J. Dawley. General Clark wanted an experienced corps commander who could reestablish leadership of corps operations at Salerno.

As finalized, the initial invasion force consisted of the U.S. 3rd ID, the British 1 Division, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, the U.S. 751st Tank Battalion, the 504th Parachute Infantry Battalion, two British commando battalions, and three U.S. Ranger battalions. (For details see appendix A.) The 45th ID and Combat Command A (a task-organized combined-arms unit of about brigade size) would be in reserve for reinforcement once the lodgment had been established.

Admiral Lowry was responsible for mounting, embarking, and landing the ground force and supporting it until the lodgment was established. His TF 81 consisted of the X-RAY and PETER Forces. Lowry commanded some 230 ships and craft (135 U.S.) of X-RAY Force, carrying American troops. Admiral Troubridge commanded some 150 ships and craft (twenty-two U.S.) of PETER Force, with the British part of the VI Corps. (For details see appendix B.) TF 81 also included one Polish, two Dutch, and four Greek ships.

The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces had about 2,600 aircraft, organized in some sixty squadrons (twenty-two fighter, six fighter-bomber, four light-bomber, twenty-four medium-bomber, and two and a half reconnaissance). About 75 percent of the Allied aircraft were operational. In late 1943 they had been moved from North Africa to the new bases on Sardinia, Corsica, and mainland Italy. The MAAF’s B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers were used for strategic bombing. Its B-25 Mitchell, B-26 Marauder, and Wellington medium bombers were used for attacking targets fifty to a hundred miles behind the enemy front. The MAAF’s medium bombers, A-20 Havocs and the Martin 187 Baltimores, were used for destroying installations and facilities closer to the front. De Havilland’s Mosquitoes and A-36 Apaches (also listed as “Invaders”) provided direct support.
to the ground troops. Spitfires, Hurricanes, P-38 Lightnings, P-40 Hawks, P-47 Thunderbolts, and P-51 Mustangs escorted Allied bombers and intercepted and destroyed enemy fighters.\footnote{177} On the German side, all ground forces in the Italian theater were subordinate to Army Group C, led by Field Marshal Kesselring, who was, as noted, also CINC Southwest. Kesselring was one of the best German commanders in World War II.\footnote{178} He was a born leader, highly intelligent and always open to new ideas.\footnote{179} Kesselring was by nature genial, optimistic, and cheerful. He had a great and rare ability to grasp what was essential and what could be disregarded.\footnote{180} A Luftwaffe officer, he had no experience as an army field commander. But he had a cool head, reacted quickly to unforeseen events, and made sound decisions.\footnote{181}

The German ground forces under Kesselring comprised the Tenth and the Fourteenth Armies, totaling twenty-four divisions. The Fourteenth Army, under General Eberhard von Mackensen, was deployed north of the Grosseto–Ancona line. It consisted of eleven and a half divisions, of which four were in the process of forming and four were in defensive positions. The Tenth Army, led by General Heinrich von Vietinghoff \textit{genannt} (“known as”) Scheel, consisted on 20 January 1944 of two army corps plus one panzer and one infantry division. Opposed to the British Eighth Army was the LXXVI Panzer Corps, with four divisions, while the Fifth Army faced four divisions of the XIV Panzer Corps.\footnote{182}

By the end of 1943, the Luftwaffe had in service about 550 aircraft in Italy, southern France, and the Balkans. However, almost all heavy bombers had been withdrawn from Italy, leaving only about fifty Ju.88s in Greece and Crete and some sixty Ju.88s, He.111s, and Do.217s in southern France. Most of the fighters, some 230 Me.109s and FW.190s, were in Italy, about a third of them at fields around Rome.\footnote{183} On 20 January, the 2nd Air Fleet had 337 aircraft, among them two hundred fighters (136 operational), and twenty-five short-range (twenty operational) and six long-range reconnaissance aircraft (two operational).\footnote{184} The German Kriegsmarine had in Italy only three torpedo boats and two U-boats.\footnote{185} On 1 January 1944, some thirteen U-boats were deployed in the Mediterranean, but only three were at sea during that month.\footnote{186}

**FIFTH ARMY’S JANUARY OFFENSIVE**

On 12 January, the Fifth Army resumed its offensive against the Gustav Line. The FEC attacked in the direction of Monte Cassino while the British 10 Corps advanced across the lower Garigliano River toward Minturno-Ausonia (Operation PANTHER).\footnote{187} The attackers gained initial successes with the assistance of a surprise landing of strong forces west of the mouth of the Garigliano.\footnote{188}
On 16 January, the Fifth Army’s G-2 gave what proved to be a highly optimistic assessment of the enemy’s situation and intentions. Among other things, it stated that “within just [the] past few days there have been increasing indications that enemy strength on the front of the Fifth Army is ebbing due to casualties, exhaustion, and possibly lowering of morale. One of the reasons for this are continuous Allied attacks. His entire strength will probably be needed to defend his organized defensive positions.” Moreover, it also asserted,

in the view of weakening of enemy on the front—it would appear doubtful, if the enemy can hold [an] organized defensive line through Cassino against a coordinated army attack. Since the attack is to be launched before Shingle it is considered likely [that] this additional thrust will cause him to withdraw from his defensive positions once he has appreciated the magnitude of that operation.

Despite successive attacks, however, neither the French nor the British were able to break through the mountain defenses. On 20 January the U.S. II Corps tried to cross the Rapido River. After two days of bitter fighting and heavy losses, that attack too proved unsuccessful. By 22 January, the attack on the Gustav Line had bogged down in the midst of strong German counterattacks. It would prove fortunate for the Allies at Anzio, however, that the Tenth Army had now been forced to commit most of its operational reserves.

**PHASES**

Operation SHINGLE itself can be divided into seven distinct but closely related phases: assembly and loading (19–20 January), sea transit (21–22 January), landing (22 January), establishment of the lodgment and the German reaction (22–24 January), the battle ashore (25 January–4 March), stalemate (5 March–22 May), and breakout (23 May–1 June).

**Assembly and Loading, 19–20 January**

On these two days activity in the port of Naples and satellite ports was greatly intensified as the troops, weapons, equipment, and supplies were embarked. The loading schedule had been prepared and coordinated by the joint loading board of the Peninsular Base Section, the Fifth Army, and the VI Corps. Each division was responsible for its own loading areas, movement to the docks, and loading. Vehicles were waterproofed in division areas and loaded on 19 January. The troops of X-RAY Force were loaded at four locations in the Gulf of Naples. The PETER Force was assembled in the afternoon of 21 January north of Capri. The initial assault force of 50,000 men, 5,200 vehicles, and some 375 ships and craft was comparable in size to that which had landed at Salerno in September 1943. General Lucas established his command post on board the small seaplane tender *Biscayne* on the afternoon on 20 January. The weather forecast predicted
negligible swell and a thick morning haze to cover the landing. On 20 January, Task Force 81 was informed that D-day would be 22 January and H-hour, 0200. At 0500 on 21 January the ships of TF 81 put to sea.

**Sea Transit, 21–22 January**

The distance from Naples to the Anzio-Nettuno beaches is some 110 miles. The sorties and rendezvous of the convoys and their approaches to the beaches were carried out exactly as planned. The route of TF 81 from the Gulf of Naples to Anzio was laid out to keep the ships clear of minefields and conceal their destination as long as possible. It passed four to twelve miles seaward of Ischia and the Ponziane Islands. The assault convoy sailed at about five knots on a roundabout track. South of Ischia the LCTs and other landing craft of the X-RAY Force took a shorter course closer to the shore. Minesweepers were positioned ahead of the convoy, while cruisers and destroyers protected flanks against U-boats and torpedo boats. Fighters provided air cover.

The sea was calm, the temperature about fifty-five degrees Fahrenheit, and the ceiling was six thousand feet, good for air strikes. TF 81 was not detected during its transit. Reportedly, the last German air reconnaissance of the Naples harbor had been on 11 December 1943. At dusk, within five miles of the CHARLIE reference vessel (3.5 miles from the center point of the landing beaches), speed was reduced to allow stragglers to catch up.

On 20 January, and just prior to the movement to the beach of the landing force, the British Bombardment Group (HMS *Orion*, *Spartan*, *Janus*, *Jervis*, *La Forey*, and *Faulknor*) attacked the coastal batteries at Terracina. The 12th Minesweeping Flotilla cleared mines to enable the transit of the bombardment force through the Gulf of Gaeta.

**The Landing**

At 0005 on 22 January, in the darkness of a moonless night, the Allied assault force dropped anchor off Anzio-Nettuno. Lucas exaggerated by saying that it had “achieved what is certainly one of the most complete surprises in history.” The factors that had contributed to it, however, included the wireless silence maintained during the transit by TF 81, inadequate German air and sea reconnaissance, a lack of German radar posts on the western coast south of Piombino, and, more broadly, a failure of German military intelligence.

As described above, Allied troops and landing craft had assembled at Corsica and Sardinia as part of a deception effort. During the night of 21 January, one British cruiser (HMS *Dido*), a French destroyer (*Le Fantasque*), and a British destroyer (HMS *Inglefield*) conducted diversionary bombardment of Civitavecchia. At daybreak this force moved south to bombard the coast between Formia and Terracina to check any enemy reinforcements toward Anzio. Allied coastal
craft made dummy landings; however, preoccupied by heavy fighting along the Gustav Line, the Germans paid little attention to these.\textsuperscript{210} ULTRA did not reveal whether the Germans believed the deception story, but in any case they moved no troops. The Germans apparently preferred to rely on their aerial reconnaissance to warn of any actual, imminent amphibious attack.\textsuperscript{211}

The landing at Anzio-Nettuno was carried out as planned (see map 3). All the waves except the DUKWs landed within two minutes of the scheduled times. Some LCIs grounded on the inner bar and unloaded via LCVPs. The CHARLIE reference vessel proved effective.\textsuperscript{212} In the PETER Force’s sector, a British submarine (HMS \textit{Ultor}) helped minesweepers clear mines starting at 2030 on D–1. However, because of inadequate rehearsal, gear was fouled, and there were near collisions and narrow escapes from floating mines.\textsuperscript{213}

The PETER Force arrived at its landing sector at about midnight.\textsuperscript{214} At H–10 (or earlier than planned) two British LCT(R)s launched a powerful five-minute barrage of five-inch rockets.\textsuperscript{215} Two cruisers (USS \textit{Brooklyn} and HMS \textit{Penelope}) and five U.S. destroyers provided fire support. In X-RAY Force’s sector, fire support was provided by two British cruisers, \textit{Orion} and \textit{Spartan}. In reserve were two Dutch gunboats, \textit{Flores} and \textit{Soemba}.\textsuperscript{216} Enemy movements detected on the coast road in the Formia area were shelled by \textit{Dido} and a destroyer.\textsuperscript{217}

In the PETER Force’s sector, both LSTs and LCTs had to unload over pontoon causeways. Ten LSTs were sent to X-RAY beaches for unloading on D-day.\textsuperscript{218} The first wave reached the beaches at about 0200, but the DUKWs did not roll out until 0400. The LCTs did not beach until 0645. Lack of exits from the beach and serious delay in rigging causeways postponed the unloading of LSTs until 1045.\textsuperscript{219} Because of the unfavorable beach gradient, as noted above, the troops disembarked by the LSTs had to wade over three hundred feet to the shore. Only a single ship could be unloaded at a time. Also, the movement of vehicles on the exit roads was impeded by the soft and boggy ground.\textsuperscript{220}

The 3rd ID disembarked on the RED and GREEN Beaches. A British submarine, HMS \textit{Uproar}, guided a force of twenty-three minesweepers, which found only a few mines in the approach lanes.\textsuperscript{221} By 1500 on D-day supplies began to be shipped directly to the VI Corps dumps. The 36th Engineer Combat Regiment cleared the port of Nettuno; by the early afternoon it was able to receive four LSTs and three LCTs simultaneously.\textsuperscript{222}

The initial mission of the Luftwaffe was to hinder the enemy buildup and attack supply shipping. The main burden was on torpedo and glide bombers.\textsuperscript{223} The Luftwaffe flew only 140 sorties on 22 January.\textsuperscript{224} About 0850, eighteen to twenty-eight German fighter-bombers made three attacks on the unloading areas but sank only a single 160-foot LCI.\textsuperscript{225} On D-day, the Allied aircraft flew 1,200 sorties against the targets in the amphibious objective area.\textsuperscript{226} Their main targets
were the roads leading to the landing beaches. However, the Germans quickly repaired them.⁹²⁷
Establishing the Lodgment and German Reaction, 22–24 January

All the initial objectives by the VI Corps were captured by noon on 22 January. The only resistance came from elements of two depleted battalions of the 29th Panzer-Grenadier Division. These units had just been withdrawn from hard fighting along the Gustav Line and assigned to what had been expected to be a long rest, coast watching between the Tiber River and Nettuno. A few scattered minefields, mostly in the port and on the PETER beaches, were the greatest hazard. After sunrise on D-day, however, the enemy 88 mm batteries deep inland began sporadically shelling the port and PETER beaches. Despite the support of Allied cruisers and destroyers, these guns were not silenced all day.

After the landing, the Allied forces advanced and expanded the beachhead. By the evening of D-day advance elements of the 30th Infantry and 3rd Reconnaissance Regiment had seized all the bridges across the Mussolini Canal. However, the Hermann Goering Panzer Division recaptured most of them that night.

Despite claims to the contrary, some ULTRA messages were shared with the commanders taking part in SHINGLE. For example, on 20 January the British Admiralty informed Commander, TF 81 that “service of ULTRA will open for Admiral Lowry and Major General Lucas immediately.” Three days later the British naval Operational Intelligence Centre in the Mediterranean stated that “naval information for admiral Lowry being passed as Admiralty ULTRA but no service to major general Lucas until the recently requested special party has been formed.” However, it is unclear whether Lowry and Lucas received the same ULTRA messages that General Clark did.

By the end of the 24th, the beachhead was roughly seven miles deep and fifteen miles wide, centered on the port of Anzio. Its twenty-six-mile perimeter was considered the maximum that could be held by VI Corps. The beachhead was too small—all of it could be reached by enemy artillery, and the forces within it had little space for maneuver. German artillery observers in the Alban Hills enjoyed an unobstructed, spectacular view of the beachhead and directed fire to all parts of the congested beachhead (see map 3 and the cover of this issue). By 24 January it had become clear that the main Fifth Army could not link up with the VI Corps as envisaged in the original plan. Accordingly, VI Corps was directed to consolidate its gains on the ground before starting an advance toward the Alban Hills, at which point Lucas’s intermediate objectives would be the capture of Cisterna and Campoleone.

Luftwaffe medium bombers, armed with Hs.293 radio-guided glide bombs, and torpedo aircraft conducted frequent raids of the Anzio-Nettuno area. They skimmed at low altitude at dusk through the mist and a hail of AA fire, releasing bombs and torpedoes on the crowded shipping in harbor.
carried out twenty attacks on shipping, with 150 sorties, on the nights of 23/24 and 24/25 January. On the 23rd, a radio-guided glide-bomb attack at dark sank the British destroyer *Janus* and damaged heavily another, HMS *Jervis*. The next day, the anchorage was attacked during daylight by fifteen Luftwaffe fighter-bombers, followed by another forty-three at dusk. After dark, fifty-two aircraft repeatedly attacked the transport area. The aircraft attacked three British hospital ships (*St. David, Leinster, and St. Andrew*), sinking one (*St. David*) and damaging another (*Leinster*). The U.S. destroyer *Plunkett* was hit by a single bomb, killing fifty-three crewmen (however, *Plunkett* reached Palermo under its own power). The light cruiser *Brooklyn* was nearly struck several times.

The Allies had achieved complete tactical surprise in their landing at Anzio-Nettuno. However, Kesselring and OKW had long anticipated a major landing in the rear of their forces in Italy. Kesselring and his staff had noted the concentrations of troops and ships between Naples and Sicily after 13 January. However, they believed a landing improbable prior to the resolution of the enemy attack on the Garigliano River, because of the German counterattack from the right flank of the Tenth Army against that advance. Kesselring and his staff interpreted the heavy air raids on railways and roads in central and northern Italy as meant to cut off the Tenth Army’s supply lines, not as preparations for a landing. Nevertheless, Kesselring now took specific and prudent steps to guard against a landing.

On 18 January he ordered alerts for German forces throughout Italy (with the exception of the German Naval Command Italy, which did not alert its forces against the enemy landing, supposedly because of its shortage of personnel). The Allied commanders learned about Kesselring’s orders on the 19th, through ULTRA. (Ironically, Kesselring’s staff tried to dissuade him from alerting forces on the night of 21/22 January, because constant alerts were wearing troops down.) Because of the threat of a breach of the Gustav Line on the Garigliano, Kesselring moved combat forces in the Rome area southward for a possible counterattack; such weak forces remained west of Rome that they could be employed only for coastal observation in the Tarquinia–Terracina sector. The only headquarters in the Rome area was that of Army Group C. No other staff was available to organize an emergency defense.

At 0235 on 22 January, the first report of four or five enemy cruisers in the Anzio-Nettuno area was sent by the 8th Company of the 71st Panzer-Grenadier Regiment to its battalion command. Kesselring’s chief of staff, General Siegfried Westphal, was awakened at 0300 and informed that the enemy forces had landed at Anzio-Nettuno about 0200. He immediately alerted subordinate forces for Case RICHARD. Afterward, the first alerted German units began to move. Case RICHARD, as noted, called for forces in the Rome area to contain
the beachhead and for uncommitted forces on the Gustav Line to move to the scene. Battalion and regimental forces on the line but in minimal contact with the enemy would be also moved.

However, the critical situation at the southern flank of the Tenth Army required deployment of all reserves in the Italian theater. Failure to take immediate countermeasures, in the face of enemy landings south of Rome, could lead to the cutting off of the Tenth Army and the collapse of the entire southern Italian front. Therefore, Kesselring intended to establish a defensive line on the beachhead as quickly as possible. At that point, it had to be assumed that the enemy might seize the Alban Hills before sufficient German troops could be brought up. These considerations made a counterattack necessary, for which reinforcements would have to be transferred from other theaters.

Meanwhile, Kesselring immediately alerted the 4th Parachute Division and replacement units of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, in the Rome area, to block all roads leading to Rome from the Alban Hills. ULTRA detected all these movements, except those of two battalions in the Rome area that used telephone instead of radio. At 0600 on 22 January, Kesselring reported to the OKW that a landing had taken place and requested that the forces from other theaters earmarked for Case RICHARD be sent to Italy.

Kesselring decided to take away temporarily some forces from the Tenth Army until the arrival of reinforcements from northern Italy, southern France, and Yugoslavia. Hence, the I Parachute Corps, under General Alfred Schlemm, was ordered to stop its attack on the Garigliano River, withdraw the 29th Panzer-Grenadier Division, and move it to the Anzio area. The Tenth Army was directed to release from the Adriatic front various units, especially motorized reconnaissance detachments and infantry divisions, and send them to Anzio.

At 0710 on 22 January, Kesselring directed General Mackensen to transfer to the assault area all forces involved in Case RICHARD. Mackensen accordingly ordered to proceed immediately to the Anzio area the 65th ID (less one regiment) at Genoa, the 362nd ID (less one regiment) at Rimini, and two regiments of the newly formed 16th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division at Leghorn. Their movements started that evening and continued through 23 January. At 0830 on the 22nd, Kesselring directed General Vietinghoff to transfer the headquarters and all combat troops that could be spared of the I Parachute Corps to the Anzio area as quickly as possible. The forces most suitable for release by the Tenth Army were the 71st ID and the parts of the 3rd Panzer-Grenadier Division and of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division that were then on the Tenth Army front (the remainder of each was still on the march from the north). In addition, local reserves were withdrawn from the southern front. Since the enemy had landed tanks, antitank forces and artillery had to be released for Anzio. From the
Adriatic front, the Tenth Army sent 26th Panzer Division and elements of the 1st Parachute Division.\textsuperscript{262}

Later in the morning of 22 January, the Joint Operations Staff of the OKW issued by phone the code word MARDER 1. CINC West (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) was ordered to move by rail to CINC Southeast (Field Marshal Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs) the partially mechanized 715th ID, the 998th Artillery Battalion (general headquarters [GHQ] troops, directly subordinate to divisional or corps headquarters), the 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment (with Panther tanks), the 301st Panzer Battalion, and the 216th Assault Howitzer Detachment. CINC Southeast was ordered to deploy the 114th Light (Jaeger) Division and two artillery battalions of GHQ troops.\textsuperscript{263} The Replacement Army in Germany was directed to send to Italy the headquarters of the LXXV Corps, the Infantry Demonstration (Lehr) Regiment, 1026th Grenadier Infantry Regiment, the 1027th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, the Artillery Demonstration Regiment, the Rocket Launcher Demonstration Battalion, three battalions of security troops, two battalions of Russian “volunteers,” six construction battalions, and the 508th Panzer Battalion (with Tiger tanks). Neither the CINC West nor CINC Southeast could provide a second division as planned in Case RICHARD, because of the transfer of troops to the Russian front. Hence, immediate activation of the 92nd ID in Viterbo, Italy, was ordered.\textsuperscript{264}

On the eve of the enemy landing at Anzio, Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean had been reduced to about two hundred aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe reacted quickly and energetically to the new threat.\textsuperscript{265} After a phone conversation with Hitler, its commander in chief, Hermann Goering, ordered all available aircraft to Italy. In the night of 22/23 January, OKW directed CINC Southeast to send the 1st and 2nd Air Groups (Gruppe) of the 26th Bomber Wing (Kampfgeschwader), the 2nd Air Group of the 100th Bomber Wing (flying Do.17s), and 2nd Air Group of the 50th Bomber Wing (with He.177s).\textsuperscript{266} To the 2nd Air Fleet would be transferred, from Luftwaffe Command / CINC Southeast, the 3rd Squadron, 1st Group, of the 1st Bomber Wing (Ju.88s); the 1st Squadron of the 3rd Group and the 2nd Group of the 100th Bomber Wing (Do.217s); and the 2nd Group of the 40th Bomber Wing (He.177s).\textsuperscript{267}

Between 23 January and 3 February, some 140 long-range bombers were brought in from northwestern Germany, southern France, and Greece. Antishipping aircraft in southern France were reinforced by fifty to sixty Do.217s and He.177s armed with radio-controlled glide bombs. About fifty single-engine fighters were moved down from northern Italy to the Anzio area by 23 February, and by the end of the month about forty single-engine fighters had been sent (though the Germans never had more than thirty or thirty-five fighters available). Despite all difficulties, Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean by March
1944 had grown to 750–75 aircraft, including some six hundred in the central Mediterranean, of which about 475 were available for operations in the Anzio area.  

At 1700 on 22 January, the I Parachute Corps established a defensive line at the Anzio beachhead and took command of all arriving troops. That evening it became clear to Kesselring that the landing was a major enemy effort. Vietinghoff recommended immediate withdrawal from the Gustav Line and shortening of the Garigliano–Rapido front to free two seasoned divisions for Anzio. However, Kesselring, perceiving a lack of aggressiveness by the enemy VI Corps, instructed him to stand fast. This was a bold decision, because the first strong contingents from the Tenth Army could not be expected earlier than the 24th. If the enemy tried a breakout before then, Kesselring estimated, German forces would not be strong enough to resist.

Kesselring moved his headquarters about twenty-eight miles north to underground bunkers at Monte Soratte, a secure and bombproof place. He directed General Mackensen to take over the defense in the Anzio area; the I Parachute Corps and LXXVI Panzer Corps became subordinate to him. Mackensen’s mission was to strengthen the defensive ring and reduce the enemy bridgehead.

The Germans anticipated that the landing force would limit itself to reconnaissance and patrol toward the north and artillery fire on German positions. By the 24th Kesselring was convinced that there was no danger of an enemy breakout. By then the German defenders had a total of seventy artillery batteries, including AA. This estimate was supported by the belief that the enemy did not have sufficient troops on the beachhead for a large-scale attack. Kesselring concluded that the enemy would make only local attacks.

On the basis of these assumptions, Kesselring decided to counterattack, to destroy the enemy landing force or drive it back into the sea. Every effort would be made to deliver this blow before the enemy had completed its initial consolidation. Yet a concerted attack could not start before the 28th, because forces could not be assembled earlier—although if the enemy attacked after all, the counterattack would start immediately, regardless.

By the end of 25 January, the Germans had almost twenty-six thousand combat troops on the line. Instead of weakening the Gustav Line, the Germans had brought in some thirty-four thousand troops to the area. By 25 January, elements of eight German divisions were facing Anzio, and five more, with many supporting units, were on the way. This number was much larger than Allied intelligence had believed possible. The Allies had estimated that German commitments in northern Italy and elsewhere would limit reinforcements to only two divisions from north of Rome, and those not for sixteen days.
The Battle Ashore, 25 January–4 March
By 29 January the Allies had disembarked at Anzio-Nettuno some 69,000 troops, 237 tanks, 508 guns, and about 27,250 tons of supplies. By then the Germans had built a strong defensive line in front of Cisterna and Campoleone (see map 4). The terrain, with its gullies and soggy ground caused by rain, worked in their favor. The Germans concentrated about thirty battalions, supported by panzers...
and artillery, keeping six battalions in reserve. Lucas planned for that day a two-pronged attack: one force would cut Highway No. 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Alban Hills; the second force would advance northeast up to the Alban road and break through the Campoleone salient. Lucas still believed that a quick linkup with the main Fifth Army in the south was possible. Yet German resistance all along the perimeter was growing stronger, not weaker. Further, and unknown to Lucas, his attack would be aimed directly at thirty-six German battalions massing for their counterattack.

The attack on Cisterna on 30 January was spearheaded by the two U.S. Ranger battalions. Both were ambushed and trapped by the Germans. Most of the Rangers were captured; out of 767, only six escaped. In an attack on Cisterna on 30/31 January, the 3rd ID fought stubbornly but was unable to break through—in part because the 3rd ID attacked along a seven-mile front toward an objective three or four miles away. At the same time, the British 1 Division tried to breach the enemy’s defense line along a railroad by seizing a crossing at Campoleone.

After three days of heavy fighting, growing enemy strength forced Lucas to abandon his assault and prepare for an expected German counterthrust. The Allied attack had failed to reach its stated objectives. Nevertheless, it forced the Fourteenth Army to commit most of its forces and postponed the counterattack intended to wipe out the Allied beachhead. By 2 February, VI Corps had taken about 1,500 prisoners and inflicted heavy casualties. Its own casualties were about 6,500.

The Germans had planned to attack from north to south along the Albano–Anzio road, with the main concentration on either side of “the Factory” at Aprilia. The original date for the attack was 28 January, but on the 26th Kesselring and Mackensen postponed it to 1 February to await the arrival of the reinforcements. The German plan called for three main phases: Phase I (3–10 February), preparatory attacks to cut off the British salient at the Alban road and to capture the Factory; Phase II (16–20 February), penetration of the enemy perimeter along the Alban road; and Phase III (28 February–2 March), an attack on Cisterna and penetration of the beachhead defenses along the Mussolini Canal. The counterattack was delivered as planned; the first and second phases were successful, but the third failed. The Germans resumed their attack against the weakened British 1 Division on 7 February. In two days of bitter fighting they pushed the British from the Factory and Carroceto. On the 11th American troops tried to retake Aprilia. They failed but inflicted heavy casualties on the German defenders.

Between 3 and 15 February, the Luftwaffe carried out seven attacks against Allied shipping in the Anzio–Nettuno area. The highest number of sorties on any single night was only about fifty. There were about twenty sorties by Do.217s and He.177s armed with Hs.293 radio-controlled glide bombs. The Ju.88s in northern
Italy were capable of no more than harassing raids, mainly on ground targets. Daylight raids on shipping by fighter-bombers were even less effective.\footnote{289}

The lack of Allied success at Anzio became increasingly a matter of great concern to Churchill and General Maitland Wilson. On 11 February, Churchill wrote Alexander, “I am sure you realize how great disappointment was caused at home and in the United States by the stand-still at Anzio.” While he did not know what orders Lucas had, Churchill wrote that “it is a root principle to push out and form contact with the enemy.”\footnote{290} Wilson informed Churchill that as of 10 February, the Allies had in the Anzio bridgehead some eighteen thousand vehicles, including four hundred tanks and more than 1,200 carriers and half-tracks.\footnote{291} This prompted Churchill to say that for him it was a “spectacle” to see eighteen thousand vehicles “accumulated by the 14th day [after D-day] for only 70,000 men or less than four men to a vehicle including drivers and attendants, though they did not move more than 12 or 14 miles”; it was “most astonishing.” He also wondered why seventy thousand American and British troops were blocked by at most sixty thousand Germans. Churchill was clearly impressed with “the ease with which the enemy moved their pieces about on the board and the rapidity with which they adjusted the perilous gaps they had to make on their southern front is most impressive.” In his view, all that “seems to give us very awkward data in regard to OVERLORD.”\footnote{292} General Wilson noted that the Germans rapidly built up their forces to seal the beachhead. Their troop strength had increased from ten infantry battalions and two reconnaissance units on 24 January to twenty-nine infantry battalions and seven reconnaissance units on 30 January, and to forty infantry battalions and seven reconnaissance units on 5 February. In his view, bad weather was the main factor that prevented Allied air forces from cutting off railway traffic from north Italy to Rome.\footnote{293}

On 9 February, Mackensen ordered a second major attack (Operation FISCHFANG), aimed to break through the enemy’s main defense line, split VI Corps in two, drive to Nettuno and Anzio, and destroy the divided enemy force.\footnote{294} The attack started on 16 February but was repulsed with heavy losses, achieving only minor penetrations. The Germans launched a larger assault on 18 February.\footnote{295} However, by noon the next day Allied air and artillery superiority had turned the tide. The final German assault was stopped by air strikes and massed mortars, and machine-gun, artillery, and tank fire. Much weaker attacks on 19 and 20 February were broken up, and the crisis had passed, although harassing attacks continued until the 22nd. The VI Corps now went on the offensive and retook some lost ground.\footnote{296} The German Fourteenth Army was close to exhaustion.\footnote{297}

Neither Alexander nor Clark was entirely happy with Lucas’s performance. They believed Lucas was tired, both physically and mentally. Clark told Alexander that he intended to make General Truscott Lucas’s deputy commander and later
to transfer Lucas and appoint Truscott the VI Corps commander. This and other command changes within the VI Corps became effective on 17 February. On the 22nd Clark formally relieved Lucas and appointed Truscott. Clark thought that Truscott was the most outstanding of all the Fifth Army’s division commanders. A quiet, competent, and courageous officer, with extensive battle experience in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, Truscott inspired confidence. He worked well with the British, who had the highest regard for his judgment.

Apparently, Truscott found the situation in the VI Corps headquarters highly unsatisfactory. He later recalled that the VI Corps staff had never been positive or confident in planning or execution. Although it had many able staff officers, proposals were often made without proper analysis. Conferences often became debating societies, producing decisions that were usually accepted only with reluctance and rarely supported in a way that would have inspired confidence. Orders were based on cursory study of maps and intelligence; few staff officers bothered much about reconnaissance.

The third and last major German effort to throw the Allied forces into the sea started at midnight 28/29 February. The VI Corps and 3rd ID responded strongly; for each German shell they fired twenty, sixty-six thousand on 29 February alone. The Germans’ biggest success was an eight-hundred-yard penetration north of Carano, although they suffered heavy losses.

**Stalemate, 5 March–22 May**

On 4 March, Mackensen decided that further German attacks were useless and ordered the Fourteenth Army to revert to the defense. Over five days of fighting the Germans had suffered 3,500 men killed, wounded, or missing. The Fourteenth Army greatly reduced its strength along the beachhead perimeter, withdrawing its best divisions to the area south of Rome as Army Group C’s operational reserves. Other divisions were sent to northern Italy. By the end of March the enemy force around Anzio had been reduced by more than four divisions, and battle-hardened troops had been replaced with generally second-rate units. A major part of the reinforcements were Italian troops; not trusting their Italian allies, the Germans mixed Italian with German units down to the platoon level. The troops of the VI Corps were equally exhausted; the Allies replaced them with fresh forces. The arrival of fourteen thousand fresh reinforcements in March brought the Allied strength up to ninety thousand troops by the end of March.

After 4 March, there was a lull in fighting for almost three months. Both sides limited themselves to defending their then-held positions. The Anzio-Nettuno front now resembled in many ways the western front of World War I. Most Allied casualties were caused by artillery and air attacks. The Germans used with a devastating effect their 280 mm K5(E) Leopold railway guns (called...
“Anzio Annies”) mounted on the Alban Hills. The VI Corps built up its forces and piled up a huge logistical reserve in preparation for a May offensive, to be followed by a drive to Rome. Allied aircraft and artillery constantly pounded enemy positions.

**Breakout, 23 May–1 June**

On the night of 11/12 May, the Fifth and the Eighth Armies launched a long-awaited offensive against the Gustav Line. The main Fifth Army attack was staged from a bridgehead north of the Garigliano River, between the Liri Valley and the sea. The Eighth Army launched an attack on the Cassino front, which it had taken over after the failure of an offensive in February. After a week of fighting, the Germans abandoned Monte Cassino. By 15 May the FEC and the U.S. II Corps had broken the Gustav Line.

By dusk on the 30th, however, the Fifth Army’s drive appeared to have stalled, and the Fourteenth Army fought hard on 31 May–2 June to check the advance. The Germans offered especially stiff resistance to the VI Corps, which had been on the offensive since 23 May. On the night of 2/3 June, the main enemy forces withdrew northward from the Alban Hills, leaving only scattered rearguard elements. At 0800 on the 4th the first American troops entered Rome, and with that the ultimate operational objective of the Anzio-Nettuno operation had been accomplished—but by other forces.

During the Anzio-Nettuno operation the VI Corps suffered 29,200 combat casualties, comprising 4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded, and 6,800 prisoners or missing. About two-thirds of these casualties occurred in the heavy fighting that ended on 3 March. In addition, the Allies had suffered some 37,000 noncombat casualties (26,000 Americans). Out of the total combat losses, 16,200 were American (2,800 killed, 11,000 wounded, and 2,400 prisoners or missing). During the first thirty days, combat casualties in the VI Corps were 17 percent, for the British 27 percent. During the entire operation, about 33,000 casualties were evacuated by the sea (24,000 Americans). The Fourteenth Army suffered 27,500 casualties (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, 4,500 prisoners or missing).

**CONCLUSIONS AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED**

The Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on 22 January did not itself accomplish its stated ultimate operational objective, despite enormous superiority possessed by the Allies on land, in the air, and at sea. The main reasons for this failure were unsound decisions by Allied political and military leaders and poor performance by operational commanders in planning and execution. The Germans proved much tougher and more resourceful enemies than the Allies anticipated, and the German operational and tactical commanders performed much better than their counterparts.
The Allied command organization in the Mediterranean was fragmented and complex. Some high commanders had two positions or even more. Changes in the names of service components and major tactical commands were frequent, sometimes for no apparent reason. Perhaps the most glaring example of the fragmented command was air forces—there were simply too many tactical commands in the Mediterranean theater, with overlapping responsibilities. The German command organization in the Mediterranean, after the capitulation of Italy, underwent major changes as well, after which it too lacked badly needed unity.

Command organization is one of the key prerequisites of sound command and control. It should be simple and straightforward. It should avoid overlapping responsibilities. Changes in the command structure should not be made often, especially in the course of a campaign or major operation. Optimally, an operational commander should be entrusted with command responsibilities for all forces taking part in a campaign or major operation.

One of the Allies’ greatest advantages was their ability to intercept and read high-level German radio messages. ULTRA intercepts provided a steady stream of information about order of battle and statuses of fuel, ammunition, and food. The cryptologists at Bletchley Park were able to read estimates and plans by Kesselring and his subordinate commanders and exchanges between Hitler, OKW, and Kesselring. Allied high commanders were informed in this way about German assessments of Allied forces. However, army commanders could not “sanitize” them—that is, package the information in a way that did not compromise the source—for relay to major subordinates. Also, British intelligence officers in the theater did not share all ULTRA information with their American counterparts (whom they did not trust to protect it properly), creating not only distrust but difficulty reaching agreements.

An ability to intercept and read in a timely way coded enemy messages provides an enormous advantage. Such a capability must be highly classified, yet subordinate commanders directly involved in combat must possess information that would allow them to make sound decisions. As a minimum, higher commanders should have the authority to sanitize received information and transmit to subordinate tactical commanders. In any case, one’s operational intelligence should not overly rely on technical means but use other sources as well, human intelligence in particular.

A plan for an Anzio-Nettuno landing was revived by Churchill in late December. His insistence, strongly supported by other Allied commanders, on capturing Rome as soon as possible led to the adoption of Operation SHINGLE. This decision was based primarily on political, not military, considerations—an operational decision made by strategic leadership. It was also based on highly suspect assumptions about the time and scope of the enemy reaction to a landing.
in the rear. Allied commanders and their staffs paid more attention to the enemy’s intentions than to his capabilities, a common but often fatal mistake.

The operational commander—not high political leaders—should be primarily responsible for preparing, planning, and executing a major operation. Political and other nonmilitary considerations should be always taken fully into account. Yet the operational commander should consult higher political-military leadership about the advisability of a proposed major operation and the availability of the resources that would be necessary for it.

Clark’s proposal on 10 December to disconnect landing at Anzio-Nettuno from the progress of the Fifth Army from the south was a radical change. It made the landing an independent major joint operation instead of an integral part of a renewed Fifth Army offensive. It also largely doomed the landing.

An amphibious landing aimed to envelop an enemy flank on the coast should be planned and executed not as an independent major operation but as an integral part of a major offensive joint/combined operation by the main forces on the land front. Hence, timing and amphibious objective area should be selected to ensure a rapid linkup of the landing force and the main force on the land front; otherwise, an amphibious landing would most likely accomplish a major tactical objective but would fail to have an operational impact on the course of the entire operation—the operational commander risks too much and will achieve too little. Such an error can be fatal against a strong and skillful enemy.

The lack of sufficient reserves and the situation on the main Italian front required that the landing force be a mix of American and British units. This in turn created problems in both planning and execution: American and British units used different staff and tactical procedures, and relationships between the Allied commanders and between their staffs were generally poor. The timing and duration of Operation SHINGLE were heavily affected by the need to timely redeploy a large number of the LSTs from the Mediterranean to support the Normandy invasion. Another complicating factor was the need to employ a relatively large number of LSTs for buildup of forces on Corsica for the planned invasion of southern France.

A major problem in the planning and execution of SHINGLE was a divergence of views on the main mission of the VI Corps. Capturing the Alban Hills, as stipulated in Alexander’s operations instruction, would clearly have seriously threatened vital supplies to the Tenth Army on the main front and possibly forced a general German retreat toward Rome—an operational objective. In contrast, capture of a lodgment in the Anzio-Nettuno area without an advance toward the Alban Hills, as laid down in Clark’s operations instruction, amounted to only a major tactical objective.
An operational commander must formulate missions to subordinate commanders in consonance with the mission given by his higher commander. In a case where he has some reservations about the mission received, he should not change unilaterally and drastically the mission's content received from the higher operational commander. The missions issued to subordinate commanders should be short, clear, and above all militarily achievable. There is perhaps nothing worse than vague or open-ended missions.

The VI Corps was too small to accomplish the mission stipulated by Alexander; it could capture the Alban Hills but would be unable to hold them should the enemy move in large forces. Yet without seizing and holding the Alban Hills it was not possible to endanger seriously the supply routes to the Gustav Line, as would be required if the Germans were to be forced to react operationally—that is, to start withdrawing toward Rome.

One of the most important and fundamental requirements in determining a military objective is to balance the factors of space, time, and force. Any serious imbalance has to be resolved, by scaling down the objective, or reducing distances, increasing the time available, assigning larger forces, or taking some other action. This process is more an art than a science.

The prospects for a landing at Anzio-Nettuno were highly dependent on the ability of the main Fifth Army to break through on the Gustav Line and advance quickly up the Liri Valley in the direction of the Alban Hills and ultimately Rome. However, the renewed offensive should have started much earlier than 12 January, when plans were issued for Anzio-Nettuno. In the interim a decision could have been made whether to go ahead with or cancel SHINGLE. The main Fifth Army's attack on the Gustav Line, although sequenced, lacked a clear main effort. Instead of the majority of forces being deployed in a sector of main effort, each corps attacked within its assigned sector. The 15th Army Group should not have had to carry out, almost simultaneously, attacks on two widely separated objectives—to capture Cassino and to advance toward the Liri Valley.

Lucas's decision to establish and consolidate the beachhead instead of moving quickly to capture the Alban Hills, twenty miles distant, has been heavily criticized by commanders and historians. Yet it should be evaluated on the basis of the information Lucas had at that time. He apparently did not know that the Germans had only weak forces defending approaches to Rome. The most important reason for his decision not to advance to the Alban Hills was that two divisions were inadequate to defend a greatly enlarged beachhead. He might have sent either the Rangers or one regimental combat team to the hills, in the hope that the Germans would be induced to withdraw from the Gustav Line, but it was unlikely that they would. Yet Lucas was apparently quite content to consolidate defenses on the beachhead. A more energetic and aggressive commander like General
Patton would almost certainly have tried to capture the Alban Hills, twenty miles away. One cannot say with a benefit of hindsight whether such a commander would have been ultimately more successful than Lucas was. But perhaps the single biggest mistake was on the part of the Allied high command, in assigning inadequate forces to the Anzio-Nettuno landing and not ensuring that it could join with the Fifth Army within forty-eight hours.

It is hard to understand how Churchill and many higher Allied commanders so late in the war so badly and repeatedly underestimated the German will to resist stubbornly any large-scale threat to the Gustav Line. The Germans, when faced with serious situations in their rear, rarely simply folded their tents and silently stole away.

The VI Corps eventually tied up large enemy forces that otherwise would have been available on the southern Italian front or possibly in France. Yet one wonders whether a better solution to the stalemate in southern Italy in the winter of 1943 might have been an advance through the Liri Valley toward Rome as the sector of main effort instead of almost simultaneous attacks toward Rome and Cassino. By deploying the VI Corps in the sector of main effort it might have been possible to breach the German defenses on the Gustav Line much earlier than mid-May 1944. With four army corps instead of three, perhaps General Clark would have captured Rome much earlier than he did.

NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 11.


5. Ibid., p. 8.


7. Ibid., p. 21.

8. Ibid., p. 20.


10. Ibid., p. 378.


22. Ibid., p. 323.


31. Ibid., pp. 90–91.

32. Ibid., p. 75.


34. Laurie, *Anzio*, p. 4.

35. Ibid.


42. Ibid., p. 3.


45. Ibid., pp. 323–24.


58. Morison, *Sicily-Salerno-Anzio*, p. 326. Morison believes that fifty-six LSTs were in question, not fifty-eight.
59. Cassino and Anzio, p. 15.
65. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, p. 3.
66. Ibid.
73. Laurie, *Anzio*, p. 5.
74. Cassino and Anzio, p. 67.
75. Ibid., p. 65.
80. Ibid., p. 3.
81. Cassino and Anzio, p. 15.
83. HQ, 15 Army Group, Operations Instruction No. 32, 2 January 1944, p. 1, folder 105-0.3.0 Fifth Army Rpt on Cassino Operation, Nov 43–Mar 44, entry 427, box 1622, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, WW II Operations Reports, 1940–48, 5th Army, 105.3 Vol. VIII to 105-0.3.0, NARA.
85. Ibid., pp. 336, 338.
86. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, p. 9.
87. Cassino and Anzio, pp. 15–16.
91. “Annex Number Two: Orders and Instructions of Fifth Army, Field Order No. 5,” 12 January 1944, in *Cassino and Anzio*, p. 207 [emphasis added].
93. Laurie, Anzio, p. 6.
94. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 66.
95. Blumenson, Anzio, p. 66.
96. “Outline Plan Operation ‘Shingle,’” 12 January 1944, pp. 1–2, folder Fifth Army HQ, entry 427, box 1623, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, WW II Operations Reports, 1940–48, 5th Army, 105.3 to 105-0.4.0, NARA.
99. Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 329; Laurie, Anzio, p. 8; Roskill, Offensive, p. 301.
108. D indicating the model year, 1942; U, the body style, utility (amphibious); K, all-wheel drive; W, dual rear axles. A DUKW was able to carry twenty-five soldiers, an artillery piece, or five thousand pounds of general cargo; its speed at sea was five knots, on land fifty miles per hour.
109. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, pp. 88–89.
110. Other sources say that Col. Ralph H. Tate, Fifth Army’s “G-4” (staff logistician), introduced that concept to the Mediterranean theater. For example, Lida Mayo, United States Army in World War 2: The Technical Services—The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, CMH Pub 10-11 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1968), p. 192.
115. Roskill, Offensive, p. 299.
120. “Shingle Intelligence Summary No. 8,” pp. 1–2.
121. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
124. Ibid.
129. Roskill, Offensive, p. 301.

131. Roskill, Offensive, p. 300.
133. Cassino and Anzio, p. 59.
134. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, p. 15.
137. Center of Military History, Anzio Beachhead 22 January–25 May 1944, pp. 11–12; Cassino and Anzio, p. 60.
139. Cassino and Anzio, p. 60.
140. Roskill, Offensive, p. 300.
142. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 87; Cassino and Anzio, p. 60.
144. Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 333.
145. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 87; Cassino and Anzio, p. 60.
146. Cassino and Anzio, p. 60.
149. Cassino and Anzio, p. 61.
151. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 90.
152. Ibid., p. 91.
153. Ibid., p. 50.
155. British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, German Operation at Anzio, p. 5.
160. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 80.
162. British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, German Operation at Anzio, p. 4.
163. Ibid., p. 6.
164. Ibid., p. 7.
166. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 75.
170. Clark, Anzio, p. 17.
173. Laurie, Anzio, p. 7.
175. Roskill, Offensive, p. 304.
177. Blumenson, Anzio, p. 27.
180. Ibid., p. 276.
181. Ibid., p. 288.
182. Casino and Anzio, p. 2.
187. Casino and Anzio, p. 27.
196. Casino and Anzio, p. 61.
205. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, p. 15.
209. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, p. 15; Casino and Anzio, p. 68.
214. Ibid.
217. Ibid., p. 18.
222. Casino and Anzio, p. 65.
225. Casino and Anzio, p. 65; Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, p. 18.
228. Casino and Anzio, p. 65.
229. Ibid., p. 62.
230. Ibid., p. 63.
231. Ibid., p. 65.
233. “Admiralty to C.T.F. 81,” ADM 223/326, 20 January 1944, p. 1, Admiralty: Naval Intelligence Division and Operational Intelligence Centre: Intelligence Reports and Papers, Operational Intelligence Centre Special Intelligence Summaries, 2092–2424, vol. 6, Records of the Admiralty, Naval Forces, Royal Marines, Coastguard, and related bodies, 1 January 1944–30 June 1944, TNA.
235. Casino and Anzio, p. 66.

238. Cassino and Anzio, p. 85.


245. British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, *German Operation at Anzio*, p. 11.


248. Ibid., p. 11.


254. Ibid.


256. British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, *German Operation at Anzio*, p. 11.


270. Cited in ibid., p. 338.


277. *Cassino and Anzio*, p. 86.


282. Ibid., pp. 35–36.

283. *Cassino and Anzio*, p. 86.


290. Prime Minister to General Alexander, PREM 3/248/4, 11 February 1944, p. 310, Prime Minister’s Office: Operational Correspondence and Papers, Italy, SHINGLE Operation (Anzio Landing), Records of the Prime Minister’s Office, 1 January 1944–28 February 1944, TNA.


292. Ibid., pp. 310–11.

293. Ibid., p. 308.


295. Laurie, Anzio, p. 18.

296. Ibid., p. 19.


298. Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 306.

299. Ibid.

300. Fournier, Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio, p. 52.

301. Truscott, Command Missions, p. 329.

302. Laurie, Anzio, p. 20.

303. Ibid., p. 21.


305. Cassino and Anzio, p. 159.


308. Ibid., p. 23.


310. Ibid., p. 116.

311. Laurie, Anzio, p. 23.


APPENDIX A: VI CORPS COMPOSITION, 22 JANUARY 1944

Maj. Gen. J. Lucas, Commander
HQ/HQ Company

**Antiaircraft Artillery**
35th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade
68th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) [minus 3rd Battalion]

**Armor:**

**1st Armored Division (Combat Command B)**
(Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon)
6th Armored Infantry Regiment
1st Armored Regiment
27th/91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions [105 mm howitzers]

*Attached to 1st Armored Division:*
- 191st Tank Battalion
- 751st Tank Battalion
- 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
- 18th Field Artillery Brigade
- 35th Field Artillery Group
- 15th Field Artillery Observation Battalion
- 1st Battalion, 36th Field Artillery Regiment [155 mm guns]
- 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment [155 mm howitzers]
- 141st/938th Field Artillery Regiment [155 mm howitzers]
- 69th Armored Field Artillery Regiment [105 mm howitzers]
- 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion [minus Batteries C, D] [75 mm pack howitzers]
- 976th/977th Field Artillery Battalions [155 mm guns]
- 434th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion

**Infantry:**

**3rd Infantry Division** (Maj. Gen. Lucien K. Truscott)
3rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops (Mechanized)
9th Field Artillery Battalion [155 mm howitzers]
7th Regimental Combat Team
- 7th Infantry Regiment
  - 10th Field Artillery Battalion [105 mm howitzers]
15th Regimental Combat Team
- 15th Infantry Regiment
  - 39th Field Artillery Battalion [105 mm howitzers]
30th Regimental Combat Team
- 30th Infantry Regiment
  - 41st Field Artillery Battalion

*Attached to 3rd Infantry Division:*
- 441st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion
- 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (attached)

**45th Infantry Division (Combat Command A)**
(Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles)
45th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
189th Field Artillery Battalion [155 mm howitzers]  
157th Regimental Combat Team  
  157th Infantry Regiment  
  158th Field Artillery Battalion [105 mm howitzers]  
179th Regimental Combat Team  
  179th Infantry Regiment  
  160th Field Artillery Battalion [105 mm howitzers]  
180th Regimental Combat Team  
  180th Infantry Regiment  
  171st Field Artillery Battalion [105 mm howitzers]  

Attached to 45th Infantry Division:  
  504th Regimental Combat Team  
  504th Parachute Infantry Regiment  
  509th Parachute Infantry Battalion  
  645th Tank Destroyer Battalion

British 1 Division (Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)  
1 Division Royal Artillery  
2, 19, and 67 Field Regiments Royal Artillery  
1 Reconnaissance Regiment  
2 Infantry Brigade  
3 Infantry Brigade  
24 Guard Infantry Brigade  
46 Royal Tank Regiment

British 56 Division (London) (Maj. Gen. G. W. R. Templer)  
64, 65, and 113 Field Regiments Royal Artillery  
100 Light Anti-aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery  
44 Reconnaissance Regiment  
167 Infantry Brigade  
168 Infantry Brigade

Tank Destroyers:  
701st Tank Destroyer Battalion  
894th Tank Destroyer Battalion

First Special Service Force ["Devil's Brigade"]  
(Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick)  
1st Regiment  
2nd Regiment  
3rd Regiment

6615th Ranger Force (Col. William O. Darby)  
1st Ranger Battalion  
3rd Ranger Battalion  
4th Ranger Battalion

APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE 81, 22 JANUARY 1944

List of abbreviations

Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry [flagship Biscayne]

Control Force

Embarked VI Corps (Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas)
3rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Lucien K. Truscott)
British 1 Division (Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)

81.1 Force Flagship

Biscayne (AVP 11) [flagship]
Frederick C. Davis (DD 136)

81.10 Beach Company Group

1st Navy Beach Battalion

81.11 Salvage Group

1 ARS [Prosperous]

81.12 Air Navigation Group

2 PTs

81.13 Loading Control Group

81.14 Return Convoy Group

1 LCI(L)

81.2 Ranger Group (Capt. E. C. I. Turner, RN)

2 LSI(M) [Royal Ulsterman, Beatrix], 1 LSI(L) [Winchester Castle], 1 LST, 32 LCI(L)s, 22 LCTs, 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT(R), 4 PCs, 6 SCs

81.3 RED Beach Group, Cdr. William O. Floyd, USN

12 LSTs, 31 LCI(L)s, 22 LCTs, 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT(R), 4 PCs, SCs

81.4 GREEN Beach (Cdr. O. F. Gregor, USN)

1 LCI(L) [flagship], 2 LSI(L)s [Circasia, Ascania], 2 LSTs, 16 LCI(L)s, 11 LCTs, 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT(R), 2 PCs, 2 SCs

81.5 First Follow Up Group (Capt. J. P. Clay, USN)

39 LSTs, 20 LCI(L)s, 7 LCTs

81.6 Escort Group (Capt. J. P. Clay, USN)

1 DD [Plunkett] [flagship], 4 DDs [Gleaves, Croome, Niblack, HMS Themistocles], 2 DEs [Herbert C. Jones, Frederick C. Davis], 1 antiaircraft vessel [Ulster Queen], 2 AMs [Ready, Sustain]

81.7 Sweeper Group (Cdr. A. H. Richards, USN)

1 AM [flagship] [Pilot], 7 AMs [Strive, Pioneer, Portent, Symbol, Dextrous, Sway, Prevail], 14 YMSs, 1 SC

X-RAY Fire Support Group

81.8 Gunfire Support Group (Capt. Robert W. Cary)

81.8.2 Fire Support Group One [Mayo, 1 LCG]

81.8.2 Fire Support Group Two [Woolsey, Ludlow, 1 LCG]

81.8.3 Fire Support Three [HMS Penelope, USS Edison]
81.8.4 Fire Support Group [Brooklyn, Trippe]
81.8.5 Rocket and AA Support Group [3 LCT(R)s, 1 LCF, 1 LCF]

81.9 Beach Identification Group
1 SS [HMS Uproar (P-31)], 1 DD [Crete], 3 PCs, 2 SCs

**PETER FORCE** (Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge)
Embarking British 1 Division (Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)
4 transports [HMS Bulolo, Glengyle, Derbyshire, Sobieski [Polish]]
3 AA/fighter-direction ships [HMS Ulster Queen, Palomares]
8 DDs [HMS Janus, Jarvis, Laforey, Urchin, Tenacious, Kempenfelt, Loyal, Englefield]
4 DDs [HMS Beaufort, Brecon, Wilton, Tetcott]
2 gunboats [HNMS Flores, Soemba]
6 minesweepers [HMS Bude, Rothesay, Rinaldo, Fly, Cadmus, Waterwitch]
3 LSTs [HMS Boxer, Bruiser, Thruster]
4 PCs [Two Step, Sheppey, Hornpipe, St. Kilda]
14 British LSTs, 5 U.S. LSTs, 2 LCGs, 31 LCI(H), 1 LCT(R)
1 oiler [British Chancellor], 1 net tender [Barndale], 2 tugs [U.S.] [Evea, Edenshaw],
2 PCs [U.S.], 3 hospital ships [HMS St. Julien, St. Andrew, Leinster, St. Davis]
1 beacon submarine [HMS Ultor (P-53)]

**Force PETER Fire Support Group** (Rear Adm. J. M. Mansfield, RN [flagship HMS Orion]
81.8.6 British Bombarding Squadron [HMS Spartan, Orion, La Forey, Loyal, Jervis, Janus]

LUCAS’S DECISION

General Lucas had two course of action open to him after the landing. The first was to move quickly and capture the Alban Hills, twenty miles away. The second was to consolidate the beachheads and await a counterattack. He rejected the first course of action partly because he remembered Salerno landing, where the Germans had reacted quickly to the landing and almost defeated the Allied force. He was completely unaware of the ULTRA report that the two German divisions deployed in the Rome area had been ordered to move to the Gustav Line. He also did not know that the Germans had only two maneuver battalion in the Anzio-Nettuno area. Lucas was further concerned that his two-division force was inadequate to move so far inland and that its flanks would be vulnerable. He was also told by Clark shortly before the start of the operation to remember Salerno and not to "stretch his neck out too far." In the second basic course of action, which Lucas adopted, he essentially could consolidate a small beachhead; expand the beachhead to encompass the towns of Campoleone and Cisterna (both road and railroad intersections); or deploy one regimental combat team to the Alban Hills to occupy, screen, or disrupt German forces approaching the beachhead. In the end, Lucas adopted a combination of the first two limited courses of action: consolidating a smaller beachhead and then gradually enlarging it. By 24 January Lucas had decided to consolidate the defense of the beachhead. The VI Corps conducted only limited actions. Lucas showed more interest in capturing the port of Anzio intact and putting it into operation to handle incoming troops and materiel from Naples to Anzio. He considered that his most important achievement.

Lucas’s decision not to advance and capture the Alban Hills became very controversial. Predictably, Churchill blamed Lucas for failing not only to capture Alban Hills but to take Rome immediately. Clark wrote in his memoirs that he had been disappointed by the "lack of aggressiveness of VI Corps [at Anzio], although it would have been wrong in my opinion to attack to capture our final objective [the Alban Hills] on this front. [But] reconnaissance in force with tanks should have been more aggressive to capture Cisterna and Campoleone." After the war, Clark offered a more nuanced view of Lucas’s decisions: "When he [Lucas] landed, he established himself ashore securely on that little beachhead as far as he could. You can’t go way out because you’d get cut off. You just can’t spread it that thin with no reserves, you see. So, he did right. I was up there, frequently, and I checked him. We began immediately to get the [ULTRA] intercepts, you see, as to what counteractions the Germans were taking and to have ordered Lucas to go with his two divisions and to start forward march was asinine." Clark had at the time believed that Lucas could have captured the Alban Hills but not have held them. The Germans would have cut his extended force in pieces. This was why he rephrased Lucas’s mission. Clark believed that it would have not been wise on his part to tell Lucas before the operation to seize the Alban Hills, because doing that would jeopardize Lucas’s efforts to secure initial beachhead line.

e. Fournier, *Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio*, p. 100.
Alexander too supported Lucas’s decision. In his memoirs, in hindsight, he observed that Lucas was right to consolidate before striking out. He also remarked, concerning the German enemy, “He is quicker than we are, quicker at regrouping his forces, quicker at thinning out on a defensive front to provide troops to close gaps at decisive points, quicker in effecting reliefs, quicker at mounting attacks and counterattacks, and above all quicker at reaching decisions on the battlefield. By comparison our methods are often slow and cumbersome, and this applies to all our troops, both British and American.” The Fifth Army’s two main efforts, at Anzio and Cassino, could not offer mutual support, and neither was powerful enough to do the ultimate job (i.e., capture Rome) alone. The Allies simply did not have sufficient forces to secure a beachhead, move to capture the Alban Hills, and then seize Rome, simultaneously protecting the lines of communication required to attain these objectives.\(^9\)

Eisenhower also approved Lucas’s actions. He thought the situation almost a model for the classic battle of destruction: “The Nettuno landing was really not much heavier in scale than an airborne landing would have been during those critical days when time was all-important. The force was immobile and could not carry out the promise that was implicit in the situation then existing. . . . [T]here will be no great destruction of German divisions as a result thereof.” General Marshall essentially endorsed the decision made by General Lucas not to move to the Alban Hills, at least not immediately, or until the beachhead was fully secured.\(^h\)

Kesselring wrote in his memoirs that Lucas had passed up a great opportunity to cut German lines of communication and thereby place German forces along the Gustav Line in jeopardy.\(^i\) Westphal claimed in his own memoirs that the road to Rome was practically open until 25 January.\(^j\)

g. Fournier, *Influence of Ultra Intelligence upon General Clark at Anzio*, p. 100.

h. Ibid., p. 101.

i. Ibid., p. 99.

## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>antiaircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>auxiliary minesweeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>rescue and salvage ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVP</td>
<td>small seaplane tender</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>destroyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>destroyer escort</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCF</td>
<td>landing craft, flak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCG</td>
<td>landing craft, gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI(H)</td>
<td>landing craft, infantry (hospital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI(L)</td>
<td>landing craft, infantry (large)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSI(M)</td>
<td>landing ship, infantry (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT</td>
<td>landing craft, tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT(R)</td>
<td>landing craft, tank (rocket)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>landing ship, tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>patrol craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>patrol torpedo boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>submarine chaser</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMS</td>
<td>auxiliary motor minesweeper</td>
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REVIEW ESSAY

BASING AND THE PIVOT

Robert E. Harkavy


This excellently edited volume of essays, most contributed by Naval War College faculty, is devoted to the ongoing rebalancing of U.S. forces (the Obama administration’s much-heralded “pivot”) and their concomitant basing structure from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. For reasons only dimly understood by this retired professorial reviewer, the term “containment” appears to be politically or otherwise incorrect, not only in this work, but also in other current efforts. Yet it is indeed containment, and its hope is to impede the rise of incipient hegemonic China. One derives a certain sense of déjà vu—that “heartland” and “rimland” have returned with a vengeance, evoking the memories of Halford Mackinder and Alfred T. Mahan, respectively. Indeed, another of the old geopolitical theorists, James Fairgrieve, predicted a century ago that the heartland would one day migrate eastward, and so it has.

Sprinkled throughout the many “cases” are statements and analyses from Chinese military and political officials indicating the seriousness with which they take the strategic inevitability of a hegemonic struggle with the United States. It is further apparent that Chinese planners at least contemplate preemptive strikes, even the use of nuclear weapons, in connection with the main conflict scenarios that may potentially involve the United States, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a Chinese attempt to take over the Senkaku Islands. It is clear that the United States now has fewer problems in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Singapore than
before, for the obvious reason that its allies are nervous about American weakness and their own vulnerability in the face of rising Chinese power and North Korean nuclear weapons.

This work involves a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the past, present, and projected future of U.S. basing and forward presence, running roughly east to west, from Guam to former-Soviet Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). The analyses are dense and detailed.

The opening chapter, on Guam, by Andrew Erickson and Justin Mikolay, examines its role as a “strategically central sovereign location”—that is, “a well-placed and politically reliable location” and a major global support and logistics hub. The pros and cons of this location and of placing so many assets on one relatively small island are well covered. Above all, the authors lay out the facts of the ongoing big military buildup on Guam and the corresponding construction costs. There is also a discussion of the Chinese missile threat to Guam, particularly from the DF-4 (CSS-3).

The chapter on Japan, by Toshi Yoshihara, ominously and bluntly titled “Japanese Bases and Chinese Missiles,” makes extensive use of Chinese military writings and pronouncements. There is a good review of the long-held U.S. basing sites in Japan and of the complexity of U.S. facilities and force deployments in Okinawa. As with all the other chapters, a good map displays the base locations. However, not covered here are a plethora of important U.S. technical facilities facing China, North Korea, and Russian Siberia. The politics, past and present, surrounding the U.S. presence in Okinawa is discussed; however, the core of the analysis is whether the United States might be denied use of Japanese bases in a crisis under the threat of Chinese missiles.

The chapter on South Korea, by Terence Roehrig, is a review of the subject going back to the 1953 United States–Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. Current modernizations are seen to have focused on Apache helicopters and PAC-3 Patriot surface-to-air missiles. Most importantly, the United States has moved forces southward, away from the Demilitarized Zone and vulnerable Seoul, hence making for more reliance on Republic of Korea forces to repel attack. Despite past political problems and an altered command structure for wartime operational control, relations between the United States and the host appear to have improved. Also discussed are scenarios using U.S. forces outside Korea (Taiwan-China) and how they may be perceived by the South Koreans.

In a chapter by Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman, the U.S. strategic relationship with Australia is seen as having gone through three phases. In the first, the United States used Australian bases during World War II to repel the Japanese drive to take over the southwest Pacific and Australia itself. In a second phase, during the Cold War, the United States made use of several major “technical”
facilities, especially Pine Gap and Nurrungar. More recently, the United States has continued use of these facilities, but also of training facilities and ports and other facilities for prepositioning, maintenance, logistics, and rotational deployment of Marine units. This new, third, phase, China's strong trade relations with Australia notwithstanding, has engendered little political opposition.

In “Singapore: Forward Operating Site,” Rahman lays out the rather astounding growth of the U.S. presence in Singapore. During the Cold War, Britain and New Zealand had some access there, but the United States had none. Since then, and for the most part because the United States needed replacements for access lost in the Philippines, Singapore came into play. As Rahman suggests, “in some respects it could be argued that Singapore has become the most important partner in the U.S. Pacific Command security network after the three main formal allies—Japan, South Korea, and Australia.”

The U.S. base at Diego Garcia, the “Malta of the Indian Ocean,” is discussed by Erickson, Mikolay, and Walter Ludwig. Diego Garcia—a small island, part of the British Indian Ocean Territory belonging to the United Kingdom—has, along with Guam, Okinawa, and Singapore, become vital to the U.S. rimland posture. The problems and the invulnerability inherent in the distance factor are examined (unlike Guam, Diego Garcia is not easily threatened by China). India's long-held opposition to a U.S. base in the Indian Ocean (India wanted an “Indian lake”) is now muted by improved U.S.-Indian relations and perhaps the latter's fear of China.

Alexander Cooley’s chapter, “U.S. Bases and Domestic Politics in Central Asia,” addresses the ups and downs of U.S. access to the K2 base in Uzbekistan and the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan. The United States was granted access to Uzbek airspace for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and to Manas for basing and refueling, both in exchange for security and economic assistance. These were supplemented with refueling and air-corridor arrangements with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. As the United States now prepares to leave Afghanistan, all of this appears moot. The Russians are rolling again in Central Asia, and America appears to be out of it.

The final chapter, by Sam J. Tangredi, examines sea basing. This subject appears to be embroiled in disputes between the Army and Navy / Marine Corps and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Just what scenario involving China might bring sea basing into play is a little difficult to discern.

A couple of other things emerge from this volume that are worth mentioning. It is noted that China has begun to leapfrog the containment ring, much as the Soviets did in the 1960s. Limited access is being acquired or at least speculated about in Pakistan, on Burmese islands, in Bangladesh, in Sri Lanka, and even in Zimbabwe. There is also the elephant in the room—whether India will constitute...
a counterweight to China. Mention is also made of a U.S. carrier visit to the port of Chennai, possibly a harbinger of U.S. access in India.

Although this work was hatched in early 2014, the ongoing rush of world events may already have created the need for addenda, such as reports of pessimism in the Obama administration about the budgetary implications of the “pivot,” some new possibilities for bases in the Philippines, Putin-Russia-Ukraine and the prospect for more of the same, and the near collapse of the U.S. security and alliance structure in the Middle East. Max Boot, writing in *Commentary*, May 2014, says:

The Obama administration came into office declaring that the U.S. military forces would “pivot” from the Middle East, where they were supposedly overcommitted, to deal with growing challenges in the more important Asia-Pacific region, where they were “underweighted.” The administration doesn’t talk much about the “rebalancing” to Asia anymore, and for good cause. Katrina McFarland, Hagel’s assistant secretary of defense for acquisition, reflected the new reality when on March 4 she was quoted by *Defense News* as saying, “Right now the [Pacific] pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can’t happen.”

This had been anticipated in the McCaffrie and Rahman chapter: “However, it is also worth noting that considerable concern remains in Australia over the long-term fiscal viability of the United States and its ability to maintain the regional strategic presence at current levels.”

On a brighter note, the United States appears to be returning to the Philippines, despite considerable domestic political opposition. As elsewhere in Asia, people in the Philippines seem to be getting a bit nervous. As for the resurgence of the Russian bear, the basing/forward-presence implications are not yet clear, keeping in mind the already strained budgetary implications of the “pivot.” How indeed to pay for all of this, or even part of it?
At the Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum in June 2014, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, dramatically challenged members of the audience, including representatives of the officer corps of the U.S. Navy, to take off their jackets, roll up their sleeves, and think about naval strategy in the twenty-first century. For both the novice and the seasoned professional returning to the subject of maritime strategy after a lapse of time, Geoffrey Till’s Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century is just the book with which to focus on this subject, understand the broad principles involved, and learn of the challenges ahead. For more than three decades Geoffrey Till has been providing a series of such textbooks, beginning with his 1982 volume Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age. The book under review is the latest version, one that builds on its predecessors and at the same time brings the subject up to date. As this reviewer can attest from his own teaching and lecturing experience, Till’s books have consistently been the best starting points for gaining a solid theoretical understanding of maritime strategy and for linking theory to recent doctrine and the practice of naval operations around the globe.

Till masterfully ties his book together by focusing on five fundamental characteristics that modern naval professionals need to understand when thinking about strategy, factors around which maritime issues coalesce: the sea as a resource, the sea as a medium for transportation and exchange, the sea as a medium of information and the exchange of ideas, the sea as a medium for dominion, and the sea as an area of sovereignty. The work is carefully organized to examine these topics in a logical manner. After an insightful examination of the tendencies of navies both to compete and to collaborate in a globalizing world, Till summarizes succinctly the major insights of naval theorists in a chapter entitled “Who Said What and Why It Matters.” From there, he turns to an analysis of the constituents of sea power and the fundamental issue of navies and changing technology before turning to discuss such categories of naval operations as sea control, command of the sea, power projection, control of communications,
diplomacy, expeditionary operations, and maritime security. In a penultimate chapter he takes the example of the issues currently surrounding the South China Sea as a case that simultaneously combines all five of his strategic viewpoints and requires an integrated and coordinated approach to its solution.

In conclusion, he emphasizes that naval strategists will find no easy answers—competitive and collaborative trends are important but will be impossible to predict as the importance of navies continues to rise in the twenty-first century. There are shifting attitudes to the global commons, while the range and diversity of naval tasks are both increasing.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College


This work attempts, in the author’s own words, “to reintegrate wargames . . . with human culture as a whole.” It succeeds admirably, providing a valuable addition to the knowledge base of the serious national-security war gamer, whose objective is to understand modern and future war as well as possible to plan and train for it and to educate national-security professionals.

Drawing on his established strengths as an expert in military history and strategy, the author traces the history and development of war games from earliest hunters up to modern times, setting war gaming within the context of the general topic of games. He addresses the narrow questions of how war games are influenced by the experience of war and what they tell us about the conduct of war. More broadly, van Creveld examines the general topic of gaming, why we game, the types of game in which we engage, what these types of game tell us about our culture, and how our culture influences who games and which games are chosen.

In his sequential survey of the history and development of gaming and war games within gaming, the author establishes four basic human needs that gaming satisfies: religious (appease the gods or ascertain their wishes by combat), decision making without engaging the whole of society (duels, trial by combat), preparation for war (explore possible futures; plan, train, and educate), and entertainment. He also examines interactions and how they evolved. Over time games and war games have become bloodless, as weapons have become more lethal and reliable (modern weapons make a medieval tourney simply impractical as a method of training for war), and the first two needs have withered, leaving us with bloodless war games and entertainment.

Van Creveld makes the interesting point that the differences between real war and gaming about war are themselves of value and not simply artifacts to be removed. This is a critical point, given the lukewarm response to war gaming by some leaders. In the same way a single war game represents a single possible trajectory through a large space of possible sequences of decisions and outcomes, so does a historical event represent a single collection of decisions drawn from all those that could have been made—the reality of that moment could be “entirely atypical.” The
differences between reality and gaming provide a means of capturing what the culture sees as important in the reality of war. Culture and the structure and execution of games by that culture should provide insights into the differences and similarities between that culture and ours when thinking about war. Of special interest is the author’s examination of the effect a culture has on how and why it games, thus providing insight into how to integrate gaming with other techniques drawn from the culture to improve performance in war.

STEPHEN DOWNES-MARTIN  
Naval War College


In his latest book Michael Wheeler incorporates his years of experience as a professor at Harvard Business School, his membership in the Program on Negotiation (a cross-disciplinary consortium of negotiation experts from Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Tufts University), and the research of the latter of over ten years in a project led by James Sebenius to take the study and practice of negotiation to a new level.

The members of this project analyzed such diplomats as George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke, investment banker Bruce Wasserstein, United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, and sports agent/marketer Donald Dell, to learn what these individuals believed to be the most important factors in successful negotiation.

Wheeler credits his colleagues who published before him: Roger Fisher, Bill Ury, and Bruce Patton, whose ground-breaking text published thirty years ago, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In*, significantly contributed to the development of negotiation. Readers are reminded that relationships are important and that though aggressive, value-claiming tactics may work once, people rarely come back for another drubbing. Wheeler also agrees that a careful consideration of your own interests, as well as those of the other party, is important before beginning negotiations. He recognizes the necessity of establishing your own best alternative to a negotiated agreement—or, as he calls it, your “baseline”—as the minimum agreement you must achieve to get as much value as you are giving. He maintains, however, that although these things are important, it is often impossible to identify your baseline, never mind those of others, until you actually begin negotiations. Wheeler seeks to recommend ways to deal with that situation, arguing that successful negotiators are those who are able to see new possibilities for agreement by improvising, in a process he likens to what jazz musicians do. The greatest value of this work is that the author takes this difficult concept of how to improvise successfully during negotiations and offers great examples of how to accomplish it.

This is a great book for anyone involved in negotiations, whether it be diplomacy, national policy, or purchasing. It takes the study and practice of negotiation to a level that had not previously been reached.

ROGER H. DUCIEY  
Naval War College

Submarine fiber-optic cables provide an interconnected, seamless network that serves as the foundation of the world’s telecommunications system. Each day stock exchanges, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and businesses transmit large amounts of data across the globe at the touch of a button, without ever thinking about how the information travels or what would happen if the system failed. The belief that most international communication travels by satellite is mistaken; it could not be further from the truth. As the editors point out, nearly 97 percent of all international communications flows over a relatively small number of submarine cables. Moreover, the majority of these cables are owned or funded not by states but rather by private entities. Thus governments are often unaware of the effort needed to build and maintain a cable system. As a result, some states have developed laws and policies that may not only be inconsistent with international law but also could threaten the health and well-being of the international telecommunications system, as well as the commercial sectors that rely on such systems.

To shed light on the legal and policy issues surrounding the laying, use, and maintenance of these crucial networks, the editors have compiled sixteen chapters, written by a combination of international lawyers and experts from the submarine-cable industry, covering all aspects of this little-known subject. The handbook is a pioneering effort and serves as a one-stop resource for all issues related to the international governance of submarine cables. Each chapter begins with a layman’s explanation of the technical activity being discussed, follows with a discourse on the legal issues associated with the activity, and concludes with policy recommendations to correct the gaps in international governance.

The topics addressed range from the broad basics, including a history of submarine cables and an overview of the industry and applicable international legal regimes, to the much narrower practical aspects of planning, surveying, manufacturing, laying, repairing, maintaining, and protecting cables. Special-purpose submarine cables are also addressed, along with, in a chapter dedicated to the subject, the relationship between submarine cables and the marine environment.

One theme that runs throughout the book is the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the international legal regime governing submarine cables. There are two main international conventions related to submarine cables: the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, which applies to the relatively small set of countries that were signatory to it, and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which applies to the vast majority of countries. Many contributors to this book make the case that state practice, particularly regarding coastal-state rights to regulate cable operations and the duties of states to protect cables, is at odds with the UNCLOS provisions on submarine cables. Many coastal states, for example, require that their permission be sought for cables outside their territorial waters and, conversely, fail to have adequate
laws on their ledgers to protect cables within their territorial waters. This leaves submarine cables vulnerable and could lead to unintended disruptions of service and potential economic crises.

The book's message is the need for better balance between competing interests in the ocean space. Both coastal and other states must show flexibility in their interpretations of their legal obligations. Their common interest lies in minimizing conflicts between submarine cables and competing uses, with the ultimate goal of protecting the integrity of the international communications system on which the world economy relies.

In the end, this book is well written and interesting. The explanation of how the submarine-cable industry operates is enlightening, and legal concepts are explained simply and concisely. Thus this is a useful volume not only for the academic and legal practitioner but for the casual reader as well. The policy recommendation sections would be especially useful to government officials and policy makers. For those with an interest in submarine cables, it is a must-read.

DAVID O'CONNELL
Naval War College


Colonel Wesley Fox, a Medal of Honor recipient, shares his leadership insight gleaned over a forty-three-year career as a Marine. This book is a combination memoir, personal narrative, and collection of examples of leadership. Fox's philosophy is shaped from true-grit experiences as an enlisted Marine who climbed the ranks during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. His personal stories mixed with combat heroism give credibility to the book. The reader is both informed and inspired. Fox begins by discussing various concepts of leadership, emphasizing that leadership begins with an understanding of human nature. In particular, knowing the thoughts, attitudes, and ideals of those under one's leadership is essential. He also addresses the differences between leadership and management, the sources of leaders, principles of leadership, and historical traits of leaders. These concepts emphasize that effective leaders are concerned about and care for those who follow. The six elements of leadership are care, personality, knowledge, motivation, commitment, and communication. An entire chapter is devoted to each of the six elements. Although these principles are effective, leadership takes hard work.

The real gem of the book is Fox's reflective and transparent writing style. His experience of four decades is a treasure trove of wisdom that offers a glimpse not only into the author's character but into the culture of the Marine Corps in a different era.

The book is written for a general audience and therefore has wide appeal. The fact that Fox's career is legendary in the Marine Corps only proves that he has indeed mastered the art of leadership. To put it simply, Colonel Fox is someone from whom we all can learn.

CDR. JUDY MALANA, CHC, U.S. NAVY
Office of the Chief of Navy Chaplains

A student once asked, “Why can’t Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan just shut down the Iranian economy?” A discussion about the limited effectiveness of trade sanctions followed, but the student was more right than he or his instructor realized. New tools of financial warfare wielded by the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments have been powerful against terrorists, criminals, and rogue states, at little economic or diplomatic cost. This is the case made by Juan Zarate in his latest publication. Zarate led such efforts as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes during the George W. Bush administration. Thereafter he served on the president’s National Security Council staff.

The conventional wisdom is that trade sanctions generally fail to make hostile regimes change course, because they rarely have enough multilateral support, are easy to evade, and are too blunt in the pain they inflict on target countries. Sanctions are even less useful against nonstate actors; there are no Al Qaeda products to boycott.

Financial weapons capitalize on three key differences. First, the global banking system is a choke point. Even clandestine groups need financial services; Al Qaeda may not have exports, but it does have bank accounts. Second, U.S. power is greater financially than economically. The United States represents only one-fifth of the world economy, but the dollar is the dominant reserve currency, and most international trade is settled in dollars. Also, the United States has the largest financial markets, and the other big markets belong to like-minded allies. Foreign banks cannot risk access to U.S. markets and clearinghouse banks. Finally, access to the U.S. financial sector is under unilateral American control—U.S. regulators can bar American banks from doing business with firms involved in money laundering, drug trafficking, or terrorist support.

Zarate explains how U.S. agencies developed tools and techniques (a financial intelligence infrastructure) to trace the flow of money to and within groups of interest, whether the Sinaloa cartel or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Often the mere threat of public disclosure, let alone formal blacklisting, has convinced foreign banks to cease business with illicit groups, even banks in nations not friendly to the United States. Zarate details campaigns against targets like Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, North Korea, and Iran. He contends that financial tools severely disrupted the terrorist groups and pressured North Korea and Iran into negotiations. However, causality is far from proved (how effective were financial sanctions versus Iran’s growing diplomatic isolation?), but the case is plausible enough to take seriously.

There are limits to financial tools, and the United States could undermine its own advantages. To Zarate’s credit, he shows sensitivity to such concerns. Financial methods are powerful against small targets considered illegal almost everywhere (no rational bank would give up Wall Street for Al Qaeda’s checking account). North Korea and Iran can be pressured, but Zarate doubts—correctly, I think—that these regimes will give up their nuclear trump cards to escape
such pressure. Great powers are another matter, since the financial relationships are more symmetrical. One need only consider the United Kingdom’s reluctance to limit lucrative financial ties to Russia in the wake of the Crimea crisis.

Dominant as America is financially, abuse of that power threatens the dollar’s special role in global commerce. Zarate relates an anecdote about an event that took place in 2003, in which American officials proposed cyber attacks against Iraqi assets to penetrate bank computers around the world covertly and set Iraqi account balances to “zero.” Treasury successfully argued that the plan would shatter confidence and outrage allies, but the proposal shows that not all leaders see financial weapons in a nuanced light.

Nations have been slower than “realists” predicted to challenge the U.S.-led financial order, likely because the system has not harmed their interests. Freezing out terrorists is one thing, but if the world perceives the United States as using access to global finance as a reward for good behavior, the use of other currencies and development of alternative payment systems will leap ahead.

Zarate writes as a participant and advocate for the policy of financial statecraft and for the institution of the Treasury Department. One should not treat Zarate’s account as definitive history (diplomats will likely disagree with Zarate’s harsh take on the State Department), but it is a good, detailed account of how policy is made and implemented.

The book could be better organized. It is not quite chronological, not quite thematic, and sometimes redundant. The military will wish Zarate had said more about Treasury and Defense Department cooperation.

_Treasury’s War_ is a useful contribution, though clearly a participant’s account and not a scholarly assessment. It will interest those trying to understand how economic tools can support national security goals.

DAVID BURBACH
_Naval War College_

Wilson, James Graham. _The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War._ Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2014. 264pp. $29.95

This is an interesting and innovative look at the course of the Cold War. It is interesting in large part because Wilson’s perspective is to look for the unscripted moments in the course of the conflict—the occasions when grand strategy, even policy, did not dictate outcomes. To a political scientist, this is a refreshing approach. Political scientists and historians often focus too heavily on patterns, theories, and grand schemes. This volume is a reminder of the crucial role played by policy makers struggling to make up their minds at critical junctures.

Wilson’s book is well informed, looking for moments when leaders took the initiative, such as when President Reagan sensed a crisis in Poland in 1981. This work struck this non-specialist as well documented and particularly well researched on the American side. One might expect that of Wilson, who served as a historian for the U.S. State Department. Deliberations over nuclear-arms limitations talks receive a great deal of Wilson’s attention, as one might expect, and his discussion of the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative is particularly engaging.
However, prospective readers might be warned that this book would probably not make good introductory reading to the Cold War. Wilson takes it as his task to relate the critical junctures and the respective leaders’ reasoning at the cost of communicating the overall history of the conflict—a reasonable approach, given the troves of work available on the period. His portrait of Mikhail Gorbachev is particularly interesting. He casts a light on Gorbachev not merely as a new thinker who offers a different strategic perspective but as a responder to American initiatives. Gorbachev and Reagan shared an abhorrence of nuclear weapons, sometimes letting this revulsion outstrip the policies with which their advisers were comfortable. Wilson’s portrait of the time is an engaging one, capturing to an unusual extent how leaders then were trying to understand each other’s motives. “In the last years of the conflict, improvisation mattered more than any master plan.” We do well to be reminded of this, since there is often a temptation to look through the lens of history and see outcomes as certain and predictable, which is often a mistake and the product of psychological bias rather than cold analysis. Wilson’s book is a useful corrective in this regard, examining how the role of improvisation and accident can play critical parts at crucial junctures of history.

ANDREW STIGLER
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British author Sam Willis’s latest book, in what is a fast-growing and impressive collection of naval historical works, reveals new details of battles previously immortalized, shining new light on how these battles were conducted. Willis titles his book aptly and in a manner appreciative of the primary source material he has thrust forward from obscurity. Vice Admiral Collingwood’s first dispatch to the Admiralty after the battle of Trafalgar begins, “The ever to be lamented death of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, who in the late conflict with the enemy fell in the hour of victory.” The victorious Collingwood goes on to describe for his superiors and for the British public the circumstances that allowed twenty-seven Royal Navy ships of the line to dominate a larger combined French and Spanish fleet. This book analyzes not only the original dispatches from Trafalgar but also those from several other great fleet battles from 1794 to 1806. Specifically, the author lays out original dispatches, historical context, and skillful interpretations for the battles of the Glorious First of June (1794), St. Vincent (1797), Camperdown (1797), the Nile (1798), Copenhagen (1801), Trafalgar (1805), and San Domingo (1806). These giant fleet engagements were remarkable in several respects, most notably in that they marked the last large-scale battles of the sailing warfare era, and all represent overwhelming British victories.

This work weaves into its narrative fascinating insights already known to naval historians. How did Britain come to dominate all these battles? Numerical superiority, though normally paramount in sailing warfare, was not enough to help the French, Danes, Spanish, or Dutch during this era whenever a British
fleet seized the initiative with bold maneuver. British officers had more experience with sailing tactics. British seaman were better trained, and their gunnery was better. The hulls of British ships could withstand cannon balls better, and their rigging was more amenable to repair. Estimates from these battles have British seamen firing multiple broadsides to each one fired by their enemies. However, Willis warns against presuming that the outcomes of these engagements were inevitable. He argues, with merit, that these dispatches “remind us of the occasions when random events tipped the battle one way or another.”

These commanders all had choices, which set in motion tumbling aftereffects. A change in the wind could have a huge impact and turned well-laid plans into chaos. Sailing warfare took a great deal of skill but also luck, and both factors aided the British enormously during this war-laden period of naval history.

In addition to detailing an interesting history of these fleet showdowns, Willis analyzes how the commanders themselves shaped history after the smoke from the cannons had cleared. This is the book’s biggest contribution. Willis examines not only their states of mind at the time of drafting the dispatches but also their personalities. Nelson was a wordsmith and a self-promoter. Admiral Duncan possessed a deep desire to maintain the public's respect for the Royal Navy and thus minimized confusion of battle and negligence of subordinates. No two commanders would describe a battle in the same way, especially not when they are all still damp from sweat and sea spray, their ears still ringing from the cannon shot, and the screams of the injured still audible from below decks. Moreover, writing with a quill pen while a battered ship pitches and rolls is not easy, particularly when one is sleep deprived. Regardless, these scribbled dispatches made months-long journeys to the Admiralty and then appeared in newspapers, where they became the first draft of history. Willis places these dispatches into historical context and crafts a very enjoyable narrative in the process.

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IN MY VIEW

MORAL OBLIGATION—NONE OF THIS IS EASY

Sir:

A few thoughts in reply to articles in the Winter 2014 Review, from hindsight's perspective . . .

The Air Force (and Navy) made serious commitments to education throughout my military career. Much of this focused on “technical/managerial” proficiency in the tradecraft of acquisition and operation of highly technical systems to support national objectives. Much of that training has been used on a daily basis, and I use it even today, as a defense contractor—there are elements of physics and operational employment of such systems that are and remain fundamental and immutable. What I find interesting from the perspective of hindsight is the extent to which the other elements of that educational commitment have retained and perhaps increased in value over time. In the end, education is meant to shape, as well as inform, the mind.

To the question posed as the title for a book review: Professional Military Education (PME) is necessary and lies beyond the obvious study of conflict and strategy. More broadly, many institutions offer thoughts on ethics—I think Admiral Stockdale and Dr. Brennan got it right when they crafted a PME course on “Moral Obligation.” It is that inner imperative and moral compass that shape the elements of leadership noted in Christopher Johnson’s essay. I think this is also the essence of Williamson Murray’s approach to Thomas Ricks and The Generals. These “obligations” (leadership moments) are not theoretical exercises—the open wound of sexual harassment is cancerously eating at our servicemen and servicewomen, as well as at the services’ relationship with the state. Recent episodes of cheating on proficiency exams within Air Force and naval nuclear staffs also bring to light the necessity of education beyond that of “operational proficiency.” In fairness, the military is not unique—GM faces issues re ignition switches, and one of the great “moral” institutions (the Roman Catholic Church) faces issues
re priestly abuses. It is leadership (not management) that allows organizations to, first, avoid these crises and, ultimately, rise beyond them.

Regarding Williamson Murray, I will disagree with him re his closing thoughts of “return to a moral calculus that is nothing short of a return to the sexual standards of the Victorian age.” The “highly respected retired general” cheated—cheated on himself and his family (and the other person involved did likewise). It’s the cheating that most fundamentally mattered, not the affair per se. I believe that it is moral obligation—how you hold yourself in a world whose moral compass is compromised uncontrollably by events outside of a leader’s control—that most strikingly points at leadership.

None of this is easy. I offer these thoughts as thanks to Admiral Stockdale and Dr. Brennan for conceiving such a course, the Air Force and Navy for offering it to me, and to Bill Turcotte [Dr. William E. Turcotte, today professor emeritus, was the chairman of the College’s National Security Decision Making (now National Security Affairs) Department from 1975 to 2002], for granting me his personal copy of the original text, signed by Dr. Brennan. Of all the materials from that year in Newport, it has been the one I have returned to most often, for all the reasons captured in the Winter 2014 issue of the Naval War College Review.

JONATHAN WRIGHT
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he concept of identifying books of value that should be read by men and
women seeking to improve their professional skills is certainly not a new
idea in the U.S. Navy. The Secretary of the Navy issued the service's first reading
list in 1828. The tradition carries through to modern times, and in May 2014 the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, announced an
update to his Professional Reading Program (PRP)—see the Spring 2014 Naval
War College Review. Shipments of these books were recently completed to every
major ship, squadron, and activity of the Navy. The CNO’s list of eighteen titles
offers a variety of excellent books from which a reader can choose, but great
books can also be found on other military-oriented professional reading lists.
These books are great reads in themselves, and many are aligned with the CNO’s
two warfighting tenets of “Warfighting First,” “Operate Forward,” and “Be
Ready.” For example:

• The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List includes On China,
  by Henry A. Kissinger. Its publisher describes it in this way: “In this sweep-
ing and insightful history, Henry Kissinger turns for the first time at book
length to a country he has known intimately for decades and whose modern
relations with the West he helped shape. On China illuminates the inner
workings of Chinese diplomacy during such pivotal events as the initial en-
counters between China and tight line modern European powers, the forma-
tion and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, and Richard
Nixon’s historic trip to Beijing. With a new final chapter on the emerging
superpower’s twenty-first-century role in global politics and economics, On
China provides historical perspective on Chinese foreign affairs from one
of the premier statesmen of our time.” This book is an excellent resource for
considering issues related to the strategic “re-balancing” toward Asia-Pacific
directed by the president in 2012. It also aligns effectively with the notion
that the Navy must be prepared to “Operate Forward.”
• The Air Force Chief of Staff Reading List for 2014 includes *Switch: How to Change Things When Change Is Hard*, by Chip Heath and Dan Heath. The publisher has written, “In a compelling, story-driven narrative, the Heaths bring together decades of counterintuitive research in psychology, sociology, and other fields to shed new light on how we can effect transformative change. *Switch* shows that successful changes follow a pattern, a pattern you can use to make the changes that matter to you, whether your interest is in changing the world or changing your waistline.” The ideas brought forward in this book will help Navy readers “Be Ready” for the future.

• The Marine Corps Commandant’s Professional Reading List includes the *New York Times* number-one bestseller *Unbroken: A WWII Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption*, by Laura Hillenbrand. The publisher notes, “On a May afternoon in 1943, an Army Air Forces bomber crashed into the Pacific Ocean and disappeared, leaving only a spray of debris and a slick of oil, gasoline, and blood. Then, on the ocean surface, a face appeared. It was that of a young lieutenant, the plane’s bombardier, who was struggling to a life raft and pulling himself aboard. So began one of the most extraordinary odysseys of the Second World War. The lieutenant’s name was Louis Zamperini. . . . Ahead of him lay thousands of miles of open ocean, leaping sharks, a foundersing raft, thirst and starvation, enemy aircraft, and, beyond, a trial even greater. Driven to the limits of endurance, Zamperini would answer desperation with ingenuity; suffering with hope, resolve, and humor; brutality with rebellion. His fate, whether triumph or tragedy, would be suspended on the fraying wire of his will. . . . Telling an unforgettable story of a man’s journey into extremity, *Unbroken* is a testament to the resilience of the human mind, body, and spirit.” Zamperini’s recent death in July 2014 at age ninety-seven marks the loss of one more veteran from the “Greatest Generation,” whose stories help illustrate the concept that military professionals must always be prepared to engage in “Warfighting First.”

According to a recent estimate there are 129,000,000 different books in print, with thousands more being published every day. Readers have plenty to choose from, and the CNO-PRP exists to encourage every sailor to develop a habit of reading books of consequence. The wisdom of the ages can be found in the libraries of the world. We endorse the concept put forward in the Marine Corps reading program, that of “a thirty-year-old body and a five-thousand-year-old mind.”

JOHN E. JACKSON