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AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE POLICY

Peter J. Dean

Since its European settlement in 1788, Australia has been dependent on great-power protectors for its security. Initially this security was achieved by virtue of Australia's status as a British colony, later as a member of the British Commonwealth. In return for its protection, Australia committed military forces in support of British interests to the Sudan, in the Boer War, and in the First and Second World Wars. Australian support for these actions was premised on two key factors: Australia's membership in the Empire (and with that the identity of its citizens as "independent Australian-Britons") and the assessment, universal among Australians, that support and protection of the Empire and of British interests were also in their interest.

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However, the fall of Singapore in 1942 was a "salutary warning about the dangers of a smaller power [like Australia] becoming too reliant on a great power to protect it."¹ Accordingly, while Australia's strategic approach in the post-Singapore era involved heavy reliance on the United States, it was not as one-dimensional as its relationship with Great Britain had been. As early as October 1944 the Australian Defence Committee recognized that the nation "should not accept the risk of relying primarily for its defence upon the assistance of a foreign power."² What developed instead was a combination of, on one hand, support for multilateral organizations and a rules-based global

order through a strong liberal, internationalist approach to diplomacy and, on the other, alliances with major Western powers and a credible, capable, and permanent Australian military force for the defense of the home territory.³

Following the Second World War, Australia strongly supported the establishment of the United Nations, forged a new security partnership with Great Britain, and, along with New Zealand, formed the ANZUS alliance with the United States. Australian support for the West in the Cold War and the British presence in the Far East led to commitment of troops to Malaya and Malaysia in the 1950s and 1960s, and its emerging relationship with the United States would see it sending forces to Korea and Vietnam. Continued support for U.S. global leadership and Western liberal democratic values into the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras would lead Australia to commit forces to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a consequence of this “expeditionary strategy,” by which its armed forces have been used principally in support of its major alliance partners rather than in direct defense of Australian territory, Australia’s approach to war fighting has come to be distinguished by the “quality of its expeditionary infantry, who are usually sent overseas as part of a wider coalition and depend on a larger ally for logistical and other support.”⁴

This expeditionary approach to strategy—embracing a major alliance partner while maintaining a degree of defensive self-reliance—has led to tensions in Australian strategic policy. These tensions have been manifest in the need both to develop forces that can be used to support alliance partners in distant operational areas and to maintain capabilities to meet strategic interests and objectives in its immediate region and for the defense of the continent. Amphibious warfare represents an intersection of these needs and therefore a focal point for understanding the tension between them.⁵

This article traces the role of amphibious operations in the evolution of Australian defense policy. It argues that the Australian experience with amphibious operations has been ironic, in that while Australia’s military forces conducted them in both world wars to support its interests and those of its major alliance partners, the potential for managing the nation’s own regional security was not realized. Thus, during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War years the amphibious capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) were not robust. However, with the end of the Cold War the ADF was forced to reorient its security strategy toward one requiring moderate projection and sustainment of forces to promote regional stability. As the necessary capabilities were being developed in response to the demands of the new era of “Regional Defence,” moreover, major shifts in the strategic environment were under way.⁶ The rise of China, the movement of the global strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region, and,

after 2011, the U.S. “pivot,” or “rebalance,” to the region have reshaped Australia’s security future.

As the nation commits itself accordingly to a strategy of both maritime security and regional engagement, what emerges is an end to what has been described as the “tyranny of dissonance” in Australian strategic policy. As a result, amphibious operations are finally coming of age in Australia and will play a more crucial role in the nation’s defense policy for the “Asian Century.”⁷

AUSTRALIA’S ENDURING STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES

Australia’s dependence on its two major alliance partners, Great Britain and the United States, and the dominance of an expeditionary approach in its strategy and use of military force have been a result of Australia’s enduring strategic geography and circumstances. Australia is the sixth-largest country in the world and the only one of the largest six to be surrounded completely by water. With an area of 7,618,493 square kilometers and 59,736 kilometers of coastline, it is not only an island but also a country and a continent. Australia, which has a strongly Western cultural identity, is a classic trade-dependent maritime state. As the then Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, remarked in March 2014,

If Australia was to be described as an organism, a startling characteristic would be that most of its vital organs exist outside its body. Over 50 percent of Australia’s [gross domestic product] has an external basis. Australia’s national interests require that for its prosperity and future stability, it must be able to shape its strategic environment and respond to threats to those vital organs. This is not, for example, merely the protection of Sea Lines of Communications and freedom of navigation, but rather the protection of trade itself.⁸

The combination of its location in Asia and its cultural heritage, deriving largely from its British settlement in 1788, along with its small population, large land mass, and rich natural resources, means that Australians have always sensed acutely a “tyranny of distance” from their major ally and the West, a sense that “gave rise to popular fear[s]—which still linger in the collective consciousness—that the country [is] indefensible.”⁹

It is for this reason that since its settlement Australia has relied for its security on the exercise by a major Anglo-Saxon maritime power of dominance over the Asia-Pacific. From 1788 until 1941 this power was the Royal Navy and from 1942 the U.S. Navy.¹⁰ Throughout its history Australia’s ability to pursue an expeditionary strategy to defend its interests and values has always depended on a stable Asia-Pacific, largely devoid of tension and major strategic competition. Not only that, but when Australia has committed forces to Europe and the Middle East, its “great and powerful friends” have themselves been guaranteeing its maritime security in Asia.¹¹

This expeditionary approach to strategy and war fighting has, it has been argued, been at odds with a peacetime Australian strategic policy tending to the defense of geography—that is, continental defense, generally referred to as “Defence of Australia.”¹² This has led to the aforementioned “tyranny of dissonance,” between Australia’s strategic theory and its actual conduct of military operations.¹³ Defense of the continent, that is, butts up against Australia’s strong affiliation with Anglo-Saxon culture, democracy, and Western diplomacy and values and its tradition of committing forces in pursuit of interests in such areas as Europe (First and Second World Wars) and the Middle East (the world wars, the Gulf War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).¹⁴

So binary a distinction between continental defense and expeditionary strategy has left little room for amphibious warfare in Australian defense policy. The former has relied on Australia’s two powerful allies to provide its first line of defense while Australia’s own military forces focused on the “air-sea gap” to the continent’s north. The latter has involved niche, single-service, distant contingencies, sometimes described as “wars of choice,” as part of coalitions with major alliance partners.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND “IMPERIAL DEFENCE”

Dependence on the British Empire and Imperial Defence (see note 6) in the period after Federation in 1901 meant that Australia’s military forces were little interested in amphibious warfare. Counterintuitively, however, Australia’s first-ever national military action came in the form of a joint expeditionary operation with an amphibious component.¹⁵ In 1914, the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force was created and dispatched to secure German New Guinea. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) provided “means for deployment, force protection, sustainment, command and control, support, and landing parties.”¹⁶ The army provided, at very short notice, a 1,500-strong battalion group for a number of landings in New Guinea to defeat the light-armed indigenous troops under German command. However, although it “demonstrated the usefulness of joint forces in the defence of Australian interests,” this small and brief campaign was soon forgotten in the maelstrom of the Australian Army’s actions at Gallipoli in 1915 and in the Middle East and on the western front between 1916 and 1918.¹⁷

Australia secured possession of New Guinea at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which concluded the First World War. In the same negotiations the Japanese used their support for the Allied powers during the war and their occupation of Germany’s Pacific colonies in the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands to push for their annexation. Their success in effect cemented Japanese “domination of the central and western Pacific,” an outcome that radically altered the strategic position of both Australia and the United States.¹⁸ Australia’s

acquisition of German New Guinea and its excellent harbor at Rabaul on New Britain and the Japanese annexation of the central Pacific Islands made the two uncomfortably close neighbors in the southwestern Pacific.¹⁹

Despite the experience of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force in the South Pacific in 1914 and the requirement to protect and sustain Australia's newly won colonial possessions during the interwar period, amphibious operations were almost entirely absent from Australian defense planning.²⁰ In fact, only one amphibious exercise was undertaken between the world wars. In 1935, Tasmanian militia forces from the 40th Battalion landed at Blackman's Bay, south of Hobart, from the cruisers HMAS *Canberra* and HMS *Sussex*. This sole military exercise, evidence of the paucity of interest in amphibious warfare, was remarkable only "for [its] air of unreality."²¹

In the interwar period Australia placed its faith in the Singapore Strategy for its defense against Japanese aggression in the Pacific, despite the clearly understood problems with this one-dimensional naval strategy.²² The naval "fortress" at Singapore and the need to contribute to Imperial Defence saw Australia raise a second all-volunteer expeditionary force for service in Europe and the Middle East at the start of the Second World War; the majority of this force was sent overseas in early 1940. The bulk of the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), including the 6th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, plus considerable elements of the RAN and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), would serve in the Middle East until the outbreak of the Pacific War at the end of 1941. The majority would return to Australia and the Pacific soon after, but the 9th Division did not return until the beginning of 1943, and a number of RAN ships and RAAF squadrons were to remain in the Middle East for most of that year.²³

THE PACIFIC WAR

The fall of Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Australian New Guinea in early 1942 radically changed Australia's strategic circumstances. For the first and only time in its history, Australia faced a genuine threat of invasion. The loss of the territories to the north was soon followed by the bombing of Darwin and a Japanese air offensive against northern Australia.²⁴ The establishment of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under the American general Douglas MacArthur by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff helped to secure Australia;²⁵ nevertheless, MacArthur had to spend the majority of 1942 defending the last remaining Allied bastion to Australia's north, Papua. Notwithstanding this initial defensive stance, it soon became apparent to MacArthur that a maritime strategy, one formed around land-based airpower and amphibious operations and embracing the concept of maneuver, was needed to defeat the Japanese in the region.²⁶ MacArthur's headquarters proposed an offensive based on island hopping, each jump of no more than three

hundred miles (480 kilometers) in order to ensure fighter cover for the SWPA's strike aircraft and heavy bombers. It also proposed the use of combined-arms task forces to undertake these amphibious landings, with heavy naval support under the cover of air umbrellas.²⁷

MacArthur's principal strike weapon, however, was his air force. His strategy rested on air superiority, enabling sea control to allow his amphibious force to leapfrog forward, establishing airfields, ports, and logistical bases to allow the advance to continue and isolating large numbers of Japanese troops on islands and around areas not assaulted.²⁸ The problem was that the majority of MacArthur's ground and naval forces from 1942 to early 1944 were Australian, neither equipped nor trained to conduct amphibious operations.²⁹ It would take MacArthur and his American and Australian commanders over a year to establish amphibious training schools for the army and navy, as well as to acquire the necessary specialized equipment.³⁰

During 1943–45 the Australian Army with support from its U.S. ally in the SWPA would conduct a number of joint expeditionary operations utilizing amphibious warfare. This would include four division-sized amphibious assaults, one brigade-sized assault, dozens of battalion- or company-sized landings and hundreds of amphibious transportation operations. The most critical of these occurred in New Guinea in 1943 and in Borneo in 1945.³¹ Meanwhile the RAN's landing ships HMAS *Manoora*, *Kanimbla*, and *Westralia* would form a core part of the U.S. Navy's VII Amphibious Force throughout the SWPA in 1943–45, as did the landing craft, destroyers, and cruisers from the RAN that supported MacArthur.³²

THE COLD WAR

As a result of the Australian experience of joint and combined amphibious expeditionary operations in its immediate region during the Pacific War, the 1946 and 1947 "Appreciation of the Strategic Position" prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended the development of a "mobile RAN Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with their escort[,] . . . [a] Fleet Train[,] . . . Amphibious craft for combined operations[,] . . . [and] Standard [army] formations designed for . . . amphibious operations, but capable of conversion to meet the conditions of jungle warfare."³³

This rather ambitious force structure was not taken up by the government. The threat of the Cold War and the fact that by 1950 Australia again found itself providing niche, single-service contributions to overseas coalitions, this time in Korea, meant that amphibious operations drifted from priority. Australia moved into what was known as the era of "Forward Defence" (1955–72), a period that, along with the overlapping Commonwealth Defence (1901–42 and

1945–69—again, see note 6), would once again see Australia concentrate on securing its interests and supporting Western values and objectives in conjunction with its major alliance partners, far from its shores.³⁴ The default condition seemed to be that the farther away from Australia's immediate region its military operations were, the less they had to do with amphibious warfare.

Thus it was for the Australian deployment to Vietnam. Here the Australian services fought singly alongside their American and South Vietnamese counterparts. Amphibious warfare played no role for the Australian commitment, but because of the lack of amphibious transportation and logistics ships and the need for maritime sustainment of the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province, one of the RAN's two aircraft carriers, HMAS *Sydney*, was pressed into service to move troops and supplies to South Vietnam. The ship was soon nicknamed the "Vung Tau ferry."³⁵

THE DEFENSE OF AUSTRALIA

At the conclusion of the Vietnam War and with the establishment of the Nixon Doctrine (by which the United States reduced its direct involvement in the defense of allies), Australian strategic policy shifted toward a focus on the "Defence of Australia." This continental-defense posture was based on a "need for greater self-reliance and the ability to act independently" in the defense of continental Australia and the necessity to "prepare for low level contingencies."³⁶ This basic premise was accepted by the conservative Coalition government of Malcolm Fraser and later the Bob Hawke–Paul Keating Labor governments. The resulting emphasis on the Defence of Australia at the "air-sea gap"—Australia's northern approaches—meant that the army would focus on the protection of the mainland against low-level incursions. Meanwhile, air and maritime forces would deter major-power threats. This defensive "self-reliance" was to be achieved within the alliance (ANZUS) framework.³⁷

The new strategy offered little prospect for the development of an Australian amphibious capability. In fact the influential 1986 *Review of Australia's Defence*, which had been commissioned by the minister of defense Kim Beazley, noted that the ADF's amphibious lift capability "is limited" and recommended the gradual running down of what was left.³⁸ By mid-1986 the few ships and landing craft of the RAN's "Australian Amphibious Squadron [had been] disbanded."³⁹ The review declared that the 5,800-ton heavy landing ship HMAS *Tobruk* and supply ship HMAS *Jervis Bay* were between them "sufficient to support any modest deployments of ground forces or their equipment that could not be handled by aircraft or land transport." The six heavy landing craft (LCHs) were to be used only for "coastal hydrographic work or maintained in the operational reserve." Finally, "there is no requirement to plan now for their [LCH] replacement, nor

is there any need for additional . . . [ships] of the *Tobruk* class.”⁴⁰ This approach, as a commentator noted, “left the Army, in particular, with little capacity for, or doctrinal interest in, the projection of military power at a distance.”⁴¹

The perception that there was little need for force-projection capabilities, given the strategic focus on sea denial in the defense of continental Australia, was soon to reveal its shortcomings with regard to regional interests. In May 1987, in Suva, the capital of the Melanesian island nation of Fiji—about two thousand kilometers north of New Zealand and some three thousand east of Brisbane, in Queensland—Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka and elements of the Royal Fiji Military Forces staged a coup. The Australian government of Prime Minister Bob Hawke asked the ADF whether it could rescue the deposed Fijian prime minister, Timoci Bavadra. The Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, quickly explained the insurmountable obstacles. However, foreseeing a requirement to conduct a protected evacuation of some four thousand Australian nationals, the Operational Deployment Force, based in Townsville, Queensland, was flown by RAAF C-130 Hercules aircraft to Norfolk Island (roughly midway between Australia and Fiji) and embarked in an “ad-hoc fashion” on board the warships HMAS *Parramatta* and *Sydney*, the supply ship HMAS *Success*, and the RAN’s only amphibious ship, *Tobruk*.⁴²

For fifteen days these troops stood offshore between Norfolk and the Fiji island of Viti Levu, then returned to Australia. This period revealed the poor state of joint capability in the ADF—inadequate doctrine, poor communications between services, shortage of amphibious ships and craft, and the absence of operating concepts. As one observer noted, “Operation Morris Dance [as the Fiji operation was designated] provided a sobering demonstration of the limits of Australian military power in the late 1980s. Even if it had wanted to or needed to, Australia simply could not have deployed a land force into the South Pacific safely and effectively if there was any prospect of onshore opposition to such a move.”⁴³

The critical fault was that the Defence of Australia strategy had excluded force-protection capabilities. While single-service expeditionary deployments with allies could be undertaken with the existing force structure designed for the defense of Australia, the lack of force-protection capabilities meant that Australia lacked the capacity to deal with regional security problems.⁴⁴ This shortcoming had been tolerated despite the fact that it had been long recognized that the expeditionary strategy almost invariably involved “wars of choice,” while deployments in the immediate region were, and would continue to be, “non-discretionary.”⁴⁵

While Defence of Australia dominated strategic thinking and force-structure priorities from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, some in the ADF acknowledged during the 1980s that given the size of the Australian continent, an amphibious capability could play a significant role.⁴⁶ However, any action was hamstrung by

a debate within some sections of the Department of Defence over the concept of “non-offensive defence,” put forward in a review, commissioned in May 1989, of civil-military relationships in Australia by a former Deputy Secretary of Defence, Alan Wrigley. His report, *The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s Defence*, released in June 1990, recommended placing the defense of the continent in the hands of largely part-time forces and restricting the regular ADF to overseas deployments in a constabulary role. Wrigley’s views of “non-offensive defence,” it was pointed out, implied that not even a “defensive” amphibious force could be supported, for fear that it might be destabilizing for the region.⁴⁷ In addition, the Hawke government made it clear that it found the “offensive nature” of an amphibious capability, like that of the RAN’s aircraft carrier capability, which was retired at this time, “inappropriate for Australia’s force structure.”⁴⁸

The government rejected Wrigley’s recommendations, although the 1991 *Force Structure Review* did cut the size of the army and transferred a number of its combat capabilities from regular to reserve forces.⁴⁹ However, arguably, the most significant impediment to the development of amphibious capabilities in the ADF at this time was a lack of institutional interest from the navy and, especially, the army.⁵⁰ The post-Cold War era would see Australia again making single-service military contributions to distant “wars of choice,” this time in support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq and later in the first Persian Gulf War, 1990–91.⁵¹

As has been noted, the 1980s and 1990s were “a dark period for amphibious and joint operations, which were only kept alive in largely unread doctrine or through heavily orchestrated training exercises.”⁵² However, concurrently with international deployments, post-Cold War Australian strategic policy was also concerning itself with instability in the immediate region; the period from 1997 to 2001 was in fact the era of “Regional Defence.” The year 1999 saw Australia’s most significant military operation since Vietnam, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a peacekeeping mission undertaken in response to the conflict between East Timorese pro-independence supporters and pro-Indonesian militias (supported by regular Indonesian forces). During INTERFET the “ADF [would] rediscover the importance of joint operations to national security.”⁵³

EAST TIMOR AND REGIONAL OPERATIONS

The realization of the limitations of the ADF’s force-projection capabilities after MORRIS DANCE in Fiji, coupled with concern over growing instability in the South Pacific, had led to a revised strategic guidance, in the 1991 *Force Structure Review*, acknowledging a need to “respond to regional requests.”⁵⁴ In particular, the review noted that “the ADF currently has no single vessel capable of operating

a number of helicopters simultaneously.”⁵⁵ This led to a decision to replace the roll-on/roll-off support ship *Jervis Bay* with a dedicated training and helicopter-support ship. However, in 1993 the government balked at the expected \$500A million price tag for a purpose-built vessel and decided instead, in 1994, to acquire two surplus U.S. Navy *Newport*-class 8,500-ton tank landing ships, redesignated as “Landing Platforms Amphibious” (LPAs).⁵⁶ This was “an important, positive [move in the] use of the sea for [a] military purpose [that] added to the 1987 [Defence of Australia] construct.”⁵⁷

Nevertheless, 1999 found the ADF woefully short on the amphibious capability it needed to undertake INTERFET. The acquisition of the LPAs “could not disguise the years of institutional and doctrinal neglect, cost cutting and lack of single-service interest” in amphibious operations.⁵⁸ In any case, the LPAs *Kanimbla* and *Manoora* had not completed refitting and were not yet in service when Australia decided that year to send a stabilization mission to East Timor.⁵⁹ This left the RAN with only *Tobruk* (long overdue for maintenance), the recently leased fast catamaran (a new HMAS *Jervis Bay*), and three heavy landing craft. These vessels were supplemented by the RAN’s replenishment and supply ship *Success*, soon reinforced by ships from the Canadian, New Zealand, Singaporean, and U.S. navies, as well as seventeen commercially chartered vessels.⁶⁰

The ADF was exceptionally lucky that it was able to secure the harbor of Dili, the capital, and its one wharf and crane, before it could be damaged by forces opposing East Timorese independence.⁶¹ Loss of this critical node would have severely hampered the ability of the ADF, with its one small amphibious ship, to build decisive force ashore rapidly and then sustain it. Furthermore, these amphibious forces proved especially significant, as INTERFET pushed out from Dili and its immediate surrounds. As has been argued, “coalition maritime capabilities and, above all, amphibious units proved essential to any realistic efforts to make land forces mobile over long distances.”⁶² To facilitate these moves, *Tobruk* and the RAN’s heavy landing craft conducted numerous over-the-beach lodgments.

RAN and coalition amphibious forces, then, were critical to the success of INTERFET. Its commander, General Peter Cosgrove, would state the ADF amphibious assets were a “capability of first resort.” While in many respects this is unsurprising, given the archipelagic nature of the region, INTERFET served to highlight not only the potential requirement for amphibious operations but also the ADF’s stark lack of such capability at the time.⁶³ These deficiencies were particularly noticeable once the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ship USS *Belleau Wood* (LHA 3) started to provide heavy lift with its Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters.⁶⁴

The East Timor experience was ultimately to herald a new era for amphibious warfare in Australian policy and strategy.⁶⁵ By 2000 *Manoora* and *Kanimbla*

were available and in concert with *Tobruk* formed the first RAN amphibious ready group (ARG) since the end of the Second World War. This increase in RAN capability was matched by a resurgence in the Australian Army's doctrinal interest in amphibious operations. This new doctrine was established on the back of U.S. concepts such as "Operational Maneuver from the Sea," which had developed after the Cold War as the U.S. Navy transitioned from the conception of a blue-water fleet as envisioned by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan to an idea of maritime strategy that, reminiscent of the theoretician Sir Julian Corbett, focused heavily on force projection, support of forces ashore, and expeditionary operations.⁶⁶

For the Australian Army, such ideas were developed under the rubric of MOLE (Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment). However, its development in the land forces soon stagnated. Against the background of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-September 11 era, MOLE "has long been overshadowed by [Army doctrine development on] Complex Warfighting and the Hardened and Networked Army scheme, [which] . . . merged into the comprehensive framework of Adaptive Campaigning."⁶⁷

In the years after 2001 the ADF undertook its regional-security operations, which relied so heavily on the RAN's amphibious assets, at the same time that it (in particular, the army) became involved intensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus during the past decade two of the major drivers of Australian defense strategy—far-off expeditionary deployments (Iraq and Afghanistan) and regional operations (East Timor in 2003 and 2006, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands)—have been undertaken concurrently. This has placed enormous strain on the ADF's resources and has led to two very different sets of experiences and lessons. In some cases, such as the army's MOLE doctrine, the Middle East experience would overshadow, though not eclipse, thinking and concept development for regional amphibious operations.

The first operational deployment of the ARG was in 2006, when the ADF was again required to intervene in East Timor as the security situation deteriorated. Its three ships were able to land an infantry battalion group within three days, including armored and support vehicles and three Blackhawk helicopters. They did so entirely over the beach, as, unlike in 1999, the Dili harbor facilities were not secured.⁶⁸ This was a considerable achievement for assets that sixteen years earlier had been deemed "inappropriate."⁶⁹

In the years after MORRIS DANCE the ADF's amphibious assets had also seen extensive service in Vanuatu (1988), in Somalia (1993), and on Bougainville (1990 and 1994). The ARG also has since played a critical role in the support of the Australian response to the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Aceh region of Indonesia.

In light of the lessons from Somalia, Bougainville, and East Timor, the John Howard government's white paper *Defence 2000* committed the nation to purchasing two new amphibious vessels to replace *Tobruk*, *Manoora*, and *Kanimbla*. This met the third of the paper's five objectives—"Stabilization of South West Pacific," which the government deemed a "self-reliant task" (although it expected support from New Zealand).⁷⁰ The "main requirements for the RAN force structure that flow[ed] from this objective . . . [were] . . . for a capability to patrol South Pacific waters, and for amphibious lift."⁷¹

The 2003 *Defence Capability Review* noted that "both frigates and amphibious ships have been engaged constantly since September 2001 across a full spectrum of operations. Additionally, the importance to the Government of the ability to safely deploy, lodge and sustain Australian forces offshore has been re-emphasised."⁷² As a result, the government announced that the replacement amphibious ships would be "large vessels" and would be supplemented by an additional sealift ship. By the release of the *Defence Capability Plan 2004–2014*, the size of these two ships had doubled from that envisaged in 2000.⁷³ The plan had evolved to a decision to purchase two 27,500-ton, Spanish-designed ships of the LHD (landing helicopter dock) type, the largest vessels that the RAN has ever operated. Each of these ships, when operational (late 2014 and 2016), will be able to deliver ashore in three hours what the RAN's ARG needed three days for in East Timor in 2006.⁷⁴

THE END OF "DISSONANCE"?

The irony of Australian expeditionary warfare is that the forces the ADF has consistently deployed to distant theaters generally do not actually conduct joint expeditionary operations. Truly expeditionary, and amphibious, operations have occurred only close to the Australian homeland. The reductive and binary debates, therefore, over Australia's strategic policy as a choice between an expeditionary strategy and Defence of Australia have been particularly unhelpful in understanding the role that amphibious operations have played in achieving the nation's strategic objectives.

In particular an "expeditionary strategy" / "Defence of Australia" distinction obscures the requirement for Australia's military forces to operate in the zone between the continent itself and far-off deployment zones—that is, notably, in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. This region has long been characterized by Australian strategic policy as the nation's "area of direct military interest" or "primary operating environment." As the 2009 white paper noted, it is an "expansive strategic geography [that] requires an expeditionary orientation on the part of the ADF at the operational level, underpinned by requisite force projection capabilities."⁷⁵

As the ADF has transitioned away from high-tempo operations in the Middle East it has started to carry out its own “pivot,” or “rebalance,” toward the Asia-Pacific region. This move is in response not only to the drawdown in Afghanistan but also, and especially, to the shift of global strategic competition and economic power to the Asia-Pacific. As a result, the “tyranny of dissonance” between geography, on one side, and history, values, and political interests, on the other, has begun to recede.⁷⁶ Australian trade and investment are now becoming firmly centered on the Asia-Pacific region; Australia’s major alliance partner, the United States, has announced, as noted, a strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific; Australia is now deeply engaged in stability operations in the South Pacific; and Canberra is developing regional defense relations with such fellow democracies and major trading partners as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Japan.⁷⁷

In the process Australia is embracing a maritime strategy in which amphibious and joint expeditionary operations in the Asia-Pacific region will play a significant role.⁷⁸ This move was reflected in *Defence White Paper 2013*, which devotes a section to maritime strategy (paragraphs 3.42–3.47) and refers to amphibious “capability,” “operations,” “training,” or “forces” no fewer than forty-three times. The amphibious-related sections include discussions of “Joint and Enabling Forces” (paragraphs 8.12–8.14), of “Land Forces,” of “Naval Forces,” and of the amphibious capability as the “central plank in our ability to conduct security and stabilisation missions in the [South Pacific] region” (paragraph 6.55); and of “cooperation and engagement activities in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste, including bilateral or multilateral exercises with regional security forces” (paragraph 3.51).

This approach is set to continue under the conservative government of Tony Abbott that was elected in late 2013. In the lead-up to the election, Abbott, then opposition leader, and his shadow defense minister, David Johnston, committed themselves to writing a new white paper on defense, a commitment they reaffirmed once in government. Johnston has suggested the central role that the new LHDs will play. Speaking alongside the American and Japanese ambassadors to Australia and the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., at the Kokoda Foundation annual dinner in Canberra on 31 October 2013, Johnston emphasized their critical importance for regional engagement and deeper relations with Australia’s allies and regional partners. Johnston called this amphibious capability a major new “strategic asset for Australia.”⁷⁹

The development of this “strategic” amphibious capability is a critical part of the continuing close strategic partnership with the United States, a relationship that is taking on a new emphasis and new roles as a result of the American “pivot.” As the 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review noted, more will be asked of Australia and other allies to “undergird the ability of the United States to face

future crises and contingencies” and especially to grow partners’ “capacity . . . [to] play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions.”⁸⁰

Nonetheless, development of this capability presents enormous challenges to Australia and the ADF. As the 2013 white paper notes, “the challenges for training and institutional culture involved in developing the capability to conduct amphibious operations will be significant.”⁸¹ This challenge is manifest in the difficulties the ADF has faced in developing clear strategic guidance, the slow progress of amphibious concepts, and a lack of integration between some of the amphibious plans and projects managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation. Of major concern is the erosion of the ADF’s littoral amphibious capabilities, especially with the retirement of the heavy landing craft and the delays in implementing and funding replacements for these and other brown-water assets as the LHDs come online. As one ADF officer has observed, “You can’t ride a concept to the beach.”⁸²

However, this is not a capability or institutional problem of the ADF alone. Rather, in many respects it is reflective of much broader, national, cultural problems. These are barriers to the acceptance of a focus on the Asia-Pacific and in particular of a maritime strategy for Australian defense policy. This issue is a divide less between values, history, and geography than between continental and maritime cultural outlooks: a result of the “peculiar trajectory of Australia’s national culture . . . [which] has impeded a sense of maritime consciousness . . . [—a] situation that is particularly reflected in defence policy.” But as has been noted, this cultural hand brake is not immovable; rather “Australians, while respectful of their continental ethos, must increasingly seek to recast the national cultural narrative towards the seas of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.”⁸³

Such an approach, in terms both of national outlook and of the integration of a maritime strategy into the ADF, is of paramount importance, given the focus on the Asia-Pacific region. The changing nature of Australia’s strategic environment is also critical. Although Australia’s “region has been at peace now for almost 40 years” and there is a “low likelihood of war between the major powers[,] . . . miscalculation and misjudgement short of major war are a risk, as they have been throughout history. And in our part of the world there are plenty of territorial and ideological tensions and jockeying for influence by the rising powers.”⁸⁴

Increased strategic competition in this region has important ramifications for strategic policy and will make it much more difficult for any Australian government to participate in expeditionary deployments outside the Asia-Pacific region in the future. In addition, given the low risk of a direct threat to the Australian continent, a regional focus has become of overriding importance to Australia’s strategic interests and objectives. The region to Australia’s north—a vast maritime, littoral, and archipelagic region—presents the ADF with a land-sea-air operating

environment, not an “air-sea gap.” It requires the ADF to be able not just to provide for continental defense or deploy alongside major alliance partners but also to carry out joint maritime operations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific—operations that are critically dependent on a robust amphibious capability.⁸⁵

With the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the rise of China, and the increasing importance of both the immediate region and the wider Asia-Pacific to Australia’s strategic interests and objectives, the odds are that even more demands will be made on the ADF’s emerging amphibious capability. This is especially true as a modern, versatile amphibious capability could provide much more than the standard, orthodox roles of amphibious assault, raid, withdrawal, and demonstration.

Rather, a joint amphibious expeditionary force will also play key roles in humanitarian assistance, evacuation, and peacekeeping. It will increase the ADF’s ability to assist friendly nations and undertake military diplomacy and combined military exercises, as well as to provide “presence” and undertake preventative diplomacy.⁸⁶ This joint maritime force could also exert a high level of coercion, especially through deterrence and compellance.⁸⁷ These are all critical for strategic shaping;⁸⁸ if utilized properly, they will be key elements of Australia’s policy of engagement and of the ADF’s contribution to managing the peace in the immediate region. These capabilities highlight the prospect that despite its troubled past, Australian amphibious warfare has an enduring role to play in contemporary defense policy and strategy.⁸⁹

NOTES

1. Rob Lyon, “Do Alliances Work?,” *Strategist*, 19 December 2012, www.aspistrategist.org.au/.
2. Defence Committee, minute 335/1944, 18 October 1944, A5799, 206/1944, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory [hereafter ACT; this collection hereafter NAA].
3. For an overview of Australian defense policy see Hugh White, “Defence Policy,” in *The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics*, ed. Brian Gilligan and Winsome Roberts (Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 150–53.
4. Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia* (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), p. 5. This is not to overlook the service of either the Australian air force or navy, in particular the latter, in support of Australia’s global interests and military coalitions. The army’s commitments in two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, however, have been numerically more significant than those of the other services.
5. “Amphibious operations” in this article is defined as “a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.” Australian Dept. of Defence, *Amphibious Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2 (Canberra, ACT: 29 January 2009). This ADF definition is also the standard NATO definition and is only slightly different from that found in U.S. Defense Dept., *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: 8 November 2010). While “amphibious operations” is

tactical in orientation, the associated “Expeditionary Operations” concept is highly relevant to Australia’s use of amphibious operations, given Australia’s island/continent status and the character and types of operations in which Australia has used its amphibious capabilities. These include operations in New Guinea in 1914, in the Pacific in 1942–45, and in the South Pacific and East Timor from the 1970s to the present. Sam J. Tangredi has noted that “expeditionary warfare consists of military operations on land that are exclusively or primarily initiated, supported and supplied from the sea. It is largely the responsibility of marines, naval infantry, or army units transported by ship, and is supported by fleet units, naval aviation and other strike assets . . . and—based on situational factors—land-based combat aviation.

“Amphibious warfare is a significant subset of expeditionary warfare, and prior to the 1990s was the preferred American term for naval expeditionary operations. . . . In short, expeditionary warfare is more than amphibious warfare, but amphibious operations remain its keel”; Sam J. Tangredi, “Navies and Expeditionary Warfare,” in *The Politics of Maritime Power: A Survey*, ed. Andrew Tan (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 80.

6. Since Australia federated in 1901 there have been five broad defense eras, referred to in Australian Army, *Manual of Land Warfare*, LWD1 (Canberra, ACT: Dept. of Defence, 2001) [hereafter LWD1] as “Imperial [later Commonwealth] Defence” (1901–42 and 1945–69), “Forward Defence” (1955–72), “Defence of Australia” (1973–97), “Regional Defence” (1997–2001), and “Expeditionary Strategy” (2001–12). The first three are widely used in Australian security circles; however, there is some debate over “Regional Defence.” “Expeditionary Strategy,” which has not yet been taken up in common usage, merges Australia’s operations under Regional Defence and activities in the global war on terror, asserting that Australian security interests are not defined by geography alone. The rise of China and the shifting global strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific have seen the emergence of what this author would loosely call an emerging “Indo-Pacific Maritime Strategy” era (from 2009). This most recent change has emerged through the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers (the 2013 white paper introduced the “Indo-Pacific” term); however, its establishment as a strategic-policy era will depend on the direction of a new white paper, due in 2015 and announced by the incoming conservative Coalition government during the federal election in late 2013. In the meantime, there is an ongoing debate about the western extent of the zone identified as the “Indo-Pacific”—most argue for the eastern Indian Ocean. The more familiar “Asia-Pacific” is used in this article, except in formal or implied reference to the white paper.
7. See Commonwealth of Australia, *Australia in the Asian Century*, White Paper (Canberra, ACT: October 2012), available at pandora.nla.gov.au/.
8. Gen. D. J. Hurley, Chief of the Defence Force, “Address to the National Security Institute,” University of Canberra, March 2014, available at www.lowyinterpreter.org/.
9. For “tyranny of distance,” Geoffrey Blainey, *The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History* (Sydney, NSW: Macmillan, 2001). For “popular fear[s],” Paul Dibb, “Is Strategic Geography Relevant to Australia’s Current Defence Policy?,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 2 (June 2006), p. 248.
10. This bilateral defense pact was formalized through the ANZUS alliance, signed in 1951.
11. See Peter Dean, “Ah the Serenity: Defence White Paper 2013 and the View from Canberra and DC,” *Strategist*, 8 May 2013, www.aspistrategist.org.au/.
12. The notion of “expeditionary” in Australian parlance can be somewhat misleading. Many strategic commentators in Australia use the phrase “expeditionary operations” to describe deployments of Australia’s forces away from its immediate region in support of its allies. This is actually, however, the use of force as part of an expeditionary strategy; examples are the use of Australian forces in Europe (World Wars I and II) and the Middle East (the world wars, Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan). This is opposed to the shared U.S., British, and NATO definition—“the projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific mission.” One reason for this confusion is that the

- ADF still has no agreed joint definition. In the competing Expeditionary and Defence of Australia schools of strategic thought there has been little room for joint expeditionary operations, despite their critical importance in 1914, 1942–45, and the post–Cold War era; see Peter Dean, “The ADF and Expeditionary Warfare,” *Strategist*, 5 October 2012, www.aspistrategist.org.au/. The best definitions of this joint operational-level concept and examinations of its requirements can be found in Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 252–81, and Thierry Gongora, “Expeditionary Operations: Definition and Requirements,” *Military Technology* 28, no. 6 (June 2004), pp. 106–108, 110–12, 114–15.
13. Michael Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901–2005* (Canberra, ACT: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005). See also Evans, “Overcoming the Creswell/Foster Divide in Australian Strategy: The Challenge for Twenty-First Century Policy-Makers,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 2 (June 2007), pp. 193–214.
 14. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *The Australian Approach to Warfighting* (Canberra, ACT: 2002), pp. 23–30.
 15. See S. S. Mackenzie, *The Australians at Rabaul*, vol. 10 of *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18* (Sydney, NSW: Angus and Robinson, 1927).
 16. Bob Breen, *Struggling for Self-Reliance: Four Case Studies in Regional Force Projection in the Late 1980s and the 1990s*, Canberra Papers in Strategy and Defence, no. 171 (Canberra, ACT: ANU E-Press for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2008), p. 15.
 17. For the quoted phrase, Russell Parkin, *A Capability of First Resort: Amphibious Operations and Australian Defence Policy 1901–2001*, Land Warfare Studies Working Paper 117 (Canberra, ACT: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2002), p. 6.
 18. John McCarthy, *Australia and Imperial Defence: A Study in Air and Sea Power* (St. Lucia: Univ. of Queensland Press, 1976), p. 7.
 19. For details on Australian-Japanese relations during this period and Japanese military intentions toward Australia see Pam Oliver, “World Wars and the Anticipation of Conflict: The Impact on Long-Established Australian-Japanese Relations, 1905,” and Steven Bullard, “Japanese Strategy and Intentions towards Australia,” in *Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War*, ed. Peter J. Dean (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 33–54, 124–39.
 20. Alternative thinking on defense against possible Japanese aggression offered by Capt. Walter Hugh Thring, RAN, amounted to a denial strategy by submarines and floatplanes in the islands to the north; David Stevens, “Captain Walter Hugh Thring RAN (1873–1949),” *Maritime Strategist Seminar* (Canberra, ACT: Sea Power Centre, 14 October 2013). The Australian Army did little planning or preparation for the defense of this region in the interwar period; David Horner, “The Army, the Navy, and the Defence of Australia and the Empire, 1919–1939” (paper presented at “Armies in a Maritime Strategy,” Chief of Army History Conference, Canberra, ACT, 2 October 2013; conference proceedings forthcoming). Neither service considered the use of amphibious warfare.
 21. *Report on Combined Operations in Hobart to the Secretary of the Naval Board*, 26 April 1935, as quoted in Parkin, *Capability of First Resort*, p. 14.
 22. Augustine Meaher IV, *The Road to Singapore: The Myth of the British Betrayal* (Melbourne, Vic.: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2010). See also David Stevens, ed., *In Search of a Maritime Strategy: The Maritime Element in Australian Defence Planning since 1901*, Canberra Paper 119 (Canberra, ACT: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1997).
 23. The 8th Division AIF would be lost at Singapore and in the islands north of Australia in early 1942.
 24. For the events of 1942 see Dean, *Australia 1942*.
 25. Although Australia had been largely absent from U.S. prewar planning to defeat Japan, Adm. Ernest J. King gave critical support to securing the island chain from Australia to Hawaii; Walter R. Borneman, *The Admirals* (New York: Brown, 2012), pp. 258–59.
 26. See Peter J. Dean, “Army vs Navy: Allied Conduct of the Pacific War” (paper presented at “Armies in a Maritime Strategy,” Chief of Army History Conference, Canberra, ACT,

- 2 October 2013). MacArthur never actually used “maritime strategy” to describe his approach to operations in the SWPA, but the phrase contains all the fundamental elements.
27. This strategy is articulated in a General Headquarters (GHQ) SWPA report, “Defensive and Offensive Possibilities,” GHQ G-3 Journals & Files Box 566 (no. 1), April 1942–30 May 1943, Record Group 407 98-GHQ1-3.2, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.
 28. *Ibid.*
 29. See “Long Range Planning for Offensive Action: Landing Operations,” 13 March 1942, B6121 289, NAA.
 30. “A Summary of Combined Operations Training in Australia (Amphibious) 1942–1945,” n.d., p. 1, 54 943/16/1, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, ACT. For detail on the development of Australia’s amphibious operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, see Peter J. Dean, “To the Jungle Shore: Australia and Amphibious Warfare in the SWPA 1942–1945” (“Global-Regional Nexus: The Sea and the Second World War Conference,” Kings College London and Global War Studies, 3–5 May 2012).
 31. For the former, see Peter J. Dean, ed., *Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea* (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).
 32. See Daniel E. Barbey, *MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1969).
 33. “The Strategic Position of Australia: Review by Chiefs of Staff Committee,” n.d., A8744, 1947–1949; “Defence Policy and National Security: Strategical Appreciation of a Regional Arrangement in the Pacific from the Aspect of Australian Security,” Chiefs of Staff Committee Minute 12/1946, 20 March 1946, A5954, 1669/6; both NAA.
 34. For Commonwealth Defence, “A Brief History of Australian Military Strategy,” app. A in LWD1, pp. 79–82. During this period Australian forces operated alongside the British in Southeast Asia in the Malayan Emergency and in Borneo during the Konfrontasi with Indonesia, as well as in Korea and Vietnam. As part of Commonwealth Defence planning during the 1950s and ’60s, it was intended that in the event of a global war against communism Australian forces would deploy to defend the Middle East.
 35. Vung Tau was the main port in Phuoc Tuy Province. For details on the maritime sustainment operations see Jeffrey Grey, *Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955–1972* (Sydney, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1998).
 36. Defence Committee, *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy*, 1 June 1973, para. VII-5, p. 17, as quoted in Stephan Fruhling, *A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945* (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, 2009), pp. 28, 31.
 37. While Defence of Australia had been laid out as the major priority for Australia in the early 1970s by the conservative Fraser government, it was not until the mid-1980s under Robert Hawke’s Labor government that the concept was fully integrated into strategy and force structure. See Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities* (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, 1986), and Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *The Defence of Australia* (Canberra, ACT: 1987).
 38. Dibb, *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities*, p. 145.
 39. Michael Evans, “Unarmed Prophets: Amphibious Warfare in Australian Military Thought,” *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* (January/March 1999), p. 14.
 40. Dibb, *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities*, p. 145.
 41. David Stevens, *Strength through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise*, Working Paper 20 (Canberra, ACT: Sea Power Centre Australia, 2007), p. 3.
 42. HMAS *Tobruk* was the first purpose-built major amphibious ship in the navy. The vessel, commissioned in 1981, was designed to carry troops (350–550), vehicles, and stores and to put them ashore without the aid of port facilities.
 43. John Blaxland, “Game-Changer in the Pacific: Surprising Options Open Up with the New Multi-purpose Maritime Capability,” *Security Challenges* 9, no. 3 (2013), pp. 33–35; Breen, *Struggling for Self-Reliance*, chaps. 4, 5. See also John Blaxland, *The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard* (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 64–68.

44. For the argument in favor, Kim Beazley, "Operation Sandglass: Old History, Contemporary Lessons," *Security Challenges* 4, no. 3 (Spring 2008), pp. 22–43. Beazley was Minister for Defence in 1984–90, a period including the Dibb review and the 1987 white paper.
45. Paul Dibb, "The Importance of the Inner Arc to Australian Defence Policy and Planning," *Security Challenges* 8, no. 4 (2012), p. 14.
46. R. E. Moyses, "The Future of Amphibious Warfare in the ADF: Cognitive Dissonance or 'Catch 22'?", *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 117 (March/April 1996), pp. 25–27.
47. Sam Roggeveen, "Amphibious Warfare in the ADF: The Poverty of Non-offensive Defence Strategy in the Australian Context," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 120 (September/October 1996), pp. 35–37.
48. Kim Beazley, quoted in Graham Cheeseman, *The New Australian Militarism* (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto, 1990), p. 212. It had been planned to replace the already retired *Melbourne* and *Sydney* with a British carrier, *Invincible*, but that ship was retained in the Royal Navy after the Falklands conflict. See *The Royal Australian Navy*, ed. David Stevens, vol. 3 of *The Australian Centenary History of Defence* (Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 225–27.
49. Blaxland, *Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard*, pp. 86–87.
50. Peter Jones, "1983–1991: A Period of Change and Uncertainty," in *The Royal Australian Air Force*, ed. Alan Stephens, vol. 2 of *The Australian Centenary History of Defence* (Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), p. 261.
51. For details see David Horner, *Australia and the "New World Order": From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: 1988–1991*, vol. 2 of *The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations* (Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011). Australia has provided maritime assistance in Persian Gulf security operations continually since 1991.
52. Parkin, *Capability of First Resort*, p. V.
53. Ibid.
54. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Force Structure Review* (Canberra, ACT: 1991), p. 28.
55. Ibid.
56. Kathryn Spurling, "1991–2001: The Era of Defence Reform," in *Royal Australian Navy*, ed. Stevens, p. 275.
57. Stephan Fruhling, "Golden Window of Opportunity: A New Maritime Strategy and Force Structure for the Australian Navy," *Security Challenges* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008), p. 85.
58. Evans, "Unarmed Prophets," p. 14.
59. For details on Australia's commitment to East Timor see Iain Henry, "Playing Second Fiddle on the Road to INTERFET: Australia's East Timor Policy throughout 1999," *Security Challenges* 9, no. 1 (2013), pp. 87–113. *Kanimbla* and *Manoora* were former U.S. Navy ships, respectively USS *Saginaw* (LST 1188) and USS *Fairfax County* (LST 1193). These ships were found riddled with rust and other problems that delayed their entry into service, pushed refurbishment costs far above expectations (from \$70 million to \$400 million), and eventually led to their early retirement; Spurling, "1991–2001," p. 275.
60. David Horner, "Deploying and Sustaining INTERFET in East Timor 1999," in *Raise, Train and Sustain: Delivering Land Combat Power*, ed. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Loftus, NSW: Australian Military History Publications, 2010), p. 223.
61. The port was secured by troops from the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, flown by C-130 aircraft directly from Townsville to the Dili airport, which had been secured by Australian and New Zealand special forces.
62. Stevens, *Strength through Diversity*, p. 28.
63. For the East Timor deployment, Aldo Borgu, *Capability of First Resort? Australia's Future Amphibious Requirement*, Strategic Insights (Canberra, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2004), p. 2.
64. "Operation Stabilise," *The Navy: Magazine of the Navy League of Australia* 62, no. 1 (January–March 2000), p. 7.
65. Michael Evans, "On Military Grammar: The Australian Army beyond Afghanistan," *Security Challenges* 7, no. 2 (Winter 2011), p. 37.
66. U.S. Navy Dept., *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, January 1996); Evans, "Unarmed Prophets," p. 14.

67. Evans, "On Military Grammar," p. 37.
68. "Operation Astute: The RAN in East Timor," Sea Power Centre Australia *Semaphore*, no. 12 (June 2006), pp. 1–2.
69. Peter Jones, "1983–1991: A Period of Change and Uncertainty," in *Royal Australian Navy*, ed. Stevens, p. 261.
70. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defence 2000* (Canberra, ACT: 2000); idem, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2007* (Canberra, ACT: 2007).
71. Fruhling, "Golden Window of Opportunity," p. 89.
72. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defence Capability Review: Statement of Findings*, Media Release 142/03, Friday, 7 November 2003, defence.gov.au/.
73. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defence Capability Plan 2004–2014* (Canberra, ACT: 2004). For amphibious and strategic lift capability, see idem, *Defence Capability Plan December 2010 Update*, JP 2048 (Canberra, ACT: 2009), phases 2–4C, p. 68, available at www.defence.gov.au/.
74. "Operation Astute."
75. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Canberra, ACT: 2009), para. 6.42, pp. 51–52.
76. Evans, *Tyranny of Dissonance*.
77. Australia's major trading partners are, in descending order, China, the United States, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Thailand, Germany, Malaysia, and the other countries of Southeast Asia.
78. See Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013* (Canberra, ACT: 2013), paras. 3.42–3.47, p. 29.
79. Senator David Johnston, Kokoda Foundation Annual Dinner Speech, 31 October 2013, Canberra, ACT (author's notes from the speech).
80. U.S. Defense Dept., *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: 4 March 2014), pp. 9, III, available at www.defense.gov/.
81. Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, para. 4.27, p. 39.
82. Andy Love, "You Can't Ride a Concept to the Beach: The Gaps in Australia's Envisaged Amphibious Capability," *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 186 (2011), pp. 5–13.
83. Michael Evans, "The Withheld Self: The Impact of National Culture on the Development of Australian Maritime Thought," in *A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia*, ed. Justin Jones (Canberra, ACT: Sea Power Studies Centre, 2013), pp. 35, 40.
84. Paul Dibb, "Managing Australia's Maritime Strategy in an Era of Austerity" (unpublished paper delivered at Sea Power Conference, Sydney, NSW, 9 October 2013).
85. See Commonwealth Dept. of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*. This document outlined for Australia a maritime strategy with a heavy increase on amphibious operations; however, it removed any reference to an ADF ability to undertake joint expeditionary operations. This is mainly due to the mistaken notion of the term "expeditionary" in Australian strategic debate and the term's connotation for the Labor government of distant deployments of single-service forces.
86. Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, RAN Doctrine 1 (Canberra, ACT: Sea Power Centre Australia for Chief of Navy, 2010), p. 100, available at www.navy.gov.au/.
87. This last point is really significant only for the ADF within the South Pacific, but the ADF can undertake collaboration around the region, across the Asia-Pacific, and in concert with the United States, while Australia can play its own (limited) role in coercion. The latter can take the form of preventative or reactive deployments. An emphasis on humanitarian assistance / disaster relief, search and rescue, and joint exercises does not mean that war fighting should be overlooked. Australia's maritime strategy should not be one of peacekeeping.
88. Maren Leed and Benjamin W. Moody, *Tough Choices: Sustaining Amphibious Capabilities' Contributions to Strategic Shaping*, New Defense Approaches Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), p. 4.
89. See Peter J. Dean, "Australia, Maritime Strategy and Regional Military Diplomacy," in *Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia*, ed. Jones, pp. 89–101.