Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes

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Martin van Creveld

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diplomacy, expeditionary operations, and maritime security. In a penultimate chapter he takes the example of the issues currently surrounding the South China Sea as a case that simultaneously combines all five of his strategic viewpoints and requires an integrated and coordinated approach to its solution.

In conclusion, he emphasizes that naval strategists will find no easy answers—competitive and collaborative trends are important but will be impossible to predict as the importance of navies continues to rise in the twenty-first century. There are shifting attitudes to the global commons, while the range and diversity of naval tasks are both increasing.

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This work attempts, in the author’s own words, “to reintegrate wargames ... with human culture as a whole.” It succeeds admirably, providing a valuable addition to the knowledge base of the serious national-security war gamer, whose objective is to understand modern and future war as well as possible to plan and train for it and to educate national-security professionals.

Drawing on his established strengths as an expert in military history and strategy, the author traces the history and development of war games from earliest hunters up to modern times, setting war gaming within the context of the general topic of games. He addresses the narrow questions of how war games are influenced by the experience of war and what they tell us about the conduct of war. More broadly, van Creveld examines the general topic of gaming, why we game, the types of game in which we engage, what these types of game tell us about our culture, and how our culture influences who games and which games are chosen.

In his sequential survey of the history and development of gaming and war games within gaming, the author establishes four basic human needs that gaming satisfies: religious (appease the gods or ascertain their wishes by combat), decision making without engaging the whole of society (duels, trial by combat), preparation for war (explore possible futures; plan, train, and educate), and entertainment. He also examines interactions and how they evolved. Over time games and war games have become bloodless, as weapons have become more lethal and reliable (modern weapons make a medieval tourney simply impractical as a method of training for war), and the first two needs have withered, leaving us with bloodless war games and entertainment.

Van Creveld makes the interesting point that the differences between real war and gaming about war are themselves of value and not simply artifacts to be removed. This is a critical point, given the lukewarm response to war gaming by some leaders. In the same way a single war game represents a single possible trajectory through a large space of possible sequences of decisions and outcomes, so does a historical event represent a single collection of decisions drawn from all those that could have been made—the reality of that moment could be “entirely atypical.” The
differences between reality and gaming provide a means of capturing what the culture sees as important in the reality of war. Culture and the structure and execution of games by that culture should provide insights into the differences and similarities between that culture and ours when thinking about war. Of special interest is the author’s examination of the effect a culture has on how and why it games, thus providing insight into how to integrate gaming with other techniques drawn from the culture to improve performance in war.

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In his latest book Michael Wheeler incorporates his years of experience as a professor at Harvard Business School, his membership in the Program on Negotiation (a cross-disciplinary consortium of negotiation experts from Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Tufts University), and the research of the latter of over ten years in a project led by James Sebenius to take the study and practice of negotiation to a new level.

The members of this project analyzed such diplomats as George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke, investment banker Bruce Wasserstein, United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, and sports agent/marketer Donald Dell, to learn what these individuals believed to be the most important factors in successful negotiation.

Wheeler credits his colleagues who published before him: Roger Fisher, Bill Ury, and Bruce Patton, whose groundbreaking text published thirty years ago, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In*, significantly contributed to the development of negotiation. Readers are reminded that relationships are important and that though aggressive, value-claiming tactics may work once, people rarely come back for another drubbing. Wheeler also agrees that a careful consideration of your own interests, as well as those of the other party, is important before beginning negotiations. He recognizes the necessity of establishing your own best alternative to a negotiated agreement—or, as he calls it, your “baseline”—as the minimum agreement you must achieve to get as much value as you are giving. He maintains, however, that although these things are important, it is often impossible to identify your baseline, never mind those of others, until you actually begin negotiations. Wheeler seeks to recommend ways to deal with that situation, arguing that successful negotiators are those who are able to see new possibilities for agreement by improvising, in a process he likens to what jazz musicians do. The greatest value of this work is that the author takes this difficult concept of how to improvise successfully during negotiations and offers great examples of how to accomplish it.

This is a great book for anyone involved in negotiations, whether it be diplomacy, national policy, or purchasing. It takes the study and practice of negotiation to a level that had not previously been reached.

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