China as a Sea Power: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People during the Southern Song and Yuan Periods

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fortress Zeelandia, near present-day Tainan. Koxinga succeeded in taking the fortress and driving the remaining Dutch back to Batavia (currently Jakarta) over the course of a bitterly contested nine-month siege. Andrade compares Chinese seventeenth-century military capabilities with those of the Dutch, especially on four levels. His conclusions are, first, that the technology in guns was about equal but that second, the military discipline of the Chinese was better than that of the Dutch, whose discipline was vaunted in Europe at the time. Third, as for ships, the ability of the Dutch ships to sail to windward gave them an edge over Chinese. Fourth, although the Chinese outnumbered the Dutch by a large margin, the Renaissance fortress configuration, with corner battlements, allowed the Dutch to hold out for many months before surrendering. That was long enough for Koxinga to study and absorb the technology of the Renaissance fort and incorporate it into his own counterstrategy. Each side had elements of relative strength, and the elements were not static in terms of relative advantage. Thus, Andrade proposes, during the seventeenth century China was fairly similar to Europe in terms of military capabilities. Koxinga and his heirs controlled Taiwan until 1683, when they were defeated by a former Zheng family commander, Shi Lang, who had defected to support the Qing emperor. Andrade makes the interesting observation that the Qing dynasty, following the Taiwan campaigns of the late 1600s, was an era of 160 years of peace in China, requiring little in the way of military advancement. Meanwhile, Europe was embroiled in nearly constant warfare, improving its military capabilities decade by decade. Thus the Chinese were to be at a distinct military disadvantage when the Opium Wars began in 1839, and the century of humiliation for China was by that time a fait accompli with respect to relative military advantage.

The book includes a fine set of maps and figures, as well as a dust jacket with an evocative seventeenth-century painting by Andries Beckman of the Dutch fort at Batavia. The Dutch governor of Taiwan, Frederick Coyet, was executed symbolically in front of this fort for losing the profitable colony of Taiwan to Koxinga.

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Lo Jung-pang (1912–81), the scion of a distinguished Chinese family, was a great historian, old enough to have received a traditional Chinese education when young and young enough to have mastered the Western way as a student abroad. Like many of his cohorts, he chose exile, becoming one of those who for decades kept the study of China alive outside the country until the post-Mao liberalization of the 1980s allowed its resumption at home. Lo, a long-serving professor and historian in the United States, focused on China’s great middle era and launched the field of China’s maritime history. Bruce Elleman’s unearthing and editing
of this previously unavailable 1950s manuscript, properly seeing contemporaneous United States–China strategic relations as his backdrop, has made Lo’s encyclopedic knowledge available to us. However, Lo’s book is instructive beyond that; *China as a Sea Power* is a magisterial contribution to the study of world maritime history and should be known everywhere by those who are interested in that subject.

Lo was determined to illuminate China’s maritime history to edify his countrymen, who had seen the consequences of a lack of naval power. In the first decades of Lo’s life, foreign navies dominated China’s coastal ports and also had wide-ranging rights in other ports hundreds of miles up the great rivers. It was as if foreign navies could, by right, sail at will up the Mississippi from New Orleans to Minneapolis. The Chinese had become accustomed to the seeming inevitability of such circumstances and knew of the failures to revive Chinese naval power at the end of the nineteenth century and of Japan’s easy closure of China’s ports between 1937 and 1945. It was for them that Lo wanted to present a grand history of Chinese power on the sea, and not only naval power but seaborne commercial power and the urbanization, wealth, and sophistication that it had created in great ages past. China’s remarkable efflorescence that we see today derives from such visions.

Of this book’s many compelling accounts, perhaps the richest is Lo’s description of the naval campaigns of the Mongols, who, as the Yuan dynasty, ruled China between 1271 and 1368. The Mongols, who had no experience fighting at sea, quickly adapted and soon organized armadas built and manned by their new Chinese subjects. They launched invasions northward into the East China Sea and southward into the South China Sea. Today’s increasingly visible and vocal Chinese admirals seem eager to draw inspiration from these huge undertakings, but for all the immense capabilities they demonstrated, Kublai Khan’s two invasions of Japan and his three invasions of Vietnam in the thirteenth century all ended in disaster. Eight centuries later, in his November 2012 valedictory address, Hu Jintao, China’s outgoing president and the Communist Party’s general secretary, urged his successors “to build China into a maritime power.” In this they would be well advised to read Lo Jung-pang’s account of China’s past glories as a sea power, not only as inspiration but also as a cautionary tale.

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President Dwight D. Eisenhower is remembered in history as a dedicated Cold Warrior whose staunch anticommunism included commitment to the containment and rollback of communism in Asia. In *The China Threat* Nancy Bernkopf Tucker challenges this narrative, suggesting that Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles possessed a more nuanced view of China than is generally supposed.

Tucker is an established and respected historian of U.S. policy toward China whose earlier works include a study of U.S.-Chinese relations during the