

2013

## Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College

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### Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (2013) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 66 : No. 3 , Article 11.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/11>

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### IS CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY DRIVEN BY PERCEPTIONS OF VULNERABILITY?

Nathan, Andrew J., and Andrew Scobell. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012. 406pp. \$32.95

The nation's "rebalance" to Asia has been greeted by a plethora of new books on Asia-Pacific security issues. In contrast to the many worthwhile specialist works now available, *China's Search for Security* stands out as an ambitious attempt to offer a one-volume overview of China's security situation as seen from the Chinese point of view. Both authors are established and respected scholars. Andrew Nathan is best known as an editor of the *Tiananmen Papers* (PublicAffairs, 2002), while Andrew Scobell is author of the well-regarded *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge University Press, 2003). This work began as a revision of their 1997 collaboration *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, but the rapid changes in the Asian security landscape in the last decade have made *China's Search for Security* essentially a completely new volume.

The authors begin by asking what drives Chinese foreign policy and who makes decisions in the Chinese system. Their clear, cogent explanation of the state,

party, security, and intelligence elements that constitute the Chinese foreign policy-making elite is exceptional and is perhaps the best part of the book. The authors conclude that a small elite group still has the ability to "sustain strategic policies in a disciplined way over long periods of time." While arguably better informed and more constrained by other elements of society than in the past, the elite remains largely isolated, with the risk that it will make major mistakes or fail to adapt to changing circumstances.

Scobell and Nathan contend that Chinese foreign policy is driven primarily by perceptions of vulnerability. Chinese elites see the world as "a terrain of hazards" comprising four interlocking circles of threats: territory China administers or claims; border states, which include the United States as a Pacific power; six nearby multistate regional systems; and the rest of the world. Within this construct, the authors do an admirable job of presenting the history of China's relations with each of its key neighbors. Scobell and Nathan suggest that China engages the fourth ring

(comprising three-quarters of the world) only to serve specific interests. Though those interests are expanding, most of the finite attention Chinese leaders give to international issues focuses on challenges within and near its borders.

Presenting China's obsession with its territorial integrity, Scobell and Nathan explain Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in a sophisticated and integrated overall context. They conclude that China is not expansionist but rather unyielding within its identified historical claims. By focusing on these four core geographic areas and relegating discussion of the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands to chapters on China's relations with Japan and Southeast Asia, however, the authors understate the sometimes elastic nature of Chinese claims. In this context, the authors' focus on elite political decision making arguably underrepresents the growing impact of popular nationalism on high-profile sovereignty issues. Nationalism, they concede, is "the only important value still shared by the regime and its critics" in Chinese society.

Finally, Scobell and Nathan present the instruments of Chinese power, focusing a chapter each on the economic, military, and "soft power" tools at the disposal of the Chinese Communist Party. They conclude by offering three possible trajectories for Chinese development: economic success and authoritarianism (the "Singapore model"), political democratization, and regime failure. The authors do not betray which of these outcomes they view as most likely. Consistent with their presentation of the Chinese point of view, they conclude that China no more knows its own future than does anyone else.

Reducing a topic this complex into one volume is inherently an exercise in intellectual triage, and some topics are naturally underrepresented. Issues of cyber warfare, the Internet, and the political impact of new media are touched on, but their full complexities as mechanisms of Chinese soft power, potential threats to regime stability, or means of economic espionage are not fully explored. Consideration of People's Liberation Army capabilities, while deftly crafted, comprises less than forty pages. The Chinese navy's three years of sustained operations in the Gulf of Aden are mentioned only in passing. Readers interested in details of Chinese military capabilities and institutions will want to consult more specialized texts.

With this limited caveat, *China's Search for Security* is the best one-volume introduction to Chinese security issues in print. At once rigorous and readable, it offers U.S. Navy officers headed to the Pacific a chance to consider the region through a Chinese lens. Specialist readers may disagree with specific points of interpretation but will be impressed by the scope of the survey and the synthesis presented.

COMMANDER DALE C. RIELAGE, USN



Crist, David. *The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran*. New York: Penguin, 2012. 638pp. \$22

Author David Crist writes, "Conspiracy theories abound in the Middle East in part because there frequently *are* so many conspiracies." Every chapter of *The Twilight War* pulls back the curtain and sheds new light on many previously

undisclosed and often underappreciated events that have shaped U.S.-Iranian relations. This masterfully researched historical account focuses on U.S.-Iranian relations since the fall of the shah of Iran and the beginning of the Iranian Revolution. The policy and strategy decisions of the past six U.S. presidents, covert CIA operations, Iranian actions and reactions, and the struggle to create the present-day U.S. Central Command are all detailed in this book.

David Crist works as a historian for the federal government and as a frequent adviser to senior government and military officials. He is also a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. His research for this work included interviews and access to records of many of the principal decision makers on both sides. *The Twilight War* comes at a critical time in the relationship between the United States and Iran.

If plotted on a graph, the thirty-year chronology of events between the United States and Iran would look like two opposing synchronized sine waves: when one is up, the other is down, and never the two shall meet. Crist's engaging account provides never-before-revealed insights into the near, and often missed, opportunities for reconciliation between both countries. In what could sometimes pass for a Sophoclean tragedy, if not for the very real consequences, these two opposing nations cannot seem to get in step long enough to find ways to resolve their standing grievances.

Some readers may criticize Crist's lack of detail on the complex history of Iran during the reign of the American-supported shah. Crist explains his decision to pick up the story of U.S.-Iranian relations at the time of the

Iranian Revolution on the grounds that these are the years of direct conflict and competition with Iran. It is clear that this decision allows for a more focused examination of the current regime, as well as the events that are currently shaping our world. Those interested in prerevolutionary U.S.-Iranian relations may wish to read Stephen Kinzer's *All the Shah's Men* (Wiley Press, 2008).

General James Mattis has made *The Twilight War* required reading for members of the U.S. Central Command staff. This insightful and intellectually provocative book should be required reading in fact for all military professionals who wish to gain a better understanding of what many in the profession of arms consider the most likely reason for military conflict in the next decade.

DANIEL DOLAN  
Naval War College



Smith, Jean Edward. *Eisenhower: In War and Peace*. New York: Random House, 2012. 951pp. \$40

When you mention Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower, far too many people will hark back either to D-Day and the invasion of Normandy or to a mythical, almost lyrical presidency, when life was good, three martinis accompanied every lunch, and gas cost pennies a gallon. The truth, of course, is far different and far more interesting. In *Eisenhower* Jean Edward Smith has produced what may well be the best one-volume biography on this figure. The book moves fast and yet manages to leave nothing out.

In illuminating Dwight D. Eisenhower, Smith steps adroitly and rapidly through the years of his life, maintaining the

reader's interest and never shortchanging his subject. It is a bravura performance. For example, Smith moves through Eisenhower's childhood at a gallop, while fully describing a family that was centered on a domineering, distant, and hot-tempered father but made bearable by the love and efforts of his mother, Ida.

Eisenhower's rise in the Army also speeds by, but not without explanation of the critical importance of Fox Conner, Ike's steadfast mentor and advocate; George Patton, who became a trusted friend and fellow missionary of armored warfare; and Douglas MacArthur, who both recognized and used Eisenhower's talents in Washington, D.C., and in the Philippines. Ike's rise to prominence in the late 1930s and early 1940s as an exceptional staff officer is well chronicled, as is his progressively improving ability to lead combined forces, once given major command in North Africa and Europe. Almost before the reader knows it, Eisenhower has invaded Europe, arranged for the liberation of Paris, been surprised by the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, and terminated the war. He then becomes the first commander of NATO and the chancellor of Columbia University. Ike's campaign and two terms in the White House flow by at an equally fast pace, leading to his retirement from office and a final move to the farm at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Ike's transition from military leader to political candidate to president is as surely and speedily dealt with. Smith lays out the major issues of the day and in so doing reminds the reader that Eisenhower, far from pursuing a presidency of golf and leisure, dealt with major domestic and international issues throughout his term in office. Ike was less than kind to Richard Nixon, although readers may

find it difficult to muster much sympathy for the vice president. The two men were of vastly different temperaments and capabilities, and Eisenhower made it clear he thought Nixon was not of presidential caliber. However, part of Eisenhower's antipathy might have stemmed from the fact that Nixon, with the brilliant success of the Checkers speech, forced Eisenhower to report earnings he would rather have kept private.

Smith awards Eisenhower full points for the handling of the Suez crisis of 1956. He depicts a world leader in his prime, a president who is savvy, decisive, and powerful. The reader is reminded that his stand on Suez was as much about principle as it was about power.

If, however, there is one portion of the book that truly stands out as the best part of an exceptional work, it is the recounting of how Eisenhower handled Arkansas governor Orval Faubus's refusal to desegregate public schools as directed by the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Topeka*. Eisenhower the man, while in no way a racist by the standards of his day, was not one to challenge southern apartheid or other racial inequities. However, Eisenhower the president was different. He had taken the oath of office, and the Supreme Court decision made clear where his duty lay. Faubus refused to fulfill his gubernatorial responsibility to provide order and safety, so Ike stepped in, federalizing the Arkansas National Guard and ordering elements of the 101st Infantry Division to Little Rock. Equally credible was the manner in which Eisenhower refused to accept delays in desegregating the military, something for which he is routinely given too little credit.

In this excellent biography Smith also takes a major, and unfortunately

deserved, swipe at the late Stephen Ambrose. Ambrose, long accepted as a leading scholar on Eisenhower, was found to be guilty of plagiarism in some of his later works; as Smith points out, Ambrose also fabricated accounts of meetings between himself and Eisenhower, meetings that simply did not occur. The failure of Ambrose stands as a stark reminder as to the fallibility of historians and the need to get the history right. This Smith does. His scholarship is meticulous, and his book is a worthy addition to any shelf.

RICHARD NORTON  
*Naval War College*



Berman, Larry. *The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell "Bud" Zumwalt, Jr.* New York: HarperCollins, 2012. 528pp. \$29.99

Larry Berman has written a scintillating biography of the man who is credited with changing the U.S. Navy more, perhaps, than any other single individual in its history. Zumwalt was controversial in his day, and Berman found during his research that feelings about the admiral, both positive and negative, still run strongly nearly forty years after his tour as Chief of Naval Operations. His book, although clearly written from an advocate's viewpoint, captures the essence of why Admiral Zumwalt was such a polemic figure during a time of great social and political turmoil, both inside and outside the Navy.

Berman crafts a comprehensive picture of a highly complex individual who was driven as much by his heart as by his keen intellect. Zumwalt's strong social conscience enabled him to perceive what most did not—a navy that was

fundamentally racist and sexist, a navy that inflicted innumerable injustices on its sailors under the assumption such practices were needed to ensure discipline among the rank and file. As Berman found, few of Zumwalt's contemporaries were his intellectual equals, particularly when it came to understanding the magnitude of the Soviet naval threat that confronted the United States in the 1970s. Berman makes clear that Zumwalt's reward for attempting both to change the Navy's force structure and to eliminate its abusive personnel policies was pushback by many of its most senior officers, who felt he was pushing too hard and going too fast. While Zumwalt saw a lack of accountable leadership, his critics saw a man hell-bent to destroy many of the Navy's most cherished traditions. To most junior officers and junior enlisted he was a godsend, who, unlike most senior enlisted and older officers, understood the difficult conditions under which they served. Berman paints a vivid picture of the social issues and grievances that were not simply demeaning to the young sailors who manned the Navy but also threatened the service's ability to man its ships and squadrons once the all-volunteer force replaced the Vietnam-era draft.

Berman also provides his readers with a riveting account of Admiral Zumwalt's troubled relationships with President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Nixon held Zumwalt personally responsible for the race riots that broke out in three ships, blaming him for allowing lax disciplinary standards that, in his view, had led to the problems. Kissinger is portrayed as a self-interested political scientist who was willing to put the nation's security at grave risk in order to achieve an ill-advised arms-reduction treaty.

Berman has penned a compelling story of a man before his time and a book that sheds greater light on the diverse challenges that confronted Admiral Zumwalt during his tenure. Naval professionals in the twenty-first century will find many of the issues he attempted to rectify in the 1970s still unresolved today.

RONALD RATCLIFF  
*Naval War College*



Zanco, Jean-Philippe, ed. *Dictionnaire des ministres de la marine, 1689–1958*. Collections Kronos. Paris: Éditions SPM, 2011. 564pp. €45

Loge maritime de recherche La Pérouse (France). *Dictionnaire des marins francs-maçons: Gens de mer et professions connexes aux XVIII<sup>e</sup>, XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles*. Edited by Jean-Marc van Hille. Collections Kronos. Paris: Éditions SPM, 2011. 571pp. €46.50

Jean-Philippe Zanco's biographical dictionary of French naval ministers provides an extremely useful and handy overview and guide to the history of French naval administration over a period of 269 years. The first forty pages provide a broad and authoritative overview of the history of French naval administration, a survey that includes the background for the earlier period from Richelieu to Colbert's initiatives under Louis XIV. This overview offers organizational charts that trace the transmission of naval and maritime affairs over the broad periods of French governmental history, as well as a chronological list of all ministers who served between 1626 and 1958. The following four hundred pages of the book are devoted to biographical sketches of all ministers who served between 1689 and 1958, listed in alphabetical order and written by twenty-six different contributors. About a page and a half is

devoted to each individual who served the French government as minister of the navy, secretary of state for the navy, undersecretary of state for the navy, or secretary of state for the merchant marine. Each biographical sketch includes a short summary about the person's term of office as a naval minister, as well as other aspects of his life and career, and a portrait, where known, all followed by a list of the key archival and short references to the published sources about each individual. The short references are linked to full bibliographical references at the end of the volume, where one can also find an index to all personal names.

The book is particularly useful, in all periods, for its gathering of archival references to personal papers. For the periods of the Third and Fourth Republics, it is an enormous help to sorting out the frequent change in ministries, which sometimes lasted only days or months. Zanco's *Dictionnaire des ministres de la marine* is an essential guide for anyone approaching the administrative history of the French navy for the first time, as well as a ready reference guide for those who are already familiar with the subject.

The *Dictionnaire des marins francs-maçons* identifies a little-known connection between mariners and Freemasonry. The work was originally published in 2008; the 2011 edition has added more than two thousand names that range from prominent French admirals such as Suffren, d'Estaing, and Raoul Castex to the British explorers Captain James Cook and Ernest Shackleton; Admirals Rodney, Nelson, Beresford, Jellicoe, and Fraser; such Germans as Admiral von Tirpitz and Count von Luckner; prominent early American naval officers like Abraham Whipple, John Paul Jones, John Barry, Stephen Decatur, William

Bainbridge, Oliver Hazard Perry, and Matthew Perry; and later admirals of the U.S. Navy, including Winfield Scott Schley, Henry Mayo, Ernest J. King, Harris Laning, and recent chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, along with a host of other naval officers and mariners of all types. The entries for each person tend to be very short, sometimes only a line with the name of the Masonic lodge with which that person was associated. In other cases, such as King George VI and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, there are twenty- and thirty-line entries on the individuals' lives and Masonic connections. Some entries have dates of birth and death, others do not.

The alphabetical listing of individuals is complemented by two short appendices. The first is devoted to a listing of prominent naval officers in the twentieth century who opposed Freemasonry, such as French admirals Darlan and Platon, the Austrian Horthy, and the German admiral von Rosenberg. The second appendix lists the Masonic lodges active in 2010 that were originally founded by people with professional maritime connections, including one in France, seventy-one in the United Kingdom, twelve in the United States, and one each in Australia, the Philippines, and Cuba. Those in the United States include naval lodges established in the Washington Navy Yard in 1805 and at Mare Island, California, in 1855, as well as the Mariner's Lodge of New York, established in 1825. The alphabetical listing of individuals also includes short histories of "Naval Lodge no. 4, Washington, D.C.," and "Naval Lodge no. 2612, London." The Masonic maritime research lodge in France, under the direction of Jean-Marc van Hille, continues its pioneering research for this reference work, aiming for complete

worldwide coverage. An updated digital edition is reportedly in planning.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF  
*Naval War College*



Converse, Elliott V. *History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense*. Vol. 1, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960*. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012. Available at [history.defense.gov/resources/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf](http://history.defense.gov/resources/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf). 784pp.

It is immediately obvious that the effort put into this work was monumental. The foreword by Dr. J. Ronald Fox states that "management of defense acquisition has slowly improved, but not without painful periods of recreating and re-experiencing acquisition management problems of the past. . . . It is my belief that the painful periods have resulted to a significant degree from the absence of a comprehensive history of defense acquisition or even a formal record of lessons learned."

The initial volume covers the twists and turns of the politics of the post-World War II transition from total war to a situation where a single, powerful adversary possessed the very same weapon that had ended the earlier conflict. The newly conceived Defense Department was required to oversee this problem.

Technology was accelerating across the entire spectrum in the 1950s. The newly constituted U.S. Air Force first fought in the Korean War with the short-legged Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star and ended up with the North American F-86 and the "century series" of operational fighters from the F-100 to the F-106. The Navy started out with the Grumman F8F Bearcat and ended up with the F8U Crusader, which set a record in 1956 at one thousand miles per hour.

The multiple external, real-world steering currents must be placed in historical context. There is no question that during the early 1950s, following the Soviets' demonstration of nuclear-weapons capability in August 1949, the U.S. Navy had to fight for a place at the table. This situation was exacerbated when Louis A. Johnson, the second defense secretary (28 March 1949 to 19 September 1950), canceled the construction of the carrier *United States* in what was for a very short time a period of untimely total-defense-budget reductions. It was to be British and U.S. carriers that provided air support for the ever-shrinking Korean "Pusan Pocket."

The relevance of these comments ties to the Defense Department's acquisition and the troubled development and operational life of the Navy's North American AJ nuclear bomber. World War II ace Jimmy Flatley called this period "the bad old days." It was a time when the naval aviation accident rate peaked for all high-performance aircraft. The Crusader was among the worst. The problems of the AJ were well known. The era, with all that was happening in military aviation, including aircraft like the B-58, should be viewed in this context.

The B-58 discussion covers the twists and turns of the contract, tracing an amazing technical achievement that pressed all sides of the engineering envelope from the coke-bottle fuselage to the requirement for navigation and ordnance delivery at supersonic speeds. This section of the book provides insights into and lessons in government and contractor interactions, many of which remain valid today. The similarity will become evident in the next volume when the Total Package Procurement Concept will be

covered in the Lockheed C-5 chapter—an example of Dr. Fox's continuing reoccurrence of acquisition concepts.

The two major successes of acquisition in the 1950s were the Atlas and Polaris ballistic-missile programs. General Bernard A. Schriever managed the Air Force program, and Admiral "Red" Raborn led Polaris development. "Years later, [the former CNO Admiral Arleigh] Burke told interviewers that the officer he wanted 'didn't have to be a technical man. He had to be able to know what technical men were talking about. He had to get a lot of different kinds of people to work [together].'"

The Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb in 1955 and launched Sputniks 1 and 2 in October and November 1957, respectively. In September 1961 the Atlas D was operational, and in mid-November 1960, shortly after Kennedy's election, USS *George Washington* (SSBN 598) departed Charleston, South Carolina, on an operational patrol with sixteen nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles.

How did this happen?

What remains clear in the text are that both Schriever and Raborn were given carte blanche and direct access to their service heads, as well as to whoever could provide assistance in industry and academia. A review of Air Force and Navy aircraft development highlights that the two services were literally stumbling through technology advances in aero and engine developments and systems. The 1950s produced aircraft that continued (in several cases into the 1980s) to contribute—for example, the A-6 and F-4. And of course, the B-52, C-130, and KC-135 still do today.

ADMIRAL RICHARD GENTZ, USN, RET.