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Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare

Peter M. Swartz

Bruce A. Elleman

S. C. M. Paine

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Elleman, Bruce A., and S. C. M. Paine, eds. *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*. Cass Series. New York: Routledge, 2011. 256pp. \$180

The eminent naval historian David Rosenberg once advised this reviewer that serious readers of good naval history can expect one of three outcomes: they will be *entertained*; they will be *informed*; or they will be *empowered*. The fortunate readers of this timely book will fall into all three categories. But above all, they will be *empowered*.

This book is a compendium of thirteen case studies of various wars and campaigns by some of the most distinguished naval historians and analysts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The case studies are short, readable, and often exciting. Some of the events are well known, others less so. So the book will certainly entertain.

It also will certainly inform. Andrew Lambert's tale of the Royal Navy's White Sea campaign of 1854 contributes enormously to our understanding of the nineteenth century's great global maritime war against Russia—misnamed the Crimean War. (That real-world event was a key progenitor of Admiral Mahan's formulation of a construct for a counter-Russian war in "The Problem of Asia" [1900] and of the concepts that underlay the Reagan administration's Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.) Coeditor S. C. M. Paine provides a fascinating analysis of Japanese military and naval strategy during World War II, making the point that peripheral and expeditionary campaigns are not necessarily panaceas but can even prove disastrous. Later in

the volume, David Stevens reminds us of the details of one of those campaigns, in New Guinea—a campaign that while peripheral to the great powers was central to Australia, a country whose military past must become much more familiar to us as our focus shifts to the Asia-Pacific. Bruce Elleman's quick description of China's 1974 naval expedition to the Paracels should be required reading for anyone scanning today's headlines. Other chapters explore legal issues in expeditionary campaigns and shed fresh light on the Peninsular War, Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Guadalcanal, Korea, Malaya, the Falklands, Iraq, and the war on terror. John Hattendorf contributes a short but perceptive foreword, a perfect scene setter.

However, where the book truly excels is as a vehicle of *empowerment*. In both their analytical and well-argued introduction and conclusion, Elleman and Paine propound a thesis that there are insights to be gained from considering naval expeditionary operations in peripheral areas as constituting a discrete subset of military operations and that those insights can be compounded by comparing and contrasting the thirteen cases under scrutiny. They are correct.

However, it will be the rare reader who will buy completely into their characterization of the coherence of their concept, and an even rarer one who will not pause to think about the rationale they present for including these specific case studies. (Examples would be Peter Jones's discussion of the 2003 maritime campaign in Iraq and John Reeves's treatment of the war on terror.) It can be difficult to view, as the editors do, the relationship between the Pearl Harbor raid and the Sino-Japanese War in the same

light as that between the 1982 battle for the Falklands/Malvinas and the Cold War, or that between the U.S. Navy's contribution to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and the global war on terror. Their analogies sometimes appear forced and their syntheses sometimes, well, stretched.

But far more important is the expansion in thinking that this book is sure to engender. For all the debates with the editors and authors that will arise in readers' minds as they turn the pages, previously unthought-of concepts and insights are bound to emerge as well. Peripheral naval campaigns can win a war or waste valuable resources in profitless undertakings. This book explains how and why this has happened, and it yields insights for future planning. No serious reader who actively engages with the arguments that the editors present and the examples that they provide will finish this provocative book without a greatly enlarged understanding of the past, present, and potential uses and limitations of naval power. As we enter a new era of military and naval operations, that understanding can empower us indeed, especially the policy makers, staff officers, and analysts who support those operations.

This, of course, is not the first time that Professors Elleman and Paine have done something like this. This book follows at least two similar earlier efforts, a volume on naval blockades and sea power and one on naval coalition warfare. Like those compendiums, *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare* seeks to get its arms around a topic vital for naval policy and strategy today by looking to the past for data and concepts. Like those earlier volumes, it definitely succeeds. All in

all, this is an important book for naval historians, strategists, and operators to engage with, learn from, and ponder.

PETER M. SWARTZ

CNA Strategic Studies, Alexandria, Virginia



Koistinen, Paul A. C. *State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare 1945–2011*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2012. 313pp. \$39.95

The last volume of Paul Koistinen's five-volume study of the political economy of American warfare from the nation's colonial period of the seventeenth century to the present day, this new book analyzes U.S. foreign policy and national defense from the end of World War II to the present. In it Koistinen studies the decisions and actions that led to the development of the current U.S. national security system and what was termed by Dwight D. Eisenhower the "military-industrial complex" (MIC).

This study includes a comprehensive historical examination of the relationships among American political, economic, and military institutions and of the combined effects of U.S. policy decisions. It is an assessment of the actions and decisions made by important institutions in the U.S. national-security establishment. Koistinen devotes a chapter each to the presidency, Congress, the military, the defense industry, the scientific community, and think tanks in a consistently organized and chronological assessment of key foreign and domestic events, government policies, and institutional actions. The last two chapters synthesize government actions and policies, with their resulting impacts on the national economy.