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## State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare 1945–2011

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light as that between the 1982 battle for the Falklands/Malvinas and the Cold War, or that between the U.S. Navy's contribution to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and the global war on terror. Their analogies sometimes appear forced and their syntheses sometimes, well, stretched.

But far more important is the expansion in thinking that this book is sure to engender. For all the debates with the editors and authors that will arise in readers' minds as they turn the pages, previously unthought-of concepts and insights are bound to emerge as well. Peripheral naval campaigns can win a war or waste valuable resources in profitless undertakings. This book explains how and why this has happened, and it yields insights for future planning. No serious reader who actively engages with the arguments that the editors present and the examples that they provide will finish this provocative book without a greatly enlarged understanding of the past, present, and potential uses and limitations of naval power. As we enter a new era of military and naval operations, that understanding can empower us indeed, especially the policy makers, staff officers, and analysts who support those operations.

This, of course, is not the first time that Professors Elleman and Paine have done something like this. This book follows at least two similar earlier efforts, a volume on naval blockades and sea power and one on naval coalition warfare. Like those compendiums, *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare* seeks to get its arms around a topic vital for naval policy and strategy today by looking to the past for data and concepts. Like those earlier volumes, it definitely succeeds. All in

all, this is an important book for naval historians, strategists, and operators to engage with, learn from, and ponder.

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Koistinen, Paul A. C. *State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare 1945–2011*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2012. 313pp. \$39.95

The last volume of Paul Koistinen's five-volume study of the political economy of American warfare from the nation's colonial period of the seventeenth century to the present day, this new book analyzes U.S. foreign policy and national defense from the end of World War II to the present. In it Koistinen studies the decisions and actions that led to the development of the current U.S. national security system and what was termed by Dwight D. Eisenhower the "military-industrial complex" (MIC).

This study includes a comprehensive historical examination of the relationships among American political, economic, and military institutions and of the combined effects of U.S. policy decisions. It is an assessment of the actions and decisions made by important institutions in the U.S. national-security establishment. Koistinen devotes a chapter each to the presidency, Congress, the military, the defense industry, the scientific community, and think tanks in a consistently organized and chronological assessment of key foreign and domestic events, government policies, and institutional actions. The last two chapters synthesize government actions and policies, with their resulting impacts on the national economy.

In his farewell address to the nation in January 1961, Eisenhower advised government to “guard against the unwarranted influences, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” Koistinen analyzes Ike’s caution and considers the evolution and development of the MIC.

Koistinen does not argue that the MIC created itself or was constructed with intent in some coordinated or collaborative effort led by the government. He, however, does state that U.S. foreign policy and national security requirements led to its development and that the MIC’s pervasive influence in government, economics, and society is the result of numerous mutual and supporting interests of government and nongovernment institutions and organizations.

The author evaluates what he describes as the “noncompetitive” defense industry as an economic sector within the U.S. domestic economy, considering fundamental economic principles. This government-constructed defense sector operates free of the market pressures of supply and demand; prices, accordingly, result from the contracting processes between the military services and contractors. The conditions of the defense sector rarely stimulate competition, owing to numerous mergers among a decreasing number of defense corporations.

Today, the U.S. defense budget remains large, yet insufficient to meet the requirements placed on the military. Koistinen observes that the MIC continues to produce high-technology weapons at high cost. The cost of these weapons results in smaller quantities, a fact that results in a force structure that is insufficient to meet the requirements of the national strategy.

The author concludes that over time the MIC has become so entrenched in the economic, political, and social lives of the nation that today it is nearly impossible to diminish its influence. This book presents a compelling explanation of the effects on the U.S. economy of government and private-sector actions of recent decades regarding the development of the current national-security system.

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Bell, Christopher M. *Churchill and Seapower*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013. 429pp. \$34.95

Although Winston Churchill is still regarded as one of the great British leaders of the twentieth century, he continues to attract not only praise but a large measure of criticism. This book is a valuable addition to a formidable library of such analysis. As its title tells us, this is a review of Churchill’s thinking about sea power in general and British sea power in particular. Its central theme is nicely encapsulated by a famous remark made about Churchill by General Sir Alan Brooke, arguably one of Britain’s most famous and successful soldiers during the Second World War: “A complete amateur of strategy, he swamps himself in detail he should never look at and as a result fails ever to see a strategic problem in its true perspective.”

However, Christopher Bell asks, is this kind of criticism, from a number of scholars, any more justified than the uncritical adulation Churchill usually receives? Where does the truth lie in this spectrum of possible reactions to Churchill as naval strategist?