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Cultural Heritage, Ethics and the Military

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other unusual techniques. In these cases, the raiding tactics of Greene and Nathan Bedford Forrest simply proved too effective. The obvious implications are made clear by the author and should give readers plenty to reflect on, in terms of evaluating the U.S. position in either regular or irregular warfare.

This is a useful book for both specialists and general audiences, although the themes presented here in plain, clear writing have special implications for military readers. *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits* represents an important and unique contribution to the crowded field of books on irregular warfare.

LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., USA
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Stone, Peter G., ed. *Cultural Heritage, Ethics and the Military*. Woodbridge, Suffolk, U.K.: Boydell, 2011. 228pp. \$90

When the National Museum of Iraq (originally the Baghdad Archaeological Museum) was damaged and looted in 2003, along with archeological sites across Iraq, international concerns were raised by a wide variety of political, military, and other professional leaders regarding the protection of historical and cultural treasures. Observers around the world were reminded that the consequences of military operations across the spectrum of war are far-reaching and long lasting. So too are the responsibilities of political and military leaders during conflict. Proponents of the just-war tradition have long understood this and have thus shaped ideas regarding the parameters of actions before, during, and after a conflict. But there is

sometimes a failure to appreciate fully the breadth of responsibility. The editor of this collection, Peter Stone, addresses several of the many issues pertaining to protecting and maintaining the cultural heritage within the space of a battle. The work also addresses questions surrounding the tension (and sometimes hostility) between the military and civilian specialists from, for instance, the archeological, anthropological, religious, and medical communities. Drawing from a wide range of Western and non-Western authors, the editor has assembled a useful volume for both military and nonmilitary professionals.

The volume consists of fourteen chapters on various ethical challenges and professional responsibilities of parties involved in the preservation of cultural heritage in war zones. After an introduction, in which the editor (who served as an archeological adviser to the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence in 2003) provides context, there are essays on restitution, World War II, African perspectives on cultural preservation, academia and the military, archeology in war zones, and case studies from Lebanon and Iraq.

Three essays stand out as particularly helpful for gaining perspective: Margaret M. Miles provides a historical overview of the issue of restitution in "Still in the Aftermath of Waterloo: A Brief History of Decisions about Restitution"; "Christian Responsibility and the Preservation of Civilisation in Wartime: George Bell and the Fate of Germany in World War II," by Andrew Chandler, shows the influence of the Anglican bishop of Chichester, who as a member of the House of Lords and vocal cleric was an outspoken critic

of area bombing and the decision to pursue the unconditional surrender of Germany; and Fritz Allhoff's "Physicians at War: Lessons for Archaeologists?" looks at ethical dilemmas of medical professionals with respect to military ethics, medical ethics, and torture in an endeavor to provide insight and parallels for other professions.

Whether one is interested in archeology and cultural preservation in a war zone, the archeology of military and battle sites, the erection of military monuments, or considerations for military planners and those who subsequently execute their plans in combat zones, there is much to consider in this book. The final chapter consists of a series of responses from archeologists to queries concerning relations between them and the military during the war in Iraq. Some of the respondents have had experiences both in Iraq and with the military, and some have not. However, the respondents all have connections with the preservation of cultural heritage, and their comments show that professionals outside the military must also evaluate the ethics of their own disciplines with respect to war. For example, should a member of a community outside the military, such as an archeologist, provide information and advice before a conflict commences, or only later? Though these are not questions for the military professional, military professionals should be aware of them. Stone is to be commended for bringing together in a single volume essays and perspectives on this important issue. Interested readers will not be disappointed.

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Tillman, Barrett. *Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan, 1942–1945*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. 336pp. \$28

Over sixty years after its conclusion, the air war that was waged against Japan remains one of the most controversial and brutal campaigns conducted by any of the Allied powers during World War II. The debate centers on the questions of the morality and necessity of the bombing campaign against Japan, primarily its cities, that culminated in the dropping of two atomic bombs, and whether the campaign hastened the end of the war.

In his richly detailed and well written *Whirlwind*, Barrett Tillman addresses these two arguments and the decision making that led the United States to wage aerial war. He starts by laying the groundwork with the surprise bombing of Tokyo by U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-25s led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle in April 1942, relating how Japan's leaders, shocked at the audacity of the carrier-borne attack on the home islands, moved forward with a complex plan to eliminate the U.S. Pacific Fleet once and for all, thus setting the stage for Japan's strategic loss at the battle of Midway less than two months later.

However, the USAAF and its chief, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, had bigger plans of their own for Japan. Arnold, a disciple and friend of General Billy Mitchell, resolutely believed in the power of strategic bombing to bring about an enemy's surrender. The Royal Air Force and USAAF had thoroughly tested this theory in the skies over