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BOOK REVIEWS

HOW SENIOR LEADERS VIEW THE WORLD

Saunders, Elizabeth N. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2011. 320pp. \$35

In today's political environment, military intervention is frequently debated. These discussions often bring to light interesting points of agreement and perhaps surprising instances of disagreement. In the end, it is with the president that the final decision rests. Elizabeth Saunders explores the rationales that U.S. presidents have used for deciding whether or not to initiate military interventions. Dr. Saunders, a graduate of Yale, now teaching at George Washington University, advances a thesis that the model of intervention depends mainly on a president's formative ways of thinking about foreign policy. While it may seem that these views would follow party lines, Saunders shows that this is not necessarily true. On one hand, the internal approach focuses on how the foreign state is organized and follows the transformative model. In contrast, the external approach looks at states' outward behavior and uses a surgical strike-type model to coerce change in behavior. The author chose to examine Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson for two important reasons. First, among the three a

consensus would be expected based on the prevalent Cold War mentality and context. In fact, these three did not follow in lockstep. The shared case of Vietnam, the second reason for the author's selections, highlights their differences.

Eisenhower was an externally focused president; if states' external policies were successful, he chose largely to ignore internal issues in those same states. A decreased priority on conventional forces translated under Eisenhower to less investment in transformative capabilities. Lebanon was his only overt intervention; Eisenhower did not intervene in Vietnam in 1954 or in Iraq in 1958. In contrast, Kennedy sought to influence states' domestic institutions. His predetermined agenda, based on his congressional career, explains his choice and method of intervention in Vietnam. This theme held true with the murder of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which preceded Kennedy's own assassination by only a few weeks. Johnson, despite his obvious ties to Kennedy, was an externally focused president as regarded foreign affairs. Saunders highlights that while this diverges from his transformative

domestic agenda, it explains Johnson's expansion of the Vietnam War in such a different direction from Kennedy.

The well-researched text concludes by looking beyond Vietnam at how well the pattern holds under different circumstances and time periods, to include the Iraq war. Saunders's framework categorizes presidents as belonging to either of two ideal types. While this may hold from a strictly political science view, it falls short of the reality of history. For this reason, the book will appeal more to political scientists or those seeking model-centric explanations of events. This work should also have strong appeal for strategists and people serving on planning or policy staffs. Understanding how senior leaders view the world is often as significant as factual knowledge of a given situation when providing recommended courses of action.

LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., U.S. ARMY
Naval War College



Marrin, Stephen. *Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice*. New York: Routledge, 2011. 192pp. \$130

A former CIA analyst turned scholar, Stephen Marrin attempts to bridge the gap between intelligence studies as an academic discipline and intelligence as a bureaucratic function. His analysis grounded in the intelligence literature, Marrin provides readers a good overview of such intelligence-studies classics as those of Sherman Kent, Roger Hilsman, and Richards Heuer, along with more contemporary work by Roger George, James Bruce, Richard Betts, and Amy Zegart. Marrin certainly

displays a penchant for the academic that is informed by his former role as an intelligence analyst. He believes "intelligence scholarship can provide knowledge and insight useful for the analytic practitioner; so useful in fact, that it will help improve the quality of the resulting intelligence analysis."

With such a goal, Marrin offers six ways to improve intelligence analysis, but it is unclear how he derives these. Marrin does not draw his conclusions from known cases of highly publicized intelligence assessments. In the case of Iraq, it would have been useful to illustrate why the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research had a better answer on the status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program than the Defense Intelligence Agency. Had Marrin tested his advice against known intelligence failures or drawn from assessments of failed analysis, his advice would be more convincing.

With intelligence increasingly public and used to justify or explain foreign-policy decisions, it seems one more piece of advice Marrin could offer is how to incorporate public discussions or open sources into analysis. Fortunately or not, the intelligence community does not have a monopoly on the "facts," so discussing the ways in which analysts can more readily connect with scholars and the private sector would be useful.

To be fair, the book is focused on intelligence analysis, but it seems to ignore how, why, and where facts are collected. In an era when both scholars and private citizens have access to information, it is important that Marrin address the epistemological underpinnings of what is being analyzed. There is a logical and important

relationship between collection and analysis that is in need of further study.

In spite of the book's shortcomings, Marrin offers readers a look at what a junior CIA analyst does and offers a sketch of how to move beyond the "generalized intuition" that often afflicts intelligence analysis. His discussion of improving intelligence analysis through empathy is interesting and has implications for personnel recruiting. In fact, this slim volume should be valued by human-resources departments and senior managers as they prepare for the next reorganizations of their agencies.

DEREK REVERON
Naval War College



Rickards, James. *Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis*. New York: Penguin Group, 2011. 304pp. \$26.95

Is the United States now engaged in a currency war? Are we involved in an international competition of currency devaluation that will impact America in seldom-studied ways that are critical to its defense? James Rickards suggests that we are, and that today's currency war could be as devastating to national security as any kinetic war.

James Rickards is a counselor, investment banker, and risk manager with over thirty years of experience in capital markets. He advises the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and major hedge funds on global finance. He served as a facilitator for the first-ever financial war games conducted by the Pentagon.

Rickards argues that currency conflicts should and must interest our

military leaders. Such conflicts can and should be prepared for, because the cheap-dollar policies of both the present and immediate past administrations portend a dollar crisis. Rickards argues that policy makers have lost the enormous national-security advantages that dollar hegemony affords, by adopting weak-dollar policies.

In part 1 Rickards discusses Pentagon-sponsored "war" gaming in 2009, using rules of engagement (ROE) in which the only "weapons" allowed were currencies, stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Because the specific ROE were unrealistic, however, the results were inconclusive, although useful for future simulations. Then, in part 2, the author delves into historical accounts of what he calls "Currency War I" (1921–36) and "Currency War II" (1967–87). Rickards argues that we have now entered "Currency War III," the three primary combatants being the United States, China, and Europe. He argues that there are four possible outcomes of Currency War III: a move to multiple reserve currencies, with the dollar playing a much smaller role; an International Monetary Fund-controlled world money, called "Special Drawing Rights"; a return to the gold standard, at a substantially higher gold price (the prospect endorsed by Rickards); and chaos. This last possibility and the associated dollar collapse appears most likely to the author.

It is unfortunate that Rickards did not include any reference to Edward S. Miller's *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor* (Naval Institute Press, 2007), written by a skilled financial analyst who discusses in great detail how the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration used dollar hegemony to block Japan

from world financial markets. One could argue that Currency War I culminated on 25 July 1941 with Executive Order 8832, which froze Japanese financial assets. Dollar hegemony was an essential national-security tool used to deprive Japan of the resources needed to wage war. Miller's work is a useful illustration of the utility of a strong dollar.

In summary, Rickards provides an excellent account of the currency wars. He provides information that should be at the fingertips of every national security planner.

EDWARD FULLER, *Incline Village, Nevada*, and
ROBERT C. WHITTEN, *Cupertino, California*



Leffler, Melvyn P., and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds. *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2011. 243pp. \$19.95

This collection of ten essays focuses on the American government's foreign policy through three administrations after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, and also after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Editors Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro examine these events from the perspectives of both the policy makers who were active in Presidents George H. W. Bush's, Bill Clinton's, and George W. Bush's administrations and scholars who have analyzed the government's actions. Government response to these events provides strong examples of how the United States reacts in times of uncertainty. The editors chose the Berlin Wall and 9/11 because both events impacted the global order to an extent requiring a complete reexamination of the nation's foreign policy.

The chapters written by scholars provide excellent background, discussing the situations before, during, and after the events. However, the chapters written by government officials involved in policy decisions greatly enhance and increase the success of this work. The collaborators from these administrations have yet to publish their individual memoirs, making their perspectives not only unique but refreshing.

In his essay, "Shaping the Future: Planning at the Pentagon, 1989–1993," Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during George H. W. Bush's administration and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense during George W. Bush's administration, discusses how defense decisions made at the end of the Cold War influenced decisions after 9/11. His analysis of the similarities between strategic decisions made in 1989 and 2001, as well as of the impact that the 1989 decisions had on 2001 strategy plans, is one of the most interesting parts of this book. Eric Edelman also does this especially well in his "The Strange Career of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance," in which he compares the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance to 2002's National Security Strategy. He served George W. Bush as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs.

John Mueller, who holds the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center, takes an approach different from those of his fellow collaborators in "Questing for Monsters to Destroy." He adds 2 September 1945, the end of World War II, and the Korean invasion by the North Koreans on 25 June 1950 as

equally important events for American foreign policy in times of uncertainty.

One of the major considerations for both policy makers and scholars is the impact these events had on the military. Whether to increase or decrease the active forces was a complicated issue that caused disagreement among government officials in both 1989 and 2001. Readers of this journal will find particularly interesting the varying opinions regarding the military, especially in light of currently anticipated force restructurings and budgetary constraints.

While each chapter can be read on its own, an author sometimes refers to another chapter, establishing a continuity that may be lost or underappreciated otherwise. This is especially true for essays written by policy makers. The editors are to be congratulated on a timely and helpful volume that not only studies American foreign policy in the recent times of uncertainty but provides food for thought for the uncertainty of now.

NORAH SCHNEIDER
Salve Regina University



Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*. 2nd ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2010. 360pp. \$30

In some ways, publishing a book that purports to capture contemporary African political trends, particularly involving the “progress of democracy,” faces the same basic problem as do books attempting to explain state-of-the-art computers. Both information streams are now flowing so quickly that the truth you write about today may be very different from that of tomorrow. In

fact, the African scholar has even harder going than his information-systems contemporary, because unlike computer technology, the course of democracy in Africa frequently changes direction and from time to time even reverses itself.

The editors of *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat* are, as the title indicates, well aware of this challenge. This is not surprising. This volume is part of the International Forum for Democratic Studies’ Journal of Democracy book series, and both Diamond and Plattner have edited numerous volumes.

The book is well written, well researched, and well organized. The reader is first treated to a selection of seven readings, all looking at themes involving “progress and retreat.” The remainder of the book is divided into three sections, covering West Africa, East Africa, and southern and central Africa. Given the events in North Africa, the lack of coverage along Africa’s Mediterranean shore is regrettable and underscores the point about “lag time.”

In general, the first section of the book is thought provoking and arguably the most useful. The topics are broad, and their panoramic view allows the authors to chart the many directions of emerging trends. For example, John Clark of Florida International University argues that the military coup as an instrument of regime change is in decline. While certain events indicate that the end of the African military coup is nowhere near in sight, in the main it seems that Clark is correct.

Despite the editors’ best efforts, shelf life remains a problem. Although updated for this new edition with new information, many of the book’s chapters were written far enough in the past that the

situation itself is out-of-date. Despite the book's 2010 publication date, twenty-one of the twenty-four essays here were originally published between 2007 and 2009. Not all these essays are "expired," Clark's being a case in point. However, the careful reader is forced to spend far too much time checking other sources to learn the actual current "state of play." In some cases, however, such as Côte d'Ivoire, the changes from the time of initial publication to the present is extreme. In others, such as Zimbabwe, current events have not called the author's findings into question.

In the end, despite powerful writing, careful scholarship, and the best of intentions, *Democratization in Africa* is too much of a "fly in amber." Teachers, students, and lay readers alike would be better advised simply to subscribe to the *Journal of Democracy*. For a slightly higher cost they would reap much greater gain.

RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College



Cohen, Eliot A. *Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*. New York: Free Press, 2011. 405pp. \$30

The American way of war—a product of two centuries of war with . . . Canada? How can that be? Civil War history and the experience and history of World War II have driven out of our minds a truth known to James Fenimore Cooper, Francis Parkman, and Kenneth Roberts. The American colonies, thereafter the United States, fought battle after battle with France, Britain, and Canada throughout most

of the seventeenth century and until the early nineteenth century. The place of these battles was then called the Great Warpath, stretching from Albany to Montreal and Quebec.

American readers who pick up Eliot Cohen's *Conquered into Liberty* will most likely be embarrassed by learning how much they do not know (or only vaguely remember) about American war fighting in the colonial and early national periods. However, by the time the first chapter, about the Schenectady raid of 1690, is finished, American readers will feel embraced, as though part of their American selves has been returned. Non-Americans will be surprised at first, and by the end of the book astonished.

Cohen teaches strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and he was a senior adviser to the secretary of state on strategic issues from 2007 to 2009. This book is a military history, as good a one as might ever be done. As a historian, Cohen's strongest suit is that he treats war as it is made by political and military leaders, by the regulars (and irregulars and Native Americans), and by "leaders and managers who got things done." By the last he means those (mostly citizen-soldiers) who improvised in combat and managed to supply forces under nearly impossible conditions. His insights regarding these sorts of men make up a large part of his understanding of what the "American way of war" is about. Cohen quotes Germany's Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to affirm that what was an eighteenth-century American quality has endured—the American speed of adaptation to armored warfare, Rommel wrote, is explained "by their extraordinary sense for the practical and the material and

by their complete lack of regard for tradition and worthless theories.”

American wars along the Great War-path, Cohen reminds us, were parts of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean more linked us to Europe than it insulated us from it. Moreover, these wars exposed us to a full range of seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century European warfare, from set-piece battles to what could be called unconventional and secret warfare. They also brought the full horror of war to us. Cohen explodes the contemporary European notion that the United States did not become “the territory of war” or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed, terror in the form of murderous raids on New York and New England villages marked much of its colonial period.

Among many other things, Cohen argues that the American appetite for the kind of unconditional surrender pursued by Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had its grounding in the eighteenth-century American intention to destroy the enemy polity that was Canada. More than that, America’s wars to attach Canada to itself were wars for the freedom of that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’ as the Continental Congress had written to the doubtful *habitants* of Canada in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and Japan, occupied and transformed by armies that combined, in paradoxical degree, thoroughness in defeating an enemy and an unlimited, even naïve, commitment to liberating him.”

Cohen’s book is an astonishingly good read in addition to being highly thoughtful and often revelatory.

KEN JENSEN
McLean, Virginia



Matzke, Rebecca Berens. *Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy under Pax Britannica*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2011. 320pp. \$45

Historians have long argued about the true mechanism behind a ninety-year period of relative peace in Europe, a period that began with the end of the Napoleonic wars and became known as the *Pax Britannica*. Over the years critics have questioned both aspects of this term—whether the period was actually as peaceful as its title suggests and whether that peace really was, in large part, due to Great Britain’s overwhelming and imposing commercial, industrial, financial, and naval might. Through a searching analysis of political decision making during three different crises within an eight-year period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a developed and published version of the author’s Cornell University dissertation, seeks to add weight to the notion that Britain did indeed use the strength and versatility of the Royal Navy as an effective deterrent force during this time.

The author explains that on three separate occasions between 1838 and 1846 (Canadian trade and border disputes with the United States, 1838–42; the Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first Opium War of 1839–42), British politicians, in particular Lord Palmerston, were not afraid to threaten the use of, or to use, naval power to further discrete British interests on the world stage and to coerce and influence the activities of their main rivals in Europe. In each case, while the immediate aim was obviously to benefit British regional activities, each was undertaken with an eye to preserving the broader peace

and stability of the international order as a whole. In other words, Britain's defensive "status quo" policy was implemented by operationally offensive threats or means. Furthermore, Matzke clearly shows that the British politicians well understood that if they failed to respond to some of these lesser challenges (the Chinese opium war being a prime example), over time they risked weakening their ability to influence their major adversaries in the future, in situations where the stakes might be higher.

During the course of her analysis, Matzke takes issue with established scholarship holding that the relative inactivity of the Royal Navy during this period was indicative of its comparative weakness within Europe as a whole. On the contrary, she depicts an early Victorian navy that was well up to the task, possessing shipbuilding, logistics, and manpower support superior to that of any competitor. It was this depth of capability that represented its major coercive value, particularly to the European rivals, often allowing what she terms demonstrations of Thomas Schelling's "skillful nonuse of military force." Moreover, the British instinctively knew all this, giving them great confidence in their brinkmanship with rivals. The case of the successful coercion of France in the Egyptian/Syrian crisis is a notable example.

Matzke's work is meticulously researched, using a wide array of contemporary archival material that focuses on the collected thoughts and writings of the main players involved, material taken from their personal papers, letters, and diaries. The weakness in her work lies in the admittedly implicit assumption that this short period can

be taken as truly illustrative of the situation throughout the whole of the *Pax Britannica*. Arguably, Matzke has found a narrow historical period where thesis and facts align, but she is less convincing over the broader time frame, and more work would likely be necessary to settle this point decisively. Less important, but nonetheless still of concern, is her rather rosy picture of the reliability of the steamships of the day. As John Beeler has forcefully demonstrated, truly globally deployable, oceangoing steamers would have to wait until the late 1880s to be realized; their limitations until then, in terms of maintenance requirements and support while deployed, facts of which navies were only too well aware, do not come across well. That said, this is an important work that successfully advances the study of British naval policy into an earlier period. When taken together with the more established scholarship of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, it moves us closer to a more complete understanding of British efforts to wield naval power in support of a global free-trading system. As such, it has timeless relevance.

ANGUS K. ROSS
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Kleinen, John, and Manon Osseweijer, eds. *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press and International Institute for Asian Studies, 2010. 312pp. \$74

Liss, Carolin. *Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh*. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press and International Institute for Asian Studies, 2011. 446pp. \$82.35

These two books from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Press share one single characteristic—a long delay between authorship and publication. This has no appreciable effect on Kleinen and Osseweijer's edited collection, based on a 2005 conference, but it ill serves Carolin Liss.

She evidently completed her book in 2006. Since then, however, various maritime-security initiatives in the region whose births she observed, including the various Malacca Strait patrols and the ReCAAP information exchange, have matured. It would have been interesting to have her views on the decline in major incidents that gathered pace starting in 2005—as to the degree to which they contributed to this decline, and what caused the recent modest uptick in numbers.

This is a disappointing shortcoming, because her survey up to 2006 adds much useful detail to what are now a number of well-established themes. Her contributions are particularly welcome in two areas, first on small-scale piracy. There she advances a persuasive argument that the general and substantial increase in fishing-boat numbers and the use of more sophisticated search equipment beginning in the 1950s (which resulted in widespread overfishing) and, within that overall picture, the malign effects of large and sophisticated foreign ships operating illegally contributed, possibly significantly, to the rise of piracy everywhere from the Philippines to Bangladesh. Also welcome is her critical examination of the political, practical, and moral effects of substituting private security companies for government-provided security. Among several observations none is more germane than that private security would be unnecessary

if governments had more interest in protecting maritime trade and made a better job of it when they try. This point has relevance to the waters off Somalia as well. If Liss misses anything, it is that governments prior to the modern naval era expected individual ships to look after themselves and that the return of piracy at the end of the twentieth century is producing an edging back toward a similar expectation.

Kleinen and Osseweijer's book is the fourth in a series from ISEAS that has focused primarily on modern piracy in Southeast Asia. In contrast to its predecessors, half the book is devoted to historical cases. It contains a number of noteworthy contributions to the literature on piracy studies, ranging from an excellent chapter by one of the editors, John Kleinen (on the inapplicability of Eric Hobsbawm's radical and romantic thesis that bandits could be Robin Hoods), to the historical experience of piracy in Asia. Robert Antony's detailed study of the frontier town of Giang Binh adds to our knowledge of the late-eighteenth-century southern Chinese "water world," which was first explored by Dian Murray.

The majority of the essays, however, concentrate on waters between the southern Philippines and Borneo, centered on the Sulu Archipelago. James Warren adds to his indispensable work on the Sulu Zone with a chapter on the workings of the Sulu slave market between 1800 and 1850. Esther Velthoen examines Dutch attempts to tame coastal raiding up until 1905, efforts that have some remarkable similarities to Roman attempts to curb Cilician piracy. Stefan Amirell describes the region between 1959 and 1963, when Britain was left as the sole colonial

power, struggling to contain an upsurge of piracy following the withdrawal of the Americans from the Philippines and the Dutch from Indonesia. Two complementary studies of the contemporary situation, one by Carolin Liss, from the perspective of Sabah,

and the second by Ikuya Tokoro, from the perspective of Sulu, complete this examination of a region where piracy was, and to an extent remains, a way of life for marginalized communities.

MARTIN N. MURPHY
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