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## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS: THE NEAR-NORMAL STATE FOR THE NAVY STAFF

Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz. *Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009)*. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, January 2010. 118pp. Available at [www.dtic.mil](http://www.dtic.mil).

For any institution adapting to change, the dreaded “R-word” (reorganization) has come to represent an often disruptive, albeit necessary, transition. But as the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) authors Peter Swartz and Michael Markowitz clearly highlight, reorganization has been the near-normal state for the Navy Staff (OPNAV) over the past several decades. Conducted under the sponsorship of the Naval History and Heritage Command, this CNA report effectively tracks the numerous changes in the organization of OPNAV in response to changes both in Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) and in the strategic and budgetary environments since 1970.

As experienced CNA researchers, Swartz and Markowitz have applied their knowledge and experience in analysis, policy, and history to assemble a highly accurate and credible compendium of the mechanics of change in OPNAV over a forty-year span. Swartz has special insight here. As a former Navy captain, he served on the OPNAV staff during part of the period covered

by this report and is currently CNA’s adviser to the Strategy and Policy Division (N51), giving him both an outsider’s and insider’s view of the process and personalities.

The study focuses on answering three principal questions: What have been the significant changes to the OPNAV staff, why were these changes made, and what observations and conclusions can be drawn from these changes? Swartz and Markowitz admit that the emphasis of the study was in the “data-gathering task” embodied in the first question. Also, some readers may find the “PowerPoint with heavy notation” format of the study off-putting. However, this format lends itself to understanding the complex structures, timelines, and machinations of the reorganization efforts of each successive CNO from the 1970s onward.

The taxonomy used by Swartz and Markowitz in presenting and categorizing the myriad changes in the OPNAV staff structure provides a highly understandable and ordered review of the complicated and sometimes confusing

organizational adaptations. Especially useful are the four “context” tables, one for each decade starting with the 1970s, that list by year who was presiding as CNO, along with the relevant Navy capstone documents, the Navy’s “total [that is, financial] obligation authority,” total number of ships in the fleet, new ships arriving in the fleet, active personnel, and new capabilities introduced. Juxtaposed against the numerous organizational charts in the report, these context tables help in understanding how each CNO has reorganized, not only responding to the variety of exogenous forces but also to implement his own vision for the future of the Navy. By recounting in detail the reorganization that the current CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, has made to the staff, readers can see for themselves the most consequential changes enacted and, by extension, the most consequential issues facing the Navy today, in Roughead’s view.

Swartz and Markowitz identify two major changes made by Admiral Roughead. First is the consolidation of the Intelligence (N2) and the Communications Networks (N6) directorates into a newly created Directorate for Information Dominance (N2/6), a move that underscores the critical importance of a holistic approach to communications and intelligence, including the emerging preeminence of cyber and electronic warfare. The future impact of this consolidation could be quite large, given the issues at stake.

Second, equally as revealing has been the morphing of the staff’s internal think tank, “Deep Blue,” into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) cell to meet the challenges of the recent QDR, and finally into the Naval Warfare

Integration Group (00X), in late 2009. One function of 00X will be, acting as a “special assistants” group, to provide the CNO with direct assessments of Navy programs and systems. Plainly, this CNO sees a critical need to be armed with as much information and analysis as possible to address the tremendous budgetary pressures affecting the Navy, which pose a special challenge to the future health of the naval force, a challenge requiring particular attention and focus.

Where the study itself is admittedly thin is in its narratives—which might have been richer—of the colorful personalities, nuanced forces, and institutional rivalries that sculpted the shape of the OPNAV staff during a very dynamic period. Those wanting an Allisonian-like examination of the organizational, political, and personal dynamics shaping this change will have to wait for what Swartz and Markowitz recommend as next steps: an expansion of the study to personalities, relationships, and in-depth answers to the “why” question. Until then, scholars of U.S. Navy history and organizational studies can be content with this well researched, accurate, and informative report.

THOMAS CULORA, *Chairman, Warfare Analysis and Research Department*  
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Drezner, Daniel W., ed. *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009. 230pp. \$24.95

Students of American national security policy, particularly those without the benefit of firsthand policy-making

experience, frequently under- or over-estimate the difficulty of formulating and implementing strategy in the U.S. government. As a result, observers tend either to portray senior policy makers as dolts or incompetents or to engage in a sort of strategic nihilism holding that it is impossible to develop sound strategy in this day and age.

Daniel Drezner's informative collection *Avoiding Trivia* deserves to be read by scholars of both varieties. It contains essays that were commissioned for a 2008 conference held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the State Department's policy planning office, an organization best known for its first director, George Kennan, and his successor, Paul H. Nitze. The contributors are largely scholar-practitioners, including several of my own counterparts during my service as deputy assistant secretary of defense during the George W. Bush administration.

The first section of the book includes contributions by Richard Haass, David Gordon and Daniel Twining, and Jeffrey Legro, who discuss the strategic environment and the challenges it poses for policy planning in the United States.

Bruce Jentleson, Aaron Friedberg, and Peter Feaver and William Inboden are found in the second section, discussing how strategic planning can best be implemented in the executive branch. The latter chapter, describing the resurrection of the strategic planning function at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration, is particularly insightful.

Essays by Amy Zegart, Thomas Wright, Andrew Erdmann, and Steven Krasner

cover the opportunities and limitations for strategic planning in the final section.

This work collectively emphasizes the imperative of strategic planning as well as why it is an art whose practice is difficult. It deserves the attention of scholars and practitioners alike.

THOMAS G. MAHNKEN  
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Nielson, Suzanne C., and Don M. Snider, eds. *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2009. 409pp. \$34.95

Samuel J. Huntington published his seminal work on American civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, in 1957. His analysis, reflective of the U.S. experience in World War II, Korea, and the Cold War, was designed to "maximize military security at the least sacrifice to other social values." It has provided a theoretical and practical guide to civil-military relations for more than fifty years. However, in this "new era" of the first decade of the twenty-first century, many have challenged the continued relevance of Huntington's theories.

In 2007, editors Suzanne Nielson and Don Snider assembled an impressive interdisciplinary group of scholars to analyze Huntington's theories in light of the American experience since 1957. Fifteen researchers produced a dozen essays addressing Huntington's main theoretical contributions: the functional and societal imperatives that shape the nature of the military organization, the subjective and objective patterns of civilian control of the military,

and the development of the military officer corps as a profession. The book serves as a dialogue on those theories and produces often-diverging viewpoints about Huntington's ideas and the condition of the American civil-military relationship.

Regarding Huntington's "The Crisis of American Civil-Military Relations," the book begins with the current state of civil-military relations. Richard D. Betts suggests that while tension may exist between the military and its civilian leadership, it is not unusual, given the realities of our democratic system. This is so because "objective control," although not of a pure form, has kept the military obedient to various administrations. Matthew Moten discusses Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's leadership of the Department of Defense, characterizing it as a period of "broken dialogue" marked by "distrust within the Pentagon and throughout the defense establishment." General Eric Shinseki, retired Army chief of staff, serves as a model for the military response to such strong civilian leadership, providing forceful military advice in private, while publicly supporting political superiors.

The assembled authors agree that military officers should avoid political involvement. When military and civilian leaders disagree on security policy, several authors state, resignation is not an option for the military officer, since it is an inherently political act. Yet James Burk comments that military officers are also morally autonomous and accountable for their actions, not "purely instrumental" agents of the state. Discussing Huntington's assertion that the "military mind" should reflect a conservative outlook in support of American institutions, Darrell Driver cites research

suggesting that no such unifying conservative ideology exists. Yet a number of authors comment on the overwhelming Republican Party affiliation of military personnel. Other authors discuss improvement of professional military education, expansion of military missions to include stability operations, "Madisonian" approach to national security and civilian control, and the responsibility of military professionals to build trust with civilian leaders of inconsistent military expertise.

In the final chapter, Nielson and Snider advance nine conclusions resulting from their research (however, not all contributors are in agreement). The last is probably the most instructive, that Huntington's work provides "continuing value" to the discussion regarding American civil-military relations. This book is best regarded as a commentary on Huntington's 1957 work, one that also provides a good review of the current scholarship on American civil-military relations theory and experience. However, keep a copy of Huntington nearby as you read it.

DAYNE NIX  
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Asmus, Ronald D. *A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 272pp. \$27

In August 2008, Russia shattered the post-Cold War peace in Europe by invading the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Though only days long, that war dashed NATO's hopes to expand to the Caucasus and sparked fundamental reevaluations of American and European Union (EU) relations with Russia.

Ronald Asmus's *A Little War That Shook the World* is an engaging read that combines the best available history of the war with a broader analysis of the geopolitical forces that led to it.

Asmus is well positioned to write this book. He was a senior Clinton official dealing with NATO enlargement, and since 2001 he has been a senior researcher at the German Marshall Fund. Asmus has wide access to U.S. and EU officials, and although uncommonly well connected in Georgia, he is not a supporter of President Mikheil Saakashvili. While Russian sources were not forthcoming, overall this is a very well documented account.

The book offers a blow-by-blow account of prewar diplomacy and the conduct of the war, with lively portraits of key personalities. Asmus also puts the war in the context of post-Cold War Europe, arguing that the war was about much more than Georgia. Striking at Tbilisi sent a message to Washington and Brussels. It culminated Russia's decadelong frustration with an international order it believed to be fundamentally against it. From a Western perspective, former Warsaw Pact nations had been freely choosing to associate with NATO and the EU, in an environment where force and "spheres of influence" were passé. Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, saw instead encroachment and a running roughshod over Russian concerns (as when NATO ignored Russia on Kosovo). NATO's halfhearted moves toward admitting Georgia and Ukraine in early 2008 offered Putin a window to act. Georgia's "frozen" separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provided a pretext that was aided by the

rashness of Saakashvili and the dithering of the Europeans.

Asmus sheds light on important questions like whether the United States gave the "green light" to Tbilisi to escalate (Asmus convincingly argues it did not) and whether Russia's invasion was preplanned or opportunistic (Asmus believes it was preplanned). Ironically, Georgia's preparations for NATO membership hurt its military capability: when war started, 40 percent of its army was in Iraq or preparing to leave. According to NATO doctrine, Georgia had trained and equipped for peace-keeping operations, not territorial defense.

Asmus suggests that more adroit NATO diplomacy would have averted the war. He lays out a clear and compelling case, but given Russia's demonstrated willingness to incur costs, the claim is not fully convincing. Even President George W. Bush was far less willing to risk a U.S.-Russian conflict than were the Europeans. The disparities of interest, risk tolerance, and geography made the Western goal of a Georgia in NATO very difficult without a fight, but Asmus is correct that the United States and the EU could have better played their hands.

What emerges is a larger story of American overstretch and a failure to balance ends and means. The United States simultaneously wanted to have its way in the Balkans and the Caucasus; to obtain Russian support for Iranian sanctions, Afghan logistics, and counterterrorism; and to enjoy active EU support for all that, even as U.S. policies were highly unpopular among EU voters. Washington did not credibly back its Georgia policy militarily or politically, nor would it choose between competing

goals. Asmus thinks more skill and resolution might have carried this through, but one wonders whether the bigger lesson isn't really about the finite nature of national power.

DAVID T. BURBACH  
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Cronin, Audrey Kurth. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2010. 311pp. \$29.95

Audrey Kurth Cronin's engaging and enlightening book examines how terrorist movements come to an end, focusing almost exclusively on terrorist organizations over the last half-century. She offers six pathways by which terrorist groups end: decapitation, negotiation, success, failure, repression, and reorientation.

One of the book's strengths is that it captures the full spectrum of possible outcomes for terrorist organizations and explains why particular campaigns did or did not end. The organization of the book is laudable—by looking in each chapter at tactics and strategies for ending terrorism, rather than simply marching through case studies, one is able to examine more soberly specific strategic approaches to counterterrorism and their effects. In this regard, this book will be very useful for policy makers and counterterrorism practitioners.

Cronin is cautious in making causal claims. For example, in her chapter on decapitation she recognizes that killing the leaders of terrorist organizations has sometimes contributed to the

eventual end of the organization (Sendero Luminoso, for example) but in other cases has not (Hamas). Though she does offer insights into the different outcomes, she tempers her conclusions by emphasizing that the act of decapitation provides "critical insight into the depth and nature of a group's popular support." In effect, one cannot know in advance.

The final chapter, "How Al-Qaeda Ends," attempts to apply some of these lessons. Cronin convincingly argues that decapitation will not end al-Qa'ida. Beliefs that decapitation will have a dramatic impact on that organization are "tinged with emotion, not dispassionate analysis." Killing Bin Laden, Cronin argues, might "actually enhance his stature, in practical terms."

Although Cronin firmly states that all terrorist groups end, this reviewer read the final chapter wondering whether there are numerous aspects of al-Qa'ida (all of which Cronin notes in some capacity) that make it a candidate for some form of irrelevant perpetuity among terrorist organizations. It is transnational in influence like no other group in Cronin's study. In 2001, al-Qa'ida struck an unprecedented blow against the sole global superpower. Cronin asserts that the group's message will have staying power for some people as a call for resistance that will endure for many years, no matter what Bin Laden's fate. This may be an unprecedented recipe for unusual longevity.

A combination of increased counterterrorism measures, a military offensive in Afghanistan, and al-Qa'ida's own underrecognized organizational and operational deficiencies have rendered the group unable to execute a successful

attack in the United States since 9/11. There is good reason to expect that 9/11 will prove to have been the apex of al-Qa'ida's operational effectiveness. But a final ending for the group's following may be generations away, when the memories of both 9/11 and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.

ANDREW L. STIGLER  
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Brown, J. D., *Carrier Operations in World War II*. Edited by David Hobbs. Vol. 3. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 320pp. \$72.95

Developed by J. D. Brown over many years as the third volume of a trilogy, *Carrier Operations in World War II* is an exhaustively researched history, with the finest collection of aircraft and carrier photographs one can possibly imagine. Brown was an aviation observer for twelve years in the Royal Navy, a historian, and ultimately head of the Royal Navy Historical Branch. This work combines material from two earlier studies as well as new data.

At Brown's untimely death in 2001, his close friend David Hobbs, curator of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton Air Base—himself a pilot in the Royal Navy for thirty-three years—took up the torch and completed the third volume. In doing so he produced a highly detailed narrative of carrier operations for every major theater of the Second World War, as well as the detailing of special carrier forces created for particular operations. Jumping directly to operations, without any preliminary explanation, Hobbs presents Brown's meticulous documentation of carrier

operations in a readable and highly narrative account.

Brown and Hobbs both have impeccable credentials for writing this book. Without question the material amassed by Brown represents a single-source gold mine for scholars and buffs alike. Unfortunately, though, there is not a single footnote in the entire volume. Thus what could have been a valuable scholarly work, replete with traceable linkage to original sources, is transformed into simply a detailed narrative. Yet it is well worth its price for the photographs alone.

The first half focuses almost exclusively on British carrier operations, moving from the Atlantic and Arctic oceans to the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, the Indian Ocean, and ultimately to the Pacific Ocean in the latter stages of the war. The remainder of the book focuses primarily on American and Japanese carrier actions from Pearl Harbor through preparations for Operation OLYMPIC and the projected 1 November 1945 invasion of Kyushu in the Pacific.

The volume includes an accurate listing of aircraft carriers and other ships, their embarked squadrons, the types and numbers of aircraft they flew, and the locations involved. Where appropriate, there are vignettes of ships' personnel, pilots, and aircrew. The photographs included throughout—many of which are from Brown's private collection and never before published—give an incredible insight into the aircraft and the carriers from which they flew as technology progressed throughout the war. *Carrier Operations in World War II* is an especially useful companion to other volumes considering specific naval battles or aspects of the war at sea.

With Hobbs's expert help, Brown's intended purpose of offering a clear picture of every carrier and air action of World War II has been achieved.

DOUGLAS SMITH  
*Naval War College*



Blake, John. *The Sea Chart: An Illustrated History of Nautical Maps and Navigational Charts*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2009. 160pp. \$39.95

Only on occasion will an author and publisher produce a work of remarkable beauty and excellence. John Blake's illustrated history of nautical maps and navigational charts, now available in paperback, is one such delight.

Commander Blake is a former Royal Navy officer and a fellow of the Royal Institute of Navigation. He not only knows what sea charts are about but has had privileged access to the treasure trove of British charting housed in the Hydrographic Office, which in journalistic terms is a veritable scoop.

Blake relates the development of the sea chart from the days when manuscripts were drawn on sheep skins, such as the portolan charts that survived from the thirteenth century, through the maritime ascendancy of the Spanish and Portuguese, then the Dutch, French, and British through the eighteenth century, when the discovery and charting of the coasts and the oceans of the globe had become a strategic naval and commercial requirement, to the modern Admiralty charts of today.

In doing so Blake brings together an outstanding collection of charts, some never before reproduced, culled from British, Spanish, French, Netherlands,

and American origins, with a look also at Chinese, Japanese, and Indian charts. Other sources include some of the most important maritime archives of the world, including the Library of Congress and the Hispanic Society of America in the United States, as well as the National Maritime Museum, Admiralty Library, and Hydrographic Office. The quality of reproduction is outstanding.

The foreword by HRH the Duke of York leads in to the opening chapters, which look at how navigation and navigational tools (including the development of the chronometer to allow determination of longitude at sea), celestial navigation, and surveying developed. Other chapters look at the chart as the key to exploration geographically through each theater of the globe, then chronologically within each chapter. There is also a multiplicity of significant and interesting historical charts and maritime documents, such as the personal tide tables of Sir Francis Drake, the taking of a slave-trade ship off Africa, and charts of the early-twentieth-century Antarctic explorers such as Captain Robert Scott and Ernest Shackleton.

Unusual historical insights are included as stand-alone vignettes, such as how the immense curiosity of Benjamin Franklin, both on his first transatlantic crossing from London to Philadelphia in 1726, and as deputy postmaster general for the American colonies in the 1760s, caused him to investigate the disparity between east-west and west-east crossing times. His understanding of the Gulf Stream led to his Atlantic charts that showed how best to exploit it and so speeded the mail between Europe and the Americas.

A comprehensive bibliography curiously omits any reference to the British Library in London, which holds the second-largest collection of manuscript sea charts in the world.

*The Sea Chart's* appeal is to a wider readership than just mariners, leisured or professional. It is a must for all whose interest is in grasping how Earth's continents and oceans were charted and our world was shaped.

LAWRENCE PHILLIPS

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Norton, Louis Arthur. *Captains Contentious: The Dysfunctional Sons of the Brine*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2009. 185pp. \$29.95

"Honor," as Douglass Adair explains in *Fame and Founding Fathers* (1974), "is an ethic of competition, of struggle for eminence and distinction." "In a particular culture," he writes, "a sense of honor—a sense of due self-esteem, of proper pride, of dignity appropriate to his station—acts like conscience for a practicing Christian." Adair argues that "the lust for the psychic reward of fame, honor, and glory, after 1776 becomes a key ingredient in the behavior of Washington and his greatest contemporaries." Gregory D. Massey observes in *John Laurens and the American Revolutions* (2000), "Like his fellow officers, [Continental Army colonel John] Laurens valued his honor or reputation above all else. Honor, more than anything, defined a man." What Christopher McKee says about the U.S. Navy officer corps of 1794–1815 in *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creations of the U.S. Naval Officer*

*Corps, 1794–1815* (1991) applies equally well to naval officers of the Revolution: "Unless this search for fame . . . is recognized as a primary element in the ethical air breathed by the naval officers . . . , a true understanding of that corps is . . . impossible."

Lacking this essential understanding of the place of honor in the value system of the late eighteenth century, Louis Arthur Norton, professor emeritus at the University of Connecticut and author of several works on nautical themes, has built a wrongheaded argument about the character of the Continental navy officer corps.

Norton's title encapsulates his thesis—that captains of the fledgling American navy were excessively concerned with their honor, making them unusually contentious, which in turn impeded their effectiveness and harmed the Continental navy. Norton believes these captains' preoccupation with personal honor and rank was indicative of dysfunctional personalities dominated by narcissism, ambition, obsession with order, and aggression, rather than indicative of the shared values of their time, the same values that motivated Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison.

The heart of *Captains Contentious* comprises five chapters, devoted respectively to the Continental navy careers of John Manley, Silas Talbot, Dudley Saltonstall, Joshua Barney, and John Paul Jones. The choice of these five is somewhat arbitrary, for one—Talbot never even held a Continental navy command. None of these biographies makes a convincing case that these men were more contentious or touchy about rank than their contemporaries in other armed services. Anyone familiar with

interpersonal conflicts within the Royal Navy of the era must dismiss Norton's assertion that the British naval officers were less contentious than their American counterparts. Nor does Norton demonstrate that the strong personalities of the officers he studies harmed the effectiveness of the naval service. This book has an extensive bibliography, but a single example will illustrate the sloppy use of those sources. Norton states on page 2 that common sailors who continued seagoing into middle

age often retired ashore as broken men, whereas the source he cites in fact refutes that notion.

*Captains Contentious* is not what it purports to be—a useful study of the connections between leadership and personality. Instead, setting aside its wrongheaded thesis, it is a collection of five unconnected brief biographies in the tradition of “lives of distinguished naval officers.”

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