

2011

## Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

Lee Corder

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Corder, Lee (2011) "Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 64 : No. 4 , Article 7.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/7>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

## PROGRESSING MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

---

*Lee Cordner*

**T**he theme of the second Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), hosted in Abu Dhabi by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Navy on 10–12 May 2010, was “Together for the Reinforcement of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean.”<sup>1</sup> Navy chiefs of service and senior maritime security officers or their representatives from thirty of the thirty-two Indian Ocean region (IOR) navies and maritime security forces gathered for this significant event. Participants from the diverse Indian Ocean littoral came from the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia.<sup>2</sup> Pakistan, which had declined an invitation to attend the first IONS meeting, in New Delhi in 2008, was represented by the local air attaché. In addition, extraregional maritime force participants included the U.S. Navy, represented by Commander, Naval Forces,

*Lee Cordner is a strategic analyst who worked as a Principal Research Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia, and was formerly CEO of Future Directions International, an independent Australian strategic think tank. He is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Naval War College’s Naval Command College and served for over thirty years in the Royal Australian Navy, including command at sea in Operation DESERT STORM. He is a commodore in the Active Reserve. Published works and research interests include maritime strategy and security policy, international relations, and risk management. He is currently working on Indian Ocean maritime security and offshore oil and gas safety and security in the Asia-Pacific.*

*Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4*

U.S. Central Command, Vice Admiral William Gortney, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan; the Italian Navy, represented by its chief, Admiral Bruno Branciforte; and the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom, which sent a senior delegation. Notable was the absence of participants from the navies of other external countries with significant and growing interests in the IOR, for example, China, Russia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

The opening ceremony saw India, the founder and inaugural chair of IONS, represented by Admiral

Nirmal Verma, the Indian Navy chief, pass chairmanship for the next two years to his UAE counterpart, Brigadier Naval Staff Ibrahim Salim Mohamed Al-Musharrakh. Admiral Verma spoke of the vision of IONS bringing regional navies together for the greater collective good: to enhance safety and security, to share knowledge, and to support disaster relief and humanitarian assistance for “the larger benefit of mankind.” Brigadier Al-Musharrakh noted that the concept of security had changed, that it was no longer simply about territory but now encompassed issues like water availability and the environment. He stated that trade protection, law and order, regional stability, and the effects of climate change were key collective-security issues for the region. He emphasized the need for regional naval forces to work together to ensure that the IOR continued to be a source of growth and well-being in the face of common threats and challenges.

Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the IOR transitions from an international backwater, a mere thoroughfare for maritime trade, to status as a major global nexus of resource, human, economic, and environmental issues. The IONS theme suggested a region moving toward maritime security cooperation; there was considerable convergence of views on related issues and recognition of the need to take collective approaches.

Moving from a common understanding of issues and aspirations to cooperation to effective action presents enormous challenges. This is particularly the case for the Indian Ocean, which does not have region-wide security architectures, a common regional identity, a history of regional cooperation, or accepted regional leadership frameworks. Significant problems are also posed by the need to recognize the interests and accommodate the involvement of regional powers, as well as of extraregional powers, like China and the United States. Nonetheless, emerging strategic and security circumstances in the medium and long terms dictate a compelling need for effective IOR maritime security cooperation. This article analyzes the prospects of, and offers ideas for, progressing maritime security cooperation in that region.

### COMMON INTERESTS, THREATS, RISKS, AND VULNERABILITIES

The international system is fundamentally anarchic, with states acting in accordance with their perceived national interests.<sup>3</sup> If progress is to be made toward effective maritime security cooperation among nation-states, there needs to be a strong sense that commonly held interests are threatened, at risk, or vulnerable and that cooperative action among states will help to protect them. States are most likely to embrace cooperative security measures when there is a compelling, shared belief that the defense of their own interests can be usefully enhanced through that course. Pertinent questions that arise include: What are the

common regional security interests? Whose national interests are affected? How are those interests threatened? What are the key strategic vulnerabilities? Critically, how would maritime security cooperation help manage the risks posed? Short- and long-term regional risk assessments and strategic-level analyses are required to answer these questions.

The evolving strategic environment in the IOR is profoundly impacted by divergent perceptions about its unique regional political and geographic circumstances. For many in this region, especially South Asians, the Indian Ocean has historically been one of the region's strongest unifying factors. For centuries, its waters have carried religions, languages, traditions, and indeed people across thousands of miles and bound them together in a cultural brotherhood. According to those who hold this view, it is only the failure of the inhabitants to record the region's maritime history that has deprived it of the status of a cohesive regional entity. For most others, however, the IOR appears to be a largely disaggregated oceanic and littoral zone, more a collection of subregions than a coherent, single region.<sup>4</sup> This view appears to have been reinforced by its division by the United States between the Pacific, Central, and Africa unified commands, whose trijunction is in the northwest Indian Ocean.<sup>5</sup>

The IOR is demonstrably maritime. The national interests of its states range from the need to ensure the unfettered flow of maritime trade to support burgeoning, or emerging and struggling, economies to the need for effective management of the Indian Ocean's vast "maritime commons," both national jurisdictions and high seas.<sup>6</sup> It is in the maritime domain that the interests of IOR states largely converge, and it is at sea that the need for cooperative security is most pressing.<sup>7</sup> It is also at sea that the best opportunities lie to develop mechanisms, and ultimately habits, of security cooperation that may in the future have application to more controversial security agendas.

#### CLIMATE CHANGE, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT

The direst long-term threats to the collective interests of regional countries and peoples are nontraditional security risks. The combined impacts of climate change, environmental degradation, and ocean resource exploitation will profoundly affect the lives of millions in a region where many states have little capability to manage or respond to them.<sup>8</sup>

##### *The Impact of Climate Change*

The Geneva-based Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that the evidence of warming of the global climate system is unequivocal.<sup>9</sup> Sea temperatures of the equatorial areas of the Indian Ocean are rising more quickly

than elsewhere, and the likelihood of significant variances in the monsoon season has increased, which could create drought conditions for much of South Asia. There are increasing incidences of very intense storms, with higher peak wind speeds and heavier precipitation than has been typical, which could result in major coastal damage and massive flooding.<sup>10</sup> The changing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, together with sea-level rise, are expected to have significantly adverse effects.<sup>11</sup>

The scale of the potential climate change impact in the IOR is so immense as to be difficult to comprehend. The region is likely to be faced with a series of major weather-related events that, over time, will impose human suffering and environmental damage that will cumulatively overwhelm and drain response resources and undermine resilience. The impact will be deeply felt in Asia;<sup>12</sup> more than a billion people will have been adversely affected by the 2050s.<sup>13</sup> Africa is also very vulnerable.<sup>14</sup> The number of people annually subject to flooding in coastal populations is projected to increase from thirteen million to ninety-four million, primarily in South Asia and Southeast Asia.<sup>15</sup> Millions of people in low-lying areas of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, Vietnam, Burma (Myanmar), and Indonesia will be affected. The incidence of increasingly intense tropical cyclones, combined with growing coastal populations, will result in massive loss of life, damage to property, and large-scale transmigration, resulting in turn in very frequent requirements for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

*Marine Resources.* Global warming will also have far-reaching implications for marine ecosystems.<sup>16</sup> The effects of climate change will be compounded by increased competition for and environmental degradation and overutilization of the ocean's resources. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is predicted to increase in the Indian Ocean as stocks in traditional fishing areas are exhausted and fishermen are forced to move to deeper and more distant waters. There is already significant evidence of the wider implications of the illegal plundering of stocks by distant-water fishing fleets off Somalia, for example.<sup>17</sup> Local fisheries are being progressively dispossessed by external enterprises catching marketable fish, like tuna, to meet international demand.<sup>18</sup> These circumstances exacerbate already tenuous food-security concerns in the IOR.

*Maritime Boundary Delimitations.* The delimitation of the maritime boundaries of many IOR states has not been agreed, although progress is better here than in some other parts of the world.<sup>19</sup> Maritime disputes between adjacent littoral states are likely to occur due to boundary uncertainty and overlapping claims. There are ocean-management concerns in some areas due to the lack of clarity over which nations are to exercise rights and accept obligations for

husbanding, regulating, and enforcing marine zones. Many Indian Ocean states have submitted extended-continental-shelf claims to the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; these claims, if established, will extend the marine zones that require responsible management.<sup>20</sup>

### *Maritime and Marine Challenges: Managing the Risks*

Many IOR states have little or no capacity to fulfill their responsibilities for managing marine zones effectively. Exploitation, pollution, and water-security infringements will proceed unchecked in many parts of the Indian Ocean, both under national jurisdiction and in the high seas. Very few regional countries have the individual capacity to deal with human tragedies and environmental damage to coastal areas on a massive scale resulting from repeated natural disasters. The overall regional capacity to mitigate the risks from climate change is grossly inadequate.

The widespread coastal devastation and loss of life caused by the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2007 and 2009 Bangladesh cyclones point to the collective human-security challenges that lie in the future. In those instances, many regional countries rallied in mutual support; significant response and recovery assistance was also provided by extraregional nations and organizations.<sup>21</sup>

The combined effects of climate change and marine environmental degradation pose profound threats over the medium and long terms to many IOR littoral states. Natural-disaster response and humanitarian aid will demand the application of resources and the coordination of collective efforts on scales and at frequencies far beyond anything so far experienced. Related human, food, and environmental security concerns will be greatly magnified. Vast cooperative responses will be required that will involve regional and extraregional maritime security forces.

## MARITIME TRADE, ENERGY, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

Law and order threats to maritime trade that are prevalent in the IOR pose significant risks to both regional and extraregional economic and energy security. The proliferation of failed and failing states in the region adds further dimensions to the security challenges that—along with competition and perhaps conflict between regional and extraregional powers, for example, China and India—could impinge upon freedom of navigation and therefore the flow of maritime trade.

*Energy Supply and Demand.* Asia is forecast to experience by far the world's greatest increase in energy demand into the medium term.<sup>22</sup> China and India's proportions of world energy use have greatly increased.<sup>23</sup> More than a third of the world's oil exports come from the IOR, with the vast majority of known

reserves in the Arabian Gulf subregion; “energy-surplus nations” have assumed increased importance in the global economic hierarchy.<sup>24</sup> The largest energy-growth area is in the demand for coal, forecast to grow by 73 percent between 2005 and 2030, most of the increase coming from China and India. Australia is the world’s largest exporter of coal, with South Africa close behind;<sup>25</sup> both countries ship much of it via the Indian Ocean.

*The Indian Ocean Sea-Lanes.* The Indian Ocean is now the world’s most important route for the movement of long-haul cargo.<sup>26</sup> More than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil passes through the Indian Ocean’s choke points: the straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb.<sup>27</sup> In addition to energy, vast quantities of bulk commodities and manufactured goods are moved by sea as part of the increasing intra- and extraregional trade.<sup>28</sup> The integrity of the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is vital to global and regional economic security. In the complicated international shipping and trading context, maintaining the flow of trade is very much in the collective interest of the world’s nations; to ensure it, cooperative maritime security efforts are required.

*Piracy.* The current international response to piracy off Somalia presents an example of the complexities of maintaining that flow. The multinational nature of the interests involved is clearly evident, as are the great challenges of dealing with even a relatively small piracy problem in a vast oceanic area. Despite the requirements of international law for flag states to exercise jurisdiction over ships and crews, the onus upon all states to repress piracy, ten UN Security Council resolutions since 2008, and the commitment of naval task forces, the international community continues to struggle with the problem of piracy off Somalia.<sup>29</sup>

The incidence of piracy elsewhere in the IOR—for example, the Malacca Strait—has lessened, due to the combined efforts of littoral and extraregional nations. The advent of international cooperative entities—including the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and, more recently, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, aimed to “help address the problem of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden”—brings together regional nations and other interested parties to combat piracy.<sup>30</sup> Both are cooperative maritime security initiatives; however, there are some significant differences between them. ReCAAP is supported by Asian nations with capable maritime security regimes and some history of cooperation. The Djibouti Code of Conduct nations, in contrast, have very limited maritime security capabilities and little experience of cooperation.

*Maritime Terrorism.* The likelihood of terrorist attacks continues to be a major concern;<sup>31</sup> the IOR retains the dubious distinction of being one of the world’s

sanctuaries for violent extremism.<sup>32</sup> Although the threat of terrorist attack on shipping remains relatively low, it must be taken seriously, and some incidents have occurred in the IOR.<sup>33</sup> The terrorist threat at sea must be viewed as credible; major attacks can disrupt global security and the global economy.

In recent years, the need to counter that threat has led to substantial changes in the international maritime security environment. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts conventions and protocols have profoundly improved the security preparedness of the international maritime community, with respect to both ports and shipping.<sup>34</sup>

*Other Threats to Law and Order at Sea.* Other law and order issues that threaten the interests of IOR states include illegal immigration, illegal fishing, marine pollution, and the smuggling of people, drugs, and arms. The protection of maritime boundaries and the policing of maritime domains are largely the responsibilities of individual nations. Threats to law and order at sea often have transnational dimensions—for example, crime and illegal immigration, which require collective regional or subregional responses. Illegal immigration is likely to increase significantly, given the impacts of climate change on burgeoning populations, combined with local conflicts.

## REGIONAL STABILITY

The Indian Ocean region contains a large proportion of the world's failed and failing states, including eleven of the twenty states listed in the journal *Foreign Policy's* 2009 "Failed State Index."<sup>35</sup> Parts of the IOR have been labeled the "arc of crisis";<sup>36</sup> the term "arc of instability" has also been used.<sup>37</sup> Conflicts in the Middle East; political instability and conflict in Yemen, Sudan, and Eritrea; the "Talibanization" of Pakistan, extending from Afghanistan;<sup>38</sup> social unrest in parts of India; the political polarization in Bangladesh; the prodemocracy movement in Burma; simmering ethnic tensions after the recently concluded civil war in Sri Lanka—all these add fuel to the perception of a region riddled with political instability, actual or potential conflict, and uncertain security.

Somalia is the quintessential failed state, having long disintegrated as a functioning entity. A key consequence is a "yawning maritime security gap off the Horn of Africa," both a symptom and a result of the lack of law and order ashore.<sup>39</sup> The prospect of the degeneration of other states adjacent to vital international SLOCs and straits must be seriously considered. The maritime security interests of regional and extraregional states are likely to be affected if this occurs.

In a related vein, the Mumbai terrorist attacks are symptomatic of a lack of effective maritime-border control.<sup>40</sup> India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan have capable naval and other maritime security forces, as do Arabian Gulf states



(Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE). Some other countries, however, have small naval forces of little effectiveness (Yemen, Kenya, and Djibouti, in the western Indian Ocean), and in many respects the region is a maritime security void. Many IOR states lack intelligence, early warning, and maritime air surveillance and reconnaissance or the coordinated maritime security patrol and response capabilities necessary to exercising sovereign control over their maritime domains. The lack of national capabilities is exacerbated at regional and subregional levels by the lack of cooperative bodies to coordinate the use of sparse resources.

Many extraregional countries have significant and legitimate interests to protect in the IOR. The extensive involvement of the U.S., Chinese, South Korean, and various European navies in the antipiracy effort off Somalia, for example, is aimed at protecting a common stake in the free flow of maritime trade. The United States, Britain, and other Western powers remain deeply engaged in the Middle East in support of global energy security and in addressing the sources of Islamist extremism. It can be argued that the involvement of external states helps to stabilize regional security; in many cases such involvement is essential to make up for shortfalls in the capabilities of regional states. However, in many IOR nations that experienced colonial rule it remains easy for politicians to invoke the specter of imperialism or “gunboat diplomacy.” External intervention is not universally welcomed by regional states, and certain types of intervention are potentially destabilizing. However, realization has dawned, especially since the 2004 tsunami disaster relief episode, that “cooperative engagement” with outside powers offers many benefits.

The emergence of China as a maritime power with increasing involvement in the Indian Ocean has created angst among some IOR states, particularly India. The Indian-Chinese strategic circumstance, in fact, presents a “security dilemma.”<sup>41</sup> New Delhi perceives Chinese involvement as an attempt to strategically encircle India.<sup>42</sup> The pace and scope of Chinese naval expansion and military modernization and the lack of transparency with which they have proceeded are certainly causing concern around the IOR.<sup>43</sup> China has extensive and legitimate interests there, including maritime trade and cooperative relationships with several IOR states.<sup>44</sup> However, China’s assertion that “it will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes” is viewed with suspicion in India.<sup>45</sup> India too is modernizing and expanding its naval capabilities, which it seeks to justify because of its extensive coastline and maritime domain and broadened interests in IOR security and freedom of the seas.<sup>46</sup>

India’s relationships with China are characterized as “cooperative at present but there is a competitive rivalry in trade and power projection.”<sup>47</sup> Some analysts consider that a potentially dangerous security situation is developing between

the two great Asian powers.<sup>48</sup> Strategic competition is likely to be played out largely at sea.

All parties with security interests in the IOR are likely to benefit from cooperation to manage the challenges presented by failed and failing states, as well as by great-power competition, with its attendant potential for miscalculation. Present circumstances represent compelling reasons why IOR states should collaborate among themselves and with extraregional states to promote regional stability.

## MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

The case for cooperative security in the Indian Ocean region, then, is driven primarily by extreme vulnerability to the combined impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. This situation presents dire consequences over the medium and long terms for both regional and extraregional countries. Significantly, environmental security–related interests converge in the maritime domain.

### *A Compelling Case for Maritime Security Cooperation*

The threats posed are insidious. There is unlikely to be a single defining moment that will galvanize collective action—and herein lies a major difficulty. Without a stark and immediate threat, like the prospect of global nuclear war during the Cold War period, persuading political leaders to act upon cooperative responses will present major difficulties. But unless regional and extraregional leaders exercise vision and imagination and take early, proactive action, crises will inevitably arise of enormous and unmanageable proportions, and only highly inefficient, largely ineffective, and essentially inadequate reactive responses will be available. The hard lessons will ultimately be learned by the international community, but it will be too late in many respects. Regrettably, it is difficult to avoid a pessimistic sense that late and ineffectual reaction is the most realistic and likely scenario.

The outcomes will be costly—financially, environmentally, and morally, in terms of human misery and lives. The threats to maritime trade security and energy security will also significantly affect the interests of external and regional nations. In the IOR, threats to the economic, environmental, and human security interests of regional and external countries have already grown to the extent that the common interests—especially in the maritime realm—of maintaining a stable region have become paramount.

Conversely, however, maritime security issues in the IOR could, if managed astutely and prudently, bind a diverse and largely disaggregated region. The maritime and marine context provides the opportunity for nations to cooperate to protect common interests—against a range of vulnerabilities that no single

state has the power to mitigate effectively—without significantly compromising territorial integrity or sovereignty. The risks posed in the maritime context are huge and must be faced, but in cooperative security terms they represent the “low-hanging fruit” that offer the potential for rapid and mutually beneficial action. Dealing with them could catalyze habits of region-wide cooperation that might arguably be applicable to harder and more sensitive security issues, like arms control and territorial, ethnic, ideological, and religious disputes ashore.<sup>49</sup>

### *Risk Management*

Managing the risks posed by an environment beset with uncertainty needs to be at the core of cooperative security in the IOR. Risk management is fundamentally about a structured approach to uncertainty. The international standard *ISO 31000:2009—Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines* presents a comprehensive framework that is intended to help “ensure that risk is managed effectively, efficiently and coherently . . . in a systematic, transparent and credible manner.”<sup>50</sup> A formal, strategic risk-management approach would be useful in defining the magnitude of challenges and identifying mitigation options. In a regional, cooperative context, the hard questions to be addressed include: How will risks be recognized? Who has the capability, capacity, and will to respond? What cooperative arrangements and mechanisms are needed? What would be the consequences of doing nothing?

Governments are increasingly applying risk-management approaches to strategic issues. The international risk-management standard offers an internationally accepted framework, a systemized approach to dealing with regional security. An independent, collaborative, and authoritative regional risk assessment would help inform IOR and external nations about the scale of the risks being faced and options for addressing them. In the maritime domain, a regional maritime-security risk assessment represents a way to initiate cooperation. Such a proposal would need regional champions and a deal of support from extraregional nations to proceed.

### *How Are IOR Maritime-Security Cooperative Arrangements to Be Developed?*

Deciding the nature of cooperative arrangements and devising methodologies to achieve cooperative agendas present serious problems and pose many questions. What is meant by “maritime security cooperation”? What are the desirable extent and scale of cooperation? Who needs to participate? To what extent should extraregional nations and forces be involved? How can regional and extraregional capabilities be effectively coordinated in the common interest? Who has the capability and capacity to contribute, and who should do so? Who is responsible, and who will pay? Where are capability and capacity lacking? What alternate options and models for cooperation need to be considered? For

example, do we need standing, combined naval forces and formal agreements, or will loose coalitions of the willing assembled on ad hoc bases suffice? Are there lessons to be drawn from security cooperation in other regions? What are the risks associated with various possible courses of action versus the risks of inaction? What international instruments are in place (e.g., the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), and to what extent have these been adopted by regional states? Do these instruments aid or impede cooperation? What leadership structure would accommodate most appropriately the aspirations and concerns of both regional and extraregional participants? Importantly, what maritime security cooperative arrangements are likely to be achievable in practice?

It is much easier to ask such questions than to formulate acceptable, workable, and achievable solutions in the IOR context. Real progress toward maritime security cooperation is likely to be torturous, slow, and frustrating.

#### MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION: EXPLORING OPTIONS

The distinct nature of the geostrategic environment must be at the core of any cooperative-security considerations. The circumstances of the Indian Ocean region are in many respects quite different from those of the Atlantic or Pacific, for example. In the IOR, the concept of regionalism is not well developed. The disparate and disaggregated subregional IOR geography, lack of common region-wide historical integration and identity, and an absence of accepted regional leadership represent considerable obstacles. The Indian Ocean is too big, too diverse, and too important and the challenges too large to be dominated or “owned” by any single nation or small group.

There is a strongly held view in some states, particularly India, that the responsibility for IOR maritime security should rest primarily with the regional states. However, as outlined earlier, most of them lack the capacity, whereas external powers have both the capacity and interests to protect; they need, therefore, to be constructively engaged. For reasons of identity, security and long-term stability, and to take account of regional peculiarities, some tailor-made version of regional cooperation must be devised.<sup>51</sup> International regimes that are self-generated and based on negotiation are likely to offer the greatest utility and the greatest chances of success for the IOR, in terms of legitimization and regional cooperation.<sup>52</sup>

*Does ARF Provide a Useful Model for the IOR?* The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, focused primarily on the western Pacific and East Asia, may provide a model to work from.<sup>53</sup> ARF has been operating for sixteen years and provides a forum for nation-to-nation dialogue on political

and security issues. In some respects, ARF represents a strategic and security parallel to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).<sup>54</sup> Notably, however, India and Pakistan are participants in ARF but not of APEC. Neither ARF nor APEC is a formal alliance or treaty arrangement; both are nonbinding forums for dialogue and cooperation. ARF includes the major Pacific powers—the United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia—both Koreas, Australia, and many smaller states. Importantly, ARF has established a very active agenda for discussion of security-related matters.

However, there are significant factors that make direct translation to the IOR less than ideal. ARF has at its core ASEAN, originally established in 1967, a collection of ten mainly small (except for Indonesia) Southeast Asian states; there is no IOR equivalent.<sup>55</sup> Given the Indian Ocean geography, there are several subregional groups that would need to be accommodated. Participation by external countries with significant interests in IOR maritime security, like the United States, China, France, Japan, and Russia, could be envisaged for an IOR version of ARF. However, underpinning ARF is a web of bilateral and multilateral formal security alliances between the United States and many western Pacific states; that is not the case, at least to the same extent, in the IOR.

*CSCAP.* The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific in many respects parallels and feeds directly into the ARF and other official regional-security and defense forums.<sup>56</sup> This “Track 2” entity performs a very useful function in enabling sensitive and controversial issues to be informally discussed by experienced former diplomats, officials, and academics, generating proposals that can be put forward to official forums and regional governments for consideration.<sup>57</sup> CSCAP includes four IOR states: India, Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand, but there is currently no similar Track 2 organization to deal with security-related matters specifically in the IOR. Creation of such an entity would be worth consideration.

*Does NATO Offer Lessons Relevant to the IOR?* NATO, of course, was devised in the context of the Cold War; it is a formal security alliance originally created to coordinate U.S. and European responses to the threat of invasion and potential nuclear war with the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The clear, compelling, and immediate threat to the survival of Western Europe drove the need for formal cooperative security arrangements. The shared history of two world wars and the key leadership role of the United States have been central to NATO. Strong political and military leadership and a cooperative approach generated by a shared sense of threat to individual interests have been essential. There would seem to be little in common with the evolving situation in the IOR. In any case, NATO’s journey of over sixty years highlights the challenges of building,

gaining, and maintaining consensus between nation-states in a formal alliance even with survival at stake.

*What about the IOR-ARC and Other Existing Regional Entities?* The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation is cited by some analysts as potentially meeting the need for an IOR security forum.<sup>58</sup> However, it does not currently encompass all the key players.<sup>59</sup> Its charter is to facilitate and promote economic, business, and cultural cooperation by bringing together government, business, and academia. It specifically does not deal with security matters, although piracy off Somalia has been discussed in the context of trade implications.<sup>60</sup> In fact, senior Indian officials have been outspoken about the ineffectiveness of the IOR-ARC.<sup>61</sup> There may be an opportunity to revitalize it when India assumes the chair (and Australia the vice chair) during 2011–12, and when Australia succeeds India 2013–14.<sup>62</sup> However, the charter, national memberships, participants (including government ministers and officials), and the nature of IOR-ARC business would need to be significantly changed if political, strategic, and security issues were to be included.

*How Useful Is IONS?* The emerging role of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, along the lines of that of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), represents useful progress toward regional maritime security cooperation.<sup>63</sup> However, in the absence of something akin to the Track 1 ARF, perhaps supported by the Track 2 CSCAP—to work security, strategy, and policy issues at head-of-government, senior-minister, senior-official, and academic levels—IONS is likely to facilitate only minor and relatively low-level, navy-to-navy cooperation. Such issues as regional strategic-risk assessments, national security policies, rules of engagement, and multinational strategic and operational directives, and regional security regimes, arrangements, and agreements need to be considered at and directed from national political levels. As does WPNS, IONS may usefully consider and coordinate issues like military and naval doctrine, naval procedures and training, and technological compatibility (protocols, information technology connectivity, logistics). But WPNS took many years to evolve to the stage where worthwhile multilateral naval exercises and training were possible, and IONS is currently well short of achieving this.

At the second IONS meeting, in Abu Dhabi, much useful discussion occurred on a range of naval professional, technical, and tactical matters. There was also a well supported session that discussed development of a common maritime security strategy. However, in the final plenary, involving only the lead national representatives, a proposal that this idea be pursued gained no support. There was no appetite even for preliminary work that would inform the possibility of common strategic perspectives. IONS is the wrong level for such matters; they

lie more appropriately with governments. There appeared to be reluctance in the fledgling IONS to move too quickly. Notably, India, the originator of IONS, appeared to adopt a conservative and low-key approach to the future agenda.

*Subregional Structures.* There are several subregional entities in the IOR that have limited, subregionally based membership; examples are the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Southern African Development Community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.<sup>64</sup> These entities generally do not address security issues and would be unlikely to form the basis for the evolution of IOR-wide maritime security cooperation. The key leaders of each of these subregional groupings could, however, play critical roles in devising a region-wide way ahead.

Moving toward collective maritime security and common maritime security strategies requires active engagement at the highest political levels. In the IOR, India needs to play a key leadership role. However, India appears to be more comfortable in bilateral relationships with the United States and others and appears reluctant to take a collective-security leadership role. Other key regional and subregional states—for example, Australia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia—have the potential to perform vital leadership roles and need to be engaged. The core leadership of IOR security initiatives needs to come from within the IOR, at least initially.

## NEW IOR SECURITY DIALOGUE FORUMS

Forging a way ahead for maritime security in the Indian Ocean region is not going to be easy. Current mechanisms are at best fragmented and incomplete. There may be suspicion toward external powers in some quarters and a lack of willingness to engage with them. Similarly, external powers may well differ among themselves as to what cooperative IOR security arrangements should be supported. The nature of the IOR and the maritime security risks it faces mean that a region-wide entity would need to accommodate both regional and key extraregional countries.

Options that represent the status quo could be attractive to some parties—they could wait and do nothing. Regrettably, this may be the most likely outcome. But waiting until crises emerge offers the lowest likelihood of mitigating the emerging risks. Another and related option would be to continue to rely upon ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” to deal with crises as they arise. This reactive approach has been applied to maritime security challenges to date—for example, antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa and responses to the Indonesian tsunami and other natural disasters. Like the “do nothing” option, it

gives little hope of dealing effectively with the massive maritime security-related risks anticipated to beset the IOR in the future.

Both options would ensure that the results of attempts to prevent, respond to, and recover from the massive human and environmental tragedies of the kinds forecast would be suboptimal. Responses to crises would remain inadequate due to the lack of mechanisms to coordinate action, including training, collective learning, and the sharing of capabilities. They would also allow some regional states, and extraregional states in certain cases, to abrogate their responsibilities to control effectively the marine areas under their national jurisdiction and to protect their maritime security interests.

Creating an informal IOR dialogue and policy discussion entity (that is, Track 2), similar to CSCAP in concept, would be a good first step. A possible foundation for such an entity, if appropriately supported and resourced, would be the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG), which has been operating for several years.<sup>65</sup> The IORG leadership comes primarily from India and Australia, with participants from numerous regional as well as external nations. It brings together academics and former senior officials from a broad range of backgrounds, including security and strategy. The key objective of IORG is “to initiate a policy-oriented dialogue, in the true spirit of partnership, among governments, industries, [nongovernmental organizations] and communities, toward realizing a shared, peaceful, stable and prosperous future for the Indian Ocean region.”<sup>66</sup> Its published materials suggest it would be well placed to fulfill the need for a Track 2 security-policy forum. The first task of an invigorated IORG could be to develop policy options for progressing maritime-security risk assessment and cooperation.

But as argued above, a Track 1 entity along the lines of ARF but tailored specifically to IOR circumstances—to the region’s unique nature, character, and needs—would appear to be necessary as well. An entirely new entity would appear to offer a greater likelihood of success than an attempt to graft national and regional-security agendas upon the IOR-ARC, which has an unfortunate reputation for impotence. There would be significant benefit in creating a fresh regional-security forum, one that begins with recognition of the massive regional security challenges that lie ahead, without the burdens of association with the past.

Once formed, a new Track 1 body would find a number of steps necessary as matters of urgency and high priority, such as:

- Commissioning a multinational team of “experts” (a research group) to develop proposals for security cooperation in the IOR, with its first priority being maritime security cooperation, perhaps using IORG as the foundation, augmented and resourced as necessary.



- Establishing an “eminent persons group” comprising esteemed elders—“wise men” (and women)—to act as a reference and advisory panel to governments and the proposed research group.

The members of both the research group and the reference panel should include representatives of both IOR and extraregional countries.

The IOR-ARC may be a useful vehicle for initiating these proposals. But who will champion, support, and fund them? One option would be a “pilot” model, a “test” entity for maritime security cooperation dialogue. The aim would be to start small, learn, build trust, engender confidence, and evolve, noting how time pressures mount. Strong and inspirational leadership is needed to get the ball rolling. This could initially come from India and Australia, perhaps to be joined by, say, South Africa, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia. External countries with significant IOR maritime security interests, like the United States, China, France, and Japan, could be drawn in at an early stage.

There is a compelling, imperative need to develop maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region to address the massive human, economic, environmental, and energy security risks of the future. The maritime domain is where the collective interests and common security concerns of regional and extraregional states converge. Both regional and extraregional countries—those with interests in the Indian Ocean and the capacity to assist—need to be included in security dialogue and cooperative arrangements. Work should commence immediately.

---

#### NOTES

The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and support of Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy (Ret.), chairman of the National Maritime Foundation, India, in the preparation of this article.

1. See *Indian Navy*, [www.indiannavy.nic.in/](http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/), for information about IONS, which “provides a regional forum through which the ‘Chiefs-of-Navy’ of all the littoral states of the IOR can periodically meet to constructively engage one another through the creation and promotion of regionally relevant mechanisms, events, and activities.” The inaugural IONS seminar in February 2008 was hosted and chaired by India and comprised representatives from Australia, Brazil, Burma, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Notable absentees were Iran and Pakistan.
2. IONS 2010 comprised senior maritime security officials (navy, coast guard, or maritime police chief) from Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, the UAE, and Yemen. The navies of Egypt, Oman, and Pakistan were also represented at senior levels. Burma and Malaysia did not provide representatives.

3. Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 35–60.
4. See Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin, "Neglected No Longer: The Indian Ocean in the Forefront of World Geopolitics and Global Geostrategy," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 6, no. 1 (June 2010), pp. 41–44. A useful analysis of IOR subregional groupings is presented here.
5. U.S. Defense Dept., *United States Unified Commands*, available at [www.defenselink.mil/](http://www.defenselink.mil/).
6. Ronald E. Ratcliff, "Building Partners' Capacity: The Thousand-Ship Navy," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007) p. 49. On jurisdiction and the high seas, see the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 10 December 1982 (entered into force 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 397 [hereafter UNCLOS], introduction, pp. xxiv–xxvi, for a discussion of what constitutes "areas of national jurisdiction" and the "high seas," along with the philosophy behind the rights and obligations of nations therein. Areas of national jurisdiction include territorial seas (article 3), the contiguous zone (article 33), exclusive economic zones (articles 55–57), and the continental shelf (article 76); oceans areas beyond that are high seas.
7. See Lee Cordner, "Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Compelling and Convergent Agendas," *Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2010), pp. 16–27.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–19.
9. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereafter IPCC], *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report* (Geneva: 2007), available at [www.ipcc.ch/](http://www.ipcc.ch/).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
12. R. V. Cruz et al., "2007: Asia," in *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability—Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, ed. M. L. Parry et al. (Geneva: 2007), p. 472, available at [www.ipcc.ch/](http://www.ipcc.ch/).
13. *Ibid.*, p. 471.
14. S. H. Schneider et al., "Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate Change," in *Climate Change 2007*, ed. Parry et al., pp. 779–810, available at [www.ipcc.ch/](http://www.ipcc.ch/).
15. Cruz et al., "2007: Asia," pp. 484–85.
16. IPCC, "Summary for Policymakers," in *Climate Change 2007*, p. 17.
17. See Thean Potgieter and Clive Schofield, "Poverty, Poaching and Pirates: Geopolitical Instability and Maritime Insecurity off the Horn of Africa," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 6, no. 1 (June 2010), pp. 103–105, for a concise assessment of the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing implications for Somalia.
18. See Lee Cordner, ed., *Proceedings from Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium, 15–17 April 2009* (Wollongong: Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, Univ. of Wollongong, n.d.), p. 63, available at [www.ancors.uow.edu.au/](http://www.ancors.uow.edu.au/).
19. See Stuart Kaye, "Indian Ocean Maritime Claims," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 6, no. 1 (June 2010), pp. 113–28, for a comprehensive assessment of the status of maritime boundary claims in the Indian Ocean.
20. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf [hereafter CLCS], *Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982*, available at [www.un.org/](http://www.un.org/). There are sixteen submissions to the CLCS with regard to the Indian Ocean, with only Australia's submission established and adopted so far.
21. For a summary of U.S. military support to the 2004 Asian tsunami, see Ralph A. Cossa, "Improving Lives: Military Humanitarian and Assistance Programs," *eJournal USA: Foreign Policy Agenda*, 4 March 2005, [www.america.gov/](http://www.america.gov/). The Indian Navy also deployed some thirty-two ships, and many other regional and extraregional navies and military forces provided assistance.
22. For world energy demand, U.S. Energy Dept., *International Energy Outlook 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and

- Forecasting, July 2010), pp. 9–10, available at [www.eia.doe.gov/](http://www.eia.doe.gov/). For the medium term, International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2008* (Paris, 2008), p. 39, available at [www.worldenergyoutlook.org/](http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/). All of the projected increase in world oil demand is from non-OECD countries (over four-fifths from China, India, and the Middle East).
23. U.S. Energy Dept., *International Energy Outlook 2009* (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, May 2009), pp. 6–8, available at [www.eia.doe.gov/](http://www.eia.doe.gov/).
  24. See Michael T. Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), pp. 14–21.
  25. “The Australian Coal Industry: Coal Exports,” *Australian Coal Association*, [www.australiancoal.com.au/](http://www.australiancoal.com.au/). In 2008–2009 Australia maintained its position as the world’s largest coal exporter with exports of 261 million tons, or 28 percent of the world total. South Africa was the world’s fifth-largest exporter of coal.
  26. Christian Bouchard et al., eds., “Editorial Essay: Research Agendas for the Indian Ocean Region,” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 6, no. 1 (June 2010), p. 2.
  27. *Ibid.*
  28. See Manoj Gupta, *Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation* (New York: Springer, 2010), chapter 7, “Intra–Indian Ocean Trade,” pp. 183–202, for a concise synopsis of increasing intra–Indian Ocean maritime trade, and chapter 8, “Shipping and Port State Control in the Indian Ocean,” pp. 203–61, for an analysis of global shipping as it affects the Indian Ocean.
  29. UNCLOS, arts. 94, 100; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010), 23 November 2010, available at [www.daccess-dds.ny.un.org/](http://www.daccess-dds.ny.un.org/).
  30. Information on ReCAAP and the ReCAAP Agreement is available at *ReCAAP Information Sharing Center*, [www.recaap.org/](http://www.recaap.org/). For the Djibouti Code, IMO, “High-Level Meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of Conduct to Repress Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,” available at [www.imo.org/](http://www.imo.org/).
  31. U.S. State Dept., *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 2010), available at [www.state.gov/](http://www.state.gov/).
  32. Brahma Chellaney, “India: Regional Security Challenges,” in *Security Politics in Asia and Europe*, Panorama Insights into Asian and European Affairs (Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010), pp. 166–71.
  33. Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli, *Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 9 January 2007), pp. 1–2. IOR maritime terrorism incidents include the bombings of the USS *Cole* (DDG 67) in 2000 and the French oil tanker *Limburg* in 2002; the Philippine vessel *Superferry 14* was attacked in 2004 in the Pacific Ocean.
  34. Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 Contained in Resolutions 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Conference of Contracting Governments and including the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, London, 12 December 2002 (entered into force 1 July 2004); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988), adopted 10 March 1988 (entered into force generally 1 March 1992); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 1988 (1988 SUA Protocol), adopted 10 March 1988 (entered into force generally 1 March 1992); and 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 SUA Protocols) (entered into force generally 28 July 2010).
  35. “The Failed State Index,” *Foreign Policy*, [www.foreignpolicy.com/](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/).
  36. Chellaney, “India,” pp. 158–59, for a reference to “an arc of crises stretching from Jordan to Pakistan.” Also, Andrew Gavin Marshall, “Creating an ‘Arc of Crisis’: The Destabilization of the Middle East and Central Asia—the Mumbai Attacks and the ‘Strategy of Tension,’” *Global Research*, 7 December 2008, available at [www.globalresearch.ca/](http://www.globalresearch.ca/), writes of an “Arc of Crisis” “stretching from the Horn of Africa to India.” According to Marshall, “the ‘Arc of Crisis’ describes the ‘nations that stretch across the southern flank

of the Soviet Union from the Indian subcontinent to Turkey, and southward through the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa.’ Further, the ‘center of gravity of this arc is Iran.’ In 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski gave a speech in which he stated, ‘An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.’”

37. See Dennis Rumley, “The Emergence of Australia’s Arc of Instability,” in *Australia’s Arc of Instability: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security*, ed. Dennis Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes, and Christopher Griffin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), pp. 16–18. “Arc of instability” is a term variously used to describe the island chain extending across Australia’s north from Indonesia in the west to the southwestern Pacific.
38. Chellaney, “India,” pp. 159–60.
39. Potgieter and Schofield, “Poverty, Poaching and Pirates,” pp. 86–87.
40. V. K. Shashikumar, “Gaps in Maritime Security—I,” *Indian Defence Review* 24, no. 1 (January–March 2009), 27 November 2010. The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks in India obliged governments and analysts to refocus attention upon maritime areas both as potential terrorist targets and as sources from which terrorism can be projected ashore. The pressing need for maritime security cooperation between adjacent littoral states (India and Pakistan) was highlighted in this instance.
41. See Lee Cordner, “Rethinking Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region,” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 6, no. 1 (June 2010), pp. 73–74, for a brief analysis of the Indian-Chinese maritime security relationship.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
43. *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Defence White Paper 2009 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), p. 34.
44. For an assessment of specifically naval Chinese involvement in the region, see Daniel J. Kostocka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” *Naval War College Review* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011), pp. 59–78.
45. China’s National Defense in 2008, available at [China.org.cn](http://China.org.cn).
46. *Annual Report 2008–09* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, n.d.), pp. 8–9, available at [www.mod.nic.in/](http://www.mod.nic.in/); *Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy* (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence [Navy], 2007), pp. iii–v, 49, available at [www.indiannavy.nic.in/](http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/).
47. Ranjit Rai, “Maritime Security: Indian and American Perspectives” (report, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, seminar, 30 April 2009), available at [www.ipcs.org/](http://www.ipcs.org/).
48. Harsh V. Pant, “Indian Ocean: Ruling the Waves,” *International Relations Security Network*, 5 August 2009, [www.isn.ethz.ch/](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/).
49. See Cordner, “Rethinking Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region,” for elaboration of the compelling need for maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
50. International Organization for Standardization, *ISO 31000:2009—Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines* (Geneva: 13 November 2009), available for purchase at [www.iso.org/](http://www.iso.org/), introduction, p. iv.
51. See Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi, *Energy Security and the Indian Ocean Region* (New Delhi: South Asian, 2005), pp. 5–27, for an analysis of evolving IOR regionalism.
52. See Gupta, *Indian Ocean Region*, pp. 95–125, for an analysis of measuring regimes effectiveness, esp. p. 104, table 5.1.
53. See *ASEAN Regional Forum*, [www.aseanregionalforum.org/](http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994, with objectives as outlined in the first ARF chairman’s statement (1994): to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts toward confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. There are currently twenty-seven participants: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic People’s Republic of (DPR) Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New

Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, the United States, and Vietnam.

54. See *APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation*, [www.apec.org/](http://www.apec.org/). APEC involves twenty-one “member economies,” listed as Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; the Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; the United States; and Vietnam.
55. See *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, [www.aseansec.org/](http://www.aseansec.org/). The ASEAN charter includes the promotion of peace and stability; however, ASEAN has largely avoided difficult security questions and differences between member states.
56. See *CSCAP: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific*, [www.cscap.org/](http://www.cscap.org/). CSCAP “provides an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. It also provides policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with institutions and organizations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation.” CSCAP has twenty-one full members (Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam) and one associate member (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat).
57. A useful discussion on the utility of Track 2 diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific is in Desmond Ball, Anthony Milner, and Brendan Taylor, “Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future Directions,” *Asian Security* 2, no. 3 (2006), pp. 174–88. “Track 1 diplomacy” refers to official governmental diplomacy, or a technique of state action whereby communications from one government go directly to the decision-making apparatus of another. Track 1 diplomacy is conducted by official representatives of a state or state-like authority and involves interaction with other states or state-like authorities—heads of state, officials of state departments or ministries of foreign affairs, and other governmental departments and ministries. “Track 2 diplomacy” is a specific kind of informal interaction in which non-officials (academics, retired civil and military officials, public figures, and social activists) engage in dialogue. The informal, unofficial nature of Track 2 diplomacy allows serious, sensitive, even potentially dangerous issues to be discussed in open forums.
58. See Bouchard et al., eds., “Editorial Essay,” p. 22. See also *Indian Ocean Rim Network*, [www.ior-net.com/](http://www.ior-net.com/). The IOR-ARC “will facilitate and promote economic cooperation, bringing together representatives of government, business and academia. In a spirit of multilateralism, the Association seeks to build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus-based, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach.” Members are Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the UAE, and Yemen. The Seychelles announced its withdrawal from the association in July 2003. China, Egypt, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners of the IOR-ARC. At present, only the Indian Ocean Tourism Organization has observer status.
59. Some Middle East states are included, but not Saudi Arabia. The East African participants do not include Sudan, Eritrea, Tanzania, or Somalia. Pakistan and Burma are also not members. China, Egypt, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners, but the United States and Russia are not.
60. Mahmoud Assamiee, “IOR-ARC Supported Anti-piracy Center in Yemen,” Yemen News Agency, 27 June 2009, [www.sabanews.net/](http://www.sabanews.net/).
61. “India Seeks Structural Changes in IOR-ARC,” *OneIndia News*, 2008, [www.news.oneindia.in/](http://www.news.oneindia.in/). At the eighth Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation meeting in Iran, the Indian delegate is reported as having stated that in the decade of the IOR-ARC’s existence, not much progress had been made in terms of concrete projects and that the character of the organization

needed to be reviewed. The Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, E. Ahamed, is reported to have declared, "Areas of common interest that bind the (IOR) countries, such as ocean bed exploration, hydrographic survey, disaster management and information sharing, shipping, coastal infrastructure, fisheries, weather forecasting, should be given priority."

62. The Hon. Stephen Smith, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Australia Next Vice Chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation," media release, 7 August 2010, *The Hon. Kevin Rudd MP: Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs*, [www.foreignminister.gov.au/](http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/).
63. See *All Partners Access Network*, [www.community.apan.org/](http://www.community.apan.org/). The Western Pacific Naval Symposium aims to increase naval cooperation in the western Pacific by providing a forum for discussion of maritime issues, both global and regional, and in the process generating a flow of information and opinions between naval professionals, leading to common understanding and possibly agreement. Member nations: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, People's Republic of China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States, and Vietnam. Observer nations: Bangladesh, Chile, India, Mexico, and Peru.
64. SAARC: *South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation*, [www.saarc-sec.org/](http://www.saarc-sec.org/); *Southern African Development Community*, [www.sadc.int/](http://www.sadc.int/); *The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: Secretariat General*, [www.gccsg.org/](http://www.gccsg.org/).
65. IORG, [www.iorgroup.org/](http://www.iorgroup.org/).
66. *Ibid.*