

2011

Book Reviews

The U.S Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S Naval (2011) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 64 : No. 3 , Article 10.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/10>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS

THINK AGAIN: SECURITY ISSUES FOR A NEW CENTURY

Reveron, Derek S., and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris. *Human Security in a Borderless World*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2011. 255pp. \$30

The authors, professors in professional military education in the U.S. Navy (Reveron) and the U.S. Air Force (Mahoney-Norris), bring more than sixty years of collective expertise as military officers and educators to their subject—“human security,” which they define as “a people-centered approach focused on individual human beings and their rights and needs.” The authors’ purpose is to transcend the traditional national-security model rooted in the so-called realist school of international relations and offer a broader construct that examines a continuum of interrelated issue areas that affect individuals and groups in ways that cumulatively influence and shape regional and international security.

The authors argue that transnational issues in the twenty-first century have less to do with threats to territory than with threats to people and more to do with human development than with state-on-state competition and conflict. They aver that additional perspectives on security are necessary to grapple with contemporary challenges and threats that are neither constrained by

nor dictated exclusively by states. They begin their examination by assessing global civic security, people’s physical safety and integrity, noting that human development is often hampered by oppressive governments, while in other states it is impeded because weak governments cannot protect their people from predation by nonstate actors (criminal gangs, drug cartels, and smugglers) increasingly empowered by the tools of globalization. Importantly, throughout their book Reveron and Mahoney-Norris stake a position on globalization midway between Thomas Friedman’s optimism and Moisés Naím’s pessimism.

The authors identify and discuss economic security, people’s capacity to provide food and shelter for themselves and their families, as a key component of human security. They note how inequitable development and severe poverty around the world imperil civic security by making weak states more susceptible to criminality, terrorism, and other forms of extremism. As a part of this discussion, Reveron and Mahoney-Norris delve into issues related to

sustainable development and the rising role of women in human security. They link civic and economic security to environmental security, pointing out how climate change will have implications for access to clean water and food, as well as for stable health conditions and ecosystem stability. The authors believe that climate change will weaken already feeble states and contribute to regional and global insecurity in ways not seen heretofore.

They offer a new focus on maritime security because new challenges and threats could manifest themselves on and below the world's oceans. Fisheries depletion and pollution could threaten a vital food source for a growing world population, while piracy and competing claims for sea routes and seabed hydrocarbons could contribute to forms of conflict not seen previously. Reveron and Mahoney-Norris also highlight two other areas often neglected by traditional security studies: health security and cyber security. They illustrate how in a more interconnected world infectious diseases carried inadvertently by modern air and sea travel could have deleterious effects on human security. Cyber security receives attention because both state and nonstate actors possess growing capabilities to disrupt the global population's increasing interconnectedness and mounting dependence on the virtual world.

This highly accessible book offers a novel approach to security studies, including insightful inserts ("Think Again") to stimulate readers' thinking about security issues for a new century. *Human Security in a Borderless World* should prove invaluable to a wide audience ranging from civilian and military

students to policy makers and those who advise them.

CHARLES E. COSTANZO
Air Command and Staff College



Murphy, Martin N. *Somalia, the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2011. 176pp. \$26.50

Within the sea services, allusion to the Barbary pirates and the "shores of Tripoli" continues to resonate. Readers of Martin Murphy's detailed and thoughtful book *Somalia* may come away wishing that a solution to the situation our mariners and fleet forces now face in those inhospitable waters were as straightforward as storming the beaches.

Murphy's previous works include *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World* (2009). He introduces the current volume with this caution: "The purpose of this book is to examine whether or not state failure is a useful and accurate explanation of Somali piracy. . . . It will ask if there are links between Somali pirates and international or regional terrorist groups. Even if these links are tenuous, it will ask why and how the terrorist groups that operate within Somalia might exploit the maritime dimension in the future. Finally, it will review whether or not naval action, in the absence of political engagement with entities within Somalia, will provide solutions to either problem, and if, perversely, achieving the political stability that may reduce or eliminate piracy might provide violent Islamist groups with the secure sanctuary within Somalia they are seeking." In

posing these questions Murphy takes the story forward from that told in *Small Boats*, which looked at maritime crime worldwide. Although this work, like his earlier book, finds no direct link between terrorism and crime, despite circumstances conducive to both, the question remains how long the international maritime community can tolerate the effects of such an expensive absence of the rule of law.

The current volume treats Somali piracy as it should be treated, *sui generis*. Piracy as experienced today off Somalia, and emanating from that nonstate, cannot be compared to contemporary experiences in the Gulf of Guinea or those in the Strait of Malacca or among the islands of the Indonesian archipelago. As dangerous as those waters are, the crimes they record are mostly of the “smash and grab” variety, perpetrated against ships in port, maneuvering slowly in restricted waters, or at anchor. Virtually all these crimes have occurred in territorial waters and thus within local or national law-enforcement jurisdictions, rather than on the high seas, a point that is critical to the legally actionable definition of the internationally recognized crime of piracy.

Many archipelagic and littoral states lack the will or effective capacity to exercise their maritime sovereignty and to combat crime uniformly throughout their maritime territories. However, only Somalia among today’s community of nations so lacks a sense of unitary statehood that pirate bands may function as if they governed a ministate within its borders. Yet these pirate “strongholds” are virtual only, without the centers of gravity that even a ministate would possess. In that sense, they are not in reality the New Barbary but

something more ephemeral and even more difficult to call to account.

How difficult is amply demonstrated in Murphy’s detailed history of modern Somalia and the forces that continue to conspire to keep it ungoverned and, so far, ungovernable. *Somalia, the New Barbary?* not only takes us through the history of Somalia’s failure to gel into stable statehood but illustrates at each turn how these continuing failures contributed to the ongoing pirate dramas playing out in the waters off the Horn of Africa.

There are few heroes in this story, and the international community, insisting on support for the minimally effective Transitional Federal Government as its sole interlocutor in combating piracy and explaining away the lack of progress despite huge sums spent on counter-piracy patrols and escort duties, bears a large part of the burden. As Murphy demonstrates, a large part of this inability on the part of the international community lies in the legitimate fear of creating an even more intractable problem should the extremists, currently characterized by the Islamist al-Shabaab, form a governmental shield behind which piracy could both thrive and marry itself to extremism. However, as Murphy pointed out in *Small Boats* and now refines in *Somalia*, these fears have no basis in evidence. In fact, there is ample evidence that the money-driven pirates continue to hold political influences of all stripes at arm’s length, fearing restriction on their operations and heavy taxation of their ill-gotten gains.

Where the above has caused many observers to throw up their hands, resignedly calling down a plague on all their houses, Murphy carefully outlines how

Puntland, which is largely self-governing and (by Somali standards) governed, but which also hosts the vast majority of pirate operations, could be a key either to combating piracy or to being held accountable for not doing so.

However, either way, the international community needs to extend tacit recognition to Puntland's *capabilities*, if not its sovereignty, in order to harness any sense of responsibility to that international community.

The bigger challenge to the United States and to its navy may come from the appearance of a power vacuum that continued Somali pirate success offers. Many nations have joined the counter-piracy coalition off the Horn of Africa, but as Murphy points out, not all forces are equally effective, except perhaps in demonstrating their nations' right to be there. As long ago as 1809 the Royal Navy, operating with armed ships of the Honourable East India Company, engaged pirates who were operating in the Strait of Hormuz with the benign neglect of local rulers along the littoral. After protracted combat, culminating in the battle of Ras al-Khaimah, that left the waters relatively safe, the Royal Navy remained as the international guarantor of the safety of trade, and Britain enjoyed a century of military, political, and economic preeminence. Britain would not be the last to seek to do so.

Somalia, the New Barbary? thus takes the reader beyond the breakers, which may be all of Somalia that most analysts of the current maritime scene have examined, and returns us to essential questions on the water. It is an experience every reader with an interest in matters that impel naval operations ought to embrace.

CHARLES N. DRAGONETTE

Senior Commercial Maritime Operations Analyst
Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center

(The views expressed here are purely the author's and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Navy or of the Office of Naval Intelligence.)



Moore, John Norton, and Robert F. Turner, eds. *Legal Issues in the Struggle against Terror*. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic, 2010. 565pp. \$70

For the better part of the last ten years, the word "terrorism," in some shape or form, has become an integral part of the world's vocabulary. Whether in regard to military operations, air or sea transportation, law enforcement, cyber communications, or even the environment, responses to perceived or actual threats almost always include some form of counterterrorist activity. With each response, various legal rights, and regimes that society and individuals rely upon and often take for granted, are time and again directly impacted. Whether such impacts are experienced as good or bad depends in great part on one's ability to understand clearly the issues, which is where *Legal Issues in the Struggle against Terror* comes in.

This book of essays is essential reading for anyone looking to understand the many significant and complex issues regarding responses to terrorism since 9/11. The essays, written by legal experts and scholars, put into context, using words that are easy to read and understand, some of the most hotly contested international and domestic legal issues. The editors state in the preface that this work is an important collection of essays that cover topics considered integral to the "struggle against al Qaeda and its terrorist allies."

However, the topics the editors chose to cover in this book also include detailed insight and analysis that transcends the struggle with al-Qa'ida and undoubtedly will be debated and revisited in many venues for years to come.

While it is impractical to review in detail each individual author and chapter, a brief synopsis of the discussions presented is essential for assessing this book's value within the scope of current events. Detailed yet readable analyses of the issues and challenges involving detainees and military commissions, U.S. constitutional issues, national security concerns, intelligence efforts, the law of war, and civil-military relations provide a broad overview of the legal concerns and challenges the government faces when confronting terrorists. A chapter discussing civil liberties provides an integral counterbalance and reminds readers of the human impacts that efforts to counter terrorism often create.

Collectively, these essays represent a well reasoned and researched look into the role of executive power and the challenges that confronting terrorism on a global scale presents to those tasked with applying (or even developing) domestic and international law. To their credit, the editors clearly note that many of the issues addressed by the authors are "so new or so unsettled that no one can draw bright legal lines with great confidence." If the book does not offer any bright legal lines, it does help focus readers on where those bright lines might better fit within the various issues discussed.

This book's worth is reflected in the quality of authors whom Moore and Turner selected. Arguably, their diverse and notable backgrounds make this book a uniquely authoritative

compilation. From a law-school dean to several law professors, as well as current and former senior CIA, military, and homeland-security legal professionals, the authors are recognized and tested experts within their areas of expertise. Undoubtedly, John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner's own extensive backgrounds and reputations in international law have enabled them to bring together individuals who clearly were up to the challenge. The reader is much better off for the results.

Overall, *Legal Issues in the Struggle against Terror* is an important work that should be considered an integral resource for anyone interested in the legal, ethical, and moral issues that efforts to counter terrorism raise in the twenty-first century.

ERIC YOUNG
Naval War College



Coram, Robert. *Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine*. New York: Little, Brown, 2010. 374pp. \$27.99

Victor "Brute" Krulak is a legend within the U.S. Marine Corps. That may be a cliché, but it is true. This reviewer personally witnessed this phenomenon at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, nearly four decades after Krulak left the service. While delivering a lecture at the College, I flashed a picture of Krulak on the screen. Instantly, audience members began to call out Krulak's nickname—"Brute! Brute!" The fact that Krulak's son became Commandant of the Corps only enhanced his reputation. The funny thing about Krulak's being so admired is that he never held a major combat command

as a general officer. He was brave, and he won hero medals in World War II, including the Navy Cross, but as a general during the Vietnam War he was in Hawaii instead of in country. Flag and general officers usually need to be combat leaders during a war to reach iconic status.

As a result, this biography of Krulak by Robert Coram is an all the more worthy contribution to the historical literature on the American military. Coram was trained as a journalist and has written two biographies of Air Force colonels, John Boyd and Bud Day. This background proved important, because Krulak had a powerful military intellect and could think well on how to employ military power in all three mediums, air, land, and sea.

Coram makes a strength out of a weakness when he starts the biography off in what seems a vague fashion. Krulak was a brilliant self-promoter who often distorted the historical record to bolster his reputation. This tendency included lying about his early years growing up in Wyoming. Born and raised a Jew, Krulak decided sometime after his arrival at the U.S. Naval Academy that he was an Episcopalian. He also hid the fact that he had married as a teenager. Although his deception regarding his ethnic and religious identity could be understood as a consequence of the bigotry of the time, it continued for the rest of his life. One of his biggest claims was for a wartime association with Lieutenant (junior grade) John F. Kennedy—there was none. Krulak's assignment to the Kennedy White House had nothing to do with old ties of wartime comradeship.

As Coram notes, what is important about Krulak is his military career, not

so much his personal character. With that point made, Coram—in a testament to his skills as a reporter—does a good job of letting the man's personality come through. The biography grows in strength as Krulak moves through his career. In the days before World War II he made major, truly important contributions to the development of amphibious warfare. After the war he helped develop doctrine for the use of the helicopter. In the 1960s he turned his intellect toward counterinsurgency. The section on counterinsurgency is the best part of the book, though specialists will want to see more than is there. Krulak had good ideas that are still extremely relevant. In all of this, Krulak was a constant defender of the institutional interests of the U.S. Marine Corps, including in the acrimonious debates on military unification in the late 1940s.

In short, after reading this book it is easy to see why Krulak is such an icon. Marines and others will enjoy the read.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
Naval War College



Peattie, Mark, Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven, eds. *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2010. 614 pp. \$65

The title of this book appropriately suggests a degree of ambiguity regarding the actors fighting over the territorial integrity and cultural identity of China. The interplay of imperial Japan, Nationalist and Communist Chinese, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and the United States from 1937 through 1945 creates a terrain challenging to

navigate with historical accuracy and objective truth. The conflicting viewpoints on these contentious events have proved difficult, and perhaps impossible, material from which to develop a definitive narrative. Consequently, the editors have chosen to avoid illusions of defining the “facts” of the matter, instead offering a number of exploratory essays from opposing viewpoints. In order to offer this multisource assessment, the editors coordinated the efforts of scholars from China, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.

Editors Mark Peattie (a research fellow at the Hoover Institution), Edward Drea (former chief of the Research and Analysis Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military History), and Hans van de Ven (a professor of modern Chinese history at Cambridge University) stand apart as leading authorities on the Pacific War. The other seventeen contributors range from unknown doctoral candidates to heavyweight historians like Ronald Spector. Despite the pitfalls of bringing together authors of multiple disciplinary backgrounds, varying languages, and competing cultures and ideologies, the editors have maintained a surprisingly well organized text, firmly grounded in analysis of events from the perspective of military affairs. The book is organized in six parts: the overview; opposing armies’ organization, training, and equipment; initial hostilities (1937–38); a “stalemate in strategies” (1938–42); the Burma and Ichigo campaigns (1943–45); and conclusions. Each section begins with valuable information provided by the editors, furnishing continuity between thematic essays. The essays themselves are insightful, if not groundbreaking, offering milestones for future study and

debate. One innovative and striking theme is the attention to and appreciation for the challenges facing Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT). While not excusing any failures, the authors make it easy to understand the KMT’s weak position in an agrarian society with undeveloped state organization in the face of a growing communist insurgency, tepid allied support, and a vicious campaign of destruction by an industrialized opponent. The deprivations endured and the sacrifices made by the Chinese through seven long years of the most brutal warfare does much to explain the KMT’s precarious situation at the war’s end. At the end of the book, Ronald Spector provides excellent context to these essays on the Sino-Japanese War, placing the scholarship within the framework of the Pacific War, World War II, and the history of warfare.

For military officers, I think, this book provides a number of important insights. For one, it imparts valuable lessons regarding the success of and shortcomings in the Imperial Japanese Army. At a tactical and operational level, the Sino-Japanese War validates the Japanese emphasis on offensive tactics and aggressive spirit to overcome numerical superiority of opponents—a technique proven successful in this case against the Chinese rather than the Russians, for whom the Japanese had prepared.

My only criticism of *The Battle for China* derives from the inadequacy of the maps. Those not intimate with Chinese, Japanese, and Burmese geography will find places described difficult to locate. For instance, the prominent province of Chahar in Inner Mongolia finds its name nowhere on the fourteen maps, including that given for the battle

of Pingxingguan Pass, which took place in Chahar. The Burmese map shows fewer than half the important locations discussed and no indications of the Burma Road, for which the forces were fighting. The Japanese province of Kyūshū was certainly an important place for recruiting, but one will have to look elsewhere to find its location. The political instability of the period exacerbates the situation in terms of geography. Many locations have Japanese, Chinese, and European names. For instance, the Japanese refer to Tianjin, near the city of Peking (modern-day Beijing), as Tientsin. This situation is compounded by the fact that provincial boundaries and place-names of what we now call China, especially in the north, changed frequently in the mid-twentieth century. Although the political and geographic landscapes of the Sino-Japanese War admittedly pose a challenge, the maps could have better illustrated the events described.

As I am not certain that Chinese or Japanese audiences (those most interested in this topic) will gravitate to this English work, *The Battle for China* must be presumed to target a small niche market of Sino-Japanese War military history enthusiasts in North America and Europe. To offset what may be limited interest in its subject, I feel compelled to praise in the strongest terms the efforts of Peattie, Drea, and Van de Ven in organizing, editing, translating, and publishing this important book. Without these distinguished professionals, Western students of the Pacific War would not have access to this important Chinese and Japanese research, mediated by celebrated Western scholars. *The Battle for China* is a rare treasure that will likely renew interest in an

underdeveloped field of Western scholarship. I highly recommend it to those interested in the Pacific War or greater insight into modern Chinese history.

MAJ. ROBERT BURRELL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
U.S. Special Operations Command



Mort, Terry. *The Hemingway Patrols: Ernest Hemingway and His Hunt for U-boats*. New York: Scribner's, 2009. 272pp. \$26

The Battle of the Atlantic has been thoroughly researched and exhaustively studied, especially by students attending the Naval War College. However, rarely has the epic campaign to defeat the German U-boat menace been viewed through the lens of the life and personality of one of America's greatest literary figures. In *The Hemingway Patrols*, Terry Mort offers a well researched account of this great campaign, one that reads almost like an actual Hemingway novel.

For students of military history, Mort's account of the titanic struggle between the Allied navies and German U-boats in the early months of 1942 will be somewhat familiar. It is the juxtaposition with Hemingway's decision to participate in the campaign that provides the strength of this narrative. Mort depicts Hemingway in 1942 as at the zenith of both his life and his professional career. Likewise, the German U-boat campaign would reach its zenith during this year: American shipping suffered grievous losses at the hands of only a dozen or so U-boats in the early months. Why would Hemingway, living in luxury in Cuba at the time, risk everything, with his drinking buddies, to hunt U-boats in his wooden fishing trawl

Pilar? Having studied at Princeton with Hemingway biographer Carlos Baker, Mort provides one of the most convincing explanations yet offered for Hemingway's decision to place himself in harm's way.

It would be easy simply to ascribe Hemingway's decision to that of a writer living out the life that he had illustrated in his art. Mort takes a more scholarly approach, however. One of the most interesting elements of this book is its description of the three stages through which each of Hemingway's characters pass in his novels—the stage of innocence, then suffering, and finally an existential stage, in which the hero creates meaning out of nothingness. It is certainly possible to see Hemingway himself following this trajectory. In the imaginative mind of a writer, the U-boat appeared as a multifaceted menace, not only a threat to merchant vessels but a stealthy craft that could deliver spies to the many coves and inlets of Caribbean islands like Cuba. Hunting down and attacking these modern weapons of war would require a dedicated band of ardent antifascists, the likes of whom Hemingway had consorted with in Spain in the late thirties, and whom he would lead into action again, as his small fishing vessel sought valiantly for the elusive U-boats throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Many elements of Hemingway's complex personality combined to compel him to sail *Pilar* into action, and Mort gives each of these factors due treatment.

A former naval officer himself, Mort is familiar with life at sea. The many accounts of Hemingway leading his crew on these dangerous missions benefit from Mort's having participated in

patrols in some of the same waters. In summing up this work, one phrase stands above the rest as a testament to the sweeping panorama of Mort's ambitious attempt to tie together a great naval campaign and the life of an American literary giant: "It was action and artistry combined. It was also fun, most of the time, especially when there was enough gin." Mort has provided us with a fascinating book, and students of both military and literary history will definitely want to put *The Hemingway Patrols* on their reading list.

JEFF SHAW
Naval War College



Stoker, Donald. *The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010. 498pp. \$27.95

It is difficult to imagine historical ground that has been more thoroughly mined than that of the American Civil War. Biographies, battle studies, sweeping histories, and all manner of specialized analyses dot the literary landscape. However, rather than turning away from a potentially saturated market, our collective interest in this sanguinary conflict has kept publishers and authors delivering a steady stream of material year after year after year.

It is nonetheless a brave author who claims to offer something truly original to our understanding of the war. Although some scholars may quibble over whether or not Stoker has succeeded in this effort, his *Grand Design*, a one-volume history that examines the role of strategy in the Civil War, is something of a *rara avis*. More to the point,

it is both a useful and thought-provoking addition to any library.

Surprisingly, Stoker is at his weakest when discussing just what he means by strategy. The term is admittedly somewhat slippery, and competing definitions abound. In the end, Stoker settles, by his own admission, for examining the linkage of political policy objectives and subsequent military operations.

As a result, the two most important personages in the book are Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. As political leaders of their respective sides, it was they who were responsible for setting and approving political policy and objectives. Lincoln emerges as a political leader who, having once determined the political objectives of the United States, was forced time and again to intervene in the running of the war because his generals failed to gain those objectives through military operations. In doing so, Lincoln gradually gained a distinct appreciation for the military art and sharpened his ability to see clearly which courses of action would likely produce successful results. Davis, in contrast, saw himself as the Confederacy's general in chief and would persist in that notion to the detriment of the Confederate war effort until 1865.

Stoker naturally examines the military men on the other side of the political-military equation. Perhaps no one should have expected strategically gifted senior officers to be found in the ranks of the U.S. officer corps in 1860, and Stoker confirms that such men were then lacking, with the possible exception of the aged Winfield Scott. The U.S. Army was small, its garrisons were small, and with the exception of the brief war with Mexico, its units had always been small. The only big things

about the Army were its theater of operations and the egos of some of its more famous personalities. Yet individuals with a broader expanse of vision did emerge. The best of these wore Union blue, and Stoker makes a convincing argument that the best of the best was Ulysses S. Grant, a man notable in his ability to complement the president's policies and objectives with effective military operations. Stoker argues that Grant's success was not just a question of superior resources. Grant saw beyond his theater of operations. He understood the tools available to him, and he worked in harness with his political leader. William T. Sherman is also given credit for being a general in strategic alignment with national policy and objectives. In contrast, however, Stoker reasonably judges George B. McClellan as a general with strategic insight and imagination but woefully incompetent when it came to battlefield leadership, without which strategic objectives cannot be realized.

Stoker is far from being an unabashed fan of the Union's strategists; his biggest censure on its generals' performance is that they were slow. He convincingly claims that a Union victory was possible much earlier than the spring of 1865; however, he does not regard that victory as inevitable. In contrast, he faults Confederate counterparts with never getting it right at all. His criticisms of Jefferson Davis's fixation on forward defense and the waste of trying to preserve and protect the Confederacy west of the Mississippi are well argued indeed. Stoker gives credit to Robert E. Lee for his capability to be as good as Grant but notes that he was nearly always confined to theater operations. General P. G. T. Beauregard, a

self-proclaimed Southern strategist, is simply and reasonably dismissed as a fantasist.

Given the number of bad books that have been written about the Civil War, it is a pleasure to find a good one. Stoker is a solid, competent author who makes his points in clear convincing prose. Written from a refreshing viewpoint, *The Grand Design* is a book worth reading.

RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College



McMeekin, Sean. *The Berlin–Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power, 1898–1918*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2010. 496pp. \$29.95

If ever there was a story of epic unintended consequences and “might have beens,” Sean McMeekin’s *The Berlin–Baghdad Express* is it. Approaching the First World War in the Middle East from the German and Ottoman perspectives, McMeekin expands our Anglo-centric understanding of the conflict. In doing so, he unveils a breathtaking catalogue of misunderstandings, miscalculations, simple mistakes, and missed opportunities that would be comic if not so horribly tragic.

While the title conjures images of the fabled Orient Express, the book is a first-rate history of the diplomatic jockeying of the German and Ottoman Empires to gain advantage over their respective archrivals, Britain and Russia. The railway would be a tool to enable Germany’s *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the East) while strengthening the Turks (bitter enemies of Germany’s

Russian rivals) by linking the farthest reaches of the Ottoman Empire with the seat of power in Istanbul. The completion of the railway, first to Baghdad and then extended on to Basra, would have profound political, economic, and strategic importance.

To achieve this end Germany designed a strategy to undermine the cohesion of the British Empire through Islamic holy war. That strategy was an outgrowth of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s reckless and amateurish meddling in Oriental affairs. The kaiser believed that his affinity for Sultan Abdulhamid II, Caliph of the Faithful, and for all things Islamic would enable him to engineer a jihad against the hated British, targeting the empire’s large Muslim populations in India, Egypt, and beyond. The kaiser, in league with the sultan and later the Young Turks, embarked on ambitious propaganda and military campaigns designed to rally Muslims to the sultan’s call for jihad, despite the facts that most educated Muslims had long given up the idea of the caliphate; that there was no distinction in Islamic jurisprudence or practice between a bad infidel (British, French) and good one (German, Austrian, American, or maybe Italian); that Sunni and Shia Muslims had vastly different views of jihad; and that the British had for years controlled access to Mecca for the hajj. McMeekin also points out the oddness of German support for jihad juxtaposed with the German-based Zionist movement, which actually anticipated Britain’s Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

The cast of characters includes soldiers, statesmen, adventurers, charlatans, humanitarians, and thugs from across Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, and the

Middle East. Many are familiar, such as Kaiser Wilhelm, Abdulhamid II, and T. E. Lawrence. Still more are rather obscure. Central among this group are “Baron” Max von Oppenheim, a Jewish scion of the famous banking family, and Curt Pruffer, a scholar assigned to the German embassy in Cairo. Both were Orientalists, both were devotees of Kaiser Wilhelm, and both shared the kaiser’s vision of jihad. Together they worked to foment holy war from Libya in the west through Egypt, Abyssinia, Sudan, Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, and India. After the war they emerged in the forefront of Nazi anti-Semitism and the atrocities that it produced.

A common theme found throughout the narrative is that of miscalculation born of ignorance or misunderstanding of basic historical, cultural, political, and religious truths. A prime example is Germany’s tendency to see the Muslim world as either for the Germans or against them, while missing the vast range of options in between, a problem that persists in varying degrees today. Another is the complexity of the region that breeds such miscalculations.

McMeekin’s treatment of the struggle for control of Baku in August 1918 provides a brief but illuminating example of just how complex that corner of the world can be. With British, German, Russian, Turkish, Armenian, Azeri, and other factions vying for control of the city (and its oil), fighting was not only savage but included intramural attacks upon allies. As we look at Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, and other tribal regions today, we can see that the same elements of complexity and confusion that bedeviled earlier Western strategists is ours to deal with again, and again.

Sean McMeekin is assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University, in Ankara, Turkey. His work is based on German, Turkish, Austrian, Russian, and American archives, as well as secondary sources. It is carefully researched, well documented, and presented with a lively style that combines analysis, insight, and a mix of irony and wry humor that makes the book as readable as it is informative.

COL. THOMAS E. SEAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED
Stafford, Virginia