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## Book Reviews

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### **“THE LATTER TEND ALSO TO BE THE FORMER”**

Gray, Colin S. *National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009. 334pp. \$29.95

Colin Gray’s highly engaging book addresses a spectrum of national security considerations that are likely to impact the United States in the coming years. Gray, who is a professor at the University of Reading and served for five years in the Ronald Reagan administration, argues that America’s sports-mindedness has culturally prepared Americans to think in terms of winning and losing and of confrontations that have a beginning, middle, and end. In this light, the former expression of art “Global War on Terrorism,” one that President Obama has dispensed with, leads us to overlook the eternal nature of the struggle against individual and small-group violence. Gray convincingly observes that the conflict the United States has embarked upon after September 11 “bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most people understandably call a war.”

Gray warns that although we cannot control surprise, we can control our reaction to it—a particularly important observation for the current geostrategic environment. His call for the United States to develop a “detailed, culturally

empathetic understanding of its new adversaries” is particularly apt. One is left with the task of struggling to choose which arguments should be highlighted.

Even the chapter on understanding revolutionary changes in warfare, a topic that received too much attention after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, is rewarding. Gray points out that though the term is of use, one cannot assess the true nature of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) outside the wider political, strategic, and social context. For example, Germany’s successes in May 1940 were due as much to French mistakes as to Nazi military innovation.

In addition, at a number of points throughout the book Gray makes the cogent point that the United States could easily spend too much time looking for, or attempting to create, the next RMA and put too little effort into understanding social and cultural changes in how it views war. I believe Gray coined the term “Revolution in Attitudes toward the Military” to argue that variations in acceptable military practices and the need to understand

the cultural implications of violence will be increasingly important.

I would offer two minor critiques. Gray may have set the bar too high when he argues at length that the United States suffers “a persistent strategy deficit.” Doesn’t history offer more than a handful of examples of powerful states that demonstrated superb long-range strategic planning, in particular during peacetime? I wonder if one can agree with the great majority of Gray’s individual critiques on American strategic practices and yet be skeptical that a broad-gauge indictment is warranted.

Also, when I read the brief section in which he argues that al-Qa’ida could potentially be deterred, I remained unconvinced. The facts that al-Qa’ida protects its key members and that some of the organization’s support system may be deterrable are far from demonstrating that “the organization itself . . . should be eminently deterrable.” However, these are two minor points regarding a commendable work that engages a wide array of security considerations and offers much engaging and original thinking.

As Gray notes regarding his subtitle, “the latter tend also to be the former.” Colin Gray’s work offers many important arguments and observations that will help identify both.

ANDREW L. STIGLER  
*Naval War College*



Stuart, Douglas T. *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008. 342pp. \$38.50

Douglas Stuart holds the J. William Stuart and Helen D. Stuart Chair in International Studies, Business and Management at Dickinson College and is an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army War College. He provides an insightful history of the struggle to reform completely the U.S. national security establishment from 1937 to 1960, an effort that resulted in the creation of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and three separate armed service departments under a secretary of defense.

This extensively researched study of the political and bureaucratic battles to establish control over the national security establishment holds invaluable lessons for those interested in the current efforts to reform the joint, inter-agency system to better develop, resource, and execute a coherent national security policy and strategy.

Prior to World War II, Edward Pendleton Herring of Harvard identified problems with the existing foreign and defense policy-making system. The United States was wedded to isolationism and antimilitarism, with narrow domestic political interests that shaped its foreign and defense policies. Pendleton Herring introduced the “concept of national security” and was visionary in proposing an alternative national security system. Pearl Harbor quickly changed the way Americans thought about security. The fact that the United States was attacked from such distance firmly “established the concept of national security as an unchallengeable standard against which all future foreign policy decisions were to be made.”

Stuart describes the significant roles played by presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower; secretaries of state George Marshall and Dean Acheson; Secretary of Defense James Forrestal; Congressman Carl Vinson; policy adviser Ferdinand Eberstadt; and Pendleton Herring. He explains how national security was managed during the war, how the Joint Chiefs' power grew, the marginalization of the State Department, and the lessons learned. There is also a discussion of the unsuccessful efforts made by Truman, Marshall, and the Army leadership to unify the services. Forrestal and the Navy opposed unification, proposing an alternative national security system developed by the Unification Study Group, chaired by Eberstadt, with Pendleton Herring's participation. The bureaucratic battles lasted over three years and resulted in the 1947 National Security Act, which created a National Military Establishment, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, secretary of defense, Air Force, and three other institutions that soon disappeared. Stuart identifies this system's severe flaws, especially the limited powers granted to the secretary of defense and the statutory membership of the three services in the NSC with the secretary of defense. In 1949, 1958, and with Eisenhower's reorganization plan of 1953, these flaws were rectified. There follows a discussion of the reasons for this final transition from a National Military Establishment to a Department of Defense and the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the three services removed from the NSC, becoming now departments under the defense secretary. Stuart's lucid analysis of

lessons learned is a must-read for future reform efforts.

RICHMOND M. LLOYD  
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Tangredi, Sam J. *Futures of War: Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2010–2035*. Newport, R.I.: Alidade, 2008. 273pp. \$20

What Sam Tangredi offers here is not a standard attempt at predicting the near future of warfare but rather a synthesis of various competing predictions and analyses.

The book is a follow-up to his earlier book *All Possible Wars* (2004), the object of which was to inform political decision making in the realm of defense planning. One hopes that this latest effort does not follow the fate of its predecessor, which Tangredi freely admits remained largely ignored by its target audience.

A “reinvestigation and rewrite rather than a revision,” the work has as its explicitly stated purpose “to provide—not an independent forecast—but a comparative analysis of current studies of the future security environment in order to support upcoming reviews of America’s defense posture.”

Methodologically speaking, the work is comprehensive, drawing from forty different studies. Each study is rigorously surveyed, analyzed, and compared with others for points of agreement and dissent. Points of consensus and divergence are tested against the sources to distinguish dissenting positions from points of consensus and to validate consensus as a majority view.

This methodology, “Representative Source Comparative Analysis” (RSCA), identifies threats, conflicts, and drivers, the latter incorporating ideologies, economic factors, and technology. The sources are, like this study, authoritative.

Chapter 5 contains the bulk of the work by identifying “common assessments and consensus.” Dividing the analysis into categories of threats, military technology, and opposing strategies, which are then subdivided into eighteen subscenarios, Tangredi makes an effective comprehensive and succinct examination of the literature to provide a review of the various studies in each case, explaining what arises in consensus and in opposition.

The intention of chapter 6, “Divergence and Contradictions,” is to capture the essence of basic divergent views and examines ten “either-or” propositions. In this instance, these are broken into various category headings, such as nature of conflict (which replaces military technology), threats, and opposing strategies. The chapter is simple, clear, to the point, and—although the substance is more complicated than the author represents it to be—credible.

In chapter 7, “Wild Cards and Hedging Scenarios,” touching on the bane of defense planners everywhere, the book inevitably loses some of its certainty—a point not lost on Tangredi. Yet he cleverly utilizes the “wild card” and the “hedging scenario” to provide a conceptual overlay that, he argues, enables the assessment of an adopted defense policy’s flexibility and baseline assumptions.

One caveat is, naturally, that in dealing with this subject, what was once the

future quickly becomes the past. This is the case, for example, regarding wild-card scenarios, where a global economic collapse is discussed. This has arguably happened since publication.

*Futures of War* is certainly worthy of the attention of U.S. defense policy makers, but it is impossible to know if this work will follow its predecessor and be ignored as well.

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Graham, Gordon. *Ethics and International Relations*. 2nd ed. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. 223pp. \$21.95

In today’s world, citizens, statesmen, and men and women in uniform are faced almost daily with real questions about terrorism, torture, humanitarian intervention, and foreign assistance. They must return again and again to the problem of determining when the use of military force might be an appropriate response to the horrors of the day. For these individuals Gordon Graham’s *Ethics and International Relations* is an invaluable work. It is stimulating, challenging, insightful, and, perhaps most unusually, helpful. Not by any stretch of the imagination is this a “how-to” book, with explicit guidance or facile answers. Rather, it represents an understanding of the contending logics that lead to competing conclusions about right or wrong action, or nonaction, on the global stage.

Graham, a distinguished philosopher now holding the Henry Luce III Chair at the Princeton Theological Seminary,

updates and expands here his original 1997 publication, tackling issues that have emerged in the last decade. This revised work retains the extraordinary merits of the earlier. The author brings wonderful clarity of logic and presentation to what, in other hands, is often a confused mess of unconnected arguments, claims, counterarguments, and counterclaims. Graham offers his presentation without disparaging or giving short shrift to anyone, exploring realist, various moralist, and what he terms “Legalist” traditions of international ethics, the assumptions and reasoning built into them, the criticisms that have been leveled against them, and possible responses to these criticisms.

Graham himself is neither, on the one hand, utopian nor, on the other hand, dismissive of ethical concerns. In the “Legalist” tradition, Graham stresses the moral disanalogies between states and individuals (a difference that “Moralist” approaches often regard as unimportant), argues the need to consider both natural law and the law of nations in wrestling with international ethics, and uses the just-war theory as a logical starting place for consideration of other interventions. Graham is candid and thoughtful about the problems of such an approach, as well as about the strengths of alternatives.

While this volume is a tightly integrated whole, it is organized into what are essentially eight separate, carefully organized, and self-contained twenty-five-page lectures. Beginning with the rise of the state system and of the nation-state, Graham investigates the ethical assumptions built into this political framework and the challenges inherent in such an organization of political life. He explores just-war theory and

considers the ethical problems associated with weapons of mass destruction before turning to the issues that have increasingly dominated the international agenda of the post–Cold War period.

Among the joys of this wonderfully erudite but never overwhelming or condescending volume is Graham’s capacity to explain, without going off on tangents, many of the concepts and distinctions—from the differences between power and authority and between force and violence to the logic of the principle of double effect—that, left unexplained, befuddle so many analyses and discussions.

Readers are likely to realize many “aha!” moments as all sorts of nonsensical arguments suddenly make sense. Surprisingly, given the weightiness of the topic, this is a book that is difficult to put down and an important book to pick up.

EDWARD RHODES  
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Kets de Vries, Manfred F. R. *Reflections on Character and Leadership: On the Couch with Manfred Kets de Vries*. New York: Wiley, 2009. 332pp. \$29.95

*Reflections on Character and Leadership* is not your typical book on leadership. It delves into aspects that are often neglected in both the classroom and professional press. How often do we focus on the leader who is dysfunctional and on what drives the destructiveness?

This is what Manfred Kets de Vries has set out to do. An engaging writer and scholar with a penchant for practical workplace applications, Kets de Vries

has taught at Harvard and is currently the Clinical Professor of Leadership at INSEAD in Paris, one of the world's leading and largest business schools. His background in economics, psychoanalysis, and organization research gives a holistic perspective to the material, including his recommendations for intervention.

The author opens by describing troubled entrepreneurs and analyzing the psychology of dysfunctional leaders. The examples are vivid and instructive. As individuals gain recognition, authority, and power, eventually they arrive at a fork in the road. One path commits them to serve for the greater good, while the other leads down the dark lane of hubris and malevolence. Kets de Vries then discusses how this choice can affect organizations and proposes possible remedial actions.

One reason the "dark side" of leadership is underrepresented in literature is that the genesis of a pathology is not readily assessable. Research cannot directly validate the developmental or emotional voids that lead to paradoxical behavior in the executive ranks. Unfortunately, organizations often reward personality defects and encourage the wrong role models. For example, while charismatic aggressiveness is often viewed as a positive leadership trait, it can also be compensatory cover for insecurity or paranoia, for which the organization will pay a price.

Kets de Vries draws on his clinical and psychoanalytic research to identify these pathologies and their consequences, which are frequently substantial. Arrogance, power, and a tendency to distort reality can result in oppressive micromanagement, a toxic

workplace, and insidiously faulty decisions. In this day and age, we do not have to look far to find examples.

When confronted with pathological leadership, followers have three options: flight, fight, or dependency. The author discusses the strong symbiotic dynamics between a corrosive leader and dependent followers. Subconscious identification with such a leader gives followers the illusion of control, protection, and purpose. It is a regressive way for followers to cope with anxiety and fear, and it is fertile ground for ideological manipulation.

The book concludes with a discussion of transformational leadership and the challenges confronting global organizations. Here Kets de Vries brings to bear his international leadership-forum experience, stressing the necessity of interpersonal and cultural acumen and of appropriate organizational structures. This section contains an intriguing analysis of how Russian leadership behavior and thinking has been influenced by that nation's unique culture.

*Reflections on Character and Leadership* is the first of a planned three-volume series. It suffers from a few irritants that haunt collected works, such as dated material, repetition, and unevenness. However, the convenience and enjoyment of reading a range of material from this influential and gifted writer more than compensate for any transgressions.

HANK KNISKERN  
*Naval War College*





Tenet, George. *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. 549pp. \$30

George Tenet's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was marked throughout by controversy, so it is no surprise that his memoirs face more of the same. Partisans will never be satisfied; policy and national security insiders, regardless of their depth on the inside, will find areas with which to disagree; historians will decry the lack of citations; and individuals who helped to create some of that history will be glad for that lack.

Yet for readers not looking for confirmation of their prejudices, *At the Center of the Storm* will provide an engrossing narrative of a critical time in U.S. history. This much cannot be contested: George Tenet was a key player during a period that reshaped this nation. Was he the best possible choice? Some will argue that he was not, while others who look back at the history of the CIA during the 1980s and 1990s will be grateful for his tenure.

*At the Center of the Storm* is above all a story of love and passion, for Tenet is not a cold chronicler who hides his emotions behind a detached, simple narrative of events. As Virgil writes, "I sing of arms and the man," so does Tenet. Just as his love for his country and for his family shines throughout this work, so does his love for the CIA and its officers. This book reads as a first-person history should. It is engrossing and fascinating, with the personal view of "this is what we were trying to do."

Tenet's strengths were as a leader and visionary, strengths that civilian agencies, unlike the military, rarely have the pleasure to experience. Tenet took over the agency during a time of demoralization and became its greatest champion, cheerleader, and advocate. If he was not as successful within the larger intelligence community, it was not for lack of effort.

Tenet's appointment showed both the advantages and disadvantages of having an intelligence outsider at the helm of the CIA. As an outsider, he was willing to challenge the old ways of doing things that any bureaucracy develops over time. Changing from a Cold War world to a multipolar world required a new perspective to meet new threats and challenges. But outsiders cannot always recognize the nuances of the intelligence craft (whether operational or analytic) and risk losing the balance necessary for producing good intelligence. The reader can decide where events like the now-infamous "slam-dunk" incident belong.

Decades from now, historians likely with no better knowledge than we have will write an objective account of DCI George Tenet. If there is a degree of justice in the world, Tenet will be rightfully acknowledged as one of the greatest DCIs in history. If these historians are faithful to their craft, however, they will also point out that George Tenet, like all great men, had an element of hubris that in the end tarnished his record.

JOHN R. ARPIN  
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Huchthausen, Peter A., and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix. *Hide and Seek: The Untold Story of Cold War Naval Espionage*. New York: Wiley, 2009. 414pp. \$30

Contrary to the popular notions of spying as conveyed in novels and films, espionage is a difficult and frequently dangerous business. Although everyone does it, some nations are just better at it. In this work, Peter A. Huchthausen and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix offer a series of accounts of naval espionage after World War II.

While this reviewer cannot attest to the bona fides of Sheldon-Duplaix, I do know that Huchthausen was the consummate insider in naval intelligence, having had a diverse career during which he always seemed to be in the middle of the action. His specialty was in human-source intelligence, with a primary focus on the Soviet Union and its navy. Sadly, Peter died in July 2008, before the formal release of this book, so it seems somewhat unfair to critique his work.

To be of value to other than casual readers, a book on Cold War naval espionage should first describe the national security context to explain why these intelligence activities were undertaken in the first place and what bits of knowledge were so important that they required such great risk. Second, it should ask, what did naval espionage do to obtain the information, and what contributions did naval intelligence offer to the problem? What did naval intelligence add to the body of knowledge? Against this paradigm, *Hide and Seek* falls short of the mark.

The early chapters provide an interesting account of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to obtain German technology immediately after World War II. The authors go on to discuss the early stages of the Cold War, culminating with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Although there are numerous references to archival historical material, books, and personal correspondence, Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix largely rely on anecdotes (we call them “sea stories” in the Navy), loosely strung together, and offer few conclusions. For example, one is left wondering why the Royal Navy would risk the life of the World War II hero, frogman, and MI6 diver Lionel Crabb in a seemingly failed effort to conduct underhull reconnaissance of an aging Soviet warship.

While some insights are provided into naval intelligence activities during the Cold War, especially the Cuban missile crisis, no description is offered of the enormous contributions of naval intelligence and its operations to the redefinition of the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy in the 1980s, which focused on holding at risk the Soviet ballistic-missile submarine force.

Extensively covered is Project JENNIFER, the joint CIA-Navy venture to recover the lost Soviet Golf II ballistic-missile submarine from the depths of the northern Pacific Ocean in 1974. The authors’ unique contribution is a lengthy description of the efforts taken by the United States to provide the lost Soviet submariners dignified burials at sea when the submarine was recovered—an event that was videotaped and years later handed over to the Russians.

Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix also examine a number of counterintelligence issues, such as the 1961 Christine Keeler affair in Britain and, more important, the treason of John Walker, who spied for the Soviets from 1967 to the mid-1980s and whom the authors describe as “one of the greatest espionage successes in history.”

Two concluding chapters introduce orthogonal themes, such as the 1980s Soviet operations that culminated in the “Whiskey on the Rocks” (a euphemism for the grounding of a Soviet submarine in Swedish territorial waters) and a bizarre account of how UFOs might have altered the strategic balance during the Cold War.

Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix offer an interesting and entertaining read, one that shows that U.S. naval attachés at times work in difficult and dangerous circumstances. However, because of its excessive use of anecdotes, this book does not add much to the body of knowledge about naval espionage—neither that of the United States, of the Soviets, or of anyone else.

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Rhys-Jones, Graham. *Churchill and the Norway Campaign*. South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and Sword, 2008. 223pp. \$33

“The principle of aiming everything at the enemy’s center of gravity admits of only one exception—that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally rewarding.” This classic dictum, given to us by the great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, provides the impetus

behind this book. Originally conceived as a case study for inclusion in the Strategy and Policy curriculum at the U.S. Naval War College, this historical work covers the operations in Norway during the spring of 1940, one of the most overlooked campaigns of the Second World War. The reader is presented with a complete account, in a fast-moving and easy format, of the strategic decision making that eventually led both Great Britain and France, on the one side, and Germany, on the other, to conclude that opening a new theater in Norway could in fact be “exceptionally rewarding.”

While Churchill figures prominently in the book’s title, the reader will find examined not only his policy decisions and strategic ideas discussed at length but also the actions and decisions of numerous other participants in the governments of the major belligerents. Most studies concerning the war in the West in 1940 focus on the French military’s epic defeat, but Rhys-Jones offers an account of French participation in the war as Great Britain’s strategic partner. The strategic partnership between the Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier governments in the spring of 1940 is a subject that usually does not get much attention, but an interesting account of that short-lived alliance can be found in this book.

Rhys-Jones, a former member of the Naval War College faculty, presents his analysis in a manner that both students and faculty at the college will find familiar. He begins at the policy level, focusing on the benefits and drawbacks that each major participant concludes are relevant to undertaking operations in what was considered a secondary theater. He then outlines each belligerent’s

strategy before presenting a thorough examination of operations and tactical considerations for both land and maritime forces involved in the campaign. The outcome in Norway was never a foregone conclusion. Germany's tactical prowess and brilliant leadership at the small-unit level are conveyed nicely, leaving the reader to actually wonder throughout the narrative whether the Germans can pull off such a bold and daring feat of arms.

It is a tribute to Rhys-Jones's authoritative approach to the subject matter and his fine writing style that he has created such a useful study of the elements—the matching of strategy and policy, the conduct of joint operations, and the wisdom of opening a new theater—while at the same time telling a riveting story.

Any student of grand strategy, as well as the casual reader, will find plenty of value in this well written historical narrative. If there is a waiting list of books to be included into the curriculum at the Naval War College, this book should top the list.

JEFF SHAW  
*Naval War College*



Kuehn, John T. *Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008. 296pp. \$32.95

Skeptics of disarmament treaties, such as Richard Pearl, have long argued that these treaties make a nation weaker by depriving it of the means of self-defense. John Kuehn, former naval aviator and presently professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is far more subtle in this excellent book. He shows how the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 froze battleship construction and yet made the U.S. Navy stronger by 1941. While it is never easy to prove something so counterintuitive, Kuehn does it hands down.

How did this happen? First, by freezing the building of battleships the treaty drove the Navy to invest more time, money, and imagination into other projects, particularly submarines and aircraft carriers. These ships had greater potential than the battleship, which had just about reached its maximum technology by the end of World War I. In addition, by preventing the United States from enhancing its base fortifications west of Hawaii, the treaty drove the Navy to design new vessels of much greater operational radius, build floating dry docks, and enhance its total transport capabilities. By World War II, the U.S. Navy could do the seemingly impossible: beat a peer competitor in the western Pacific without permanent bases in the area of operations.

One wonders why the Japanese did not take advantage of the constraints imposed by U.S. arms limitations. Kuehn offers a convincing explanation, by focusing on the General Board of the U.S. Navy. Whereas the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy were hierarchal and faction ridden, the U.S. General Board was collegial, collaborative, and remarkably open to new ideas from all branches of the service, virtually irrespective of rank. Both the British and the Japanese fell far behind in antisubmarine warfare. The Japanese stuck to their Mahanian dogma of decisive naval battle conducted by large battleships.

The Americans, meanwhile, built a more balanced fleet, able to starve Japan of supplies as well as defeat its forces on land, in the air, and beneath the sea.

When Kuehn writes of being collegial and collaborative, this reviewer thought of a perpetuation of the status quo, since I was of the opinion that military innovation is only the by-product of egotistic individuals who are unable get along with their fellow officers. Billy Mitchell, J. F. C. Fuller, George Patton, and Pete Ellis readily come to mind. Kuehn points out yet another irony as well—that the U.S. Navy of the 1920s thrived because of financial constraints. All naval officers with pulses and open eyes could see that they could no longer rely on their navy's simply being bigger than its prospective opponents. Hence the institution entertained all serious ideas of reform, so that the rebels, so to speak, became the norm.

Although this is an excellent book, it is not perfect. The discussion of flying-deck cruisers (a model never put into production) is too long. Chapter 8, however, which compares innovation or lack of it in the navies of Britain, Japan, and Germany, is about the best writing I have seen on military development in the interwar years.

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Kozak, Warren. *LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2009. 434pp. \$27.95

Warren Kozak captures the true essence of General Curtis LeMay. Like many great leaders, LeMay was a paradox, a vivid contrast of unique strengths and debilitating weaknesses. He was insecure, afraid of failure, always questioning his own decisions. LeMay hid his insecurities beneath a stern and gruff demeanor that gave the impression of confidence and strength. The antithesis of the stereotypical dashing American flyboy, “LeMay was dark, brooding, and forbidding. He rarely smiled, he spoke even less, and when he did, his words came out in a snarl.”

Always seeking to learn as much as he could, LeMay not only flew airplanes but took time to service and repair them alongside his maintenance crew. He made himself the best navigator in the U.S. Army Air Corps. For example, he successfully located the USS *Utah* in a 120,000-square-mile area of the Pacific, and he found the Italian ocean liner SS *Rex* in a large Atlantic storm. As the United States entered World War II LeMay commanded the 305th Bomber Group, which began with only three aircraft to train thirty-five crews. He was a stern disciplinarian who demanded excellence.

LeMay was always able to cut to the heart of the matter. He devised radically new tactics that improved bombing accuracy and reduced aircraft losses. To build trust and confidence within his crew, he led the missions himself. His success was noticed, and as Generals Hap Arnold's and Ira Eaker's “fireman” he was given the toughest challenges to overcome.

Kozak goes on to describe LeMay's development of Strategic Air Command (SAC), which supported his long-held

vision that the best way to avoid war was through strength and readiness, as reflected in SAC's motto: "Peace Is Our Profession." LeMay felt he was one of the few people who understood that the United States was at war with the Soviet Union and that the only way SAC could provide the security that the nation needed was to be prepared to go to nuclear war at a moment's notice. Everything he did was focused on that objective.

After relinquishing command at SAC, LeMay served as the U.S. Air Force's vice chief of staff and then chief of staff during the Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations. In the later years, LeMay worked for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who, ironically, had once worked for LeMay as a targeting analyst. The relationship between these two men was often confrontational, but despite their differences McNamara called LeMay "the finest military strategist this nation ever produced."

The last major chapter in LeMay's life is the one probably best remembered and yet least reflective of LeMay's internal values. LeMay's decision to run for vice president on the Independent ticket with Alabama's Governor George Wallace confounded everyone, including his own wife, daughter, and closest associates. Kozak maintains there is no evidence of LeMay being a racist and maintains that the only reason he chose to run was to split the vote, ensuring that Democratic presidential candidate, Hubert Humphrey, would not win the election and so continue the policies of the Johnson administration. By running, LeMay believed, he was taking "one last chance to rise up and do battle" against the "defense intellectuals,"

whom he believed would cut the U.S. deterrent until the Soviets could win a general war.

This book's greatest value might be that it offers an opportunity to consider objectively the impact that Curtis E. LeMay (the youngest general in modern American history and its longest serving) had on the events that shaped this nation for many years to come.

ROGER DUCEY  
*Naval War College*



Willmott, H. P. *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War*. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2008. 520pp. \$17.60

*The Great Crusade* is a comprehensive military history of World War II. With a focus on strategic-level military operations and a global perspective, this work provides a particularly complete and nationally balanced account of the war. H. P. Willmott achieves his ambitious goal of providing "a basic reference and guide to the war" that offers balance among the major fronts of the conflict and illuminates "why events unfolded in the manner in which they did."

*The Great Crusade* discusses conflict between countries and systems, not between leaders or equipment. It is about "how states make war and the basis on which services planned, executed and either won or lost campaigns." Willmott distinguishes between the use of available forces by military commanders to win campaigns and the use of national power to win wars. National and international political factors, beginning in 1931, get the attention they deserve. How and why countries joined and left the conflict (including the

lesser Axis members) is presented in context but without excess sympathy. The ideology and associated atrocities of Germany and Japan strengthened morale at home and intimidated some, but brutality prevented any prospect of willing economic or military support from conquered areas, particularly China and the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union. The failure of the German and Japanese governments to mobilize their economies effectively when at war contrasts with efforts by the key Allied powers.

Willmott argues convincingly against numerous popular ideas concerning the war. He attacks the “myth of German military excellence,” offering numerous examples of error and failure in military efforts and in related economic and political activities. He highlights the paramount importance of the Russian front, covering the enormous scale of combat and the tremendous improvement in Soviet military strategic and operational skill.

This work is rich with comparisons between campaigns, strategies, and countries, and it covers land, sea, and air operations with good balance. Numerous statistics illustrate key ideas and strengthen the historical narrative. Dozens of maps help illustrate key campaigns. Also, the general index is useful. Corrections to page numbers in the “Campaign Index” planned for the second printing will make this book invaluable. The bibliography organizes suggestions into fourteen categories that reflect regions or themes in a way that may compensate for the absence of citations.

Willmott’s impressive credentials include faculty experience at several universities and at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He has written

nineteen books and coauthored several others. He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

Because this work is “a general overview of military events” with some emphasis on correcting popular misunderstandings, it offers a great deal to readers at every level of expertise. This sweeping history provides the reader with great insights into World War II in particular but also into enduring issues, including relationships between military, political, and economic power.

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Barritt, M. K. *Eyes of the Admiralty: J. T. Serres—  
an Artist in the Channel Fleet, 1799–1800*. London: Hydrographic Office and National Maritime Museum, 2008. 144pp. \$39.95

For centuries, the port of Brest in northwestern France has been the chief naval base and dockyard for French naval operations in the North Atlantic and the Channel. For Britain, during the Napoleonic Wars—as well as in all the maritime wars between Britain and France in 1689 and 1815—the French Brest squadron was a central threat to the Royal Navy. British naval strategy to counter this threat had a number of elements. The Royal Navy’s Channel Squadron had, as a primary duty, the blockade of Brest. These operations served the strategic function of deterring the Brest squadron from leaving port and, thereby, of preventing it from launching an invasion force against Britain or its overseas possessions, attacking the British fleet, or interfering with British warships and merchant convoys that were using the nearby



sea-lanes en route to various other parts of the world. Given the central importance of dealing with the French naval threat, British naval activities off Brest are important in naval history and, not surprisingly, they feature too in the widely read historical naval novels that are set in the period of the naval wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

This volume is about a British naval intelligence operation off Brest in 1799–1800. The story begins at a critical moment. The Second Coalition against France had just been formed in June 1799, and in December Napoleon was making his way back from Egypt to overthrow the Directory and to make himself First Consul. In London, halfway between those events in September 1799, the First Secretary of the Admiralty, Evan Nepean, found that nothing available in any government office in London provided a detailed visual image of Brest that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord St. Vincent, could use to understand the operational challenges or opportunities that the port presented. To fill this gap in British naval intelligence, Nepean ordered John Thomas Serres to report immediately to a frigate with the inshore squadron on blockading duty to paint a series of views of Brest and the nearby coast of Brittany.

John Thomas Serres (1759–1825) was the son of Dominic Serres (1719–93), a French merchant seaman, who had been captured in 1748 and brought to England. Making his hobby of drawing and painting into a lucrative new career, the elder Serres had become one of the founders of the Royal Society of Art. His evocative and highly accurate depictions of naval battles during the War of the American Revolution had brought him wide praise and, at the

very end of his life, in 1791, the title of Marine Painter to King George III. On his death two years later, his son, John Thomas Serres, who was already Master Draughtsman to the Admiralty, inherited his father's position.

Serres's beautiful and informative sketches and paintings from this important mission have lain long unnoticed by naval historians at the archives of Britain's Hydrographic Office in Taunton, Devon. Captain Michael K. Barritt, Royal Navy (retired), has now brought them to light in a beautifully produced volume that is accompanied by Barritt's well researched, skillfully written, and informative history of Serres's mission. Barritt first came to learn of this material when in 2003 he retired after thirty-three years of naval service, having risen to become Hydrographer of the Royal Navy. Fascinated by a framed image from this series that he received as a retirement gift, he set out on a research quest to understand more about it. This book is the result of that research, which is informed by his naval career and professional hydrographic expertise as well as by his undergraduate education in history under Piers Mackesy at Pembroke College, Oxford. The story that Barritt tells in this volume is a valuable contribution to naval history, one that directly complements the documents in the Navy Records Society's volume edited by Roger Morriss, *The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of Brest, 1793–1801* (vol. 141, 2001). At the same time, Barritt describes in this beautifully illustrated volume a naval mission that is full of action and interest for both the general reader and the naval professional.

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