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Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America

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the cultural implications of violence will be increasingly important.

I would offer two minor critiques. Gray may have set the bar too high when he argues at length that the United States suffers “a persistent strategy deficit.” Doesn’t history offer more than a handful of examples of powerful states that demonstrated superb long-range strategic planning, in particular during peacetime? I wonder if one can agree with the great majority of Gray’s individual critiques on American strategic practices and yet be skeptical that a broad-gauge indictment is warranted.

Also, when I read the brief section in which he argues that al-Qa’ida could potentially be deterred, I remained unconvinced. The facts that al-Qa’ida protects its key members and that some of the organization’s support system may be deterrable are far from demonstrating that “the organization itself . . . should be eminently deterrable.” However, these are two minor points regarding a commendable work that engages a wide array of security considerations and offers much engaging and original thinking.

As Gray notes regarding his subtitle, “the latter tend also to be the former.” Colin Gray’s work offers many important arguments and observations that will help identify both.

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Stuart, Douglas T. *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008. 342pp. \$38.50

Douglas Stuart holds the J. William Stuart and Helen D. Stuart Chair in International Studies, Business and Management at Dickinson College and is an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army War College. He provides an insightful history of the struggle to reform completely the U.S. national security establishment from 1937 to 1960, an effort that resulted in the creation of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and three separate armed service departments under a secretary of defense.

This extensively researched study of the political and bureaucratic battles to establish control over the national security establishment holds invaluable lessons for those interested in the current efforts to reform the joint, inter-agency system to better develop, resource, and execute a coherent national security policy and strategy.

Prior to World War II, Edward Pendleton Herring of Harvard identified problems with the existing foreign and defense policy-making system. The United States was wedded to isolationism and antimilitarism, with narrow domestic political interests that shaped its foreign and defense policies.

Pendleton Herring introduced the “concept of national security” and was visionary in proposing an alternative national security system. Pearl Harbor quickly changed the way Americans thought about security. The fact that the United States was attacked from such distance firmly “established the concept of national security as an unchallengeable standard against which all future foreign policy decisions were to be made.”

Stuart describes the significant roles played by presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower; secretaries of state George Marshall and Dean Acheson; Secretary of Defense James Forrestal; Congressman Carl Vinson; policy adviser Ferdinand Eberstadt; and Pendleton Herring. He explains how national security was managed during the war, how the Joint Chiefs' power grew, the marginalization of the State Department, and the lessons learned. There is also a discussion of the unsuccessful efforts made by Truman, Marshall, and the Army leadership to unify the services. Forrestal and the Navy opposed unification, proposing an alternative national security system developed by the Unification Study Group, chaired by Eberstadt, with Pendleton Herring's participation. The bureaucratic battles lasted over three years and resulted in the 1947 National Security Act, which created a National Military Establishment, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, secretary of defense, Air Force, and three other institutions that soon disappeared. Stuart identifies this system's severe flaws, especially the limited powers granted to the secretary of defense and the statutory membership of the three services in the NSC with the secretary of defense. In 1949, 1958, and with Eisenhower's reorganization plan of 1953, these flaws were rectified. There follows a discussion of the reasons for this final transition from a National Military Establishment to a Department of Defense and the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the three services removed from the NSC, becoming now departments under the defense secretary. Stuart's lucid analysis of

lessons learned is a must-read for future reform efforts.

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Tangredi, Sam J. *Futures of War: Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2010–2035*. Newport, R.I.: Alidade, 2008. 273pp. \$20

What Sam Tangredi offers here is not a standard attempt at predicting the near future of warfare but rather a synthesis of various competing predictions and analyses.

The book is a follow-up to his earlier book *All Possible Wars* (2004), the object of which was to inform political decision making in the realm of defense planning. One hopes that this latest effort does not follow the fate of its predecessor, which Tangredi freely admits remained largely ignored by its target audience.

A “reinvestigation and rewrite rather than a revision,” the work has as its explicitly stated purpose “to provide—not an independent forecast—but a comparative analysis of current studies of the future security environment in order to support upcoming reviews of America’s defense posture.”

Methodologically speaking, the work is comprehensive, drawing from forty different studies. Each study is rigorously surveyed, analyzed, and compared with others for points of agreement and dissention. Points of consensus and divergence are tested against the sources to distinguish dissenting positions from points of consensus and to validate consensus as a majority view.