Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush

James P. Terry

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/15
systems, each a precision-guided weapon project and a mission-planning system.

The book’s foremost merit is its sober analysis, grounded in business economics. Each case covers technological, economic, and operational trade-offs and frames each project within a relevant and timely international business context. For example, Hasik’s space-system case emphasizes the competencies and alliances of the few firms competing in the satellite business. He explores the credible competition for the Space-Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS Low) satellite contract by the five-hundred-employee Spectrum Astro Corporation against the established and significantly larger firm TRW Inc. Hasik’s land-vehicle case demonstrates how the DoD benefited from decades of prior research and development in South Africa on blast-resistant vehicle design, greatly accelerating the Army’s and Marine Corps’s adaptations for our current wars. As a bonus, Hasik adroitly presents the academically rigorous clearly, and for a reader accustomed to plowing through the arcane prose of technical reports and academic papers, this is no small gift.

The Department of Defense is constantly looking for innovative technologies through its service labs and several science and technology development programs. The enduring challenge is in managing the underlying risk and in the integration into a complex system-of-systems life cycle amid competing priorities, operational commitments, and assessments of the future strategic environment. Although this book could be more comprehensive, it need not be. Through his case-study selection and opening and closing synthesizing chapters, Hasik provides a cogent and instructive assessment of innovative technology development and procurement approaches across defense system sectors. *Arms and Innovation* suggests opportunities for more nimble defense systems innovation in the future, opportunities that do not require comprehensive acquisition reforms or reiterations of revolutions in military affairs.

DAVID FOSTER
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
China Lake, California


John Yoo’s most recent book is far more than a defense of the George W. Bush administration, which he served, as some of his many critics may find it. In fact, *Crisis and Command* is a carefully documented study of the exercise of presidential power from George Washington to President Obama. This is the last book in a trilogy by Yoo, the first two being *The Powers of War and Peace* (2005), which explains the founders’ original understanding of the foreign-affairs power within the Constitution, and *War by Other Means* (2006), which discusses the law and logic behind the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies. This study extends well beyond the Bush administration, focusing mainly on Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. In each of these respected leaders Yoo finds bold presidents who changed the existing political order and transformed it into...
their own. They found distinction by leading the nation through crises, carefully shaping the direction of national security policy and recasting the boundaries of presidential authority. Through careful historical analysis, Yoo reminds us that the relationship between presidential greatness and the exercise of executive power is an inextricable link that has always taken advantage of the vague contours of Article II of the Constitution, which addresses executive authority. In his historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces the founders’ work at the Constitutional Convention to accommodate the executive’s energy and decisiveness within a workable constitutional framework.

In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and addressing the Indian uprisings of 1789–90, the first U.S. president believed that Congress having created a military, he had the authority to decide when and how to use it. In the latter case, Washington sought no authority from Congress when he directed an attack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians 150 miles within their territory. Similarly, in the Prize Cases, President Lincoln concluded, and the Supreme Court agreed, that after hostile acts are directed against this nation the president is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any legislative authority. President Roosevelt went even farther prior to the Second World War by taking action to assist Britain through the Lend-Lease program and to isolate Japan from critical resources without congressional approval or consultation, actions that clearly provoked Japan and drew the United States ever closer to war.

A later section in the book reflects the application of this lengthy historical analysis to the current administration and to the response of the Bush administration to 9/11. Yoo points out that President Bush looked to former presidents for support of his actions. He states succinctly that “Congress simply does not have the ability to make effective, long-term national security decisions because of the difficulty in organizing 535 legislators and the political incentives that drive them toward short-term, risk-averse thinking.”

In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on President Obama’s early determination to close the detention facility at Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA’s special authority to question terrorists, and to suspend military commissions in the middle of the trials of al-Qa’ida leaders for war crimes. Describing the new president’s law enforcement approach to terrorist violence, he asks whether this approach, although popular with his liberal supporters, can be successful. He suggests that the new president may be learning to “draw on the mainspring of Presidential power as deeply as his greatest predecessors.”

COL. JAMES P. TERRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED
Chairman, Veterans Affairs
Washington, D.C.


Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe have attempted to provide a narrative of the U.S. Army from the end of the Vietnam War through the present wars